history of the 1st battalion 9th marines - walking dead...

History of the 1History of the 1stst Battalion 9Battalion 9thth Marines 3Marines 3rdrd

Marine Division Marine Division -- ““The Walking DeadThe Walking Dead””

By Sergeant Thomas J. Holmes, USMCand

Sergeant Major Larry E. Gugle, USMC, Retired

IntroductionIntroduction• The History of the 9th Marines in WWI, WWII, and Vietnam• Vietnam Operations & Battle Locations• 1st Battalion 9th Marines in Vietnam

– Operations March 1965 – March 1966– Operations April and May 1966

• “The Walking Dead” – How the Nickname was earned• 1st Battalion 9th Marines in Vietnam

– Operations: Liberty, Buffalo, Hill 64, and Dewey Canyon 1967 - 1969• Statistics About the 1st Battalion 9th Marines in Vietnam• Medal Recipients (Medal of Honor, Navy Cross Medal, & Silver Star Medal)• Poems Written by individuals who where with 1st Battalion 9th Marines• Statistics About Vietnam• Myths and Facts About Vietnam

“Some people spend an entire LIFETIME wondering if they made a DIFFERENCE. The MARINES don’t have that Problem.”

President Ronald Reagan, 1985

History Of The History Of The 99thth MarinesMarines

World War OneWorld War One• The 9th Marines had its origin in the great expansion of the Marine Corps during

World War I. Created as one of the two Infantry regiments of the Advanced Base Force, it was assigned to duty in the Caribbean area as a mobile force in readiness. The 9th's mission was the protection of advanced naval bases and the Panama Canal in the event of enemy action. On 10 November 1917, the 142d anniversary of the Marine Corps, the Commandant signed the order directing the formation of the regiment.

• Ten days later, at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, the 9th Regiment was organized. Its Headquarters Company was activated and one machine gun and eight rifle companies were assigned to its three battalions. Three of the units, the 14th (machine gun), 36th, and 100th Companies, were transferred to the east coast from the naval base at San Diego; the remaining six, the 121st through 126th

Companies, were formed from Marines in training at Parris Island, South Carolina

• With the end of hostilities, the need for the 9th evaporated, so the regiment embarked 10 April 1919 aboard USS HANCOCK for Philadelphia, where it arrived and unloaded 25 April. The same day, it was officially disbanded. Although the 9th did not win combat honors during World War I, it did perform the exacting task of keeping itself at peak effectiveness as a mobile force in readiness.

World War TwoWorld War Two• Enough of the great surge of Marine recruits following Pearl Harbor had been

processed by 12 February 1942 to make the establishment of another regiment possible, and the 9th Marines was organized at Camp Elliott, San Diego, as part of the 2nd Marine Division. By this reactivation, the regiment acquired its present and permanent designation, the 9th Marines.

• Officers and men of the 2nd Marines formed the nucleus of the newly activated regiment, Headquarters and Service Company and the 3rd Battalion. On 1 March, the 1st Battalion was activated, the largest percentage of its men coming from the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, recently returned from duty in Iceland. Regimental Weapons Company and the 2nd Battalion were organized on 1 April, completing the regiment and increasing its strength to 99 officers and 3,003 enlisted men.

• Immediately, a training program was inaugurated to weld the 9th Marines into a hard-striking, fighting team. During the months of May and June, amphibious training was conducted In the San Diego-La Jolla area. A depletion of strength was suffered on 15 June; when the regiment was called on to furnish the cadre for the formation of the 22nd Marines. Again in July the unit was further reduced when it supplied personnel for the newly formed 23rd Marines. Beginning 1 August, a gradual replacement of personnel soon brought the 9th back up to full strength. Two days later, it was detached from the 2nd Marine Division and assigned to Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet.

