hunt and hunt et al., canal irrigation and local social organization

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Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization [and Comments and Reply]

Author(s): Robert C. Hunt, Eva Hunt, G. Munir Ahmed, John W. Bennett, Richard K. Cleek,P. E. B. Coy, Thomas F. Glick, Russell E. Lewis, Bruce B. MacLachlan, William P. Mitchell,William L. Partridge, Barbara J. Price, Wolf Roder, Axel Steensberg, Robert Wade and ImreWellmannSource: Current Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 389-411Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological

Research

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CUJRRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1976? 1976by TheWenner-Grenoundation orAnthropologicalesearch

Canal Irrigationand

Local Social Organization'

byRobert . Hunt ndEva Hunt

INTRODUCTION

For a few cholars n socialanthropology,rrigation as been

of great theoreticalmportancesee especiallyWittfogel 957and Steward1955; cf. Leach 1961, Childe 1954, Wolf nd Pa-lerm1955, and Sanders nd Price 1968). Most anthropologists,however, ave ignored t,even when t was a major techniqueof cultivationn the society hey tudied, rmentioned t onlybriefly n passing (Beteille 1965). We believe that irrigatedagricultures a very nusual ocial resource, hat t almost er-tainlyhas systematic elationships o otherfeatures f socialorganization, nd thattheserelationshipseed to be pursued111n X7.fi.-tnnfif- XAwnX

Resourcecontrol ystemse.g., land tenure, rade,produc-tion) oomvery arge n mostmacrotheoriesbout ocioeconom-ic organization. here would seemto be, historically,hree

major andcumulative)waysof ntensifyinglantfoodproduc-tion: domesticationf plants, rrigatedgriculture,nd indus-trializedfarming.t is widelyassumedthat the yieldsfromagriculture ith rrigationre farhigher han withoutt. Irri-gated agriculture ould thus eem o be anunusually ich ddi-tion to man's repertoire or exploiting is environmentndconsequently resource f unusual ocial power.The intensifi-cationdue to rrigationas beenproposed, nder ome ircum-stances, o have had enormous ffects,ncluding he urbanrevolutionnd theorigin fpristinetates. t isthereforeorthdetermining hat its characteristicsre and whether t hasanysystematicorollaries.

Ofthe imited umber fgeneral ropositionsoncerningherelationshipf rrigationnd social structure,ome focuspri-

marily n the surplusgeneratedby irrigationnd others nlabor inputs nd their ontrol.Bothsetshold that there refunctional, nd even causal, relationships etween irriga-tion ndpolitical tructure.herehas been virtually odiscus-sionofthe roleof rrigation'surplus inceChilde. Discussionhas focused nsteadon the controlof labor input,which isprominentnWittfogel'sriental-despotismypothesis1957;cf.Bennett1974:44-47). We shall focuson thelabor-controlaspecthere.2

Wittfogel'sheory as fourmain elements: a) a particularform fresource arid land, largewatersource,potential orlarge rrigated griculture orks); b) for reindustrialegimes,a sociologicalmperativeor tsexploitationmassive, entrallyorganizedand controlledabor demands); and, as a conse-

1We wish toacknowledge he upport eceivedfrom he NationalScience Foundation; NSF Grant GS-87, to Eva and Robert Hunt,enabled us to gather data on the San Juan case, and NSF Grant

GS-3000, to Eva Hunt, is supporting hegathering nd analysisofmaterialson Tehuacan in thecolonial period.

The materialson contemporary ehuacan come in part fromtheworkof our graduate students n thesummerof1970,mostofwhich s not yetpublished.The workofKjell Enge (cf. Enge 1973),Paula Sabloff, nd Gordon Dreverwas mosthelpful n providingnew ethnographicnformation.

We have receivedcommentson previousversionsof thispaperfrom Robert McC. Adams, George Appell, George Cowgill,Thomas Glick, William Kelly, Barbara Price, Jerryand PaulaSabloff, teve Sellers, nd SergioSismondo.We trust hatwe havenot been capricious n our responses o the large amount ofgoodadvice we have received.

This is a greatly xpandedversion fa paper entitled Irrigationand Local Social Structure"whichwepresented t the1973 annualmeetingoftheAmericanAnthropologicalAssociation.

2 The surplusargument s at least as interesting,speciallyfor

local social organization, nd we plan to investigatet in anothernaner.

ROBERT C. HUNT is Associate Professor f Anthro ology atBrandeis University Waltham, Mass. 02154, U.S.A.). Born in1934, he was educated at Hamilton College (B.A., 1956), theUniversityof Chicago (M.A., 1959), and NorthwesternUni-versity Ph.D., 1965). He has taught tNorthwesternniversity(1964-66) and at the Universityof Illinois Chicago Circle(1966-69). His research nterests re comparativemethodandirrigationand social organization. His publications includePersonalitiesnCultures: eadingsnPsychologicalnthropologyNewYork: Natural HistoryPress,1967); "ComponentsofRelation-ships n the Family: A Mexican Village," inKinship ndCulture,edited by F. L. K. Hsu (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); "Social An-thropology," n Quantitativeocial Science esearchnLatin Ameri-ca, edited by R. S. Byars andJ. L. Love (Urbana: University fIllinois Press, 1973); and "Irrigation, Conflict, and Politics:A Mexican Case," in Irrigation'smpact on Society, dited by

Theodore E. Downing and McGuire Gibson (Tucson: Univer-sityofArizona Press, 1974).EVA HUNT isAssociate ProfessorfAnthropologyt BostonUni-versity Boston,Mass. 02215, U.S.A.). Born in 1934, she waseducated at the University f Chicago (M.A., 1959; Ph.D.,1962). She has taught at Northwestern niversity1962) andat the University f Chicago (1966-69). Her research nterestsare social anthropology, Mesoamerica, ethnohistory, ocialstructure, nd symbolism.Among her publications are "TheMeaning of Kinship in San Juan: Genealogical and SocialModels" (Ethnology:37-53); "Irrigation and the Socio-polit-ical Organization of the Cuicatec Cacicazgos," n The Prehistoryof theTehuacanValley, ol. 4, Chronologynd Irrigation,dited byR. S. MacNeish and F. Johnson Austin: University f TexasPress, 1972); and The Transformationf theHummingbird: heCultural oots fa ZinacantanMythic oem Ithaca: Cornell Uni-versity ress, n press).

The presentpaper, submitted n finalform8 I 76, was sent

forcommentto 50 scholars. The responses re printed belowand are followedby a replybythe authors.

Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September976 389

This content downloaded from 130.132.173.252 on Thu, 16 May 2013 00:11:10 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions






quence of his, c) a particular ind f tate ystemmanagerial)with d) a particular istributionf power despotism). hereare two main thrustso thetheory: ne concerns he role ofirrigationn the evolution fthe state, nd the other s a syn-chronicfunctionalsystemic)model of how certain kindsofstates re structured. here has been a large amount fdiscus-sion ofthe first f these cf. Adams 1966, Price 1971,Mitchell1973, Bennett 974), but relativelyittle f the econd cf.Mil-lon 1962) exceptfor ts type-case, hina (cf.Eberhard 1965).We shall concentrate n this econddimension.

The directionn whichwe wishto movehere sone that s a

preconditionf hypothesis estingn a diachronic rame ndinvolvesthe synchronic nalysis of the system's arameters(Godelier 1970). Canvassing portion f the iterature ithina synchronicramemaysharpen ome distinctionsnd suggestsome hypotheses.We intend o explore ome sociocultural e-sponses o rrigated griculturet the ocal level,paying pecialattentiono (1) the ocal organization fthetaskspursuant oirrigation,2) the inkages etween he ocal level and higherlevels of the system, nd (3) the relationship etween oles nthe rrigationystem nd other oles n the ocal social organi-zation. We will be able to suggest fewhypotheseslong theway,some of themreferringo covariationwithin sample ofirrigated ommunitiesnd some to irrigations a special phe-nomenon. he latter an onlybe testedwith differentample

that ncludes ommunities ithout rrigations a control roup.None ofthehypothesesan be testedwiththepresent ample;it s too small, thas been used to suggest he hypotheses,ndit cannotbe adequatelymeasured.3

Furthermore, ittfogel'seneralpropositionsre concernedwithwatercontroln itsrelationship o whole societies.Watercontrolmeansnotonly rrigatedgriculture,utalso,andper-haps more mportantor hegeneralhypothesis,lood ontroland drainage ystemsnd canals as a meansofcommunicationand transport.As Price (1971) has pointedout, the largerproblem f and and watermanagements complex nd com-posedofmultiple ubsystems.espite this, he iteraturen so-cial anthropology hichhas been considered elevant o hispropositionss almost xclusivelyased on detailed ase studiesof small localities,usually communities, hichdepend upon

canal irrigationor significant art oftheirproduction cf.Millon 1962). These case studies over ess than the totalso-ciety nd tendto be synchronicnd contemporarycf.Kaplanand Manners[1972:97-98]for discussion ftheproblem nterms fWittfogel'snd Sahlins'swork). n consequence, hereis a logical gap between hegeneral hypothesesnd the casestudieswhichpurport o test hem.Three significanthiftsnlevel of analysis ave beenmade: fromwhole societies o com-munities,romwater ontrol o local irrigatedgriculture,ndfrom diachronic o a synchronicrame.

A number fanthropological ield tudieshave taken placein localitieswith rrigated griculture. lmostnone of these,however, epresents riental-despotismonditions,o most reirrelevantoWittfogel'shesis.Wittfogel,or xample,has con-

sistently aintained hattheclassic"hydraulic ociety" ccursin an "arid" environment. s Conklin 1973) has remarked,critics fhisthesis arely ay attentiono this.Another ariableis"scale,"whichmaybe taken o mean the caleof hephysicalworks ssociatedwithwater ontrol, hepopulation erved, heacreage irrigated, he lengthofcanals, and so on. Measure-ment f hese n the vailablestudies sgenerally o better han

an intuitive rdinal cale. Leach (1961) gives a picture f theold canal systemeadingfrom neof he anks n Pul Eliya, andwe presented s much informationn the San Juan physicalsystem s we had, includingmeasures f atmosphericmoistureconditions, cale of canals and irrigated ands, and at leastsome folkviews of amountsof silting, tc. (Hunt and Hunt1974). Geertz 1973) gives general ccountofclimatic ondi-tions nd describes he general ayoutof the canal system, utgives no physical measures size, amount of water, length,technicaldevices). All of the phenomena of interest an bemeasuredphysicallywith current echnology, nd most such

measurementsre withinthe competence f the fieldworkerwith ittle raining. ntil suchdata are generally vailable, atest fWittfogel's ypothesis rom nthropological ield tudiesis out of the question.

We shall focus n canal irrigation lone because there s asyetno evidence n the iterature fcommunity-levellood on-trol or canals as means of transportation.n any case, canalirrigations a significantspect of ocal production nd socialorganization nd is worth nderstandingn itsown right.

There is at least one good reason for oncentratingn thelocal level of ntegration:here re major difficultiesith on-cept formationnd measurementn themoregeneralproposi-tions. uch concepts s centralization,espotism, ater ontrolcreating ther inds f ocial power, tc., reall extremelyiffi-

cult to work with n an empirical ase study see Hunt andHunt1974).Theseconceptual nd measurement roblems anbest be dealtwithby establishingeedbackoopsbetweende-tailedcase studies nd generalizing omparative fforts. hecase studies anmost fficientlye conducted nsmall ocalizedpopulations, here he nalyst as some reason o beoptimisticabout being able to control hevaluesofparametersn suffi-cientdetail. In this egard,wefollowGoodenough 970.)

In addition,general propositions ll contain,at the veryleast, mplications or ocal structure. lthough entralization,despotism,tratification,nd agromanagerial ureaucracyefertophenomena t thecenter fthe ociety, hey houldmanifestthemselvesnsomewayat themost ocal level, incethey eferto linkages etweenvertically rrangedunits n a society ndespecially o the distribution fpowerwithin hese inkages.Most generaldiscussions f thesephenomena end to be dis-tressinglybstract.A highly esirable tep, therefore, ill betomeasure hesephenomena t the ocal level.

Our discussionwill largelybe based on a fewhigh-qualitymonographs n local irrigationvstems:Gray (1963) on theSonjo ofTanganyika now Tanzania), Leach (1961) on PulEliya, Ceylon,Fernea 1970) on theEl Shabana of raq, Glick(1970) on medievalValencia, and ourownmaterials n a re-gionof ruralMexico (E. Hunt 1972,Hunt and Hunt 1974).We also refer o work done in Bali (Geertz 1959, 1973) andJapan (Eyre 1951, Beardsley,Hall, and Ward 1959). Thesample s thusheavilyweighted t the extremes fthepoliticalscale,therebeing argestates t one end and a small tribe ttheother.4We also have used other tudieswhich, although

theydo not contain nformation n all variables, exemplifyspecial problems e.g., Bacdayan 1974).

LOCAL ORGANIZATION OF TASKS

Every societywith rrigated griculture as several taskspe-culiar to irrigationo accomplish.The physical ystemmustbe constructednd maintained.Relationships mong thosewhowoulduse the waterpresent ther asks, ncluding lloca-tion fwater to theusers, onflictesolution,nd organization

3Ultimately,we would like to ask whether here re sociologicalor sociocultural forms f organization which are specific to irri-gated agriculture as a resource. This is inherent n Wittfogel'swork and in Marx's theories of the Asiatic society cf. Wittfogel1957). The researchdesignfor his demands a comparison of vari-ous systems, ome with rrigated griculture nd some without. tis uncertain f such a job of research could be done with thepub-

lished iterature.Our guess s that t could not, at least not withoutsome additional archival work.

4We originally ttempted o utilizea larger ross-culturalamplebased on the "EthnographicAtlas." Unfortunately,he data and

coding are simplynot sufficiento discriminatewithprecision nterms four needs.

390 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY







Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONf ritual. The social organization f these asks s our interesthere.

In our Mexican case study,we distinguishedetweenfre-quent or daily decisions nd intermittentr infrequentnes.The constructionf a physical ystem, or xample, s a rareevent; heallocation fwater o users svery requentdailyorhourly). n general,frequentvents ncludeallocation,main-tenance, nd, in somecases,resolutionf nternal onflict;n-frequentnes ncludeconstruction,epair, nd, in somecases,resolution fmajor internal s well as external onflict.Wesuggestedn the context ftheMexican case thatthe different

levelsof social structurehousehold,village, municipio,dis-trict, tate) are differentiallyesponsible or these differentkinds ftasks. n general, here s a strongssociation etweeninfrequentecisions ndhigherevels nd between requent e-cisions nd lower evels.

The social system(s) s(are) a collectivitycollectivities)frolesand institutionsn one way or another onnectedwiththe physical ystem(s).A major stimulus or the distinctionbetween ocial and physical ystemss thatphysical ystemsdiffern size. A differenceetween statesthat is crucial forpolitical organization bove the local level is the presenceor absence fphysical ystems hich ut acrossocalcommunityboundaries.

All societieswith rrigationhatwe have so far tudiedhave

an institutionalocus

whichis

primarily esponsible orthemaintenance, epair, llocation, nd minor-disputeesolutionfunctionscf. Beardsley1963; Glick 1970:31). This organiza-tion s based upon a clearlyboundedphysical rrigation ys-tem, uch as a feeder anal, a stream, r a tank. ts personnelis headed by some named, pecially esignated ole or role set.(These rolesmaybe embedded n otherroles-village head-man. local communityfficials,nd so on.) A bodyofnorms,rules,or customaryaw regulates hedecisions nd behaviorsofboth management ole holders nd waterusers.The localunit s small n relation o the wholesociety; lthoughnsomecases arger han community,t sthe mallest nit oncernedwith ollectivewatermanagement nd iscapable ofmanagingmostof ts own nternal ffairs.t usuallyhas no morethanafew hundred members.Recruitments always connected to

waterrights,and rights,r both.This local groupcannotre-solvedisputeswith quivalent roups xceptbymediatednego-tiation, ubmission,r violence. f it takeswaterfrom largerartificialystem,thas little o do with the decisionsmade atthe evel of the arger ystem.

The relationshipfthis ocal irrigationnit opolitically e-fined territorial nits (such as villages, cantons,municipios,districts,refectures,tc.) ishighly ariable.On occasiontheymay exactly oincide e.g., Sonjo), but where arger tate ys-tems existterritorialnd irrigation nits often rosscut neanother. he irrigationssociationsn theTehuacYan alleyinMexico cut across municipios.n San Juan, they re smallerthan hemunicipio,ocated tthevillage ndhamletevel.Bothareas, however, re under themanagement fa singlewater

districtwhich cuts across threestates.Irrigationunitscutacross everal erritorialnits nBali (Geertz 1959) and so dowater ooperativesnJapan (Eyre 1955) and medievalValen-cia (Glick 1970).

Thereappearsto be considerable ariation n the degreetowhichpoliticalunits ccupyhydrological nits.When politicalunits rosscut cologicalones,therehas to be some kind ofsu-perordinatenittomanagethe water ystem. his can be onewhichdeals specifically ithwater, uch as theqanat societiesin theTehuacan Valley in Mexico or the cooperativewatersocieties nBali. At times heseunits, t least n the 20th cen-tury,may occupy the wholeof a watershed e.g., the Tennes-see Valley Authoritynd thevarious gencies round heworldwhichmoreor ess reproduce t, such as the Papaloapan Com-mission n Mexico). The 12-village ooperative s a unitoc-cupying arts f hewatersheds f woriversn southern apan.

Some of the specializedbodiesare creations f the central ol-ity, nd some are local in origin nd authority.t wouldseemthatmanyof the pre-Hispanic ettlementscacicazgos) in partsofMexicowere organized nterms fhydrological oundaries,and indeed omeof thedisputes etween hem oncerned re-ciselythe issueof one basin-political nit attemptingo ex-pand its nfluencento the basin ofanother nit cf.E. Hunt1972for n extended iscussion).On occasion, he argerunitmaybe a preexistingnit f he entral olity or of ome nter-

mediate evel) which s given, r takes, esponsibilityor verallcoordinationfthe rrigationystem. his can be seen n con-temporaryraq, where he dministrativeistricts alsotreatedas an irrigation istrict, decisionwhich eems rbitraryroma hydrologicalointof view (Fernea1970).

Glick (1970:230) has identified wo alternative rinciplesgoverningheallocationofrights o irrigation aterwithinsystem. ne, the Syrian, s associatedwith arge rivers, reatswater ights s inseparable romand rights,nd allocateswaterproportionally.lantingchedulesmaybestaggered.he other,the Yemenite, s based on smallsources fsupply often ases,verysmall or impermanenttreams, r water tanks), treatswater rights s separablefrom and rights nd as capable ofbeingsold, and uses fixed ime measurement nits.The pri-

mary differenceetween the two is clearestwhen there s a

serious eductionn the mount fwater vailable. n the Syri-an model, here s a proportional eductionn allocation fthewater,and everyone uffersqually. In the Yemenite model,some individuals r communities ave primary ights o thewater, nd they re the asttosuffer.

