Christoph Meißelbach, M.A.

Department of Political Science

Technical University of Dresden, Germany

christoph.meisselbach@tu-dresden.de

Human Nature Theory Revisited.

Developing an Evolutionary Informed Idea of Man.

Paper presented at the panel “Evolution and Politics”

IPSA World Congress, Madrid, 10 July 2012

Abstract

This paper pursues the objective to not only carve out the boundary points between political

science and life sciences but also develop and advance them in constructive theorization. Its

starting point is the social science controversy about “human nature”, in which research

based on the Darwinian paradigm is regrettably left out for the most part. By now, however,

Evolutionary Psychology, Sociobiology and Evolutionary Epistemology offer many empirical-

ly well-grounded ultimate causations that could be the basis of a complex, exact – and first of

all empirically applicable social science idea of man. Right this Evolutionary Epistemology

teaches us that the patterns of human cognition and interpretation predominantly work causal

– and dichotomic. Even the scientific discourse mentioned above reflects that: life sciences

take a stand opposite to ‘the’ standard social science model (SSSM), social scientists struggle

with the micro-macro problem and the nature-nurture debate. This article will argue, that all

these antagonisms can be fruitfully resolved by not considering the named disciplines as anti-

thetical. Such a project does not have to end in much-feared ‘biological reductionism’. Ra-

ther it can – and will – result in interdisciplinary theorization, in which social science theo-

ries of all ranges will assume important explanatory tasks.

1. Inquiring human nature

„Human nature is a phrase so richly overloaded with distracting connotations that we would,

if we could, discard it. We cannot, and so we must work with it and even reintroduce a mean-

ing which an unfortunate experimental cultural impoverishment has caused us to forget.”1

There is something strange about the relationship of human nature and political science. On

the one hand, no social science theory goes without presumptions about the conditio humana.

Furthermore those presumptions often serve as final substantiations for the theoretical con-

struct as a whole. And as primary supporting pillar of those theories, they are usually not a

subject to critical analysis. Social science theories share that trait with non-scientific common

sense theories such as political ideologies and religious thinking: neither the socialist nor the

liberal idea of man is negotiable, just like the rational choice paradigm of the homo oeco-

nomicus or the structuralist perspective of homo sociologicus. Time and again the idea of a

guaranteed minimum income is discussed based on a specific idea of man, as are incentive

based job market policies. Usually it won’t show promise to discuss those underlying anthro-

pological postulates with representatives of those beliefs. The consequences of questioning

the capstone of the argumentative structure would just be too far reaching for the whole theo-

ry.

Thus, anthropologic theories rank among the most influential social and socioscientific as-

sumptions. But while the plurality of those premises outside the scientific community simul-

taneously fosters fruitful policy competition in democratic societies and delivers legitimacy to

all kinds of authoritarian regimes; they simply provide an indication of the necessity of further

research in the realms of science. Because – obviously – if there are two or more mutually

excluding ideas of man only one of them (or a third one that has not been developed yet) can

be right. And even if pragmatic arguments like reduction of complexity and empirical verifia-

bility of deductions can strengthen the proponents of the scientific status quo, nobody would

seriously challenge the fact that a satisfactory status won’t be reached until social science is

based on a theory of human nature that is not only logically consistent but also empirically

correct – just like mathematic axioms in physics or evolutionary theory in biology. In this

paper we point out that precisely the aforementioned evolutionary theory provides crucial

1 McShea (1978): 667

components for a new political anthropological paradigm. Hence the purpose of this paper

culminates in the answer to the question: What are the components of a sustainable human

nature theory of political science?

To answer this question four aspects have to be taken into account. First, we have to draw a

map of the anthropologic landscape of political science to clarify the obstacles and retentions

in view of the evolution of political anthropology. Second, we should look for a way out of

this awkward situation by anticipating state-of-the-art knowledge of life sciences and carving

out the advantages that this trans-disciplinary theorization can offer. Third, there should be

some descriptive models in social sciences that facilitate the incorporation of life science

knowledge in political science theory work. Finally we will introduce an abstract causal mod-

el of human nature – and discuss its central implications.

2. Inspecting contemporary political anthropology

The relation between political science and anthropological issues did not develop for the ben-

efit of empirical research. Two different strategies of dealing with human nature can be dis-

tinguished – and both should be reassessed.

The first strategy is the historization of anthropological questions by scholars of political theo-

ry. In this perspective, human nature isn’t an empirical topic, but to be handled as nothing

more than a particular postulate and thus a premise in classic political thinking.2 And so, stu-

dents of political theory learn that the cornerstone of assumptions about human nature has

most serious consequences for the theory built upon it. Depending on whether a zoon politi-

con, a homo oeconomicus, a lupus homini or another classic idea of man is seen to be true, the

causal explanations of social facts will differ – and thus the normative conclusions and practi-

cal advices. But it does not seem to be a relevant question for contemporary political theory if

those premises are true – even though exactly this question leads to enhancing the descriptive

an explanatory power of political theory. The common immunization strategy starts with the

2 See textbooks of political and philosophical anthropology, for example: Kupperman (2010), Stevenson & Ha-

berman (2004), Trigg (2009), and introductions to sociological thought such as Mahoney (1998) or Coser

(2003).

note, that classic political theories have to be seen as historic documents – and so it would just

not be adequate or “fair” to judge them among present-day knowledge.3 But even if this is

clearly true in terms of doing justice to classic authors, we obviously reach a dead end when it

comes to creating state-of-the-art theories of political science.

