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PLATFORM COMPETITION AND ‘FAILURE’ IN THE STANDARDIZATION PARADIGM

PIETER BALLON VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL

Richard Hawkins

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

This paper explores the question: “What is the relationship between standards and business models?” and illustrates the conceptual linkage with reference to developments in the mobile communications industry. The short case studies of Mobile-ICT illustrate that regardless of institutional orientation or process, the most important standardization strategy for equipment and service providers is to create platforms that are open to the development of complementary products and services while at the same time preserving the proprietary edge necessary to ensure lock-in effects. Both cases yield strong reasons to doubt whether many of the traditional advantages of standardization (interoperability, economies of scale, positive externalities etc.) will be achieved equitably for all of the stakeholders.

I. Introducing the problem tandards were once regarded analytically mainly as a form of public goods with high inherent welfare characteristics (Kindleberger 1983). The traditional view was that standardisation occurred late in the innovation process when technology was mature and the later stages of the product cycle were being reached (Vernon 1966). The current view stems largely from economic theories proposing that standards could influence the directions of technical change much earlier in the product cycle, mainly by building up

positive returns to adoption and creating path dependencies (Arthur 1989, Katz &Shapiro 1986, David 1985). This opened the field up to critical exploration of the strategic role that standardisation could play for suppliers in coordinating technologies and organising markets (Blind 2004, Schmidt & Werle 1999, Hawkins 1996). In this framework, the impact of any particular standard could be expected to be different for each stakeholder group.

It has become apparent to many observers that the standardization paradigm, whereby competing firms elect to negotiate and adopt voluntary collective solutions to common technical problems, is somehow in trouble. Regarding the information and communication technology (ICT) industries, some would go as far as to say it has broken down altogether. The culprit in most eyes is the industry ‘consortium’ or ‘forum’ – variously defined groupings of technology stakeholders (producers and users) that develop common technical specifications using often similar but almost entirely uncoordinated methods and processes. The phenomenon is hardly new – various computer and communication industry trade associations have been active in defining standards, formal or otherwise, since the 1970s (Hawkins 1999). What has changed in the past fifteen years or so is that the quantity of consortia has escalated dramatically from only a handful in 1990 to perhaps over 350 today.

The conventional rationale behind the consortium phenomenon is putative failure in the formal standardization processes. Standards Development Organizations (SDO) like ISO, CEN or numerous national standardization bodies are seen to operate according to rules that prevent standards from being promulgated quickly enough to match the rapid prototyping and market cycles typical of ICT products and services. The obvious problem with this view is that as more informal alternatives proliferate, additional coordination costs are created that accumulate very quickly. According to an increasing number of observers, the net result has been both to slow down the standardization process as a whole and to undermine the positive effects of variety, cost and risk reduction that are expected of standards.

Cargill & Bolin (2007) are forceful in their concerns:

S

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“While standardization should respond to changing business requirements and needs, we believe that some of these changes – namely the excessive proliferation of specifications and [standards organizations] – are undermining the very value of standards and the markets that they serve.” But they note also what they consider to be an especially important change in the nature of the relationship between standardization and the firm:

"… consortia were also often more visible within a company than were formal organizations, because consortia were directly tied to the product success of a company. In other words, a company joined a consortium to promote the creation of a specification that it needed for market reasons—there was an imperative behind the consortia’s creation. The same imperative was not necessarily found in formal organizations." Cargill & Bolin are well placed and highly respected observers of evolution in standardization processes,

organizations and strategies. We see no particular reason to argue with their overall analysis. However, their purpose is to comment upon possible actions that will restore order and productivity to the standardization paradigm as a means of coordinating technology more productively. We do not discount this objective, but we take away something quite different from their observations.

Businesses may well be joining consortia for commercially strategic reasons, virtually on a product-by-product basis. But what interests us is the prospect of using technical standards (whether developed in SDOs or consortia) for the specific purpose of organizing markets, irrespective of any implications this may have for the characteristics of technology or the efficiency of standardization processes as such. One of the most intense debates in transferring new technologies to markets concerns developing appropriate business models that will bridge the gap between what the technology does and what consumers may want from the technology, in what form and at what price. It would seem reasonable that decisions to develop standards as part of overtly commercial strategies would somehow form a link to the business modeling process.

