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Religion and Political

Development: Comparative

Ideas on Ibn Khaldun and

Machiavelli

Barbara Freyer Stowasser

Dr. Barbara Freyer Stowasser holds an M.A. in Middle Eastern studies rom the Univer-sity o Caliornia, Los Angeles, and a Ph.D. (magna cum laude) in comparative semiticsand Islamic studies rom the University o Mnster, Germany. She has taught at George-town University since 1966, where she developed and taught all the graduate courseson Quranic tasirand introduced the study o Islam and gender into the curriculum.Her best-known and most popular publication is Oxord University Presss Women inthe Quran, raditions and Interpretation (1994). In 1998-1999 Dr. Stowasser served asPresident o the Middle East Studies Association o North America. From 1980-1984and rom 1985-1991, she was Chair o the Department o Arabic (now the Departmento Arabic and Islamic Studies, in Georgetown College). In addition to the 2010-2011academic year, she has served as the Center or Contemporary Arab Studies director

rom 1993-2003 and rom 2006-2007. In 2009, she was appointed to the Sultanate oOman Chair in Arabic and Islamic Literature at Georgetown. Tis paper is a reprint otwo earlier versions, the original rom 1983 and the other rom 2000.


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BARBARA FREYER STOWASSER

2

Center or Contemporary Arab StudiesEdmund A. Walsh School o Foreign Service241 Intercultural Center

Georgetown UniversityWashington, D.C. 20057-1020202.687.5793http://ccas.georgetown.edu

1983, 2000, and 2011 by the Center or Contemporary Arab Studies. All

rights reserved.


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RELIGION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Arabs can obtain royal authority only by making use o some religious coloring,such as prophecy, or sainthood, or some great religious event in general. Te reasonor this is that because o their savagery, the Arabs are the least willing o nationsto subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, andeager to be the leader. Teir individual aspirations rarely coincide. But when thereis religion [among them] through prophecy or sainthood, then they have somerestraining infuence in themselves. Te qualities o haughtiness and jealousy leavethem. It is, then, easy or them to subordinate themselves and to unite [in a socialorganization].1

[R]eligious coloring does away with the mutual jealousy and envy among peoplewho share in a group eeling, and causes concentration upon truth. When people

[who have a religious coloring] come to have the [right] insight into their aairs,nothing can withstand them, because their outlook is one and their object one ocommon accord. Tey are willing to die or [their objectives]. [On the other hand]the members o the dynasty they attack may be many times as numerous as they.But their purposes dier, in as much as they are alse purposes, and [the people othe worldly dynasty] come to abandon each other, since they are araid o death.Tereore, they do not oer resistance to [the people with a religious coloring],even i they themselves are more numerous. Tey are overpowered by them andquickly wiped out.2

Tis can also be illustrated [by the situation existing at the time] when the religiouscoloring changes and is destroyed. Te power [o the ruling dynasty] is then wipedout. Superiority exists then merely in proportion to [the existing] group eeling,without the additional [power o] religion. As a result, the dynasty is overpoweredby those groups [up to this time] under its control, that are equal or superior toit in strength. It had ormerly overpowered the groups that had a stronger groupeeling and were more deeply rooted in desert lie, with the help o the additional

power that religion had given it.3

I


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hese passages in Ibn Khalduns Muqaddima refect the role which IbnKhaldun in his political philosophy assigned to religion as a cohesiveorce and source o political strength. Religion is the basis o state-

building and empire, because it unites groups and makes them invincible. It bringsorth and guarantees collective morality, virtue, and civic obedience while doingaway with savagery, individual ambition, and civic strie. Without religion, a groupis merely endowed with natural cohesiveness through group eeling which causesthe individual members to act together to achieve superiority. But religion, i andwhen it is superimposed upon or added to this group eeling, is a much strongercohesive orce than that created by common descent. Once corrupted, however,religion loses its capacity to bind the group into one, and becomes ineective. Tegroup then has no strength le but its natural solidarity. Tis situation will leadsooner or later to the groups decline and disintegration.

Tough the rst person to give Rome a constitution was Romulus, to whom, as adaughter, it owed its birth and its education, yet, since heaven did not deem theinstitutions o Romulus adequate or so great an empire, it inspired the Romansenate to choose Numa Pompilius as Romulus successor, so that the things whichhe had le undone, might be instituted by Numa. Numa, nding the peopleerocious and desiring to reduce them to civic obedience conjoined with the artso peace, turned to religion as the instrument necessary above all others or themaintenance o a civilized state, and so constituted it that there was never or so

many centuries so great a ear o God as there was in this republic.4

It will also be seen by those who pay attention to Roman history, how muchreligion helped in the control o armies, in encouraging the plebs, in producinggood men, and in shaming the bad. So that i it were a question o the prince towhom Rome was more indebted, Romulus or Numa, Numa, I think, should easilyobtain the rst place. For, where there is religion, it is easy to teach men to usearms, but where there are arms, but not religion, it is with di culty that it can be

introduced.5

All things considered, thereore, I conclude that the religion introduced by Numa wasamong the primary causes o Romes happiness; or this entailed good institutions;good institutions led to good ortune; and rom good ortune arose the happy resultso undertakings. And, as the observance o divine worship is the cause o greatnessin republics, so the neglect o it is the cause o their ruin. Because, where the earo God is wanting, it comes about either that a kingdom is ruined, or that it is keptgoing by the ear o a prince, which makes up or the lack o religion. And becauseprinces are short-lived, it may well happen that when a kingdom loses its prince, italso loses the virtue o its prince. Hence kingdoms which depend on the virtue oone man do not last long, because they lose their virtue when his lie is spent, and itseldom happens that it is revived by his successor.6


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Tose princes and those republics which desire to remain ree rom corruption,should above all else maintain incorrupt the ceremonies o their religion, andshould hold them always in veneration; or there can be no surer indication odecline o a country than to see divine worship neglected.7

Te rulers o a republic or o a kingdom, thereore, should uphold the basicprinciples o religion which sustains them in being, and, i this be done, it will beeasy or them to keep their commonwealth religious, and, in consequence, goodand united.8

Tese passages in Machiavellis Discourses outline the role which religion playsin Machiavellis description o the rise and all o the state. Here, again, religion isseen as the strongest guarantee, as well as one o the sources, o civic obedience,collective morality, and virtue. Tis is so because religion is a cohesive orce o thegreatest importance. It endows the young nation and its leaders with the strengthto establish, and then to maintain, a fourishing state. Without religion, the statespolitical e ciency and success are based merely on the individual virtue o theruler, which may be short-lived. Virtue without religion is insu cient to ensurecontinued unity and strength.

Tis paper was instigated by the obvious and intriguing similarities o IbnKhalduns and Machiavellis views on the role o religion in, and its eect upon,the political ate o groups and nations.9 Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) and Machiavelli (d.1527), though roughly contemporaries, lived and worked in vastly dierent political,

cultural, and intellectual environments. Ibn Khaldun, standing in isolation at the endo the medieval civilizations o Islam just as it was slackening its pace, developed hisscience o society and politics in a stagnating and decadent environment. Againstthe background o a tumultuous North Arican tribal society that lacked the powerand the institutions to achieve unity and renewal, and aware o the gravity o thispolitical decline and the intellectual sterility accompanying it, he took up the themeo development in history as a subject o theoretical consideration. Machiavelli, onthe other hand, was a Florentine o the Florentines, and the citizens o his city werethe quintessence o the new spirit that was then stirring in Italy.10 He was imbuedwith the spirit o the new civic humanism o his native city that came to alter thewhole tone o Italian thought. Against the backdrop o the Florentine wars and thediplomatic negotiationsand the bickering and haggling accompanying them

he recorded in literary orm the resh attitude o his age toward statecra and theconduct o international relations.

