http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/The RFID Ecosystem Project

Studying Next GenerationRFID Applications in the Workplace

Evan Welbourne

University of Washington, CSEChips Ahoy?

The Legal Issues Associated with RFID in the WorkplaceMay 1, 2009 - Seattle, WA

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

PART 1: RFID and The RFID Ecosystem

PART 2: Current and Future Applications

PART 3: Security and Privacy Issues

+

Technical Protection Mechanisms

Outline

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Image credit: Tom Reese, The Seattle Times

PART ONE

Radio Frequency Identification

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

What is RFID?

Wireless ID and tracking

Captures information on: Identity Location Time

Unique identification

Passive (no batteries)

Reader

Tag

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Radio Frequency Identification

Wireless identification and tracking Information on:

Identity Location Time

tag time location

… … …

t 1 A

t 2 B

A B C

t 3 C

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

RFID Tags – A Wide Variety

Consumer Item Cases Pallets Trucks Ships / Trains

barcodes

passive tags

active tags

GPS-enabledactive tags

Cos

t of

tag

(loga

rithm

ic)

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Elements of an RFID System

RFID ReaderRFID Tags Reader Antenna

Network Infrastructure

Data ManagementSystem

Applications

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

The RFID Ecosystem 100s of passive EPC Gen 2 tags

100s of RFID antennas

85,000 sq ft (8,000 sq m) building

Simulating an RFID-saturated future

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

RFID Ecosystem at UW CSE

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

PART TWO:Current and Future RFID Applications

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location

Current trend: RFID in Hospitals

Track equipment, patients, personnel

Improve utilization, track workflows

Rapid progression in 2009: Feb 19: Awarepoint deploys RFID throughout 4 M sq. ft. Hospital Feb 26: Versus Tech. deploys RFID system at Virginia Mason Mar 4: St. Vincent Hospital deploys RFID workflow tracker Mar 9: St. John’s Deploys RFID to track child patients Mar 23: Good Samaritan tracks surgical instruments w/RFID Mar 24: Western Maryland Health deploys RFID tracking system Mar 25: RFID system for tracking patient files at Cleveland Clinic April 14: RFID vendor Reva Systems gets $5M in VC funding April 21: Greenville Hospital System tracks OR case carts Ongoing…

[ right middle and right bottom image credit: http://www.pcts.com ]

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location

Proposed in research: Infer higher-level events from data Business Intelligence Reminding Systems Social Networking

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

PART THREE

Security & Privacy Issues+

Technical Protection Mechanisms

Image credit: Karsten Nohl, from: OV-chipkaart Hack using polishing paper, a microscope and Matlab

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Many attacks:

Encryption can improve security but… Increases cost and power consumption, slows down read rate

-- to be useful, RFID tags have to be cheap and fast!

Physical security Foil-lined wallet: works, but you have to remove tag sometime

Skimming Cloning

Replay attack Eavesdropping

Ghost leech

Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID

Case Study: WA State Enhanced Driver’s License

DHS claims RFID “removes risk of cloning” Can be cloned easily in less than a second w/cheap device

Can be read more than 75 ft away

Sleeve doesn’t always work, worse when crumpled

# EDL Reads, Week of Apr 27th

Case study credit: Karl Koscher, Ari Juels, Tadayoshi Kohno, Vjekoslav Brajkovic

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Our approach in the RFID Ecosystem:

1) Store little on tags, secure link between the tag ID and PII

2) Incorporate cryptographic techniques as they emerge

Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Who owns collected data?

Who has access to it? Modes of information disclosure: Institutional

Organization collects, uses, and potentially shares personal data Addressed by contracts, federal law, corporate practice (e.g. FIPs)

Peer-to-Peer or “Mediated” Peers and superiors access data through some authorized channel Mediated by access control policies

Malicious Personal data is compromised by unauthorized parties Addressed by secure systems engineering

Issue: Data Access & Ownership

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Our approach: “Physical Access Control Policy”

Each user has a personal view of the data

Each user has access to only those historical events thatoccurred when and where s/he was physically present

Models line-of-sight, augments memory

Other “context-aware” policies are possible:

“Only reveal my location during business hours”

“Only reveal my activity when I am in a meeting”

Issue: Data Access & Ownership

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Issue: Uncertainty of RFID Data

1) In practice, RFID tags are often missed by readers Data cleaning algorithms are commonly applied

2) Further, apps need high-level information from smoothed data Event detection and data mining algorithms applied

But there is always a “sensory gap” between what actually occurs, what is sensed and what is inferred from the data.

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Issue: Uncertainty of RFID Data

Our approach: Directly represent uncertainty with probabilistic datae.g. “Bob could be in his office (p = 0.5), the lounge (p = 0.1), or next door (p = 0.4)”

Problem: probabilistic data is huge; and compressed by throwing away less likely possibilities.

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Main Takeaways

1) Use what security the technology provides Should improve with time

2) Verify implementation meets security/privacy claims

3) Access control can help enforce a policy framework

Novel, context-aware access controls are a possibility

4) RFID data and higher-level info inferred from it probably should not be considered actionable

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Thanks

Thank you!

Check out our blog:http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/blog/

Follow us on Twitter! http://twitter.com/rfid_ecosystem

See publications for details: http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/publications.html

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Backup Slides

Backup Slides…

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Privacy & Security Discussion…

Just having an RFID tag could be a privacy risk

Pseudonymity not Anonymity Each RFID tag you carry has a unique number Sequential readings of your tags create a trace Over time this trace can be used to identify you-“The person who: wears this sweater, takes this bus, uses this bus stop, shops at this grocery, …”

U.S. privacy law doesn’t consider these traces to be PII European and Canadian law may handle this better

Important to discuss these issues RFID is increasingly ubiquitous, may be in the REAL ID cards

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Security of Tags and Readers

Promise: Provides a faster, easier payment option

Problem: Name, #, expiration sent as plaintext

$150 homemade device can steal and replay credit cards

Next generation of cards includes better security

Promise: Faster border-crossings, improved security

Problem: Identity, nationality sent in the clear

Malicious parties can easily identify / target U.S. citizens

Revised passport includes faraday shielding and BAC

First generation RFID credit card vulnerabilities (UMass Amherst, RSA labs)

Security and Privacy Risks of the U.S. e-Passport (UC Berkeley)

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Data Privacy and Security

RFID and Contactless Smart Card Transit Fare Payment

Promise: Streamlines transit experience and book keeping

Problem: Massive databases with transit traces of individuals

Not entirely clear what data is private and how it can be used

Oyster card data is the new law enforcement tool in London

Increasing # of requests for Oyster data: 4 in all of 2004 61 in Jan. 2007

ORCA Card: RFID-Based Transit Card for Seattle Area (August 2008)

Promise: Streamlines transit experience and book keeping Integrated with easy pay and institutional partners

Problem: The word “privacy” appears twice in 500 pages of docs…

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

Data Privacy and Security

From RFID Ecosystem user studies: “How do I know if I have a tag on me?”, “How do I opt out?” Users must be carefully educated before consenting There should be equal, available alternatives to the RFID option

If personal RFID data is stored:

Clearly define how each piece of information can and will be used

Define and enforce appropriate access control policies• May depend on user, application, and context of use (PAC)

Formal data privacy techniques to further ensure privacy (K-anonymity)• Store only the information you need, and add noise!

Provide users with direct access to and control of their data

http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

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http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/

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