Hitler's Baby Division

"The Baby Division" was more than a cynical epithet, born of desperation and

a sense of foreboding doom. It brought the whole symbiotic relationship

between the Hitler Youth and the Elite Echelon to its final symbolic and actual

conclusion. The connection between these two Nazi generations, the process

of socialization under the Nazis, and the ultimate implications of the HJ SS

alliance, expressed in numerous small ways at home and on the battlefield,

was compressed within the confines of a single combat division, deliberately

patterned to take full advantage of what was thought to have been achieved

by these key affiliates of the national socialist movement. A thirst for

action, increasingly protomilitary as the uncertain prospects of the war

revealed themselves, changed the Hitler Youth into a school for soldiers at

the end. Exploiting this incubator of ideologically drilled warriors, the SS not

2

only extracted a sizeable proportion of its elite troops from this source but

began to think about more specific ways of using the HJ.

Organization, Indoctrination and Training

Creating teenage combat units was not unique, since it had been foolishly

tried in the early days of World War One, when talented and enthusiastic

young volunteers were thrown into battle without adequate training and due

consideration for future officer candidate needs, at Langemarck in Flanders.

Some party leaders and certainly old army veterans remembered this

blunder, but the fanaticism prevailing in the SS and the RJF made those who

made decisions in these matters oblivious to the suggestive precedent which

had been played out in the bloody fields of Flanders. So it was not by chance

that the Hitler Youth Division remained closely associated with the Führer's

SS Body Guard, beginning in Berlin's Lichterfelde Barracks shortly after the

"Night of the Long Knives" and ending in the Battle of Caen, the Stalingrad of

the Hitler Youth, the so-called Battle of the Bulge, another sign of

desperation fraught with atrocity, and finally the last ditch efforts to defend

an indefensible Vienna, the portentous scene of Adolf Hitler's painful

struggle for manhood.

Hitler’s Body Guard and the Hitler Youth Division

With peculiarly independent relationships to Himmler and the rest of

the Waffen SS, the Body Guard was an elite within an elite. As a personal

security unit dedicated exclusively to the person of the Fuhrer, the

Leibstandarte gave birth to a unique and exclusive combat division which was

moved from front to front to rescue difficult military situations or to

snatch glory from the jaws of death by benefitting from victories won by

3

others. It was in the forefront of every major military campaign: the march

into the Rhineland, the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the seizure

of Prague, the attack on Poland, the attack on France, the campaign in the

Balkans, and finally the assault on Russia. The Guard took part in vicious

combat on the Eastern Front and played a significant role in the battle to

retake the city of Kharkov during the month of March in 1943. Hitler's

private " fire-brigade" heaped laurels of victory on its head and Goebbels'

propaganda mill spread its valorous renown throughout Germany and among

the soldiers of the Allies. Singularly reckless in its style of warfare, the

Guard, not surprisingly, suffered a disproportionately large number of

casualties, requiring as a result perpetual replenishment. It was mainly the

Hitler Youth, of course, which had to furnish the required special cannon

fodder.1

Special recruiting privileges within General SS Main Sectors had been

given to the Guard as early as 1934. We have already seen that the Guard

also established direct contacts with the Hitler Youth in order to siphon off

the best available young manpower. Many starry eyed young men therefore

joined Hitler's Guard before the war began and many more must have been

recruited during the halcyon years of 1939 to 1941, although there are no

available records to document any specific wartime recruiting campaign until

1941. There is little doubt, however, that to become a member of Hitler's

famous Praetorian Guard fulfilled the ambition of many young idealists in the

Hitler Youth, especially after the inflated exploits of the Guard became

weekly features of Goebbels' newsreel editors. Some of these would-be

heroes, nevertheless, became disappointed and impatient with the slow pace

of promotion in the Guard, as in the Waffen SS generally. In December 1940

a controversy arose in the 12th company of the Guard when two former HJ

4

leaders complained about lack of career opportunity. Dissatisfaction reached

the ever sensitive Baldur von Schirach, who soon registered a protest with

Himmler, pompously demanding disciplinary action against the commander of

the company, SS Captain Hubert Meyer, subsequently chief of staff of the HJ

Division. What happened then illustrates how much the SS relied on the HJ to

maintain its war machine. An investigation took place which absolved Meyer

from any prejudicial infraction against former HJ leaders and reaffirmed SS

recognition of HJ experience as preferential consideration for promotion.

Any ill will which this and other incidents like it might have created were soon

forgotten. By the fall of 1941 the RJF agreed to mount special recruiting

campaigns only for the Guard. The Youth Leader promised to mobilize ail

leaders in an effort to solicit some 3,000 recruits, but conditions of 5'8"

height and four-and a-half or twelve-year enlistment periods affected

results. Slightly less than 500 seventeen-year-old boys were taken into the

Guard at this time.2

After Hitler's SS Guard became a mechanized infantry division in 1942

the recruiting campaign was repeated, this time accompanied by special

appeals from Artur Axmann himself. He asserted that only the best

volunteers had served in the Guard for years thus affirming a continuous

relationship and that it was therefore a “particular honor” to serve in a unit

which carried the banner of the Führer. The best Hitler youths “belonged” in

the Body Guard. Although exact numerical results for this second known

campaign are not available, it must have been fairly successful since

subsequent SS recruiting efforts were based on the experiences of 1941

and 1943.3

Planning, Recruiting and Premilitary Training

5

The idea of creating a Waffen SS armored division composed

exclusively of Hitler youths has been generally credited to Artur Axmann.

Even Himmler seems to have been under this impression for a while. But

Gottlob Berger jealously insisted that it had been his idea. Since he had known

that the SS Operations Office would oppose the notion, he had discussed the

matter with his recruiting personnel and with RJF chief-of-staff Helmut

Möckel, who had been the main defender of the idea from the start.

According to Berger early negotiations were kept secret in order to avoid

premature resistance by Dr. Ernst Schlünder and other youth leaders. The

RJF as a whole apparently revealed little interest until it discovered that

Hitler was enthusiastic about the plan. The idea of mobilizing teenagers in

separate units may have occurred to a number of people, including Berger

and Axmann. Certain army leaders and Göring seem to have entertained such

a project as well. The ambience of “total war,” produced by the monumental

Stalingrad defeat, was fertile ground for such desperate expedients.4

During a discussion between Berger and Möckel on February 9, 1943, it

was agreed that the division should be formed from seventeen-year-olds.

These were to be prepared in Premilitary Training Camps for six weeks,

spend four additional weeks in the Labor Service and conclude their training

with another sixteen weeks of intensive military drilling under SS auspices.

As a concession to physical immaturity they were to receive special rations

during training. Möckel offered the services of the RJF in securing adequate

reserves without affecting the reinforcement of other SS divisions. Right

from the start it appears that Berger and Axmann competed for the enticing

job of commanding this extraordinary division. In fact Berger offered his

services to Himmler on the day he conferred with Möckel and suggested that

6

Axmann be given inspection rights over division reserves as a mollifier. But

Himmler rejected both of them, telling Berger he understood his wish but

needed him for other things. Axmann's inspection rights were granted. On

the loth Himmler saw Hitler at the Wolf's Lair and discused the project with

him. Three days later he informed Axmann that the plan had made the Fuhrer

happy and that he had authorized immediate commencement of recruiting.