Te similarities o Ibn Khalduns and Machiavellis ideas are enhanced byIbn Khalduns apparent modernity. He insisted on knowing history, man, andsociety as they really are by investigating the actual conditions o man and society


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through the ages in a pronouncedly secular, realistic, and political manner. Tesame realism was the hallmark o Machiavellis thought as he elaborated his scienceo politics on the basis o the actualities o human experience.

Tere even existed some discernible resemblance in the very personalities andcareers o the two men. Tey seemed quite alike in temperament and inclination.A undamental vitality and a zest or politics were common to both. Both wereseasoned and successul, i opportunistic, politicians. Both withdrew in their earlyorties rom active political lie. Ibn Khaldun did so voluntarily. Aer having ailedin North Arica and in Spain to bring about the establishment o the political ordero his hopes, either through personal exercise o power or as a teacher o princes,he decided, when he was 43 years old, to retire to the secluded ortress o IbnSalama (aughzut) or a period o our years in order to pursue theoretical studies.

His research, particularly as presented in the Muqaddima or introduction to hisWorld History, was to give him the answers to some o the problems with whichhe had wrestled while actively engaged in politics. Specically, it was to give himan understanding o the cause o the decline o his region and thereby, indirectly,an explanation or his own ailure as a statesman.11 In addition to ullling thisspecic purpose, the Muqaddima dealt with human aairs in general. When IbnKhaldun reemerged rom his seclusion, he was unwilling to be involved once againin political activity and instead migrated to Egypt where he chose to make hisimpact as a teacher, counselor, and judge.12

Machiavellis withdrawal rom active involvement in politics was involuntary.Aer having played a leading role under the Florentine republic both in internal

and oreign aairsas secretary o the republican council and member o severalimportant diplomatic missionshe was at the age o 43 orced into retirement bythe restoration o the Medici. He withdrew to his country estate where he wrote inunwilling isolation his major works, notablyTe Prince and Te Discourses.13 Tesetwo works were intended to provide both special counsel or political action and acomprehensive account o the things o the world.14

Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli were accustomed to sizing up politicalsituations not only in terms o the conficts o individuals, but in terms o theunderlying orces propelling them. Hence, when they engaged in the study o history,they did so or practical ends. Tey turned to history because o its useulness as aguide to political action. Both thought that history, i studied correctly, urnishedrelevant acts that can be organized to reveal both the nature and causes o these

acts and the lessons they can teach the man o action.15Te present as well as the past can yield insights into laws o history and urnish

models or political action. For the most part, in theMuqaddima Ibn Khaldun tookas examples events that had occurred in the Islamic past in order to observe theirrelationships, explain their trends, analyze their regularity, and thus gain insightinto the laws o historical development. He rarely reerred to contemporary events,


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possibly because he elt that his proximity to some o these events necessitated somepersonal caution. Machiavelli used both past (mostly Roman) and contemporary(mostly Italian) examples to illustrate and substantiate his insights into the natureo the interplay o political and social orces. While there is a certain preponderanceo modern examples in Te Prince and o ancient examples in Te Discourses,16

both books were intended to counsel contemporary men o action. Te counsel ismore specic in the case oTe Prince, which has been interpreted both as a casestudy o a specic political situation, i.e., a handbook o eective political behavioror a specic ruler,17 and as a mixture o treatise (conveying a general teaching)and tract or the times (conveying a particular counsel).18 Machiavelli was o theopinion, however, that the political modes and orders which should be imitated byhis contemporaries were those o ancient Rome.19 Hence his most penetrating and

engaging probings into history and political modes and orders in general are to beound in Te Discourses, his commentary on the rst ten books o Livy, the Romanhistorian o the glory o Rome. Livy supplies the matter on which Machiavelliimpresses his orm.20

Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli centered their refections on human aairsand the condition o man. Tough both writers took man or what he is, selsh anddesirous o power, neither reduced political questions to questions o psychology.

In comparing Ibn Khalduns and Machiavellis theories concerning the natureand workings o religion in political nations, it will rst be necessary to describein detail the kinds o additional political orces envisaged by these thinkers, i.e.,orces other than religion (but ultimately intertwined with and reinorced by

religion) that bind and propel groups to political actions. In Ibn Khalduns case,it will be necessary to describe the nature and role o group eeling (asabiyya),and in Machiavellis that o collective and individual virtue (virt). It will thenbe possible to probe how these notions relate specically to religion in either case,and how religion in turn relates to and is refective o the philosophical oundationso Ibn Khalduns and Machiavellis thought. Tis nal investigation, however, willshow the limitations o their similarities and comparability.


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In Ibn Khalduns science o culture, the basic creative orce which underliesall political action is asabiyya: group eeling, social solidarity, or groupsolidarity. Te term asabiyya is related to the word asaba (i.e., kin). Tus,

it originally signied something like making common cause with ones kin. Teterm is also related to isaba and usba, both meaning group.21Asabiyya is thecohesive power at work among individuals which endows them with strength andorges them into healthy, strong, and politically active groups.

Te purpose o asabiyya is deense and aggression (I, 374; I, 381).22 Aggressiveand deensive strength is obtained only through asabiyya which means [mutual]aection and willingness to ght and die or each other (I, 313). It moves men

to deend and protect the place where they live and is behind every other humanactivity, such as prophecy, the establishment o royal authority, or propaganda[or a cause]. Nothing can be achieved in these matters without ghting or it,since man has the natural urge to oer resistance. And or ghting, one cannot dowithout asabiyya (I, 263).

Asabiyya is originally based on blood relationship.

Te respect or blood ties leads to aection or ones relations and blood relatives,the eeling that no harm ought to beall them nor any destruction come upon them(I, 264). I the direct relationship between persons who help each other is veryclose, so that it leads to close contact and unity, the ties are obvious and clearly

require the [existence o a eeling o solidarity] without any outside [prodding] (I,264).

Close client relationships can lead to asabiyya as well, or, in other words,asabiyya can be awakened by an e cient leader among his non-related supportersand ollowers.

II


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Client relationships and contacts with slaves or allies have the same eect. Teconsequences o common descent, though natural, still are something imaginary.What really brings about the eeling o close contact is social intercourse, riendlyassociation, long amiliarity, and the companionship that results rom growingup together. I close contact is established in such manner, the eect will beaection and cooperation (I, 374). Between the two [the leader and the ollower],there develops a special closeness o relationship which has the same eect [ascommon descent] and strengthens the close contact. Even though there is nocommon descent, the ruits o common descent are there (I, 374).

In such cases, the ollowers can acquire house and nobility through their masters,because

only those who share in a group eeling have basic and true nobility. Te clientsand ollowers, by taking their special place within the asabiyya [o their masters]participate to some extent in the [common] descent to which [that particularasabiyya belongs] and are thereby able to create glory and importance orthemselves (I, 276-77).

Tus, oreign descent does not prevent the absorption o a ollower into theasabiyya o his leader. Conversely, it does not stand in the way o a leader whomanages to unite a oreign group and to concentrate their loyalties upon himsel,i his original descent has become obscured, or, as Ibn Khaldun said, i it has beensloughed o and he has put on the skin o the new ollowers and thus appearsas one o their skin (I, 55).

Under certain special conditions, such as in a political vacuum created by thedisintegration o a dynasty, asabiyya can center on an individual o lowly birthrather than a member o a noble house.

Leadership [as a rule] goes to members o great and noble houses who are eligibleor the positions o elders and leaders in a city. Sometimes, it goes to some personrom the lowest class o the people. He obtains asabiyya and close contact with themob or reasons that ate produces or him. He, then, achieves superiority over theelders and people o the higher class when they have lost their own group support(II, 305).

