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Human Evolution and Economic Development
Oded Galor
Zeuthen Lectures - Lecture III
May 20, 2016
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 1 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Captures the coevolution of human traits and the economic development overthe course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary processesin the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits on thegrowth process
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 2 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Captures the coevolution of human traits and the economic development overthe course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary processesin the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits on thegrowth process
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 2 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Captures the coevolution of human traits and the economic development overthe course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary processesin the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits on thegrowth process
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 2 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growth
Comparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulation
Hereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive success
Become more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selection
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selectionIncreased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth process
Reinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selectionIncreased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth process
stimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Main Hypothesis
The coevolution of human traits and the development process is critical forthe understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growthComparative economic development
During the Malthusian epoch the composition of human traits that werecritical for the growth process had not been stationary
The Malthusian pressure affected the size and the composition of thepopulationHereditary physical and cognitive traits that generated higher income
Higher reproductive successBecome more prevalent in the population
The forces of natural selectionIncreased the representation of traits that were complementary to thegrowth processReinforced the growth processstimulated the take-off from an epoch of stagnation to sustained growth
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 3 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capital
Increased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)
Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Selection of Predisposition Towards Child Quality
The rise of the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimalinvestment in offspring’s quality
The evolution of the human brain and the complementarity betweenbrain capacity and investment in human capitalIncreased economic complexity in the course of the Neolithic Revolution
The Malthusian pressure increased the representation of human traits thatwere complementary to investment in human capital
Preference for child quality (Galor-Moav, QJE 2002)
Higher life expectancy (Galor-Moav, 2005, 2007; Franck-Galor-Ozak, 2016)
Entrepreneurial spirit (Galor-Michalopoulos, JET 2012)Moderate fecundity (Galor-Klemp, 2015)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 4 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
Evolutionary Growth Theory
Evolutionary Changes in Humans in the Past 10,000 Years
Lactose Tolerance
Triggered by the domestication of animals in the course of the NeolithicTransition
Genetic immunity to malaria - Sickle Cell Trait
Triggered by the engagement in slash-and-burn agriculture
700 regions of the human genome
Reshaped by natural selection within the past 5,000 to 15,000 years (Voightet al., 2006)
Oded Galor Evolution and Growth May 20, 2016 5 / 5
The Biocultural Origins of Human Capital Formation
Oded Galor and Marc Klemp
19 May, 2016
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 1 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Research Questions
The evolutionary foundations of human capital formation
Have the forces of natural selection favored individuals with a largerpredisposition towards child quality?
Have the forces of natural selection contributed to:
Human capital formation?
The demographic transition?
The transition from stagnation to growth?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 2 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Existing Theories
The Life-History Theory (Lack, 1954)
Reproductive strategies of any organisms have evolved to maximize theirlong-run reproductive success
Clutch size (e.g., number of eggs) maximizes long-run reproduction
Evolutionary Growth Theory (Galor-Moav, 2002)
Natural Selection is the origin of economic growth
Traits associated with pre-disposition towards child quality were selected,triggering the transition from stagnation to growth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 3 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Fundamental Empirical Questions
Is there an intergenerational trade-off in reproductive success?
Is higher fecundity (e.g., higher sperm count) conducive for reproductivesuccess in the long run?
Does a larger number of children generate a larger number of offspringin the long run?
Have the forces of natural selection favored moderately fertile indivi-duals (i.e., the quality strategy) during the Malthusian epoch?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 4 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Fundamental Empirical Questions
Is there an intergenerational trade-off in reproductive success?
Is higher fecundity (e.g., higher sperm count) conducive for reproductivesuccess in the long run?
Does a larger number of children generate a larger number of offspringin the long run?
Have the forces of natural selection favored moderately fertile indivi-duals (i.e., the quality strategy) during the Malthusian epoch?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 4 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Fundamental Empirical Questions
Is there an intergenerational trade-off in reproductive success?
Is higher fecundity (e.g., higher sperm count) conducive for reproductivesuccess in the long run?
Does a larger number of children generate a larger number of offspringin the long run?
Have the forces of natural selection favored moderately fertile indivi-duals (i.e., the quality strategy) during the Malthusian epoch?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 4 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Fundamental Empirical Questions
Is there an intergenerational trade-off in reproductive success?
Is higher fecundity (e.g., higher sperm count) conducive for reproductivesuccess in the long run?
Does a larger number of children generate a larger number of offspringin the long run?
Have the forces of natural selection favored moderately fertile indivi-duals (i.e., the quality strategy) during the Malthusian epoch?
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 4 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Conditions for the Optimality of Moderate Fertility
Necessary Condition: Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Quantity of children come on the account of their quality (survival,education, marriageability)
Lower quality reduces the child’s earning capacity and therefore fertility
Sufficient Condition:
The product of the following elasticities is greater than 1:
The elasticity of child quality with respect to to quantity
The elasticity of grandchildren with respect to child quality
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 5 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Evidence for a Quantity-Quality Trade-off
Plants
Trade-off between the number and size of seeds
Animals
Trade-off between the number of offspring and their size
Humans
Trade-off between the number of children and their human capital
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 6 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirics of Intertemporal Trade-off in Reproductive Success in Humans
Poorly identified
Unobserved heterogeneity
Reverse causality
Small samples
Often post-demographic transition populations
No intertemporal trade-off in reproductive success:
Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2000)
82 men and 64 women in 4 income groups
No trade-off for men and for 3 of the 4 income groups
New Mexican men (Kaplan et al., 1995)
Post-demographic transition
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 7 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Historical Lab: Quebec During its Demographic Explosion
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 8 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Quebec During its Demographic Explosion
Quebec 1608–1800
Founder population order of magnitude smaller than carrying capacity
Reproductive histories of 3,798 lineages
Genealogy of nearly 500,000 individuals
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 9 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Quebec During its Demographic Explosion
Quebec 1608–1800
Founder population order of magnitude smaller than carrying capacity
Reproductive histories of 3,798 lineages
Genealogy of nearly 500,000 individuals
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 9 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Quebec During its Demographic Explosion
Quebec 1608–1800
Founder population order of magnitude smaller than carrying capacity
Reproductive histories of 3,798 lineages
Genealogy of nearly 500,000 individuals
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 9 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Quebec During its Demographic Explosion
Quebec 1608–1800
Founder population order of magnitude smaller than carrying capacity
Reproductive histories of 3,798 lineages
Genealogy of nearly 500,000 individuals
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 9 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Findings
First comprehensive evidence for presence of an intertemporal trade-offin reproductive success (across any species)
An intermediate level of fecundity is associated with maximal long-runreproductive success.
Confirmation of selection of a quality strategy over the pre-industrial,pre-demographic transition era
The optimal level of fecundity is below the population mean
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 10 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Findings
First comprehensive evidence for presence of an intertemporal trade-offin reproductive success (across any species)
An intermediate level of fecundity is associated with maximal long-runreproductive success.
Confirmation of selection of a quality strategy over the pre-industrial,pre-demographic transition era
The optimal level of fecundity is below the population mean
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 10 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Findings
First comprehensive evidence for presence of an intertemporal trade-offin reproductive success (across any species)
An intermediate level of fecundity is associated with maximal long-runreproductive success.
Confirmation of selection of a quality strategy over the pre-industrial,pre-demographic transition era
The optimal level of fecundity is below the population mean
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 10 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Findings
First comprehensive evidence for presence of an intertemporal trade-offin reproductive success (across any species)
An intermediate level of fecundity is associated with maximal long-runreproductive success.
Confirmation of selection of a quality strategy over the pre-industrial,pre-demographic transition era
The optimal level of fecundity is below the population mean
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 10 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Main Hypothesis: Moderate Fertility Maximizes LR Reproductive Success
LR Reproductive Success
Children
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 11 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Main Hypothesis: Moderate Fertility Maximizes LR Reproductive Success
LR Reproductive Success
Children
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 11 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical challenges: Unobserved Heterogeneity
Income and education
Transmitted intergenerationally
Positively affects fertility
Biases the results towards the absence of an intergenerational trade-off
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 12 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical challenges: Unobserved Heterogeneity
Income and education
Transmitted intergenerationally
Positively affects fertility
Biases the results towards the absence of an intergenerational trade-off
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 12 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical challenges: Unobserved Heterogeneity
Income and education
Transmitted intergenerationally
Positively affects fertility
Biases the results towards the absence of an intergenerational trade-off
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 12 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical challenges: Unobserved Heterogeneity
Income and education
Transmitted intergenerationally
Positively affects fertility
Biases the results towards the absence of an intergenerational trade-off
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 12 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Challenge: Unobserved heterogeneity
Grandchildren
Children
Poor
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 13 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Challenge: Unobserved heterogeneity
Grandchildren
Children
Ordinary
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 13 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Challenge: Unobserved heterogeneity
Grandchildren
Children
Rich
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 13 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Challenge: Unobserved heterogeneity
Grandchildren
Children
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 13 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical Challenge: Reverse causality
Effect of offspring quality on quantity
Lower quality of children that results in higher child mortality
Higher fertility via the replacement motive
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 14 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical Challenge: Reverse causality
Effect of offspring quality on quantity
Lower quality of children that results in higher child mortality
Higher fertility via the replacement motive
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 14 / 72
Introduction Motivation
Empirical Challenge: Reverse causality
Effect of offspring quality on quantity
Lower quality of children that results in higher child mortality
Higher fertility via the replacement motive
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 14 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Empirical strategy
Exploits random variation in fecundity (i.e., the physiological ability toreproduce) to establish the optimality of moderate fecundity for long-run reproductive success.
Employ the time interval between the date of marriage and the first birth(TFB) as a source of variation in fecundity, .
TFB is affected by:
Genetic predisposition
Socio-environmental conditions
Random elements that affect conception
Identification will be based on the random variation in TFB
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 15 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
The Distribution of Time to First Birth (TFB)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Per
cent
age
of o
bser
vatio
ns
0 38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 16 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Time to First Birth (TFB) and the Number of Children
8.5
9
9.5
10
Num
ber o
f chi
ldre
n
40 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
Show unconditional relationship
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 17 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Isolating the Random Variation in TFB
Control for socioeconomic factors
Literacy
Gender
Birth year, birth parish and death parish
Month of marriage and month of birth of firstborn
Marriage and stoppage age
Birth order
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Control for genetic predisposition
Lineage-specific fixed effects
Identification based on variation across siblings as opposed to thepopulation as a whole
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 18 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Reproductive Success of Head of Dynasties
Focus on head of dynasties born prior to 1685 allows for:
Reproductive histories of 3,798 head of dynasties
Tracing reproductive histories over 4 generations
Account for lineage-specific fixed effects
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 19 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Reproductive Success of Head of Dynasties
Focus on head of dynasties born prior to 1685 allows for:
Reproductive histories of 3,798 head of dynasties
Tracing reproductive histories over 4 generations
Account for lineage-specific fixed effects
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 19 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Reproductive Success of Head of Dynasties
Focus on head of dynasties born prior to 1685 allows for:
Reproductive histories of 3,798 head of dynasties
Tracing reproductive histories over 4 generations
Account for lineage-specific fixed effects
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 19 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Reproductive Success of Head of Dynasties
Focus on head of dynasties born prior to 1685 allows for:
Reproductive histories of 3,798 head of dynasties
Tracing reproductive histories over 4 generations
Account for lineage-specific fixed effects
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 19 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Head of Dynasty
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 20 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
The Lineage of Head of Dynasties
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 21 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
The Lineage of Head of Dynasties
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 22 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Lineages of Head of Dynasties
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 23 / 72
Introduction Empirical strategy
Lineages of Head of Dynasties
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 23 / 72
Number of Children
0
2
4
6
8
10
Perc
enta
ge o
f obs
erva
tions
1 5 10 15 20 25 30Number of children
Number of Grandchildren
0
1
2
3
4
5
Perc
enta
ge o
f obs
erva
tions
1 50 100 150 200Number of grandchildren
Data & Analysis Data
Summary Statistics
Mean Median S.D. Count(1) (2) (3) (4)
Children 9.70 10 3.99 3,798Surviving childrena 4.63 4 2.59 3,798Grandchildren 47.35 44 28.07 3,798Great-grandchildren 187.59 159 140.17 3,798Great-great-grandchildrenb 294.01 171 363.58 3,798Years from marriage to first birth (TFB) 1.20 1.02 0.47 3,798Literate 0.66 1 0.47 2,222Fraction of literate children 0.74 1 0.35 3,448Fraction of surviving childrena 0.49 0.50 0.21 3,798Fraction of surviving children with known literacya 0.76 0.67 0.56 3,727Age at first marriage 22.67 22.2 5.46 3,798Age at last delivery 41.95 42.1 8.61 3,798c Survival is recorded at age 40.b The moderate increase in the mean and median number of descendants from the third to the fourthgeneration (i.e. from great-grandchildren to great-great-grandchildren) reflects the fact that these cohortsare less fully observed. Furthermore, since men produce children at later ages than women, this effect ismore pronounced among men.
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 26 / 72
Children vs. TFB: restricted cubic splines
8.5
99.