In this paper we will explore one simple question: What is the relationship between standards and business models? We are concerned to define the basis on which these functions interact and to locate some of the points of articulation between standardization strategies – that are aimed at achieving design, production and distribution efficiencies through variety reduction and market aggregation – and business modeling strategies that are aimed at generating new sources of revenue by linking technological capabilities to consumer wants in innovative ways.

We will illustrate the conceptual linkage between standards and business models with reference to developments in the mobile communications industry. The issue is of great concern in this market because massive recent investments in R&D, infrastructure and spectrum access – especially for third-generation (3G) mobile systems – for the most part were having considerable trouble to find viable business models (Ure 2003, Eazel 2006). The mobile industry is especially interesting in the present context. It has been built-up as a ubiquitous consumer services environment largely on the back of a succession of formal standardization regimes, but also it is becoming integrated increasingly into numerous informal standardization frameworks aimed mainly at mobile online data services.

II. What is a business model and how does it relate to standardization? From rather intellectually obscure beginnings, there is now a degree of consensus in the literature that a business model is a depiction of the relationship between how goods and services are exchanged and how their value is determined. In other words, at least part of the value of a commodity is derived from the context in which it is exchanged (Afuah & Tucci 2001, Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002). This business model context encompasses both the social relationships of production and consumption, but also the financial and market structures that pertain to any given group of goods or services.

This implies that some types of contextual changes might actually increase or decrease product/service value. In commercial markets, sellers may transform new exchange contexts into additional revenue at the margin or into entirely new revenue streams. But ill-advised changes, or inability to change where required can destroy value. Many forces can motivate these contextual changes including the introduction of entirely new products or services, changes in product/service use patterns, migration from product to service based revenues, changes in product/service functionalities, product/service obsolescence and many others (Hawkins & Verhoest 2002).

The most evident link between these dynamics and standards concerns the fact that, typically, business models are not applied exclusively by individual vendors, but rather in complex networks that may involve the intersection of various models that are specific to individual stakeholders (Hawkins 2003, 2002). Crucially, these networks may involve the complex interaction of technological components and systems also.

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For example, the rollout of digital mobile telephony based on the GSM standard was dependent upon an interconnected set of models in which the nominal price of equipment was subsidised at several stages in order to encourage rapid adoption of the technology. The strategy was to absorb the subsidy costs quickly by generating a large service revenue base. This generated very complex business models. For example, the nominal ‘retailer’ did not actually earn much if any revenue from the sale of a handset or subscription to a customer but rather from a premium paid by the network provider for each signed-up subscriber. In effect, the business model was not to sell networks to subscribers, but to sell subscribers to networks. Similar situations applied all the way up the value chain, meaning that the business models of the network provider, the retailer and even the equipment manufacturer were entirely interdependent, all underpinned by the GSM standard.

The business model concept provides a framework for describing and analysing dynamics like these and for identifying how a given standard contributes to the creation of value in a product or service environment. This form of analysis begins with the assumption that in order to produce sustainable levels of revenue and profit, an enterprise must have developed a business model that is appropriate for the specific functionality of a specific asset (or system of assets) in a specific marketplace. Although in the first instance this kind of analysis is ex post, it also identifies those specific variables that may induce evolution in the business models of various goods and services, or migration from one model to another.

This creates a dynamic framework within which also to consider standardisation issues. A direct linkage between business modelling and standardisation can be established in that many of the relational, contextual and motivational variables that we see in the standardisation process have analogues and complementarities in the business modelling process. The business model concept is one way of describing the standards development and application environment in terms of how the motivations of different stakeholders to standardise are affected by factors that generate commercial pressures for change in product/service functionalities.