Water rights an sometimes e held independentlyf allrightsn land. In thatevent, hediscussionan largelygnoreland (althoughthere are othercomplications, uch as thatpolitical lientshipubsystems aythenbecomedominant). nmostcommunitiesn our sample,however,waterrights resaid to be permanentlynd inalienably onnectedwith andrights, nd allocation of wateris a function f rulesof landallocation.

While we think hatthedifferentater llocationprinciples

are realandsociologicallymportant, edoubtthat hey orre-late very trongly ith ize ofwater ource. t is alsodebatablewhetherproportionalityf distributions necessarilyinkedwith ize of water ource, rwithwhether r notwater rightsare separatefrom and rights. or example,both Pul Eliya(Old Tank) and the 12-village ooperative nJapan have aproportional-distributionodel,but theformer'ssbased on asmallvillage 143persons) nd a very mall tank Leach 1961)and the atter's n a largeriver,with ver5,300ha. of rrigatedfieldsBeardsley, all, and Ward 1959). In neither ase,at themoment, an waterrights e separated romand rights. hiscodingofcommunitytudies ccording o boththe allocationprinciple orwater nd the ize of hewater ystemeveals hatthere s little fany relationshipetween he two.Theremay

be,however, relation etween llocationprinciplesnd scar-city fwater t crucial times n thegrowth ycleofa crop cf.Downing1974).

SanJuan s npractice case ofmixture f he woprinciplesof allocation.San Juanhas a moderatelyargeriver nd twosmall streamswhich oin it,bothpermanent. here are threecommunalphysical ystems,wo ofwhichuse all the waterfrom wo streamsnd oneofwhichtakeswaterfrom heriver.In addition, here re private anal systems hichtake waterfrom heriveror buy it from ne ofthe communal ystems.Mexican aw isvery efinite boutrightsowater, nd it s theSyrianmodel which tproposes. n San Juan, fthere s suffi-cientwater n thecommunal ystems,hendistributions egal,according o theSyrianmodel. fthere s a shortage, owever,the center f the communal ystem, here the ands ofmorepowerful eople are located,gets more than ts share.This is,








in effect, he Yemeniteform f allocation.The private analsare clearly un according o theYemenitemodel.

Three differentindsof conceptualmodels re available tothe ocial nthropologist.irst, heres a local folkmodel,whichLevi-Strauss 1953) calls the homemade model. This modelhas been the one most ikely o be resorted o by theanalystfor an understandingf the irrigation ystem. his has hadharmful esults. f a larger ocial entity xists, here s likely obe a folkmodel,often hrased s a legal code, explaining rri-gation t that evelas well. n the Mexicancase,each of theselevels has two separate components, normative ne (e.g., a

nativeview ofhowthe ystemoughtto work") and a descrip-tiveone (e.g.,a nativeview ofhow the ystem reallyworks").As Levi-Strauss rgues,however, he primary urpose f thesefolkmodels s to manage the system,o permit ontinuity fthe statusquo, not to explainit. Considerable gnorance rmisinterpretationf ethnographic ealitymay be built intothesemodels, s Netting 1974a) has shown.Our job as ana-lysts s to construct scientificmodel which will explain notonly the way the irrigation ystemworks,but also the folkmodels-how theyrelateto the social reality.We agree withFlannery 1972) that nformationrocessings an integral artofany ecological tudy, utwe would add that n many rri-gation systems, ot only s waterunevenly llocated,but in-formationrucial for an understandingf how the system

reallyworkssunevenly ontrolled.The folkmodels fSan Juando not ssign he llocation rin-ciples ust described o twodifferentystems,ut consider hemto be good and bad variants f the same system. he averagewater user perceives he Yemenite ystem imply s a faultyversion f heSyrian ne. From henational egal point fview,thisversions corrupt nd punishable y law. From the pointof view ofthose avoredby thesystem, owever, t s the onlyrationalway ofcopingwithwater hortage. hus analysis an-not be based purely n folkmodelswithout erious istortion.5

A majorfeature f water ontrol ystemss the possibilityfa shortage r excess fwater.Water carcitys not a fixed on-dition,ofnyplace, but rather particular elationship etweensupply nd demand forwaterat a givenpoint n time. f de-mand sgreater han upply, hen here s scarcity. t iswidely

presumed hat rid nd semiaridnvironmentsre automatical-ly characterized y shortages,ut this s not always the case.Forexample, an Juan n the ate Post-Classic nd most fthecolonial period whenpopulationwas greatly educedbecauseofother actors uch as epidemics)had no shortage fwaterfortraditional gricultureE. Hunt 1972). In theTehuacfan al-ley,which s also arid, however, arly n the colonial period,water hortages nd conflict evelopedbetween illagesplant-ing traditional rops and haciendasplanting ugar as a cashcrop, because haciendastookmorethan their legal" shareofcommunalwaters.This croppingpattern ntroduced carcitybecauseof hehighwaterdemands f ugarvis-a-visraditionalcrops e.g., corn,beans). Wheremeteorologicalnformationor30 ormoreyears s available, t becomes lear that most gri-

cultural ystems re subject to very onsiderable ariation nthe amount of environmental oisture vailable. First, herearedroughts, loods, nd more r essnormalyears n between.

Second, there are cases of environmental egradation e.g.,steady owering f thewatertable n theTehuacfan alley).

Social systems an, to a point, ncrease he supply fwater.This has happened slowlyn many differentocieties China,Japan, medieval Valencia,Pul Eliya, San Juan). In moderntimes, t sometimes appensvery rapidly Lees 1973). Onestrategys to utilizepresent echnology o expand supply, ndanotherstosearch or ew technology. othof hese re repre-sented n mostofthestudieswe have consulted. till anotherstrategys to locate a new source. Bacdayan (1974) has de-scribed uch a solution. n this ase, individuals lowly dded

terraceso the ystem ntil, t somepoint, hefact hatdemandwas significantlyreater han supplywas recognized. he firstpublic responsewas to accuse the authorities f mismanage-ment.Next the communityecided thatdeforestationas thecause ofthe"drop" in supply, ightened p rulesfor xploit-ing, and searched he forest or new source.Theywere ableto tap one, and now supply s back up above demand.

Another trategy societymay use in balancing upply nddemand s toplace limits ndemand. ftheresa well-balancedtraditional gricultural ystem, he major means of limitingdemandis to resistnew uses (new canals, new terraces, ewfields,new crops, etc.). Glick (1970) shows how and whyirrigatorsnmedievalValencia fought ew construction.inceValencia used a proportional-allocationrinciple, veryone

sufferedqually nthe aseofdrought.f thedemand xpandedso as to exhaust hewater n a normalyear, twouldbe insuffi-cientwhenthe upplywas less, o therewasgreatresistance otheexpansion fthecultivated rea without correspondingincrease n total upply.

Otherresponses o a shortage fwatermaybe individualemigration e.g., Iraq, Mexico) or a shiftn the allocationprinciplesowardswatermonopolizationuch that ome socialsegmentsmust uffermorethanothers. his latter esponsesdocumentedt leastfor ne ofourcases (colonialTehuacan).If land is in short upply, ropping an be intensifiedo thepoint of involution, roviding he water supply s adequate(Geertz 1963).

The conditions nderwhich each alternatives chosen s asubjectworthyf research.t is likely hat ccessibilityoout-

side marketslabor as well as commodity) nd thesystem fsocial (e.g., class, ethnic) tratificationn the arger ocialsys-temwillaffect uch choices.

LINKAGES

Wittfogel's eneral propositions bout the relationships e-tweenrrigationnd socialorganizationre concerned rimari-lywith herelationshipetween political enter nd the ub-ordinate ocal systems.he presence r absence f centralized,specializedbureaucracywhich deals with rrigation as beena prominent artofthe discussion.Mostsocialanthropologistswho have triedto respond o thishypothesis ave concluded

that centralizations not a constant, r a necessary,oncomi-tantof rrigatione.g.,Gray 1963,Fernea 1970). The originalhypothesiss a complex tructurefvariables esigned oapplyin itsentiretyo a few ituations. moreusefulmodel wouldbe one concernedwith ources fpower, heorganizationnduse ofpower, nd therelationshipsetween evelsoforganiza-tion n a social system. uilding ucha modelis beyondthescopeofthisarticle.Whatwe shalldo instead s consider hetwocomparative tudies o date whichhave concentratednthe issueof centralizationnd thenpresent omefindingsnthe inkages etween ocal and nonlocal ystemsfroles n thecontext f rrigation.

Kappel (1974) has argued hat s population ize and densityincrease, o do political entralizationnd the ize of he rriga-

tion system. sing Murdock's Outline f World ultures,e ex-

5The ability ounderstand heworkings f a local system f rri-gated agriculture s totallydependentupon detailed informationofhigh quality and degree ofcompleteness.Such basic questionsas how a person acquires rights o land and water are oftenveryhard to answerfrom heethnographic ecord.Beardsley,Hall, andWard are among the fewwho specify, nd they say thatwater isabsolutely function faccess to land but do notdemonstrate owthey know this.Furthermore, s we have pointed out, there s adanger n takingthefolkmodel as a model ofactual behavior. Theonlywaytoknowwhatdistributionractices re is tostudy good-ly number of actual cases. There are preciousfewof these casesreported n the literature, nd yet statements bout distribution

abound.








Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONmines 17 societies orwhich he finds ufficientvidenceonsize and density fpopulation, ize of rrigation acilities, nddegreeof centralization f decisionmaking.None of the casesinhissample s a classicalfield tudy f rrigation. s he pointsout, there re difficultiesn the measurementf hisvariables.The most mportant ifficultys withpoliticalcentralization.He states p. 370) thathe wishes o measure decision-makinggroupswhichmanage rrigation,"uthisdata seemtorefer othehighestevelsof ntegrationfthepoliticalunit. t cannotautomaticallye assumed hat thehighestevelofsovereigntyis also the highest evel of control f rrigation. ntil the rela-

tionship etween hese evelshasbeenanalyzed,hisconclusionsare doubtful.The major attempt t a comparative mpirical nvestigation

of therelationshipetween rrigation nd centralizations bvMillon (1962). He uses materials rom even case studies oinvestigate he relationship etween ize of the irrigation ys-tem (defined n terms f both acreage and population) andcentralizationf authority ver the allocationofwater. Hefinds hat or ul Eliya,Bali,Japan, and theNahid (in Arabia),allocation s strongly r partlydecentralized,while forTeoti-huacan, the Sonjo, and the El Shabana allocation s central-ized.He goesontoconclude p. 80) that centralized uthorityand the practiceof irrigation re not necessarily elated."Further, e states pp. 86-87):

The studiesofrelatively mall irrigation ystems . . illustrate hattheres nonecessaryelationshipetween hepractice f rrigationas such ndcentralizeduthority,nd that ocialresponsesothepractice f rrigationgriculturere as varied s the socialandecological settings fthe people who practice irrigation.... Oneconclusiontronglyuggested y the evidence xaminedhere sthat entralizationfauthoritys an exceptional esponseo theproblems f rrigationgriculture.

Millon'sconclusions ave been mentionedmore or lessfavor-ably byLees (1973) and have been accepted byWolf 1966),Price 1971), and Mitchell 1973). His work s therefore orthexaminingn some detail.

First, he narrow cope of Millon's paper mustbe empha-sized.Millon is interested nly n the llocation f water,not nother tasks. Wittfogel,t shouldbe noted,was interested smuch in constructionnd maintenance s in allocation.)Ofthefive asks rfunctionshatwehaveconcentrated n,Millonchoosesonlyone. It is perfectlyegitimate or him to do so,butthereadermust e careful ottogeneralize oomuchfromso narrowly efined study cf. discussionn R. Hunt 1973).Secondly,while centralizationn mostdiscussionss closelyconnectedwith the idea ofdespotism nd totalcontrolof asociety,n this ase centralizationsconcernednlywith lloca-tion.There sno strong priori eason osuspect hatcentral-izationof allocationwould have any ystematic elationshipocentralizationfother unctionsn the ociety.n the ongrun,broadcomparativetudieswillbe able to examine hismatterclosely. or themoment, owever,we must onfine urinter-pretationfMillon'sstudy o therangeofhisassumptions.

A majordifficultyithMillon's tudys that ize of he rriga-tionsystems inconsistentlyeasured.For some of the casesin the ample, t s easyenough otake a measure irectlyromtheethnographye.g., Japan,Pul Eliya), but for t leasttwoothersMillon'smeasuresrealmost ertainly ideof he mark.In thecase oftheEl Shabana,hegives heapparent rea com-mandedbythe tribe n 1918 rather hanthearea commandedatthetime f hefieldwork,r,more mportant,ither he reaserved ythe ocal irrigationistrict r the area irrigatedromtheDaghara main canal. In the case ofBali, the figures egivesare fora virtually nique small princely tate, and inthe article n which thisunit s discussedGeertzdoes not sayanything bout the relationshipetween t and any irrigationsociety. n fact,we have so farbeen unable to find ny popu-lation figures or rrigation ocieties t any level higherthan

theminimal ne.Moreover,whiletheacreage of theJapanesecase is clearly givenin the ethnography,here s no stablepopulation igureor hewhole f he ooperative.n some ases,then,Millon usesthefiguresorpopulation nd acreagewhichare dependent pona givenhead work. n other ases,he usesa unitwhich, s far s can be determined, as nothingo dowithirrigation.n still thers, e chooses nitswhich re notall de-pendent pona head work n thesame sense s the others. tis our conclusion, herefore,hathismeasure of size of the

irrigationystems not stable enough to warranteven thetablehe presents.Furthermore, illon's centralization ariable s not clearly

defined.n one "centralized" ase, theSonjo, the top officersof the village deal withallocation;in the othertwo, the ElShabana andTeotihuacan bothparts f tates),national-levelbureaucratsmake allocationdecisions. n the"decentralized"cases, Bali, Pul Eliya,and Japan (also partsof states), lloca-tion is not handled by national-level fficers,nd therearewhat Millon (p. 80) calls "stronglyraditionalized" ules forthe allocation fwater. t isnotat all clear whathe meansbytraditionalization,ut apparently t is that customary ulesabout thedistributionfwater annotbe contravenedy someauthority.he linkagehereof decentralized" nd "tradition-

alized" seemsnot veryuseful. n all systems hichhave beenin operation or ny ength f time, here re customaryulesaboutrights o water and procedures o be used,regardlessfthe amountof control centralized uthoritytructuremayhave. There is evidencefor his n Millon's accountof Teoti-huacan,where ne villagehad special rights owaterbasedondocumentary roof fpre-hacienda ights.He also states p.79) that nthevillage evel "waterwas allocated o ndividualson the basis of traditional greements."Millox's point s thattheallocationrulesfor hebasin as a wholehavenotbeen in-stitutionalized,ut within orporateunits theyhave been sofor longtime.The federal overnmentas become nvolvedin the ntervillageevels and lately n the villagesthemselves.We thereforeeel that the additionof "traditionalized" oesnot contributeo theanalysis.

Millon's (implied)definition f centralizationeems to bethat llocation ecisions rehandled by an office fthehighestlevelofgovernmenthat xistsnthe ociety.f this saccepted,we agreewithMillon's findingsn thecases of heSonjo,Teoti-huacan, and the El Shabana. We also agreewithhisfindingswithrespect o allocationnJapan (although,s we shall dem-onstraten another aper,thisdoesnot holdfor ther asks nthatcase). We are unable to evaluate his assessment f theNahid, because the data have notyetbeen published.Thatleavestwocases,Pul Eliya and Bali, and herewe disagree.

Millon concludesthat Pul Eliya is strongly ecentralizedwithrespect o waterallocation.Netting 1974b) also arguesthatthere s no centralized ontrol f rrigationn Pul Eliya.Leach's book (1961) containssufficientvidenceto demon-

strate,however, hatthe irrigationystems embedded n ahierarchicallyrranged, nified tatepolitical ystem.Pul Eliya irrigatesrom woreservoirs,illageand temple.

Only thevillagetank s largeand in good repair. ts water schannelled o fields ycanals. One or twotanks ppear tobetypical fsomevillages n theprovinces fnorth-centraley-lon, butmanyvillages nthearea sharetankswhich re underthedirect ontrol f he national entral overnment.ll tanksare said tobelong o theCrown, nd this s howvillagecorveelaborto repair hetank, alled "Crown'swork," s legally n-forcedpp. 17, 43, 45, 46).

The tank fPulEliyawasbuilt nthe 11th enturynder heauthorityf classicalSinhalesekingdomwhichLeach (p. 16)describes s a "strikingnd characteristicxample ofwhat

Wittfogel ascalled hydraulic ivilization.' Before he rrival








ofthe British, ul Eliya was partof the owest evel of a largefeudal ystem. his systemwas controlled rom capitalout-side Pul Eliya and had more than three evels,withnamedofficials, ho dealt with water ssues bove the village."Theadministrativeategories fthe British olonialPeriod wereasystemizationof the . . . feudal system" (p. 28).

Atthevillage evel, and was controlled yaristocraticand-grantholders,who weretenants f a district eudal ordandmanagedthe services f the villagers, ollectedtaxes,enter-tained government fficials,nd maintainedthe irrigationtankin good working rder. Such obligations ontinuedfor

quite a while underthe British ystem,fter he abolitionoffeudalismpp. 153-54). In exchange, he ocal aristocracyadclearprerogativesn ritual nd in theuse ofboth and andwateraccording o the traditional ld-field enure ystem pp. 155,166,103-4, 124, 153). The British n partfroze he ocal politi-cal and economic tructurese.g., p. 156),but at the ametimethey reatednew offices onnectedwith and and thecontrolof irrigation. f these the most mportant,rom hepointofview of Pul Eliya, was the village irrigation eadman. Theheadman s what Leach calls a "dictatorial ffice p. 154).Mil-lonbelieves,however, hatthe Pul Eliya systems effectivelydecentralizednd that"no single ndividual rgroupof ndi-vidualsexercise nyrealauthorityver its operation" Millon1962:64,emphasis urs).

Leach isexplicit n theauthorityfbothheadmanand cen-tralgovernment.n theold system,e tells s, until bout1838,"all effectiveuthority as in the hands of ... theRatema-hatmaya" thehead of thetop regional nit).Now all effectiveauthorityt thevillage evel is in thehandsof the irrigationheadman;below himare theheads ofkingroupings. personholdsthe headman's ob for ife, nd until 1926he had to bean aristocrat. e ratifiesand titles.He has theexclusive re-rogative foperating hevillagetank'ssluice.He keepsthevillage and and tax records. His first esponsibilitys to seethat governmentegulationsegardinghefairdistributionfwater refully dhered o." His "authoritysmainly conom-ic," but "he can, ifhe so chooses, xercisewideand autocraticpowers."He settles isputes,ncluding hose overwater.Be-sidesbeingresponsibleorwaterdistribution,e has accumu-lated great economicand political power by manipulatingorthodoxustom o hisadvantage.

