holistic science 4 the wood or the trees

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HOLISTIC SCIENCE

A Tapestry of Essays

by

Robin Wilding

The Wood or the Trees

The scientist is like a late night drunk looking for his car keys under a lamp post. When a helpful policeman

asks him whether he is sure he dropped them near the lamp post, the drunk replies, “No, but this is the only

place there is any light”.

Anonymous

Nature’s Laws

The search for understanding the world, both around and within us has a long history. When

we can find a pattern in events and attribute them all to the same cause it brings a satisfying

order to our lives. For example, the start of a new cycle of growth in woods and fields is simply

understood to be caused by Spring, the thaw after winter. When one observation can be

explained in general terms which also explains many other similar observations, that

generalisation has been called a “law”. Spring is just one of Nature’s Laws’. The order imposed

by this law is maintained by some person, perhaps God or Mother Nature and is therefore

stable, fixed and dependable. It holds promises of other laws out there, perhaps yet to be

discovered.

But such laws as we think we find, are of our own construction. Generalisations are not

concrete laws, they are our best efforts to explain events and subject at any time to being

revised or even replaced. Yet many scientists are drawn towards the idea of a Law for

Everything. It would be a law of all laws, a higher level, all embracing law which like a

commandment, prescribes what can happen in the universe. The appeal of a single overarching

law of everything is not that far, in mind set, from the appeal of a single God, Lord of

everybody. Both are authoritative, final and may be written in stone.

We have seen in Chapter 1 how the foundations of science are rooted in those of

religion. The belief in the scientific method shines through with evangelical zeal in the writings

of Peter Atkins. “Scientist, with their implicit trust in reductionism, are privileged to be at the

summit of knowledge and to see further into the truth than any of their contemporaries... Poets

merely entertain self deception.... and theologians have contaminated truth and wasted the time



Holistic Science 4 The Wood or the Trees of 22

of those who wish to understand the world.” He continues to claim that physics and chemistry

are able to answer, at the deepest level, all questions that could arise in any enquiry. We may be

consoled to read on, that this does not mean we will “exterminate history, law and so on ... We

need recourse to these more superficial domains because the deeper scientific account wouldbe too cumbersome for daily use”. This is an extreme example of faith in the existence of

rational law whose fundamental nature will be revealed only by fundamental reductionist

processes.

Discovery by induction

The scientific method for establishing “best-explanations” was given several particular

refinements by Francis Bacon. He believed that knowledge had to be worked for. It was not

there lying about waiting to be noticed. One had to devise conditions which would allow

observations to be carefully recorded. Bacon promoted the scientific experiment, which sets

out to answer a particular question. The question needs to take us beyond our current

knowledge but it also has to be within range of an answer. The crucial refinement attributed to

Bacon is to require that from many observations of each experiment, a logical process of

reasoning will induce a generalisation, an overall understanding of process, perhaps even a law

governing all such processes. The induction of a generalisation from many observations has

become the foundation upon which modern science claims to be based.

Induction applied

Imagine that a new analgesic (pain killer) has been produced by adding codeine to aspirin, and

we want to test whether the combination tablet is really any better than aspirin alone. We could

observe volunteer patients with toothache taking either one of the two tablets ( aspirin or

aspirin plus codeine). We could watch carefully and get a feeling or even speculate on what is

probably the better analgesic. If there were a group of us we might find opinion was divided,

our competitive instincts might arise and our voices become raised in debate or even argument.

Some might claim that they have evidence of having actually witnessed the dramatic

improvement after taking a particular tablet. This is what is called “anecdotal evidence” and it is

very weak. Recall how damaging and widespread the practice of blood letting was, no doubt




supported by highly reputable practitioners with years worth of anecdotes and loud confident

voices.

Bacon insisted that feelings and personal experiences were to be “disciplined” and set aside.

Induction requires that first of all we are evenly prepared for either result. We do not bring anyprejudice to the trial. We will have to ask for volunteers and explain the procedures. We have to

devise some measurements of the reduction in pain achieved by each analgesic. Pain is difficult

to measure but we will have to do our best. A ten point scale (0 is no pain and 10 is unbearable)

might be used or even a visual analogue scale ( the patient marks a point on a line which

represents no pain at one end and unbearable pain at the other. We can now actually measure

the pain in millimeters!) We will want to set up a clinical trial on a group of patients who have

similar levels of pain. There has to be some control with which to compare the new drug, so

some of the patients need to be given an analgesic whose effectiveness is known, or better still,

a tablet with no active ingredient at all. This is called a placebo and it is a very important

component of all experiments to test drugs. The reason is that as much as 40 percent of the