Asabiyya exists in dierent degrees o strength. Wherever it exists in thegreatest density, superiority and leadership necessarily ollow. Tis secret osuperiority is one o the laws o nature. It works in social organization and groupeeling just as it does in the process o mixture o the things that come intobeing (I, 269 n).23


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When elements are combined in equal proportions, no mixture can take place. One[element] must be superior to the others, and when [it exercises] its superiorityover them, mixture occurs. In the same way, one o the various tribal asabiyyasmust be superior to all [others], in order to be able to bring them together, to unitethem, and to weld them into one asabiyya, comprising all the various group. Allthe various groups are then under the infuence o the superior asabiyya (I, 336-37).

While Ibn Khaldun here expressed the opinion that the existence o asabiyyain various degrees o density is a natural phenomenon, and that higher densityinevitably results in superiority, he did not explain why this is so, but limited

himsel to a description ohow the process works. Hence, the secret o superiorityremains ultimately unexplained, since he regarded it to be as inexplicable as theworkings o nature itsel.

Preponderance oasabiyya thus leads to the superiority o one group over others.It also leads to the leadership o one individual over the other members o hisgroup. Based on the group eeling available to him, he establishes chieainship andeventually kingship through the destruction o all other loyalties and the threat oorce. Kingship or royal authority, then, is the goal toward which the mysteriouspower o group eeling moves (I, 284 ; I, 336-337; I, 414-16; II, 119).

Royal authority is more than leadership. Leadership means being a chieain andthe leader is obeyed, but he has no power to orce others to accept his rulings. Royal

authority means superiority and the power to rule by orce. When a leader ndsthe way open toward superiority, he ollows it because it is something desirable. Hecannot completely achieve his [goal] except with the help o a group eeling whichcauses [the others] to obey him. Tus, royal authority is a goal to which groupeeling leads (I, 284).

Asabiyya also leads to conquest. Te group that is most eective in achievingconquest is the group with the stronger asabiyya. It subdues lesser group eelingsand brings them under control.

I one asabiyya overpowers the other, the two asabiyyas enter into close contactand the deeated asabiyya gives added power to the victorious asabiyya which,

as a result, sets its goals o superiority and domination higher than beore. (I,285-86).

In conquest and in battle, asabiyya is more important than numerical strength. IbnKhaldun emphatically rejected Al-urtushis theory that the military strength o adynasty (I, 316-17) or victory in battle (II, 87) depends on the size o the army or


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the number o brave and amous knights; rather, he saw military strength as well asvictory as being unctions o the asabiyya.

Yet, the very virtues o the group that perorms such eats can be the sourceo new dissensions and conficts. Once they have achieved certain objectives, thegroup members may resist urther demands rom their ruler. Tey may need anadditional orce to eliminate their shortcomings and to enhance their solidarity.Tis cohesive orce is religion.

Since the workings o religion and its relation with asabiyya will be discussed insome detail below, it may su ce at this point merely to say that the initial eect oreligion as seen by Ibn Khaldun is to complement and to enhance asabiyya.

All strengths and all achievements, whether political, social, economic, orcultural, are temporary. Tey grow and develop to an optimal point and a natural

limit beyond which they cannot go. Ten decline and dissolution set in. Tis is astrue oasabiyya as it is o authority. Aer he has achieved absolute royal authoritythrough group eeling and through religion, the ruler destroys those who sharepower with him and uses mercenaries who are loyal to him as a person and notto an asabiyya or to a religious cause (I, 372 ). Tereaer a kings royal authorityseems more secure and less threatened than ever. He can dispense with asabiyya.

Te souls o the subject people are colored with the habit o subservience andsubmission and they cannot think o anything except being submissive to the ruler(II, 121-22; I, 314 ). Tey believe as an article o aith in being obedient to [himand his people] (I, 318). Meekness and docility are now a habit (I, 287 ).

But although the dynasty seems more secure because o this subservience, the lacko asabiyya makes its substance dwindle like natural heat in a body that lacksnourishment. Eventually it reaches its destined time (II, 121-22; also II, 119-20).

Asabiyya originally thrives in situations marked by poverty, virtue, anddedication. It is ound primarily in strong young groups that are unspoiled,courageous, healthy in body and spirit. Tey are willing to sacrice all or thecommon good. Tey live in equality and reedom (see, e.g., II, 267). Yet it is notonly meekness and docility that break the vigor and strength o this asabiyya. Moredangerous than the will o the ruler bent on his personal, individual rule are theattractions o wealth, ease, and luxury.

Te things that go with luxury and submergence in a lie o ease break the vigor othe asabiyya which alone produces superiority (I, 286-87; I, 296-97; I, 317; I, 344;II, 118-119).

When asabiyya goes, all personal and political virtue goes with it. Tis is true orthe individual ruler as well as or the nation. Te presence oasabiyya is indicated


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by and calls orth good and virtuous deeds whereas its absence calls orth and isindicated by vice and evil deeds (I, 291-93).Ibn Khaldun used the concept oasabiyya as the key to understanding political

reality. Te ate o a group and its leaders is determined by the degree o strengthand density in which asabiyya exists among its members. Wherever this orce is tobe ound in large quantities, strength, superiority, and conquest ollow. Particularlyi enhanced by religion, asabiyya can bring orth a fourishing state and civilization.Ultimately, it is doomed to weaken and to decline, as are the institutions which ithas brought orth.

Returning now to our original topic, religion, we must investigate how IbnKhaldun perceived this orceboth its nature and its workings in human societies,i.e., specically its relation to asabiyya. Ibn Khaldun dealt with religion in two

ways. Considering it in general and in terms o its unction, he understood it as acohesive social orce that complements and enhances asabiyya. As such, its eectsare that it leads to strengthened group solidarity, to the establishment o kingship,and to conquest. Considering it in terms o essence and specics, Ibn Khaldun sawreligion (in the case o Islam) as God-given ruth, Law, and Justice.

As Ibn Khaldun described the workings o religion in general, he pointed outthat or its establishment asabiyya is necessary (I, 55 ; I, 188; I, 263; I, 322 ; II, 195; II, 198). Once established, religion is an even stronger orce than asabiyya itsel.Te solidarity it imparts is stronger than the solidarity resulting rom commondescent. Tis is so because religion does away with individual ambition, haughtiness,jealousy, and inghting. It unites the group with respect to outlook and purpose.Even in a savage, notoriously disunited group (such as the Arabs, i.e., Bedouins),religion makes royal authority possible. Furthermore, by removing the ear o deathrom the members o the group, it makes them invincible in conquest.

Arabs can obtain royal authority only by making use o some religious coloring,such as prophecy, or sainthood, or some great religious event in general. Te reasonor this is that because o their savagery, the Arabs are the least willing o nationsto subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, andeager to be the leader. Teir individual aspirations rarely coincide But when thereis religion [among them] through prophecy or sainthood, then they have somerestraining infuence in themselves. Te qualities o haughtiness and jealousy leavethem. It is, then, easy or them to subordinate themselves and to unite [in a socialorganization]. (I, 305)

[R]eligious coloring does away with mutual jealousy and envy among peoplewho share in a group eeling, and causes concentration upon the truth. Whenpeople [who have a religious coloring] come to have the [right] insight into theiraairs, nothing can withstand them, because their outlook is one and their objectone o common accord. Tey are willing to die or [their objectives]. [On the other


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hand] the members o the dynasty they attack may be many times as numerousas they. But their purposes dier, in as much as they are alse purposes, and [thepeople o the worldly dynasty] come to abandon each other, since they are araido death. Tereore, they do not oer resistance to [the people with a religiouscoloring], even i they themselves are more numerous. Tey are overpowered bythem and quickly wiped out (I, 320).