Indeed,theheadman managed, n the1940s, o changethedistributionfrightsowater, factnoticedneither yLeachnorbyMillon. Prior othe ate1930s, rrigationad apparentlybeenconfined o a small area known s the Old Field. Therewasnormallynoughwatertocultivate hisplottwice year.In the1940s,under he timulus f a central-governmentam-paignto increase iceproductiondue to supplydifficultiesnWorldWar II), the headman and his associates broughtlargeamount fnew and under rrigation,tillusing he ameold sourceof upply.The new andwas then ultivatedn oneseason, heOld Field in theother.As a consequence, he newlandshave taken halfthewater away fromts traditional e-

cipients-all thosewho have rightsn the Old Field.Moreover, lthoughPul Eliya is today far from eing partof feudal rrangement,nd the ocal land-grant olders xistin name only, he castesystem, hemarriage ystem,nd landand waterdistribution ave kept aristocraticitles n only afewfamilies, hohappen tobe the wealthy f the communityand who,not by accident,hold the traditional oweroffices(pp. 20, 28, 47, 64, 160, 198,154, 204, 227,232).

Thus, nPul Eliya irrigations the most ignificantactor nsocial organization,n the recognitionfkinship,n theforma-tion fmarriage lliances,nthedistributionfpolitical ower,and inrelationships ith heoutsideworld.Historicallys wellas at present,hePul Eliya systems not a local invention,ure-ly ocallymaintained, or s t free rom mpingementromhelarger social and political world.The centralgovernmentfCeylonprovidesid in times f aminep. 32), forceshevillages

tokeep recordspp. 28, 47), givesfinancial ssistancen irriga-tion p. 46), legitimizeshe types f and tenurepossible ndthereforeater llocation p. 20 etpassim), nd subsidizesma-jor repairs n the rrigationanks pp. 45-46). Therefore, econcludethat the Pul Eliya allocation systemhouldnot bedescribed s decentralized.

In Bali, waterand land are managedby a corporateunitcalled thesekasubak.This unit is entirely eparatefrom hevillage and has both sacred and secular activities. t tendsto be small (Geertzand Geertz [1975] mention wo,one ofwhichhas 70 ha. of and and 197members nd theother159

ha. and 439 members). t has authority ver watersources(damsor take-offsrommajorcanals), canals,and all mattershaving o do with he management fthephysical ystem,n-cludingtheworknecessary o maintain t and the allocationof water. Each such societyhas an elected chief (Geertz1959:996).

A readingofsome additional ources eveals hatthere reconflictingetsof evidence on the questionof authority. llagreethat and and waterare managedby a subak,that thesubak is quite separatefrom therkinds ofassociations,ndthatthere s a complex ustomaryaw which ppliesto subakmatters Grader1960,Geertz1959,Geertz and Geertz1975).What is notclearis the relationshipfeach subakto a super-ordinate politicalhierarchy.Geertz (1959:995-96) says that

subaksare groups, uchthatan entirewatersheds a single,albeit oose,organization,onnected ymeansof n office iththeprincely ousehold:

... the ordsplayed n importantole incoordinatingctivitiesbetweenrrigationocietiesnd ettlingnterlocalisputes,rantingrightso clearnew and,buildnewdams nd form ew ocieties,andso on.Usually, member f theroyalhousewas appointedgeneral verseerf rrigationor hewhole egionnd each noblehousehad oneor two rrigationfficialsf ts wn.

Grader,a Dutchmandoing administrativeurveys or thecolonialgovernmentn the 1930s, eported hat theheads ofthe ubakswereappointed ythegovernmentnd that prin-cipal job ofthe entirehierarchywas to oversee nd managewater llocation Grader1960:270,287). The clearconclusionfrom hismaterial s that allocation n Bali is centralized.Ontheother and,Geertz ndGeertz 1975 19-20) unequivocallystate hat ach irrigationocietysegalitariannd autonomous.Either hoiceseems rbitrarynderthese ircumstances.

Becauseofthe mallness fthesampleand the extreme iffi-cultywith hemeasures,t seems o us thatMillon's conclusionsare prematurend doubtful.What does emerge rom hisma-terial s a quite consistenticture fa strong elationshipe-tweenrrigationndpower.Veryoften, igherevels f uthor-ity hanthe ocal are stronglynvolvednlocal affairs,ndnotas distant rpassive gents.6 irectevidence or his an be or-ganized n terms fthetypes f taskswe have outlined bove:construction, aintenance,llocation, onflict esolution,ndtheorganization fritual.

1. New construction hich sgreatern scale thanprevious

works s usually mposedby an outside gency.Centrally r-ganizedconstructions surely ot nfrequentnd has occurredin all sample asesexcept onjo.For Japan,Mexico,and Iraq,there re several ccounts f constructionycentral gencies,and in all cases localswere largelyunable to resist hem. nmedievalValencia, thereweredeep divisions fopinion t alllevelsof the society boutnewconstruction,o it is difficultfnot mpossibleosaythat ocalswere orwerenot able to resistexternal ecisions.n thecase ofPul Eliya,theresno instanceinLeach's account f centrallymposed onstructionecision.Murphey 1957), however,does mention arlyhistoric on-structionchemes nder entral irectionwhichhad theeffect

6 In anotherwork now in preparation,we are exploringthese

relationships ystematicallywith a larger sample than we havebeen able to use here.








Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONf tying hedry-zone anks nto a centralized anal system.Yalman (1967:37, 248-49) mentions hat hegovernmentuilta newsystemnd that nevillagebuilt tsowntank.

The new works entrallymposedmaywell be detrimentalto thelocal society r the ocal ecology.This has been docu-mented or raq (Gibson1974) and for heValley ofOaxaca(Lees 1972). One function fhavingmembers f he ocal com-munity ccupyroleswhich nvolve xtra-local ower maybeto protect helocale againstthedamaging policiesofhigher-level nstitutions.his sclearlywhatwastried ytheSanJuanelitewhen central ureaucracy ealingwithwater, hePapa-

loapanCommission,roposed newcanal thatmight hreatentheir conomicpower.There sa second,minor, indofconstructionhich swith-

in themeansof mostparticipantsn an irrigationystem: heextension nd enlargementfa physical ystem. anals can bewidened nd deepened ittleby little, nd newditches an beadded on to the end in a piecemealfashion Geertz 1963).This does not seemto involve xtensive xecutive rganizationor a tie-in odecision-makingenters. t is uncertain ow thispart of the constructionfforts accomplished, or there svirtually o informationn it.

In Tehuacan, qanats and associated anals are financed ycooperative roups fpeasantmen,whilethework s actuallydirected ya single ocal expert, man with echnical xperi-

encewho shiredfor uch obs. The completion fa qanat cantake,often, p to 50 years, lthoughwaterfromtcan be usedbefore he total length s reached.Although he initiative slocal, the federal overnmentas to give permission.

2. Routine maintenance f a physical ystem t the locallevel s apparently lways n the hands of the ocal social or-ganization.While thecentralpartof a canal systems the re-sponsibility f an extra-local ollectivity,hemaintenance ftheperipheral artsof the systems under ocal control.Wewouldnot be surprised odiscover, owever, hat,where hereis industrial griculture ased on highly apitalized anal irri-gation, omeextra-local nit is taking strongnterestn atleast monitoringocal maintenance onditions. his seemstobe the case on thenew canal system fourJapan example,where themodern ectionofcanals (Ashimori) nd the new

facilities f theold canals are maintained irectly ythepre-fecture,ypassinghe ooperativesnthe ystemEyre1955).

3. The allocation f waterto local branches f a largearti-ficial ystemsusuallydone above the ocal level, nd there slittle hat he ocal unit an do to alter he tate faffairse.g.,Iraq,Japan). Allocationwithin he ocal physical ystemsap-parently lmostalways the responsibilityf the local socialorganization, nd within his s managedbyminor xecutiveroles (e.g., gate guards). Allocation and maintenancerolesmay or may not be combined n the same personnel. n thecommunal ystemnSanJuan,daily allocation s inthehandsofwaterpolicemen,but maintenance s determined y thewater ommittee. rivate anal owners n San Juanmake bothsetsofdecisions. n Pul Eliya, both decisions remade bythe

samepersonnel. n villageJapan, wherewaterrightsre firmlyassociatedwith and rightsnd theSyrian llocationprincipleisdominant, here s apparently ittleneed for bvious entralorganization nd decision makingabout allocation. (It isprobably his ituationwhich eadsMillon [1962]to concludethat theserepresent nly"traditional" orms forganization.)That suchsystemseem to runthemselves ver theshort un,however,s insufficienteasonto conclude that no formal e-cision-makingrocedure s available. As Beardsley,Hall, andWard (1959) show,new decisionsmust ften e made becauseofunusualevents such as a flash lood n theriver).

4. The resolutionf conflict ver allocationhas two dimen-sions.One has todo with onflictshat re internal o the ocalunit but cannotbe resolved ocally. It is a universal eatureof tate ystemshat onflict ot resolved t the local levelwillbe taken to higher evels (e.g., through he courts). n the

Mexican case,this s oftenhecourse ollowed. ince 1940,thishas also been the case in our Japaneseexample. As faras wecan see, internal onflict esolutions alwaysconnectedulti-matelywithhigher-rankedoliticalroles n the society,whichmayor may notbe directlyinkedwith he ocial organizationofthephysical ystem.ometimes pecialized oles such as thewater udges inValencia) are created odeal withthis pecialsetofproblems.

The otherdimension f conflict esolutions defense.Con-

flict etween wo ocal organizationsver rrigation aterhasa highviolence otential. his ssue smentionedor urValen-cia,Mexico,Japan,and Iraq cases and may wellbe universal.The central uthorityan impose ecisions ecause t can resortto force r punitivemeasures r thethreat f them.This seemsto be a majorfactor n the maintenance f a workingystemovertime. n thecase of the Nahid citedby Millon (1962), itappearsthat the collapseof thecentralpolitical ystemed toparalyzing onflictt lower ystemevels.

The other ide of this coin is that,from he local pointofview, he ssue s oneofdefense rexpansion fone'sown terri-tory.As far as we can determine,he central uthority'soleis to see thatdisputes reresolved y peacefulmeanswith eastcost to the largersocial system. his may normallymean a

courtprocedure r the mpositionf someform fsupervision

to maintainpeace and keep productionevels up, but it mayalso involvepreferentialreatmentf localities n water allo-cation.The degree o whichthe finaldecision an be imposedbythe ourt s notclearfor ll cases. n many ases ofhacienda-village onflictn colonialTehuacan, the courtwas largely heservant fthe more powerful fthe twocontendersthe ha-cienda) andwas ineffectubber-stampingdecisionmadebyone ofthe ocal parties.Ultimately,hiscan be attributedothefactthat twas to theadvantageofthe colonialelitethatcash-crop andlords e favored versubsistenceeasants.Thevillagers, n the otherhand, oftenboycotted ourtdecisionsand took heir laims o a differentgency, ometimes rolong-ing a case in one courtor another or everalgenerations.nthe colonialperiodand duringthe "hacienda boom" in the

19th century n Mexico, absentee landlordshad a virtualmonopolyover allocation,construction,nd changes in thesystem, ot onlyfortheirhaciendas,but also forthevillageswhich had the misfortunef sharing he watershed r watersourceswiththem.Even whenthe courts ccasionally avoredthe villages,the hacendadoscontinuedto imposetheirwillwithoutmajorconflict ecauseoftheir ther ources fpower.

In the Tehuacan Valley,forexample,because of the shiftfromubsistencegricultureosugar ash-croppingn the16thcentury,he haciendashad illegally educedtheallocationofwater to local communities.When such cases were takentocourt,the local communitiesnvariablyosttheir raditionalrights,nd a newallocation ystemavoringhehaciendaswasimposed rom bove. The hacendadosas a groupwere able to

control he court ystem ecauseof their xtra-localinkswiththegovernmentpparatus,becauseoftheir bility o converttheirwealth intopowerover the udiciarypersonnel t theregionalevel, ndbecause,ultimately,heir ole s waterman-agerswas legitimizedytheotherbureaucratic oles heyhadcorneredfor themselveswithinthe regional political andeconomic tructure. urthermore,hesechanges led to mo-nopolization f ocalpowerbymakingmanyof the ocalpeas-ants,who could no longerplantbecause of nsufficientatersupply, nto hacienda peons. (This, it needsto be remarked,occurred otbecausethepeasants ecame andless, utbecausetheybecamewaterless.)

The lengthy ourtcases in the archiveson Tehuacan areampleevidence hatprocedureso convertllegalwater lloca-tions nto new egal codes forwaterdistributionavoring aci-endas and millswere highly standardized.They involved,

Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September976







among otherthings, he recurrent ribingofwitnesses, hestealing fwoodenwater-measuringemplates,he control flawyers n thecapital, ocal military arassment, nd threatsof conomic anctionsgainst hevillages e.g.,ArchivoGeneralde la Nacion,Ramo de Tierras 1673-1745,1689-1801,1690,1711-35, 1769). In order to understandmorefullyhow andwhythesedecisions re made,we need detailedcase studieswith full ocialcontext. ince this egal context nvolves hecentralgovernment,nd especiallytscourt ystem,t is clearthat nthropologistseed new skills nd strategieso deal withit. One pointwhichneeds nvestigatingsthe mpact f olonial

systems n themanagement f rrigationacilities. othCher-nyak 1968) and Frank 1970) have argued hatWesternocialscientistsave ignored his roblem ecause of heirdeologicalbiaseson the ssueofcolonialism.

5.Beyond hese inkageswith arger olitical nits, heremayalsobe linkageso ritual rganizationsndreligiousnstitutions.There is in the iteratureery ittle n this opic, nd inmostof themodern tatesthephenomenon an hardlybe said toexist.Linkagesofthiskindwere,however, ignificantnJapanand Indonesia in the past, and in the Mexican regionwestudied he ritual ycle nd roles re involvedncomplexwayswith the irrigationystemn the Indian villages.Here wellcleaning, ommunalrepair, nd construction,rom hepointofviewofthe ocal culture, ecessitate heactiveparticipation

ofworkersn ritual nd thedelegation fpowerto ritual pe-cialists.These are now local-levelroles,but it is possiblethatin thepast,when theRomanCatholic Churchwas themajorlandownern thearea, the Churchcontrolledccessto waterby the local communityhrough itualscheduling. his wastrue n Tehuacan, because severalhaciendas were ownedbyreligious orporationsmonasteries nd convents)which wereabsentee andlords.

Some generalizationsrom hesedata are possible:Massiveconstruction nd conflict esolution re closely inked withextra-local rganization, hilemaintenance nd daily alloca-tionmatters re in local hands. With arge artificialystems,allocationofwaterto the ocal segmentss a matter fcentralpolicyand management. f there re anydemands ofa smalllocal rrigationystem hich ncourage entralization,hey rethesocialproblems etweenhomologous nitsrather han thetechnical nes. Thismay wellnotbe the casewhere lood on-trol nd large-scale anals are the ssue, r where very arge(in both extent nd volume) artificialwater supply ystem sin operation.Here again, the limitations f the communitystudymustbe noted.No communitytudy an throw ight ntheproblems ftheorganization f the arge artificialupplysystems. ommunitytudies annotthereforeear upon ques-tions nvolving uch a higher-levelystem. ommunitytudiescan show,however, ow local organizations re linkedor re-latedto sucha larger ystem,s we have tried o show, enta-tively, ere.

ROLE EMBEDDEDNESSThe relationship etween roles whichmanage the irrigationsystem nd otherroles, specially owerful nes, n thelocalsocialorganization as receivedesstheoreticaliscussion hanthe inkagesustdescribed, utmoredata on it are available.Social stratifications an integralpart of the problem; interms f thecase studieswe have examined, here an be nodoubt that wherethere s irrigated griculturehere s socialstratificationnd thatthe stratifications importantlyinkedtodifferentialecision-makingowerover thetasks f the rri-gation ystem.

A major concernwithmost fthegeneralpropositionsstheexistencef specialized rganization or opingwith hetasksof hephysical ystem.Wittfogel'sgromanagerial ureaucracyisone form.) n our sample,where here sa smallphysical ys-

tem and no large artificial upply ystem, nd where he ocalirrigationystem s nearly somorphic erritorially ith thegovernmentalnit, here s a high degree of embeddedness firrigation-systemoles in otherpowerful oles in the localsociety. urthermore, ater asksmaybe controlledy agencieswhich have other political tasks,for example, a municipalboardora villagegovernment.n SanJuan,for xample,whilethere re somespecialized personnel e.g., waterpolicemen)and three pecial watercommittees, lmostall the authorityroleswhichdeal with heproblems f the rrigationystem reembedded n otherrole systems f the local elite (economic,

political, nd, in the past,religious), nd many are not for-mallypart of thewater committeest all (e.g., the sugar-millmanager ontrols ne wholephysical ystem,gnoring hecom-mittee fficiallyverhim).The same s true or ul Eliya,withitsheadmanembedded n thestatepolitical tructure,nd fortheSonjo and their hiefs.

Degree of role embeddedness t thelocal levelseemsto berelatedto thedegree of internal tratification.f there s lowinternal tratification,uthority ifferencesf water-manage-ment roles may be minimized,while the real authorityiesoutsidethe locality. n Pul Eliya, the irrigation eadman isthe bottomrungof a long ladder ofgovernmentfficesndlocal elite roles, and he is integrated nto the state powerstructure. is role s also embedded n a number f other oles

involving inship roups, ontrol f axation,udicialfunctions,and executive asks. n southernraq, thecentral overnmenthas beentryingo cut backthepowerof theshaykhsormanydecades. At the time of Fernea's study, he local irrigationofficerf the centralgovernment,hose functions erefor-mally technical,was responding o local pressure to makedecisions about allocation n the fashion f a local politicalleader. We have, then,apparently, ome structural ressureto coalesce the rolesof technicaldecisionmaker about thephysical ystemnddecisionmaker boutallocation.That thetechnicalaspect of his role comes first, owever,may havemore to do with the reduction n power of the traditionalshaykh han with tsbeing connectedwith a centralbureau-cracy, and factors f historicalprioritymay be related toexogenousvariables.

Normally,hemanagement fthebasic functionsf an irri-gation ystemsassigned o a highly pecificetofranked oles.These rolesper se, however,may not carrymuch politicalweight.The set of roles which s usuallyassociatedwiththemanagement f ocal social affairss a mixed ategory,nclud-ing local governmental oles,dominant economic interests,high-prestigeersons, nd perhaps thers. t israrely hecase,apparently, hattheserolesform single r consistentystem(cf.Bell and Newby1972:186-249).We are therefore,n re-ferringo itas a system, apering ver considerable ifficultiesand ambiguities. his is not the place to tryto solve theseproblems,which n any case we are in no position o do. Wesimplywish o start rom heposition hat here re (a) rankedlocal rolesassociatedwith social affairs nd (b) ranked ocal

rolesassociatedwith themanagement f the rrigationystemand to have a preliminaryook at how these two sets relateto each other.