510
10.5
Pre
dict
ed n
o. o
f chi
ldre
n
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
A
Grandchildren vs. TFB: restricted cubic splines
4042
4446
4850
Pre
dict
ed n
o. o
f gra
ndch
ildre
n
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
B
Great-Grandchildren vs. TFB: restricted cubic splines
140
160
180
200
Pre
dict
ed n
o. o
f g.g
rand
child
ren
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
C
Great-Great-Grandchildren vs. TFB: restricted cubic splines
200
250
300
Pre
dict
ed n
o. o
f g.-
g.-g
rand
child
ren
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
D
Econometric Specification
The effect of TFB on the number of children:
lnDi ,1 = β0,1 + β1,1TFBi + Ziβ2,1 + εi ,1,
The effect of TFB on the number of offspring in generation t = 2, 3, 4:
lnDi ,t = β0,t + β1,tTFBi + β2,tTFB2i + Ziβ3,t + εi ,t ,
Econometric Specification
The effect of TFB on the number of children:
lnDi ,1 = β0,1 + β1,1TFBi + Ziβ2,1 + εi ,1,
The effect of TFB on the number of offspring in generation t = 2, 3, 4:
lnDi ,t = β0,t + β1,tTFBi + β2,tTFB2i + Ziβ3,t + εi ,t ,
TFB and Number of Descendants for Head of Lineages Born before 1685(Accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TFB -.052** .167 .505** .783*** -.062*** .140 .463** .773*** -.077*** .810***(.024) (.163) (.205) (.264) (.024) (.162) (.204) (.264) (.011) (.258)
TFB2 -.068 -.193*** -.310*** -.063 -.183*** -.309*** -.325***(.053) (.067) (.087) (.053) (.067) (.087) (.084)
Literate -.006 .063 .148*** .138** -.027* .109*(.030) (.040) (.051) (.066) (.014) (.066)
Male .220*** .254*** .299*** .131** -.028* .036(.031) (.039) (.047) (.060) (.015) (.063)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 .015 .016 .038 .306 .032 .029 .052 .307 .799 .355Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .031 .196 .002 .000 .010 .130 .002 .000 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.224 1.307 1.261 1.113 1.263 1.249 1.247Lower limit of 90% CI - .961 .999 - .827 .976 1.002Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.467 1.398 - 1.435 1.389 1.376This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFBand TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage agedummies are included in columns 9–10. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 5–10. Standard errors clustered atthe level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
TFB and Number of Descendants for Head of Lineages Born 16851660–1685 (accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TFB -.065** .237 .544** .830*** -.075*** .193 .487** .802*** -.079*** .773***(.025) (.175) (.216) (.280) (.025) (.174) (.216) (.282) (.012) (.277)
TFB2 -.096* -.214*** -.337*** -.086 -.199*** -.330*** -.323***(.057) (.071) (.092) (.057) (.071) (.093) (.091)
Literate -.031 .023 .120** .116* -.035** .087(.033) (.042) (.054) (.070) (.015) (.070)
Male .219*** .279*** .315*** .177*** -.035** .115*(.032) (.040) (.049) (.063) (.015) (.066)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376Adjusted R2 .019 .020 .042 .335 .036 .036 .058 .337 .804 .379Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .010 .066 .001 .000 .003 .042 .000 .000 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.230 1.270 1.232 1.124 1.219 1.214 1.196Lower limit of 90% CI -11.448 .923 .961 - .761 .919 .886Upper limit of 90% CI 1.505 1.427 1.37 - 1.392 1.357 1.343This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects OLS regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e.TFB and TFB2 for heads of lineages born in the period 1660–1685. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummiesare included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 9–10. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressionsunderlying column 5–10. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to Alternative Cohorts: No Restrictions on Cohorts (Accountingfor Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TFB -.064*** .055 .319** .409** -.071*** .031 .293** .393** -.090*** .459**(.017) (.120) (.141) (.199) (.017) (.119) (.140) (.199) (.008) (.198)
TFB2 -.039 -.133*** -.192*** -.033 -.126*** -.187*** -.212***(.040) (.046) (.065) (.039) (.046) (.065) (.065)
Literate .007 .078*** .133*** .134*** -.014 .121**(.023) (.030) (.037) (.049) (.011) (.048)
Male .222*** .220*** .191*** .088** -.013 .019(.018) (.023) (.027) (.036) (.009) (.038)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664Adjusted R2 .026 .022 .067 .413 .049 .036 .077 .414 .789 .431Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000Maximizing TFB .694 1.200 1.065 .457 1.166 1.049 1.079Lower limit of 90% CI - .741 .466 - .604 .396 .610Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.376 1.269 - 1.355 1.261 1.264This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects OLS regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years,i.e. TFB and TFB2 for heads of lineages born in the entire sample period. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriageage dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 9–10. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in theregressions underlying column 5–10. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Mechanisms
The observed patterns may reflect the positive effect of reduced fertilityand thus higher child quality on the reproductive success of each child
Child quality enhances the likelihood that a child would
Reach the reproductive age and marry – a preconditions for reproductivesuccess
Marry early – a preconditions for large number of children
Be educated and thus would have higher earning capacity and repro-ductive success
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 35 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Mechanisms
The observed patterns may reflect the positive effect of reduced fertilityand thus higher child quality on the reproductive success of each child
Child quality enhances the likelihood that a child would
Reach the reproductive age and marry – a preconditions for reproductivesuccess
Marry early – a preconditions for large number of children
Be educated and thus would have higher earning capacity and repro-ductive success
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 35 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Mechanisms
The observed patterns may reflect the positive effect of reduced fertilityand thus higher child quality on the reproductive success of each child
Child quality enhances the likelihood that a child would
Reach the reproductive age and marry – a preconditions for reproductivesuccess
Marry early – a preconditions for large number of children
Be educated and thus would have higher earning capacity and repro-ductive success
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 35 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Mechanisms
The observed patterns may reflect the positive effect of reduced fertilityand thus higher child quality on the reproductive success of each child
Child quality enhances the likelihood that a child would
Reach the reproductive age and marry – a preconditions for reproductivesuccess
Marry early – a preconditions for large number of children
Be educated and thus would have higher earning capacity and repro-ductive success
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 35 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Mechanisms
The observed patterns may reflect the positive effect of reduced fertilityand thus higher child quality on the reproductive success of each child
Child quality enhances the likelihood that a child would
Reach the reproductive age and marry – a preconditions for reproductivesuccess
Marry early – a preconditions for large number of children
Be educated and thus would have higher earning capacity and repro-ductive success
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 35 / 72
The Effect of TFB on the Fraction of Children Surviving to Age 40 andMarry
Fraction of children survivingto age 40 that got married
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFB .299*** .256** .235** .232**(.113) (.112) (.111) (.110)
Literate .770*** .763*** .779***(.110) (.110) (.109)
Male .396*** .365***(.112) (.120)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,727 3,727 3,727 3,727This table presents the results of a series of fractional logit regressions of the fractionof children, i.e., individuals in the first generation, surviving to age 40 that gotmarried on time to first birth measured in years, i.e., TFB, for heads of lineageswith at least one child surviving to age 40. Birth year and marriage age dummiesare included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in column4. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlyingcolumn 2–4. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported inparentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
The Effect of TFB on the on the Average Marriage Age
Average marriage age of children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFB -.430*** -.400*** -.376** -.339**(.005) (.008) (.013) (.023)
Literate -.629*** -.621*** -.705***(.001) (.001) (.000)
Male -.406*** -.720***(.009) (.000)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,796 3,796 3,796 3,796Adjusted R2 .006 .010 .011 .036This table presents the results of a series of OLS regressions of the average marriageage of childre,, i.e., individuals in the first generation, on time to first birth measuredin years, i.e., TFB. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls.Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in column 4. A dummy indicatingunknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 2–4. Standard errorsclustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.
The Effect of TFB on the on Share of Literate Offspring
Fraction of literate children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFB .401*** .351*** .322*** .337***(.090) (.090) (.091) (.091)
Literate 1.308*** 1.307*** 1.305***(.094) (.094) (.095)
Male .563*** .407***(.090) (.098)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448This table presents the results of a series of fractional logit regressions of the shareof children, i.e., individuals in the first generation, obtaining literacy on time to firstbirth measured in years, i.e., TFB, for heads of lineages with at least one survivingchild with observed literacy status. Birth year and marriage age dummies are includedas controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in column 4. A dummyindicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 2–4. Standarderrors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
Data & Analysis Parametric analysis
Findings
Maximal reproductive success is attained by couples with a moderatelevel of TFB
Lower TFB maximizes the number of children
An intermediate TFB maximizes long-run reproductive success
In comparison to highly fertile couples whose first child is born withoutany delays (i.e., 38 weeks after the marriage) they have:
0.3 fewer children
0.4 more grandchildren
8.4 more great-grandchildren
15.7 more great-great-grandchildren
Selection of a quality strategy
The optimal level of TFB and fertility is below the population median
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 39 / 72
TFB and number of descendants for head of lineages born –1685(accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
TFB -.052** .167 .505** .783*** -.053** .170 .499** .788*** -.062*** .140 .463** .773*** -.077*** .208 .535*** .810***(.024) (.163) (.205) (.264) (.024) (.163) (.205) (.264) (.024) (.162) (.204) (.264) (.011) (.130) (.181) (.258)
TFB2 -.068 -.193*** -.310*** -.070 -.191*** -.313*** -.063 -.183*** -.309*** -.089** -.210*** -.325***(.053) (.067) (.087) (.053) (.067) (.087) (.053) (.067) (.087) (.042) (.059) (.084)
Literate -.008 .060 .145*** .136** -.006 .063 .148*** .138** -.027* .044 .125*** .109*(.031) (.040) (.051) (.066) (.030) (.040) (.051) (.066) (.014) (.032) (.046) (.066)
Male .220*** .254*** .299*** .131** -.028* .025 .085* .036(.031) (.039) (.047) (.060) (.015) (.031) (.043) (.063)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 .015 .016 .038 .306 .017 .016 .041 .307 .032 .029 .052 .307 .799 .442 .296 .355Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .031 .196 .002 .000 .026 .184 .003 .000 .010 .130 .002 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.224 1.307 1.261 1.223 1.304 1.260 1.113 1.263 1.249 1.163 1.272 1.247Lower limit of 90% CI - .961 .999 - .948 1.000 - .827 .976 -.141 1.012 1.002Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.467 1.398 - 1.466 1.397 - 1.435 1.389 1.393 1.403 1.376
This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriageage dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 13–16. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 5–16. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn arereported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
TFB and number of descendants for head of lineages born 1660–1685(accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
TFB -.065** .237 .544** .830*** -.066*** .238 .537** .830*** -.075*** .193 .487** .802*** -.079*** .201 .498*** .773***(.025) (.175) (.216) (.280) (.025) (.175) (.217) (.282) (.025) (.174) (.216) (.282) (.012) (.139) (.191) (.277)
TFB2 -.096* -.214*** -.337*** -.097* -.212*** -.337*** -.086 -.199*** -.330*** -.088* -.203*** -.323***(.057) (.071) (.092) (.057) (.071) (.093) (.057) (.071) (.093) (.046) (.063) (.091)
Literate -.028 .027 .124** .118* -.031 .023 .120** .116* -.035** .016 .110** .087(.033) (.043) (.055) (.070) (.033) (.042) (.054) (.070) (.015) (.035) (.049) (.070)
Male .219*** .279*** .315*** .177*** -.035** .056* .116*** .115*(.032) (.040) (.049) (.063) (.015) (.032) (.044) (.066)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376Adjusted R2 .019 .020 .042 .335 .020 .020 .045 .335 .036 .036 .058 .337 .804 .451 .306 .379Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .010 .066 .001 .000 .009 .066 .001 .000 .003 .042 .000 .000 .000 .005 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.230 1.270 1.232 1.230 1.268 1.231 1.124 1.219 1.214 1.137 1.224 1.196Lower limit of 90% CI -11.448 .923 .961 -11.038 .910 .959 - .761 .919 -1.02 .883 .886Upper limit of 90% CI 1.505 1.427 1.37 1.504 1.427 1.369 - 1.392 1.357 1.387 1.375 1.343
This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects OLS regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB and TFB2 for heads of lineages born in the period 1660–1685. All regressions account forMaternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 13–16. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 5–16.Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to alternative cohorts: no restrictions on cohorts (accounting forMaternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
TFB -.064*** .055 .319** .409** -.064*** .050 .310** .400** -.071*** .031 .293** .393** -.090*** .096 .378*** .459**(.017) (.120) (.141) (.199) (.017) (.120) (.141) (.199) (.017) (.119) (.140) (.199) (.008) (.094) (.125) (.198)
TFB2 -.039 -.133*** -.192*** -.038 -.129*** -.189*** -.033 -.126*** -.187*** -.060* -.158*** -.212***(.040) (.046) (.065) (.040) (.046) (.065) (.039) (.046) (.065) (.031) (.041) (.065)
Literate .007 .078** .133*** .133*** .007 .078*** .133*** .134*** -.014 .057** .110*** .121**(.023) (.030) (.037) (.049) (.023) (.030) (.037) (.049) (.011) (.024) (.033) (.048)
Male .222*** .220*** .191*** .088** -.013 .005 .019 .019(.018) (.023) (.027) (.036) (.009) (.019) (.025) (.038)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664Adjusted R2 .026 .022 .067 .413 .026 .023 .070 .414 .049 .036 .077 .414 .789 .420 .282 .431Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .018 .000 .000 .000 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000Maximizing TFB .694 1.200 1.065 .663 1.198 1.060 .457 1.166 1.049 .798 1.196 1.079Lower limit of 90% CI - .741 .466 - .708 .434 - .604 .396 -3.176 .924 .610Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.376 1.269 - 1.378 1.268 - 1.355 1.261 1.167 1.333 1.264
This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects OLS regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB and TFB2 for heads of lineages born in the entire sample period. All regressions accountfor Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 13–16. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column5–16. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Summary statistics for females
(1) (2) (3) (4)Mean Median S.D. Count
Children 9.42 10 3.66 2,058Grandchildren 45.99 43 27.40 2,058Great-grandchildren 187.65 159 142.74 2,058Great-great-grandchildren 341.04 206.5 408.07 2,058Years from marriage to first birth (TFB) 1.23 1.04 0.49 2,058Literate 0.68 1 0.47 1,192Fraction of literate children 0.72 1 0.36 1,872Fraction of surviving childrenb 0.59 0.60 0.20 2,058Fraction of surviving children with known literacyb 0.62 0.60 0.40 2,044Age at first marriage 19.34 18.7 3.79 2,058Age at last delivery 38.27 40.3 6.46 2,058a The moderate increase in the mean and median number of descendants from the third to the fourthgeneration (i.e. from great-grandchildren to great-great-grandchildren) reflects the fact that these cohortsare less fully observed. Furthermore, since men produce children at lager ages than women, this effect ismore pronounced among men.b Survival is recorded at the average marriage age, i.e. 23 years.