patients who receive a placebo will report a reduction in pain. This is not because they are

having “imagined” pain, as all pain is real, but because pain is a complex experience and even

the promise of its control brings relief. It is also essential that patients are not told whether they

are to receive a placebo or a tablet containing the active ingredient. We will want to keep the

manufacturers of this new analgesic at arms length during the assessment, certainly they should

not interview the patients. The allocation of active tablet and placebo must be made in a

randomised way and not by selection.. We will have to arrange that patients report their

experience of pain relief to someone who does not know which tablet they received. Such a

trial is therefore is known as random and double blind, as both the patient and reporting

clinician are “blind” to the “code” of who has an active tablet. All the information must be

decoded, listed and compressed using statistical methods to discover whether any slight

differences might be due to chance or are can be confidently attributed to differences in the

analgesic. This attempt to avoid bias, may seem very long winded and unnecessarily pedantic.

But it is clearly crucial to discovering the real influence of treatments. A recent survey by Ernst

and White, of published clinical trials which tested the analgesic power of acupuncture in

comparison with controls revealed the value of double blind trials. Those published trials which




were not randomised and blind, over estimated the effect of acupuncture.

This example serves to validate the process of careful method in teasing out the influence of a

single factor on a complex process. Scientific method is a well proven approach to getting

reliable answers to questions of this sort where we want to make accurate comparisons. Beforewe look at the shadows around this process of induction, it has to be said that this method has

been found to be extremely successful, and in the particular example given, nothing less would

be appropriate if we wanted to get close to the truth about the comparative effect of those two

tablets.

But there is a shadow cast by this approach to pain relief that is the result of objective

measurements. In reducing pain to some “thing” we can measure, we reinforce a perception

that pain is a predictable sensory response to tissue damage. This reduction brings with it the

expectation that there is a linear chain of causes which determine events. Unfortunately pain is

not a linear process. Sometimes tissue damage causes no pain and sometimes pain is

experienced without any sign of tissue damage. Many factors converge to produce pain, such

as past experience, cultural attitudes, levels of understanding, anxiety or fear, meaning,

emotions and so on. Those rather fuzzy, difficult to measure factors are less often the subject

of research. I am not suggesting that they bias the results of our random study , there are in fact

one of the main reasons such studies have to be randomised. But those less measurable

influences on pain, such as emotions, may be the most important to identify and control.

Clearly if I have a dental abscess I want appropriate treatment which may be an antibiotic and

drainage of the abscess. There is no call for a psychologist. Chronic pain however is a different

matter. Drugs and surgery are not that effective. We want to spend more effort in

understanding the influence of depression, stress, anger, despair, all of which have profound

influences in stirring up the whole pain process. We need to see pain as the subjective

experience of a network of interacting agents, rather than a linear chain of causal links (Fig 3.1).

It is difficult to design studies which have to contend with many interactive agents which are

each difficult to measure. A research project which sets out to test one quantifiable variable is

easier to plan and more likely to yield results. We tend, as the drunk in the metaphor which

starts this chapter, to look where the light is best.




Is inductive method a myth?

When we look for evidence to support inductive method in science there are some surprises.

Great discoveries have not happened through logical induction of evidence. Brian Magee gives

a lucid account of the impact Karl Popper had on scientific method. Popper argued that

scientists set up experiments that are already well soaked in theory, their own and those of

others. It is hunches, dreams, criticisms of prevailing theories, accidental experiments, in fact a

host of unpredictable and complex interactions, which are responsible for the fresh theories

that have challenged the old successfully. Observations cannot be made without some desire,

reason and meaning attached to them.

Peter Medawar recalls the extraordinary dedication to detailed observation of the anatomist

William Harvey. Harvey had all the well dissected evidence before him, yet he dismissed the




idea that the ovaries might be involved in conception, because he believed something else. He

believed Aristotle, who was sure that the egg was a product of the male seed. Careful

observation does not imply faultless interpretation or take the place of belief.

Gunther Stent recalls the upset caused by James Watson’s frank account of the discovery thatDNA is a double helix. One of the many reviewers of Watson’s book was the well known

Jacob Bronowski who wrote ” It (the book) brings home ....how the scientific method really

works.. we invent a model and then test its consequences... it is imagination and realism which

constitute induction”. But invention and imagination are not supposed tp be part of the

admissible method. Stent remarks that there were serious objections to Watson’s

embarrassingly honest account of his discovery. There were those who thought that young

scientists would be lead astray by it and put off by the maneuvering and ruthless elbowing

aside of potential competitors that was revealed as part of the process of scicence.