And here the second strategy comes in. Empirical political science research needs anthropo-

logical assumptions by default. Regardless if dealing with electoral behavior, collective ac-

tion, political culture, parties, parliaments or nearly any other issue of political reality one has

to take a stand on anthropology. That usually happens implicitly – by using the framework of

methodological collectivism or methodological individualism as one of the two main research

approaches.4 The main function of making this fundamental decision is a pragmatic one: the

choice of research approach provides the opportunity to reduce the complexity of explanatory

models and thus to enhance theories by testing deduced empirical hypothesis. Even though

these pragmatic reasons are valid, this status quo of political anthropology should nevertheless

be questioned since this contemporary dualism of methodological individualism and collectiv-

ism is mainly the product of a path dependent development. It started with the requirement of

handling the micro-macro-problem in times of institutionalizing and differentiating social

sciences.5 In the absence of scientific knowledge about human nature, the struggle for the

most plausible anthropological premises led to the long running competition of homo oeco-

nomicus and homo sociologicus ending in the two antithetic and thus fundamental conflicting

anthropological doctrines that nowadays consolidated in scientific camps.6 Apart from the

epistemological problem that the decision for one of the big methodological paradigms is

mainly a matter of scientific socialization and not scientific plausibility, both paradigms have

revealed weaknesses that are highly visible, but nonetheless frequently overseen.

Because when political science got more and more institutionalized, when empirical research

consolidated and theories got more elaborate, both paradigms turned out to be not very suc-

cessful in predicting real life phenomena apart from the laboratory circumstances of models

built mainly for efficiency and complex reduction. Rational choice theory did well in explain-

ing the actions of collective actors – but proved insufficient for explaining individual behav-

3 Haberman (2004): 13ff.; Kupperman (2010): 189ff. 4 See textbooks of sociology such as Esser (1993), Giddens et al. (2011), Tischler (2010) 5 Greve, Schnabel & Schützeichel (2009) 6 For a brief history of sociological thought and institutionalization see Swingewood (2000) and Calhoun (2007).

ior, for instance in connection with the ultimatum game or the observer effect.7 Structuralist

theories highly value the role of socialization and cultural conditioning.8 But their explana-

tions lack the adequate modeling of individual decision rules and the influence of exposed

individuals on social facts.9 Both individualists and collectivists anticipated these weaknesses

in the last decades by making concessions to the opposite side: rational choice theory incorpo-

rated concepts like “bounded rationality”, the RREEMM-model, framing and opportunism;

structuralists began to consider the relevance of interdependent individual behavior.10

Regret-

tably this didn’t lead to a more holistic concept of human nature as a cornerstone of future

social science theory work. The theories based on the paradigmatic assumptions of homo

oeconomicus and homo sociologicus had already become too sophisticated and coherent as

that they could have been put together easily. Rather multi-perspective approaches (in the best

case) and eclecticistic theoretical frameworks (in the worst case) led to diminishing clarity

about those basal premises of empirical research. The lowest common denominator seems to

be that social macro phenomena indeed do impact individual behavior, which on its part de-

pends on individual – and in a way rational – decision rules.

But even if political anthropology as neuralgic part of nearly every political theory obviously

needs elaboration and specification to be a solid ground for both empirical studies and norma-

tive research, the question of human nature is not relevant in contemporary mainstream politi-

cal science. On top of that, the once fierce competition between methodological collectivists

and individualists lost ground to an implied taboo that presumably protects both sides from

questioning their basic premises without having satisfactory new answers up their sleeves.

We claim that the incorporation of a third perspective facilitates the productive resolution of

this theoretical deadlock and the connected problems. This is the perspective of modern life

sciences like neuroscience, evolutionary biology, evolutionary epistemology and – basically –

evolutionary psychology. Their contribution to an enhanced social science idea of man can be

best carved out by introducing their main criticism on what they call the social science stand-

7 Tingley (2007) gives an introduction to criticism of classical rational choice theories. For the ultimatum game

see Heinrich, Boyd et al. (2001) and Alvard (2004). The observer effect is treated by Bateson, Nettle & Rob-

ertson (2006). They found an effect of an image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box (ibid, p.

412) that has been reproduces in many subsequent studies. See Ernest-Jones, Nettle & Bateson (2011) for de-

tails. 8 Pinker (2002) 9 Gilgenmann & Schweitzer (2006): 351 10 Ibid: 351ff; Tingley (2007)

ard model (SSSM) of human nature.11

Because unlike the dualistic (and nonetheless oversim-

plified) view on social science schools of thought described above, the evolutionary life sci-

ences experience the social science’s anthropological premises as deficient in one and the

same way: they are reductionist! (This might surprise political scientists, normally bringing

into position the accusation of reductionism against biologists by themselves. We will deal

with the concept of reductionism later). The major argument put forward maintains that the

SSSM is blind to the biological implications of human nature and thus fails to incorporate

central causal explanations of human behavior.

Tooby and Cosmides (1992) describe the SSSM to imply the following: Humans are born a

blank slate, and are ‘programmed’ by socialization and cultural environment. Thus, as brains

are non-specific and “general-purpose” information processing devices, there are no con-

strains for the variance of cultures over time and space. One general assumption purports that

biology is relatively unimportant for explanations of individual behavior and collective phe-

nomena. And even if those critics do not necessarily capture the complexity of political an-

thropology as a whole, this description applies to the major social science models of human

nature, such as homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus – as different as they might be.12

3. Bringing nature back in

In opposition to that, evolutionary psychologists propose some premises derived from the

insights of evolutionary biology, that bring forth a much more elaborate theory of human na-

ture which not only incorporates the two factors of individual rationality and the power of

cultural patterns, but also connects them in a holistic, consistent and causal model. Those

premises are – very much simplified, just to carve out the main argument – the following:

Humans are a product of biological evolution.