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 44 / 72
Summary statistics for males
(1) (2) (3) (4)Mean Median S.D. Count
Children 10.03 10 4.32 1,740Grandchildren 48.94 45 28.77 1,740Great-grandchildren 187.53 159 137.10 1,740Great-great-grandchildren 238.38 136.5 293.17 1,740Years from marriage to first birth (TFB) 1.16 0.99 0.44 1,740Literate 0.64 1 0.48 1,030Fraction of literate children 0.76 1 0.34 1,576Fraction of surviving childrenb 0.60 0.60 0.20 1,740Fraction of surviving children with known literacyb 0.57 0.50 0.39 1,728Age at first marriage 26.62 25.9 4.41 1,740Age at last delivery 46.31 46.9 8.81 1,740a The moderate increase in the mean and median number of descendants from the third to the fourthgeneration (i.e. from great-grandchildren to great-great-grandchildren) reflects the fact that these cohortsare less fully observed. Furthermore, since men produce children at lager ages than women, this effect ismore pronounced among men.b Survival is recorded at the average marriage age, i.e. 23 years.
Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 45 / 72
TFB and number of descendants for head of lineages born –1685 (usingGLM w/ neg. binom.)
Number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
TFB -.063*** .120 .371** .616*** -.063*** .090 .324* .573** -.081*** .028 .260 .525** -.090*** .049 .346** .573**(.018) (.148) (.185) (.230) (.018) (.148) (.186) (.231) (.017) (.145) (.184) (.231) (.010) (.121) (.167) (.227)
TFB2 -.047 -.133** -.232*** -.039 -.119* -.219*** -.026 -.106* -.209*** -.035 -.137** -.224***(.048) (.060) (.074) (.049) (.061) (.074) (.048) (.060) (.074) (.039) (.054) (.073)
Literate -.002 .143*** .222*** .227*** -.009 .138*** .219*** .225*** -.056*** .098*** .180*** .195***(.020) (.030) (.038) (.046) (.019) (.030) (.038) (.046) (.011) (.025) (.035) (.047)
Male .295*** .379*** .402*** .306*** -.004 .094*** .150*** .194***(.019) (.027) (.035) (.041) (.011) (.023) (.032) (.042)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .000 .446 .059 .000 .000 .445 .086 .001 .000 .139 .041 .000 .000 .016 .001 .000Maximizing TFB 1.273 1.399 1.328 1.159 1.363 1.306 .546 1.229 1.255 .702 1.262 1.277
This table presents the results of a series of GLM regressions, with a negative binomial distribution and a logarithmic link function, of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB and TFB2. Birth year andmarriage age dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included in columns 13–16. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 5–16. Standard errors clustered at the level of thefirstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
TFB and number of descendants for head of lineages born –1685 (usingGLM w/ neg. binom. – accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
TFB -.041** .126 .412** .547** -.042** .131 .414** .557*** -.052*** .101 .387** .547** -.073*** .195* .468*** .595***(.020) (.146) (.179) (.215) (.020) (.146) (.178) (.215) (.020) (.145) (.177) (.215) (.010) (.118) (.160) (.216)
TFB2 -.054 -.162*** -.234*** -.056 -.163*** -.238*** -.050 -.158*** -.236*** -.087** -.191*** -.256***(.047) (.058) (.068) (.047) (.058) (.069) (.047) (.058) (.068) (.038) (.052) (.069)
Literate -.006 .059* .121*** .119** -.006 .061* .124*** .121** -.020 .055* .118*** .104*(.026) (.036) (.045) (.056) (.025) (.036) (.045) (.056) (.013) (.029) (.040) (.055)
Male .248*** .280*** .282*** .127** -.015 .044 .083** .072(.027) (.036) (.044) (.054) (.014) (.029) (.040) (.055)
Stoppage age fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .045 .207 .001 .000 .037 .189 .001 .000 .009 .097 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.172 1.271 1.169 1.174 1.27 1.169 1.01 1.226 1.155 1.116 1.225 1.159
This table presents the results of a series of GLM regressions, with a negative binomial distribution and a logarithmic link function, of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressionsinclude dummies for Maternal Founder fixed effects (the results without the Maternal Founder Fixed Effects is presented in Table A.7). Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Furthermore, stoppage age dummies are included incolumns 13–16. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying column 5–16. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to including extinct lineages – accounting for Maternal Founderfixed effects
Log number of descendants in: Log 1+number of descendants in:
Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -.046* .151 .462** .773*** -.041* .414* .822*** 1.169***(.026) (.172) (.208) (.264) (.021) (.215) (.294) (.336)
TFB2 -.071 -.180*** -.309*** -.149** -.293*** -.427***(.057) (.068) (.087) (.068) (.093) (.108)
Literate -.022 .060 .153*** .138** -.014 .058 .144* .180**(.033) (.042) (.053) (.066) (.027) (.056) (.076) (.087)
Male .321*** .321*** .349*** .131** .276*** .456*** .597*** .478***(.033) (.040) (.050) (.060) (.027) (.051) (.069) (.076)
Number of observations 4,240 4,002 3,933 3,798 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240Adjusted R2 .052 .044 .068 .307 .054 .065 .084 .241Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .073 .083 .003 .000 .053 .046 .002 .000Maximizing TFB 1.067 1.283 1.249 1.387 1.403 1.368This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured inyears, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Adummy indicating unknown literacy is also included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, the restriction of at least one observed great-great-grandchildis relaxed and extinct lineages drop out of the sample in the relevant generations. In columns 5–8, the same extended sample is used, but the outcomeis ln(1 + Di,t), where the added number 1 ensures that the logarithmic transformation is defined and all lineages remains included. Standard errorsclustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to additional sample restrictions: more than one child andmarriage occurring after turning 15 years – accounting for MaternalFounder fixed effects
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -.053** .204 .560*** .891*** -.052** .129 .461** .779***(.021) (.157) (.201) (.263) (.025) (.175) (.218) (.279)
TFB2 -.082 -.211*** -.344*** -.057 -.180** -.310***(.051) (.066) (.086) (.058) (.073) (.093)
Literate .025 .090** .175*** .162** -.016 .052 .139*** .123*(.027) (.038) (.050) (.065) (.031) (.041) (.052) (.068)
Male .251*** .272*** .314*** .135** .225*** .269*** .318*** .153**(.029) (.038) (.047) (.061) (.031) (.039) (.048) (.061)
Number of observations 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,604 3,604 3,604 3,604Adjusted R2 .044 .037 .060 .318 .035 .031 .055 .314Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .011 .104 .001 .000 .038 .294 .009 .000Maximizing TFB 1.248 1.323 1.296 1.140 1.282 1.256Lower limit of 90% CI - 1.059 1.095 - .798 .973Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.464 1.417 - 1.458 1.396This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured inyears, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls.A dummy indicating unknown literacy is also included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, the sample is restricted to heads of lineages who produced atleast two children. In columns 5–8, the sample is restricted to heads of lineages who were married after their 15th birthday. Standard errors clusteredat the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to additional control variables: number of marriages and spousalmigration (accounting for Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -.059*** .282* .590*** .828*** -.059** .117 .423** .720***(.022) (.157) (.200) (.263) (.024) (.161) (.204) (.264)
TFB2 -.109** -.225*** -.328*** -.054 -.168** -.289***(.051) (.066) (.087) (.052) (.067) (.087)
Literate -.013 .059 .143*** .135** -.007 .067* .148*** .140**(.028) (.039) (.050) (.066) (.030) (.040) (.051) (.066)
Male .168*** .204*** .255*** .116* .198*** .206*** .232*** .037(.028) (.037) (.046) (.060) (.032) (.039) (.047) (.061)
Total number of marriages fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No NoTotal number of marriages of spouse fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No NoImmigration status of spouse fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes YesEmigration status of spouse fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 .188 .116 .097 .312 .035 .035 .062 .315Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .009 .027 .000 .000 .013 .169 .005 .000Maximizing TFB 1.289 1.311 1.263 1.073 1.260 1.244Lower limit of 90% CI .420 1.063 1.024 - .716 .935Upper limit of 90% CI 1.509 1.446 1.393 - 1.445 1.392This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e. TFB andTFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. A dummy indicating unknown literacy isalso included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, dummies for the total number of marriages experienced during the lifetime of the heads of lineages, as well as dummies forthe total number of marriages experienced by the first spouses of the heads of lineages, are included. In columns 5–8, dummies indicating the immigration and emigrationstatuses of the head of the first spouses of the heads of lineages are included. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10,** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to gender distinction – sample restricted to females (accountingfor Maternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -.079*** .374* .985*** 1.568*** -.080*** .380* .993*** 1.581***(.030) (.214) (.278) (.349) (.030) (.215) (.278) (.349)
TFB2 -.140** -.347*** -.560*** -.142** -.349*** -.564***(.069) (.088) (.109) (.069) (.088) (.110)
Literate -.040 .072 .120 .145(.043) (.067) (.084) (.107)
Number of observations 2,058 2,058 2,058 2,058 2,058 2,058 2,058 2,058Adjusted R2 .089 .064 .091 .267 .089 .064 .092 .267Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .008 .057 .000 .000 .007 .056 .000 .000Maximizing TFB 1.334 1.418 1.401 1.339 1.422 1.402Lower limit of 90% CI .366 1.24 1.263 .428 1.247 1.267Upper limit of 90% CI 1.58 1.538 1.500 1.583 1.542 1.501This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measuredin years, i.e. TFB and TFB2 for female heads of lineages. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage agedummies are included as controls. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is also included in the regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level ofthe firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to additional control variables: location of birth and death –accounting for Maternal Founder fixed effects
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -0.062∗∗∗ 0.106 0.416∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.032 0.391∗ 0.653∗∗
(0.024) (0.163) (0.205) (0.267) (0.023) (0.161) (0.202) (0.255)TFB2 -0.052 -0.168∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.154∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.067) (0.088) (0.053) (0.066) (0.084)Literate -0.008 0.062 0.149∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ -0.015 0.037 0.097∗ 0.074
(0.031) (0.040) (0.051) (0.066) (0.031) (0.040) (0.052) (0.067)Male 0.214∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.031) (0.039) (0.048) (0.061) (0.031) (0.038) (0.046) (0.059)Constant 3.861∗∗∗ 5.949∗∗∗ 6.288∗∗∗ 6.228∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗ 4.130∗∗∗ 5.229∗∗∗ 4.676∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.649) (0.667) (0.935) (0.428) (0.681) (0.703) (0.921)Birth parish fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No NoDeath parish fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 0.034 0.030 0.050 0.308 0.066 0.098 0.130 0.370Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .009 .155 .002 .000 .009 .425 .011 .000Maximizing TFB 1.024 1.234 1.223 .700 1.264 1.243Lower limit of 90% CI - .646 .875 - .607 .892Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.424 1.379 - 1.461 1.402This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured inyears, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. Adummy indicating unknown literacy is also included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, dummies indicating the birth (or baptism) parish of the headsof lineages are included. In columns 5–8 dummies indicating the death (or burial) parish of the heads of lineages are included. Standard errors clusteredat the level of the firstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to additional control variables: month of marriage and first birth– accounting for Maternal Founder fixed effects
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -0.061∗∗ 0.151 0.482∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ 0.181 0.500∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.163) (0.205) (0.265) (0.024) (0.166) (0.208) (0.274)TFB2 -0.067 -0.190∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.073 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.067) (0.087) (0.054) (0.068) (0.089)Literate -0.008 0.062 0.146∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ -0.004 0.065 0.153∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.051) (0.067) (0.030) (0.040) (0.051) (0.067)Male 0.224∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.048) (0.060) (0.031) (0.039) (0.047) (0.060)Month of marriage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No NoMonth of birth of firstborn fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 0.032 0.028 0.051 0.307 0.032 0.032 0.056 0.308Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .010 .109 .001 .000 .037 .169 .001 .000Maximizing TFB 1.126 1.267 1.253 1.242 1.286 1.254Lower limit of 90% CI - .865 .994 - .904 .968Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.433 1.389 - 1.452 1.398This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured in years, i.e.TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls. A dummy indicatingunknown literacy is also included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, dummies indicating the months of marriage of the heads of lineages are included. Incolumns 5–8, dummies indicating the month of birth of the the firstborn of the heads of lineages are included. Standard errors clustered at the level of thefirstborn are reported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Robustness to additional control variable: birth order (accounting forMaternal Founder FE)
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFB -.062*** .139 .462** .773*** -.062*** .144 .456** .752***(.024) (.162) (.204) (.264) (.024) (.162) (.204) (.265)
TFB2 -.062 -.183*** -.309*** -.063 -.181*** -.303***(.053) (.067) (.087) (.053) (.067) (.087)
Literate -.006 .064 .149*** .137** -.008 .064 .149*** .141**(.030) (.040) (.051) (.066) (.030) (.040) (.051) (.067)
Male .219*** .250*** .296*** .132** .220*** .248*** .293*** .131**(.031) (.039) (.047) (.060) (.031) (.039) (.047) (.061)
Firstborn .016 .064** .042 -.019(.023) (.031) (.038) (.047)
Birth order fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798Adjusted R2 .032 .030 .052 .307 .031 .030 .052 .308Joint sign.-level of TFB & TFB2 .010 .135 .002 .000 .009 .139 .002 .000Maximizing TFB 1.117 1.264 1.249 1.133 1.261 1.240Lower limit of 90% CI - .828 .976 - .807 .949Upper limit of 90% CI - 1.436 1.388 - 1.434 1.384This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects regressions of the number of descendants in generation t on time to first birth measured inyears, i.e. TFB and TFB2. All regressions account for Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year and marriage age dummies are included as controls.A dummy indicating unknown literacy is also included in the regressions. In columns 1–4, a dummy for the firstborn status of the heads of lineagesis included. In columns 5–8, dummies the birth order of the heads of lineages are included. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn arereported in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Effect of number of children on long-run reproductive success – accountingfor Maternal Founder fixed effects
Log number of descendants in:Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Number of Children 2.334*** 3.446*** 4.491*** 2.339*** 3.459*** 4.545*** 2.384*** 3.515*** 4.619***(.524) (.842) (1.078) (.525) (.851) (1.091) (.520) (.837) (1.075)
(Log Number of Children)2 -.371 -.728** -1.280*** -.376 -.738** -1.306*** -.388* -.749** -1.324***(.229) (.367) (.474) (.230) (.373) (.481) (.228) (.366) (.474)
Literate .068 .151** .171* .067 .150** .170*(.047) (.070) (.092) (.047) (.070) (.092)
Male .129*** .266*** .307***(.046) (.071) (.092)
Number of observations 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240 4,240First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 30.701 30.701 30.701 33.094 33.094 33.094 31.891 31.891 31.891Joint sign. of linear and squared terms .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000Maximizing number of log(1+D) 3.142 2.367 1.754 3.113 2.343 1.74 3.069 2.345 1.744Exp(Maximizing log(1+D)) 22.15 9.665 4.777 21.488 9.412 4.697 20.52 9.433 4.72Lower limit of 90% CI 1.618 1.770 1.473 1.473 1.756 1.465 2.081 1.767 1.472Upper limit of 90% CI 6.012 8.556 2.805 2.805 8.445 2.757 57.776 7.475 2.702This table presents the results of a series of fixed-effects 2SLS regressions of the log number of descendants in generation t, i.e. ln(1 +Di,t), where Di,t is the number of descendantsthat the head of household i has in generations t, t = 2, 3, 4, on the number of children and the number of children squared, i.e., ln(1 + Di,1) and (ln(1 + Di,1))2, instrumented byvariation in TFB. The added number 1 ensures that the logarithmic transformation is defined for extinct lineages and all that lineages remain in the sample. All regressions accountfor Maternal Founder fixed effects. Birth year, marriage age, and stoppage age dummies are included as controls. Since the second stage of these 2SLS regressions is quadratic in theendogenous regressor, it is necessary to instrument for both the linear and the squared terms in order to identify the parameters. Thus, following Wooldridge (2010), pp. 267–268, azeroth stage is introduced to the analysis, where Di,1 is first regressed on TFB and all the second-stage controls to obtain predicted values of the number of children. The predictednumber of children from the zeroth stage, D1,i is transformed by ln(1 + D1,i ) as well as (ln(1 + D1,i ))2, and these transformed terms are then used as excluded instruments in thesecond stage. A dummy indicating unknown literacy is included in the regressions underlying columns 4–9. Standard errors clustered at the level of the firstborn are reported inparentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
0
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Galor and Klemp Biocultural Origins of Human Capital 19 May, 2016 56 / 72
2.2
2.25
2.3
2.35
2.4
Pre
dict
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(1+
child
ren)
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
A
3.6
3.65
3.7
3.75
3.8
Pre
dict
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(1+
gran
dchi
ldre
n)
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
B
4.7
4.8
4.9
5
5.1
Pre
dict
ed ln
(1+
g.gr
andc
hild
ren)
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
C
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
Pre
dict
ed ln
(1+
g.g.
