PHOTOGRAPH BY NOAA/ZUMA/CORBIS

Team Three Hurricane Katrina

Group Project

Carl Cahanin, Kelly Miller, & Pamela Portocarrero Arrambide

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Introduction

As a federalist government system, power and authority are separated between

federal, state, and local governments by the 10th Constitutional Amendment (Jay, Goldman,

Hamilton, & Madison, 2008). This separation of power is intended to better serve citizens

by allowing local and state governments to have dominion over those activities that most

directly benefit and affect citizens (Conlan, 2006). However, the federalist system sets the

stage for political influence at multiple levels, restrictive administrative procedures,

financial, and procedures. In order to serve the citizens of a representative government, all

levels of government must communicate, cooperate, and collaborate. The interaction of

these is the study of intergovernmental relations (IGR) or intergovernmental management

(IGM).

In this paper our team will examine the concepts of IGR and IGM as it applies to the

federal, state, and local government’s response to the disaster left by Hurricane Katrina in

2005. The political, financial, administrative, and cooperative actions surrounding the

response to this natural disaster resulted in successes, many failures, and valuable lessons

learned.

Hurricane Katrina Impacts U.S. Gulf Coast States

In early August 2005, the National Hurricane Center in Miami began tracking a

powerfully building storm at the fringes of the Gulf of Mexico (Derthick, 2007). On August

24, 2005 the National Hurricane Center issued its first warning to state and local

governments with more urgent warnings issued as the storm gained power and its

imminent landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast states became apparent (Derthick, 2007). On

August 28, New Orleans Mayor Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation with an astounding

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number of residents successfully leaving the city and others being transported to the

Superdome (Derthick, 2007). Successful pre-planning by the state of Louisiana and the City

of New Orleans resulted in a mass evacuation of over 1.2 million residents leaving only an

estimated 70,000 residents inside the city when Katrina hit (Derthick, 2007).

As Hurricane Katrina passed through the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, it built

up to a Category 5 hurricane, before weakening to a Category 4 to a Category 3 hurricane

with sustained winds of 125 – 140 miles per hour and 20 foot storm surges that flooded

coastal communities (History.com, 2009; Morris et al., 2007). During the storm, and soon

after its passing, the levee system designed to protect the City of New Orleans failed with

numerous breaches adding to the devastation inside the city (Morris et al., 2007). Already

vulnerable by its location inside the swamps of the Mississippi Delta and 80% of the city

sitting below sea level, poor urban planning, and unmet maintenance needs to aging levees.

New Orleans and the remaining city population were quickly flooded making accessibility

for assistance and rescue nearly impossible and dangerous (Derthick, 2007).

City officials and first responders used buses to get as many of the remaining

residents to safety inside the Superdome, a sanctuary that proved to be ill-equipped and

inadequate for this level of need (Derthick, 2007). As the storm passed, the

intergovernmental response to those left stranded is criticized as an even greater disaster

than the storm itself (Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007; Derthick, 2007).

Applying the Concepts of Federalism and Political Influences on the Hurricane Katrina Response

Ideally, the government’s response to a natural disaster should largely be controlled

by the local government, followed by state support and then the federal government as

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requested (Walters & Kettl, 2005). However, in terms of disaster response, since President

Coolidge the federal government has been steadily increasing its role in disaster response

beginning with the Mississippi River flooding in 1927 (Walters & Kettl, 2005). The Federal

Civil Defense Act defined what and how much aid the federal government could extend to

states while the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act set forth the steps in declaring a

disaster and the expected intergovernmental response (Walters & Kettl, 2005). President

Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 with

the intent of creating a federal agency solely tasked with coordinating the federal

government’s assistance to state and local governments when disasters strike (Walters &

Kettl, 2005).

Hurricane Katrina was the first disaster since the terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001(Morris et al., 2007). After September 11, both federal and state governments devoted

considerable effort to emergency response planning with the passage of the Homeland

Security Act, The National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management

System (NIMS) (Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014; Morris et al., 2007). The intent of all planning

and actions was to clearly define the role of each level of government when the next

disaster occurred. In the end, the failures can be attributed to a lack of intergovernmental

collaboration, communication breakdowns, political perceptions, and misunderstandings

of the role each government should have played (Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007;

Lester & Krejci, 2007). Seeing the breakdown of local and state effectiveness, the federal

government attempted to preempt local and state authority by taking control of the

emergency response through FEMA and military response, an act prohibited by the Posse

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Comitatus Act of 1878 limiting the use of federal military forces for domestic activities

(Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007; Derthick, 2007).