Popper and falsifiability

The orthodox scientific method of induction has had detractors for other reasons. Karl Popper

was determined that no matter how many observations you could make, you could not account

for the one that was yet to be made which might not fit the pattern. No matter how many

swans you might have counted were white, that does not prove that all swans are white. And

in this instance he was right. The extension of this argument goes on to claim that scientists

cannot claim anything to be true. They can however prove a statement is false. This nicety is

seen as little more than a philosophical game by many scientists who argue that inductive

science has produced a never ending stream of useful and predictable “laws” which nature

seems to obey. Nevertheless a tradition in publishing an experiment is to propose what is

referred to as a null hypothesis. This asserts, before the experiment has begun, that for

example, there is no difference between the analgesic effect of the two tablets we tested. Only if

the results show that the relationship is beyond the odds of probabilities is it permissible to

conclude that the null hypothesis was wrong. This rather tortuous procedure may seem

academic but it has deep significance. It holds science to the contract that any law or

generalisation must be falsifiable to be considered scientific. The null hypothesis must be in

place so as to provide for the possibility that any proposed relationship is indeed not entirely or




always true. Scientific laws must be testable. Popper advised that we formulate our laws in

such a way as to make them readily refutable. The refutation of a law provokes the question

why? If water does not always boil at 100 degrees centigrade why is this?. A further search for

the influence of altitude, or air pressure, forces the observer to develop a new law, and even abetter understanding of what boiling really is. So the process of theory and refutation is a

dynamic one which leads to an evolution of understanding.

Knowledge is not static and fixed. The more daring and fragile the theory the more likely our

knowledge center moves. Knowledge is like a swarm of bees moving slowly across the land.

There are many scouts flying far from the main mass of bees. Some of the scouts will be left

behind, others have moved to one side and will be lost. Some scouts are in a direction that the

main swarm will eventually follow, but until they do it is not possible to say which scouts are in

front, as the swarm does not move in a straight line.

But all human enterprise tends to reduce abundance, to compress and select, otherwise we

could not survive the continual onslaught reaching our senses. This is why, according to

Feyerabend (interviewed by John Horgan) any description of reality is hopelessly inadequate

as it has been reduced and filtered out the way that suits us.

Reduction; from the wood to the trees

Roger Penrose explains that reductionism is about breaking things down into smaller and

smaller parts so that if you understand how the small parts work you will be able to infer or

construct how the whole works. If the process you are observing is a mechanism it is justifiable

to extend this reduction to conclude that the whole is governed by its parts. That the parts

determine the whole. The position of the hands of a clock can be accurately determined if we

know the details of each cog and spring in the mechanisms. But there are other physical

mechanisms which defy such predictions from a knowledge of the parts. A driven pendulum

obeys all the laws of physics and has quite measurable mechanical components. But its

behavior may be completely unpredictable. I will review this process which has been called

deterministic chaos in a later chapter.

This approach to understanding which reduces the world around us to its smallest operating

bits, has its origins in Atomism, an idea put forward by Galileo who suggested that there were




tiny basic corpuscular element particles upon which all matter was based.. Descarte

consolidated the expectation that life could be reduced to it basic mechanical components. As

we have just found, a clock can be adequately described as the collective action of all its bits

and pieces. This view is represented in today’s orthodox science by those who believe thatgenes are the fundamental units of life and determine how the entire organism operates. We

will return to the topic of reduction in biology and neuroscience after a short description of

inter theoretic reduction.

Paul and Patricia Churchland point out that reductionism may also refer to the process of

making one more general theory form a number of smaller ones. An early example of inter-

theoretic reduction was the reduction by Isaac Newton of Kepler’s three laws of astronomical

motion. Newton’s laws of motion not only held good for Kepler’s’ laws but applied more

generally to all bodies in motion. Thus astronomical motion turned out to be a special case of

the inertial and force-governed motions of massive bodies in general.

Another successful application of the reductive process is the more fundamental understanding

of chemistry provided by atomic physics. The concept of successive electron shells around the

atom and the character of stable patterns of electron sharing allowed the systematic

understanding of many atomic elements, the laws of valence bonding and the gross structure of

the periodic table. So these laws of electron distribution condensed and accounted for a

number of laws of chemistry. The variety of chemical compounds is however almost endless

and it cannot all be predicted or reconstructed, except in the most basic way in quantum

mechanical terms.

While these examples are testimony to the triumph of reductionism, and trumpeted by Peter

Atkins, the process is not invariably successful. Success appear to be most likely in physics but

even in that realm many attempts at inter-theoretic reduction have failed. Philip Anderson, a

physicist and founder of the Santa Fe Institute, was interviewed by John Horgan. Anderson

believes that particle physics has a limited capacity to explain the world. Reality he claims, has

a hierarchical structure. At each stage new concepts and generalizations are required.