On the other hand, in describing the rise o Islam specically, Ibn Khaldunpresented it as a unique and incomparable event. Te early years o Islam were atruly exceptional period in history as, or a ew generations, the naturalasabiyya wasnot just complemented and enhanced by religion, but was eclipsed and supersededby the experience o direct divine intervention in human aairs.

Asabiyya, which determines unity and disunity in the customary course o aairs,was not o the same signicance then Islam was winning the hearts o thepeople and causing them to be willing to die or it in a way that disrupted thecustomary course o aairs. Tat happened because people observed with theirown eyes the presence o angels to help them. Men generally had the coloringo submissiveness and obedience. Tey were thoroughly rightened and perturbedby a sequence o extraordinary miracles and other divine happenings (I, 436-37;c. I, 444).

As a result, the whole will o each and every member o the community wasgoverned by his religious conviction, and his animal nature was held in check.Religion in this true and absolute sense made all other restraints and checks

unnecessary.24

Tis was, indeed, a truly extraordinary situation, all the more so as thissubmissiveness, obedience, and reliance on the laws did not destroy the earlybelievers ortitude (as would normally be the case) but rather strengthened andenhanced it (I, 259).

the men around Muhammad observed the religious laws, and yet did notexperience any diminution o their ortitude, but possessed the greatest possibleortitude. When the Muslims got their religion rom the Lawgiver [Muhammad],the restraining infuence came rom themselves, as a result o the encouragementand discouragement he gave them in the Quran. It was not a result o technicalprecepts o the religion, which they received orally and which their rmly rooted

[belie in] the truth o the articles o aith caused them to observe. Teir ortituderemained unabated, and it was not corroded by education or authority (I, 260)

Te reason oered by Ibn Khaldun or the strength and invincibility o the earlyMuslim community, hence, is two-old: rst, its religion and the laws thereo weretrue, and second, its members had experienced that religions appearance rsthand,


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which caused them to observe its laws in absolute obedience and submission.Tus, the restraining infuence came rom the early Muslims themselves and theypossessed the greatest possible ortitude. Tey were thereore able to build astrong and united state, and were completely invincible.

Te strength o the original religious experience, however, paled as the eventssurrounding the aiths rst appearance receded into the past. Aairs began to taketheir ordinary course again.

Tese helpul [circumstances] passed with the disappearance o miracles andthe death o the generation that had witnessed them with their own eyes Teinfuence o asabiyya and o the ordinary course o aairs maniested itsel inthe resulting good and bad institutions. Te [question o] caliphate and o royal

authority and that o the succession to both became very important aairs in theopinion o the people (I, 437).

While, thereore, neither asabiyya nor the caliphate or royal authority had beeno any importance or the rst generations o Muslims, these issues regained theirimportance or the later generations.

Here, however, Ibn Khaldun made a clear distinction between good and badroyal authority. A group eeling that is working or the truth and or the ulllmento the divine commands is something desirable (I, 416). Royal authority is equallyacceptable as long as it is exercised or the sake o God and in the way o God.

Likewise, when the Lawgiver [Muhammad] censures royal authority, he does

not censure it or gaining superiority through truth, or orcing the great massto accept the aith, nor or looking aer the [public] interests. He censures royalauthority or achieving superiority through worthless means and or employinghuman beings or indulgence in [selsh] purposes and desires I royal authoritywould sincerely exercise its superiority over men or the sake o God and so asto cause those men to worship God and to wage war against His enemies, therewould not be anything reprehensible in it (I, 416-17).

Hence, what corrupts both asabiyya and royal authority and makes themreprehensible is distance rom the demands and concerns o Islam, which goes handin hand with personal and collective submission to greed, pride, and selshness.Te great wealth which the early Muslims acquired, however, was not directly

responsible or this corruption since even wealth, i used in the way o God, isrighteous. Tere was no blame attached to the tremendous wealth amassed by theearly Muslims because what they had acquired was lawul property:

Tey did not employ their property wasteully but in a planned way Amassingworldly property is reprehensible, but it did not refect upon them, because blame


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attaches only to waste and lack o planning. Since their expenditures ollowed aplan and served the truth and its ways, the amassing [o so much property] helpedthem along on the path o truth and served the purpose o attaining the otherworld (I, 420-21).

Even the early Umayyads, like the early rulers o the Abbasid dynasty aer them,did not apply their superiority to worthless things, and they did not abandon theintentions o the religion or the ways o the truth (I, 421). Te later members oboth houses, however, orgot the deliberate planning and the reliance upon thetruth that had guided the activities o their predecessors (I, 423). When the laterAbbasids began to be concerned only with the gratication o their desires andwith sinul pleasures, when they became enmeshed in worldly aairs o no value

and turned their backs on Islam God permitted them to be ruined, and [Hepermitted] the Arabs to be completely deprived o their power, which he gave toothers (I, 424).

Gods punishment or these greedy, selsh, and hence illegitimate dynastieswas their disappearance rom the ace o the earth. As or the community atlarge, its corruption resulted in ragmentation, actionalism, and dissent. Whenthe Muslims ceased to cling to their religion as their sole source o unity andenthusiasm, asabiyya reemerged in order to weld society together once again andto strengthen it in commitment and purpose. Tereby, the Islamic community,now no longer the perect community o its beginnings, reverted to the customarycourse o aairs. Group eelingor the group eelings o its dissident actionsagain rose and declined in the customary ashion, while the communitys strength

and achievements rose and declined with it.Like Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli recognized religion as the prime cohesive orce

and central source o group solidarity. In addition, he gave a prominent place in hisdiscussions o politically e cient groups and individuals to the concept o virt.Machiavellis virt can be a collective as well as an individual quality, unlike IbnKhalduns asabiyya, which is always a collective orce.

It will now be necessary to consider rst Machiavellis views on the natureo collective and individual virtue as a wellspring o political cohesiveness ande ciency, then on the relationship o virtue to religion, and nally on the role oreligion as a source o unity and strength in e cient political development.


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As he pondered the question o whether the past was better than thepresent, Machiavelli, in the introduction to the second book o TeDiscourses, argued that essentially the world has always been in the

same condition in it there has been just as much good as there is evil but thisevil and this good have varied rom province to province.25

Tis may be seen rom the knowledge we have o ancient kingdoms, in which thebalance o good and evil has changed rom one to the other owing to changes intheir customs, whereas the world as a whole has remained the same.

What Machiavelli implied is that good and evil are the result o the presenceor absence o a mysterious reality, a substance26 which is and has been o equalquantity through the ages, but which has generally been unevenly distributed. Tismysterious reality is virt.

Te only dierence is that the worlds virt rst ound a home in Assyria, thenfourished in Media and later in Persia, and at length arrived in Italy and Rome.And, i since the Roman empire there has been no other which has lasted, and in

which the worlds virt has been centered, one none the less nds it distributedamongst many nations where men lead virtuous lives. Tere was, or instance,the kingdom o the Franks; the kingdom o the urks, [i.e.,] that o the Sultan;and today all the peoples o Germany. Earlier still there were the Saracens, whoperormed such great exploits and occupied so much o the world, since they brokeup the Roman Empire in the East. Hence, aer ruin had overtaken the Romans,

III


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there continued to exist in all these provinces and in all these separate units, andstill exists in some o them, that virt which is desired and quite rightly praised(Discourses [hereaer reerred to as D] II: Preace, 5).