Since an irrigation ystems onerous o run,theincentivesleading ndividuals o seekexecutive ositions re of interest.If there srelatively igh ctualorpotential emandforwater,management killsare crucial fordaily operations, ut theoccupants fmanagement oles,more ftenhannot,find heirlottobe harassmentnd even grief. orexample, nSanJuan,duringthe periodof watershortage,waterpolicemen carryrifles implyto protecttheir ives frompossibleattacksbyangry armers ithdryfields. romthe studies n oursamplewith sufficientnformation n identity f officeholdersndidentityf andowners Pul Eliya, Sonjo, San Juan,Japan), apattern merges. he chiefs f theSonjo have executive asksand clearly gain in termsof the local stratificationystem








HuntndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONhrough onnectionwith the rrigation ystem. he irrigationheadman nPul Eliyahas clear executive esponsibilityor hewhole systemnd has been able to use hisposition odevelopa separatephysical ystemmainlyforhimselfnd his clients.In San Juan, he owners"of heprivate analsclearlymanagethem nd gain personally romuchmanagement fromwatersales,rights o buycrops fwater lients, tc.).The communalsystem, n the otherhand,confersittle ainon theexecutives,and it is said to be hard to get people to serveon thewatercommittee. nformantsften all it "a wasteoftime." Waterpolicemenare poorertownsmen aid to be "contentedwith

small bribes." Glick (1970) mentions he same phenomenonformedievalValencia, but we have no informationn land-holding r on other ositions or he xecutives.n theJapanesecase, mosthamletmembers refer ot to take thepostofhead-man, and it sa rolewhich sdifficultofill; hehours re ong,thework prodigious, nd the personalgain apparentlynearzero Beardsley, all, and Ward 1959). We thereforeroposethehypothesishat he ncentive or person o assume xecu-tiveresponsibilityor local irrigationystemies n thepossi-bility f differentialontrol f the deployable urpluses f thesystem.

It would also seemto be the case in our sample that thehigherroles n the local stratificationystem re linkedwithinstrumental ecisions n irrigation, hether r not theindi-

vidualoccupies a water-managementole.Again, water-man-agementroles are actually power roles only when control fwater s associatedwithcontrol f theflowofproduction rdistribution.

The degreeof ocal stratificationeemstobe greaterwheretheressomemeansfor onvertingeployable griculturalur-pluses n some xtra-local conomic ystem. he most revalentsuchmeans s themarket. hisappearsofparticularmportancein systems ere irrigations utilized to raise cash crops,butredistributiveystems ay operate n the ame fashion t lowerlevelsof efficiencynterms f ncreased ifferentiation.here-fore, here s a strong ase to be made for linkagebetweencontrol ver waterresourcesnd control ver otherdecisionsinthe ocal unit.We have no doubt that his s the casefor hefew losely tudied ocal systems hatwe have (Pul Eliya, San

Juan,Sonjo, and El Shabana). Therefore, ater ontrolsnottheonly ource fpower, utone of complex etofproductionvariables inkedto economicflow n thesociety nd to otherfactors hichdeterminehedistributionfpoliticalpower.

A major questionraised byWittfogels thedirectionalityfthe relationshipsetweenpower over water and poweroverother aluedsocialresources.Wittfogel's ositions thatwaterpowerdominates. he study f ocal stratification,tsrelation-ship to irrigation, nd the directionalityf thatrelationshipdemands considerable etailed nformationbout powerandotherdifferencesetweenroles and betweenparticular ndi-viduals, both at thelocal level and above. Some of our casestudies rovide his nformationnd somedo not.Some studiesgive only a generaloverall view of the local communities

(Geertz,Glick, Lees); others ive at least some detailon therelevantvariables of one case (Leach, Beardsley,Hall, andWard,Hunt and Hunt,Fernea, Gray). In SanJuan,we haveargued, here s complexmutual nfluencefeedback) etweenvariables. n Pul Eliya, theheadman was able to gain controlover new source f rrigation ater fter e becameheadmanfor heoriginal ource.For the Sonjo,there sno clear ndica-tionofwhichcomesfirst, ower over water or power overpeople; Gray discusses oth, but in his materials n recruit-mentto the office here s sufficientmbiguity hat we canmakeno decision.There are, n a givenvillage, everal etsofroles, rrangedhierarchically,ach of whichhas somesonr frights ver water,and one set is the primary xecutive ndjudicial body ofthevillage.Positions n these ets re inheritedpatrilineally, ut they can also be bought and sold (Gray1963:146). Whena person s recruitedo the position, large

initiationee fgoatsmust e paid. It is notpossible rom ray'saccountto separate hesepayments f goatsand lineageposi-tions rom ifferentialontrol fwater, lthoughGrayhimselffeels hatwater ontrol as priority.

Assessment f the relationship etweenthese two sets ofphenomenademands,first f all, adequate frameworksormeasurement. ightsof access to land, labor, capital, othermonopolized esourcessuchas salt n the Chinese ase orper-mits to mill sugar and distillalcohol in Mexico), markets,

judicial and ritual oleswhich ontrol istributionf urpluses,etc., mustbe analytically istinguished. ll too often heserights re merged n the accounts,perhapsbecause therolesare frequently ergedn small ocal systemsnd thefolkmodelis presented s an ethnographicmechanicalmodel (in Levi-Strauss's ense) ofhow the systemworks. urther ocumenta-tionof tatisticalmodelsmay be needed to answermanyof theunanswered uestions.

Furthermore,hesedifferenthenomenamustbe anchoredin carefullymeasured ime.The major empirical echnique orinferringause and effects temporal equence,and it musttherefore e a prominent art of any researchdesign. Theordinary ynchronicommunitytudy s perhaps east likelytobe able toaddress tselfo thedirectionalityssue.AsAdams

(1973) and others ave pointedout, the time pan of observa-tion s muchtoo short. t would be desirable o havemeasureson all the nterestingariables xtending vera longenoughtimeperiod o cover everal hanges f eadership.n thisway,changes n relationshipso property,oliticaloffice, nd irri-gationroles ould be correlated. his might ive at leastsomemeasure f lite irculations it relates o the rrigationystem.With documents,he time pancan be extended onsiderably(see, e.g.,Adams 1965,Adamsand Nissen1972), but anthro-pologists ho are bothcapable of and interestedn doing bothparticipant bservation nd extensive istorical ocumentaryresearchhave been rare.Probablyboth teamwork nd long-term ommitmento research n a particular rea areneeded(cf.R. Hunt 1973: 90-92). It is a curious act f he ntellectualhistoryfour disciplinehat heRadcliffe-Browniantructural-

functionaltudieswhichhave dominated hefield nd whichsupposedlymphasize holisticystemics"ave so oftengnoredtimedepth s a variable, r dealt with tas mythologyLeach1954), or simplyprojectedthe synchronictructurentothepast,assumingyclicity,omeostasis,r a steady-stateystem.

Finally, he research esignwill have to allowfor hepossi-bility ffeedbackoopsbetweenpoweroverwaterand poweroverother esources,ortseemsntuitivelynlikelyhat implelinear ausalitys nvolved. learly, systems-analysispproach,with a sufficientime pan topermitmultidirectionalorrela-tions,s indicated.We are obviously ealingwithvery ompli-catedphenomenawhich an evennow be measured ya largenumber of variables.At this stage in the evolutionof theanalysis,we should doptresearch trategies hichwillreflect

and managethat omplexity.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

First,t shouldbe clearthatfuturetudies f rrigationystemsshould include informationn the physicalsystem nd therelevantnvironment.sNetting 1974b)and Conklin 1973),to mention nly two,have pointedout, the environmentscrucialforunderstandinghe ocal irrigationituation.Meteo-rological nd climatic nformationovering long periodoftime snecessarynorder o assess hecontemporaryituation.Physicalmeasurementsre necessary orthe investigationfdifferencesn ecological ystemrom ne locale to another.

Second, t is importanto specifyhe role systemonnectedwiththe managementfthe ocal physical ystemnd therole








systemwhichmanagesthe local political nstitutionsnd toclarify he relationship etween hem. This will demand in-formationn andtenure,water ights,ffice olding, hefunc-tioning f territorialoliticalunits, tc.

Third,theexternal extra-local) ocial environment ustbespecified,ncludingpolitical (governmental), conomic,andreligious imensions. he specificationf connections etweenthe national and regional political and economicstructuresand the ocal rolesystems crucial.Similarly, elationshipsooutsidemarkets, ransportationystems,reditsystems,tc.,need to be investigated ecause of theirdirect mpacton the

local system. he same applies to the ritual organizationsifany) involved n thesystem.Ultimately, hat we are callingfor s a shift ffocus romhetraditionalommunitytudy.Wethink t now self-evidenthat mportantuestions bout irri-gation as a social system annot be answeredby confininganalysis o a yearor two and to a single isolated" ocale. Weare infundamentalgreement ithNetting 1974b:34) on theabovepoints.

Irrigations clearly resource funusualfecundity.t occurswithdifferentiationfpower n thetotal ociety,nd thepoweris frequently,fnot universally,ssociatedwith themanage-ment of the irrigation ystem tself.t is thereforeonnectedwith tratificationystems ased inpart on differentialontrolofmeans ofproduction.We have arguedthat ocal communi-

ties embeddedin state systems re linked n complexways,especiallywithhigher evelsoforganizationf watermanage-ment, nd that hese igherevels f rganizationresignificantvariables n at least somecrucial aspects f ocal processwhichconcern rrigation.We have shown hatthemanagement olesfor thelocal irrigation ystem re closely inkedwithsystemsof rolesbelonging ohigher evelsof ntegration,fsuchexist.In many cases, the ocal unit s incapable ofresisting or nylength f timemany of the decisionsmade at higher evels ofintegration.

Irrigation griculturehus learlys a resourcefgreat truc-turalpotential; t is systematicallyinkedwithmajorfeaturesof he ocialorganization,loselyinkedwith ifferentialower,and embedded n the ocal-nationalinkages f states. t maytherefore e associatedwith distinct orms fsocial organiza-

tionwhichrequirefurthertudy.There is little thnographicinformationhat suseful or hetesting fhypotheses.We canchoosebetween ifferentiewsonly n the trengthfourcon-victions.Whatweneed, nstead,s to return o thefieldwithmore learly pecifiedetofquestions.We have tried o outlinea few nthispaper.

CommentsbyG. MUNIR AHMED

Departmentf Geography,hicago tateUniversity,5thSt. atKingDrive, hicago,II. 60628,U.S.A. 13 iv 76

This article s welldocumented, ummarizes voluminousit-erature, nd admirably ontributeso research s a review. tfalls hort, owever, f thesignificancelaimed n the title orlocal social organization.Notwithstandingomeremarks, newonders ftheparticular actors nd elements f ocial organi-zation discussed an be construed o constitute portrayal fsocialorganizationerse.Furthermore,hevalue of hereviewis limitedby theauthors' hoice of iterature. houghthis sjustifiablen tsownterms, hey ouldprofitably ave ncludedoneof themost xtensiveanal irrigationystemsnthe world,in SouthAsia, nottomention thers.Had theydone so, theircritiqueof the iterature nd the preconditionsor esting y-potheseswould have been conceptuallymorefunctionalndregionallymorebalanced. The sampling echnique dopted n

the presentationould have been a littlemoreflexible.Addi-

tional iterature o render t morerepresentativeould havebeen accommodated y shorteninghesomewhat oo ong dis-cussion fWittfogel, illon, Lees, et al., of slight r doubtfulrelevance o the article's itle.The conclusions um up all oftheresearch: ts cope and limitations. plea is, however,madethatwe return o the fieldwith "clearly pecified et ofques-tions" or urthertudy. n this ies hope ofunfoldinghe ecretsof nvironmentalndother ocioculturalovariations hatbindirrigation nd social organization.

by OHN W. BENNETTDepartment fAnthropology, ashington niversityt St. Louis,St. Louis,Mo. 63130, U.S.A. 10 iii 76

We shouldbe grateful o theHunts forthis nterestingon-tributiono the lender omparativeiteraturen anthropology.For manyyears econdary nalysishas beena ticket o profes-sional oblivion, nd I had hoped thatmyrecentpaper onwater-resourcesritingsnanthropologyBennett 974) wouldstimulate certain mountof nterestn comparativework.

The Huntsare ustifiablykeptical bout thevalue of com-munity tudies-especially community tudiesdone withoutadequate referenceo the larger systemsn whichthey arelocated-for derivinggeneral theory.Nevertheless, hey at-tempt ouse communitytudies o find egularities"systemiccorrelates")n therelationshipfwater-resourceevelopmentto socialorganization. think hey houldbe congratulated ortaking n a job whichwas almost ure to produce meagerre-sults.Only in thiswaywill theshortcomingsfclassicaleth-nographic ommunitytudybe revealed.

Theirpaperdemonstrateshe dearthoftheoryn thestudyof therelationshipf resource evelopmento socialbehavior.A descriptionfan irrigationystem oes not ubstituteor nattempt o explainthe behaviorofpeople in varying ontextsof thatsystem.Only a theoretical pproachto theproblem,featuring daptationalconceptswhich ask whatpeople wantand how theyget t, n differentystemsnd at differentimesin the samesystem,an do the ob.

In twoplacesthe Hunts note thetendency or ocal systemsto devolvetoward llegalor inequitable tates: 1) in thedis-

cussionofthe San Juanschemes nd the "good" and "bad"distinctionetweenwaterrights ssignedon watercourses nthe basis of land-tenure ights which,followingGlick, theycalltheSyrian) nd water ights ssigned n thebasisof wner-ship of sourceofwater, makingthemsaleable (whichGlickcallstheYemenite);and (2) in thediscussion f tratification,especiallywithreferenceo a searchforpoweron thepartoflocal personswho seewaterresourcess a vehicle.

A variety fmodels s available in the literature n watermanagement or heanalysis fthesevery ommon ituations.The distinctionetween hetwo kindsofwaterrightss basicin all studies nd textsn this ield. he Syrian ystemsequiva-lent o the"doctrine fprior ppropriation," hich sthefoun-dationofmodernwesternNorthAmericanwater aws. The

Yemenite s similar o the classicriparian-rightsystem, re-vailing n easternNorthAmerica, nd formerlyn theWest.The two pproacheshavedisplayedn institutionalrogressionbecausetheunderlying roblemsa physical nd instrumentalone-the fluidnatureof and absoluteneedforwater.Hence,increasing opulation plus increasing ationalcontrolof re-sources n order to maintain quityof allocationof water nthispopulationmeans thatsystemsend to evolvefrom heYemenitetowardthe Syrian-that is, as long as land tenureremains n privatehands. This happened in westernNorthAmericaas populationand wateruse increased n arid andsemiarid ands.When andtenure ndusemovetoward ollec-tive olutions, owever, heprior-appropriationSyrian) ystemmay bemodifiedr abrogated y the tate rother ody uper-vising ollective se or control nd replaced by collective-use

schemes r relatedmethods f allocation.This three-or-more-








Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONtageprogressions basic n NorthAmerica nd elsewhere, ndwhile nstitutionalariations etween ocieties an influencet,there s an underlying niformityntroduced y the amountofavailablewater, heneedfor t,and the size of thepopula-tionusing t.'

Withregard o thetendencyo view one or the other lloca-tion ystem s illegalor corrupt,he Huntsmight aveprofitedfrommymodel Bennett 967) showing ow n NorthAmericasystems f resource llocation end tomovefrom niversalistic(i.e., equal or fair llocation or ll) toparticularistici.e., un-equal and covert llocation o the few),usuallywith he collu-

sion of government ureaus that become involved n localaffairs nd with wealthy r highly roductive perators s aresult of their decision-making unctions, djudication pro-cedures, tc. This evolutionary rogressionlso seemsto haveoccurredn theNeolithic-Bronze ge transition. s the Huntsnoticed, eople tend to use irrigation s a meansfor ollectingpower because water s a necessitynd the accumulation fpower s a universal ehavioral endency.

Still another rogressionhich havepublished ninbrief2concerns he nteractionetween xternal ureaucratic ontrolagencies nd the ocal populationwith espect o theallocationofwater nd operating rrangementsfthe rrigationcheme.In many nations, ocal, technologicallyimple, nd inefficientprivate chemes rereplacedby government-constructedom-

munity chemeswhich are costly nd mustbe operated by aprofessional ater master est the "corrupt"particularisml-luded to above develop and a generalfree-for-allmerge. nmostcases this ituationwill ast for ome time,untilgovern-ment decides it can no longer affordwages and salaries forpersonnelosettle uarrels, et allocations, penandshutgates,etc. Then government ttempts o give theresponsibilityorthese functions o the local water users,who are requiredorpersuadedto organize heir wn users' association nd estab-lish procedures. his is usually esisted ecause t costsmoney,whichmust be collectedby a tax on the users or by raisingwater ees.The cyclemay continuef nd when he ocal users'association alls ntodisorder, he cheme egins o breakdown,the governmenttepsback in, and so on.

At severalpointsthe Hunts' paper could have benefitedgreatly rom he use of conomicmodelsor at least elementaryeconomicperspective. bout halfway hrough he paper theycome to two conclusions: (1) that "new construction . . great-er nscale thanpreviousworks s usually mposed y an outsideagency" and (2) that "routinemaintenance f a physical ys-tem at the ocal level s apparently lways n the hands of thelocal socialorganization."Well, of ourse.There area numberofreasons orbothof hese, utoneoverridingne: cost.Localsystemsreusually-in tribal,peasant, nd entrepreneurialo-cieties-relatively implebecause they re largelyabor-inten-sive: few ocal agrarian communities t any level ofdevelop-ment an generate nough apital to afford laborate chemes,which n water management re very xpensive, otonlyforconstruction,ut also forengineering xpertise nd mainte-

nance.Hence, f he ystems to be enlarged r mproved, ome-one elsehas to payfor t. I am talkingnotonlyaboutmoney,

but also aboutknowledge,kill, echniques f socialmobiliza-tion, nd so on. These are all monopolieswhich re assembledin statebureausor the ike;the ocal communityimply annotbe expected ohave them.Moreover, he osts f mprovementsor high-levelmaintenance an be so great that ocal commu-nitieshesitate o embarkon themeven whenthey mightbeable tomanagetheoperation airly ell.As the Huntsremark,irrigations "onerous."Thisexplains greatdeal.

In otherwords, omeof theWittfogelianropositionsoil

down tosimple conomic ruisms:.g., as increasingfficiencyis desiredn water-controlystemsn local communities,hereisneedfor supra-authorityf omekind o paythebills-notto mention oliticalaggrandizement,tc. You don't have togotoancientEgypt ofind his, ither-ithas happened ntheTennesseeValley Authoritynd practically veryotheren-larged and rationalized rrigationystem n westernNorthAmerica, ndia, Pakistan, nd elsewhere.