Psychology is not applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry. He agrees with the

biologist Stephen Jay Gould that life is shaped by unpredictable circumstances. He is not

enthusiastic about finding a theory which will explain everything; “.... when one understands




Figure 3.2 The impossible triangle

The fixation with “things” rather than process

Some biologists want to

reduce living organisms to

their smallest operational

units, genes. They are as

Brian Goodwin puts it

“genocentric”, meaning

that they hold (quite

wrongly according to

Goodwin) that the gene as

the essential, most

fundamental cause for an

organisms being what it is.




Genes are codes for building molecules, some of which are enzymes which control the

behavior of each cell. Other molecules are proteins which determine the structure and form of

each cell. The reductionists scale this process up, from cells to tissue, from tissue to organs and

thence to the entire organism. They make causal chains between the genes and the structureand function of entire organism. One of the proponents of this process is Richard Dwarkins. In

addition to believing that genes are the fundamental determinants of organisms, Dawkin

suggests that organisms are fated to carry their genes, as though little more than convenient

transport, from one generation to the next. The driving force in the diversity of all life is that

genes are selfish; their strategy is simply to make more of themselves and survive. The

anthropomorphic language in this metaphor of selfishness is clear. Holmes Rolston asks, what

choice does a gene have to be anything but what it is? Against whom or what is it selfish? A

gene works in collaboration within a network, or to use the favoured human narrative, it works

within a team. The genes for mitochondria code for producing power. Other genes code for

enzymes which control the use of this power. Most enzymes are formed from more than one

gene. Most metabolic pathways are controlled by a variety of enzymes. Where, asks Rolston,

in this symphony of activity does the individual gene apply its “selfishness”? The idea make no

biological sense at all, yet it is widely popular, in spite of adequate evidence that biological

processes are neither linear nor deterministic.

There are less fundamental objections to this gradual march of progress by selfish genes to

more effective and successful genes. Steven Jay Gould does not accept the idea of progress or

inevitability implicit in Dawkin theory. He also does not believe that genes determine the

characteristics of an organism. He has attacked the use of genetic determinism as a quasi -

scientific argument to support categorisation of humanity by race or intelligence.

The prevailing view of evolution, Neo-Darwinism, is based on mathematical explanations for

the way in which organisms evolve.. The precepts are that discrete genes act independently and

that their interactions determine the characteristics of the organism that are selected by

environmental pressures. Changes in gene structure, so called mutations are held responsible

for changes in the fitness of the organisms to adapt to its niche. The fittest survive to the next

generation and carry the mutant gene. This theory is attractive as it is reduced enough to be free

of uncertainty and gives credibility to efforts at genetic engineering in order to alter the




organism. Yet it relegates the role of the environment to some fixed niche to which the

organisms either fits itself (adapts) or dies. Richard Lewontin points out that organisms, like the

nitrogen fixing soil bacteria have co-constructed an environment with the leguminous plants.

The plant develops root nodules to house and protect the bacteria which provide the plant withnitrates. Neither the plant’s nor the bacteria’s genes have acted independently. Biology is rich

with examples of cooperation between different species to create a suitable environment for

both. Are all examples of cooperation the result of just the right and simultaneous random

mutation of genes in the members of the cooperate? Or is a set of genes in an organism not as

deterministic as reductionist biologist would have? Is a genotype flexible enough to allow

variations in response to changes in its environment? Lewontin explains that the behavior of

different strains of the plant Achillia in different geographic elevations is not predictable. One

strain will do better at higher altitudes than another. We cannot identify an outright “best”

strain but have to represent the performance of each strain at each elevation as a graph called a

“norm of reaction”.

In passing, it is interesting to compare the norm of reaction of transgenic plants with wild

varieties. While the transgenics do exceptionally well in the climate for which they were

developed, they have a very poor yield in different climates. The wild varieties have a flatter

norm of reaction plot indicating that while they may not do as well as the highest yield of

transgenic plants they do fairly well over a wide range of environments. From the evidence

provided by norms of reaction, Richard Lewontin concludes that a genotype does not specify

or determine a unique outcome, rather it specifies a norm of reaction.