World War Two ContinuedWorld War Two Continued……• The first four days of September were spent marching from Camp Elliott up the

coast to the new Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside. On 8 September, the 9th was transferred to the newly activated 3rd Marine Division, an association that was to last until the end of the war. Again the regiment engaged in intensive combat training, including two weeks of amphibious exercises in the San Diego-Oceanside area. Just a few weeks before shipping overseas, Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 9th and later the 20th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1952-1955) suggested the design for the unique "Striking Ninth" insignia. Although not authorized for a shoulder patch, it was generally accepted and remained the regimental insignia during World War II. "The emblem consists of a bald eagle with outstretched wings carrying three chain links in each claw, the motto 'Striking' on a ribbon running through a large figure nine and another ribbon lettered 'Ninth Marines' below the shield. The chain links typify the interlocked, interdependent battalions forming the backbone of the Regiment. The eagle itself and the flashing lightning represent the striking power of the regiment."

World War Two ContinuedWorld War Two Continued……BougainvilleBougainville

• Like the earlier Guadalcanal operation, the Bougainville campaign was a limited-objective assault designed to capture and defend a strategic airfield site--a vital link in the campaign to neutralize Rabaul, the Japanese stronghold on New Britain that was blocking the Allied advance up the Solomon chain. The Cape Torokina region was selected for the landing because the Japanese lightly defended it, possessed a suitable site for an air base, and was part of a natural defensive region approximately eight miles by six miles in dimension.

• At 0730 on D-Day, the landing craft carrying the 9th Marines' assault waves crossed the line of departure and headed for the chosen beaches of Empress Augusta Bay. Landing with three battalions abreast on the extreme left of the division beachhead, the regiment encountered little enemy opposition. It rapidly crossed the beaches, established defensive positions, and sent a strong patrol to the Laruma River mouth to protect the divisions left flank.

• When it did not appear that the Japanese would offer opposition on the left (west) flank, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 9th Marines were moved on 2-3 November to the east sector. This consolidation of the beachhead left the 3rd Battalion, 9th

Marines (3/9) on the extreme left flank. Before 3/9 could rejoin its regiment, the Japanese made their only attempt to reinforce their troops and the Battle of Koromokina Lagoon was on.

World War Two ContinuedWorld War Two Continued…… GuamGuam• Assigned Blue Beach on the extreme right flank of the 3rd Marine Division, the 9th

had several missions. Its first objective was to seize the ridges just inland from the beach and then, to expand the beachhead to the perimeter designated by III Corps. On order, the regiment was to drive west around the shore of Apra Harbor to link up with the 1st Brigade.

• At 0740 on 21 July 1944, the amphibian tractors carrying the first assault waves of the 9th Marines started toward the shore of Guam, which had just undergone the heaviest preparatory bombardment yet delivered by the Navy in the Pacific. After crossing the reefs and landing the Marines on the beach, the amphibian tractors hastened back to the reef's edge to rendezvous with landing boats bringing up following waves.

• During a division attack on 25 July, the 9th‘s 2nd Battalion, attached to the 3rd

Marines, spearheaded that regiment's assault upon the Fonte Plateau, the site of an elaborate Japanese Division command post. Within an hour, 2/9 had secured its first objective, Mt. Tenjo Road, which gave the Marines a much-needed route over which to bring up tanks.

• On the night of 25-26 July, the 2nd Battalion, in its exposed position, received the brunt of the Japanese Fonte Plateau counterattack. Beating off seven determined thrusts, the Marines held their ground, although they suffered over 50 per cent casualties. In the morning, the bodies of 950 Japanese soldiers in front of the battalion's lines testified to the fury of the enemy attack. Still continuing in the advance, 2/9 was to see much heavy fighting before it seized the Fonte Plateau on 29 July.