Meanwhile, Hitler had been softened up to consider waiving labor service duty

for HJ Division volunteers.5

A planning conference was held on February 16 at HJ headquarters in

Berlin, attended by Axmann, Möckel, Schlünder, Berger and two members of

the SS Recruiting Office. They agreed to accept volunteers with a minimum

height of 5’6” with a slight reduction for signal units, tank crews and

motorcycle companies. The only other requirements were that the boys be

capable of waging war and possess the HJ Achievement Medal wherever

possible. RJF representatives thought that 30,000 boys could be made

available. Since most of them had already been examined by HJ doctors,

Recruiting Stations could begin mustering within a month. Those found

suitable would be inducted into WELs for a six-week course and go directly to

the division thereafter. This plan could be followed if Hitler meanwhile decided

to exempt recruits from labor service obligations. The conferees also agreed

that boys who had not yet reached their seventeenth birthday could be

accepted, which would necessitate, however, a special arrangement with OKW

or a Führer decree. Seemingly reluctant to accept HJ insistence on

premilitary training, Berger thought the simplest method would be to

assemble the boys in basic training centers close to the area where the

division was to be formed. In lieu of this, the existing 39 WELs, still staffed

by the SS, with a total capacity of 8,000 would have to be pre emptied

7

temporarily for HJ Division candidates. The latter were to receive uniforms

and equipment while in the WEL.6

During the following day the RJF announced these plans to regional

leaders assembled for a regularly scheduled conference in Berlin. Axmann

said that the HJ Division, alongside the SS Body Guard, was intended as a

"Guard of the Fuhrer." It would be fully motorized, equipped with the heaviest

weapons and led mostly by HJ leaders. Boys who became seventeen on June

30 could volunteer. Eagerness for action and enthusiasm should be decisive

factors, while parental permission was unnecessary. Recruiters were urged

to accept only boys who were physically fit, spiritually alive and those who

had exemplary records in the Hitler Youth. Earners of the Achievement Medal

and the Marksmanship Medal should receive preference. The recruiting should

be done in such a way s to create a vocational balance among peasants,

workers, artisans and students. There should also be balance between

leaders and rank and file boys. Since the division was not intended to be an

elite combat formation, according to Axmann, it indicates that the precedent

of Langemarck was circumvented at least on the surface. Axmann further

announced that the special WEL courses, another attempt to avoid the

Langemarck syndrome, would begin in April and ordered vigorous recruitment

to begin immediately. HJ regions were asked to produce their contingents by

March is so that SS mustering could be completed fifteen days later. A mere

twenty six days were thus allowed to recruit an entire division, a sign of hope

and haste produced, no doubt, by extreme pressure from Berger's Recruiting

Office.7

On the afternoon of March 8, while furious recruiting was in progress,

Berger ran another planning session in the Main SS Office. It dealt mostly

with the difficult problem of getting sufficient NCOs and officers for the

8

division. The RJF offered to supply a sizeable proportion of the needed 4,000

NCOs by extracting eighteen-year-old HJ leaders who met SS requirements

and had experience as “war training leaders.” Hitler meanwhile released them

from labor duty if they agreed to become NCO candidates. They were to be

prepared in a special camp at St. Veith (Oberkrain, Austria) as “training

assistants” to aid WEL trainers running courses for regular HJ Division

recruits. After that they were to undergo NCO training with the Waffen SS

and join the division in the fall. The training at St. Veith was to be done by

Waffen SS reservists. Experienced technical NCOs for the division still had to

be found. Jüttner soon objected strenuously that the latter two groups were

not available in the light of NCO shortages. Berger was willing to send the

proffered HJ leaders directly tn NCO schools, but that would have meant

skipping the WELs for enlisted men and the RJF insisted on premilitary

training. Himmler would have preferred to extract the SS Body Guard from

the front line and have it train the entire 20,000-men HJ Division, but since

that could not be done, eighteen-year-old HJ leaders would have to become

NCO candidates as Berger recommended. Subsequently many of them were

supposed to be exchanged for experienced NCOs from the Body Guard.

Himmler also promised to ask Hitler for an order to transfer HJ leaders with

army and air force reserve status to the SS in order to supply the remaining

divisional cadre of noncommissioned officers. Initially the RJF thought at

least half of the needed 840 commissioned officers could be found among

veteran HJ leaders who had front experience as company and battalion

commanders in the army. Himmler believed he could get most of them

transferred to the Waffen SS. The rest would have to come from existing SS

field units. SS personnel chief Maximillian von Herff found some sixty

lieutenants in various SS units who were former HJ leaders and could be

9

shifted to the HJ Division, but Hans Jüttner objected to that many transfers

from field units already short on officers. Himmler then stepped in with a

compromise solution. There were 600 former HJ leaders serving as NCOs in

the Waffen SS. They would be required to take accelerated officer-training

and eventually replace active officers to be transferred from the Body

Guard and other SS divisions.8

While planners threshed about in convoluted schemes and expedients,

no one seems to have anticipated the problems of recruitment soon to be

faced. What they did fear is negative publicity. Hence recruiting began

secretly, because the RJF thought public notice would call attention to the

distasteful memory of Langemarck where very enthusiastic but badly trained

volunteers suffered disastrous losses. As late as November secrecy was

still maintained under threats of prosecution, coupled with the suggestion

that appearance of HJ Division units should be called simply Waffen SS

volunteers. When recruitment was set in motion by Axmann in the middle of

February, the HJ ran into surprising reluctance to volunteer, especially

among students of secondary schools, a development the RJF might have

expected had the hostile attitude of students in the WELs been taken into

account. But the RJF plunged on nevertheless. Late in March an agreement

was concluded with the National Business Chamber to allow vocational

students, who would normally nave graduated in the fall, to take premature

examinations in April, thus opening the way for induction into the WEL. For

non-vocational students the problem was more complicated and eventually

required SS influence to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Education.

The RJF had accepted responsibility to negotiate a solution but seems to

have encountered a series of roadblocks. Not until April was Axmann able to

inform regional leaders that volunteers would be granted "preliminary leaving

10

certificates" with the promise that they could finish secondary education in

special courses after the war. This made recruiting among students difficult.