Evolution awards those entities that are relatively better adapted to their environment

than others, because they have better chances to gain resources, to subsist and/or to re-

produce.

11 Tooby & Cosmides (1992, 1994) 12 Tooby & Cosmides (2005); Gilgenmann (2006); Tingley (2007); Workman & Reader (2008)

During the process of animal reproduction random mutations occur and, in case of di-

morphic species like humans, new recombination of genetic material.

The thereby occurring variance of properties gets narrowed down in direction of an

optimum adaptation referring to the environment by multiple selection mechanisms.

So, evolution is not only a struggle for life, not just a competition that leads to the survival of

the fittest. It is rather a process of solving adaptation problems. A problem – for instance gain-

ing food under circumstances of changing climatic circumstances – is solved more efficiently

by a randomly better adapted individual than by another who isn’t. The former gets the

chance to reproduce and play the game of evolution for another round (‘generation’), the latter

fails to. And so, as a matter of fact, contemporary species have been successful in solving

adaptation problems in recent environments. So species are as they are for reasons: They have

metabolism to gain resources. They possess sensory organs to detect resources or enemies,

and extremities to move to or away from it. The characteristics of their phenotypes solve

problems – or were selected throughout evolution, because they solved problems in former

times.13

These are the basic components of the evolution theory of Charles Darwin, and no sensible

social scientist would certainly disagree. Nonetheless resistance occurs when the logical con-

clusions of those assertions are applied to anthropologic thinking: Humans, like all other spe-

cies, are adapted to that habitat in which the lived for millions of years. This environment of

evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) is the world of the Pleistocene, starting about 1,8 million

years ago and ending with the Neolithic revolution about 12.000 years ago, when culture

started to be the main environment for humans. Since an adaptation (in the evolutionary sense

explained above) to this new cultural environment could not have happened in such a short

period of time, it is very much plausible to assume that all human characteristics were subject

to adaptation problems in the EEA or earlier.14

And moreover, many human characteristics

are not genuinely human at all.15

Think of extremities, sensory organs and reflexes for exam-

ple: The human species developed contingently and path dependently along the evolutionary

heritage of all previous stages of development – and so from common ancestors with other

primates, other mammals, even reptiles, insects and nearly all other species – some more,

some less. Human traits evolved (or persisted from prior times), because they enabled their

13 For basic information concerning the algorithm of evolution see e.g. Dawkings (1989) and Dennett (1995).

The classic work – of course – is Darwin (1859). 14 Workman & Reader (2008): 25; Hampton (2010): 29-31; Tooby & Cosmides (1990, 1992) 15 Dunbar & Barrett (2007): 57-126; Buss (2012): 57

carrier to solve adaptation problems – or at least did not hinder them from solving them.

Many social scientists probably would not dissent until here, because it is nothing more than

an application of evolutionary theory to the development of the human species, and a resound-

ingly plausible one at that.

But the traits that underwent the selection by evolution not only range from metabolic organs,

extremities and reflexes to emotions and drives. They also extend to the structure of the brain

and our cognitive skills. The way humans gain information about their information via their

sensorium is shaped and bounded by the structure of the organs. We only see a small aperture

of the optical and acoustic spectrum, and our brain interprets different wavelength of light as

colors, which apparently exist only in our perception, not ‘as such’.16

So obviously the way

we process information is shaped by the structure of the brain long before consciousness

comes in. Basically, we can only process that information and have those thoughts that our

brains’ structure allows us to. On top of that there is evidence that even (at first view) con-

scious decisions and concrete actions are shaped by subconscious neural processes that root in

our evolutionary heritage. The advertising industry and spin doctors have certainly incorpo-

rated this knowledge to their benefit for a long time. So even if it sounds really strange and far

away from the theories of political science: we should really keep up with the progress!

4. Connecting the pieces

So far we only showed examples of the biological foundation of cultural issues. To move

forward to a systematic, applicable, evolutionary informed idea of man, we have to develop

concepts that describe the interdependence of culture and biology, of nature and nurture in a

way that satisfies the empirical evidences and solid theories of both life sciences and social

sciences.

Of course culture matters! Theories of socialization, of the power of institutions in shaping

human behavior and many other well approved concepts of political science give evidence to

16 Workman & Reader (2008): 115-128; Heyes & Huber (2000). For an introduction to the field of evolutionary

epistemology see Radnitzky et al. (1993).

the fact, that humans grow into a cultural setting, learn and anticipate social norms and incen-

tive structures – and adjust their actions among them. Moreover, social meso- and macro-

structures obviously have characteristics that are emergent and thus not simply the sum of the

smaller social entities they are consisting of.17

For example, institutions evolve with a mo-

mentum of its own that we shouldn’t expect to explain by only using biological mirco-level

factors like genetics. Besides, the development of social macro structures can be explained by

an evolutionary theory of institutions.18

But this theory is based on a concept of evolution of

cultural patterns (memes), not superficially genes.19

So, in a causal model of human behavior

cultural phenomena should be conceptualized as self-contained factors.