III. Linking the commercial and technological characteristics of Mobile ICT Mobile information and communication technology (M-ICT) has long ago past the point where technologically it is a form of ‘telephone’. Instead, M-ICT could be considered to be a ‘general purpose technology’ for the wireless distribution of data: voice in a digital environment essentially being data also (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Lindmark et al, 2004). Indeed, similar to the situation noted by Bresnahan & Greenstein (1999) for the computer industry, M-ICT has emerged as a technology platform upon which many complementary innovations have been developed.

Typically a general-purpose technology opens up new opportunities rather than offering discrete solutions; that is, it realizes most of its value by creating opportunities for complementary innovations. The main design consideration for a successful business model is to maintain control over the overall technical and business architecture. This involves acquiring control over the interfaces between various technical and commercial modules in the system architecture as a whole. Once a platform becomes established, it can impose its particular architecture upon an entire market.

Henderson & Clark (1990) coined the term “architectural innovation” to refer to innovations that change the architecture of a product without necessarily changing its components. This type of innovation can have rewards, but only if control over the evolution of the architecture is maintained. Baldwin & Clark (2000) have applied this concept to the ICT industry. They illustrate the advantages of modular design for complex adaptive systems such as ICT, and point to the importance of the initial “design rules” that govern subsequent innovation. They stress that successful innovation is partly due to the technical accomplishments of the design, but just as much to the capacity to capture any economic value that may be inherent in the design.

Gawer (2000) and Gawer & Cusumano (2002) have taken the argument further and have argued that the main strategic driver for firms aspiring to control an environment characterised by technical as well as market modularity, is the quest for “platform leadership”; the objective being to control a central module around which other companies develop complementary technologies and products. They observe the main levers of a platform leadership to include:

• fostering a thriving ecosystem of external complementary innovators, • influencing architectural design through open interfaces combined with core intellectual property

assets, • balancing consensus and control strategies towards contributors of complementary innovations, and • adopting a systemic and neutral mindset that extends to the whole industry (Gawer & Cusumano 2002).

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Although these authors offer no systematic treatment of the role of standardisation in this respect, Gawer does observe in her study of Intel and the computer industry that there is an intimate connection between technical and business model design:

“Looking at the transformation of the computer industry through both a technological and an economic lens, we can see that what seemed to be purely a problem of technical design — the allocation of features in functional blocks — has induced a radically different partitioning of the space of economic activity between different firms. Through this transformation, parameters of differentiation between products have been radically altered, and the nature of firms’ sources of competitive advantage have changed.” (Gawer, 2000, p. 77) As standardization is essentially about agreeing upon and establishing technical architectures, we may

expect that such issues have become prominent in the standardization process as well, potentially even accounting for ‘failures’ in this process as outlined above. The obvious implication is that platform ownership and/or leadership strategies, which essentially are connected to the business model, will be central to standardisation strategy, which also is connected to technical issues in the architecture.

Thus, the main business modelling considerations will concern how a basic technical architecture can be synchronized with a variety of business architectures – including that of the mobile systems vendors and network operators – such that one basic platform can attract multiple types of value-added services. The main standardisation strategy will be to ensure a level of compatibility that is commensurate with this quest for platform leadership. In the mobile industry, this mix of strategies can be expected to have far-reaching consequences for the standardisation process itself as well as for the impact of standards on market structure in terms of interoperability and vendor dominance.

IV. Case studies of mobile communication platforms We can illustrate some of the above dynamics by examining the quest for platform leadership within the standardization organizations and consortia of the mobile ICT industry. The M-ICT industry is among the last in the ICT sector to adopt a modular architecture. However, increasing modularity was evident already in M-ICT standardisation starting with second generation (2G) mobile cellular systems, and continuing through 2.5G protocols and platforms such as WAP and i-mode up to 3G systems (Bekkers, 2001). Platform leadership strategies in this sector have been well documented, i.e. regarding the i-mode platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) and the Symbian Operating System (Iversen & Tee, 2006; Evans et al, 2005). The following provides a brief overview of the entanglement of standardisation and business model design in two more recent mobile standards: DVB-H and IMS.