World War Two ContinuedWorld War Two Continued……Iwo JimaIwo Jima

• Embarking aboard ship 8 February 1945, the 9th Marines sailed from Guam to Iwo Jima on the 17th, arriving in the floating reserve area on D-Day, 19 February. Five days later, the regiment landed and moved up to the front. The situation ashore at this time found the Japanese controlling the rough high ground to the north, east, and west, looking down the throats of the Marines below. Before any general advance could be made, a breakthrough in the Japanese center was essential. To the 3rd Marine Division was given this task of clearing the critical central portion of the Motoyama Plateau by means of a frontal assault.

• On the morning of 25 February, the fresh 9th Marines passed through the front lines on the southern edge of Motoyama Airfield No. 2, and attacked with two battalions in assault and one in reserve. For three days, the Marines fought on and around the airfield, while a hail of fire from rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery rained down on the slow-moving Marines from the heights ahead.

• Enemy defenders on two key terrain features, Hills PETER and 199 OBOE, continually hampered the advance. Finally, by means of a coordinated attack between the 1st and 2nd Battalions on 27 February, the 9th overran Hill PETER and continued down the reverse slope and up to the crest of 199 OBOE. The next morning the 21st Marines relieved the depleted regiment to push the attack and break the main line of resistance of the Japanese that same day.

The 9The 9thth Marines in VietnamMarines in Vietnam• A battalion of the 9th Marines was one of the first units to land in Vietnam

following the decision to commit Marine forces against the Viet Cong. On 8 March1965, BLT (Battalion Landing Team) 3/9, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. McPartllin, Jr., landed in Da Nang in central Vietnam as part of the 9th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The brigade's mission was to defend the Da Nang Air Base, which at that time was under constant threat of attack by the Viet Cong. Marines of 3/9 quickly and effectively secured the airbase and its immediate vicinity and remained at that location. On 16 June 1965, BLT 1/9 under Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig, relieved them.

• Beginning in September 1965, at the height of the rice harvest season, the 9th

Marines inaugurated Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, so named because of the nature of the mission. Working in conjunction with local Vietnamese units and district officials, 9th Marines units conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of areas where rice was to be harvested and also provided security for the villagers. This type of operation was successful both militarily and politically and was instrumental in establishing Marine-Vietnamese rapport throughout the regimental zone of action.

• In an effort to provide maximum assistance to the pacification program and, at the same time, to accomplish one of its priority missions, the destruction of the Viet Cong--the 9th Marines developed Operation COUNTY FAIR in February 1966.

The 9The 9thth Marines in VietnamMarines in Vietnam ContinuedContinued……

• The 9th Marines' participation in COUNTY FAIR operations consisted of cordoning a target area (village or hamlet) in order to isolate it for the duration of the operation (normally two days) and providing limited medical and logistical assistance. To the largest extent possible, Vietnamese military, police, and civil authorities performed the task of searching the target areas and handling the populace. This was considered an essential element of COUNTRY FAIR operations, since one of its primary purposes was to restore the populace's confidence in the Vietnamese governmental structure and to instill a sense of trust and loyalty towards duly appointed officials.

• During its first year of deployment in Vietnam, the 9th Marines took part in approximately 45 battalion and several hundred company-size operations within the Da Nang tactical area of responsibility as well as in several III Marine Amphibious Force operations outside the Da Nang area.

Vietnam Operations & Battle LocationsVietnam Operations & Battle LocationsOPERATION DATES LOCATION PROVINCE

