ieee 802.11 wep (wired equivalent privacy) concepts and...

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1 IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and Vulnerability By Shivu Vibhuti [email protected] CS265 -Spring 2005 Advisor : Dr. Mark Stamp [email protected]

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Page 1: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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IEEE 802.11 WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and Vulnerability

ByShivu Vibhuti

[email protected] -Spring 2005

Advisor : Dr. Mark [email protected]

Page 2: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Agenda

What is WEP?

WEP Design objectives

WEP Authentication

WEP Encryption/Decryption

WEP Vulnerability & attacks

How to strengthen wireless security

Q&A

Page 3: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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What is WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)?Protection mechanism offered by the IEEE 802.11 standard

Operates on the Media Access Control (MAC) layer

Aim is to provide data privacy equivalent to the level of wired network

WEP algorithm is used to protect wireless communication from eavesdropping

Page 4: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Design Objectives as per the IEEE 802.11 standard

It is reasonably strong

It is self-synchronizing

It is efficient

It may be exportable

It is optional

Page 5: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP Design objectives

It was not designed to be the ultimate "killer" security feature

The intention was to make it hard to break-in

Page 6: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP Open Authentication

Based on request and grant

Essentially no authentication i.e. no client validation

Page 7: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP Shared Key Authentication

Based on request, challenge, challenge-response, grant/deny

Worse than open system authentication, exposes keystream

Page 8: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Shared Key Authentication Vulnerability

Known keystream can be used to generate response

Response = (Challenge) XOR (known keystream for a particular IV)

Page 9: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Shared Key Authentication Vulnerability...

Same shared key is used for both authentication and encryption

Prone to man in the middle attack

Page 10: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP Encryption

Based on symmetric shared key encryption, uses RC4 stream cipher

PlainText PlainText CRC

XOR

IV RC4 Keystream

Ciphertext CiphertextIV

Secret Key

Page 11: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP Decryption

CiphertextIV IV Secret Key

KeystreamXOR

Ciphertext

CRCPlaintext

Plaintext

CRC

CRC

Compare

Good Data

Bad Data

Page 12: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP VulnerabilityIV mechanism has made the protocol vulnerable

The IEEE 802.11 does not specify how to generate IV's

Uses 40 or 104 bits key with 24 bits IV

RC4 keystream repeats if IV's are repeated, major flaw in the WEP design/implementation

Page 13: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP VulnerabilityAttacker can identify when IV collision occurs

Attacker can pick two packets derived from the same key and obtain the unknown plaintext using C1 XOR C2 = P1 XOR P2

Same IV can be used with every packet

Cannot differentiate between forged packets and the original packets

Page 14: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP VulnerabilityDifficult to keep secret, when the same key is shared among multiple users/devices

Same key is used for a long time

CRC checksum failed to protect data integrity

Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir discovered a flaw in the WEP key scheduling algorithm(IV weakness)

Page 15: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP attacks

Known plaintext attack

Reaction attack – Guess some of the bits in a message & determine the other bits

Inductive attack – Trial and Error

Page 16: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP attacksInductive attack – trial and error method

Obtain initial keystream K (length n)

Create ICMP ping or ARP request packet

Choose packet length to be “n+1”, attacker knows n bytes K, for n+1 th byte, try 256 different values

AP discards incorrect packet and responds to the correct packet, attacker now knows n+1 bytes of keystream

Page 17: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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WEP cracking tools

AirSnort

WEPCrack

Dweputils

Page 18: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Strengthening Wireless Security

Choose bigger IV

Use different mechanisms for the data integrity check For example: Hash functions

keys can be assigned per user and configured to be changed based on time or packet limits

Page 19: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Strengthening Wireless Security

Make wireless network invisible i.e. Drop-ping unencrypted packets/requests

Use different authentication protocols e.g. EAP, LEAP, PEAP

Use alternative protocols

IEEE 802.11i and TKIP, WPA, WPA in Pre-Shared Key (PSK) mode

Page 20: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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ConclusionDon't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional measures at the higher layer

WEP has many weaknesses due to the small IV space and poor selection of CRC32 for data integrity verification

Another major issue with WEP is the key scheduling algorithm flaws discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir

Page 21: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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IEEE 802.11 WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and Vulnerability

Q&A

Page 22: IEEE 802.11 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Concepts and …stamp/CS265/projects/Spr05/ppt/WEP.pdf · 2005. 5. 18. · 20 Conclusion Don't just rely on WEP security, take ad-ditional

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Thank You!