But nature matters too! Contrariwise this model needs to respect the argument described in

the last chapter: biological facts seem to constitute the elementary layer for individual behav-

ior – and thus for cultural and social phenomena of higher levels, which of course have self-

contained characteristics but basically consist of social action. The genetic configuration of

humans seems to build the river bed of individual and collective social action, facilitating and

constraining it at once.

No nurture without nature! Ultimately this is what the basic relationship of culture and bio-

logical matters comes down to. This does in no way mean that there is no possible influence

of culture on human nature. Rather there are plenty of cultural forces affecting human nature.

Think of birth control and genetic manipulations, diseases of civilization or anthropomorphic

climate change. Imagine institutions shaping norms for mating and reproducing – each of

them improving chances to survive and to reproduce for some and decreasing it for others and

therefore having a long term effect on the gene pool of our species. But still; the driving forc-

es and the abilities to do all that, stand on the shoulders of an evolved genetic repertoire. They

can be traced back to basal human characteristics: sociality, xenophobia, curiosity, need for

recognition and social status, hierarchy, detection of free riders.20

Of course; emergent social

macro-phenomena play a role in these examples too. But we make the point that they induce

actions in interaction with those innate human properties. We will come back to this later. At

any rate, when it comes to the effect of nurture on nature, it should be described as a circular

(or better: reciprocal) correlation with nature as historical and thus causal starting point.

17 For the concept of emergence see Goodenough & Deacon (2006) 18 “Evolutionary Institutionalism”, Patzelt (2007) 19 Brodie (2009); Blackmore (1999) 20 Dunbar & Barrett (2007); Workman & Reader (2008); Hampton (2010); Buss (2012)

Once the connections between these levels of reality are properly clarified, this theory of na-

ture/nurture-interdependence can be easily tested empirically. For example it predicts, that

decision makers in policies like these mentioned in the last paragraph should have a corre-

sponding personality structure. And research around Machiavellian inteligence delivers sup-

port for that.21

5. Modeling human nature and nurture

To proceed in developing an evolutionary informed idea of human nature we have to concep-

tualize these theoretic thoughts in a precise model that incorporates all the relations compiled

above. Such a model requires clarity about the hierarchy and possible interactions between the

different components while at the same time staying quite abstract to leave space for all the

not-yet-investigated concrete interdependencies.

The concept of layers of social reality, introduced by Rupert Riedl and brought forward by

Werner Patzelt, seems to match all these requirements.22

While bringing the components to-

gether in the last chapters we often spoke of micro and macro levels of culture, we mentioned

genetic repertoires and individual behavior to be the foundation for higher levels of social

traits. Riedl’s and Patzelt’s layer-concept brings all that together in a systematic descriptive

model that displays social reality as a pattern of seven consecutive layers:

The basal layer is the one of genetically determined repertoire of cognition, sensation,

information processing and behavior options, literally “human nature”, and thus the

layer of special interest with regards to our research question.

On top of that we find a second layer of culture-specific norms, inventories of

knowledge and routines of interpreting reality, which individuals acquire in the pro-

cess of enculturation and socialization and which are not nearly as invariant over time

and space as the layer beneath.

21 Workman & Reader (2008): 128f.; Dunbar & Barrett (2007): 86 22 Riedl (1985): 66ff.; Patzelt (2003): 46ff.; Patzelt (2007): 184

The third layer consists of individuals, living at a specific time and space, carrying out

concrete actions – and in the first place developing a specific personality in interaction

with the environment and on basis of inherited genes and enculturation.

Roles, sets of roles and small groups as the fourth layer emerge out of natural human

sociality – and seem to be its natural state. It consists of individuals, of course, and is

at the same time one of the central requirement for new humans to be born and raised.

As research results in life sciences show, this seems to be the most relevant environ-

ment in individual human life.

These layers on the micro level are superposed by organizations and institutions of

most different kinds, like tribal leading structures, guilds, business enterprises and

modern political institutions. They consist of individuals and sets of roles, though

many of them stay stable over generational changes and therefore play an important

role in the socialization and enculturation of groups and individuals getting in touch

with them – and sometimes even experiencing them as a matter of fact set in stone.

Political systems emerge on the next higher organizational level, nowadays predomi-

nantly shaped as states, establishing and enforcing common commitment for organiza-

tions, institutions, groups and individuals on their territories.

When political systems integrate more and more over time to build a supranational

system, one more relevant layer is added, inducing emergent phenomena while having

effects to all inferior layers similar to those described for political systems.

The international system and transnational relations constitute the paramount layer of

social reality, presenting oneself as a more or less cross-linked network of all political

systems and supra-systems – and all organizations and institutions bound within.

This model should be seen as open at both ends of course. While we still don’t have evidence

for (but certainly can glowingly believe in) whatsoever shaped extraterrestrial layers above

the international system, we managed to uncover the layers on the bottom: the molecular,

atomic and subatomic layers.