Berger then stepped in and made a more satisfactory agreement with the

Education Ministry by granting “final leaving certificates” to student

volunteers who demonstrated the “ability, resolution and will power of

potential university students.”9 Regions and districts commenced

recruiting during the third week of February. The Swabian Regional

Directorate, for example, demanded lists of volunteers from districts by the

end of February so that physical examinations could begin on March 12. But

the response was slow. District 312 in Memmingen reported a handful of

volunteers, many of whom did not meet height requirements. Kempten

confronted a variety of problems. The district leader had been able to collect

only seven volunteers, despite vigorous personal efforts. Most boys were

then beginning their third year of vocational training and could not take final

examinations for another two-and-a-half years. They wanted to know what

was to become of them after service in the division. Others were interested

only in the officer corps. Mindelheim was more successful, reporting 15

volunteers, although that was only half of the required contingent. The

leader of this district excused his lack of success by citing the proverbial

unwillingness of peasant boys to volunteer. District 495 in Neuburg reported

a similar number of volunteers, but was able to do so only because it avoided

references to physical examinations, which would have discouraged

volunteering. At Nördlingen fourteen boys volunteered, although some 360

boys born in 1926 lived in that district. Lack of response was attributed to

“parental pressure.”10

The exact number of boys who volunteered for the HJ Division in

Swabia by March 12 is unknown. It must have fallen far short of the required

11

400 before examinations, since these were postponed. While postponement

produced more volunteers, many of them were washed out when

examinations were conducted. Augsburg reported 35 volunteers, but SS

examiners found only twelve suitable. District leaders complained that all 35

should have been suitable and accused the SS Recruiting Station officers in

Munich of assigning some of these boys to other SS armed formations. The

Station chief denied this and counter-charged the HJ Regional Directorate

with packing HJ Division recruits with previously mustered volunteers already

assigned to other SS units. As demonstrated by numerous other incidents of

a similar nature, organizational pride and loyalty was deeply ingrained and

frequently interfered with the overall purposes of the HJ-SS alliance. At

Sonthofen some 35 boys volunteered, but only 20 reported for mustering

and a mere 14 eventually marched off to the Premilitary Training camp at

Harburg.11

Recruiting problems soon forced the RJF to shorten premilitary

training from six weeks to four and postpone the starting date to May. This

became necessary despite the fact that Hitler had meanwhile exempted HJ

Division volunteers from compulsory labor service, an expedient adopted so

frequently after 1943 that it practically became a general rule. When

training finally began at Harburg, Swabia furnished only eighty mustered

recruits and eleven “training assistants,” 45 men short of the stipulated

quota. Additional volunteers became available later so that camp director

Kurt Ziegler eventually had around 100 HJ Division trainees under his wing, a

fact that gave him no little satisfaction.12 While premilitary training sessions

got underway the RJF ordered a “supplementary recruiting campaign” for

May. In WEL camps as well as in individual HJ dens the siren calls of strident

SS and HJ recruiters were heard once more. When recruits completed WEL

12

training and transferred to the Waffen SS they were ordered to recruit

personally their friends for the division while on furlough, a device that was

probably more effective than some other forms of persuasion. These

belated volunteers went directly to the reserve units of the division. At the

end of July the RJF allowed the regions to recruit from the second half of the

1926 class. They were allowed to skip premilitary training as well. In all WELs

recruiting meanwhile continued at least through the middle of August.13

Despite formal safeguards against the use of force many boys must

have been driven to volunteer under extremely coercive circumstances.

Army reserve authorities in Stuttgart, for instance, complained to OKW that

“illegal means” were being used to recruit for a “so-called HJ Division to be

presented to the Fuhrer on his birthday.” lt would be erroneous, however,

the report went on, if the Führer were to be “under the impression that he

was dealing with purely voluntary recruits.” Incidents were cited where Hitler

youths had been forcefully “moved” to volunteer. They had been imprisoned

in rooms guarded by SS soldiers until volunteer papers were signed and even

had their ears boxed for failure to respond to SS appeals. The SS Recruiting

Station at Stuttgart denied these charges when Berger was forced to

investigate and claimed it could not find allegedly responsible persons

because the army had given “imprecise information.” one of the incidents

apparently took place at Achern where 220 boys had been assembled for

recruiting purposes. But, since only eighteen had signed volunteer

certificates and a mere thirteen of them were later found to be suitable, the

SS “certainly could not be accused of using force.” Berger dismissed the

whole affair as Just another example of the army “raising a stink against the

SS.”14 SS General Kurt Meyer subsequently implied, however, that some

youths had not come voluntarily and SS General Frltz Witt, the first

13

commander of the division, ordered an investigation in November 1943 to

determine how many men had been inducted against their will. lt is quite

apparent that many forms of official influence and pressure were used to

compel “volunteering,” at a time when the critical military situation had top

priority.15

Securing the required number of NCOs for the division proved to be

equally difficult. Originally Axmann had asked regional leaders to enlist at

least 10 percent of their eligible unit leaders as divisional NCO candidates.

Swabia was thus expected to furnish 26 and send them to WEL Kuchberg

near Geislingen in Württemberg for training. The initial response was not

encouraging; only 13 mustered men went to Kuchberg. Most eligible leaders it

appears chose to go to the Labor Service, refused to surrender their

officer-candidate status with the air force and the army, or wanted to finish

formal education first. Recruiting results in Swabia must have reflected

national efforts because at the end of March Axmann issued renewed calls

for NCO candidates. While some regional leaders were afraid their staffs

would be depleted, Axmann no longer cared whether local HJ organizations

collapsed when the need for troops to face military crises was overwhelming.

What clearly also was on Axmann's mind had something to do with ah elite

division which would glorify the martial tradition of the Hitler Youth with his

peculiar stamp on it.16

Hitler Youth districts already faced severe manpower shortages in

1943. At Kempten, for instance, seven leaders had become officer

candidates for the air force, two had been transferred to a children's camp,

one was employed part time in the local civil administration, one wore

corrective glasses, and a couple of others were too short to qualify for the

Waffen SS. While two leaders were NCO candidates with the SS, they refused

14

to switch to the HJ Division, one of them wanting to finish school in order to

pursue university training in engineering after the war, while the other

served as Patrol Service leader and surveillance chief and therefore could

not be replaced. The district leader showed a considerable degree of

exasperation: “If I am to surrender two additional leaders for ‘service in the

east’ then I am faced with a practically leaderless organization. I don't think

it makes any sense to force someone to volunteer.” Other district leaders

faced similar problems.17 In this situation coercion seemed to be the only

recourse if Axmann's demands were to be met and he in turn was bound by

his commitment to Himmler. Yet draftees, it was recognized, would not

provide the kind of spirit and elan which the division was supposed to have, if

it were to follow in the footprints of Hitler's Body Guard. Axmann, clearly

worried about this problem, ordered all WEL directors training NCO

candidates to determine how many of them had been commandeered. The

latter were then submitted to another barrage of propaganda and those who

still refused to volunteer “freely” were finally excluded from the NCO roster.