Blastout I Aug-65 Cam Ne, Cau Do, North of Da Nang Quang NamGolden Fleece Sep-Oct 65 Hoa Vang District Quang NamCounty Fair Sept-Dec 65 Villlage surround and search VariousRice Straw Oct-Nov 65 TAOR Extension to Ky Lam River Quang NamIndependence Feb-66 S of Song Vu Gia Quang NamMontgomery May-66Ky Lam Campaign May-66 Dai Loc area, 6 mi S of Da Nang Quang NamLiberty Jul-66 Dai Loc area, 6 mi S of Da Nang Quang NamMacon Jul-Oct 66 An Hoa Area, S of Da Nang Quang NamDeckhouse V Jan-67 Mekong Delta, Co Chien, Ham Luong Kien HoaPrairie II Feb-Mar 67 DMZ, North of Cam Lo Quang TriBeacon Hill Mar-Apr 67 DMZ N of Cam Lo, Gio Linh area Quang TriPrairie III Mar-Apr 67 DMZ Quang TriPrairie IV Apr-May 67 DMZ Quang TriChinook II Apr-67 St w/o Joy , 12 mi North of Hue Thua ThienCimarron Jun-Jul 67 DMZ N of Cam lo Quang TriBuffalo Jul-67 NE of Con Thien Quang TriFremont Jul-Oct 67 Cobi-Thanh Tan N of Hue Thua Thien,Kingfisher Jul-Oct 67 DMZ Con Thien to Cam Lo area Quang TriKentucky Nov 67-Feb 69 DMZ Leatherneck Square Quang TriNeosho Nov 67-Jan 68 Cobi-Thanh Tan sector N of Hue Thua ThienScotland Nov 67-Mar 68 Khe Sanh Plateau (was Ardmore) Quang TriBallistic Armor Jan-68 N of Hue Thua ThienDai Do Apr-May 68 Battle of Dai Do - Cau Viet Quang TriPegasus/LamSon 207 Apr-68 Khe Sanh Area Quang TriJuly Action Jul-68 N of Camp Carroll Quang TriDawson River Nov 68-Jan 69 Ba Long Valley Quang TriDawson River West Jan-69 West of Khe Snh - to Loation Border Quang TriDewey Canyon Jan-Mar 69 Da Krong Valley Base Area 611 Quang TriApache Snow May 69-Jun 69 Da Krong Valley Quang TriUtah Mesa Jun-Jul 69 Khe Sanh Plateau Quang TriCameron Falls Jun-69 Da Krong Valley SW of Vandergift Quang TriKeystone Eagle Jul-69 Redeployment

1/9, 2/9, 3/9

26th Mar, 1/9, 2/1, 2/3

1/9, 2/9, 3/9

1/9, 2/9, 3/91/9, 2/9, 3/9

1/9, 2/9, 3/91/9, 2/9, 3/9

3/4, 1/9

1/9,2/9,3/9,1/3,2/3,3/31/9, 2/9

2/4, 1/3, 1/9

1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 2/3

26th Mar, 1/92/4, 1/9

1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/4, 3/3

3/4, 2/3, 2/9, 1/9, 3/3

1/9, 3/4, 1/4, 1/3, 2/39th Mar , 2/3

3/3, 1/9, 2/9, 3/9,1/4, 3/4

1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 2/3

1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/3, 3/3, 1/4, 3/41/9

3/3, 1/9, 1/4

1/9, 2/9

1/92/3, 3/3, 3/4, 1/9, 2/9

1/9, 2/9, 1/1

UNITS INVOLVED1/3, 1/9

1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/41/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/4

OERATIONS and BATTLE LOCATIONS

9th Mar

9th Mar1/1, 1/3, 1/9

The 1The 1stst Battalion 9Battalion 9thth Marines in VietnamMarines in VietnamMarch 1965 March 1965 –– March 1966March 1966

For the Marine Corps, the Vietnam war will prove the longest campaign in its history. It will also be one of the largest in scale. By 1968, over 85,000 Marines will be committed to the conflict, a larger force than that which stormed ashore at Okinawa.

On July 1st 1965 Vietcong sappers attack the heart of the Marine presence in Vietnam - the Air Base at Da Nang. Although the losses are of minor significance, the propaganda value to the VC is incalculable, and pressure builds to allow the Marines a more aggressive posture.

Marine Patrols ordered to secure Vietnamese villages face problems none have before encountered. Marine training, the toughest in the United States armed forces, has not prepared men for an enemy hidden amongst the civilian population.