Brian Goodwin came to similar conclusions though for different reasons. Goodwin explains

that the crucial stages of development of form, such as the arrangement of leaves around the

stem of a plant, is the result of a process of symmetry breaking in a morphogenic field and is

not a gene-orchestrated process. There are not an infinite number of ways a leaf can arrange

itself around a stem. By far the most common way is regular spiral with a highly constant angle

between each leaf. Less common is an opposite arrangement. Those two forms, spiral and

distichious constitute over 90% of all leaf stem arrangements. Goodwin calls these two forms

generic as they define two major groups. There are other examples of generic patterns in life

such as the limbs of all four legged animals. All tetrapod limbs such as a human forearm or a




birds wing are variations of a pattern which typically starts with one bone (the upper arm)

connected to two bones (the fore arm) which are connected to a group of small bones (the

wrist) to which are connected up to five multi-boned “fingers”. Random mutations do not

explain these limited generic forms in plants and tetrapods. Genes do not control morphologybut they do cooperate in setting the conditions in which a small variety of generic patterns can

be produced.

Goodwin recognises a cultural influence on science, which encourages the adoption of

explanations which offer a predictable cause for natural events. Biology has suffered from the

Darwinian reliance on historical events to explain current process. The historical explanation,

that organism are variations of ancestral forms tells us nothing of the process which is involved

in the emergence of form. Neither does the historical explanation allow us to see the functional

unity within the diversity of forms. Goodwin credits the 18th century poet Goethe with the

insight in recognising that the parts of a flowering plants are variations on the theme of a leaf.

Mae -Wan Ho points out that only a capitalist society obsessed with material “things” would

prefer to see nature dependent on objects like genes rather than on processes of life. Things can

be altered, preserved and exploited.

The rejection of a reductionist approach to biology, life and nature is felt by many ordinary

people who are not biologists nor mystics. They simply do not find the a mechanistic view

provides a full enough account of what our senses conclude is being over simplified. That there

is a raft of respected biologists who have come to the same conclusion adds to that intuition.

Though of his critics, Dawkin response to John Horgan’s question was “ Obviously I have not

made myself sufficiently clear”.

The underlying biology which supported Neo Darwinism was the certainty that genetic

information was a one way flow, from gene to protein production to organisms activity. It

excluded and even ridiculed the possibility that the experience of an organism during its life,

could alter its genes and so be transmitted to the next generation. Dawkin unwisely promised

(in John Horgan p118) that he would eat his hat if it were ever shown that information could be

backward coded into a gene.

Mae Wan Ho reviews the recent advances in genetic research which suggests that Dawkin may

regret this promise. Not only does a reverse flow of information which alters gene structure




occur but it is a necessary process in adapting the genome to environmental changes. Genetic

changes in cells at the growing tips of plants have been found to occur uniformly and

simultaneously in response to different fertilizers and herbicides. These genetic changes are

readily passed onto the next generation.Furthermore the expression of a gene’s information does not lead in a linear way to some

predictable quality of structure or behavior. Most genes in fact do not carry information to

synthesise a structural molecule but act instead as inhibitors or facilitators to other genes which

do. Furthermore each gene has to be built up from a number of separate segments. The exact

order of these spliced segments can be varied to produce slightly different proteins. Splicing of

multiple genes in varying sequences also occurs and is a process essential in the synthesis of a

wide variety of antibody proteins. There are so many shapes and sizes that a reasonable match

can be found against a foreign protein or antigen. The cell which produced the first good match

is selectively stimulated to multiply and generate a clone of cells all producing this antibody.

We have Edelman to thank for discovering this process. The selection of the best match

antibody does not end here. In the later stages of the immune response, there is a process of

“directed hyper mutation”. This involves changes in the antibody -binding region of the gene

producing the best match antibody, which are about a million times faster that ordinary

mutations. It appears that the hyper mutations are produced by successive rounds of

transcription (reading the DNA code onto an RNA version) and reverse transcription (the

reverse process) which are know to be prone to errors. These mutations continue until a very

good match emerges. This evidence supports the proposal that acquired immunological

tolerance to foreign antigens is inherited via the male line.

Genes are not therefore static building blocks with predictable parts to act out. The genome is a

fluid and unpredictable network susceptible to changes within the cell. The complexity of this

network is compounded by influences from the environment. The organism is therefore

intimately dependent on environmental cues for its behavior and adaptation.

Some genetic sequences are found to jump around from one site of the genome and insert

themselves into other sights. These transposons are used to help insert transgenic genes into

organisms. Genes which confer antibiotic resistance to bacteria may move from one species of

bacteria to another. Since 1993 there have been over two hundred papers giving evidence of




horizontal gene transfer which provide links between all forms of life in the biosphere. Where

the exchange of useful genes between organisms does occur it appears to be a more efficient

means of adapting the organism’s genome to changes in the environment than a random

mutations of genes. This evidence does not appear to have reached the dogma of neo-Darwinism which clearly states that genetic mutations which cause variation occur randomly. It

further asserts that the lifetime of an organism has no impact on its genes, it is a passive carrier.