gran
dchi
ldre
n)
38 142
Weeks from marriage to first birth
D
0
2
4
6
8
10Pe
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1 5 10 15 20Number of children
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10Pe
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of o
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1 5 10 15 20 25 30Number of children
0
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1 50 100 150 200Number of grandchildren
0
1
2
3
4
5Pe
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1 50 100 150 200Number of grandchildren
0
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30
40
Perc
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f obs
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1 200 400 600 800 1000Number of great-grandchildren
A
0
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30
40
Perc
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1 200 400 600 800 1000Number of great-grandchildren
B
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1 200 400 600 800 1000Number of great-grandchildren
C
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Perc
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1 1000 2000 3000 4000Number of great-great-grandchildren
D
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1 1000 2000 3000 4000Number of great-great-grandchildren
E
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1 1000 2000 3000 4000Number of great-great-grandchildren
F
Age at first marriage (All)
0
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10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70Age at marriage (years)
Age at first marriage (Females)
0
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10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70Age at marriage (years)
Age at first marriage (Males)
0
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Perc
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10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70Age at marriage (years)
0
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0 41 60
Age
8.5
9
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40 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
Return to presentation
2.10
2.15
2.20
Log
num
ber o
f chi
ldre
n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
3.61
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
Log
num
ber o
f gra
ndch
ildre
n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.84
4.86
4.88
4.90
4.92
Log
num
ber o
f gre
at-g
rand
child
ren
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.80
4.85
4.90
4.95
Log
num
ber o
f g.-g
reat
-gra
ndch
ildre
n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
2.05
2.10
2.15
2.20
Log
num
ber o
f chi
ldre
n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
3.60
3.62
3.64
3.66
Log
num
ber o
f gra
ndch
ildre
n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.80
4.85
4.90
4.95
Log
num
ber o
f gre
at-g
rand
child
ren
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.75
4.80
4.85
4.90
4.95
Log
num
ber o
f g.-g
reat
-gra
ndch
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n
38 60 80 100Weeks from marriage to first birth
2.00
2.20
Log
num
ber o
f chi
ldre
n
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
3.55
3.60
3.65
3.70
Log
num
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f gra
ndch
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n
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.70
4.80
4.90
5.00
Log
num
ber o
f gre
at-g
rand
child
ren
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.60
4.70
4.80
4.90
5.00
Log
num
ber o
f g.-g
reat
-gra
ndch
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n
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
2.00
2.10
2.20
2.30
Log
num
ber o
f chi
ldre
n
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
3.55
3.60
3.65
3.70
Log
num
ber o
f gra
ndch
ildre
n
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.70
4.80
4.90
5.00
Log
num
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at-g
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child
ren
38 60 80 100 120Weeks from marriage to first birth
4.60
4.80
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irth
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The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak
“Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.”
– Aristotle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 1 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Objectives
Geographical origins of human traits
Coevolution of human traits and the growth process in the
course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary
processes that shape the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits
on the growth process
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 2 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Objectives
Geographical origins of human traits
Coevolution of human traits and the growth process in the
course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary
processes that shape the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits
on the growth process
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 2 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Objectives
Geographical origins of human traits
Coevolution of human traits and the growth process in the
course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary
processes that shape the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits
on the growth process
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 2 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Objectives
Geographical origins of human traits
Coevolution of human traits and the growth process in the
course of human history
The effect of the economic environment on the evolutionary
processes that shape the composition of human traits
The impact of the evolution in the composition of human traits
on the growth process
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 2 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
The geographical origins of human traits and their coevolution
with the growth process is critical for the understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growth
Comparative economic development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 3 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
The geographical origins of human traits and their coevolution
with the growth process is critical for the understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growth
Comparative economic development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 3 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
The geographical origins of human traits and their coevolution
with the growth process is critical for the understanding of:
The transition from stagnation to growth
Comparative economic development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 3 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Human Evolution and Economic Development
Main Hypothesis
During the Malthusian epoch
Malthusian forces affected the size and composition of the population
Intergenerationally transmitted traits that generated higher income
Increased reproductive success
Became more prevalent in the population
Evolutionary forces
Increased the representation of traits that were complementary
to the growth process, reinforcing the growth process
Contributed to regional variation in economic performance
across the globe
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 4 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Long-Term Orientation and Development
Ability to delay gratification (Time Preference, Long-Term Orientation, Patience, Future
Orientation) is a fundamental determinant of:
Academic achievements
Human and physical capital formation
Technological advancement
Comparative Development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 5 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Long-Term Orientation and Development
Ability to delay gratification (Time Preference, Long-Term Orientation, Patience, Future
Orientation) is a fundamental determinant of:
Academic achievements
Human and physical capital formation
Technological advancement
Comparative Development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 5 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Long-Term Orientation and Development
Ability to delay gratification (Time Preference, Long-Term Orientation, Patience, Future
Orientation) is a fundamental determinant of:
Academic achievements
Human and physical capital formation
Technological advancement
Comparative Development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 5 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Long-Term Orientation and Development
Ability to delay gratification (Time Preference, Long-Term Orientation, Patience, Future
Orientation) is a fundamental determinant of:
Academic achievements
Human and physical capital formation
Technological advancement
Comparative Development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 5 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Long-Term Orientation and Development
Ability to delay gratification (Time Preference, Long-Term Orientation, Patience, Future
Orientation) is a fundamental determinant of:
Academic achievements
Human and physical capital formation
Technological advancement
Comparative Development
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 5 / 115
Introduction Delayed Gratification
Cross Country Variation in Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 6 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Main Hypothesis
The distribution of time preference across the globe reflects
historical variations in the natural return to agricultural
investment across regions
Pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive
to higher natural return to agricultural investment
Triggered selection, adaptation and learning processes
Persistent positive effect on
• Prevalence of long-term orientation
• Economic behavior: education, saving, non-smoking, and
technological adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 7 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Occupational Choice
Learning
Reproductive success
Intergenerational transmission of time preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 8 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Occupational Choice
Learning
Reproductive success
Intergenerational transmission of time preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 8 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Occupational Choice
Learning
Reproductive success
Intergenerational transmission of time preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 8 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Occupational Choice
Learning
Reproductive success
Intergenerational transmission of time preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 8 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Hypothesis
Formation of Time Preference: Mechanism
Individuals with higher long-term orientation:
Chose more lucrative investment opportunities (associated with
delayed return)
Gained socio-economic status, which reinforced their outlook on
long-term orientation
Generated higher income & reproductive success
Transmitted their enhanced long-term orientation to their
offspring
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 9 / 115
Introduction Structure
Structure of the presentation
1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Data
4 Country-Level Analysis
5 Second Generation Migrants
6 Individual-Level WVS
7 Conclusions
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 10 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Basic Structure
The Model
Overlapping generations economy
Agricultural stage of development
no financial markets
no storage technology
Continuum of three-period lived individuals
Childhood - passive economic agents
1st working period
2nd working period
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 11 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment ModeInvestment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment Mode
Investment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment ModeInvestment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment ModeInvestment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment ModeInvestment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Production
Feasible Modes of Production for Individual i
Two feasible modes of production:
Endowment ModeInvestment Mode
Income generated by member i of generation t
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) under endowment mode
(1,R1) under investment mode
where R1 > R0 > 1 Malthusian
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 12 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Preferences
ui ,t = ln ci ,t + β it [γ ln ni ,t+1 + (1− γ) ln ci ,t+1]
Discount factor ≡ βit = 1/(1 + ρit) ∈ (0, 1)
Rate of time preference ≡ ρit ≥ 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 13 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Preferences
ui ,t = ln ci ,t + β it [γ ln ni ,t+1 + (1− γ) ln ci ,t+1]
Discount factor ≡ βit = 1/(1 + ρit) ∈ (0, 1)
Rate of time preference ≡ ρit ≥ 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 13 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Preferences
ui ,t = ln ci ,t + β it [γ ln ni ,t+1 + (1− γ) ln ci ,t+1]
Discount factor ≡ βit = 1/(1 + ρit) ∈ (0, 1)
Rate of time preference ≡ ρit ≥ 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 13 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Individuals
Member i of generation t
Budget Constraints:
First working period
ci ,t ≤ yi ,t =
R0 under endowment mode
1 under investment mode
Second working period
τni ,t+1 + ci ,t+1 ≤ yi ,t+1 =
R0 under endowment mode
R1 under investment mode
Cost of raising a child ≡ τ > 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 14 / 115
Model Optimization
Optimization
Optimal consumption and number of children
ci ,t =yi ,t ;
ci ,t+1 =(1− γ)yi ,t+1;
ni ,t+1 =γ
τyi ,t+1
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 15 / 115
Model Optimization
Optimization
Optimal consumption and number of children
ci ,t =yi ,t ;
ci ,t+1 =(1− γ)yi ,t+1;
ni ,t+1 =γ
τyi ,t+1
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 15 / 115
Model Optimization
Optimization
Optimal consumption and number of children
ci ,t =yi ,t ;
ci ,t+1 =(1− γ)yi ,t+1;
ni ,t+1 =γ
τyi ,t+1
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 15 / 115
Model Optimization
Optimization
Optimal consumption and number of children
ci ,t =yi ,t ;
ci ,t+1 =(1− γ)yi ,t+1;
ni ,t+1 =γ
τyi ,t+1
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 15 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β it [lnR
0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Indirect utility
v i ,t =
lnR0 + β i
t [lnR0 + ξ] under endowment mode
ln 1 + β it [lnR
1 + ξ] under investment mode.
