how codecision between council and european parliament is affecting cap reform june 2013
DESCRIPTION
TRANSCRIPT
HOW CO‐DECISION IS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE CAP NEGOTIATIONS
Alan Matthews
Trinity College Dublin
Presentation to the AIEAA, 2nd Annual Conference June 6‐7 2013, Parma
Introduction
Political negotiations on the CAP reform between Council, Parliament and Commission continue at the time of this presentation
Thus, how co-decision has affected CAP outcome cannot yet be answered
Instead, this presentation highlights a number of relevant issues for future research
Literature
Both theoretical and descriptive literature on how institutional rules influence EU agricultural policy making
Runge and von Witzke (1987), Pokrivcak, de Gorter and Swinnen (2001), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2008), Crombez and Swinnen (2011)
Blumann (2008), Geuguen and Marissen (2012) Arovuori and Niemi (2009), Greer and Hind
(2012), Swinnen and Knops (2012)
Co-decision (‘Ordinary legislative procedure’)
Parliament gained co-decision powers over many policy domains (not CAP) in Maastricht Treaty 1993
Co-decision introduced into the CAP by the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 Except Art 43(3) – fixing prices, levies, aid and
quantitative limitations Formal process includes first reading, second reading,
conciliation Then delegated and implementing acts, implementation by
member states Strong preference for first reading agreement
(possibility introduced by Amsterdam Treaty in 1999) highlights the importance of the trilogue process
What are implications for CAP reform of EP involvement?
What are implications of EP involvement?
How much influence? (potentially measured by number of EP amendments incorporated into final legislation)
What kind of influence? (has EP supported or constrained CAP reform?)
Who determines EP influence? (within the EP, what is role of parties, committees, Presidency, national interests of individual MEPs?)
The struggle for influence (potential for contested ‘constitutional’ issues with the Council to influence the CAP reform outcome, both substance and timing)
Implications for Commission’s influence (has co-decision weakened role of Commission as ‘agenda setter’? (Greer and Hind, 2012; Crombez and Swinnen, 2011)
What can we expect from co-decision?
Political science literature Surveys experience across multiple dossiers Literature finds that co-decision increased Parliament’s
powers vis a vis the Council No previous studies have examined EP’s role in the CAP
(Greer and Hind, 2012) Spatial models of decision-making (Crombez
and Swinnen, 2011) explain policy outcomes as a function of legislative
procedures, the preferences of the political actors and the location of the status quo
Are not predictive models without knowing EP preferences
Preference for first reading agreement highlights importance of trilogue process
Trilogue
Political agreement
EP mandate
Council general position
Resort to conciliation committees has decreased from 39% in 1993-1999 to
only 4% in 2009- 2011 while first readings have increased
from 28% in 1999-2004 to 78% in 2009-2011.
Co-decision process
First reading procedure
Further implications of trilogues
Early trilogues avoid the ‘race against the clock’ which starts ticking once first reading is completed
Greater flexibility in appointing members to trilogues Refers especially to EP where sometimes political group leaders
become involved in addition to committee rapporteurs and chairs Unlike conciliation where the committee can only discuss
amendments previously made by either the EP or the Council, trilogues allow committee members to introduce completely new amendments to proposals and then to offer the compromise text for a single vote in each chamber
Members of trilogue negotiations have considerable flexibility in determining the outcome of legislation which is then voted on up-down basis by the two bodies
Implications of changes in formal procedures
Consultation procedure (EP opinion) Commission proposes policy. MS can propose amendments.
Amendments need unanimity for adoption. Council votes on (amended) proposal by QVM.