So in the end the RJF was forced to pick potential NCO candidates from rank

and file recruits born in 1926. This began during the second week of their

training in the WELs. So the manpower squeeze led to an expedient, which

gave the so-called Baby Division a substantial number of noncommissioned

officers of callow seventeen- and eighteen-year-old youth leading rank and

file soldiers of the same age.18

Reluctance to volunteer, no doubt, had something to do with

selectivity, since those HJ Division recruits who underwent premilitary

training at Harburg revealed high morale and eagerness for combat. None had

to be disciplined and nineteen earned the Marksmanship Medal. The overall

impression, which these boys left behind was extremely good," wrote Kurt

15

Ziegler. Although the course had to be interrupted several times for x-ray

examinations and other routine necessities, these special trainees had not

been discouraged. Some twenty five boys, however, had not yet taken

vocational leaving examinations. These boys could not be called up on June 15

as planned because local authorities could not administer examinations unto

July or August. Another thirty-two could not take their school examinations

for a variety of reasons until the fall. These boys had begged SS leaders to

remove all difficulties and allow them to enlist in June. “This pressure to Join

early,” in Ziegler's words, “was most extraordinary.” Thus, if Harburg was

typical--and there is no reason to believe it was not--the claim made by HJ

leaders that extraordinary pride and elan motivated those who survived the

bureaucratic hassle and became members of the HJ Division is correct.19

At the conclusion of premilitary training all 38 WELs staged uniform

ceremonies, transferring these HJ boys to the Waffen SS. Short speeches

by HJ and SS leaders, followed by rousing renditions of favorite songs like

“Ein junges Volk steht auf” and “Es zittern die morschen Knochen,”20

accompanied by combined SS-HJ musical units, characterized these martial

events. It was clearly a momentous occasion in a decade of HJ-SS

collaboration. Axmann and Himmler, who spoke at one of these ceremonies in

WEL Wildflecken, expressed the symbolic significance of this mutual

dependency. The Youth Leader spoke first, and somewhat disingenuously:

...My comrades and young volunteers who want to join the units of the Waffen SS,

you are a wonderful demonstration of the attitude and spirit of youth during this

fourth year of war. We all feel the burning desire to create a military unit out of

volunteer comrades from the Hitler Youth. The Führer was delighted with this

wish of his youth. He counted on you and thousands of you responded to our call.

You are the elite of German youth and I am happy and lucky that not one of you is

here except by his own free will....In your unit, my comrades, the soldierly

16

tradition of the Hitler Youth will find its ultimate expression. That is the reason

why all German youths direct their attention to this unit, to you; that is why you

must embody the virtues inherent in the best of Germany's youth. So, we expect

you to be idealistic, selfless, courageous and loyal!

Himmler was less hortatory and more candid:

Since the years of struggle, throughout the years of growth before the war and

during the war years themselves, a tie of particular intimacy and inner

fellowship bound the Hitler Youth and SS together. Not only the time of struggle,

the combat of fists, but much more, the battle of spirits and hearts for our

eternal Germany has brought us together and will forever unite us. Now during

the war ten thousands of Hitler youths have volunteered for the Waffen SS; they

have fought honorably and creditably; many of them became casualties. The class

of 1925 participated in the great Battle of Kharkov courageously and

successfully. It can be said in all candor that half of the Waffen SS divisions

which reconquered Kharkov were volunteers from the classes 1924 to 1925 For

all of them this difficult battle was the first taste of combat....In these weeks

when the sacrifice of Stalingrad was on every one's mind, when the Russians

mounted massive attacks, your Youth Leader made the decision to offer to the

Führer the best young boys of the new class for a new Waffen SS division. The

Führer agreed happily. After eight years of training in the Hitler Youth, you have

now assembled in your Waffen SS uniform with your old HJ armband. For four

weeks you have lived together, worked together, trained together and prepared

for military service. Today the National Youth Leader has released you from the

Hitler Youth and presented you to the Waffen SS. Now, in your new Waffen SS

uniforms, you will go home on a fourteen-day furlough (stormy applause),.

After a few months in SS barracks you will enter a great formation, an SS

Panzergrenadier Division. You will then train some more, loose many drops of

sweat in order to save drops of blood and finally will march alongside your sister

division, the Body Guard SS Adolf Hitler. You will carry the name which the

Führer gave you: SS Panzergrenadier Division “Hitler Youth.”21

FORMATION, MILITARY TRAINING, AND INDOCTRINATION

17

Hitler had originally ordered that the division be organized on June 1,

1943, but disagreements between Jüttner and Berger over officer and NCO

problems and postponement of WEL courses delayed this target date.

Possible delaying maneuvers by OKW and other manpower and supply

agencies, plus unanticipated slowness in recruiting may also have helped to

defer formation until the end of the month. On the l7th Himmler saw Hitler

on the Obersalzberg and informed him that the division was still in the build

up process. By this time it had been decided to use troop facilities at

Beverloo near Brussels as training and organizational headquarters.

Replacements would be supplied by a newly-created Waffen SS infantry

Training and Reserve Battalion 12 to be located at Arnheim. The formal

organizational order was issued on the 24th by Jüttner, who was responsible

for assigning officers, NCOs and men in agreement with the command of the

I. Waffen SS Panzer Korps, created three days later to contain the l2th

Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division “Hitler Youth” and the 1st Waffen SS

Panzer Division or Body Guard.22

During the month of June, while the Body Guard recovered from the

exhaustive Battle of Kharkov, SS Colonel Fritz Witt, chief of its lst Armored

Infantry Regiment, received appointment as commander of the Hitler Youth

Division. Typical of an aggressive new breed of young SS officers, the thirty

five-year-old Witt brought with him to Beverloo a select number of officers,

sergeants and technical specialists. The rest of the officers were

transferred from army and SS divisions or activated from reserve status as

the original plan provided. More than half of them must have been former HJ

leaders. A shortage of company commanders, platoon and squad leaders,

was gradually filled when the former “training assistants” arrived from the

18

SS NCO schools. Additional NCO candidates were selected at Beverloo and

trained within the division. Many NCOs were therefore barely a year older or

even the same age as the young soldiers they commanded.23 In July and

August the first 10,000 boys arrived to commence basic training, while

various units were gradually formed and shaped into battle condition. The

Commanding General of the lst SS Panzer Division, Sepp Dietrich, had already

gotten Hitler's permission to provide these boys with food rations normally

reserved for combat soldiers, but August Pohl, the chief of the SS Economic

and Administrative Office, arranged to give them special rations much more

substantial than those allotted to workers in heavy industry.24

By the end of July most top officers had been assigned. Almost all of

them were in their early thirties. To have two battalion commanders merely

26 years old (Bremer and Olboeter) and three other top commanders in their

late twenties (Wünsche, Ford, and Lintz) is unusual enough, but those below

battalion level were nearly all in their early twenties and the bulk of the

enlisted men were seventeen during training and eighteen at the time of their

first combat engagement. It was indeed the “Baby Division”!25

19

Commander SS Brigadier General Fritz Witt (35)*

________________________________________________________

25th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Colonel Kurt Meyer (32)*

I. Battalion SS Major Erwin Horstmann (31)

II . Battalion

III. Battalion SS Major Johann Waldmüller (31)*

26th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Wilhelm Mohnke (31)*

I. Battalion SS Major Bernhard Krause (33)*

II. Battalion SS Captain Gerhard Bremer (26)*

III. Battalion SS Captain Hans Scapini (30)*

Artillery Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Fritz Schröder (36)

I. Section SS Major Erich Urbanitz (34)

II. Section SS Major Karl Bartling (32)

III. Section

Panzer Regiment 12 SS Major Max Wünsche (28)*

I. Battalion SS Captain Thilo Beck (32)

II. Battalion SS Captain Arnold Jürgensen (32)*

Panzer-Jäger (riflemen)

Anti-aircraft Battalion SS Major Walter Ford (28)

Reconnaissance Battalion SS Captain Erich Olboeter (26)*

Signal Section SS Captain Reinhard Klauenreich (30)

Engineer Section SS Captain Max Müller (39)

Reserves Commander SS Captain Rolf Kolitz (30)