ξ ≡ γ ln(γ/τ) + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)]
⇒ Threshold level of time preference
β =lnR0
lnR1 − lnR0∈ (0, 1)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 16 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Mode of Production
endowment mode if β it ≤ β
investment mode if β it ≥ β
Threshold level is decreasing in the rate of return to investment
∂β
∂R1< 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 17 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Mode of Productionendowment mode if β it ≤ β
investment mode if β it ≥ β
Threshold level is decreasing in the rate of return to investment
∂β
∂R1< 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 17 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Mode of Productionendowment mode if β it ≤ β
investment mode if β it ≥ β
Threshold level is decreasing in the rate of return to investment
∂β
∂R1< 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 17 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference and Mode of Production
Mode of Productionendowment mode if β it ≤ β
investment mode if β it ≥ β
Threshold level is decreasing in the rate of return to investment
∂β
∂R1< 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 17 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference, Income and Fertility
Income
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) if β i
t ≤ β
(1,R1) if β it > β
Fertility
ni ,t+1 =
γτR0 ≡ nE if β i
t ≤ β
γτR1 ≡ nI if β i
t > β
⇒nI > nE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 18 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference, Income and Fertility
Income
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) if β i
t ≤ β
(1,R1) if β it > β
Fertility
ni ,t+1 =
γτR0 ≡ nE if β i
t ≤ β
γτR1 ≡ nI if β i
t > β
⇒nI > nE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 18 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference, Income and Fertility
Income
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) if β i
t ≤ β
(1,R1) if β it > β
Fertility
ni ,t+1 =
γτR0 ≡ nE if β i
t ≤ β
γτR1 ≡ nI if β i
t > β
⇒nI > nE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 18 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference, Income and Fertility
Income
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) if β i
t ≤ β
(1,R1) if β it > β
Fertility
ni ,t+1 =
γτR0 ≡ nE if β i
t ≤ β
γτR1 ≡ nI if β i
t > β
⇒nI > nE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 18 / 115
Model Optimization
Time Preference, Income and Fertility
Income
(yi ,t , yi ,t+1) =
(R0,R0) if β i
t ≤ β
(1,R1) if β it > β
Fertility
ni ,t+1 =
γτR0 ≡ nE if β i
t ≤ β
γτR1 ≡ nI if β i
t > β
⇒nI > nE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 18 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Parents transmit their time preference to their children
β it+1 =
β it if β i
t ≤ β
φ(β it ;R
1) if β it ≥ β
Engagement in the investment mode enhances long-term
orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 19 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Parents transmit their time preference to their children
β it+1 =
β it if β i
t ≤ β
φ(β it ;R
1) if β it ≥ β
Engagement in the investment mode enhances long-term
orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 19 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Parents transmit their time preference to their children
β it+1 =
β it if β i
t ≤ β
φ(β it ;R
1) if β it ≥ β
Engagement in the investment mode enhances long-term
orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 19 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
The Evolution of Time Preference within a Dynasty
itE)( 1RE
);( 1RitEI
it
it EE �1
it 1�E
i0EE 1
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 20 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of the Composition of Each Generation
Evolution of population of each type in generation t
LEt = (nE )tLE0
LIt = (nI)tLI0
Fraction of endowment type in generation t
θEt ≡LEt
LEt + LIt= θEt
Vanishes asymptotically
limt→∞
θEt = 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 21 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of the Composition of Each Generation
Evolution of population of each type in generation t
LEt = (nE )tLE0
LIt = (nI)tLI0
Fraction of endowment type in generation t
θEt ≡LEt
LEt + LIt= θEt
Vanishes asymptotically
limt→∞
θEt = 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 21 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of the Composition of Each Generation
Evolution of population of each type in generation t
LEt = (nE )tLE0
LIt = (nI)tLI0
Fraction of endowment type in generation t
θEt ≡LEt
LEt + LIt= θEt
Vanishes asymptotically
limt→∞
θEt = 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 21 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of the Composition of Each Generation
Evolution of population of each type in generation t
LEt = (nE )tLE0
LIt = (nI)tLI0
Fraction of endowment type in generation t
θEt ≡LEt
LEt + LIt= θEt
Vanishes asymptotically
limt→∞
θEt = 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 21 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0
⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt
= β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Evolution of Time Preference
Evolution of Time Preference
Average time preference
βt = θEt βEt + (1− θEt )βIt
βEt ≡ average time preference of endowment type
βIt ≡ average time preference of investment type
Converges to the steady state of the investment type
limt→∞
θEt = 0⇒ limt→∞
βt = limt→∞
βIt = β(R1)
Increases in return to investment
∂β(R1)
∂R1> 0
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 22 / 115
Model Comparative Statics
Cross-Country Differences in Return to Investment
itE
);( Ait REI
it
it EE �1
it 1�E
1
);( Bit REI
BE AE )( ARE )( BRE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 23 / 115
Model Comparative Statics
Effect of an Increase in Return to Investment
itE)( 1RE
);( 1RitEI
it
it EE �1
it 1�E
1)( 1 RR '�E'E E
);( 1 RRit '�EI
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 24 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Model Testable Predictions
Testable Predictions
Descendants of inhabitants of regions characterized by higher yield
(conditional on growth cycle) have higher long-term orientation
The expansion in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500
period increased long-term orientation in society
An increase in the crop growth cycle generates conflicting effects on
long-term orientation
Holding the crop yield constant, longer growth cycle reduces the
return to investment
Longer duration of investment mitigates the aversion from
delayed consumption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 25 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major crops
Over global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)
Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Data
FAO/GAEZ project
Major cropsOver global 5′ × 5′ grid (10km × 10km)Potential yield
Unaffected by time preference
Low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture
Reflecting early stages of development
Agro-climatic conditions
Unaffected by human intervention
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference
Caloric content per gram for each crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 26 / 115
Data Data
Caloric Suitability Index (CSI)
Potential Crop Yield
Cell: Calories per hectare per year of the most productive crop
Potential Crop Growth Cycles
Cell: average of days elapsed from planting to harvesting for themost productive crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 27 / 115
Data Data
Caloric Suitability Index (CSI)
Potential Crop Yield
Cell: Calories per hectare per year of the most productive crop
Potential Crop Growth Cycles
Cell: average of days elapsed from planting to harvesting for themost productive crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 27 / 115
Data Data
Caloric Suitability Index (CSI)
Potential Crop Yield
Cell: Calories per hectare per year of the most productive crop
Potential Crop Growth Cycles
Cell: average of days elapsed from planting to harvesting for themost productive crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 27 / 115
Data Data
Caloric Suitability Index (CSI)
Potential Crop Yield
Cell: Calories per hectare per year of the most productive crop
Potential Crop Growth Cycles
Cell: average of days elapsed from planting to harvesting for themost productive crop
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 27 / 115
Data Crop Yield
Potential Crop Yield pre-1500CE Post-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 28 / 115
Data Crop Growth Cycle
Potential Crop Growth Cycle pre-1500CE Post-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 29 / 115
Data Crop Return
Potential Crop Return pre-1500CE Post-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 30 / 115
Data Potential vs Actual Yield
Potential vs Actual Yield
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 31 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Other Rule
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 32 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Other Rule
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 33 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Other Rule
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 34 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Other Rule
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 35 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 36 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
Most Productive Crops post-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 37 / 115
Data Most Productive Crops pre-1500CE
LTO, Crop Yield, Growth Cycle and Return - Old World
Top Crop All Crops LTO
Region Crop Yield Cycle Return Yield Cycle Return
Europe Barley 8371 125 68 6117 112 52 66
Asia Rice 8709 139 63 5973 127 46 64
SSA Pea 4495 190 23 4180 189 22 20
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 38 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Long-Term Orientation Measure
Country-Level Analysis
Long-Term Orientation
Country-level measure (Hofstede, 1991)
“the fostering of virtues oriented toward future
rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift”
0 (Short-Term) to 100 (Long-Term)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 39 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Long-Term Orientation Measure
Country-Level Analysis
Long-Term Orientation
Country-level measure (Hofstede, 1991)
“the fostering of virtues oriented toward future
rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift”
0 (Short-Term) to 100 (Long-Term)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 39 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Long-Term Orientation Measure
Country-Level Analysis
Long-Term Orientation
Country-level measure (Hofstede, 1991)
“the fostering of virtues oriented toward future
rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift”
0 (Short-Term) to 100 (Long-Term)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 39 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Long-Term Orientation Measure
Country-Level Analysis
Long-Term Orientation
Country-level measure (Hofstede, 1991)
“the fostering of virtues oriented toward future
rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift”
0 (Short-Term) to 100 (Long-Term)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 39 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Correlations
Correlations: Long-Term Orientation and Development
(a) GDP per capitaOded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 40 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Correlations
Correlations: Long-Term Orientation and Development
(a) SchoolingOded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 41 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Correlations
Correlations: Long-Term Orientation and Development
(a) Growth rateOded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 42 / 115
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield 7.43*** 9.84*** 9.06*** 9.46*** 13.26*** 15.23***(2.48) (2.88) (2.62) (3.41) (2.55) (3.58)
Crop Growth Cycle -0.70 -3.18(3.96) (4.03)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 11.58*** 13.31***(2.15) (2.94)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) -3.15(3.52)
Absolute latitude 2.85 1.88 1.68 4.72 3.99 4.76 3.87(4.05) (3.85) (4.33) (3.29) (3.63) (4.15) (4.71)
Mean elevation 4.98* 5.97** 6.09** 5.56** 5.96** 4.58 4.87(2.87) (2.96) (3.03) (2.48) (2.46) (2.99) (3.03)
Terrain Roughness -6.24** -5.72** -5.72** -6.74*** -6.72*** -6.40** -6.29**(2.51) (2.75) (2.75) (2.53) (2.49) (2.83) (2.82)
Neolithic Transition Timing -6.46** -6.31** -4.75* -4.08(2.87) (3.06) (2.60) (2.66)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -4.77** -4.31*(2.24) (2.30)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdditional Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.54 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.61Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of crops
Choice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Reverse causality:
Time preference ⇒ actual return to agricultural investment
Choice of cropsChoice of technology
Remedy:
Exploit variation in potential (rather than actual) return toagricultural investment
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 44 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Omitted Variable:
Geography
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Institutions
Culture
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 45 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Omitted Variable:
Geography
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Institutions
Culture
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 45 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Omitted Variable:
Geography
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Institutions
Culture
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 45 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns:
Omitted Variable:
Geography
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Institutions
Culture
Long-Term Orientation
Potential Crop Yield
& Growth Cycle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 45 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEs
Adjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEs
Focusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yield
Individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEs
Individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Remedy:
Account for the confounding effects of:
Geographical characteristics(e.g., absolute latitude, elevation, roughness, distance to waterways, etc.)
Continental FEsAdjusting for the roots of contemporary populations
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounting for host country FEsFocusing on portable component of the effect of crop yieldIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Regional analysis:
Accounting for country FEsIndividual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, etc.)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 46 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Empirical Specification
LTOi =β0 + β1crop yieldi + β2crop growth cyclei
+∑j
γ0jXij + γ1YSTi + δc∆i + εi ,
LTOi ≡ Long-Term Orientation measure
Xij ≡ Geographical controls
YSTi ≡ Years since transition to agriculture
∆i ≡ Continental FEs
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 47 / 115
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield 7.43*** 9.84*** 9.06*** 9.46*** 13.26*** 15.23***(2.48) (2.88) (2.62) (3.41) (2.55) (3.58)
Crop Growth Cycle -0.70 -3.18(3.96) (4.03)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 11.58*** 13.31***(2.15) (2.94)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) -3.15(3.52)
Absolute latitude 2.85 1.88 1.68 4.72 3.99 4.76 3.87(4.05) (3.85) (4.33) (3.29) (3.63) (4.15) (4.71)
Mean elevation 4.98* 5.97** 6.09** 5.56** 5.96** 4.58 4.87(2.87) (2.96) (3.03) (2.48) (2.46) (2.99) (3.03)
Terrain Roughness -6.24** -5.72** -5.72** -6.74*** -6.72*** -6.40** -6.29**(2.51) (2.75) (2.75) (2.53) (2.49) (2.83) (2.82)
Neolithic Transition Timing -6.46** -6.31** -4.75* -4.08(2.87) (3.06) (2.60) (2.66)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -4.77** -4.31*(2.24) (2.30)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdditional Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.54 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.61Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Partial Correlation: Crop Yield and LTO
(a) Ancestry Adjusted (b) Old World
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 49 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Selection
High long-term orientation individuals settled in regions whichreward LTO
Note: This selection process will result in the same geographicalorigins in LTO
Remedy:
Exploit natural experiment associated with Columbian Exchange
Changes in the spectrum of potential crops in the post-1500period Crops
→ Assignment of potentially superseding crops to existingindividuals across regions Random
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 50 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Historical vs Contemporary Effect
Geography
HistoricalPotential Yield
ContemporaryPotential Yield
Long-TermOrientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 51 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Historical vs Contemporary Effect
Geography
HistoricalPotential Yield
ContemporaryPotential Yield
Long-TermOrientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 51 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Historical vs Contemporary Effect
Geography
HistoricalPotential Yield
ContemporaryPotential Yield
Long-TermOrientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 51 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Historical vs Contemporary Effect
Geography
HistoricalPotential Yield
ContemporaryPotential Yield
Long-TermOrientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 51 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Identification Strategy
Potential Concerns: Historical vs Contemporary Effect
Geography
HistoricalPotential Yield
ContemporaryPotential Yield
Long-TermOrientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 51 / 115
Pre-1500CE Crop Yield and LTO ∆ > 0 Natives
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 5.67** 5.98*** 7.28*** 8.82*** 12.23*** 15.21***(2.40) (2.09) (2.29) (3.13) (2.84) (3.51)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 7.88** 8.77*** 9.83*** 7.95*** 10.53***(3.08) (2.69) (3.11) (2.56) (3.30)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -3.77 -7.65(4.17) (4.80)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.16 0.31(1.90) (1.73)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 8.62*** 10.56***(2.01) (2.35)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 8.03*** 9.86***(2.03) (2.28)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -7.31**(3.59)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.77(1.60)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical & Neolithic No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.61 0.62Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding the Persistence of Development Channel
Agricultural productivity (crop yield)
→ Population density
→ Urbanization
Persistence of pre-industrial development
→ Income, education, etc.