Funding the Preparation, Response, and Recovery of Hurricane Katrina Federal funding has been invested in the City of New Orleans to protect it from the

inevitable natural disasters through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) despite its

poor location and unmanaged growth (Derthick, 2007). The port of New Orleans is a

significant point of entry and provides significant economic benefit to the entire country

(Derthick, 2007). The USACE had been working to fortify New Orleans since 1965 by

constructing a levee system and floodgates at a cost of $750 million (Derthick, 2007). The

USACE’s projects were still under construction when Katrina struck with projects

unfinished, maintenance lacking, and poorly designed structures in place (Derthick, 2007).

Beyond the physical construction aimed at protecting New Orleans, considerable federal

funding was invested in emergency response planning, training, and purchasing equipment

(Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007). As the storm passed, considerable financial resources

were expended by all levels of government in search and rescue missions. As the

floodwaters receded, massive amounts of federal funding along with private donations and

aid from nonprofit organizations were contributed to the state and local governments for

rebuilding the Gulf Coast communities (ABC News, March 25, 2013).

Working through the Administrative Requirements to Prepare and Respond to Katrina As with most government endeavors, administrative procedures, tracking, and

reporting are a requirement. In preparing for Katrina, planning and assignment of roles

was an administrative necessity with chain of command and communication channels

established. Investments and training to enact NIMS in times of crisis were devoted at all

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levels of government. However, as the storm hit, these preparation plans were quickly

overwhelmed (Morris et al., 2007). Administratively, failures to properly request aid,

inability to make decisions, transmitting misinformation, and failure to forego

administrative protocol for things such as permits or licenses slowed the response and

ultimately extended human suffering (Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007; ABC News, March

25, 2013).

Government Collaboration to Aid Communities Affected by Hurricane Katrina One of the intentions of emergency planning is to assign roles and designate

established networks of cooperation so that these decisions are not left unanswered or

disputed during an ongoing emergency (Walters & Kettl, 2005). However, a lack of

coordination is blamed as the chief cause of the poor performance and chaos left in the

storm’s aftermath (Morris et al., 2007). In truth, the existing plans, which continue to assign

first response and authority to the local and state governments, assume these governments

are available to coordinate activities (Morris et al., 2007). As Katrina proved, both levels of

government were rendered incapable of adequately coping with the disaster, which

necessitated a larger federal response (Morris et al., 2007).

Morris et al. discuss Kettl’s theory of contingent coordination as a solution to future

coordinated responses (2007). In the contingent coordination theory, authorities establish

separate hierarchal structures functioning together as needed (Morris et al., 2007). This is

a key component of NIMS (Morris et al., 2007). If properly executed, both contingent

coordination and the principles of NIMS address the most prominent failures during the

Katrina response.

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Intergovernmental Successes and Failures

The response to Hurricane Katrina is widely acknowledged as a widespread

government failure. The massive destruction left in its wake made the response too

complex and too severe of an issue to be handled exclusively by local and state officials.

Katrina’s force required the joint efforts of local, state, and federal governments, along with

other agencies, armed forces, organizations, and individuals. This collaborative effort

needed to be present before, during, and after landfall in order to best serve the people of

New Orleans. While most of the government reports, media articles, and rhetoric overplay

the failures of the response, there were also successes, mostly driven by effective

intergovernmental collaboration. Simple examples of successes and failures in the

administrative impact of Katrina include the successful implementation of the Contraflow

evacuation plan countered with the failure to recover bodies for lack of a medical examiner

(Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007). However, more extensive and complicated examples

of successes and failures require more attention.

In her article, Derthick (2007) begins by praising the exceptional efforts to evacuate

over one million people out of the greater New Orleans area days before Katrina made

landfall. Such a feat required careful planning and high levels of coordination between local

and state officials. All of the counties in the area had agreed to follow the plan and

extensive advertising and education efforts were in place. The plan had been shared with

as many area residents as possible. This resulted in 1.2 million people, out of 1.4 million, to

be evacuated out of the New Orleans metropolitan area before Katrina arrived (Derthick,

2007).

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The USACE levee system presents yet another example of intergovernmental

conflict and disagreement. The levee system was a joint project between the USACE and the

Orleans Levee District. While the levees’ failure to hold the waves is an engineering issue, it

was a direct result of poor collaboration and intergovernmental confusion as to who was

officially responsible for the performance of the levees. Both the USACE and the Levee

District could not agree on who was in charge of inspection, maintenance, and construction

(Derthick, 2007).

Unfortunately, more than 70,000 remained in the city either because they refused to

leave, were physically incapable, or lacked transportation (Derthick, 2007). An earlier

emergency exercise recommended a transportation plan for those physically unable to

evacuate the city. Unfortunately, Mayor Nagin of New Orleans failed to follow through with

the recommendations and there was no system in place to ensure such a plan was created

(Walters & Kettl, 2005). The National Response Plan (NRP) called for the joint response of

federal, state, and local governments in the case of a national emergency. However,

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Chertoff did not deem Katrina a

national emergency until several days after the hurricane hit (Walters & Kettl, 2005).