Another determined reductionist according to John Horgan is Francis Crick. After unraveling

the corkscrew of DNA and working on the origin of life, Crick turned his attention to

consciousness. With the faith of many reductionists, he insisted that the problem was not

inscrutable but would yield to persistent efforts to understand how neurons worked together, in

order to carry out fundamental activities like sight.

Is our mind in our brain?

There is a natural inclination to equate science with the science of the physical world. The

science of the mental world has a lower profile. We tend to assume that if we cannot explain a

phenomenon in terms of the physical world then any other attempt represents a descent to the

mystical. In considering telepathy, Einstein sought the safety of some sort of physical

explanation for the phenomena.

It is widely accepted that the mind is a function of the brain and that one’s mental state is

related to what is going on in ones brain. Yet Hao Wang argues that this is a prejudice of our

time. Mental activities are not necessarily localised in the brain.

It is impossible for us at this time to find anything peculiar about the brain of someone who has

most extraordinary mental power. Wittgenstein argues that one cannot by closely examining

the seed, deduce anything that relates its structure to the plant which may emerge from it.

There is the environment to consider, as there is in all things we believe go on inside our heads.

The notes we make in pencil so as to remember, and our own writing which often surprises us

with it’s strangeness, appear to be an extension of the physical brain. And where does the

music of a string quartet reside? In whose brain is the music we hear being produced?.

Candace Pert prefers to uses the term “bodymind” to infer that the old Cartesian separation of

mind and body is no longer tenable in the light of our understanding of peptides which convey




information to all cells of the body. For example the immune system has many of the general

features of a basic level of mental function. It is sensitive to the environment, discriminates

between hostile and non-hostile events and remembers past events to the benefit of its

purposes. It makes mistakes in identifying self and non-self. And it is non-local, has no highercommand, nor any physical centre. The cells of the immune system also carry receptors for

peptides (endorphins) which convey emotions, like pleasure. Can pleasure be confined to the

brain? Goedel went further to question, not only the assumption that the mind was located in

the brain but asks whether the mind is essentially coupled to any physical system. “Is there no

mind without matter?

Gerald Edelman concludes that the discipline of the mind required by scientists since Bacon,

was required to lead to objective reason. There was a strong belief in mechanical causality, a

linear chain of measurable events. There was no link with humanity, the spirit, or mind as they

were considered to interfere with the truth. While physics has served us well in dealing with the

mechanical world it has completely failed to explain the mind or human behavior. Our society

is not to be explained by the sum of many self seeking little automatons. Our minds are not to

be understood as the sum of millions of nerve cell interactions.

Neuroscience and reductionism

Some neuroscientists hold that reductionism denies of the richness and higher level

organisation of phenomena. They believe that you cannot reduce qualities like joy, pain and the

smell of a rose to a materialist explanation. To this group belong the various social sciences,

and ecologists and some biologists.

Paul and Patricia Churchland recognise that in neuroscience the reductionist and holistic

approaches meet and conflict. They identify some limitations to reduction. Firstly, there is a

strong intuitive sense that qualitative phenomena cannot be reduced. What constitutes human

consciousness is not just the intrinsic character of the individual but also the rich matrix of

relationships it has with other humans. It does not seem possible to imagine how the

intentionality of our thoughts could be reduced to a matter of signal or even symbol interaction.

However it is worth noting that many successful reductions in the history of science have not

been predictable and have come as a complete surprise.




Reduction in neuroscience will not replace or displace the science of psychology. Chemistry

has not disappeared through the quantum mechanical explication of its basics, nor has the

science of biology disappeared despite the chemical explication of its basics. The Churchland’s

reassure us that there is nothing ominous or undermining in reduction. And there is a large andrespected group who want to work towards the reduction of psychological phenomena to

neurobiological and computational processes.

According to Horgan, Marvin Minsky’s approach to consciousness is to abandon the tools of

reductionism which he claims we use because we have found them to work well in solving

other problems. The mind has many different methods for coping with the same simple

problem. It does not respond in a fixed deterministic way as you would expect if its activity

were determined by established neuron activity and interactive pathways.