→ Long-term orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 53 / 115
Excluding the Pre-Industrial Development Channel
Long-Term Orientation
Population Density Urbanization GDP per capita
1500CE 1500CE 1800CE 1870CE 1913CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (Anc., pre-1500) 11.05*** 11.52*** 10.01*** 11.08*** 11.54*** 11.54*** 14.19*** 12.66**(2.53) (2.33) (3.68) (3.68) (3.18) (3.22) (5.08) (5.02)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 10.76*** 10.40*** 8.77** 9.96*** 10.05*** 10.22*** 15.55*** 14.92***(2.89) (2.78) (3.35) (3.35) (3.23) (3.37) (3.22) (3.29)
Crop Growth Cycle (Anc., pre-1500) -8.06* -10.43*** -5.06 -7.30 -8.60* -8.75* -12.58* -10.28(4.06) (3.63) (5.28) (5.37) (4.68) (4.84) (6.44) (6.46)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (post-1500) -0.46 -1.06 1.06 0.55 0.07 0.03 2.14 3.31(1.72) (1.84) (2.91) (2.95) (2.37) (2.41) (3.38) (3.35)
Population density in 1500 CE 3.76**(1.86)
Urbanization rate in 1500 CE 1.90(2.24)
Urbanization rate in 1800 CE -0.57(1.22)
GDP per capita 1870 10.57***(3.65)
GDP per capita 1913 10.99***(3.53)
Semi-Partial R2
Crop Yield (Anc., pre-1500) 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07**Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.09***Crop Growth Cycle (Anc., pre-1500) 0.02* 0.03*** 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.04* 0.03Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (post-1500) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01Population density in 1500 CE 0.01**Urbanization rate in 1500 CE 0.00Urbanization rate in 1800 CE 0.00GDPpc 1870 0.05***GDPpc 1913 0.05***
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeography & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.59Observations 87 87 65 65 79 79 50 50
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Channels
Average Suitability PCA
Plow
Future Time Reference (FTR)
→ Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 55 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Channels
Average Suitability PCA
Plow
Future Time Reference (FTR)
→ Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 55 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Channels
Average Suitability PCA
Plow
Future Time Reference (FTR)
→ Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 55 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Channels
Average Suitability PCA
Plow
Future Time Reference (FTR)
→ Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 55 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Channels
Average Suitability PCA
Plow
Future Time Reference (FTR)
→ Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 55 / 115
Excluding Other Channels
Long-Term Orientation
Agricultural Suitability Plow Future Time Reference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 12.02*** 11.46*** 10.36*** 12.85*** 12.80*** 12.72*** 13.05*** 14.10*** 13.95***(2.69) (2.91) (3.32) (2.65) (2.67) (2.70) (2.75) (2.77) (2.80)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 10.70*** 10.50*** 10.03*** 10.93*** 10.93*** 11.17*** 10.30*** 9.89*** 10.13***(2.71) (2.70) (2.73) (2.77) (2.78) (2.76) (3.16) (2.88) (3.02)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -7.63* -7.71* -8.04* -10.02** -10.13** -10.50*** -10.87** -10.05** -10.21**(3.85) (3.94) (4.09) (3.94) (3.92) (3.94) (4.14) (3.80) (3.97)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.90 -0.96 -1.16 -1.30 -1.40 -1.63 -1.09 -0.86 -0.97(1.62) (1.68) (1.76) (1.69) (1.66) (1.61) (1.62) (1.72) (1.70)
Land Suitability 0.83(2.07)
Land Suitability (Ancestors) 2.34(3.20)
Plow 1.62(3.17)
Plow (Ancestors) 3.35(3.92)
Strong FTR -3.68**(1.68)
Strong FTR (Ancestors) -2.59(1.76)
Semi-Partial R2
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09***Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04***Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02**Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Land Suitability 0.00Land Suitability (Ancestors) 0.00Plow 0.00Plow (Ancestors) 0.00Strong FTR 0.02**Strong FTR (Ancestors) 0.01
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeography & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.70Observations 85 85 85 87 87 87 71 71 71
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation is correlated with other cultural traits.
Potential concern:
→ Potential yield determines other cultural traits
→ Other cultural traits determine LTO
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 57 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation is correlated with other cultural traits.
Potential concern:
→ Potential yield determines other cultural traits
→ Other cultural traits determine LTO
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 57 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation is correlated with other cultural traits.
Potential concern:
→ Potential yield determines other cultural traits
→ Other cultural traits determine LTO
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 57 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation is correlated with other cultural traits.
Potential concern:
→ Potential yield determines other cultural traits
→ Other cultural traits determine LTO
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 57 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation is correlated with other cultural traits.
Potential concern:
→ Potential yield determines other cultural traits
→ Other cultural traits determine LTO
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 57 / 115
Excluding Other Cultural Channels Corr
Cultural Indices
Long-TermOrientation
RestraintvsIndulgence
Trust Indivi-dualism
PowerDistance
Coope-ration
UncertaintyAvoidance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 10.03*** 6.58 -7.11* -10.88 6.69 -7.60 3.03(3.05) (3.99) (3.72) (6.59) (5.92) (5.98) (5.55)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 9.03*** 7.91** -0.53 -3.05 2.50 -1.51 -0.39(2.16) (3.10) (3.48) (2.62) (2.18) (2.23) (2.21)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -5.98** -4.59 0.35 2.20 -2.50 3.50 4.06(2.75) (3.57) (3.47) (3.82) (4.11) (4.15) (4.33)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) -0.77 2.02 1.96 -3.72 -0.89 3.00 -0.05(1.60) (2.42) (2.09) (3.18) (2.90) (2.51) (3.24)
Land Suitability (Ancestors) 2.33 0.91 -6.17 6.94 7.75* 12.54*** 6.08(3.15) (4.86) (5.10) (4.99) (4.22) (3.91) (3.98)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -7.58** -0.19 0.56 -0.60 -2.13 1.22 -8.88**(3.04) (4.62) (4.09) (3.32) (4.40) (5.85) (3.77)
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.68 0.41 0.46 0.68 0.39 0.46 0.60Observations 85 83 83 60 60 60 60
Excluding Other Cultural Channels
Long-Term Orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 10.03*** 9.38*** 10.30*** 13.54** 11.47* 12.76* 11.17*(3.05) (3.21) (3.41) (6.49) (6.78) (6.78) (6.53)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 9.03*** 8.55*** 8.97*** 7.45*** 6.88** 7.11*** 6.84***(2.16) (2.53) (2.23) (2.47) (2.63) (2.53) (2.50)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -5.98** -5.71* -6.05** -5.53 -5.14 -5.75 -5.29(2.75) (3.08) (2.76) (4.88) (5.32) (5.14) (4.89)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) -0.77 -0.88 -0.71 0.17 -0.61 -1.16 -0.59(1.60) (1.71) (1.84) (3.11) (3.11) (3.20) (3.03)
Restraint vs. Indulgence 2.18(2.22)
Trust 0.63(3.10)
Individualism 4.80(3.96)
Power Distance -0.45(3.90)
Cooperation 3.95(4.20)
Uncertainty Avoidance 1.18(6.06)
Land Suitability (Ancestors) 2.33 2.30 2.35 -2.71 -1.13 -3.67 -1.61(3.15) (3.30) (3.51) (4.93) (4.76) (5.54) (5.32)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -7.58** -7.49** -7.51** -7.86 -8.03 -8.22 -7.53(3.04) (3.05) (3.14) (5.32) (5.34) (5.07) (5.91)
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.58Observations 85 83 83 60 60 60 60
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Country-Level Analysis Identification
Robustness
Including Cells with Zero Caloric Output Table Zeroes
Daily Return Table Daily
Trade Table Trade
Population Age Structure
Life-Expectancy Table Age
Current Income
Climatic Variability Table Climatic
Spatial Autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Conley, 1999)
Omitted Variable Bias (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Oster, 2014) Table AET Table AET Changes
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 60 / 115
Crop Yield, LTO and Technological Adoption
Major Technological Changes (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.10** 0.13** 0.15*** 0.17** 0.30*** 0.29***(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Crop Yield Ch. (post-1500) 0.06 0.09* 0.16*** 0.21***(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Crop Cycle (pre-1500) -0.13 -0.22*** -0.21**(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (post-1500) -0.12* -0.23*** -0.19***(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesLanguage Family FE No No No No Yes YesContinental FE No No No No No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.43 0.45Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86
Crop Yield, LTO and Education
Years of Schooling in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.88***(0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29) (0.23) (0.28)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03(0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.32)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) -0.05 0.02 0.09(0.27) (0.26) (0.34)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.00 0.02 0.08(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesTiming of Neolithic No No Yes Yes Yes YesContinental FE No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.58Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129
Second Generation Migrants Motivation
Second Generation Migrants Analysis Data
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounts for host country FEs(geography, institutions, culture)
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Focus on portable component of the effect of crop yield
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 63 / 115
Second Generation Migrants Motivation
Second Generation Migrants Analysis Data
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounts for host country FEs(geography, institutions, culture)
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Focus on portable component of the effect of crop yield
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 63 / 115
Second Generation Migrants Motivation
Second Generation Migrants Analysis Data
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounts for host country FEs(geography, institutions, culture)
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Focus on portable component of the effect of crop yield
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 63 / 115
Second Generation Migrants Motivation
Second Generation Migrants Analysis Data
Analysis of 2nd generation migrants:
Accounts for host country FEs(geography, institutions, culture)
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Focus on portable component of the effect of crop yield
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 63 / 115
Second Generation Migrants Motivation
Correlations: Long-Term Orientation and Education
Years of Schooling
Second Generation Migrants All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Long-Term Orientation 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.36** 0.32** 0.79*** 0.88*** 0.70*** 0.63***(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes YesSex & Age No No Yes Yes No No Yes YesPray & Health No No No Yes No No No Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.21
R2 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.21Observations 705 705 705 705 42016 42016 42016 42016
Income
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 64 / 115
Second Generation Migrants Empirical Analysis
Empirical Specification
LTOic =β0 + β1crop yieldip + β2crop growth cycleip
+∑j
γ0jXipj + γ1YSTip +∑j
γ2jYij + δc∆i + εi ,
LTOic ≡ Long-Term Orientation of individual i in country c
Xipj ≡ Geographical controls in parent’s country of origin
YSTip ≡ Years since transition to agriculture in parent’s country of origin
Yij ≡ Individual controls (age, sex, education, marital status, health status, religiosity)
∆i ≡ Host country fixed effects
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 65 / 115
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation in Second Generation Migrants
Long-Term Orientation
Either Parent Mother Father Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 2.29*** 2.61*** 2.99*** 3.44*** 2.70** 3.34*** 5.63** 6.11**(0.80) (0.97) (1.10) (1.30) (1.04) (1.13) (2.43) (2.54)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.52 0.65 0.32 0.87 0.57 0.52 1.83 2.15(0.65) (0.61) (0.71) (0.77) (0.85) (0.89) (1.29) (1.76)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.82 -1.17 -1.84 -2.07(1.00) (1.56) (1.32) (2.54)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.10 -0.92 0.48 -0.07(0.63) (0.68) (0.78) (1.33)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesIndividual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geographical Controls & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04Observations 2584 2584 1596 1596 1686 1686 568 568
Crop Yield and Saving in Second Generation Migrants
Saving
Either Parent Mother Father Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.04** 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 0.05** 0.07** 0.02 0.03(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.03* 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.08*** 0.07**(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesIndividual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeography & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18Observations 2559 2559 1582 1582 1665 1665 562 562
Crop Yield and Smoking in Second Generation Migrants
Smoking
Either Parent Both
Habit Ever Habit Ever
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.13***(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) -0.02** -0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.02(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.10***(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.04*(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegion FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolithic No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.15Observations 1561 1561 1561 1561 1561 935 817 496
Individual-Level WVS
Individual-Level Analysis (WVS) Data
Individual-level analysis:
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Country FE(geography, institutions, culture)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 69 / 115
Individual-Level WVS
Individual-Level Analysis (WVS) Data
Individual-level analysis:
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Country FE(geography, institutions, culture)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 69 / 115
Individual-Level WVS
Individual-Level Analysis (WVS) Data
Individual-level analysis:
Accounts for individual characteristics(e.g., age, gender, education, etc.)