In its mysterious migrations this orce or substance virt sometimes wasconcentrated at one location, then again at several; then again it was ragmentedand divided all over the world. It moves, emerges, and disappears unpredictably.Wherever it exists, states thrive and empires rise. Whenever it disappears, strongrule declines and empires dwindle (D I: 10, 78)

Virt avors both great nations and great individuals. In a nation, virt is theinvisible, strong erment whose presence means strength, political cohesiveness,and political e ciency. Without it, nations are weak and torn. In individuals, on the

other hand, it creates the will and the power to rule. Only when possessed ovirtdo nations and individuals have ambition and courage. Without it, menbothcollectively and individuallyare cowardly, lazy, hal-hearted animals o habit,incapable o great eats, and capable only o leading ahistoric lives.27

Te complexities o the concept virt, however, do not stem solely rom itsdual nature as a collective and an individual quality. Rather, they more signicantlyderive rom the act that the term virt spans a whole spectrum o meanings,connotations, and associations. Tis multiplicity o meaning was intended byMachiavelli. Indeed, the ambiguity is essential to his presentation o his teaching. Itserves the purpose o making the reader, in Leo Strausss words, ascend rom thecommon understanding o virtue to the diametrically opposite understanding.28

At one end o the semantic spectrum, virt means possession o moral virtue

and adherence to religion. In its collective maniestation, this moral virt avorsyoung nations that adhere closely to a living religion and ollow the traditions oa great ounder or lawgiver (D I: 9, 2 -3; D I: 11, 5). Such nations live by loymoral principles. Tey are also unspoiled, healthy in body and spirit, and willingto sacrice all or the common good. Tey live in equality, relative poverty, andreedom (e.g., the Germans; D I: 55). Tese nations are lled with vitality andhence are politically e cient. Tey show courage and are successul in battle andconquest.29 And, i their virt exists in particularly concentrated orm, it enables itsbearers to embark on the building o empire.30 Serious political crises are overcomeby them with relative ease and can even lead to their rejuvenation. Te virt osuch great nations shines brightly even in the darker moments o their history and

enables them to persevere and to regain their strength, as was the case or Romeduring the dangerous times o the Punic Wars:

No bad luck ever made [them] become abject, nor did good ortune ever makethem arrogant or though the deeat was very serious, since it was their third,they never became disheartened, but kept their armies in the eld, declined to


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redeem those who had allowed themselves to be taken prisoners, contrary to theirpractice, did not send emissaries to Hannibal or to Carthage to sue or peace, but,dispensing with any such subject steps as these, devoted their whole attention tothe war, and, owing to the shortage o men, armed both the old and the slavesHence, it is clear that in trying times the Romans were not despondent, nor werethey humbled. Nor, on the other hand, did prosperous times make them arrogant(D III: 31, 2).

Such moral strength (virt) o a people can be maintained through periodicrejuvenation ensured by the laws and institutions by which that people isgoverned.

Te institutions which caused the Roman republic to return to its start were theintroduction o plebeian tribunes, o the censorship, and o all the other lawswhich put a check on human ambitions and arrogance (D III: 1, 5).

Te original strength can also be maintained i great national leaders and heroesreinstall the nation with the old virtues by leading, themselves, virtuous lives.

Hence, virt was also seen by Machiavelli as an individualquality, and as suchit may act both as an example to be ollowed, and as a restraint. Its eect upon thepolitical community is the imparting o security, peace, justice and harmony, andthereby o unity and strength.

What he will nd when good princes were ruling is a prince securely reigningamongst subjects no less secure, a world replete with peace and justice. He willsee nobility and virt held in the highest esteem, and everything workingsmoothly and going well. He will notice, on the other hand, the absence o anyrancor, any licentiousness, corruption and ambition, and that in this golden ageeveryone is ree to hold and to deend his own opinion (D I: 10, 7). Such a return totheir starting point in republics is sometimes due to the simple virtue o one manalone, independently o any law spurring you into action (D III: 1, 7).

Such occurrences are due to some good man who arises in their midst and byhis example and virtuous deeds produces the same eect as does the constitution(D III: 1, 4).

A good and wise man may bring great advantages to his country when thanks to

his goodness and his virtue he has got rid o envy (D III: 30, 2).

As an individual quality in such princes, this type ovirt clearly implies individualmoral virtue in the widest sense, which includes religion. As indicated above,Machiavelli also spoke o good princes. And indeed he oen used the wordgoodness to denote the virtuous princes morality and adherence to religion.


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Te term virt can also reer to a purely political quality that is ree oconnotations o morality and religion. Machiavelli, however, saw this type ovirtonly as an individual and not a collective quality. In the individual, this virt consistso a combination o virtuosity, cleverness, valor and courage, greatness o mind,and manliness, without any admixture o moral virtuealthough the reputation orpossessing the latter can be indispensable.31 Machiavelli saw the corrupt politicaladventurer o his own day as a person ar removed rom the mythical hero-lawgivero the virtuous beginnings and the good prince. Yet, he conquers and establishespolitical domination successully because there is some amount ovirt ermentingwithin him. His strength o mind and will enables him to use even his vices to hisadvantage. Tereore, he is successul in a world which, corrupt as it is, does notdeserve any better. A case in point is Cesare Borgia, who, despite his maniold

vices, was, Machiavelli claimed, endowed with virt.32 Machiavelli also ascribedvirt to the wicked Severus, who in spite o his wickedness died an ordinary death,a act that must be put down to his great good luck and to his virt, two things owhich ew men enjoy both (D I: 10, 6).

Tis virt is born o sel-reliance and sel-love. From it fow strength andgreatness. An individual thus endowed need not have religion, nor need he bemoral. o succeed, he only needs to make the most o his valor and resourceulnessto use moral virtue and vice according to the requirements o the situation. Tis mayimply the necessity to appear religious, and to maintain incorrupt the ceremonieso their religion and hold them always in veneration. Prudence in the individualruler or leader is more important than religion and morality.

While virt in the individual can thus be divorced rom religion, a nationscollective virt is always linked to religion. Te reasons or the importance oreligion to the political community are many. Machiavelli saw religion as the sourceo collective morality and virtue, o dedication to the common good and reesubjection to serving the whole or ones neighbors.33 Equally important, religionengenders obedience to the rulers. Te ear o Godor o the godswhich inspiresa nation has the eect o making the citizens earul o and obedient to theirleaders. Tis is particularly true in a republic. Tereore, to ound a strong republic,it is more important to organize and strengthen the religion than to promulgate aconstitution.

Tough the rst person to give Rome a constitution was Romulus, to whom, as

a daughter, it owed its birth and education, yet, since heaven did not deem theinstitutions o Romulus adequate or so great an empire, it inspired the Romansenate to choose Numa Pompilius as Romulus successor, so that the things whichhe had le undone, might be instituted by Numa. Numa, nding the peopleerocious and desiring to reduce them to civic obedience conjoined with the artso peace, turned to religion as the instrument necessary above all others or the


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maintenance o a civilized state, and so constituted it that there was never or somany centuries so great a ear o God as there was in this republic (D I: 11, 1). Itwill also be seen by those who pay attention to Roman history, how much religionhelped in the control o armies, in encouraging the plebs, in producing good men,and in shaming the bad. So that i it were a question o the prince to whom Romewas more indebted, Romulus or Numa, Numa, I think, should easily obtain rstplace. For, where there is religion, it is easy to teach men to use arms, but wherethere are arms, but not religion, it is with di culty that it can be introduced (DI:11, 3).

Te act that the Romans were earul o their gods made it easy or their senate andtheir rulers to control them and to lead them to greatness.

All things considered, thereore, I conclude that the religion introduced byNuma was among the primary causes o Romes happiness; or this entailed goodinstitutions; good institutions led to good ortune; and rom good ortune arosethe happy results o undertakings (D I: 11, 5).

Tereore, all rulers should try to preserve the oundations o religion in their state.

But those princes and those republics which desire to remain ree rom corruptionshould above all else maintain incorrupt the ceremonies o their religion andshould hold them always in veneration; or there can be no surer indication o thedecline o a country than to see divine worship neglected (D I: 12, 1).