There is anotherfactorhere: George Zipf's "least-effort"principlen action.Whenthepeopleof local communityavebecomeaccustomed o having omeone n theoutsidepaythebills, r can perceive n opportunityorgettingomeone odoso,they arely ass tup, ocal autonomyr no. If they an getwatermore heaply, hey end oput this irstnd worrybout

losing heir reedomater.Hereagain,we don'thave"culture,"

but simply hestructuralhannelling fbehavior, nd in allthese tronglynstrumentalystems e will find uchchannel-ling.Obviously necannot lwayspredict hecourse fchangeprecisely,nd of coursehumansact perverselyrom imetotime,but at key evelsthe outcomes re remarkablyimilarnthesewater-managementituationsfyou knowwhere o lookorwhat uestionso ask. Sincethe ommunitytudies heHuntssurvey id not asksuch questions, ne can hardly xpect hemtofurnishheanswers.

I amnotoverwhelmedy theHunts'findingoncerninghe"embeddednessf rrigation-systemolesn other owerfulolesin the local society,"since everyonedealing with resourcemanagementna practical ensehasbeenawareof t.Resourcemanagement side, t s a fundamentalrinciple frural ocial

organization, s Frankenberg 1966) and manyothershavepointedout.Whenthe ocal societys composedofneighborsand relatives,here s a tendencyor nyone ndividual oplaya number f overlapping oles;there s no alternative,eally,and it is almost simplematter f numbers-morerolesthanpeople. Further, incewatercontrol s a majorconcern n anagrarian ommunity,t s automatically,s theHuntshave n-dicated, sourceofpower.The specific etailsof"embedded-ness"will of coursevaryfrom ase to case, sinceat this evelspecificnstitutionaleaturesome ntoplay.

This eadstoa concludinghought: he basicproblemnallinquiriesnto herelationshipfresourcemanagementosocialorganizationnd ideas is theinterplay etween number fphysicallynd nstrumentallyeterminableehavior equences,

on theone hand,and local institutional ethods fallocation,plusthe xternalnstitutionalmperativesbureaus, axes, tc.),on the other.This is a complex hree-waynteraction hich sperfectlyusceptiblef mpirical esearch,nd evencase-studyresearch,providing hat the dimensions f the problemareclearly ormulatednd theresearchites hosenwith are.Theextent o whichphysical thenature fwater nd theamountneeded) and instrumentalhumanwants,powerdrives, osts)can prevailoverinstitutionalariants nd externalpressuresis a measure ftheextent owhich hesystemsguidedby n-strumentalather hansymbolic oncerns. he germoftruthin MarvinHarris's culturalmaterialism"ies here.The poten-tial errorsn hispositionppear fhe assumes hat nstrumentalconsiderationslways prevail,or thattheyalwaysso prevailin domainsof humanexperience ther han the nstrumental.Thisiswhymodels nd theories ertainingo humanbehavior

1For histories nd analysis ofwater rights nd water-manage-ment practices in North America and elsewhere, the followingmake a useful tart: Dobkins (1959), especiallygood for he historyof water rights and the interplaybetween the cooperative andprivateelements nWesternwater aw; Green (1973), an excellentstudyof the spread of irrigation n the Texas plains and the dy-namicsofresource buse; White 1969), a basic essayon the natureofAmerican water managementand development nd how it hasbeen influencedby social structure;White, Bradley, and White(1972), an approach to East Africanwater use, but with referencesto our own society and its systems f water use; and Smith andCastle (1966), a basic "readerr" n water management, conomics,and law.

2 See Bennett 1976:290-92); the materialthere has since been

expanded to chapter ength and will appear in a book on the an-thropoloyv f resource nd agriculturalmanagement.

Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September976







have to be founded n empiricalgeneralizationnd notuni-versal heorems.

Somefactors,fcourse, re well knownwithrespect otheirregularityrvariability.he Huntsmention ome: all societieshave an "institutionalocus" (I take it theymean responsibleauthority)ormaintainingheworks,nd all rrigationystemsre"regulated"by bodiesofnorms r aws (and nearly ll are alsocharacterizedyconstant iolation f ame!). Then theHuntsnote that the relationshipftheresponsibleuthorityo po-litical ndterritorialnits sa variable,nd ndeed t s.This ssofor he imple eason hatyoucando theob as long s someone

gives you theauthoritynd theproperorders, nd it doesn'tmattermuchwhere hey ome from-a proper ase ofdefini-tionofthe evel of nstitutionalariation. he Huntsalso notethatthere s "variation n thedegreeto whichpoliticalunitsoccupy hydrological nits." Of course, ince the boundariesdepend on the nature of the land survey,and tenure, ndsettlementistory-allvariables. t would seem thatonecoulddetermine hese levels of regularitynd variabilitywithouthaving to look intoa specificiteratureirrigation). ut thenanthropologys "preparadigmatic":t lacks a central ore ofprinciples, ence we have to recapture he essence for eachcase.Another one of mbiguityies nthebias in cultural n-thropologyowarddiversity:he assumption hatcultures l-waysdiffer, beliefwhichreinforceshetendencyo do com-

munity tudieswithout dequate reference o the larger ys-tems.Hence anthropologicaliterature s slantedaway fromregularities,ven though t frequentlyeeksthem.The Huntscomment n the"logical gap" between hegrand-scale eleo-logicalgeneralizing,n theone hand, and themicrocommunalstudies, n theother as I alsoobserve,nBennett 976:25, 30,212,271). It is ust thekindof heorizingheHuntswish odothatgets ost n the"gap."

Anthropologistsould move ahead fasterftheydid a littlereadingn thetechnical nd historicaliteraturen the ubjectstheywishto research.Although his iteratureftenmistakesculturalvariablesfor onstants,t neverthelessontains nfor-mation on the very generalizationsnthropologistseek anddraws ts data from amiliarocieties.

byRICHARD K. CLEEK

400Universityr., West end,Wis.53095,U.S.A. 28 III76The Hunt and Hunt article xtends ecent ffortsomodeltheirrigation-societyelationship. he reformulationnd refine-ment fthe ubhypothesesf heSteward-Wittfogelheory ni-tiatedby Mitchell (1973) and the 1972 Symposium f theSouthwesternnthropologicalssociation n "Irrigation's m-pact on Society" Downingand Gibson1974) form he basisfor his xcellent ffort.

The Steward-Wittfogelheory oundered n a lack of defini-tion of theterms f thetheory, he scaleof rrigationnd cen-tralizationnsocialorganization. unt and Hunt'sattempt orefine hesetermswithin three-part rameworkocusing n

labor control eems a viable approach, but several aspects ofthediscussion equire laboration.

The authors ejectGlick's 1970) twoalternativemodelsofwaterallocation,Yemeniteand Syrian,partlybecause thereexist ome"small"water ources Pul Eliya) withproportionalallocation insteadof the expectedtime-unit llocation andpartly ecauseexamination f their ample ndicatedno rela-tionship etween llocationprinciple nd "size" ofthe watersystem.This rejection eemspremature, nasmuchas Glick(1970:215-16) also proposes a developmentalhypothesis nwhich imedistributions succeededby proportional istribu-tion as demandor scarcityncreases. t could well be that"small" systems ith proportional llocationunderwentomepressure orcing he succession f the proportional rinciple.

Alternatively,iventheexistence f proportional istributionsystemsn the wider ociety, twould not be surprisingofind

"small" systemswith proportional llocation as a diffusedelement.

The preceding iscussion resents wo problems ut lightlytouched upon by the authors.One is the conceptof scale ofirrigation,which most recent writers, ncludingHunt andHunt, agreeneeds bettermeasurement. ome typology f rri-gation based on scale is criticalto most hypotheses elatingirrigation o social organization. pooner's (1974) work wellillustrateshatthe relationshipsetween cale and social com-plexity nvolve not only physical cale, but the scale of theirrigation ystemmeasured n social and economic terms. n

Spooner's ranian cases, scale measured n terms f economicinvestmentroved keyexplanatory ariable.Until our con-ceptsof cale have been refined, ejection fhypotheses elat-ing vague notions f rrigationcale (usuallyphysical) o otherphenomena eemsunwise.

The second problemhas been noted by the authors:thatthere sa logicalgap betweenmost rrigation ypotheses, hichdeal with whole societies, nd irrigation ase studies,whichdeal with communities. his seems a criticalproblem n anyproposed ross-culturalnalysis, lthough hesecond aspect ofthe authors' nalyticframework,xploring the linkagesbe-tween he ocal level and higherevels f he ystem,"may alle-viate the problem f the secondmajor termof the Steward-Wittfogelheory, centralization n social organization," s

operationallyefined. he authors'discussionfthe "centrali-zation" concept s to thepoint,but without more rigoroustypology f social organization,which obviouslyhas strongfunctional elations o centralization,he discussion emainsambiguous.

by . E. B. CoyDepartmentfSociology,niversityf tirling,tirlingK9 4LA,Scotland. 9 iii 76

The Huntshave tobe congratulated ponbringingorwardtopic long neglected. am not sure,however, hat a cross-cultural omparison uch as theyhave attempteds so muchsatisfactorys tantalizing.Where,for xample,are the refer-

ences to the significantontributions f the French human-geographersuchas Brunhes 1908) and Sorre 1934)?Whereis a considerationf hedifferenttylesfwater llocation ownthe southeasternoast ofSpain fromAlicantethrough lcheand Murcia to Lorca? Can one pass over the wholegamutoflocal control verwaterresources,s representedythediffer-ent sortsof tribunals nd their differentowersover trans-gressors,with two ambiguoussentences about "specializedroles .. [being]created to deal withthis pecialset ofprob-lems"?Whatare theargumentsor nd againstwater uctions?Is enoughmade ofthe differentmpactupona local irrigationsystem hen here s a localmanufacturingndustryompetingfor hewater?What are theconsequences fkinshipinksbe-tween rrigatorsn the same distributionhannel?Finally,wouldquestion he mplication hat,n colonialMexicancourts,local communitiesinvariably" osttheir raditional ights owater nd wood (see Coy 1968).

byTHOMAS F. GLICK

DepartmentsfHistoryndGeography,ostonUniversity,oston,Mass. 02215,U.S.A. 17 III 76

I wishto addressmyselfo the nature fproportionalitys anorganizing rinciple n allocationofwater.BothSyrianandYemenitesystems ave proportionality-basedationales, uttheyrequiredifferent easurementechniqueswhich n turnare dictated y the degree f pressure n thewater upply: hegreater he pressure,he greater s the need for precisionn

measurement. herefore do think here s a broadcorrelationbetweenupply elative o demandforwater nd thetendency








HuntndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONowardone or theothermodaltype.Where demand s high,more ocial control s needed, s is tighter echnical ontrolnthe form f more accurate measures.The Syrianmodel be-comes ncreasinglynflexibles pressure orwatergrows; hissometimesets n motion shift owardthe Yemenitemodelwherebywateronce publicbecomesprivate nd greater ffi-ciency n allocation s attained hroughhe establishmentfamarketn water or waterrights. hus, the twotypes re fre-quently inked equentiallyn the sameregion,with hedirec-tion f hange lways romyrian owardYemenite.As demandforwaterrises as theresult fa climatic hift,ncreasing en-

sity f ettlement,tc.),there s a marked endencyo move toa more patrimonialized, rivatized ystem.This can be ob-served n many places in easternSpain,where there s a dis-tinction etween old rights," ssigned n a Syrianprinciple,and "new" ones,on a Yemenite rinciple.When uch a changeoccurs, hose affected erceivea loss in justiceand in equity(see Glick1972:166 n.105), and the Yemeniteversion s seenas a faulty ersion ftheSyrian ne.

by USSELL E. LEWIS

DepartmentfSociology, niversityfEvansville,vansville,nd.47702,U.S.A. 29 III 76

As I ammorefamiliarwithgeneral cological heoryhanwiththespecifics f rrigated griculture, shall attempt o place

Hunt and Hunt's stimulatingrticle n a broaderecologicalframework.f I am not mistaken, he followings the multi-variablepropositionffereds a tentative xplanation or herelationship etween griculturalrrigationnd social organi-zation: An irrigated gricultural ystemeads to an increaseinenergy upply nd an increase n theability fcertain oles(orrolesets)to exert ontrolpower)overthesocialsystem.

AlthoughHuntand Hunt'ssynthesisftherelationshipe-tween rrigationnd power s important, am disappointedthattheydo notexplicitlyelatetheir indingso a significantbodyof iteratureealingwith herelationshipetween nergyand social organization see, esp., Adams 1975; Hanks 1972;Margalef 968;Odum 1971; Rappaport 1968, 1971;andWhite1943). This literaturewouldsuggest hat theirhypothesise-garding a linkagebetween ontrol verwaterresourcesndcontrol verotherdecisions n the ocal unit" couldbe alteredby substitutingenergyflow" for waterresources."Anotherpoint mphasized yHunt and Hunt s that notonly swaterunevenly llocated,but nformationrucialfor n understand-ing of how the system eallyworks s unevenly ontrolled."This is an important oint,but the uneven llocation fwatermustbe precededbythe uneven ccesstoinformationegard-ing the system. see thisrelationships follows:An increasein informationeads to an increase n powerfor ertain oles,or rolesets,via control verenergy low, nlywhensaid in-formations monopolizedby said roles.Obviously,there ssome differentiationf power in all societies,because evenwhen all informations public, ndividualswilldiffern theirperceptions f the same informationnd their abilities to

apply t.I wouldagree with theneedto utilize a methodologyuchas the systems pproach, whichwould allow the testing fmultidirectionalorrelationsnd many variables. The rela-tionships etween uch concepts s information,nergy low,mass-energy,esourcebase, power, role sets, and economicsare ndeedmuch oo complex o accept a "simple inear ausal-ity."However, he measurement f variablesrelated o irriga-tion nd other nergy ources s notnearly s simple s the au-thors tate see Hanks 1972:62 and Lewis 1976).

The pointsregarding henecessity f more detailedethno-graphicdata to allow for hetesting f hypotheses elated toirrigationnd power (or energy nd power) are excellent.Hunt and Hunt's analysis should indeed stimulate thnog-

raphers to return o the fieldwith a more clearly pecifiedset ofquestions."

by RUCE B. MACLACHLAN

Departmentf Anthropology,outhernllinoisUniversity,ar-bondale,ll. 62901,U.S.A.

Allotted pace permits nly bald commentswithout xplica-tion:

1. The Hunts have identifiedn irrigationarmingnstitu-tions n empirical renaof research fpotentiallyreattheo-reticalsignificance. hey have indicatedapparentgaps inwell-documentedublished ources, nd they ffer program.

2. In viewof the concernwith he inkage f rrigationys-tems o subsystemsr levelsof a complex ocial system, be-lieve thatthey will find llocationof watermore significantgenerallyhan onstructionr maintenance. he systemicocusof allocationwill argely ependupon the conception. here-fore suggest xplicit nd systematicevelopmentf thecon-ceptof allocation, pecializing he term o a meaning ppro-priate for theirpurposes and discriminatingtherpossiblemeanings, .g., by grouping hem underother, imilarlype-cialized terms.A conceptwell-designed or the Hunts' pur-posesmaybe a linchpin n the realization f theirprogram;an unconsidered oncept may mire the enterprisen a con-ceptualslough.

3. Although vailable literatureorces hemto narrow hescope of thispaper to irrigation, suspecttheywill have tobroadentheirgathering fmaterial to such uses of a canalsystems drainage,fishing,ransport,nd sourceof toll reve-nues.For the nvolvementfmore elaboratecentralized on-trol, ome ofthesemayrankwith rrigationn significance.

4. Sincethepaper ntroduces tangential sideon intellec-tual history, shallinsertmy own: It is a curiousfact of theintellectual istoryfourdiscipline, s the Hunts put it,thatit is a well-practicedustomfor n anthropologisto "set anextreme and fictitious) ictureof his predecessors' nd con-temporaries' ork o end virtue o hisown" (Hoebel 1954:183,speaking pecificallyf Malinowski).The virtue ftheHunts'topic ies in the reasons hey, nd others ited by them,haveadduced; the significancef theirprogramies n itsapposite-ness, nternal ogic, and feasibility-not n its novelty r its

superiorityo otherprograms esigned t other imes,n othercircumstances,or therpurposes.

5. Aside from heoretical ignificance,he social organiza-tion of pace and resources as practical dvantages s an ob-jectof tudy. orexample,well-choseneographice.g.,hydro-logic)features illhavemeaning oanthropologistnd native;problems f ntersubjectiveeliability etween nthropologistsandbetweennthropologistndnativewillbeminimalthoughpresent).

6. One attractive ossibilitys systematicallyonceived ndcoordinatedcollaboration mong a group of ethnographersand archaeologists. ne skillmorecommon mongarchaeolo-gists hanamongethnographerss thatofeliciting nd inter-preting eological, hysical,hemical, iological, ndmeteoro-

logical nformationfthesort upportingheHunts'program.More generally, would eschewunilateral ntellectual m-perialismn favorofexhaustive onsultationwithcolleaguesin a wide spectrum fdisciplines. A social or humanscien-tistmay profit ystudying isciplines ther han his own. It isdangerous o practise hemwithout rainingnd appropriateskills" Devon and Gluckman 964:261).

byWILLIAM P. MITCHELL

DepartmentfAnthropology,onmouthollege,West ong ranch,NJVt.7764,U.S.A. 31 III 76

One of heproblems haveencounterednutilizingWitffogel'shypothesisasbeen ntryingodeterminehe conditionsnderwhich t wouldprovetrueorfalse.The merepresence f rri-

gation n centralized nd stratifiedolities s not sufficiento

establish he validity fthe hypothesis.o this nd it seems o

Vol. 17 JNo. * September976 401







me thata combination fsynchronicnd diachronic tudiesis necessary.n thesynchronictudy, s the Hunts uggest, eneedtotest "samplethat ncludes ommunities ithoutrri-gation s a control roup."To do so, t scrucial 1) toopera-tionalize herelevant ariables fthehypothesisnd (2) totestthesevariables n a sampleof societies oth with ndwithoutirrigation. he Hunts'paper s a valuablestep nthefirstro-cedure. n addition, hey recorrect nurgingncreased seofdiachronic ata in assessinghehypothesis.wouldemphasizetheutility farcheological s well as ethnohistoricnd ethno-graphic research on the problem.The hypothesis equires

analysiswith s greata timedepthas possible.In addition o the pecific ariablesmentionedytheHunts,I wouldemphasize he mportance fanalyzing hefunctionsof rrigationn the local ecosystem. ot all irrigationystemsutilizewater n the sameway. I havefound, or xample, hatin the PeruvianAndes water s used differentlyepending naltitude Mitchell1976). The differentunctionsf rrigation,ofcourse,will have a direct ffect n the size of the rrigationsystemnd theamount f waterneededbythecommunity.

byWILLIAM L. PARTRIDGE

DepartmentfAnthropology,niversityfSouthernalifornia,osAngeles,alif. 0007,U.S.A. 25 III 76

While Hunt and Hunt aremainly oncernedwithorigins,he

analyticaldistinctionmongtasksassociatedwith rrigationagricultures importanto other heoretical roblemsuchasdevelopment.t leads to an analysisof arenas ofinteractionbothwithin ommunitiesnd between ommunitiesnd to therecognition hat a system f stratificationmportantn onearena mayhave little ignificancen others. n a municipionColombia where haveworked,his s a useful istinction. heirrigationetworks theproduct ftheUnited FruitCompanyand Colombiangovernmentlliance from 896 to 1964. Thelocal (regional)elite had no role n this.WhentheCompanyleft hisregionn 1964,the rrigation anals,together ith herailroad, and, and physicalplant,were turned over to thenationalgovernment.ince thenthe government as recog-nized old contractswiththeCompanyas legal use-right itleto irrigatedand. Formerbanana growers witched o cattleranching fthecolonial-period ype,whichdoes notuse irri-gated pasture.The AgrarianReformLaw of 1961 calls forexpropriationf and that s underutilized. onsequently,heregional litedominance s nowthreatened y squatterswhoinvadethecattleestates nd bynationalgovernmentupportofsquattersn the form f egal services, redit, echnical s-sistance,ndother ervices eeded o form easant ooperativesdevoted omechanized iceagriculture.