Case One: DVB-H Digital Video Broadcast – Handheld (DVB-H) is an ETSI transmission standard for mobile digital television. It was developed by the DVB Project, a European alliance of media, consumer electronics and telecom industry actors that has expanded since its foundation in 1993 to include over 250 members worldwide. It is an open, private sector initiative with annual member fees and governed by a Memorandum of Understanding.

As early as 1998, as so-called DVB-Terrestrial (DVB-T) services were being introduced in Europe, the DVB Project started research related to mobile reception of DVB-T. The work to define a mobile system based on DVB-T within the DVB Project started at the beginning of 2002 with the definition of a set of commercial requirements for a system supporting handheld devices. The subsequent technical work led to a system dubbed DVB-H, which was formally adopted by ETSI in November 2004 (Faria et al, 2006).

It is recognised generally that Nokia is driving the DVB-H standard, having invested strongly in the development of DVB-H and the associated technology of IP data-casting (IPDC). Yet, by associating with the DVB Project and going through ETSI, DVB-H has been strongly positioned as an open standard, and is governed by the DVB IPR rules (patent holders are required to license IPR on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, but only for equipment that complies fully with the DVB specifications). In addition, Nokia has made the air interface specifications of its mobile TV solution publicly available. The air interface is based on the DVB-H open radio layer standard, and specifies how mobile TV terminals interconnect with the network end of the mobile TV solution. Nokia has stated that this was done in order to drive device interoperability and market development.

There are several competing technologies and standards for mobile television, including Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (S-DMB and T-DMB) and Qualcomm’s MediaFLO technology. There are some inherent differences between, for example, the DVB-H and S-DMB standards in terms of the business models envisaged (see

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Tan, 2004; Kivisaari & Luukainen, 2005; Braet, Ballon & Dreessen, 2006). Nevertheless, the DVB-H and Media FLO standards are very closely aligned. The most important reported difference is the claim that MediaFLO is superior in terms of the amount of TV channels it can carry on the same amount of available spectrum. This claimed superiority is related to the fact that MediaFLO was developed by Qualcomm as an almost entirely new technology, while DVB-H had to take the already existing DVB-T standard into account. However, this very same fact has enabled DVB-H to be positioned as an open standard, with several competing suppliers present in each part of the value chain, whereas at least at the outset MediaFLO was positioned as a proprietary technology by Qualcomm who acquired spectrum and started building its own network in the US (Curwen, 2006).

The foundation of the FLO forum in July 2005 can be seen as part of a strategy to push MediaFLO as a more ‘open’ standard as well. A recent trial with UK broadcasting company BSkyB has even resulted in a first implementation of MediaFLO in Europe. Up to this point, however, it is DVB-H that has been able to gather the greatest amount of support from industry. The general consensus is that this is thanks to the links between DVB-H and the ‘GSM coalition’ of manufacturers and operators worldwide, but also to the open standard strategy followed by DVB-H.

Despite the commitment to open standards, a rift has occurred between Nokia and other DVB-H partners in terms of the Electronic Service Guide (ESG). The ESG is a structured document that contains information on all available services. With an ESG one can describe the content of various services – video games, home banking, shopping applications etc. As such, it strongly influences the look and feel of the mobile TV service to the end user and can figure prominently in the business model.

Nokia has taken an early lead in this segment by implementing its own version of the Open Mobile Alliance OMA-BCAST specification on its DVB-H handsets. This goes against proponents of DVB-CBMS (Convergence of Broadcast and Mobile Services) which is stipulated in the DVB-developed IP Datacast standard (Yoshida, 2006). The incompatible protocols both aim to offer interactive services such as discovery and selection and service purchase, along with content protection between broadcast and mobile handsets. If unresolved, handset makers will be forced to develop separate software to make handsets work on different networks. The two sides differ also on copy protection. OMA-BCAST promotes OMA digital rights management, while DVB-CBMS backs different conditional access systems using a SIM card.

The numerous DVB-H trials across Europe in 2005 and 2006 presented a mixed picture as to which protocol was being used, leading to the possible adoption of incompatible protocols in various markets (Braet, Ballon & Dreessen, 2006). The Nokia ESG strategy can be interpreted as aiming to establish and exploit a leading, proprietary ESG platform while ensuring broad acceptance and complementary innovations through the open DVB-H standard that it pioneered as well.