Te political comeback o a state, on the other hand, is possible only in combinationwith a reorm and restrengthening o religion.

Aer Rome had been taken by the Gauls, it was reborn, and in its rebirth tookon alike a new vitality and a newvirt and also took up again the observance oreligion and justice, both o which had begun to show blemishes (D III: 1, 3).

I, however, religion is le to decline, the nations political decline will inevitablyollow. Once it is corrupted, religion loses its eectiveness as a source o collectivestrength, and instead contributes to and accelerates the ongoing political corruption(D I: 12, 5-7). As religion is the source o a nations moral virtue, the guarantor ocivic obedience, and the wellspring o the communitys political solidarity, the state

stands and alls by religion. We encounter here a surprising paradox in the roleMachiavelli ascribed to religion in the state. While the individual can be successulin politics without religion, the political community cannot, since it is unable toachieve solidarity without it. Te nations collective virt is always linked to andfows rom religion.


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I he then looks attentively at the times o the other emperors, he will nd themdistraught with wars, torn by seditions, brutal alike in peace and in war Hewill see Rome burnt, its Capitol demolished by its own citizens, ancient templeslying desolate, religious rites grown corrupt, adultery rampant through the cityIn Rome he will see countless atrocities perpetrated; rank, riches, the honorsmen have won, and, above all, virt looked upon as a capital crime. He will ndcalumniators rewarded, servants suborned to turn against their masters, reedmen to turn against their patrons, and those who lack enemies attacked by theirriends (D I: 10, 8).

While religion in general makes collective virt possible, provides internalstrength, and inspires to action and the winning o glory, the Christian religion,according to Machiavelli, has had the opposite eect.

People o old were more ond o liberty than they are today because o the dierencebetween our religion and the religion o those days. For our religion, having taught usthe truth and the true way o lie, leads us to ascribe less esteem to worldly honorthe old religion did not beatiy men unless they were replete with worldly glory:army commanders, or instance, and rulers o republics. Our religion has gloriedhumble and contemplative men, rather than men o action. It has assigned as manshighest good humility, abnegation, and contempt or mundane things, whereas theother identies it with magnanimity, bodily strength, and everything else that tendsto make men very bold (D II: 2, 6).

Tis pattern o lie, thereore, appears to have made the world weak, and to have

handed it over as prey to the wicked, who run it successully and securely since theyare well aware that the generality o men, with paradise or their goal, consider howbest to bear, rather than how best to avenge, their injuries. But, though it looks as ithe world were become eeminate and as i heaven were powerless, this undoubtedlyis due rather to the pusillanimity o those who have interpreted our religion in terms

o laissez-aire (lozio) not in terms o valor (virt). For, had they borne inmind that religion permits us to exalt and deend the atherland, they wouldhave seen that it also wishes us to love and honor it, and to train ourselves tobe such that we may deend it (D II: 2, 7).

Unlike the ancient religions, the Christian religion regards humility, abnegation, andcontempt or mundane things as the highest good. Tereby, it lowers among its

ollowers the esteem or worldly honor. On the one hand, this must be so because inChristian belie God himsel assumed humility and meekness. Te belie in the Passionosters passivity, contemplation, weakness, and servility. On the other hand, however, theault lies primarily with the interpreters o Christianity who are cowardly people. By theirunwillingness or inability to imitate the ancients, they have created a world that looks asi [it] were become eeminate and a heaven that appears as i [it] were powerless.


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As or the Church, it has done more harm even than the cowardly interpreterso the Christian religion....Owing to the bad example set by the Court o Rome, Italy has lost all devotionand all religion. Attendant upon this are innumerable inconveniences andinnumerable disorders; or as, where there is religion, it may be taken or grantedthat all is going well, so, where religion is wanting, one may take or granted theopposite. Te rst debt which we, Italians, owe to the Church and to priests,thereore, is that we have become irreligious and perverse (D I: 12, 6). But we owethem a yet greater debt, which is the second cause o our ruin. It is the Church thathas kept, and keeps, Italy divided. Now o a truth no country has ever been unitedand happy unless the whole o it has been under the jurisdiction o one republic orone prince, as has happened in France and Spain. And the reason why Italy is not

in the same position, i.e., why there is not one republic or one prince ruling there,is due entirely to the Church. For, though the Church has its headquarters in Italyand has temporal power, neither its power nor its virtue has been su ciently greator it to be able to subjugate Italian truants and to make itsel their prince; nor yet,on the other hand, has it been so weak that it could not, when araid o losing itsdominion over things temporal, call upon one o the powers to deend it againstan Italian state that had become too powerul (D I: 12, 7).

Te corrupting and weakening eect o the Church, then, is two-old: rst,general irreligiosity and vice because o the bad example set by the members othe Church who themselves have lost religion, and second, political division anddisunity in Italy because o the Churchs inability to occupy and unite the whole o

Italy, and its unwillingness to let anyone else occupy and unite it.


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Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli were trying to grasp the undamentaland speciic element which constitutes that level o reality calledpolitical reality. he North Arican Arab, amiliar with the tribal

basis o much o his own eras politics as well as o previous Islamic eras, sawas the main collective orce and wellspring o social cohesion notor not atirstreligion, but rather the natural eeling o solidarity (asabiyya) whichexists normally among blood relatives, and sometimes among non-relatives.

It is a quality natural to man in his group. It shapes the group as it determines,brings orth, and maintains institutions through which desires and appetitesare satisied.34 his orce is the immediate cause creating and maintaining anyregime, be it that o a member o the indigenous aristocracy or, more rarely,that o a charismatic outsider.

While the orce itsel is a quality natural to man in his group, and whilethere is nothing mysterious about its being there, it exists in dierent degreeso strength. Quantity and density are critical here. It is this quantity anddensity, not the mere existence o the orce itsel, which represent the secreto superiority. hough inexplicable, this secret o superiority is still one othe observable laws o nature.

his collective orce, which is a unction o the initial cohesiveness o thegroup, is greatly strengthened by religion. Even so, however, it is bound in adynamic process o growth and dissolution, as is all that this collective orcebrings orth: the civilized political, economic, and scientiic institutions, thearts, customs, and conventions. Created to satisy mans desires or victory,superiority, power, luxury, and leisure, these conventions and institutions also

IV


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reach an optimal point beyond which they will not develop, and, inevitably,they decline.For Machiavelli, who was the quintessential representative o Renaissance

individualism, the basic creative political orce or secret o superiority was virt,a mysterious substance or reality which distinguishes great men individuallyas well as great nations collectively. When it maniests itsel in great men, it is anatural quality or a gi o nature, or such men by their nature desire to acquirewealth, honor, and glory.35 In great nations, however, it does not arise as a naturalquality but results rom habituation and society, as it requires the establishment ogood institutions that ensure the groups dedication to the common good and thecurbing o individual selshness. Tese institutions in turn can only be establishedi religion is alive and well among the group. Only then will it be possible or the

state to pursue the common good as its authoritative end; and this, Machiavellisaid, is true both or principalities and or republics.36

Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli saw personal and collective moral virtueas an important condition or generating and/or encouraging this basic creativepolitical orce that engenders solidarity and cohesion. Moral virtue is also a clearindication o the orces presence. Groups or nations who have it are unspoiled,healthy, and dedicated. Tey live in equality and reedom. Tey are usually youngand resh. Weakening and disappearance o this basic political strength, on theother hand, entail the loss o personal and collective virtue.