Medical Detachment SS Captain Peter Lintz (29)

Administration Battalion SS Major Dr. Wilhelm Kos (32)

The youthful character of the division not only worried the RJF but also

Goebbels, who feared that Allied propaganda might interpret it as a sign of

desperation, which lt clearly was. Allied intelligence did refer to the “Baby

20

Division,” derisively in radio broadcasts and propaganda leaflets, suggesting

the milk bottle as its tactical symbol. Hitler, nonetheless, believed his

youngsters would fight “fanatically” and predicted that the enemy would be

“struck with wonder.”26

By mid September most divisional sub units had been formed and

training within them was proceeding smoothly. Some 16,000 boys had

reported, although most equipment was still missing. At the end of

September when the division had reached nearly full strength, it still had not

acquired adequate medical services. Some sixty doctors and fourteen

dentists, all former HJ members serving in various military units, were

extracted by complicated negotiations among HJ, SS and OKW officials. Their

services were overdue, for the type of training practiced by the SS seemed

to result in many minor accidents, especially since they were dealing with

extremely young soldiers. The chief of Armored Troops West, Geyr von

Schweppenburg, complained at one point that there was a lack of adequate

training in first aid. More serious diseases plagued some units. The Engineer

Battalion, for instance, reported six cases of infectious hepatitis, eight

cases of diphtheria and two cases of scarlet fever in a single month. Yet, at

the end of October, the division was designated a full-fledged armored

division, instead of an armored infantry division, and a few days later Hitler

ordered that it be fully equipped immediately.�27

In his post-war memoir Kurt Meyer claimed that the youthfulness of

the division was taken into consideration. New training methods “based on

the traditional German youth movement” had been used instead of normal

military practice. Convivial relationships between men and officers had been

encouraged and close ties to parents and home were maintained. There had

been no time for unnecessary drill or parade ground marching, since

21

emphasis had been placed on training under simulated war conditions. This

claim of Meyer's is substantiated by the remaining records, at least as far

as Fritz Witt is concerned, although he seems to have had considerable

difficulty with lower ranking officers in showing equal understanding. Enlisted

men, guilty of minor infractions, were frequently forced to sign ready made

confessions and overpowered by accusations. Some unit leaders transferred

recalcitrant youths to other formations in order to maintain "clean outfits,"

not in itself an unusual practice in any army but certainly of some

significance in a HJ division touted for its pristine qualities. Witt reminded his

officers that they were dealing with very young men whose training had been

inadequate at home and had to be continued by them, providing a kind of

second home for youngsters deprived of normal socialization. Company

commanders should therefore assume a kind of fatherly responsibility and

try to find appropriate training methods. Some serious accidents occurred

when youthful recruits used weapons to even scores in the inevitable

personal disputes. One such incident sent a young soldier to the hospital, but

his adversary was excused on grounds of immaturity. Another recruit was

caught stealing from a Belgian professor. The thief was given a mild

punishment and the professor, whose stolen property had been returned,

was supposed to have been informed of the punishment, but the regimental

commander found that bit of civility to be unnecessary. Valuables in letters

and packages from home were frequently filched, forcing Witt to order close

surveillance of the mails. Despite many warnings by Witt, strange

punishments continued to be practiced by lower echelon officers and NCOs.

Electrifying door handles, shaving heads, and cleaning rifles between one and

three in the morning were types of penalties cherished by some superiors.

Witt forbade threats of heavy punishment for minor disciplinary infractions,

22

fearing that they might lead to ill-considered actions by impressionable young

soldiers. In one incident involving a bizarre self-disciplinary method known as

“Holy Ghost,” a young soldier died. The most sensational disciplinary incident

involved the son of Gauleiter Wilhelm Murr of Württemberg who appears to

have been “invited to commit suicide,” an example his father followed a year

later. In this context it is no surprise to find that some recruits were

actually hostile to the Nazi Party and the SS. The chief of the field court was

finally forced to instruct divisional officers in the goals of proper

punishment.28

Two months before the division was committed to combat Witt issued

one of his periodic special directives dealing with discipline and order. He

complained that many unit leaders still failed to understand that their

primary duty was to "shape young soldiers into straight and decent SS men.

Many company commanders apparently had forgotten that their charges had

grown up with fathers away at the front and mothers employed, with the

best teachers and most capable HJ leaders on the long list of casualties. Unit

leaders therefore had to become substitute educators. Providing models to

imitate was the best form of instruction and this required daily association,

since the company was the only world these impressionable recruits knew.

Witt then ordered platoon and squad leaders to live in the same room with

their men to show that they cared about their welfare. Such concern was a

soldier's "most beautiful task." Every noncommissioned officer "should

appreciate the valuable German human material entrusted to him."29

Training within smaller units commenced as soon as recruits arrived at

Beverloo, even though there was hardly any equipment and no uniforms for

some time. In December 1943 and January 1944 training exercises on the

squad, platoon and company level were carried out, since some eighty

23

percent of the required vehicles - all captured Italian machines had finally

arrived. At the end of January infantry companies, tank companies and

artillery batteries began to demonstrate their proficiency by combat

exercises with live ammunition. Sport exercises, tactical instruction and

sandbox instruction for NCOs by company commanders followed. Heinz

Guderian, the General Inspector of Armored Troops, and Field Marshal Gerd

von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief West, observed some of these war

games and acknowledged a high level of performance according to Kurt

Meyer. Armored infantry companies placed special emphasis on

reconnaissance, night fighting and flexible shifting from attack to defense.

Fully one third of the training time was devoted to nocturnal maneuvers.

Physical exercises were conditioned by consideration for the performance

capacity of young recruits. Communication practice in the area of the I. SS

Panzer Corps near Dieppe revealed the unreliability of the Italian vehicles and

led to their replacement with German made machines by order of the

“highest authority”--presumably Hitler.30

At least three hours a week were set aside for indoctrination to be

conducted by company commanders for the most part. After eight years of

incessant doctrinal drilling in the Hitler Youth and four weeks of intensive

propagandizing in the WELs, it was still deemed necessary to conduct regular

weekly indoctrination sessions within the division itself. Witt believed, as

most SS officers believed, that the war against Soviet Russia had made it

painfully clear that a “fanatically indoctrinated enemy” could only be

conquered by the "bearer of a superior ideology." Every young soldier

therefore had to know what he fought for. Hence, “attitude, spiritual

strength and emotional power were thought to be the deciding factors in

generally perceived popular wars.” Company commanders were expected to

24

dedicate themselves to this task of indoctrination with vigor and a sense of

responsibility. The themes they used were no surprise: “Germany's demand

for living space,” “the enemies of Germany are the enemies of Europe,” and

similar platitudes familiar to these boys since the age of ten, when most of

them had entered the Jungvolk and ceased to be children. Every opportunity-

-the waking call, roll call, a pause during training, an infrequent free hour--

was to be utilized by officers and NCOs to “clarify and impregnate the weekly

theme.” Aiming to create a fighting force of true believers required that

every man "grasped internally what he fought for.” Callow youths had to be

transformed into men “who lived according to the fundamentals of the SS as

fanatic warriors,” willing to sacrifice all and give no quarter.31

While some unit leaders appear to have been complacent, most

noncommissioned officers and company commanders performed the task of

indoctrination with alacrity. Hans Jürgen Walles was one such man. The

records of the division contain a set of detailed notes and charts he used to

education his boys in the esoterica of the SS, its history and racial precepts.