When it comes to the interdependencies between the layers one could say: basically all layers

interact. Even if that is actually one important assumption of the layer model, some refining of

that should increase the explanatory value. As already described when introducing the layers,

each of them is built out of the “material” of those beneath and as such inherits some of their

characteristics. In other words, lower layers deliver the constituents for upper ones, which

therefore should inherit at least some of their properties. Genes build humans, humans build

groups, groups build states. And so, of course, groups (and states) are highly characterized by

the fact that they consist of humans. That can be illustrated by a perspective that displeases

most social scientists for a start: Comparing human states with colonies of other eusocial ani-

mals like bees and ants, and human groups with herds of other social mammals illuminate that

the properties of the higher levels of human social reality are of course coined by the individ-

uals forming them: humans.23

At the same time it would be unwarrantably reductionist to reason that higher layers do not

shape discrete characteristics. Hence, Patzelt recommends viewing each layer in an emer-

gentistic perspective.24

Thus in the first step assume emergent layer-specific characteristics

and in a second view search for the facts and characteristics of lower layers that form phe-

nomena of the layer in focus. So the model predicts that these higher levels of reality, once

emerged, affect lower layers by producing norms, laws and other types of traits that are guid-

ing individual behavior and social action. And this is totally consistent with the conceptual

considerations about the relation of nature and nurture we mentioned in the last chapter.

Consequently, the next step is to ‘zoom in’ to the layers of relevance for our research and sub-

stantiate some of the interactions between them. As we want to get closer to an empirically

applicable concept of human nature as cornerstone of even better political science theories,

we basically ask for a causal model that explains individual behavior and social action. Thus,

the dependent variable is to be found on the micro level of social reality: the individuals-layer

in the case of ‘behavior’, the small-groups-layer in the case of ‘social action’ in the Weberian

sense.25

Given that, the explanantia can be easily derived from the layer model: on the one

hand we have cultural phenomena on the macro level, such as institutions, organizations and

political systems, condensed in the variable manifest cultural patterns. On the other hand we

have these latent cultural patterns on the layer of culture-specific norms, inventories of

knowledge and routines of interpreting reality, like political culture, collective memory,

norms of social organization and so on. The third and basal variable derived from the model is

that of biological preconditions that constitute the layer of genetically determined repertoires

of cognition, sensation, information processing and behavior options. Assuming emergence

on all layers, all these three variables – manifest cultural patterns (MCP), latent cultural pat-

23 For a brief introduction to the cross-species comparative approach of Evolutionary Psychology see e.g.

Röska-Hardy & Neumann-Held (2009) and Buss (2012): 57. 24 Patzelt (2003): 48 25 Weber (1922) in Runciman (1991): 7

terns (LCP), biological preconditions (BP) – independently affect the explanandum (human

behavior and social action). Beyond that and aggravating those looking for sleek explanations,

all these variables interact with each other in the way described above and clarified in the fol-

lowing.

As biological preconditions built the basis for all superior levels we have to assume an influ-

ence on all other variables in the way that BP constrain the variance of the other variables by

delivering the “hardware” of human cognition, information processing, emotion, interacting

with the environment and much more. Trying to deliver an exhaustive catalogue of all indi-

vidual influences would mean to try to condense a textbook of evolutionary psychology to

just a few sentences. Nevertheless we should work out some important ones. That means that

the time has come to deal seriously with findings from the life sciences.

6. Examining the hardware

To talk about biological preconditions of human behavior leads us directly to the popular con-

cepts of innateness and nativism. Reason enough to bring in the state-of-the-art of life scienc-

es at this point.

Nowadays evolutionary psychology and biology talk of the modularity of the human brain.26

Biological evolutionary theory (and empirical research of neuroscience as well) give plausi-

bility to the assumption that our mind contains several specialized mechanisms, that each in-

dividually are solutions for adaptive problems. The main principles connecting adaptionism

and modularity were formulated by Tooby and Cosmides – following up the remarks in chap-

ter 2 and thus thwarting the so called standard social science model.27

The brain is a physical system, working like a computer. Its function for the organism

is to generate behavior that is appropriate to environmental challenges.

26 Hampton (2010): 33f. 27 Workman & Reader (2008): 21f.

It was (and still is) shaped by evolution and thus optimized to solve problems that our

ancestors faced through evolution.

Below the level of consciousness a large number of unconscious processes work. Con-

scious experiences might therefore be incomplete, disobeying the complicated subcon-

scious neural processing that allows us to perceive challenging information processing

as “quite easy”. The still fruitless attempts to create artificial intelligence give evi-

dence to the exorbitant power of our neural circuitry below the surface.

Different neural circuits (not necessarily mapping in different parts of the brain) are

specialized for solving different adaptive problems.

These problem-solving modules of the brain are optimized for solving problems of

hunter-gatherers in the EEA of the upper Pleistocene.

Of course we shouldn’t imagine the brain as a mingle-mangle of autonomous modules. The

neural circuits are connected among each other. Some of them are “meta modules”, connect-

ing basal modules to create emergent functionalities. So even the brain itself can be described

and should be imagined as a multi-layer phenomenon, in an anatomical as well as in a func-

tional way.28

As the design of these modules is genetically encoded, we could talk of them as innate. But

obviously that does nothing to advance the debate around innate and acquired characteristics

of humans.29

However, the solution lies in the fact, that many human characteristics aren’t

hard-coded in the genes. Rather, they often deliver reaction norms to environmental factors.

That means that two genetic identical individuals would thoroughly shape different character-

istics in different environments, while two quite different phenotypes could develop similar-

ly.30

So, seeing a new-born human as blank slate or a tabula rasa is wrong if it means that

there are no biological constraints at all. But it turns out to be fully appropriate when inter-

preted as following: The genetic repertoire allows a contingent range of variance of many

human biological and psychological characteristics. Due to environmental factors that affect

the phenotype throughout its development, many of these characteristics establish specific

states by the processes of imprinting and learning. (But note that, again, it is genetically de-

termined which triggers of imprinting and which types of information humans are perceptible

for.)