The regional lite, whilepowerful n many arenas of ocallife,has no role to play in irrigation. onstruction,mainte-nance, and allocationare all governmentunctions. he re-gional stratificationystem omes nto the dispute ettlementprocess,nwhichregional litesfind hemselvesn thepositionof defendant, ut decision-makingower restswiththe na-

tionalgovernmentepresentatives.Neitherthe national nor the regional tratificationystemcame intobeing s a result f rrigationwhich sprobably hecase in moststates), nd probablymoreattention hould bepaid to themanipulation fhuman and nonhuman esourcesofall kinds ather hanmerelywater.Nevertheless,n Colom-bia the rrigationystem f thenorth oastappears to be oneelement n therise of a newsystem fstratificationhich semergingocompetewith heolderone.Hunt and Hunt's dis-tinction etween asks nd arenasof nteractionan be usefullyemployedn sucha case.

byBARBARAJ.PRICE

250 W.94th t.,N%ework,N>.r.10025, .S.A. 2 III 76Because evolution s a diachronicprocess, ny theory

fcul-turalevolutionmustbe formulated iachronically. et postu-

lated links between human behaviorand its materially x-pressed onsequences an be documented nly n the present,i.e., synchronically, here bothsides of the equation are di-rectly bservable.When a series f observations an be closelyand systematicallyinked o one stated et of phenomena ndonly partially, enuously, r indirectlyinked to others, t istheformerinkage hathas thegreater xplanatory ower.Thisis the ignificancef he Hunts'treatmentf he relation f rri-gation griculture nd sociopolitical rganization.

Particularlyalutary s their isposal f number ffallaciesthathave attached hemselveso the hydraulic ypothesisver

the years.Among hemost mportant f hese s that entraliza-tion implies the constantmeddlingof a bureaucracy n thedetailsof everyday peration.Their point that such nterven-tion s most probable n terms f decisions r actionswhich,whileonlyoccasional, ffect he broadest evelsofenergy llo-cation and the largestnumbers f people is well taken. Withthe Hunts, I lament the absence of the cross-cultural ataagainstwhich to test his proposition. heir use of essentiallyrole-theory riteriaof centralization uits the problem andgenerates dditional ropositionshatmayultimately e tested,such as the probability hat water-control oles and othersocial-control oleswill tend tobe largely somorphicn small-er, simpler ystems.While the limitations f data precludesystematic erification r falsification,his proposition ests

well upward through broader network f more inclusivetheory cf.Adam Smith n market ize and degree f pecializa-tionandWittfogel'swnstatementsoncerning ydraulic en-sity).The transition rom galitarianto rankedsocietycanalso be viewedfromhis tandpoint.

The Hunts' observation elating ack of development finternal tratificationt the local level with the structuralposition t thebottom fan existing ierarchy entered lse-where s a breathof fresh ir-the statement fa pointtakenintoaccountby too fewwho deal withpeasant societies.As isquite correct, his accords to the interrelationf hierarchicstrata the statusofa fact. t is deducibledirectly rom heirstrictureoncerning he epistemologicalllegitimacyfinfer-ring developmentally imple or early phenomenafromtheobservation fthe ocal, peasant ector fa complex, tratifiedsystem. he link betweenbehaviorand its consequenceswillhave verydifferentmaterial expression n these two typesof case.

As does Wittfogel imself,he Huntsemphasize abor anditsorganizationathermore hanthe ntimatelyelated actorsofproductivity-energylow t the expense fenergy apture.Labor organization an, however, e analyzed as a functionof scale of size and energy ontent fthesystem-in sum,asunderwritteny productivity.eremyownemphasisdepartssomewhatfromWittfogel's. he relationship etween aborand productivitys morethan mplicitly ecognized, owever,as executive oles reregarded s relativelymore ttractivehe

greater heopportunityhey ffer ordifferentialccess,director indirect,o theproduction f thesystem. nlikeanyotherform of paleotechnicmonumental construction, rrigationworksrepresent he investmentf energy o producemoreenergy. he result sa mode ofproduction ithunusualpoten-tial forntensification,ithproductionncreasings a functionof labor input and with increase n carrying apacityuntilsome new imitingactors reached.Sincethe ncreased arry-ing capacity s based on artificialmeans,the entirepositivefeedback ystems also peculiarly ulnerablebothto naturalcatastrophend to the application fpolitical anctions.Ob-viously he labor and productivity arameters re closelyre-lated; quantified ata on thisrelationship ould be desirable,

even where, n pragmatic erms, tend to share the Hunts'pessimism.








Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONyWOLF RODER

DepartmentfGeography,niversityfCincinnati,incinnati,hio45221,U.S.A. 9 iII 76

The Huntsappearto stretch hemanagement fquitevaryingsystemsf canal irrigationn a bed of Procrustesn ordertoarrive at generalizations bout socioeconomicpatternsofpower nd control. ayoutsand mechanics f canal irrigationsystems iffer romplace to place, usually in response totopography nd sources f water.Some demand a highdegreeof disciplined se and control f waterresources, specially nthe face of limited upply.Othersare capable ofleaving n-

dividual cultivators,r communities, ather ndependent fcentral uthority,lthough uchcontrolmaybe superimposedfor easonshaving ittle onnection o the needsofcarryingnirrigation. he first rder of business or the fieldresearchermay be a careful ssessment f the level ofmanagement rcontrol equired ytheparticular onditions nderwhich rri-gation s carried n inhisstudy rea.

I do applaud the Hunts' call for nvestigationf rrigationagricultureystemsn historical epthand in terms f theirconnection osocial structuresfthe arger ociety. t is prob-ably rare that entire argesocietiesdependon irrigationx-clusively, ence ocietal ontrolsmaybe transferredrom thersegments fthesociety o irrigation.hismaybe particularlythe case where rrigations a late technological evelopment

diffused rom djacentcultures.Amongone communityf the Shona in easternRhodesia,irrigationechnologyiffusedn theearlyyears fthis enturyfrom uropean ettlers.he absenceof tradition f ustomaryconcepts f water llocation nd ofcommunity ooperationnmaintaininganals hampered hedevelopment fthisform fagriculture. s is so often he case, diffusionftechnologicalinnovation utran heability fthe socialtraditionso adjust.Thereare indications hat rrigationid strengthenheestab-lished ocial tructuref hieflyontrolRoder 1965:93-102).

The irrigation rojectswhich ventuallyvolvedundergov-ernment uthoritywere in factclosely ontrolled y centralorgans fgovernment.he layoutof everal, utbynomeansall, of thesedoes require measure f upervisionor he allo-cationofwater,but by no stretch f the imagination ouldtheserequirementsxplain the almostdictatorial oleofgov-ernment.Rather,the administrationf theprojects s a sub-systemf theRhodesianauthoritytructure. incethe Rhode-sian government onsiders t necessary o keep close controloverAfricansn many respects,ts powerover rrigation ro-jects and developments merely ne consistentspectof theoverall ystemRoder 1965). The danger o be avoided s theascription ffeatures f centralized ontrol o the necessitiesof rrigationwhenthese may well derive from ther ources.A clearconcept nd definitionf central ontrol s needed. Asa research trategy would recommend omparison fpoliti-cal and social structure etween communities hatpracticeirrigationnd those n the same larger society hat do not.

Quitesimilarhierarchies f political nd social controlmaybeobservable. he fact hat ocal irrigation nits end frequentlyto crosscut ther politically efined erritorial nits seemstoargue forother ources f social stratificationnd administra-tivecontrol han rrigation.

The involvement f national or regional governmentu-thoritiesn local irrigation rojects ends o derivefrom eedsforcapital. Next to under-glass griculture,rrigation s themostcapital-intensive ethod offarmproduction. t carrieshighrisk, ong ead-times, nd slowpayout.To the extent hatfarmers an maintain heir wn rrigationystem, hey endtoremainfree f central ontrol.Where they annot,private rpublic capital tends to bringcentral direction.That moneycontrols esources, nd resources mplypower, s notuniqueto land orwater.

byAXEL STEENSBERG

Internationalecretariator Research n theHistory fAgriculturalImplements,National Museum, Brede, DK 2800 Copenhagen-Lyngby, enmark.11 iv 76

It is a well-knownact hatthe essone knows bout a matterthe easier it is to raise hypothesesnd construct onvincingmodelsof t. It is alwaysconfusing o knowtoomuch. This istheway cholars f hehumanitiesre compelled o move,how-ever, nd it s perhapsmore trikingn our branches fknowl-

edge than in the naturalsciencesthateveryproblem olvedraises unpredictablemassesof new questions.We have toreckonwith oo manyvariables.For thisreason thinkWitt-fogel's heory s alreadyout of date, and so are many othersof the same kind. Everyattempt orces ther cholars o re-think heproblems, owever,nd thereforehepaperpresentedby Hunt and Hunt is welcome. t would have simplified hecase iftheyhad confined he question o the politicalcontroland allocationof waterresourcesnd the social organisationsinvolved;but,bravely nough, hey akea stepforward,eek-ingthetechnical asis,documentedwith elevant escriptions,measurements,nd figures.What a challenge!

It is beyondmy ualificationso contributeothe heoreticaldiscussion. might ontributeo the discussion, owever, yemphasising nowledgewhichwas not included in the au-thors'prerequisites ecause the relevant iteraturewas notavailableor was writtenn languageswhich re normally otfamiliaro American cholars.Myremarks all nto three ate-gories-technical,historical,nd geographical-andforprac-ticalreasons willstart n thearidzones and finishn the tem-perateand subarctic egions fEurope, Greenland, nd Asia.In someregionsheproblemsto balance rrigation ithdrain-age; in others he problem s not only to providewater,butalso togetrid ofthe mmense uantities f alt eftwhenwaterevaporates.

Fromal-Tabari,an Arab historian f theMiddleAges, theSovietscientistAndrianov 1969) records hat thousandsofblack Zinj slaves had to remove hesurface ayerof salts andto carry he wastematerial way fromhe rrigated lots.After

the Zinj revoltedn A.D. 869, 50,000hectares f rrigatedandwere abandoned and ultimately ecame salt marshes seeUNESCO Courier[1972]).Andrianovssecretaryf heSovietAcademy'scommitteen thepracticaluses ofhistorical atain the national conomy, nd in his bookhe has drawnuponhis broad knowledge fthedevelopmentf rrigationrom hemiddle ofthe 2d millennium .C. to theMongolian nvasion,whenthe Amu-and Sir-Darjaregionwas destroyed. e sug-gests hatwith rrigationheyieldrisesbyfour- r fivefold.nhissurvey, eneral rends fthedevelopmentf rrigationntheMiddle East and India are included.

Concerninghe rrigationfMesopotamia rom a. 4000B.C.

to Roman times, alonen (1968) presentsmaterials rom on-temporaryources s well as the literature.n Ugarit n the

14th-13th enturies .C., theland belongedto the temple, othe palace, and to such persons s the rulerentrustedt to.The membersf hevillage ommunity ereointly esponsiblefor hework obe done nthe fields.n a chapter nirrigation,Salonen gives technicalterms and details of the irrigationprojects s wellas their ocialrelations,he allocation fwater,the numberofworkers,ifting evices,waterreservoirs,tc.Elsewhere, e dealswith heorganisationf abor.

Another ich ource f nformations Schi6ler's1973) book,Romanand Islamic Water-lifting heels. t is interesting hat the

noria r saqiya, robably nventedn Hellenistic gypt,whichliftswater n a continuous hainofsmallcontainers,pproxi-mates n efficiencyhemachine-drivenump.A Coptic papy-rusmentions manwhohired potgarlandwheelwith 0plugsfor he periodof rrigation,une 25 to theharvest n July24;he paid 19 measures f wheatand guaranteed he oan by27








keration n case itshouldbe stolen rhe shouldnotbe able toreturnt to the properplace in thesame condition s he re-ceived t. This is onlyan exampleofthe exact nformationnsources vailablefromntiquity.

A descriptionf the cultivationfa modern ndian paddy-systems givenby Claus and Lintner 1975), including ele-vantdetails on population,distributionf labor input, abordemandthroughouthe agricultural ear, agricultural and-use divisions,ultivationystems,nd equipment.

Hunt and Hunt refer o the use of subterranean anals,qanats r karezes,n theTehuacan Valley,a late derivative f

the morethan2,000-year-oldracticeof the Iranianplateau.Humlum 1965) has published general urvey ftheirdis-tribution hroughouthe world,illustratedwithmaps andphotographs nd with an English ummary.Relevantdetailsofconstruction,istribution,nd use are given,but unfortu-natelyvery ittle s said about their ocialsignificance. ostofthesubterranean analswerepaid for nd maintained ythebig landowners,who allocated the water to their enants ndsold it to privateholders fgardens nd shops.Consequentlytheir social implicationswere quite different romthose ofallocationsystems egulatedby the society, he small land-owners, r the tenants hemselves.

It is notalways hewater tself, ut theminerals nd siltorthe manure tcontains, hatmakes he andfertile. his iswell

known rom gypt ndMesopotamia s wellas from hemoun-tainousregions fEurope.In tropicalNewGuinea,peopledigcanals in which silt s allowed to settle, nd the silt s thenscoopedup and distributedverthebanks, ertilizingaro andother rops Heider 1970). This practice ouldwell be as oldas cultivationntheNew GuineaHighlands-which, ccordingtoJackGolson, s likely o be about9,000years.

In Europe, rrigationas beenpractised inceantiquity, otonlyfor rain rops nd legumes, rchards,nd vineyards,utalso forpastures. olumellarecommendedilling fthemead-owsfor hreeyearswith oot ndgrain rops ndfinallyowinggrass mixedwith vetch.After he firstcything,hemeadowwould be irrigated. n his book on Roman farming,White(1970) has a wholesectionon irrigationnd organisation fwater upply s wellas drainage n Italy.Thiscorresponds ellwithScheuermeier's1943) detaileddescriptions fthe tech-niquesof rrigationnd water-liftingevices, llustratedwithmaps,drawings, nd photographs,specially rom ombardy,but also from icily.This work s of mmense ignificanceortheunderstandingfwhat theclassical uthors escribe. inceit swrittennone of he nternationallyell-knownanguages,I shallnotrelate ts ontentsven nsummary.

The language difficultys greaterwiththe Icelandicsagas.Irrigation fmeadows s knownfrom gil's Saga; SkallagrimofBorgtells n chapter 0 thatwhenthe ce breaksup at themeadowStakksmyra,he grazingforcattleon this rrigatedpasturebecomesquite as good as that on manuredmeadows.The same practice is describedin HavardIsfjording's aga, Land-namab6k,nd Gragas.

In Greenland,Krogh (1974) recently nvestigated ndmapped an irrigationystemwhich made it possibleforthebishopofGardar to keep about 100 head ofcattle; the lastbishop died in 1377 or 1378. In Norway,too, irrigation fgrasslandmusthave beenpractisedinceViking imes, ecausetheAtlantic slands werepopulated from hatcountry. n adecision rom 303, type f rdploughVassarder)smentionedwhich, ccording oHasund (1932),wasused formakingwaterchannelsfor rrigation.

Hatt (1915) once wrote n article boutirrigation fgrass-land nNorway.Morerecently, ichelsen aspublished com-prehensivetudy n irrigationn the Nordiccountries1953)and anexcellentmall tudy n rrigationfgrasslandnOtztal,in theAustrianTyrol (1955). Nowheredid thepeasantsuse

water-liftingear, but they ften hannelled he wateracross

valleys in wooden gutters upportedby poles and beamsand scooped it out and spread it from mall reservoirsrdammed canals witha special shovel. In Gudbrandsdalen,situated n the shadow of the westernmountains, he cli-mate is dry,as it also is in manydeep valleys on thewestside of theridge.For this reasonthecornfields re also irri-gated before hespring loughing,nd theuse ofdrill owingmachines s earlyas the 1770smustprobablybe understoodas a meansofpreventingvaporation. ndeed, a kind ofdryfarming as practisednwhich, fter owing, heepand goatsweredriven cross hefield otramplehe oil andcoincidental-

ly oosen heupper entimetres ith heir ooves. n a dry um-mer, rrigation ithwoodenscoopswas practised s often stentimesduring he eason.Thiswouldalwaysbe done n themorningr n theevening, ever nthemiddleoftheday, andnotduring henight,when tmight ause erosionwhich ouldonlybe noticed oo late. A grassfield, owever, ouldbe irri-gatedduring henight.

Often, everalfarmswere rrigated rom hesame stream,and each spring n officialwas elected to allocatethewater.The share of a singlefarm ould be calculatedfrom ts irri-gated area or fromts duties o the tate. rrigationsrecordedfromegal disputes rom he late 16thcentury,nd fines ordamagesare codifiedn the 1687Christian 'sNorskeov.

The qualityof hewaterwas notalways he ame. We know

from rid zonesthat ubterranean aterfrom anatswas pre-ferred ecause t was cold and would notevaporate s rapidlyas surfacewaterand leave solublesalts on the top layer. ntemperate ones near mountainglaciers, hewatercould betoo cold, and therefore aterfrombigger streamswas pre-ferredo waterwhich amedirect rom hemeltingce. On theotherhand, n northernwedenand in subarctic reas itwasthepractice o damtheriversnorder hat hemeadows ouldbecoveredwith ceduringhewinter. hisrestrictedhegrowthofmosses nd shrubs, nd in spring,whenthewaterwas re-leased,thegrasswouldflourishndproduce richhay-harvest.

In theAlpineregions,rrigations recorded rom he 13thcentury. t was practised n Wallis in Switzerland nd inOtztal (mentioned bove) from t least 1313; in the upperRhone Valleyit is recorded rom heMiddle Ages.Probablythe techniqueof rrigationame to DenmarkfromGermanyas late as the 18thcentury,ogetherwith theimprovedhus-bandry, utin somepartsofGermany e.g., Siegen) itwas acommonpracticefrom ime mmemorial. n Norwayas wellas in other egions, hemeadows ould be manured, hedungbeingdissolved n the irrigationwater. n Stephens's 1855)TheBookofthe arm,manuringn that way is recorded romSir GeorgeMontgomery'sheepfarm n Scotland.He simplycollected the waterfromthe surroundingheep-drainsndirrigated ive cresofmeadow with t. In thisbook,differentmethods f rrigationredescribed rom rivate roperties,ndit swellknown hat rrigations an oldpracticenmany hires,as it s also in England.