He taught his boys that the SS provided security for the people, that it was

the carrier of the people's weapons, beliefs, blood, communal spirit and

political faith. The SS, according to Walles, fought to preserve German

space, race and humanity. He taught what he had been taught and what he

perceived himself to represent. SS Sergeant Walles' personal history was

probably typical of most noncommissioned officers in the Hitler Youth

Division. He was the son of a postal inspector, born in 1922 in Wilhelmshaven,

where he attended elementary school, later moving on to the humanistic

Gymnasium in Bremen. Since March of 1933 he had been in the Hitler Youth,

eventually attaining the rank of Gefolgschaftsführer. Without finishing the

Gymnasium he became a "leader-candidate" in the Labor Service and after

25

the conquest of Poland he volunteered to join the SS Body Guard, but had to

wait a year because he was too young, and spent that time working for the

Post Office. In March 1941 he was called up by the Guard, undergoing training

with the 5th Reserve Battalion at Breslau. As an only son he could not be

sent to the front, becoming a trainer instead. He was promoted four times,

becoming a sergeant in July 1943, when he was assigned to the Hitler Youth

Division, the restriction on single sons having been dropped. His resolute

dedication to the Nazi and SS cause was never in question, for he symbolized

the kind of loyalty expressed by Commander Witt for his men on the

occasion of Hitler's birthday: "With our whole hearts, with all our strength, as

SS men of the youngest division, We promise to dedicate ourselves to the

deciding battles which lie ahead of us in this war."32

Fritz Witt declared the training period to be concluded on March 16,

1944: “The training situation happily is a good one. Our Hitler youth boys

during these eight months have been transformed into young men Who know

the military craft.” To celebrate the miraculous metamorphosis of the "Baby

Division" Commander Witt ordered that the candy rations thus far issued be

replaced by cigarettes and tobacco. In April the Division was transferred to

France and located southwest of Rouen in the area Gace-Bernay-Evreux-

Dreux, the remaining men and equipment being added in the process. If the

Division attained prescribed strength--and there is every reason to believe

that it did--by the beginning of June it had some 20,000 men and officers,

177 tanks, 700 machine guns, 70 mortars, 37 infantry guns and howitzers,

40 field and medium guns, 33 antitank guns and over 100 pieces of varied

antitank artillery. Motor vehicles, armored troop carriers and tractors

brought the total to some 2,950 vehicles. We know for certain that the

Division had at least twenty more tanks than the average SS Panzer Division

26

and certainly more than army equivalents. Since the Hitler Youth Division was

trumpeted as a “Junior Body Guard” and since Hitler had specifically ordered

that it be fully equipped, there is little doubt that it was one of the better

supplied fighting units of the war. There were always devious ways to acquire

desired officers and equipment if normal channels failed to supply them, as

Witt's most resourceful regimental commander, Kurt Meyer, and his young

subordinate officers, repeatedly demonstrated.33

One source of strength lay in the HJ origin of the combat personnel.

The tie to the RJF was carefully maintained by assiduous propaganda and by

visits of Youth Leader Artur Axmann, who made at least two formal

inspection tours. During the first visit Witt ordered commanders to discuss

plans with Axmann and had all positions of honor occupied by young men,

making sure that the Youth Leader was accorded the same respect as

Waffen SS generals by special order of Himmler himself. Axmann spent some

time with most battalions and even with smaller units. During the second

visit he brought along Dutch and Norwegian youth leaders, no doubt at the

suggestion of Gottlob Berger who was, of course. eager to influence SS

recruitment in the occupied countries. The RJF also assumed troop welfare

for the Division in order “to solidify the special tie of the National Socialist

movement with the Division.” Special musical groups, theatrical troupes,

letter writing campaigns and dispatch of packages fell under this program.

lies with individual battalions and smaller formations were later established

by regional HJ directorates. The umbilical cord to the Hitler Youth was to be

maintained at all costs.34

All of this meticulous care in organizing, training and preparing the

"Baby Division" was certainly carried out in order to avoid the errors of

Langemarck which hung over these activities as an ominous cloud. It was also

27

done because the planners believed the HJ Division could make a difference

by setting an instructive example and reversing the rising tide of defeatism

and cynical indifference among regular army troops. These notions were

soon to be tested when the HJ Division experienced its bloody baptism of fire

in a crucial sector of the Battle for Normandy. 1Stein, The Waffen-SS, 5, 8, 19, 32, 52, 116-8, 200, 205-7; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard,passim; Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, 281.2SSFHA/Kommandoamt der W-SS, “Bericht des Gebietsführers Kohlmeyer an denReichsjugendführer,” 15.2.1941, T-175/20/2525087-111; RJF/HA l to all Regions,“Nachwuchs für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,” 15.11.1941, T-175/108/2632300; HJGebiet Schwaben, “Eintritt als Freiwilliger in die LSSAH,” Rundschreiben (1.12.1941), T-580/349/#5; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard, 69-70.3Axmann, "Freiwilligenwerbung für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler," RB. 22/42K(13.10.1942), T-81/115/134527; See also Schwaben Gebietsrundschreiben 24/42(12.11.1942), T-580/348/#2/2; Gebietsbefehl Westmark K 23/42 (14.12.1942), T-81/101/117153.4Berger to Brandt, “Betr. Division 'Hitler-Jugend'," Geheime Kommandosache, 3.7.1943, T-175/108/2631226-7; Himmler to d'Alquen, 30.6.1943, T-175/70/2586531; Himmler toSchmundt, Geheim, 22.3.1943, T-175/l08/2631233.5Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung mit Möckel,” 9.2.1943, T-175/108/2631262-4;Himmler notes, “Vortrag beim Führer, 10.2.1943,” T-175/94/2615137; “Vermerk fürFrau Bethge,” 18.3.1943, T-175/108/2631239; Himmler to Axmann, Geheim, 13.2.1943,T-175/100/2631254; Himmler to Berger, Geheim, 16.2.1943, T-175/108/2631245.6Berger to Himmler, "Aufstellung der Division Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 18.2.1943, T-175/108/2631248-51. The two members of the Recruiting Office were SS-BrigadeführerHeinrich Jürs, head of Amt B1 (Ergänzungsamt) in the Main SS Office (SSHA), and SS-Sturmbannführer Robert Brill, Jürs' deputy.7Reichsjugendführer der NSDAP, “Hitler-Jugend Division in der Waffen-SS,” GeheimRundschreiben 898/2/1/43 (17.2.1943), T-611/2/426/I.8Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung am 8.3.1943,” T-175/108/2631235-8; Berger toHimmler, "Division Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 9.3.1943, T-175/108/2631234. Jüttner(SSFHA) to SSHA, “Aufstellung der SS-Division Hitler-Jugend,” Geheim, 10.3.1943, T-175/108/2631241-2; SSFHA to Dr. Brandt, “Betr. HJ Division,” Geheime Kommandosache,11.3.1943, T-175/108/2631240; Berger to SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SS-Division 'Hitler-Jugend',” Geheime Kommandosache, 20.3.1943, T-175/108/2631228-9; Himmler, “Planzur Aufstellung der Division 'Hitler-Jugend',” Geheim, with copies to Jüttner, Berger and vonHerff, n.d. (1943), T-175/70/2586518-23; Axmann to Himmler, 8.4.1943, T-175/108/2631230.9Axmann to all Regions, 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF, Presse und Propaganda Amt,“Freiwillige der HJ für die Waffen-SS,” Vertraulich, 3.6.1943, T-81/96/110526; RJF,P.u.P. Amt, “SS-Panzergrenadier Division 'Hitler-Jugend',” vertraulich, 9.11.1943, T-81/96/110458; RJF, Stabsführer Möckel to Regions, “Div. HJ,” 23.3.1943, T-580/347/#2; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur Division HJ,”1.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF/HA IV/Soziales Amt, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur DivisionHJ,” 14.4.1943, T-81/115/134742; Ernst Schlünder to Gebietsführer der HJ Gebiete, “HJ-Division,” 9.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Lehrabschlussprüfung derFreiwilligen der Division HJ (Reichsnährstandsberufe),” 4.6.1943, T-580/349/#5;Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwillige für die Division HJ aus Schülerkreisen,”