Case Study Two: IMS The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is a set of standards, defined collaboratively by the Internet Engineering TaskForce (IETF) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), which is the 3G standards cooperation agreement between ETSI and a number of other, mainly Asian, standards bodies. IMS was introduced by 3GPP as part of its Release 5 (2002) and is being expanded and updated in subsequent releases. It also has been expanded upon by competing and collaborating standards bodies 3GPP2 and ETSI TISPAN to include CDM2000 as well as fixed networks. IMS service standardisation will be the focus of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), itself created to integrate industry consortia such as the WAP Forum, Location Interoperability Forum (LIF), SyncML Initiative, MMS-IOP (Multimedia Messaging Interoperability Process), Wireless Village, Mobile Gaming Interoperability Forum (MGIF), and the Mobile Wireless Internet Forum (MWIF).

The objective of IMS is to function as an overlay network enabling voice and multimedia communications over packet-based IP networks (for an overview see Camarillo & Garcia-Martin, 2005). IMS can serve as a low-level foundation for applications like Voice over IP (VoIP), Push-To-Talk (PTT), Push-To-View, Video Calling, and Video Sharing, and is based primarily on SIP (session initiation protocol), the network entry point to the Internet protocol (IP) network. IMS has been designed as an all-encompassing platform for wireless network operation and service delivery, enabling new multimedia services to be transported on the newer platform, but also enabling a legacy circuit-switched network to operate in a more modern packet-switched mode. As such, IMS can be characterised as an attempt to create a new, overarching platform architecture that partly reuses existing technologies and standards (modules), including Intelligent Network and application integration technologies.

The Intelligent Network (IN) concept refers to a centralised, computer-based system, controlling the switching nodes for the provision of so-called value added services both remotely and in real-time. At the end of the 1990’s, ETSI and 3GPP applied IN to GSM under the name of Wireless IN or CAMEL (Customized Logic for Mobile Enhanced Logic). Today, IN is used worldwide for value added services such as prepaid services, virtual

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private networks and so on. However, an inherent architectural feature is that the IN system is still coupled with the underlying network protocols and switching equipment. This limited the programming of value added services (and thereby also the provision of them in the market) to a small group of highly specialised telecom experts, leading eventually to the development of a new programming paradigm for telecommunications revolving around APIs (Magedanz et al, 2004).

The Parlay Group, a consortium of operators, vendors, and IT companies, started in 1998 by defining an open network API that would allow third party application providers to create value added services irrespective of the underlying network. In this sense, Parlay can be described as a platform technology for enterprise application integration (EAI) in the telecom industry. It was thus primarily a business model concern – namely, how to open up the business model for value added telecommunications services – that was the basis of Parlay, which subsequently was aligned with Open Service Access (OSA - 3GPP) and the Service Provider Access to Networks (SPAN - ETSI) APIs.

Similar sets of APIs have appeared alongside Parlay, such as Parlay X, which can be characterised as a simplified version of Parlay/OSA, and JAIN (Java APIs for Intelligent Network, later changed to Java APIs for Integrated Networks), a set of APIs developed by the Java Community Process, but with an original focus on network operators, rather than on third party developers.

IMS aims to encompass all of these technologies and standards (and many more besides) while duplicating some of their features (see e.g. Palama et al, 2003). Indeed, it is promoted as “business model agnostic”, allowing the integration of legacy systems and services, various billing and charging procedures, etc. However, it is clear that IMS retains a strong bias towards business models controlled by mobile network operators. In fact, the raison d’être of IMS is often cited as combining the advantages of all-IP networks with extensive network operator control, and replacing unspecified IP packet delivery by (chargeable) ‘sessions’. IMS would thus enable network operators to avoid the unwanted ‘bit pipe model’ and move either towards an extended ‘walled garden’ with a rich portfolio of operator services, or towards a third party ecosystem model. New Virtual Network Operator (VNO) models, including “SIP VNO” (SVNO) models, are also envisaged (Wilson, 2005; Lenahan, 2006).