I it is to generate, sustain, and guarantee long-term collective morality andvirtue, no political community can do without religion. Both Ibn Khaldun and

Machiavelli saw a living religion as the ortier o group strength, the enhancero group solidarity, the eliminator o collective deects and shortcomings. ForIbn Khaldun, solidarity created by religion was stronger as well as longer-lastingthan solidarity created by common descent. Although he could envisage primitivegroups that are held together or a while merely by group eeling, i.e., groupswithout religion as the basis o their internal social solidarity, he neverthelessperceived religion as the prime cohesive orce that endows the young nation withthe strength to establish a state. Machiavelli, on the other hand, relied on religion asthe source o social solidarity to an even higher degree than Ibn Khaldun. Withoutreligion, nations cannot develop virtue, since it is only on the basis o observedreligionwith the rites and rituals perormed and adhered to seriouslythatgood institutions can be established which then restrain individual selshness and

ensure the supremacy o the common good. Paradoxically, thereore, religion as therestraint on mans animal nature and the motive or his dedication to the commongood plays a greater and more important role in Machiavellis state than it does inIbn Khalduns.

Why are societies and states nevertheless doomed to decline? More specically,what reduces the strength o religion and weakens its salutary impact on society?


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According to Ibn Khaldun, the cycle o rise and decline o groups is nota matter o intrinsic necessity, but is caused by the circumstances. Physical,geographic, biological, psychological, and social actors determine the characterand development o collective human action and habits. Te thrust toward riseand decline, however, is not inevitably determined by these actors, nor are allhuman decisions determined by objective circumstances. Rather, the ate o manand society was and is decided by the collective choice to submit to or to disregardthe laws o religion.

For Ibn Khaldun, both the birth o Islam and its early history representeda direct divine intervention in human aairs. Ten, religion was not a meresecondhand branch o knowledge but was recognized or what it was, the ruth,which governed the whole will o all believers and guided them in all o their acts.

Aer the experience o this intervention had aded, and its initial tremendousimpact had been lost, Islam ceased to be su cient as the source o unity andagreement, and the old cohesive power o natural group eeling had to come tothe ore again to weld society together and endow it with strength. It was then thatthe righteous caliphate was transormed into ordinary kingshipwhen the orceo natural solidarity regained ascendancy over the religious enthusiasm that hadprovided strength and cohesion in the time o the early rulers. Tus, man, who wastoo weak to keep the original Islamic experience alive, was once again trapped inan existence marked by the pattern o rise and decline. By holding ast to the lawso God and their new religion, by avoiding the sin o pride, the sin o luxury, thesin o greed,37 by submitting wholly to the ruth and Law which are rom God

Himsel, the members o the Islamic community could have escaped that ate. Teirsinul ailure to do so undid the possibility o maintaining the perect society andescaping rom the inevitable decline.

Tese value judgements clearly prove that Ibn Khaldun did not intend tocreate a positive or historical or truly scientic social science, i.e., a value-neutral discipline in the contemporary sense, as it has been ashionable to suggestin the past.38 In his discussions o political and social development, to be sure,Ibn Khaldun concentrated on the study and the explanation o actual events. Heshowed greater interest in how societies had actually existed than in the best ormo society. It is this which gives his theories a semblance o modernity.39 IbnKhalduns political realism, the act that he described the phenomena o politicallie as he saw them to exist, and that on the basis o these empirical observations

he does in act describe them objectively and dispassionately, with a remarkablegrasp o the essential characteristics o political power, the stages o its evolution,and the intricate interrelations o the State with all aspects o human civilization,40

has led in many instances to a misunderstanding o the undamental aspects ohis philosophy. Ultimately, however, in spite o this emphasis on the necessityo knowing the exact nature o man, both social and political, Ibn Khaldun


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was ar rom believing that such knowledge was possible without knowingthe true end o man and society as well as the degrees o their perection. 41 IbnKhaldun was a student o classical and Islamic political philosophy. His study oprophecy, the religious law, and the nature o the Islamic community prove, asMuhsin Mahdi has convincingly shown, that he was a true disciple o the IslamicPlatonic tradition o political philosophy.42 Hence, he was neither a positivist nora pragmatist. Just as he continued to measure the actual deeds o man against theLaw inspired rom above, to weigh actual societies against the perect society tojudge the degree o their imperection, so he described actual states, i.e., specicpolitical orders, as imperect instantiations o a perect exemplar or model,namely the early Islamic umma.

Quite a dierent position emerges in Machiavellis statements on religion and

politics. Machiavelli, like Ibn Khaldun, held that religion generates and guaranteescollective morality and virtue and thus is a salutary orce. Hence, he advocatedthat the ruler should try to preserve the oundations o religion in his state, andwarned that otherwise he would weaken both the state and himsel. Machiavellisaw religion as politically useul. However, he was not concerned with religion asGod-given ruth and Law, nor did he see corruption o religion as resulting romhuman weakness and sin. Both the rise and all o religion to him were merelyobservable historical acts. Once corrupted, religion loses its strength and becomesa actor that urther accelerates the ongoing corruption. Tus, through oresightand wise attention to the well-being o religion, Machiavellis ruler can orestall orat least slow down the decline. He can also ensure a rejuvenation o his nation by

enorcing the old laws and institutions. But these measures are strictly utilitarian.In terms o motivation and goal, they are worldly and political, not concerned withthe application o immutable standards which transcend the actual.

Machiavelli took this attitude evenor particularlytoward the religion oChristianity. Christianity, as he pointed out repeatedly, is a religion incapable oproviding a deense against decline. Indeed, Machiavelli compared Christianityunavorably with other (i.e., pagan) religions. For instead o stressing action, glory,and worldly honor, Christianityat least as interpreted by the Churchteachescontemplation, humility, abnegation, and contempt or mundane achievements. Itis thus politically a liability rather than an asset. It is by discarding Christianity thatnations can become, at least potentially, politically more e cient.

In this ashion, Machiavelli indicated that he considered religion as useul and

even indispensable in politics, but that he was completely indierent to the truthso religion. Te pagan religions, since they endowed their ollowers with prudenceand strength, were part o the virtue o the ancients. Since Machiavelli arguedthat ancient virtue ought to be imitated, he denied the truth o Christianity ando religion as such. He was both a positivist and a pragmatist and in this respectdiered sharply rom Ibn Khaldun. Indeed, Machiavellis pragmatism orbade


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him to go beyond political acts and the problem o how to control them. He sawreligion as merely a political act, useul i it promotes the end o politics, useless iit does not. But it has no objective validity in and o itsel.

As or Ibn Khaldun, the great emphasis that he put on historical act and reality,as evidenced by his interest in explaining actual events, observing their relationships,outlining their trends, and analyzing their regularity, gave his work a favor opragmatism which, however, is essentially alien to his philosophy. He viewed theconcrete and particular events, their multiplicity and change, as only a beginningrom which to get at the essential structure behind the brute acts o history. IbnKhaldun saw religion, at least in the case o Islam, as not one more historical actbut as the ruth that provides the underlying principle, the immutable standardthat transcends all history and all political development.

Ibn Khaldun thereore never perceived government as an autonomous secularactivity capable o making its own morality which could be considered apartrom religion. It was this very idea, on the other hand, which is implicit in thenaked exposition o strictly political acts that gave such notoriety to Machiavelliswritings. Ibn Khaldun, like all classical Islamic political theorists, including al-Mawardi and even Ibn aymiyya,43 believed that religious and secular authoritydo not merely coexist, but are identical, since the supreme o ce in the community(the caliphate or imamate) includes all other o ces. At the same time, developedsociety is a lawul society in which both the rulers and the ruled are governed bythe sharia, the law o God.44 Authority that alls short o this God-given order isultimately illegitimate authority. Te Islamic community that ails to be a lawul

society is sinul and deserves to be weakened and ragmented.With these insights, our comparison o Ibn Khalduns and Machiavellis

thoughts on the role o religion as a social and political cohesive orce and thesource o political e ciency has brought us to the proound dierence between themedieval Muslim author and the Renaissance European writer. We nd here thesame conceptual dierence that has continued to distinguish Islamic rom Westernpolitical philosophy and social science.