28

6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Schulabschluss der Freiwilligen derDivision HJ,” Rundschreiben 15/43 (16.6.1943), T-580/349/#5; RJF to Leaders ofRegions, "Lehrabschlussprüfung der Freiwilligen der SS-Division HJ," 22.5.1943, T-84/241/6599907-9; Berger to Himmler, 27.5.1943, T-175/108/2631243-4.10HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Vordringliche Werbung für die Waffen-SS (Neue Division),"Gebietsrundschreiben 5/43 (26.2.1943), T-580/349/#5. Recruiting reports of HJ Banne312, 476, 492, 495, and 315 on T-580/348/#2/2.11HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Untersuchungstermine," n.d., T-580/347/#2; HJ Bann Augsburg toErgänzungsstelle Süd, "Werbung und Musterung für die HJ Division," 27.4.1943; SSErgänzungsstelle Süd, “Division HJ,” 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; Correspondence ofHauptgefolgschaftsführer Mathes of HJ Bann Sonthofen, March and April, 1943, T-580/348/#2/2.12Victor Brandl to RJF, “Sonderlehrgang HJ Division,” 8.3.1943; Voigtländer to GebietsführerSchwaben, “HJ Division,” 17.3.1943; Schlünder to Gebietsführer Schwaben, “Einberufungder Freiwilligen für die HJ Division in die WEL,” Streng vertraulich, 1.4.1943; Schlünder toLeaders of Regions, “Einberufung,” Streng Vertraulich, 9.4.1943; Axmann to Leaders ofRegions, "HJ Division, Einberufung zum RAD," 20.4.1943; Ziegler to SS Ergänzungsstelle Süd,"Lehrgang für Freiwilligen der HJ Division," 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2. Brandl, a woundedarmy veteran, became wartime chief of the premilitary and physical training bureau of HJRegion Swabia on 10.11.1942. As a lieutenant in the reserve and HJ Stammführer he workedwith Oberst von Pechmann of the Stellvertretendes Generalkommando of Wehrkeis VII,headquartered in Munich. He was in charge of call-ups for the Premilitary Training Camps atthis time and later transferred to Hauptabteilung V and promoted to Oberstammführer.Hauptbannführer Voigtländer was head of the Hauptabteilung Motor HJ in AmtWehrertüchtigung, part of Hauptamt II in the Reichsjugendführung in Berlin.13HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Nachwerbung für die HJ Division," 28.4.1943; RJF to Führer derGebiete, "Nachwerbung für die HJ Division," 15.5.1943; Reports of Bann Dillingen, Wertach,Allgau and WEL Harburg, May 1943; Brandl to RJF, “Betr. HJ Division,” 5.6.1943; T-580/347/#2. Report from the Leader of HJ Gebiet Baden/Alsace, 22.3.1943, T-175/159/2690436. This Region had recruited 2,502 Waffen-SS candidates by this time,including HJ Division volunteers then still being sought. See also Schlünder to Führer derGebiete, "Betr. HJ Division," 5.6.1943; Brandl to RJF, "HJ Division,” 16.6.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Sonderrundschreiben, 22.7.1943, T-81/99/115688; HJBann Karlsruhe, "Einberufung zur HJ Division," 23.7.1943, T-81/99/115721; WELHarburg, "Freiwillige für die HJ Division," 25.7.1943, T-580/348/#2/2; HJ Gebiet Baden,"HJ-Division," Sonderrundschreiben, 28.7.1943, T-81/100/1 15747; HJ Bann Zabern to HJGebiet Baden, "Betr. HJ Division," 2.8.1943, T-81/99/115718; HJ Bann Augsburg, "Betr.HJ-Division," 10.8.1943, T-580/347/#2.14Stellv. Generalkommando V, “Werbung für die Waffen-SS,” Geheim, 30.3.1943, T-175/70/2586789; Ergänzungsstelle Südwest, "Sonderfall Amt B1," Geheim, 30.4.1943, T-175/70/2586784-7; Berger to Himmler, Geheim, "Werbung für die Waffen-SS," 7.5.1943,T-175/70/2586783. See also SS-Personalhauptamt to OKW, Geheim, "Werbung für dieWaffen-SS," 25.5.1943, T-175/70/2586774-5.15“Panzermeyer” (Kurt Meyer), Grenadiere ( München, 1965), 206. 12. SS Panzer Division‘Hitler-Jugend’, “Meldungen von Männern die sich nicht freiwillig zur Hitler-Jugend Divisionmeldeten,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3798021. For examples of non-voluntary enlistmentsee letter of SS-Recruiting Station South to sixteen-year-old Bernhard Ressl of Buchloe nearKaufbeuren, 27.4.1943, T-611/2/426 I; and B.J.S. MacDonald, The Trial of Kurt Meyer(Toronto, 1954), 106-7.16Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ Division,”9.3.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Rundschreiben, 11.3.1943, T-81/99/115705-6; Schlünder to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, 17.3.1943; Hauptbannführer Walter

29

Ludwig (Stabsleiter of Gebiet Schwaben) to HJ Districts, “Sicherung...,” Streng vertraulich,19.3.1943; Brandl to RJF, 1.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; See same folder for reports of variousBanne; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, "Sicherung...," 30.3.1943; HJ Gebietsführer LudwigStinglewagner (Schwaben) to Leaders of HJ Districts, “Sicherung...," 31.3.1943; T-580/347/42. See also HJ Gebiet Baden, Sondereilrundschreiben, 2.4.1943, T-81/99/115703; RJF, "Sicherung...," 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2.17Bann Kempten to Ludwig, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ Division,"8.4.1943; Bann Nördlingen to Ludwig, “Sicherung...,” 10.4.1943; T-580/348/#2/2.18Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Unterführernachwuchs und Freiwillige für die HJ Division,"14.4.1943; WEL Kuchberg to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Unterführernachwuchs-Unterführerlehrgang...,” 16.4.1943; "Aufstellung der tatsächlichen im WEL Kuchberg,"17.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; “Unterführernachwuchs...," WEL Rundschreiben 4/43(10.5.1943); T-580/350/#6/I.19Kurt Ziegler, WEL III/36, “Arbeitsbericht über den 2. Lehrgang vom 2.5.-30.5.1943,Sonderlehrgang HJ Division,” T-580/351/#7.20The song titles can be translated as "A young nation rises" and "The world, its rotten bones areshaking." The latter was composed by Hans Baumann, a celebrated HJ poet and songwriter whoheld important positions in the organization before the war, survived the war, and later wonseveral prizes for contributions to children's literature, including one from the New YorkHerald Tribune. The first verse of the song:

The world, its rotten bones are shaking in fear of a war with the Reds.But we (Nazis) have rushed that monster, a splendid victory is ours.