Quantum like effects in consciousness

The units of activity in the brain appear to be clusters or sets of neurons which communicate

with other along nerve fibres and across nerve synapses. Could these structures allow

information transfer which did not disturb the environment and preserve quantum

entanglements? Stuart Hameroff argues that there is a great deal of complex and elaborate

computation going on inside a single cell. The cell is supported by a skeleton of fine tube- like

threads known as microtubules. Penrose suspect these structures may well behave in a non-

classical way and control the activity of the cell. Certainly single celled organisms like amoeba

have no nervous system and yet behave as thought there was an information processing

system from which coherent activity originates. This quality of coherence, is a distinguishing

feature of a living organisms at both individual and collective levels which will be reviewed in

Part II.

The activity within the nerve cell of a multicellular organism may well determine the responses

of the cell to information arriving from other cells. Thus there is the potential for quantum like

effects, which are non local, within the nerve cell to contribute to the quantum like

phenomenon of consciousness.

The moral content of reductionism

Mary Midgley reminds us that parsimony is a respectable ideal but it may also be false




economy to simplify. Good reason has to be more than the most economical account. It must

also be an account that gives us the full explanation that we need. She argues that reductionism

cannot claim to achieve even parsimony as it caries built in values and intentions. These

intentions and values are part of a larger intellectual and cultural enterprise and often reflect ourgeneral attitude to life as well. One of these attitudes which may drive reductionism is the

search for purity. What makes theorists pursue reduction may be partly a desire to find order,

but it is also the pursuit of an ideal. There is nothing shameful about ideals and morals but they

must be acknowledged. The separation of body from mind need reuniting into one whole view

which includes both objective and subjective views.

The exclusion of the subjective in favour of the most austere objective and reductionists view

has been partly a response to the repressive morality of some Christian denominations The

theory of Skinners, that human behavior is no more than a string of acquired conditioned

responses to our environment was hailed as a scientific approach as it claimed to be founded

on a firmly objective view of ourselves. Midgley argues that this claim to scientific high ground

held a strong but hidden moral position. When transcribed into practice it placed the individual,

and his suffering as merely aberrant learnt patterns of behavior. It diminished the patient’s

feelings and viewpoint and placed the power to heal squarely in the hands of the therapist, as if

she was an engineer who would examine and repair the deficiency.

The relegation of the patient to a machine which needs repair is a theme common to much

western orthodox medicine. Patients are referred to as “cases” as if they were objects.. The

greater the distance maintained between healer and patient the greater the objectivity claimed

and the more credible the scientist. Physical explanation claims to be objective, to reflect reality

whereas subjective experience are not as valid. Yet perhaps they are the more valid and real to

us. Pain, delight or trouble can be centrally important to us.

Mary Midgley gives an example of a simple factual statement; “George was allowed home

from prison at last on Sunday”. This is a simple factual statement which is not trivial or

inconsequential. It does not just appear to matter; it does matter. Yet it cannot be conveyed in

the language of physics. The underlying deeper physical truths are not, as Atkins claims “too

cumbersome for every day use”; they cannot begin, even in the most patient and tireless hands

to convey or explain such a simple factual statement.




It may be argued that the branches of science for which reductionism work best, such as

physics, make no claim for high scientific ground. Yet there still is a value judgement which

sets physics as more”fundamental” than biology. Physics appears to offer promise of

discovering the ultimate structure or processes that are universal. Francis Crick comments thatwhen physicists apply themselves to biology they tend to concoct models that are too neat, too

powerful and too clean. There seems to be an appeal in the power of reductionism to debunk

mystery or any complexity in phenomena by dismissing what most of us find amazing; as in

“ After all when you get down to it, a human body is just £5 worth of chemicals”. Reduction is

often a useful tool but not all reductions are either useful or sensible. Some are even dangerous

as they try to legitimise a callous and de-humanising view of humanity.

From Human to Machine

Dignity, according to Skinner “ is a matter of giving people credit, of admiring them for their

(self generated) achievements”. Margaret Bowden disagrees. Skinner’s “behaviorism” reduces

our notions of human worth. There is no credit for human skill, whether bodily, mental or

moral. No gracefulness, dexterity or honest toil. In his book “working” Studs Terkel reveals the

dissatisfaction of workers treated as objects, without dignity.

Boden points out that artificial intelligence makes behaviorism look quite benign. “AI compares

us with computers; dead automatic tin-cannery is all they are capable of”. The inference that

we are “no-more-than” is diminishing comment on our self worth. Boden quotes Rollo May

who wrote of “ the dehumanising dangers in our tendency in modern science to make man

over into the image of the machine, into the image of the techniques by which we study him...

A central core of man’s “neurosis” is the undermining of his experience of himself as

responsible, the sapping of his willing and decision.”