Country FE(geography, institutions, culture)
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 69 / 115
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Empirical Specification
LTOircw =β0 + β1crop yieldrc + β2crop growth cyclerc
+∑j
γ0jXrc + γ1YSTrc +∑j
γ2jYircwj + δcw∆cw + εircw
LTOircw ≡ Long-Term Orientation of individual i in region r of country c in wave w
Xrc ≡ Geographical controls in region r of country c
YSTrc ≡ Years since transition to agriculture in region r of country c
Yircwj ≡ Individual controls (age, sex, education, income)
∆cw ≡ Continent/Country and Wave fixed effects
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 70 / 115
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation (WVS)
Long-Term Orientation (OLS)
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.066***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055***(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -0.007** -0.018***(0.003) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.025*** 0.026***(0.002) (0.002)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.043***(0.002)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.041***(0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.005*(0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.018***(0.002)
Wave & Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolithic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesIndividual Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05Observations 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 176489
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Robustness
Results are robust to:
Estimation method Probit
Cells that experienced change in crop post-1500 Table
Weighted Observations Table
Country Fixed Effects Table
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 72 / 115
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Robustness
Results are robust to:
Estimation method Probit
Cells that experienced change in crop post-1500 Table
Weighted Observations Table
Country Fixed Effects Table
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 72 / 115
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Robustness
Results are robust to:
Estimation method Probit
Cells that experienced change in crop post-1500 Table
Weighted Observations Table
Country Fixed Effects Table
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 72 / 115
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Robustness
Results are robust to:
Estimation method Probit
Cells that experienced change in crop post-1500 Table
Weighted Observations Table
Country Fixed Effects Table
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 72 / 115
Individual-Level WVS Empirical Analysis
Robustness
Results are robust to:
Estimation method Probit
Cells that experienced change in crop post-1500 Table
Weighted Observations Table
Country Fixed Effects Table
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 72 / 115
Regional Analysis
Share of Individuals in WVS Region with Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
Unweighted Weighted: Area Weighted: Area Share Area Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crop Yield 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.097*** 0.032** 0.031** 0.039*** 0.032**(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.033) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Crop Growth Cycle -0.010 -0.047** -0.024** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.036***(0.012) (0.021) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 0.077*** 0.133*** 0.043** 0.041**(0.020) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017)
Crop Growth Cycle (Anc.) -0.012 -0.050*** -0.027*** -0.037***(0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009)
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No NoCountry FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No No No No No Yes YesWeighted by Region Area No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes NoWeighted by Region’s Share No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.72 0.72 0.86 0.86 0.72 0.86Observations 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1143 1143
Conclusions
Crop Yield and the Adoption of Lengthy Production Processes:
Aceto Balsamico and Parmiggiano Reggiano
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 74 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
Co-evolution of human traits and the economic environment iscentral for the understudying of comparative development
Variations in natural pre-industrial agricultural productivityacross regions
⇒ persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across
the globe
⇒ Education
⇒ Saving
⇒ Smoking
⇒ Technological Adoption
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 75 / 115
Conclusions
The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak
“Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.”
– Aristotle
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 76 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEt
Fixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Endowment Sector
Production function
Y Et = At(L
Et )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output endowment sector ≡ Y Et
Technological level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LEtFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LEt ) = R0(LEt )α
Per capita output
Y Et
LEt=
R0(LEt )α(LEt )(1−α)Xα
LEt= R0 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 77 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y It
Technology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LIt
Fixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Model
Malthusian Framework: Investment Sector
Production function
Y It = At(LIt )(1−α)Xα, α ∈ (0, 1)
Output investment sector ≡ Y ItTechnology level ≡ At
Labor in investment mode ≡ LItFixed amount of land ≡ X = 1
Boserupian technological progress
At ≡ A(LIt ) = R1(LIt )α
Per capita output
Y ItLIt
=R1(LIt )α(LIt )(1−α)Xα
LIt= R1 Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 78 / 115
Additional Results Post-1500CE Data
Potential Crop Yield post-1500CE Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 79 / 115
Additional Results Post-1500CE Data
Potential Crop Growth Cycle post-1500CE Pre-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 80 / 115
Additional Results Post-1500CE Data
Potential Crop Return post-1500CE Pre-1500CE
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 81 / 115
Additional Results Crop Choice Robustness
Total vs. Daily Yield
Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 82 / 115
Additional Results Crop Choice Robustness
Total vs. Daily Yield
Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 83 / 115
Additional Results Crop Choice Robustness
Total vs. Daily Yield
Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 84 / 115
Additional Results Crop Choice Robustness
Total vs. Daily Yield
Back
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 85 / 115
Additional Results Ancestry Adjusted Maps
Potential Crop Yield (Ancestry Adjusted) and LTO
(a) Potential Crop Yield (b) Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 86 / 115
Additional Results Ancestry Adjusted Maps
Potential Crop Yield (Ancestry Adjusted) and LTOUnadjusted
(a) Potential Crop Yield (b) Long-Term Orientation
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 87 / 115
Continental Distribution of crops (and their variants) pre-1500CE Back
Crop Continent Crop Continent
Alfalfa Asia, Europe Palm Heart North Africa, SubsaharaBanana Asia, Oceania, North Africa Pearl Millet Asia, North Africa, SubsaharaBarley Asia, Europe, North Africa Phaseolus Bean AmericaBuckwheat Asia Pigeon Pea Asia, SubsaharaCabbage Europe Rye EuropeCacao America Sorghum North Africa, SubsaharaCarrot Asia, Europe Soybean AsiaCassava America Sunflower AmericaChick Pea Europe Sweet Potato AmericaCitrus Asia, Europe Tea AsiaCoconut America, Oceania Tomato AmericaCoffee North Africa Wetland Rice Asia, SubsaharaCotton America, Asia, Europe, North Africa, Subsahara Wheat Asia, Europe, North AfricaCowpea Asia, North Africa, Subsahara Wheat Hard Red Spring Asia, Europe, North AfricaDry Pea Europe, North Africa Wheat Hard Red Winter Asia, Europe, North AfricaFlax Asia, Europe, North Africa Wheat Hard White Asia, Europe, North AfricaFoxtail Millet Asia, Europe, North Africa Wheat Soft Red Winter Asia, Europe, North AfricaGreengram Asia, Subsahara Wheat Soft White Asia, Europe, North AfricaGroundnuts America White Potato AmericaIndigo Rice Asia, Subsahara Yams Asia, SubsaharaMaize America Giant Yams Asia, SubsaharaOat Europe, North Africa Sorghum (Subtropical) North Africa, SubsaharaOilpalm North Africa, Subsahara Sorghum (Tropical Highland) North Africa, SubsaharaOlive Europe, North Africa Sorghum (Tropical Lowland) North Africa, SubsaharaOnion America, Asia, Europe, North Africa, Subsahara,
OceaniaWhite Yams North Africa, Subsahara
Changes in Crop Yield and Growth Cycle and their Correlates (Anc.) Back
Change Yield (Anc.) Change Growth Cycle (Anc.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.05 -0.29** -0.17 -0.26* -0.28* 0.16 0.26* 0.36* 0.35 0.31(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.28)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.77*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.69*** -0.32 -0.36 -0.54** -0.40(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.36)
Absolute Latitude -0.74* -0.74* -1.00* -1.24**(0.40) (0.42) (0.52) (0.62)
Mean Elevation 0.03 -0.22 0.43 0.36(0.24) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30)
Terrain Roughness -0.15 -0.02 -0.19 -0.20(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Distance to Coast or River 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15)
Landlocked 0.08 -0.01 -0.24* -0.21(0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.16)
Island -0.11 -0.12 0.17 0.14(0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14)
Pct. Land in Tropics -0.80* -0.59* -0.77 -0.69(0.46) (0.35) (0.52) (0.48)
Pct. Land in Temperate Zone 0.19 0.12 0.38 0.48(0.17) (0.16) (0.31) (0.31)
Pct. Land in Tropics and Subtropics 0.78 0.48 0.25 0.27(0.52) (0.47) (0.49) (0.51)
Precipitation -0.04 -0.07 0.17 0.05(0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.25)
Temperature -0.29 -0.67 -0.31 -0.59(0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.61)
Continental FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.01 0.24 0.52 0.40 0.53 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.18Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Potential Crop Yield, Growth Cycle, Agricultural Suitability and LTO Back
Principal Components
Component 1 Component 2 Unexplained
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.71 0.71 0.00Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.71 -0.71 0.00
Eigenvalues 1.40 0.60Proportion Variance 0.70 0.30
Observations 87
Principal Components
Component 1 Component 2 Unexplained
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.71 0.71 0.00Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.71 -0.71 0.00
Eigenvalues 1.12 0.88Proportion Variance 0.56 0.44
Observations 87
Additional Results Principal Component Analysis
Potential Crop Yield, Growth Cycle, Agricultural Suitability and LTO Back
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PC2 Pre-1500 Crop 17.38*** 17.75*** 18.53*** 12.52*** 13.37*** 11.79*** 10.90*** 10.71***(2.69) (2.70) (3.10) (2.35) (3.27) (3.22) (3.21) (3.34)
PC2 Crop Change 0.55 0.77 8.82*** 8.74*** 8.22*** 7.93*** 6.39**(2.66) (2.88) (2.20) (2.46) (2.34) (2.35) (2.75)
PC1 Pre-1500 Crop 1.25 1.10 0.74 0.75 3.08* 4.02** 2.72 3.11(2.05) (2.05) (1.57) (1.57) (1.69) (1.89) (2.80) (2.85)
PC1 Crop Change 1.30 3.28 8.04*** 7.22*** 6.95*** 6.29*** 4.86(3.04) (2.49) (2.24) (2.40) (2.12) (2.26) (3.01)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Anc.) -6.46** -7.05** -9.88**(3.02) (3.17) (4.06)
Land Suitability (Anc.) 2.34 4.28(3.20) (3.50)
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No No No No YesAdjusted-R2 0.33 -0.01 0.32 -0.02 0.33 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.63Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 70
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 91 / 115
Pre-1500CE Crop Yield and LTO
Grids that Experienced Change in Crop post-1500 Back
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 4.97** 8.52*** 7.40*** 6.65** 7.75*** 7.97**(2.28) (2.46) (2.58) (2.98) (2.81) (3.66)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 4.36* 5.81** 5.58* 7.59**(2.46) (2.55) (2.83) (2.93)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) 0.06 -1.55(2.58) (3.97)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -4.50** -4.87**(2.18) (2.36)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 8.21*** 7.85**(2.34) (3.26)
Crop Yield Change (Ancestors, post-1500) 6.09*** 7.31***(2.13) (2.25)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.95(3.16)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (Anc., post-1500) -3.44(2.27)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geographical Controls & Neolithic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.51 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.58 0.61Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Pre-1500CE Crop Yield and LTO
Natural Experiment in Countries with High Share of Natives Back
Long-Term Orientation
Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 8.49** 8.58*** 13.78*** 17.55***(3.44) (3.05) (3.47) (3.93)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 9.62*** 9.95*** 13.36***(3.53) (3.30) (3.76)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -8.86*(5.01)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 1.03(2.19)
Neolithic Transition Timing -2.84 -1.17(4.47) (4.38)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes YesGeography No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.43 0.52 0.58 0.60Observations 46 46 46 46
Additional Results Robustness Hofstede
Excluding Other Cultural Channels: CorrelationsBack
Correlation Among Cultural Indices
(LTO) (RVI) (Trust) (Ind) (PDI) (Coop) (UAI)
Long-Term Orientation (LTO) 1.00Restraint vs. Indulgence (RIV) 0.53*** 1.00Trust 0.19 -0.07 1.00Individualism (Ind) 0.12 -0.18 0.45*** 1.00Power Distance (PDI) 0.05 0.34** -0.50*** -0.66*** 1.00Cooperation 0.01 -0.09 -0.21 0.05 0.16 1.00Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) -0.04 0.07 -0.50*** -0.23 0.27* -0.00 1.00
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 94 / 115
Additional Results Robustness Hofstede
Potential Crop Yield, Growth Cycle, and LTO (Including Grids Not-Suitable for Production) Back
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield 5.26** 9.01*** 8.21*** 7.11** 11.59*** 10.79***(2.43) (2.86) (2.61) (3.06) (2.84) (3.51)
Crop Growth Cycle 2.18 1.47(4.00) (4.25)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 9.38*** 8.62***(2.43) (3.11)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) 1.52(4.23)
Absolute Latitude 3.56 2.46 3.01 3.66 4.05 4.98 5.37(4.21) (3.94) (4.35) (3.79) (4.16) (4.62) (5.14)
Mean Elevation 6.20* 7.14** 6.63* 6.73** 6.44* 5.86 5.64(3.26) (3.41) (3.44) (3.35) (3.25) (3.92) (3.84)
Terrain Roughness -6.76** -6.16** -6.09** -7.29** -7.24** -6.55** -6.59**(2.68) (2.95) (2.98) (3.00) (3.00) (3.25) (3.28)
Neolithic Transition Timing -6.81** -7.21** -5.58* -5.84*(3.05) (3.20) (2.84) (2.94)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -5.20** -5.41**(2.53) (2.63)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdditional Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.56Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 95 / 115
Additional Results Robustness Hofstede
Potential Daily Crop Return, Crop Growth Cycle, and LTO Back
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Daily Crop Return 5.71** 9.40*** 8.39*** 7.00*** 10.83*** 9.28***(2.39) (2.57) (2.44) (2.59) (2.69) (2.82)
Crop Growth Cycle 4.04 4.57(3.58) (3.85)
Daily Crop Return (Ancestors) 9.00*** 7.57***(2.41) (2.63)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) 4.23(3.79)
Absolute latitude 3.07 2.07 3.32 2.58 4.08 3.40 5.22(4.10) (3.82) (4.32) (3.78) (4.24) (4.59) (5.31)
Mean elevation 6.44* 7.19** 6.39* 6.78* 6.07* 5.98 5.32(3.38) (3.47) (3.42) (3.42) (3.26) (4.11) (3.84)
Terrain Roughness -6.66** -6.09** -6.10** -7.05** -7.08** -6.15* -6.46*(2.67) (2.94) (2.95) (3.01) (3.01) (3.31) (3.26)
Neolithic Transition Timing -6.13* -6.83** -5.14* -5.78*(3.11) (3.18) (2.93) (2.94)
Neolithic Transition Timing (Ancestors) -4.87* -5.41**(2.62) (2.66)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdditional Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.56Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 72 72
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 96 / 115
Additional Results Robustness Hofstede
Excluding Trade Channel Back
Long-Term Orientation
Suitability Money Transportation Routes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 9.00*** 9.84*** 11.48*** 12.03*** 11.27*** 11.61*** 12.37*** 11.17*** 11.73***(2.85) (2.45) (2.73) (3.33) (2.61) (2.67) (3.35) (2.66) (2.76)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 10.03*** 10.84*** 11.08*** 11.48*** 11.11*** 10.98*** 11.32*** 11.13*** 11.81***(2.97) (2.72) (3.16) (3.42) (3.09) (3.16) (3.17) (3.14) (3.42)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -5.35 -7.71* -8.36* -8.96* -8.79** -8.33* -9.28** -8.56* -9.73**(4.23) (4.29) (4.28) (4.66) (4.38) (4.30) (4.61) (4.42) (4.51)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.12 0.27 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.34 0.02(1.70) (1.52) (1.82) (1.79) (1.76) (1.85) (1.77) (1.75) (1.83)