As my commentsmay have shown, rrigations not always

plannedbya society, hough hesocietymay play itspartbymaking aws fortheregulation frivers,treams, nd canals.Furthermore,doubt that a singlemodel can collect ll thesevariations nder one hat, and I fearthat models n modernanthropologyften roduce falseunderstandingecausetheybuildupon limitedknowledge. his is not ntended s a criti-cism f he uthorspecifically,utas a generalwarning gainsttakingmodels n thehuman ciences ooseriously.

by OBERT WADE

InstitutefDevelopmenttudies, niversityfSussex, righton,England. 7 II 76

"Whatwe need ..,. is toreturn o thefieldwith more learlyspecified et of questions." Our questionsdepend on whatproblemswe wish to address.The Hunts' questions nd con-








HuntndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONepts may be usefulfor addressingproblemspertaining otheories f social evolution nd local social organization. f,however, s seems ikely, nthropologistsecomemore con-cernedto make theirworkrelevant o matters fpolicy,wemust lso ask whether he kindof approach used bythe Huntsis likely o be helpfuln thedesign nd operation f rrigationsystems.

It seems uiteclearthat ocialscience nalyses anpotential-lymake an important ontributiono irrigation olicy, nd itis equally clear that hispotential as notbeenrealized. ndia,with the second-largestrrigated creage n theworld, s cur-

rently ndertaking major rethinkingf irrigationmatters,in response o thegenerally oor performancefexistingrri-gation facilities especially canals). Yet the prescriptionsorimprovementre almost ntirelyf n engineeringrnarrowlyeconomicnature:modernize he canal structures,mprove helayout f rrigated ields, et waterprices ight, nd put n bet-termarketingtructures;hese re the imits fthesuggestionsmade. Some attention s also being given to the formation fwater-users' ssociations, ut virtuallyno attention s beingdirected tthe rrigation ureaucracynd theother ureaucra-ciesdirectlynvolvedwith rrigationnd irrigated griculture.I suspect on the basis ofpreliminaryield esearch) hatchar-acteristics fthe way rrigations organized, specially harac-teristics f the irrigation ureaucracy, re critical nfluences

on theperformancef rrigated griculture,nd thatmanyofthese haracteristicsre changeableby governmentction.Has anthropology ny legitimate usiness n thisfield? n

thedesignand improvement f water-users' ssociations, er-tainly.One has to be cautious,however, bout assuming hatroles nd procedureswhichwork ffectivelyn small-scale ys-tems,withwaterusers ully esponsible or dministration,anbe transferredo large-scale ystemsn which responsibilityssplitbetween overnmentndusers.At east nthe ndian con-text, hefactof governmentnvolvementeems o make so biga differenceo the behavior ffarmers hatone can learnfewerlessons rom he study f autonomous ystems han one mightthink t firstight.

In terms f relevance o policiesfor mprovement, owever,the ocal level s surelynot the evel to focus n, not, at least,

in thecontext f ndian canals (which tend to be larger hanthose found n Southeast and East Asia or in Africa).TheHuntsrecognize hat one cannot earn much about the argersystemrom he tudy f ocalsystems ithin t,buttheirpaper-and most otheranthropological tudiesof irrigation, partfrom he macro studies f Steward nd others-is about localsystems,nd looks at larger ystems nlyfrom hebottom p-wards. t wouldbe a pityf nthropologistsonfined hemselvesto this evel,forthey an contribute o ourunderstandingfthe structurend operationof irrigation ureaucracies n awaythatother ocial scientistsannotor willnot,particularlybydirect bservationf rrigationngineers and other fficialsconnectedwith rrigation)ntheirnativehabitat,going bouttheir sual business t theoffice,n thecanals,at home.Space

limitations recludean attempt o specifyhow thiskind ofunderstandingan contribute o improvementn the perfor-mance of rrigated griculture; ere I can only assert hat twill.To reach this kind ofunderstanding, owever, equiresthat someanthropologists,ome ofthetime,taketheirprob-lems notfrom heories f social organization nd social evolu-tion butfrom heconcerns f thebulkofmankind-problemsoffoodproduction, roductivity,ncomedistribution,nd em-ployment-and work backwards nto their discipline fromthere.

byMRE WELLMANN

Hungarian griculturaluseum, 367 BudapestXIV., Vajda-hunyad-varJ. 129,Hungary.6 III 76

Hunt and Hunt seem to oversimplifyistorical volutionbystating "three major (and cumulative) ways of intensifying

plantfoodproduction"nd identifyingrrigated griculturesthe second. n fact, ndustrializedarming,mentioned ast bythe authors,had partlybeen preceded, n Flanders and En-gland, by the agricultural evolution f modern imes,whichlaid the foundation fmodern rop production. urther,with-out the development f science-trophology, enetics, lantpathology, tc.-industrialization ould have had only limit-ed effect n agricultural rogress.As regards rrigation, tcannot be considered generally revailing tageof develop-

ment n the history fagriculture.Irrigation, long with the social organization ssociatedwith t,nonetheless adgreat ignificance:t notonly acilitatedthe ncrease f rop yields, ut also rendered ossible he stab-lishment f agriculturen arid zones. Hunt and Hunt mentionrice and sugar production, ut it would be worthwhile x-tending esearch oall kinds f rrigation,mongothersmead-ow irrigation, hichplayedan important ole n the develop-mentof animal husbandry. his is important ecause the de-mand forwater nd its periodicity,s well as thetechniques firrigation, ary from ne type of crop to another, nd thisaffectshe social structure.

The demand hatresearch e extended o other ields s wellonlyunderlineshe statement f Hunt and Hunt about the n-

adequacy of the research onducted o far. There really s agap betweengeneral hypotheses nd detailed case studiesofsmall ocalities,nd this s why he authorshave imited hem-selvesessentiallyo raisingproblems nd setting courseforfurther esearch-valuable ocal monographs eing o few ndfarbetween. fully gree with them that, besides fieldwork,more attention hould be paid to historicaldocumentation,whichallows historical evelopment o be traced over ongerperiods ftime, lwayswithan eye to the changesthat haveoccurredn climate,methods fproduction, opulation,mar-ketrelations, ossession ights, nd social and politicalcon-ditions.

It is also right o demand that researchnot be limitedtonarrow ocal units-especially, f course, fone is dealingwithartificialrrigationystemsncludingeveral ocal communities.

This, however, oesnot mean thatcommunitytudies re nolonger necessary.Hunt and Hunt themselvesndicate thateven where ocal irrigatedgricultures embedded n a widerpower structure, echnicalproblemsand maintenance, heeveryday asksofallocation, nd matters fgradualdevelop-ment were usuallyregulatedwithin hecommunity.o wereinternal isputes: he authors ightly oint utthatthe centralpowerwas happier fconflictsould be settled eacefullyndas cheaplyas possible.The autonomy f communitiess evengreaterwhere mall ocal irrigation ystems ave been estab-lishedthrough he effortsfthepeasant community. s longas noneof thehigherpowers ntervenesn local mattersndcash-crop roduction oesnot ntensifyocialdifferences,uchirrigationystemsre governed o a great xtent ylocal cus-

toms, ommunity orms, ites, eliefs, nd religious oncerns.In this ontext,twouldnotbe expedient o leave folkmodelsoutof one's nvestigations.

ReplybyROBERT C. HUNT and EVA HUNT

c/o Department f Anthropology,randeis University,Waltham,Mass. 02154, U.S.A. 19 iv 76

Some 30 differentointshave been made in the comments.They seem to fall ntothreemoreor less distinct ategories,which an be (roughly)abelled Comparative-Studyesearch

Design," "Results," and "Future Field Research."Comparative-studyesearch esign.Bennett nd Lewishave point-








ed out that bothenergy nd resourceutilization re largercontexts or urstudy nd have takenus to taskfornothigh-lighting his. t was notour purposeto elaborate on all theparadigmswhichwould be relevant or his tudy.We agreethat general heory fresource llocation s highly esirable,that general heory f nergy low n human ocietysneces-sary, nd that thetwo wouldprobably argely verlap,butitwasnotour ntention oproduce majortheorynthis rticle.Furthermore, e are not persuadedthat, giventhe limitedpurposes fthispaper,theywould have been servedby theaddition ofthe largercontextsuggested.WhenHeveliusset

out to describe he craters f the moon,he could hardlybemade responsible or not incorporating theorywhich alsoexplained he redspot ofJupiter.

Roderhas stated hatour paper s set n a Procrustean ed.One ofourpurposeswasto sharpen ategorical hinkingboutthe subject which has been muddily reated)by being verycarefulwith cientificoncepts nd distinctions.t is uncleartous howRoderdistinguishesetween learthinkingndbedsof Procrustes nd whyhe thinks ur analysishas been in-hibited.Once he haspresented is evidence learly,we will behappytorespond urther.

Ahmed eems o find urdiscussionfWittfogelnd Millonirrelevant or discussion f ocal social organization.He hasfailed ounderstand hatwe havedone.We havepresented

justification or ransferringeneral heoretical ttentionromwholesocieties o communities. he major set of conclusionsabout local socialorganization s thatofMillon.Need we saymore?

MacLachlan has suggested hatproblems f cross-culturalvalidity the relativity,r equivalence,problem) are moreeasily olved nstudies f pace and resources.We arenot ureaboutthegeneral erms fhissuggestion, ut will agreewithhim thatfor hestudy f rrigation,nd probablywaterworksin general,problems fcross-culturalonceptualvalidity remuch ess evere hanfor irtually nyother ndeavor.Clearlythe onceptsnvolved n allocationwillbethemost roblematic,butthere s no indicationyetthat, once theyhave been ade-quatelystudied,they will notyield to cross-culturaloncep-tualization.

Some of the details ofour researchdesignhave also beencommented pon.One of ourpurposeswas to distinguishev-eral tasksattendantupon canal irrigation.We are gratifiedthatnobodyhas attacked ither he purpose r theresults ndthatLewis and Partridge pprove.

Ahmedhas n effectomplained hat ur sample stoo small,becausewe "could profitablyave included one of the mostextensive anal irrigation ystemsn the world, n SouthAsia,not omentionthers."Wesuspect e s referringo thePunjabirrigationystems, ut since he providesno references e arenotcertain s to which re the published ourceswe have ne-glected.We willbe happytoreceive nyreferencesodetailedempirical tudies f canal irrigation ystems hichcoverevena partof herange f nformationnvolved n ourstudies.Most

anthropologistso notdo field tudieswhere heres rrigation.Thosewhodo often gnore hephysical ystemompletely,ndtheroles and otherphenomena) ssociatedwith t are barelymentioned.ftheyhappen to paysome attentiono these, hesubjects reusuallynot clearlymarked n the tableof ontents,and sometimes ot n the ndexeither. astly, t s almostuni-versalthat thebook reviews ublished n majoranthropologyjournals n theU.S.A., Canada, and Europe do notmentionthe presence, r importance, f rrigationn theworkunderreview.Kinship nd other raditional roblems remuchmorelikelyto receive specific ttention.Only a fewstudies havefocused nysignificantmountofattention n irrigation,ndfinding hemhas been a long,hard, and tediousob ofswim-ming hroughhe iterature.n writing he paper,we decidedto concentrate n a fewwell-known tudies.Since then,oneofus (RCH) hasembarked n a larger-scaleomparativetudy

ofthe relationship etweencanal irrigation nd local socialstructure.More than two dozen additional tudieshave beenturned p, and the forthcoming orkwill be based on a muchlarger ample.SouthAsia still resents serious roblem. ndiais the countrywiththe second-highestotal of rrigated ec-tares n the world nd thecountry orwhichgoodcommunity-leveldata are hardest o find.We are grateful o Steensbergorthe reference o Claus and Lintner 1975). This largerworkwilldeal directlywith everal spectsof ocal social organiza-tion.

The majordoubt about our model s raised bySteensberg,

who questionswhether singlemodel of canal irrigation illsufficeor ll thevariations.We agreethatprobablyno modelnow n existence an do so, althoughwithout serious ry ucha conclusions somewhat remature.Whenwe havea sufficient-ly argecollection fwell-describedases,coveringhe rangeofvariation,we can proceedwithmore ffective odeling.

Several scholarshave remarked n our call for historicalstudies.We firmlyelieve hattime-anchoredause-and-effectrelationshipsre worth ooking or nd that they re likely obe found onnectedwith rrigation.n thispaperwedeliberate-ly avoided most uchstatements,argelybecause the researchdesignforestablishinguch relationshipsurrently alls formeasurementst differentimeperiods, .e., a diachronicnal-ysis.We are notyet n a position oproduce ucha compara-

tivestudy, r even a good complete ase study. ncidentally,we disagreewithPrice's contention hatmeasurementsf twoor morevariables an onlyoccur n thepresent.We feel thatcareful istoricalwork, ndertheright ircumstances, as thepotential fyielding he appropriate ata at the appropriatetimeperiods, hereby ermittinguestions f cause and effect.In the meantime,t is usefulto proceedwith correlationalstudies, nd we are doing o.

Thatwe have emphasized he aborinput, nd not the pro-duction output,of irrigation as been mentionedby Price,Wade, and Lewis. As we pointed out, it is not because theadditions o production ue to irrigationre unimportant,rless importanthan the organization f labor. In the largercomparative tudynow n preparation,his ssuewillbe dealtwithat some length.Sufficet to say here that there were

virtually o data on productionn thecommunitytudies, ofor the momentwe concentrated n labor. We agree thatstudiesof production apacityand intensificationnd morecareful hinkingbout theresults fproduction or ocial or-ganization re notonlydesirable, utextremelymportant.

MacLachlan haspointed utthat therwaterworksand thelistapproachesa dozen) maybe important;we said so our-selves, utourpurposehere was simply o examine anal irri-gation n some detail.The other waterworksmaybe just asimportant ocially, erhaps n variedways,butuntilthedataare available we prefero directour attention o the better-documentedhenomena. leekobserves hat caleofworks s ingeneralbadlyconceived, nd he points o theneed for goodoperationaldefinition f centralization.We agreeheartily n

bothcounts.Followingus,Roder and Mitchellhave suggested tudyingmatchedpairsofcommunities,ne set with rrigationnd theotherwithout, o determine he effect firrigationn socialstructure. aving pent ome ime nd effortntheparametersof ucha research esign,we can saythatthis s not as simpleas it sounds.The only tudieswe are awareofthatcomparespecific ommunitywith rrigationnd another pecific newithoutt are two n India (Epstein1962,Mencher1966) anda Mexican case (Finkler1973). All present roblemsftheyare tobe used as Rodersuggests.

In theEpstein ase,the twocommunities ereveryneartoeach other, nd theregionhad very ecently eceived massivegovernment-providedanal irrigationcheme.The "dry"vil-lage was ust on theedge of the rrigated rea and on a mainhighway,whereas he "wet" villagewas in the middle ofthe








Hunt ndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONrrigated rea and on a secondary oad. Many individualsnthe "dry"villagealreadyowned,or soonbought, wet" landsinneighboringommunities.s this, hen, true dry" villagein anysignificantense?We thinknot. In Finkler's ase, the"wet" village received a deep well from the government,whereasthe "dry" village did not. In bothcases, the "wet"villages ntensifiedheir arming, hereas he dry"ones urnedtomore xtensive ontactswithoutside gencies nd markets.In bothcases, thewaterworks ererecentlyntroduced ythecentral olity.Neither f hese tudies,tseems ous, srelevantfor test nvolvingraditionalong-term resence nd absence

of rrigation orks.Menchercomparednucleation fvillages, entralizationfkingdoms,nd the ecologyofwaterworksnd land transportbetweenKerala and Madras in South India. She foundthathighlynucleated villages,highlydeveloped roads, and morehighly ntegrated ingdoms ere associatedwith he area withlower rainfall nd larger rrigation orks Madras). Mencherhas a strong orrelation, ut it is clear that rrigationworksare not theonlydifferenceetween he two areas. Assigningcausalpriorityoirrigations a relativelyrbitrary ecision.

Withrespect ocontrolling ariation n comparative tudies,there rebasically wo choices:one can either ry o minimizeotherkindsofvariation r to maximize hem cf.Przeworskiand Teune 1970: chap. 2). Anthropologistssually hoose the

Most Similar ystems esign.Our instincts to do so also.Thisrequiresus to control verythingut the presence r absenceof rrigation.t is easyto controlevel n thepoliticalhierarchy,populationevel,perhaps ven thedemography f ocialstrata.How, we ask, re we tocontrol he ase ofcommunication ithother enters fpopulation?Most mportant, oes thespecificstructurefthe ocal mode of production ave an effect ponthematching rocedure? n Mexico, mostofthevalleyshavebeenirrigated or t least 1,000years,while mountain egionsuse rainfallgriculture. incemountains nd valleys re struc-tured ociallyverydifferentlynd have been so formillennia(cf.Sanders and Price 1968, AguirreBeltr'an 967), it is diffi-cultto imaginefindingommunities ith and without rriga-tion n which theresource tructures in some way matched.If,however, he point f hisdesign s not o match he resource

base, how are differencesetweenresourcebases other thanirrigation o be taken nto ccount?Theseare serious roblemswhichneed a greatdeal offurtherhinking.

Results. he transition etween the Yemenite and Syrianmodes ofallocation s commented n by Glick and Bennett.In the paper we adopt the same position s Glick (Cleek iswrong), hat here sa shiftrom yrian o Yemenite. The em-pirical workforboth of us has been in the Iberian-Mediter-raneantradition.)Bennett, n the otherhand, proposes hatthe equence sreversed,hat systemsend toevolvefrom heYemenite oward heSyrian" wherethere s privatepropertyin land and increasing emand forwater.He furtheruggeststhat s landtenuremoves oward ollectiveolutions,heSyrianprinciplemay be modified ythe state and replaced by"col-

lective-use chemes r relatedmethods f allocation." We arenot now n a position odecide the issue.Rather, wokindsofwork re needed.Several componentsfthese llocationprin-ciples have beensuggested or tudy,ncluding echniques ormeasuring hewater, and tenure, ize of watersource,andsupply nd demandcurves.These need to be spelled out andclearly efined. econd,weneedempirical tudiesnwhich llthecomponentsan be measured nd a shifts documented ohaveoccurred.t maybe thecase,as Bennettn effectuggests,that woprinciples fwater llocation renot enough o covertherangeofphenomena. t mayalso be the case that t s pos-sible fora society o shift ack and forth yclically etweenallocationprinciples, epending pon demand conditionshatwe may be able to specify.Certainlyno unilinealtrend

svisible n the iterature e have consulted. hus thepotential

developmentmaybe (a) Syrian o Yemenite, b) Yemenite oSyrian, c) cyclic, r (d) somethinglse, as yetunidentified.