The attempt of IMS to force a new, overarching architecture onto existing technologies and standards has led to much uncertainty, protests and strategic repositioning of standards. In particular, it is relevant to see how more restrained service delivery platforms (SDPs), e.g. making use of standards or ‘semi’-standards such as Java Service Logic Execution Environment (JSLEE) or Java Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE), are being extended and repositioned. It is relevant also to see how IMS has impacted more restrained service delivery platforms (SDPs), e.g. those making use of standards or ‘semi’-standards such as Java Service Logic Execution Environment (JSLEE) or Java Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE). SDPs are increasingly and explicitly being extended and repositioned, either as supplementary to IMS (by emphasizing a distributed, decentralised architecture in which IMS has no place) or as complementary to IMS (by emphasizing a layered architecture in which IMS is confined to a specific layer, with SDPs sitting on top). Similarly, mobile soft-switches that separate call control from the bearer network (and in this sense can be seen as overlapping to an extent with IMS), are also being redesigned and repositioned with respect to IMS (Sullivan, 2005; Morelli, 2006; Qingfeng, 2006). Also, the open SIP standard, despite being recognized by the ITU as a central part of IMS, is becoming contested as it is being tailored to the business needs of large network operators. In particular, the basic version of SIP is being expanded and modified to service large numbers of users, to bill them for any activity and to operate within a hierarchical client-server architecture. As a result, a range of (often proprietary) alternatives is being implemented by large parts of SIP’s intended constituency (Waclawsky, 2007).

In the case of IMS, the struggle for platform leadership is illustrated by the shifts in focus between different standard versions, by the design of slight (or large) overlaps between various standards, and by redesigning and repositioning standards either as supplements or as complements vis-à-vis the IMS architecture.

V. Conclusions The ICT standardization process has fragmented to a very considerable degree, undoubtedly causing significant coordination problems and costs that undermine most of the conventional benefits of standardization. However, the premise of this paper was that the reasons for this phenomenon were more than just a loss of control or a breakdown of process or organization. We suggested that in the ICT industry standards of every description play very significant strategic roles that coordinate technologies with markets as well as with other technologies. The fragmentation phenomenon may be an inevitable result of the needs of an ever increasing array of stakeholders –

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value-added service providers as well as vendors and network operators – to develop and position new business models.

Our case studies of Mobile-ICT illustrate that regardless of institutional orientation or process, the most important standardization strategy for equipment and service providers is to create platforms that are open to the development of complementary products and services while at the same time preserving the proprietary edge necessary to ensure lock-in effects. Firms aspiring to take on a platform role have a strong incentive to gain or guard control over the overall architecture by implementing a central proprietary component, while adopting an ‘open’ strategy for standards that are needed in order to attract complementary innovators. We saw also that firms aspiring to maintain a platform role will have an incentive to engage in continuous platform evolution (e.g. through versioning or making incremental changes to module boundaries and interfaces).

Both cases yielded strong reasons to doubt whether many of the traditional advantages of standardization (interoperability, economies of scale, positive externalities etc.) will be achieved equitably for all of the stakeholders. With DVB-H, implementations of different Electronic Service Guide specifications on top of the open DVB-H standard threatens to force handset makers to develop separate software to make handsets work on different networks. With IMS, the introduction of a new architecture encompassing existing modules has led to the redesign and repositioning of many complementary and overlapping standards in order either to counter or to support the IMS claim to platform leadership.

This constant redesigning and repositioning of standards leads to a loss of meaning as to what constitutes a standard. To this extent, our case studies confirm the concerns expressed above by Cargill and Bolin. But the cases show also that a substantial part of the standardisation process is being reoriented from drafting technical specifications as such, to using these specifications in order to leverage specific product and service environments in specific markets. In this respect, a significant part of what heretofore we have viewed primarily as a standardization process has become an element in business model design.

Acknowledgements Part of the research for this paper was funded by the NO-REST consortium in the European Union Sixth Research Framework. Also, part of the research was funded by the Quality of Experience project of the Interdisciplinary Institute for Broadband Technology of Flanders, Belgium.

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