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid: 112-115. 30 Ibid: 161ff.; Harris (1995, 1998)

On top of that, humans seem to possess flexible behavioral programs by (genetic) default.

Those conditional behavioral strategies deliver algorithms that should provide behavioral

options that are appropriate for specific situations.31

They work like: “Get aggressive if com-

petition for resources increases; be cooperative when competition decreases.” Note that this

strategy is only sensitive to a specific part of the environment: the degree of competition in

the social environment – by the way, a trait highly influenced by cultural factors. These algo-

rithms explain why humans act differently under different conditions within an evolutionary

framework. They exist because they turned out to be functional for our ancestors, maybe even

the non-human-ones. All that corresponds to the module concept of the human brain intro-

duced in the last chapter. Summed up, it shall be concluded that human behavior of course

can be explained by environmental (and thus also cultural) factors, but only if taking into ac-

count how these influences are processed by human neural circuitries throughout the different

phases of human development.

This last point has to be made before we can pull together all the strings in favor for answer-

ing the question. Developmental psychology and not least Freud’s concept of psychoanalysis

teach us that humans are sensitive for different kinds of stimuli in varying intensity through-

out their development.32

The most instructive example is that of the mother language, which

is learned smoothly and (normally) without any trouble, while learning foreign languages in

later years tends to be a challenging and sometimes fruitless undertaking. But also the life

cycle of an average human gives evidence to that. A phase of immatureness is followed by

adolescence and fertile adulthood and (in case of females regular unfertile) old age. All those

stages have significant psychological and behavioral characteristics, that can’t be treated in

detail at this point. Roughly speaking, infants do inquisitively try to gather information about

their environment and thus making “decisions” or “learning” (not necessarily consciously,

though) about which behavioral strategies seem to be appropriate.33

Some of the most im-

portant “decisions” for elementary developmental options are made completely subconscious-

ly and in the very first years of childhood. Attachment theory shows that infants choose spe-

cific strategies of gaining the attention of their parents according to the behavior of the par-

ents.34

Assuming humans to be blank slates and considering the fact that all single infants

31 Main (1990), Mayr (1974), Tingley (2007), Voland (2009): 11 32 Freud (1914), Miller (2009) 33 Workman & Reader (2008): 145-152 34 Bowlby (1951, 1969)

should grow up under singular conditions one should predict a tremendous variance of result-

ing attachment types. But Belsky (1997) found only three types – and others revealed that

these early attachment types (among other things) affect later personality structures.35

Note

that even if differential psychology has not yet generated a generally accepted model of per-

sonality types, most of the existing models are quiet successful in getting by with not more

than eight personality types – and thus much less, than a blank slate theory would predict.

Again we see the nature/nurture-mechanisms working as described above: Humans develop

and act highly sensitive to environmental factors while the possible variance of developmental

and behavioral options is limited by biological preconditions. To come back to the argument

and speaking of adults, they tend to live on the information gathered and experiences made,

coined by deeply internalized habits and specific personality structures. They already formed

an image of the world that is (more or less) functional and have consolidated decision rules.

Their brains “adapted” to the environment they grew up in, choosing the appropriate behav-

ioral strategies and decision rules from a set of genetically delivered opportunities.

Obviously this has proven to be a very successful evolutionary principle for a species that has

specialized to adapt to vastly different environments. And it has a direct effect on reproduc-

tion, as life history theory teaches us.36

It is ‘evolutionary rational’ (in terms of ‘good for the

own reproductive success’) to first gather somatic and informational resources before entering

a stage of reproduction effort. And it is consistent that the phenotype’s physical and psycho-

logical characteristics are optimized for the particular stage and thus change over time. (We

share this strategy with many insects and reptiles that go through a caterpillar or pollywog

stage, by the way.) Hence, it seems appropriate for our purpose to assume, that the interaction

of our independent variables (or to be more precise: the effect of BP on the other variables

and causations) changes over the lifespan of a human. While early stages are characterized by

excessive imprinting and learning, later stages are conducted by gathering relevant infor-

mation from the environment to make appropriate and thus ‘rational’ decisions on the basis of

conscious and subliminal experiences.

35 Workman & Reader (2008): 152-159; Belksy (1997) 36 Workman & Reader (2008): 146-148; Hampton (2010): 24; Belksy (1997)

7. Compiling the causal model

Getting back to our causal model we conclude that BP on the one hand act as intervening var-

iable on the (reciprocal) causal relationship between cultural patterns and individual behavior

and social action. According to the layer model, the LCP should be mediated by imprinting

and other biological mechanisms that take effect in an early stage of human development and

are relatively intangible for conscious processing. Stretching the computer metaphor we could

describe them as operating system getting installed on the biological hardware mainly, but not

exclusively in the first years of human development. The MCP located on the higher levels of

reality deploy their direct effect on individual behavior via conditional strategies that are more

conscious, more spontaneous and at least more variant over time and space. These behavioral

programs deliver decision rules, while information about the circumstances is gathered from

the environment, from past experiences and not least from the operating system itself.

Another question is, how the direct relationship between DP and both LCP and MCP should

be modeled taking account empiricism. The null hypothesis would be that there is no direct

relationship between them, because they are all mediated by individual and group actions.