Among the most proound actors disguising this proound dierence, at leastinitially, were, rst, Ibn Khalduns political realism and interest in the concretemaniestations o social and political entities, which gave his work a much moremodern favor than is to be ound even with many twentieth-century Muslimwriters (such as Mawdudi) who are generally more pronouncedly theocratic-

utopian in their ideas; and second, the large and important role Machiavelliconceived or religion in the ounding and maintenance o states and the survivalo governments. Ultimately, however, the dierence in philosophical oundationsoutweighs the supercially similar aspects o their thinking. While Ibn Khaldun hassometimes been seen in the West as the predecessor o Machiavelli in developing atruly modern (i.e., secular) science o politics and society, he remained essentially


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and devoutly within the mainstream o orthodox Islamic political philosophy, andno such unity o eort in East and West can be detected. Islam remained in theourteenth century at Ibn Khalduns hands what it still is today, an all-inclusivepolitical ideology and thereby the prime source o political legitimacy in theIslamic umma. Machiavelli, on the other hand, recognized the idea o governmentas an autonomous secular activity, independent o religion (but using religion iand when it wishes), that derives its legitimacy rom other sources and is t tomake its own morality. Tis notion, o course, has gained ground in the West to apoint where political development, in most peoples opinion, is inversely related toreligion in politics.45


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ENDNOTES

1. Ibn Khaldun, Te Muqaddima, translated rom the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal(New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1958), Vol. I, p. 305.

2. Ibid., p. 320.3. Ibid., p. 321.4. Niccolo Machiavelli, Te Discourses, translated rom the Italian by Leslie J.

Walker, ed. by Dr. W. Stark, two volumes (London: Routledge & Kegan PaulLtd., 1950), Book 1: Chapter 11, Section 1.

5. Ibid., I: 11, 3.6. Ibid., I: 11, 15.7. Ibid., I: 12, 1.

8. Ibid., I: 12, 3.9. Ibid. Tese similarities have been perceivedthough not analyzedbeore.

C. E. Rosenthals remark that Ibn Khalduns ideas about the absolute necessityo religion or a united and eective state are strikingly reminiscent oMachiavelli (E. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldun, a North Arican Muslim Tinkero the Fourteenth Century,John Rylands Library Bulletin, 1940, as cited in C.Issawi,An Arab Philosophy o History[London: John Murray, 1950], p. 11.)

10. C. Mattingly, Machiavelli, Renaissance Profles, ed. J. H. Plumb (New York:Harper & Row [Harper orchbooks], 1961), p. 20.

11. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khalduns Philosophy o History(Chicago: University o ChicagoPress, 1964), p. 291.

12. Ibid., pp. 37., 126. C. F. Rosenthals Introduction to Ibn Khaldun,Muqaddima, pp. XXIX-LXVII.13. H. Freyer, Introduction to N. Machiavelli, Der Frst, translated rom the

Italian by Ernst Merian-Genast (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, June, 1961), pp.3-12.

14. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, Illinois: Te Free Press, 1958), pp.15-53.

15. M. Mahdi, Philosophy o History, p. 288.16. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, p. 22.17. H. Freyer, Introduction to Der Frst, pp. 12-28. C. A. Bonadeo, Corruption,

Conict, and Power in the Works and imes o Niccol Machiavelli (Berkeleyand Los Angeles: University o Caliornia Press, 1973), pp. 125-126.

18. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, pp. 54, 55, 62, 63.19. Ibid., p. 88.20. Ibid., p. 101.21. F. Rosenthal, Introduction, to Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, pp. LXXVIII and

LXXXIX.22. All Muqaddima quotations reer to F. Rosenthals translation. I have,


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however, substituted the original Arabic term asabiyya or Rosenthalstranslation group eeling.23. o linkasabiyya, a psychic orce, with the reigning cosmology o elements

is an unusual and interesting thought. Tis passage, the rst o the two cited,appears only in the unis manuscript o theMuqaddima used by the editor oBulaq (Nasr al-Hurini, Bulaq, 1274/1857) and was dropped in all later texts.See Ibn Khaldun,Muqaddima, Vol. 1, pp. 268-69.

24. H. A. R. Gibb, Studies in the Civilization o Islam (London: Routledge & KeganPaul Ltd., 1962), p. 173 .

25. Machiavelli, Discourses, Book II: Preace, p. 5. All Discourses quotations reerto this translation and edition. I have, however, substituted the original Italianterm virt or Walkers translations o this term.

26. H. Freyer,Machiavelli (Lepzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1938), p. 99.27. Ibid., pp. 98 .28. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, p. 47.29. Machiavelli, Discourses, I: 4, 1; I: 9, 2 and 3; I: 29, 3; I: 43, 2 and 3; II: 1, 4; II: 12,

6; II: 17, 2; II: 18, 6, 7 and 9; II: 22, 2 and 4; II: 24, 1; II: 29, 1 and 3; III: 12, 1; III:13, 1 and 4; III: 21, 3 and 5; III: 36, 2 and 3.

30. Ibid., I: 9, 2 and 3; I: 10, 6; I: 11, 5; III: 22, 1.31. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, pp. 47, 269.32. Machiavelli, he Prince, a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark

Musa (New York: St. Martins Press, 1964), pp. 58, 60. C. Freyer,Machiavelli,pp. 108-109.

33. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, p. 228.34. M. Mahdi, Philosophy o History, p. 262.35. L. Strauss, Toughts on Machiavelli, pp. 269, 246.36. Ibid., p. 269.37. H. A. R. Gibb, Civilization o Islam, p. 173.38. M. Mahdi, Philosophy o History, p. 11.39. Ibid., p. 293.40. H. A. R. Gibb, Civilization o Islam, p. 169.41. M. Mahdi, Philosophy o History, p. 293.42. Ibid., Chapter II.43. H. A. R. Gibb, Civilization o Islam, p. 169.44. M. Hudson, Islam and Political Development, Islam and Development, ed. J.

L. Esposito (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980), p. 3.45. Ibid., p. 13.


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OTHER CCAS PAPERS

The Idea o an Anthropology o Islam

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CCAS Occasional Papers are essays, lectures, research notes, andother items o interest to students, scholars, and riends o George-

town Universitys Center or Contemporary Arab Studies. The views

expressed are solely those o the author.

For a complete list o CCAS Papers, see http://ccas.georgetown.edu/research.


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For over 35 years, Georgetown Universitys Center or Contemporary

Arab Studies (CCAS) has enjoyed international recognition as a leader

in research, teaching, and scholarship about Arab society, culture,

and politics. At a time when it is especially urgent to comprehend the

historical and sociopolitical specifcities and transormations o the

Arab world in all o their complexity, CCAS has played a key role in

illuminating the dynamic interaction o the Arab world with the West.

CCAS is helping to prepare new generations o scholars, diplomats,

business leaders, teachers, citizens, and policymakers capable ocritical thought, constructive dialogue, and creative engagement with

the riches and challenges o the contemporary Arab world.

The Center, located in the nations capital, is distinguished by its rigorous

Arabic language training. It is part o Georgetown Universitys Edmund

A. Walsh School o Foreign Service, the oldest school o international

aairs in the United States. In recognition o the Centers frst decade

o excellence, the late Senator J. William Fulbright observed in 1985

that with remarkable oresight, Georgetown University moved to fll

the need or understanding the Arab people by creating the Center or

Contemporary Arab Studies...oering a signifcant contribution to our

country.

Since 1997, CCAS has ormed the core o Georgetown Universitys

National Resource Center on the Middle East, unded by a Title VI grant

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Few regions o the world now command as much attention as the Arab

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energy and distinction, illuminating the lives and experiences o the

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