Co-decision procedure Commission proposes policy. EP can propose amendments (1st
reading). Commission can decide to include in its proposal. Council decides on (amended) proposal with QMV, unanimity required for amendments (1st reading)
2nd reading – similar to 1st Conciliation committee – Council and EP can jointly amend
Commission’s proposal in a ‘joint text’ Commission loses much of its formal influence, especially
in CC Trilogue process introduces conciliation prior to 1st reading
Parallelism with MFF negotiations
CAP reform and CAP budget are being decided simultaneously
Lisbon Treaty gave EP enhanced powers in MFF negotiations, but not co-decision
Two issues EP has linked timing of CAP agreement to MFF agreement this issue defused by the very limited cuts to CAP budget in
the European Council conclusions but could still delay final ratification of CAP agreement
MFF agreement extended to key parameters in the CAP debate
European Council MFF positions incorporated into Agricultural Council general position – what role for co-decision for these paragraphs?
Next slide shows the overlap between MFF and CAP negotiations
CAP issues in European Council agreement (adopted into Ag Council general position) Overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 2, including
specific ceilings for direct payments Level and model for redistribution of direct support – details of
convergence across Member States The model for capping support to large farms - voluntary Method for financial discipline Allocation of 30% of Pillar 1 payments to greening Recommendation that EFAs will be implemented in ways that do not
take land out of production and that avoid unjustified income losses to farmers
Flexibility between pillars Principles for allocation of rural development support, including
‘sweets’ Co-financing rates for rural development support Operation of the crisis reserve Introduces macro-economic conditionality in deciding on the release of
EAFRD rural development funds (as well as for the structural and cohesion funds) as part of Common Strategic Framework regulation
The co-decision process to date – lengthy, messy but working!
EP Resolution on Lyon Report July 2010 to influence Commission’s consultation paper in November 2010
EP Resolution on Dess Report June 2011 responded to Commission’s consultation paper Dess draft report heavily amended in COMAGRI COMAGRI report strongly backed by Parliament plenary
COMAGRI rapporteurs’ reports responded to Commission’s legislative proposals October 2011 Over 7,000 amendments to Commission proposals reduced to
smaller number of consolidated amendments The Parliament’s mandate March 2013
Largely backed COMAGRI amendments Confusion over greening amendments
The Agricultural Council’s general position March 2013 Evidence that Presidency incorporated EP’s text where there was
no substantive disagreement
The Parliament’s position on CAP reform(dimensions of market orientation, targeting, subsidiarity, simplification)Example Direct Payments regulation
Art Issue Pro Con
9 Active farmer – negative list approach x
18 Payment entitlements – allow SAPS to continue
x
22 Flexibility in internal convergence x
28(a) Complementary payment for first hectares x
29 Flexibility wrt greening measures C
30 Crop diversification x? x?
31 Maintenance of permanent pasture x? x?
32 Ecological focus areas x
33 Mandatory payment to young farmers x
38-9 Voluntary coupled support x
C implies EP position agrees with Commission proposal, which in turn is placed in Pro or Con columns
‘Constitutional’ issues
Distribution of powers between Council and EP post-Lisbon still to be clarified Article 43(3) exceptions on fixing prices, levies, aid and
quantitative limitations Choice between delegated and implementing acts
Council and Parliament failed to reach agreement on Commission 2010 proposals on alignment of CAP regulations with Lisbon Treaty provisions
EP favours greater use of delegated acts, Council favours more use of implementing acts where MS exercise influence through comitology
Contested ‘constitutional’ issues may yet complicate completion of CAP2020 negotiations
Co-decision and Commission’s role Commission’s power of initiative determined by:
power to propose power to amend power to withdraw a proposal
The CAP2020 experience Initial proposal based on most extensive consultation process
yet Cautious initial proposal – result of Commissioner preferences
or realistic assessment of what might be possible to achieve? Commission has lost ability to control legislation
EP proposal to introduce milk supply control measures Council proposal on approximation for internal convergence From ‘co-participant’ to ‘honest broker’ Mandate must be renewed as negotiations proceed
Discussion
Co-decision has given the EP greater influence Evidence of EP positions influencing the Council legislative
track Outcome of trilogue process will shift Council/Commission
positions on at least some issues EP influence has largely pulled CAP2020 reform in a
backward direction The critical role played by COMAGRI Question mark over administrative and technical resources
Disagreements on constitutional issues could provide unexpected last-minute sticking point for EP agreement
What happens if no political agreement in June?