how tough should you be inflation targeting, fiscal feedbacks, and multiple equilibria alexandre...
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How tough should you beInflation targeting, fiscal feedbacks, and multiple equilibria
Alexandre Schwartsman
Unibanco
The model structure
Model consists of 2 blocks
The reaction function block
A “minimalist” inflation targeting model
1. Phillips Curve
2. “IS” function
3. Loss function
The fiscal/arbitrage block
Explicit modeling of:
1. Arbitrage between sovereign and risk –free debt instruments
2. Relationship between domestic interest rates, fiscal policy and
probability of default
Transmission mechanisms and efficacy usually
associated to parameters
The reaction function block - 1
Phillips curve
“IS” function
Loss function
ttttt ey 1
ttttt rEiy
0
2
nnt
ntEL
The reaction function block - 2
Modeling the exchange rate requires 2 assumptions
Uncovered interest parity
Mean reversal
Thus, the current exchange rate behavior is given by
*1 ttt iie
11 tt eee
ttt iie *
The reaction function block - 3
Reduced form for the Central Bank’s reaction function
11
* )( tttt
iri
i TR
i*
The fiscal/arbitrage block
Assume 2 other assets, in addition to the local bond
Risk-free bond with yield iUS
Risky sovereign bond with yield i*
Risk neutral agents equate expected return
where (1-) is the probability of default
USii *
Modeling the default risk - 1
1. Primary surplus is random variable with support [sL, sH]
2. Default rule: if primary surplus is higher than real debt service [s (i-)b], pay; otherwise total default
Zero probability of default
100% probability of default
0)( 1 tLL bissP 1t
LL b
si
1)( 1 tHH bissP 1t
HH b
si
Modeling the default risk - 2
Repayment probability can be expressed as a function of domestic interest rate
0)(;0)(
;0)(
;1)(
iiiii
iii
iii
HL
H
L
(i)
"<0
" = 0
iL iH i
Arbitrage
The arbitrage equation then becomes
USiii )(* )( *ii
0)(
)(*
ii
i
02*
2*
i
i
*lim iHii
LUS iiii ;*
iiH
SS
iL
iUS i*
Multiple equilibria and stability
i TRiH
iBAD SSB
iGOOD A
iL
iUS i*GOOD i* i*BAD
i TRiH
SSB
A
iL
iUS i*
Comparison to standard case
Interest rates are higher than in standard case (exogenous i*)
Fiscal feedback reduces efficiency of monetary policy instrument
i
SS (standard) TR
i*iUS
SS (feedback)
Comparative staticsi TRiHiH' SS
B SS'B'
A'A
iLiL'
iUS i*
i TRiH
SSB
A'A
iLSS'
iUS iUS ' i*
TR'i TRiH
B' SSB SS'
A'
A
iL
iUS i*
TR'i TRiH
B' SSB SS'
A'
A
iL
iUS i*
Fiscal policy Risk-free rate
ShocksUsual
transmission channels
Existence
For simplicity assume primary surplus uniformly distributed
H
L
HLLH
H
iii
iii
iiiii
iii
;0)(
;1)(
;)(
USLHtt
H
iiiri 4
)(2
11 c
1
11)(2
t
HttUS
LHc
b
sriii
Implication of inflation “floor”Setting the inflation target below the critical
threshold implies no possible equilibrium
i TRiH
SS
iL
iUS i*
Determinants of inflation “floor”
Inflation floor depends essentially on 3 determinants
1. Primary surpluses2. Public debt
3. Size of supply and demand shocks
1
11)(2
t
HttUS
LHc
b
sriii
Unstable equilibrium properties
“Bad” equilibrium associated to weaker currency due to higher interest rate
differential
i TRiH
iBAD SSB
iGOOD A
iL
iUS i*GOOD i* i*BAD
Bizarre shock responses
Responses to fiscal policy and shocks at odd with the data
i TRiHiH' SS
B SS'B'
A'A
iLiL'
iUS i*
TR'i TRiH
B' SSB SS'
A'
A
iL
iUS i*
Saddlepath properties?
Model does not have saddlepath properties, that is, Central Bank behavior is myopic
(converges to stable equilibrium)
If Central Bank were to choose the equilibrium, why would it choose the “bad” one?
i TRiH
SSB
A
iL
iUS i*
Extension
Possibility of further equilibria, depending on primary surplus distribution (if second order
condition fails)Stable high-interest rate equilibrium (C)
i
C TR
SSB
A
i*iUS
Concluding remarks
1. Multiple equilibria, at least in this setting, do not seem to be the cause behind high real interest rate
2. Fiscal feedbacks, nonetheless, imply higher interest rates than standard exogenous interest rate case
3. Feedbacks depend on sensitivity of default likelihood to domestic interest rates, which is an empirical issue. Other forces may be at work (global “risk aversion”)
4. Future direction of research: Central Bank reaction when output gap enters loss function; possibility of further equilibria depending on the primary surplus distribution