When introducing the layer model earlier we already mentioned long term influences from

MCP on BP ranging from genetic research laboratories, laws that set different reproduction

incentives for particular social classes like inheritance law or welfare regulations – or at least

states firing nuclear weapons at each other. But of course these manifest cultural macro struc-

tures do not directly affect BP. It is not institutions that change the genome over generations

or via genetic engineering. It is not organization that make mating and reproduction choices.

It is still (groups of) individuals that do so, driven by most diverse influences of MCP. As the

same argument can be made for LCP as for socially canonized religious norms, we state that

all effects of cultural patterns on biological preconditions are mediated through individual

behavior and therefore not direct.

The remaining question is if BP do have a direct effect on cultural patterns. This must clearly

be rejected in the case of MCP. There is no evidence that cultural macro- and meso-structures

are in any way coded in the human genome. The main premises of the life sciences already

contradict that option, as institutions and organizations did not exist at all before the process

of setting down called Neolithic revolution. Quite contrary to that, one of the promising ap-

proaches to the observed burst of psychological diseases in modern times goes back on the

assumption of maladaptation of the human mind to those cultural mega structures. This does

not mean that BP have no effect on MCP at all. Yet it is no direct one but, again, mediated by

acting individuals. While this is quite evident, it gets more difficult when talking about the

influence of BP on LCP. Life sciences show that the biological influence on morality, fairness

norms and so on is much greater than expected by social sciences. But we have to be precise

here. If there is something like genetically encoded morality then this would be captured by

the BP-variable.37

The LCP-variable however catches culture specific knowledge bases relat-

ed with interpretations which then can be subject to moral sentiments. Imagine two civiliza-

tions’ approaches to meteorology. The one might see weather as driven by transcendent forces

and therefore as reward or punishment for previous actions. The other might see it as vital part

of a complex climatic system explainable by Newton’s physics and thermodynamics. So ob-

viously those culture specific bodies of knowledge and routines of interpreting reality trigger

specific moral behavior or not – and are in no way biological predetermined. Of course they

are products of contingent, path dependent processes of generation of knowledge that is even-

tually based on biological preconditions in the way that individual humans (phenotypes) are

restricted in processing this knowledge. But it is not by itself in any way encoded in the hu-

man’s blueprint (genotype). Even if future work needs to further carve out this boundary, it

seems that the influence of both LCP and MCP is modeled sufficiently by assuming recipro-

cal causations between cultural patterns and IBSA on the one hand and between IBSA and

biological preconditions on the other.

Figure 1: Modeling human nature. Source: own presentation.

37 For the issue of evolved morality see Workman & Reader (2008): 169-179 or Hampton (2010): 93-94.

manifest cultural patterns (MCP)

institutions, organizations,

political (supra-)systems,

international relations

latent cultural patterns (LCP)

culture-specific norms,

inventories of knowledge,

routines of interpreting reality

biological preconditions (BP)

repertoire of cognition,

sensation, information pro-

cessing and behavior options

Individual behavior + social

action in & between groups

(IBSA)

1

1

2

2

mainly: situational decision rules, conditional strategies mainly: imprinting and learning

So, the model resulting from these considerations can be seen in figure 1. Obviously it match-

es the criteria stated at the beginning: In connection with the layer model of social reality it

clearly references the hierarchy and possible interactions between all relevant components and

stays quite abstract to leave space for future refinement.

8. Dealing with resentments

As previously established, there is nothing wrong with the central assumptions of both homo

oeconomicus and homo sociologicus from an evolutionary point of view. Humans decide on

the basis of a complex and only partly conscious rationality and are highly influenced by cul-

tural patterns. But apart from the fact that this framework deduces plausibility for both models

from evolutionary theory as one of the most successful theories of the last centuries, it addi-

tionally connects them avoiding any syncretism or logical inconsistencies. Nonetheless, evo-

lutionary approaches are usually subject to profound accusations, and so we should deal with

the most important ones, namely: biological reductionism and genetic determinism.38

8.1. Genetic determinism

As our remarks should have made clear, life sciences do not at all assume a genetic fixation of

human behavior.39

Much more they emanate that behavior results from biological precondi-

tions and cultural patterns. So even if the myth of genetic determinism is persistently present

in the social scientists view on evolutionary approaches, it is simply not true. Surely there are

functional and behavioral programs that lie in our genes. Some of them are even “hard-

coded”, such as physiological panic reactions and attaining sexual maturity including the

awakening desires. But many of the socio-scientifically relevant algorithms are designed as

conditional and open behavioral programs. The briefly introduced theories of life history, at-

tachment and psychoanalysis give evidence to this fact. And the quite holistic anthropological

model developed on the basis of central findings of both social and life sciences takes account

of this.

38 Workman & Reader (2008): 26f. 39 Buss (2012): 17f.

So in many of the politically relevant dimensions life science theories not only leave space for

cultural influences, but moreover deliver knowledge about the ways cultural facts are pro-

cessed by the human brain. So it seems really promising to try to connect these theories with

existing social science models. This would mean to make some changes to these models, but

it should pay off by increasing their explanatory and prognostic power. The model developed

here can function as a starting point for that. But the model also points out that social scien-

tists should familiarize themselves with the idea that some individual behavior and social ac-

tion in fact originates from biological preconditions that are not very sensitive to environmen-

tal influences.

Essentially political science needs to finally acknowledge the fact that human nature is of

course genetically determined insofar as that the possible variance of for example emotions,

information processing ability (or ‘intelligence’), sensory impressions and even personality

traits very much depends on the genes. So, there is of course no historical determinism as evo-

lution is open, aimless and pushed forward only by the dynamic algorithm of variation, selec-

tion and retention. But for actual individuals virtually no escape from their biological basis

exists. Or, to put it in a catchphrase: Genotypic aposteriori are phenotypic apriori.