In the meantime, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and

Fisheries, and the National Guard were the dominant forces in the search and rescue efforts

and it is because of their success that nearly all who were left behind survived. When the

local police and fire department faced tens of thousands swimming on the flooded streets,

stranded on rooftops, going hungry and thirsty under freeway overpasses, they quickly

realized they were underequipped to deal with the disaster situation. The three units

mentioned above were successful in the collaborative efforts because they were familiar

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with the area, had performed many hurricanes exercises in the past, and were adequately

equipped for water rescue. Also, the National Guard was able to solicit the assistance of

other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which increased its

number of boats, helicopters, and man-power (Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007).

At this point, Louisiana state officials were barely getting acquainted with important

emergency procedure documents, such as NRP and the NIMS, which outline the procedures

for action, resources and assistance request, and solutions during a national disaster. The

leadership hierarchy should have been assigned before disaster planning and training

began. Missing leadership and assigned agency response during the emergency created

confusion and stalled progress (Lester & Krejci, 2007). After exhausting all of its shelters

and the Superdome’s capacity, Louisiana Governor Blanco contacted Texas Governor Perry

to solicit help in housing evacuees from the city. Fortunately, Governor Perry obliged and

plans were made to transport those being rescued to Texas and other neighboring states.

However, this did not take place until a week after Katrina made landfall because of Mayor

Nagin’s failure to follow the recommendations of a joint emergency exercise months earlier

(Derthick, 2007).

Transporting evacuees became another failure. Even when Governor Blanco had

found a place where to relocate evacuees, transportation was an issue and it was FEMA’s

responsibility to address it. FEMA acts as a liaison between the states and the federal

government during a disaster (Derthick, 2007). During the consolidation of government

emergency management functions that followed 9/11, FEMA was incorporated into the

Department of Homeland Security (Derthick, 2007). During Katrina, FEMA was struggling

to communicate with the federal government and acquire the necessary supplies,

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resources, and even permission to carry on its functions (Derthick, 2007). FEMA failed to

secure buses for the transport of evacuees, it failed to provide survivors with food and

other supplies, and it delayed request for assistance to the Department of Defense

(Derthick, 2007).

Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, along with Matthew

Broderick, head of the Homeland Security Operations Center, both failed by not seriously

acknowledging the validity of the reports received from New Orleans (Derthick, 2007;

Walters & Kettl, 2005). The armed forces appeared on Wednesday, two days after the

hurricane, and were able to take over FEMA’s function of delivering food and water to

Louisiana and Mississippi. The White House tried to take control of the situation by using

the military, to which Governor Blanco strongly objected. The posturing between state and

federal government delayed the assistance from Washington leadership (Morris et al.,

2007). When state and federal officials agreed to fly evacuees out of Louisiana, TSA’s

policies to screen passengers and DHS’s security procedures became obstacles in the

rescue efforts (Derthick, 2007). Law enforcement was also an issue, which was getting

exaggerated by the media and fueling the White House’s desire to deploy the military to

assist with the violence (Derthick, 2007). Again, the media had exaggerated the acts of

violence when in reality there was little need for force to be employed. Mississippi and

Louisiana governors refused to let the federal government takeover security through its

military and instead reached out to other states for help through the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact, which demonstrated a bright example of interstate

cooperation instead of opting for a centralized military takeover that would not have

guaranteed a positive outcome (Derthick, 2007).

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All authors in this module agree that the main reason for the response failures and

poor performance after the hurricane was due to ineffective collaboration. All involved

players should have been familiar with each other and each other’s practices, behaviors,

policies, and action plans, hence the need for emergency drills and exercises that include all

involved parties. Also, each agency and department official should have known their exact

role, task, responsibility, or at least the main mission, e.g. rescue people from rooftops, as in

the case of the Coast Guard. Even though the Coast Guard’s units came from all over the

country, they were able to work well together and with other agencies because of their

specific training and prior collaborations. Knowing the mission and goals allows for

individuals to still complete the task even in the absence of authority or leadership, like it

occurred during Katrina when all major communications broke down (Derthick, 2007;

Lester & Krejci, 2007; Morris et al., 2007; Walters & Kettl, 2005).

Demonstrated Limitations of IGM

When looking at the enormous depth of theoretical importance of collaboration

between all three levels of government when dealing with both terrorist attacks such as the

tragedy of 9/11 in New York City and the natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina in the

City of New Orleans, one must know that collaboration is not simply a linkage between the

different levels, but a vehicle to transport the ideas, strategies, and most importantly a

unification between all IGM entities. In the case of Hurricane Katrina it is well noted that

ultimately there was a complete government system failure (ABC News, March 25, 2013;

Walters & Kettl, 2005; Lester & Krejci, 2007; Derthick, 2007) and there are multiple

demonstrated limitations affiliated with IGM, which will be discussed in this section.