Land Suitability (Gini) -2.11(2.02)
Land Suitability (Range) 2.46(1.65)
Exchange Medium 1000BCE 0.05(2.43)
Exchange Medium 1CE 1.15(3.12)
Exchange Medium 1000CE 4.60(4.32)
Transportation Medium 1000BCE 0.84(3.18)
Transportation Medium 1CE 2.40(4.36)
Transportation Medium 1000CE 1.50(4.39)
Pre-Industrial Distance to Trade Route 0.16(5.98)
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeography & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.61Observations 84 84 81 81 81 81 81 81 71
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 97 / 115
Potential Crop Yield and Development Back
Long-Term Orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield 11.67*** 10.87*** 13.23*** 12.96***(3.80) (3.58) (3.95) (3.90)
Crop Growth Cycle -4.53 -4.73 -4.90 -4.61(4.20) (3.95) (4.00) (4.07)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 15.52*** 14.42*** 16.39*** 16.31***(2.94) (3.02) (3.04) (3.06)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) -6.30* -6.27* -6.62* -6.33*(3.54) (3.41) (3.50) (3.49)
Age Dependency Ratio -6.51** -4.37(2.95) (2.84)
Life Expectancy at Birth 7.24* 5.77(4.32) (3.80)
Ln[GPD per capita] 3.67 3.04(3.00) (2.57)
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Characteristics & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Crop Yield, Climatic Risk, and LTO Back
Long-Term Orientation
Scale Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 10.62*** 9.28*** 10.88*** 11.56*** 10.19*** 9.58*** 11.06*** 11.08*** 10.98*** 11.04***(2.62) (2.49) (2.68) (2.70) (2.97) (2.81) (2.58) (2.62) (2.58) (2.64)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 10.23*** 8.85*** 10.75*** 10.72*** 10.23*** 9.85*** 10.77*** 10.84*** 10.74*** 10.74***(2.95) (2.93) (2.92) (2.88) (3.00) (2.93) (2.92) (3.14) (2.92) (3.12)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -7.45* -3.79 -8.14* -7.22* -6.31 -4.59 -8.07* -8.16* -8.02* -8.05*(4.30) (4.10) (4.18) (4.32) (4.83) (4.71) (4.09) (4.33) (4.11) (4.33)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.60 0.15 -0.47 -0.31 -0.12 0.19 -0.46 -0.48 -0.44 -0.45(1.68) (1.65) (1.73) (1.75) (1.87) (1.82) (1.75) (1.78) (1.74) (1.77)
Total land area 3.04(2.17)
Total land area (Ancestry Adjusted) 7.31***(2.08)
Precipitation Volatility (mean) 0.69(3.05)
Precipitation Volatility (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) -2.26(3.02)
Temperature Volatility (mean) 4.37(6.44)
Temperature Volatility (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 6.70(5.07)
Precipitation Diversification (mean) -0.22(2.95)
Precipitation Diversification (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) -0.28(2.85)
Temperature Diversification (mean) 0.78(3.05)
Temperature Diversification (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.05(2.97)
Partial R2
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.05* 0.01 0.06* 0.05* 0.03 0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Total land area 0.02Total land area (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.14***Precipitation Volatility (mean) 0.00Precipitation Volatility (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.01Temperature Volatility (mean) 0.01Temperature Volatility (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.03Precipitation Diversification (mean) 0.00Precipitation Diversification (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.00Temperature Diversification (mean) 0.00Temperature Diversification (mean) (Ancestry Adjusted) 0.00
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeography & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAdjusted-R2 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Crop Yield and LTO Back
Long-Term Orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crop Yield 9.67*** 10.14*** 13.58*** 16.57***(2.60) (3.02) (3.01) (3.37)[3.03] [3.38] [3.01] [2.57]{2.46} {2.65} {2.88} {2.95}
Crop Growth Cycle -3.78 -2.92 -5.26** -4.07(2.47) (2.95) (2.61) (2.90)[2.39] [2.67] [2.38] [2.45]{2.34} {2.59} {2.50} {2.54}
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 11.35*** 14.50***(2.56) (2.75)[2.60] [2.46]{2.43} {2.41}
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) -5.05** -4.65*(2.41) (2.59)[2.15] [2.24]{2.28} {2.27}
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geography & Neolithic No Yes No Yes No YesOld World Subsample No No No No Yes YesAET -21.58 -3.00 -5.53δ -4.72 -0.35 -0.66β∗ 11.38 22.02 21.67
R2 0.59 0.70 0.61 0.75 0.56 0.72
Adjusted-R2 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.68 0.52 0.64Observations 87 87 87 87 72 72
Changes in Crop Yield & Growth Cycle and LTO (Selection on Unobserv.) Back
Long-Term Orientation
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 11.28*** 9.51***(2.92) (2.92)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.67 -1.51(1.84) (1.81)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 10.20*** 8.83*** 11.25*** 8.39***(2.50) (2.36) (2.72) (2.88)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.79 -0.73 0.16 -1.45(1.75) (1.78) (1.87) (1.93)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 10.03*** 10.74*** 9.90*** 11.31*** 10.46*** 12.18***(2.31) (2.76) (2.30) (2.70) (2.43) (3.05)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -11.29*** -6.47 -11.59*** -6.85* -12.27*** -5.69(3.22) (3.90) (3.23) (3.65) (3.38) (4.24)
Change Crop Yield
AET 5.38 6.43 2.93δ 2.13 2.51 1.45β∗ 6.21 6.25 3.32
Change Crop Growth Cycle
AET -1.81 -0.48 -0.90δ -0.94 -0.25 -0.49β∗ -3.06 -3.58 -4.29
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Geography & Neolithic No Yes No Yes No YesOld World Subsample No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.65 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.62 0.76
Adjusted-R2 0.61 0.70 0.62 0.71 0.58 0.67Observations 87 87 87 87 72 72
Additional Results Long-Term Orientation Measure
European Social Survey Back
Data:
Third Wave European Social Survey
Academically driven cross-national survey that has beenconducted every two years across Europe since 2001Survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns ofdiverse populations in 25 nations
“Do you generally plan for your future or do you just take eachday as it comes?”
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 102 / 115
Correlations: Long-Term Orientation and Income
Total Household Income
Second Generation Migrants All Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Long-Term Orientation 0.33** 0.22* 0.22** 0.23** 0.35*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.32***(0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes YesSex & Age No No Yes Yes No No Yes YesPray & Health No No No Yes No No No Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.01 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.01 0.50 0.52 0.53
R2 0.01 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.01 0.50 0.52 0.53Observations 383 383 383 383 29323 29323 29323 29323
Education
Crop Yield, Crop Growth Cycle, and LTO in Second Generation
Migrants Graphs
Long-Term Orientation (Ordered Probit)
Country of OriginMother Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.31***(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
Crop Growth Cycle -0.13* -0.09 -0.10(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 0.30*** 0.27***(0.08) (0.09)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) -0.14* -0.10(0.07) (0.08)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesSex & Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOther Ind. Chars. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical & Neolithic No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03Observations 705 705 705 705 705 566 566 557
Pre-1500 Crop Yield and LTO in Second Generation Migrants Back
Country of OriginMother Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 2.96** 3.40** 6.45*** 6.50*** 6.65*** 5.08** 7.62**(1.18) (1.32) (2.17) (2.16) (2.15) (2.48) (2.92)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.44 1.37 1.98 2.29(1.20) (1.40) (1.63) (1.65)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -1.60 -2.65 -2.36(2.58) (2.37) (2.53)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -1.27 -0.07 -0.24(0.92) (1.19) (1.29)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 8.10*** 6.54**(2.03) (2.55)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 1.00 1.87(1.45) (1.66)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -2.42 -3.16(2.53) (2.67)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (Anc., post-1500) -1.03 0.13(0.92) (1.17)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesSex & Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOther Ind. Chars. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolitic No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 566 566 557
Pre-1500 Crop Yield and LTO in 2nd Gen. Migrants, Grids that Changed Crop post-1500 Back
Country of OriginMother Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 3.71*** 3.81*** 6.16*** 6.09*** 6.44*** 4.97** 4.85*(1.19) (1.30) (1.59) (1.63) (1.67) (2.42) (2.46)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.42 -0.25 0.39 0.94(1.58) (1.52) (1.45) (1.47)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) 0.14 -0.07 0.79(1.88) (2.28) (2.30)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 1.18 2.06 1.01(1.62) (1.63) (1.37)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 6.49*** 4.50**(1.70) (2.23)
Crop Yield Change (Ancestors, post-1500) -0.86 0.41(1.49) (1.47)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.28 0.22(1.86) (2.30)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (Anc., post-1500) 1.88 2.24(1.59) (1.62)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesSex & Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOther Ind. Chars. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolithic No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Sample No No No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 566 566 557
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation in Second Generation Migrants Back
Long-Term Orientation (weighted OLS)
All crops All cells Changing cells/crops
(Survey) (Nc ) (N) (Nm) (Survey) (Nc ) (N) (Nm) (Survey) (Nc ) (N) (Nm)
Yield (Ancestors) 7.10*** 15.24***12.16***9.29***(2.48) (3.25) (2.83) (3.42)
Growth Cycle (Anc.) -4.72* 1.46 0.05 4.58(2.43) (3.78) (3.25) (4.43)
Yield (Anc., pre) 7.03*** 15.24***12.29***11.88***(2.39) (2.54) (2.21) (2.86)
Yield Change (post) 0.87 0.50 0.33 -1.75(1.55) (2.61) (2.20) (1.94)
Growth Cycle (Anc., pre) -3.28 2.98 1.61 4.23(2.77) (4.25) (3.90) (4.93)
Growth Cycle Ch. (post) -1.70* 1.11 -0.04 1.34(0.98) (1.69) (1.41) (1.39)
Yield (Anc., pre) 6.38*** 9.39***8.18***8.25***(1.97) (2.68) (2.25) (2.24)
Yield Change (post) -1.46 0.92 0.38 -0.73(1.66) (2.74) (2.43) (2.27)
Growth Cycle (Anc., pre) -0.96 1.26 1.32 -0.45(2.27) (2.49) (2.31) (2.45)
Growth Cycle Ch. (post) 2.49 0.78 -0.70 -2.60(1.59) (1.97) (1.95) (1.95)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesAll Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.05 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.27
R2 0.13 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.13 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.33Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705
Additional Results WVS
World Values Survey Back
Data:
All waves of WVS
cross-national survey conducted every 4-5 years96 countrieswidely used in social research
Long-Term Orientation measure based preference for thrift inchildren
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 108 / 115
Additional Results WVS
Question Back
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouragedto learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be
especially important?”
Individual has LTO if mentioned “thrift, saving money and things”
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 109 / 115
Additional Results WVS
Question Back
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouragedto learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be
especially important?”
Individual has LTO if mentioned “thrift, saving money and things”
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference 109 / 115
Crop Yield and LTO (WVS) Back
Long-Term Orientation (Probit)
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Crop Yield (Anc., pre-1500) 0.022***
(0.001)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.030***
(0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (Anc., pre-1500) -0.000*
(0.000)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (Anc., post-1500) 0.002***
(0.000)
Wave & Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography & Neolithic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Chars No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Observations 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 176489
Pre-1500 Crop Yield and LTO (WVS) Back
Long-Term Orientation (OLS)
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.066***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -0.007** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.043***
(0.002)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.041***
(0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) -0.005*
(0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.018***
(0.002)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls & Neolithic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Old World Subsample No No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Observations 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 176489
Pre-1500 Crop Yield and LTO (WVS), Grids that Experienced Change in Crop post-1500 Back
Long-Term Orientation (OLS)
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.034***(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.036***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) 0.013*** 0.013***(0.002) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) -0.008*** -0.011***(0.001) (0.001)
Crop Yield (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.029***(0.002)
Crop Yield Change (Anc., post-1500) 0.028***(0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors, pre-1500) 0.014***(0.002)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (Anc., post-1500) -0.012***(0.001)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesContinent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolithic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesIndividual Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesOld World Subsample No No No No No No No YesAdjusted-R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05Observations 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 176489
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation (Weighted) Back
Long-Term Orientation (Weighted OLS)
All crops All cells Changing cells/crops
(No) (Survey) (Same N) (Pop) (No) (Survey) (Same N) (Pop) (No) (Survey) (Same N) (Pop)
Crop Yield (Ancestors) 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.015**(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Crop Growth Cycle (Ancestors) 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.046***(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Crop Yield (Anc., pre-1500) 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.021***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Crop Growth Cycle (Anc., pre-1500) -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 0.006(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Crop Yield Ch. (post-1500) 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.038***(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (post-1500) 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.033***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Yield (Anc., pre-1500) 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.033***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Crop Growth Cycle (Anc., pre-1500) 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.014*** -0.000(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Yield Ch. (post-1500) 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.026***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle Ch. (post-1500) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.007***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesContinent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesIndividual Chars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesGeographical Controls & Neolithic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesR2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07Adjusted-R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07Observations 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953 217953
Crop Yield and Long-Term Orientation (WVS Regional Analysis) Back
Long-Term Orientation (OLS)
Whole World Old World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crop Yield (pre-1500) 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.005* 0.055*** 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Crop Yield Change (post-1500) 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.006** 0.042*** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Crop Growth Cycle (pre-1500) -0.011*** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Crop Growth Cycle Change (post-1500) 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Wave & Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Individual Chars No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08
Observations 185659 185659 185659 185659 185659 185659 151299 151299