8.2. Biological reductionism

This accusation refers to the fact that the focusing on biological causations leads to a system-

atic under-evaluation of the cultural layers of reality. It is true that the life sciences focus on

biological factors as crucial independent variables in the explanation of human behavior. But

it inversely is also accurate that the social sciences are reductionist by suppressing biological

factors. So since the mutual reproval of reductionism creates a scientific deadlock, it should

be stated that reductionism can be understood in two different ways – one of them having the

potential to foster interdisciplinary growth of knowledge. Slingerland (2008) describes “good

and bad reductionism as following:

Bad reductionism systematically and carelessly flouts crucial factors of explanation. Undenia-

bly, life science theories do not integrate the power of institutions and other social macro

structures appropriately. But unfortunately political anthropology scores in no way better than

that. Because even if no social scientist would seriously question our phylogeny and the asso-

ciated genetic inheritance, these factors play no systematic role in modern anthropological

paradigms. Most of the famous textbooks of sociology and political science do not even men-

tion biological fundamentals, apart from Esser (1993) of course, who spent a whole chapter

on that subject matter. In opposition to that, life science theories very well consider environ-

mental factors of human behavior and thus of course cultural ones. But we should not be too

surprised, if these considerations are under-complex in our eyes. These simple societal proto-

theories derive from the fact that a synthesis of theories of life science and social science

would have to be made across a sharp divide between two scientific traditions looking on each

other skeptically – and thus failing until today. Nonetheless, the anthropologic causal model

proposed here shows that it is possible to achieve a better and ‘richer’ anthropologic theory.

But to do so, we need some good reductionism.

Good reductionism is nothing but scientific division of labor, and totally common in both the

natural and social scientific communities. Specialized subdivisions of the disciplines deal with

specific research fields on different levels of reality – and try to integrate their findings to

general theories. Slingerland talks of this vertical integration as following: „Neuroscience is

dependent upon organic chemistry, which in turn is dependent upon physical chemistry,

which in turn is dependent on physics. The nature of this dependence is such that lower levels

of explanation exert an important constraining function on the higher levels. A hypothesis in

organic chemistry that violates everything that we think we know about physical chemistry is

likely to be rejected out of hand; if not, it would require a complete rethinking of physical

chemistry.”40

As we can see, this is totally consistent with the layer model of social reality

introduced here which consequently can be interpreted as a rough research program. Life sci-

ences and social sciences have to reopen their theories and try to connect them fruitfully.

Obviously the accusations of both genetic determinism and biological reductionism do not hit

the core of the transdisciplinary anthropological project proliferated here. In fact they show

that there is a lot of valuable work to do – in terms of enlightenment and interdisciplinary di-

plomacy on the one hand and of solid theorizing on the other.

40 Slingerland (2008): 267

9. Concluding remarks

„Intentional decision-making can change the specific manifestation of open behavior pro-

grams, such as the language spoken or the specific symbols and identities that selectively con-

stitute status and power. For example, natural selection may have given rise to the cognitive

capacity for xenophobic behavior, but its expression is entirely contingent on how the conflict

of interest between ethnic groups is politically harnessed and manipulated through symbolic

meaning.”41

We showed that an anthropological model derived from evolutionary theory does not have to

be under-complex in any way. Culture does indeed have major influences on all types of hu-

man behavior and social action, more than ever since human environment is mainly a cultural

one. The model reflects that. But if one really wants to understand the way these influences

work out in practice, it is inevitable to acknowledge the biological basis all this stands upon.

Coming from a layer concept of social reality we developed an abstract causal model to ex-

plain human behavior as a first step in a great transdisciplinary project. The concept is emer-

gentistic and thus culturalistic, indeed, but incorporates biological preconditions as one central

causal factor, acting as independent variable on human behavior and social action and as in-

tervening variable on the reciprocal relationship of human behavior and cultural patterns.

Of course, this model still lacks clarity regarding the exact interactions of the variables in spe-

cific social situations. But this is an advantage at the same time. It provides a framework for

all relevant theories raised by the disciplines involved: evolutionary biology, psychology, neu-

ro- and social sciences. Of course the theoretical connections have still to be carved out. But

at least they can and should be developed now – with benefits for both natural and social sci-

ences. Researchers will be lucky to increase the explained variance of their experimental and

field studies by better understanding – and thus modeling – cultural phenomena on the one

hand and biological preconditions on the other.

Perceiving this human nature project as interdisciplinary venture with a clear distribution of

responsibilities will enrich political anthropology with a mine of research results and theoreti-

cal insights. Of course this will not only lead to better answers on research questions, but to

new questions and uncertainties. For example Evolutionary Psychology is a relatively young

41 Tingley (2007): 28

field still intensely debating fundamental questions, as the contemporarily ongoing debate on

the level of natural selection shows. In the last century the early paradigm of individual and

group selection got redeemed by a gene centered approach. Currently multilevel selection

theory is discussed as a synthetical approach, which incidentally would include compatibility

with the layer model and social sciences as such.

So the path to an evolutionary informed political anthropology will be a stony one. But the

reward for the effort is an idea of man beyond homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus,

which is empirically watertight and grounded on evolutionary theory: a socio-scientific con-

cept of homo sapiens sapiens.

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