AI may be considered as a subclass of Artificial Life. A-life uses computer modeling to study

processes that start with relatively simple locally interacting units which may generate complex

individual and group behavior. Flocking of birds appears to depend on local communication,

but there is no conductor who issues commands. The emergent order in complex systems is

the subject of a later chapter, but here we need to note that in both living systems and

computer models there is a whole which is not the sum of the parts and cannot be predicted by




them, and yet is determined by rules which do govern the individual. Boden finds that in A-life

and in this expanding interest in the behavior of complex systems, there is room for the dignity

of the individual.

Against Method

During John Horgan’s odyssey to visit great scientists of today he encountered Paul

Feyerabend whom he dubs “the anarchist of philosophy”. Feyerabend wrote an unusual book

titled “Against Method”. It argues that there is no way of doing science which is logically

defendable or exclusive. Scientist do whatever is necessary to advance their knowledge. In this

process anything goes. He was afraid of the dogma of science and its power to reduce human

thought and culture. The compulsive search for certainty too often led to tyranny. The attitude

of self-righteousness and certitude which made Nazism possible is still with us and accounts

for continued nuclear armament and war. The conceit with western progress justifies the

exploitation of nature and primitive cultures. There is no difference, Feyerabend claims,

between such “benefactors of mankind” and the henchmen of Auschwitz.

Feyerabend noted that many primitive people like the San bushmen had done perfectly well

without science. There was no validity in the claim that superior western knowledge

automatically conferred a better lifestyle. The San lived in peace amongst themselves and in

harmony with nature.

I find this a refreshing and enlightened view from a scientist. Even if he has a maverick view on

scientific method, Feyerabend does not deserve Horgan’s epithet “the anarchist”. Feyerabend

had a glimpse of the shadow of our past, and realised that the henchman are still with us.

Summary

Scientific method has a long history which remains influential today. The struggle for reason

over dogma, for evidence over hearsay and for detached observation instead of intuition has

been worthwhile and largely successful. It has enabled the people of the Western world to

develop life-improving technologies and a rich understanding of natural phenomena. Scientists

have good reason to believe that the process which has brought us so far, will take us the rest of

the way. Yet there is a discomfort both within and outside the scientific community. In John

Horgan’s book “The End of Science” he reveals a mixture of despair and arrogance in the




scientific community. Despair, that there is nothing left for science to do but tie up the details.

Arrogance, that if orthodox science does not have the answers, no other approach is going to

succeed. The big problems are consciousness, and the origins of the universe. It is notable that

orthodox science has turned away from the really messy problems like turbulence (especiallyas in weather forecasting) and all psychic phenomena.

The discomfort outside the scientific community is with the apparent uncertainty of science.

Members of the public wanted to know from the politicians whether BSE posed a threat to

humans. They want to know whether the MMR vaccination is safe for children and whether

GM crops, mobile phones and therapeutic cloning are safe. The politicians turn to the scientists,

who pushed for unambiguous answers declared that there was no evidence that the BSE

would make beef unsafe. But as we have seen from Popper’s arguments, science cannot prove

any statement true. At best science offers probabilities, and at worst the prevailing scientific

opinion turns out to be just wrong as it did in declaring BSE safe in the United Kingdom. Bryan

Appleyard writing in the Times (28th January 2001) identifies the dilemma as a choice of

superstitions. On the one hand is the superstitious belief in the competence and certainty of

science and on the other a superstitious fear of science.

It seems that orthodox scientific method does not have in its toolbox all the techniques for

recognising and unraveling some complex questions. Reduction is not always sensible as it

may loose the wood for the trees. Induction is appealing as a theory but does not always work

in practice. Scientific method does not produce certain truths but some lesser and more

uncertain version of the truth which seems the most probable.

There are some scientists in the field of complexity, who have started to expand the traditional

methods of science. They are not mystics or superstitious, but they do look for a broader

picture, larger systems in which there is greater interconnection, more dynamic change, less

certainty. Murray Gell-Mann has been one of the seminal thinkers in the understanding of

complex systems at the Sante Fe institute. He was recently interviewed by Matthew Blake in

New Scientist (p 29, July 24, 2010). “The crisis and challenge facing us in the 21st century

include many interwoven political, socialogical, cultural, economic and scientific issues. All of

these issues need to get folded together in the same kind of model. As it is they are mainly

studied in isolation. Complexity science might just be the keystone that brings it all together.”




These approaches do not abandon traditional science but they add dimension to it.

Science also needs to search into the darker corners, those left out by the drunk in the aphorism

which starts this chapter. In the dark and excluded from serious attention, and not because they

are trivial, are the phenomena which have been described as psychic, extra sensory or evenpara-normal.

holistic science 4 the wood or the trees

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