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By both constitutional tradition and law, when natural disasters occur both local

and state governments are initially responsible for the emergency management for the first

48 to 72 hours and upon request the federal government will then provide relief (Walters

& Kettl, 2005; Derthick, 2007). However, President Bush opportunistically attempted

(Lester and Krejci, 2007) to offset this law which illustrates another demonstrated

limitation of IGM, collaborative inertia, which will be the next limitation discussed.

After the attacks of 9/11, the federal government reorganized the emergency

management functions when they created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By

incorporating FEMA into the DHS cabinet-level department, FEMA lost direct linkage to the

White House along with funding through budget processes and necessary staff (Derthick,

2007). As previously discussed, the principle limitation is collaborative inertia or the

forming of a tilted equilibrium of power and in this case between state and federal

intergovernmental powers (Lester & Krejci, 2007; McGuire, 2006). This damaged the

response time, but it further weakened the structure when President Bush attempted to

use opportunistic federalism in order to, “expand federal authority by projecting the idea

that only a large and centralized federal response can accomplish the given task” as quoted

by Conlan (Lester & Krejci, 2007, p. 85). However, both Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen

Blanco (D) and Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour (R) respectably rejected President

Bush’s offers (Walters & Kettl, 2005).

The NIMS is intended to coordinate all emergency management functions between

local, state, and federal responders and IGM decision makers. Lester & Krejci appoint in

their thesis that the NIMS avoided the issues of both decision-making and leadership when

it comes to collaboration during natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2007). During

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a testing of NIMS in 2004, the Hurricane Pam exercise appeared effective and efficiently

planned out; however, in actuality it provided false senses of both of these important IGM

collaboration issues, decision-making and leadership, and cooperation (Lester & Krejci,

2007, p. 86). Throughout the literature it is apparent that the intergovernmental responses

were both uncoordinated and late. Planning issues related to resource allocation and a

significant lack of NIMS process training across all three intergovernmental levels rendered

any training arguably inefficient and ineffective which vividly illustrated IGM limitations.

IGM Lessons Learned

After the limitations and unfortunate failures that turned the rescue response into a

chess match, there were several lessons that could, and more so should, have been learned.

The first of these lessons learned is that both the local and state governments should have

more control over how the federal homeland security first-responder money should be

spent specifically in high-threat/high-risk population areas with Regional Logistic

Resource Centers (Walters & Kettl, 2005). This would increase response time and would

help level out the IGM fiscal equilibrium limitations. It is evident that state and local

governments do not respond to top-down authority; therefore, the next lesson learned is

collaboration between federal, state, and local governments is critical in the development

of planning for natural disasters (Lester & Krejci, 2007).

Proper mechanisms are critical to the success of collaboration, however, the IGM

issue of leadership limitation, as seen in NIMS, was pushed aside in an effort to maintain

cooperation. The lesson learned from this is that effective leadership can mitigate problems

and aid in overcoming the fundamental problems of coordination that ultimately plagued

NIMS (Lester & Krejci, 2007). Top level leadership needs to mitigate problems without

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obstructing functioning mechanisms. With these lessons, NIMS itself can become a

powerful and effective collaborative vehicle.

For efficient, effective, and mitigation of limitations there has to be a shared vision

and mission within IGM and to do this all three intergovernmental levels must act as a

team. In doing so the federal government has to freely provide resources to the state

government during emergencies, while at the same time the state government has to yield

authority and autonomy to the federal government during emergencies (Lester & Krejci,

2007). Furthermore, this cannot only be reciprocated at the organization level, it must be

reciprocated at the executive level as well between the governors and the President, with

constituent importance first and foremost and political party affiliation put aside.

Conclusion

As a lesson in intergovernmental management and relations, the response to the

disaster left by Hurricane Katrina demonstrates how quickly planning and cooperation can

disintegrate. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, our national, state, and local

governments recognized the need to participate in concerted planning and cement

collaborative relationships. Despite other significant storms, Katrina presented the first

colossal, widespread disaster suffered since the dedicated emergency planning and agency

reorganization efforts post-September 11, 2001. However, Katrina represents generally

accepted failures of intergovernmental management. Dissecting the failures in the storm’s

response will help identify communication breakdowns, political hurdles, streamline

administrative procedures, and provide incentive for greater cooperation.

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References

History.com Staff. (2009). Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved from http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-katrina Jay, Goldman, Hamilton, & Madison (2008). The Federalist Papers. Oxford: OUP Oxford. McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative Public Management: Assessing What We Know and How We Know It. Public Administration Review, 33. NOAA, ZUMA, & CORBIS. (2005). Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/content/dam/news/2015/06/01/hurricanes eason0601.adapt.768.1.jpg (Originally photographed 2005, August)