The worldhas for he past century een undergoing teadypopulationgrowth.Up until some time n the 19th century,however,mostof theirrigated reas had gone throughmanysuccessivephases of growth nd decline of population. Theflux f populationwill affect emand forwaterand thereforethe relationship f upply nd demand curves. f t s true hatthisrelationship ffects llocation principles, t follows hat

until the recentpopulation xplosion herewould have beennounilinealnd irreversiblerend n shiftsn allocationprinciples.Rather, heywould have shifted ack and forth yclically, e-pending pondemand. There s some evidence or his yclingin theMiddle East (cf.Gibson 1974) and in our Mexican case(E. Hunt 1972, Hunt and Hunt 1964). It may be that underthe onditions f he ast 100 years uch progressions Bennettsuggests as in fact been true n large nation-states.We nowneed a small numberof carefully esearched ase studies toclarifyheconditions nderwhich shift rom ne principle otheotheroccurs.This may simultaneouslylarify ow manytypes fallocationprinciplewe are dealingwith.Then we canreturn ncemore owell-groundedheorizing.

With respect o ourobservation hatpolitical nd hydrologi-

cal boundaries eem notto coincide mostofthe time, t leasttoday,Roder makestheexcellent bservationhat thiswouldimply hat there re "other ources f ocial stratificationndadministrativeontrol han rrigation."When we can finallyturn urempirical ttention o matters fcause and effect,hisquestionwillbe a primary ne to answer. t is not certain hatthe mismatchf heseboundaries s as oldas the tate. t wouldseemtobe thecase inPost-Classic ehuacan,medievalValen-cia, andmedieval apanthathydrologicalndpoliticalbound-aries werevery lose ifnot isomorphic.f this s true, nd ifthecrazy-quilt istributionf boundaries s a modern i.e., in-dustrial r colonial) phenomenon, henwe have a relativelysimpleset ofcircumstances o explain. If, however, hemis-match of boundaries s found much more generally, henRoder'shypothesis ecomes very trongne. We verymuch

need studies of the relationships etweenvariouskinds ofboundaries n clearly pecified istorical ontexts.

Wade points ut thatwe should, ome ofthetime, ry top-down view, n place of our usual bottom-up ne. In one sense,we agree wholeheartedly ith his.The anthropologyf peas-antry, nd of complex ocieties, as been movingn thisdirec-tion, t least n theoreticalerms, or 0 years r more. n ourfield tudies,however,we tend to focusprimarilyn a singleplace,andthis ives,nevitably, localocentric ias. Top-downstudies fspecificwater-controlystemsrather hanofwholebureaucracies)would certainly e verydesirable.

Bennett tates hathe is not overwhelmedy our use of theconcept fembeddedness,hat t s a fundamentalrinciple fruralsocial organization. hat is true, nd besidethe point.

At stake n our presentationre a numberof general ssues,including entralization,pecialization, ureaucratization,ndpowerwhichsderived romontrol f rrigationystems.t waseasyfor Millon to conclude, n effect,hatwater and powerare notconnectedftherewas no systematicpecialization rcentralization.We hope to have exposedsome of theflawsnthisposition. he phenomenonfrole embeddednesss crucialto thisdemonstration. e plead (a little)guilty o nothavingset the concept n its mostgeneralframework.he existenceof the phenomenonn certain circumstancess not obvious,however, and it is not imply function f the relativenumbersfroles ndpeople. an Juan has a populationof over3,000; thetotal number f official owerroles s in theneighborhoodf

35-40, and the actual power brokers re about 10. Rather, tseemsmore ikely o be a function fwhether heresponsibility








for peratinghephysical ystems focused n a locale oron acentralgovernment,nd this snotsimply matter f the izeof the communityr of the physical ystem. he sourcesofvariation re notyetclear tous,but it is certainlymorecom-plicated hanmerenumbers.

Turning o a differentetofconclusions,hose uggested ythecommentators,e find here re some we can support ndsome we feel should be challenged.Partridgepresents omedata for case in Colombia nwhich he ocal communityp-parentlyneverhad any significantesponsibilityor the irri-gation system. his is exactly he kind of case that s badly

needed in the literature, nd we urge Partridge o get thesedata published.Steensberg's dditions are particularlywel-come. In general,we findhisdiscussion xciting nd openingnew areas of thought.One of the benefits f publishingnCURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY iS thecreation ftrulynternationaldialogues. One is able to discover mportant eferencesoworkspublished n languagesone doesn'tcommand and tobecomeacquaintedwith the thinkingnd work ofpeople itwould have been difficultoknowabout under other ircum-stances.

Bennett laims thatthere s a tendency orgovernmentsotake over ocal systems,o runthemfor while, o hand con-trol over to the ocal authorities,nd thento takethemoveragain iftheybecomedisordered. his is probablyuniversal,

and thedegree owhich ocal peoplecan andwill run a systemalone whenthere s a possibilityhat n external nd superioragency s interestedn doingthe ob, and underwhat circum-stances (of capital investment,tc.) thisoccurs, badly needstudy.We have a clear case from an Juan which s the re-verse-therewas local opposition rom ll social classesandinterest roups o theproposedfederal onstructionf a newdam and canal,all seeing heactions f he tate s threateningto their pecificnterestsHunt and Hunt 1975). In southernJapan, theres alsostrong esistance oprefecturalnd nation-al involvement n local management Beardsley,Hall, andWard 1959), eventhough herehave been at least two recentgovernmentnvestmentsreclamation f land aroundNiiikeand improvementf thebed of one of therivers) n thiscen-tury.n theEbroValleyand in Iraq, there s a degree f ocalresponsibility,lthough n both cases this has diminished nthe last 50 years Lison-Tolosana1966, Fernea 1970). Someother ases areconfusing,specially hatofTaiwan (cf.Paster-nak1972,VanderMere1971).Bennett's ypothesiseems oundand reasonable nough,yet the ack ofcomparative ase ma-terials nd someapparent ontradictionsre serious nd war-rant xtreme aution.

Rodersuggests hatoften ocietalcontrols an be extendedfrom ther nstitutionalealms.When this s true, t nullifiesirrigation s themajor ourceofpower.There sno doubtthatit has sometimes een true. fwe understand dams's (1966)argument orrectly,his ppears tohavehappened n thecity-statesnMesopotamia, s well as during he ndustrial-colonialera ofmodern imes.Butto find, s surelywewill n a general

way, thatthe control f an irrigation ystems attractive oroleswithother ources fpower hould n no waydeflect hesearchfor egularitiesnwhich rrigationand generallywatercontrol) s the primaryource ofpower. Bothtypes fstudyare mportantnd ideallywillyield omplementarynsights.

BothRoder and Bennett uggest hatcentralized ontrol sa function f hecostof he ystem. he more tcosts, hemorelikely hatan extra-local gencywillhave to be involved.Hewhopays thepiper alls thetune.Bennett's roposals re com-plex. He arguesthat argeconstructions imposedfrom ut-side and maintenance s locallycontrolled ecause of costfac-tors.Statebureaushave a monopoly n money, kill,knowl-edge, etc. He appeals to Zipf's aw and goes on to claimthatsomeWittfogelianropositionsoil down toeconomic ruisms.In essence,Bennett'sposition eems to be that no elaboratetheory s necessary r desirable to explain centralization f

constructionrdecentralizationf maintenance.We have sev-eral responseso this.

It is notat all obvious hatmoney, kill,knowledge,tc., aremonopolies f tate bureaus.This may wellbe the case in the20th entury,ut t maynot lwayshave beenso. For example,in preindustrialali, much construction as local and piece-meal. In Tehuacan,the tatemust rant ermissionor anats,butthe technical dvisors nd capital are from ocal indepen-dent cooperatives, ftenworking gainst tateregulations.

It appearsthat arge constructionrojects re not handledwith ocal capital and otherresourcesn today'sworld.Partof

the reasonfor this is thatmost constructionf waterworkstoday a) takes place in difficulterrain the "easy" projectshave alreadybeen built) and (b) is on such a scale that nosmall social unit could possibly enerate he resources eces-sary.

It is certainlynot universally rue that local people willchoosewhat s "cheaper" despite hefact hat tbrings omina-tionfrom utside.We have alreadymentioned hecase fromSan Juan, in whichthe communitytrongly esisted entralgovernmentttempts o build a new dam and canal whichwould have increased he irrigated rea by more than30%.Resistance fdominationwascertainlyhemajor partof theirresponse.

It is not at all clear,again,thatmajor constructionrojects

are always mposed n the ocale bythe center.One might ejustifiedn arguing hatthe SouthernCalifornia ystemwasimposed n the central overnmentythe ocal powergroups,ratherthan the otherway around. The movie Chinatown sprobably ccurate thnographyf ome cases.

With respect o maintenance, s part of the effort o de-termine he actsoftheorganizationf rrigation,twas neces-saryto be as detailed and systematics possible.Since thesampleusedhere s so small,fewgeneralizationsre to be ex-pected. If it turns ut to be true that maintenance s locallycontrolled,henexplaining t is easy,and one of the simpleeconomicpropositionsuggested yBennettwillprobably akecare of t. f,however,t snot rue, hen heproblem f xplana-tion becomesmuch morecomplex.The only way to find utwhat is true s to searchsystematicallyor the cross-cultural

factsand present hem,howevertrivialor self-evidentheymightppeartosomeofus.

Bennett lso argues hat"as increasingfficiencys desired nwater-controlystems,here s need for supra-authority..topay thebills" (italicsours).This is a verydifferent atter,and one whichourpaperwas not addressed o. Efficiencystypically concern f central tatebureaucracy orried boutincreasing ational production nd maintainingt at a highlevel.This concern swidespreadn some ndustrializedtates(Japan,Taiwan, Spain,U.S.A.). Increasing he izeof the ys-tem which s found nevery ase study),however,s very if-ferentromncreasinghe fficiencyfuse.The firstsdesignedto increase otalwater nd/or and in thesystem. he secondaims at decreasingwaste ofwater or environmentalegrada-

tion.A new dam and main canal involveonlya short ime-periodof interventiony central uthoritynd require onlyminimal ocal cooperation.ncreasing fficiency,n theotherhand, usually nvolves ong-range ctivity, rying o changethe behaviorofeveryuser ofwaterfor t least allocation ndmaintenance, nd oftenforconstruction.ronically, entralgovernments most ikely o become nvolvedn routine ocalmaintenance reciselywhen tsgoal is to increase rmaintainefficiencyseeFreeman nd Lowdermilk 976for n example).The fact ofstate nterestn efficiency,owever, oses a newand interestingroblem orunderstandingocal social organi-zation.Furtherworksclearlyneeded nall thesedirections.

It is notclear to us which "Wittfogelianropositions oildown to simple conomic ruisms." ome Wittfogelianroposi-tions re clearlywrongcf.Adams 1966for few); all arehigh-ly controversialypotheses.What is needed are notuntested








HuntndHunt:RRIGATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONeneralizations,ut rathercareful tatements f the generalpropositions nd an equally careful confrontation ith theethnographic vidence.This is a longand tediousprocess, ndwe hope we have made some progressn this paper. There isno substitute or he hard work.Up tonow,the fieldhas beendivided nto pro-Wittfogelnd anti-Wittfogelarties, nd thepositionshave usuallyhad bases quite removed rom mpiri-cism.

We thereforeisagree hatwe couldhavebenefitedrom heuse ofother economicmodels r at least lementaryconomicperspective."We have asked economic questions;what we

haverefused o do is answer hem n an elementary ashion rtake unsupported ositions. he assumption hat all systemswant growth r that all choose economicvariablesover otherkinds s patently alse.A community r small societymay re-fuse conomic id because t entailspoliticaldomination. necan saythatthe egendary ld lady who sat in thefront f herhut in the valley while the TVA floodedher out is a lovelyfolk xampleof heconflict etween ocal and national ystems.

We completely gree with Bennett hat nstrumentalon-siderations o not always prevail. This is not because theculturalmaterialist osition s naive, but because a sophisti-cated cultural materialist osition,with whichwe identify,considers elations f production s part of a complex et ofvariables which require synchronic nd diachronic pecifica-

tion to make sense of evolving ociocultural onditions. heproblemwith he o-called nthropological arxist pproachesis that they re seldom at the evel of ethnographic larity rtheoretical ophistication f Marx's or Engels's own thinkingandare often roducedby people who havenotreadMarxandwho confuse conomic e.g., moneyflow) variableswiththesocialaspects f conomics e.g.,theflow f ervices, ppropria-tionofresources, irection fproduction ontrol,ndso on).

Wade argues hat hegovernment akes omuchdifferencethat he tudy f utonomous ystemssperhapsnotvery seful.If weaccept as a legitimate urpose four research he ttemptto encompass all kinds of experiencewith irrigation,henclearlythe autonomous ystems relevant.We would agree,however, hat n the case of the very arge and centrallyman-aged modern rrigation ystemsn aridlands, ocal autonomy

is simplynot a relevant actor, t least nsofar s thethin ur-rentdata reveal.

MacLachlan argues hat llocation s probablymore mpor-tant han heother asks, ontraryo whatwemerely peculate.In the arger tudynow underwaywe hope to be able to ap-proach his uestionna productive ay. n themeantime, ecertainly ould welcome heoretical rguments.

Futureield esearch. e social anthropologistslearly havemuchto learn from he archaeologistsn terms f nterdisci-plinarycooperation.Both MacLachlan and Bennett uggestthatwe shouldutilize pecia]istsn otherdisciplines.We couldnot agree more.A related ssue s Lewis's caution hatphysicalmeasurements aynot be simple o get.He isvery ikely ight,and thisreinforceshe need forcooperationwithtechnical

specialists. resumablyuchcollaborationmightmake t pos-sible to do whatRoder suggests-establishwhatcontrols reactuallynecessaryor system. ooperationwith he relevantspecialistswould alsoperhapshelpto dilute he ocalocentrismidentifiedyWade.

As this eply uggests,nd our commentatorsave remarked,muchremains obe done.Let's keep going.

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Institutions

* Anthropologicalesearchn Finland has beenspreadoveranumber of disciplines, nd representativesf the differentbranchesof anthropology ave had little contact witheachother.Culturehasbeen the domainofethnologistssocial andmaterial ulture) nd folkloristsspiritual nd social culture),while social anthropology as been linked with sociology.Physical nthropology as been a focusof nterest or a fewnatural cientists,nd research nto"primitive" ultureshas,since the timeofEdward Westermarck,een virtually on-existent xceptforstudies made by a fewFinnish scholarsprobablybetterknown nternationallyhanin Finland. The

word"anthropology"tself as frequentlyeen interpretedomeanphysical nthropology,hile hegeneral tudy fculturehas been referredo as general thnology.

The need for forumwhere nthropologistsould meet nddiscuss heirnterests as been felt or number fyears.Thisdemandfor concentrationf anthropologicalnterestsnderone roof, o to speak, has been augmentedby the need topromote he studyofFinnishcultureon a wider basis thanhitherto nd to approach it fromviewpoints hat cross thetraditional oundaries etween cademicdiscipliness well asbyFinland's ncreased articipationn aid totheThird World,whichhas meant thatmore needs to be known bout foreigncultures.

On March20, 1975, he imewasat astripefor he nclusion

of a newFinnishcientificociety mong heranks fthe exist-ingones. n settingp andnaming heFinnishAnthropologicalSociety, hefounders aveadoptedtheAnglo-Saxononcept fanthropologys "the science ofman." The Society, UOMEN

ANTROPOLOGINEN SEURA/ANTROPOLOGIsKA SALLSKAPET I FIN-LAND, is bilingual, and its aim, as expressed in the rules ap-proved t the firstmeeting,s "to furtherhe study f man, ofhuman ocieties ndcultures, yencouraginghe nthropologi-cal sciences nd closely elatedfields fstudy nd to increasethe knowledge and understanding f foreignpeoples anddifferentultures."

The Society will publisha periodical, uomenAntropologilFinlandsAntropolog,o provide forum ormethodological ndtheoretical rticles n anthropologicalesearch nd to dissemi-nate nformationbout currentnthropologicalvents, nclud-

ing recent tudentpapers. Among the activities nder con-siderations thepreparation f a report bout anthropologicalresearch n Finland.

Matti Sarmela of the University f Helsinki (culturalanthropology) as elected hairman ndBjornKurten, lsoofthe University f Helsinki (physical anthropology), eputychairman.The secretarys Henni Ilomaki.The address f theSociety s SuomenAntropologineneura r.y./AntropologiskaSallskapet Finlandr.f.,PL 248, 00171 Helsinki17, Finland.

* MANNFRAEDISTOFNUN HASKOLA ISLANDS (Institute fAnthro-pology, University f Iceland) was established n 1975. Itsgoverningbody consistsof four members chosen by theUniversity oard-Gudjo6nAxelsson,Gudmundur ggertsson,J hannAxelsson Chairman),and SigurjonBjornsson Secre-tary); one appointed by the Director-General f PublicHealth-Olafur Olafsson; nd one chosen by the IcelandicAnthropological ociety-David Davidsson.The directoroftheInstitute, ppointedbytheMinister fEducationand theUniversity oard, is JensP'alsson. ts research mphases rethe anthropometryf Icelanders, pigmentation f hair andeyes, age changes,secular changes, urbanisation, egionaldifferences,ethnogenesis,"xogamy/endogamyffects,entalmorphology,nd cardio-pulmonaryharacteristicsn relationto growthnd development.

Earlier anthropological nstitutionsn Iceland includeISLENZKA MANUFRAEDIFELAGID (the IcelandicAnthropologicalSociety), oundedn 1969,whichhas organizedmanymeetingsinvolving ectures nd discussion n anthropological opics.Its governing ody includesJens Palsson, President;Magnu'sM'ar Larusson, Vice-President; inar Siggeirsson, ecretary;Gudmundur ggertsson, elgi Eliasson,JohannAxelsson,ndJ n Julilfusson.ANNFRAEDINEFND HASKOLA ISLANDS (theAnthropologicalommittee f the University f celand) wascreated n December 1971 to makesuggestionsbout anthro-pological research n Iceland and cooperationwithforeignscientists.tschairmanwas Gudmundur ggertsson,ts ecretaryJensPalsson;othermemberswereDavid Davidsson,SigurdurThorarinsson, nd Olafur Olafsson.MANNFRAEDISTOFNUNIN

(the nstitute fAnthropology) as establishedn 1972bytheIcelandic Anthropologicalociety nd supported y tand theParliament f Iceland. Its directorwas Jens Palssonand itsgoverning ody ncludedJohannAxelsson Chairman),Gud-mundur ggertsson,nd OlafurOlafsson.t hasbeenreplaced

bythe newInstitute.For furthernformation, lease write: Mannfraedistofnun

H'askola slands,Asvallagata54,Reykjavik,celand.

Vol. 17 No. 3 * September976 411

hunt and hunt et al., canal irrigation and local social organization

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