We shall continue to march on, even if all be destroyed.For today Germany heeds us, tomorrow the whole world.

And if the world lies in rubble from the battleThat disturbs us not at all, for we'll just build it up again!

Vernon L. Lidtke, "Songs and Nazis: Political Music and Social Change in Twentieth CenturyGermany," in Stark and Lackner, Essays on Culture and Society in Modern Germany (Arlington,Texas, 1982),193. Stachura, Nazi Youth, 212.21Schlünder to Stinglwagner, 10.5.1943 “Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen aus der HJin die HJ Division am 30.5.1943,” WEL-Rundschreiben 4/43 (10.5.1943), T-580/350/#6/1; "Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen in die HJ Division, Wildflecken, amSonnabend, den 29. Mai 1943, 16:00 Uhr,” T/611/2/426 I; “Rede des Reichsjugendführersam 29. Mai 1943 in Wildflecken vor den Freiwilligen der Hitler Jugend,” Geheim; "Rede desRFSS am 29. Mai 1943...," Geheim, T-81/96/110517ff.22“Führerbefehl,” n.d. (April 1943?), T-175/108/2631252; Himmler notes, "Vortragbeim Führer am 17.6.1943," T-175/94/2615102, 2615111; SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SSPanzer Grenadier Division 'HJ',” Geheime Kommandosache, 24.6.1943, T-175/108/2631214-5.23Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204-5; Stein, The Waffen-SS, 205-6; Ernst-GüntherKrätschmer, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS (Göttingen, 1955), 22-5. (check neweredition)24Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 205; Pohl to RFSS, “Verpflegung der Angehörigen der SS Pz. Gren.Div. 'HJ'," 25.6.1943, T-175/70/2586532-3. Each week they were to receive 3.5 liters offresh milk, 1,750 grams of bread, 200 grams of meat, 140 grams of lard, 120 grams of sugarand 245 grams of “nutrients.”25“Führerstellungbesetzung” 31.7.1943, T-175/18/2521572, 2521760. The * indicatesindividuals who received the Knights Cross either before or after their assignment to the l2thSS Panzer Division. For short biographies see Krätschmer,Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS. For company lists with birthdates and vocational distribution see T-354/154/3798022ff.

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26Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204. Helmuth Heiber, ed., Hitlers Lagebesprechungen (Stuttgart,1962), 334-5, 381; Himmler, "Besprechung beim Führer," 20.9.1943, T-175/94/2615082.27Axmann to Himmler and Axmann to Brandt, "Ärztliche Versorgung der SS Division HJ,"24.9.1943, T-175/70/2586516-7; RFSS/Pers. Stab to SS Sanitätsamt in SSFHA,22.10.1943; Himmler to Axmann, "Freigabe der HJ-Ärzte für die HJ Division 'Hitler-Jugend'," 1.11.1943; T-611/2/426 I; General der Panzertruppen West, Geheim, order of23.10.1943, T-354/156/3800265; SSFHA, "Umgliederung der SS Pz. Gren. Division HJ,"Geheime Kommandosache, 30.10.1943, T-175/108/2631208-9; Hitler, "Weisung Nr. 51,"11.11.1943, in Walter Hubatch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung (Frankfurt, 1962),234; 12. SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend, Pi. Btl., Truppenartzt, “Meldungen ansteckenderKrankheiten vom 2.12. bis 17.12,1943,” 17.12.1943, T-354/154/3797963.28Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 206-7; Der Kommandeur, "Befehl Nr. 1 über die Behandlung vonStrafsachen," 29.9.1943, T-354/153/3797108; Witt, “Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit,Disziplin, Anzug,” 16.11.1943; Zugführer Walles, “Meldung” re “kindliche Spielerei,”16.12.1943; T-354/154/3797402, 3797630-1; II/Pz. Art. Rgt. 12, “Strafsache gegen SS-Kan., Erich Kanoniczak,” 31.1.1944, T-175/155/3799143-4; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-Straftatenverhütung,” 28.4.1944, T-354/154/379900ff; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-Untergebenen Misshandlung,” 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797063; Witt, "Sonderbefehl-'Heiliger Geist'," 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797080; 12. SS Pz. Div., Chef des Feldgerichtes,"Zweck des Strafvollzugs," 8.2.1844, T-354/156/3800384; Himmler to Bormann (reGauleiter Murr), 11.2.1944, T-175/37/2547379-80; Jochen von Lang, The Secretary,318; 12. SS Pz. Div., Brü. Kol., “Vernehmungsniederschrift” (re hostility to Nazi Party),7.3.1944, T-354/155/3799475-6.29Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 12.4.1944, T-354/3797992-3.3012. SS Pz. Div., Abt. Ia, Geheime Kommandosache, “Ausbildungsbefehl Nr. 1,” 17.11.1843,T-354/156/3800267-70; 12. SS Br. Kol., Pz. Btl. 12, “Betr. Belehrung” re considerationfor youthful performance capacities, 29.3.1943, T-354/153/3796978; Panzermeyer,Grenadiere, 206.3112. SS Pz. Div., Abt. IIa, “Die Weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS Panzer Division ‘Hitler-Jugend’,” 22.11.1943, T-354/156/3800397-8; Heck, A Child of Hitler, 1.32Pz. Pi. Btl. 12, “Btl. Befehl 25/43,” 14.12.1943, T-354/154/3798224-6; Pz. Pi. Btl.12, “Ausbildungshinweis,” 28.2.1944, T-354/153/3796924; SS-UnterscharführerWalles, “Weltanschauliche Schulung,” n.d. T-354/154/3797489-94; “Hans Jürgen Walles--Lebenslauf,” 8/II/Btl. 1. Rgt., 1.11.1943, T-354/153/3797417-9; Witt, “Sonderbefehlzum Geburtstag des Führers am 20. April 1944,” T-354/154/3797983.33Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 16.3.1944, T-354/154/3797994; Chester Wilmot, The Strugglefor Europe (New York, 1963), 202-3, 274; See also T-354/153/3797170; Lionel F. Ellis,Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962), 553; Panzermeyer, Grenadiere,passim.34Abt. Ia, “Sonderbefehl zum Besuche des Reichsjugendführers vom 5.12.-7.12.43,” T-354/154/379800-2; Axmann to Himmler, 10.4.1944, T-611/2/426 I; Witt,“Sonderbefehl Nr. 4,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3797629.