This is a new world, a world in which villagers are fearful, hostile by turn. A community of apparently peaceful farmers could harbour a deadly guerilla army.

For the Marines in Vietnam the nightmare is beginning - a hell of snipers and of booby traps, of ceaseless fear and suspicion............


1st Battalion, 9th Marines, formerly 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, was formed January 2, 1965. Composed of men fresh out of ITR and the nucleus of the old battalion returning from leave, we began Lock-On training at Camp Pendleton California. We would learn how to work as an efficient team. From fireteam tactics to the battalion FEX many days and nights were spent in classrooms and in the field. While becoming acquainted with Case Springs, the firing ranges and the hills around the San Mateo area, we watched the situation in Southeast Asia develop, wondering how long it would be before we would put this training to practical use.

After a well earned 'ninety-six' we began preparing for our overseas tour. We shipped from San Diego March 14 aboard the USS General J. C. Breckinridge. Aboard ship we attended lectures, stood inspections and continued training, even though some of us suffered seasickness. We got liberty in Hawaii and Yokohama and on April 2 off-loaded at Naha Port, Okinawa. That same day we officially became 1st Battalion, 9th Marines when we traded colors with the old 1/9. We were now a unit of the 3rd Marine Division. The 'like new' barracks at Camp Hansen were quite an improvement over the living quarters at Pendleton.

Almost immediately Bravo Company set out for the Northern Training Area for a lengthy stay as host company. Delta Company went to Raid School and was soon followed by Alpha Company. All of the line companies spent a very wet ten days at NTA for jungle warfare training. Not many of us realized at that time how valuable that training would be. We weathered a couple typhoon warnings with no more than heavy rain and a bit of wind. We even weathered a few weekends in such unlikely spots as Kin Village, Koza, Kadena, Naha and Four Corners.In the field we worked with many of the units that were to join us when we became a Battalion Landing Team. When we got the word: "pack your gear and be ready to board ship by June 12, you're going to Vietnam as BLT 1/9," it came as no great surprise. We suspected something like this would happen, but we had had our hopes set for Fuji. A hectic two days and nights of loading and we were under way.

Remember how happy those "salts" in 3/9 were when we "walked" ashore at Da Nang. They sure were glad to see us. In fact, they started loading even before we were all ashore. Bravo moved out immediately to participate in an operation in the western TAOR while the rest of us moved to Da Nang airfield and began to improve the positions.


Then the word was passed that most of the CP would be moved to the base of Hill 268 within 24 hours to make room for the Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG).

Every now and then a Viet Cong sniper would try his luck at us, but usually nothing came of it Except once in a while one of them would get lucky and get close enough to make the dirt fly.

On July 1 the VC sent a suicide squad equipped with 81 mm mortars and 57 mm recoilless rifles to the airfield. Before it was over three Air Force jets were destroyed and three were damaged. Later on we captured one of the VC who participated in the attack and from him learned that thanks to our alertness they didn't fully accomplish their mission. Shortly after this we moved back to the airfield. By now we were beginning to feel like Ringling Brothers with all that moving around. We stayed at the airstrip for a short time before we got word that we were to move again. We got pretty comfortable down by the Cau Do River, but it wasn't long until we moved to Marble Mountain.

When we were instructed in the finer points of the inter-Division Transfer System that was being initiated so that the rotation tour dates would be mixed in each unit, we lost a lot of friends and comrades to other outfits.

That night the VC hit Da Nang East, Da Nang Main and Chu Lai was a real thriller. With Da Nang East just a mile down that bumpy road we saw some action. We lost a lot of choppers that night and MCB-9 got it pretty bad but we got about 20 of them.

Life at Marble Mountain was a steady stream of sweeps, village searches and perimeter security, but we soon got strong back tents to live in and life wasn't so bad after all.

We may have moved again before this book is off the presses but we'll do our best wherever we are because we're an organization rich in the spirit and pride that makes the Marine Corps the best fighting force of its kind in the world today. In early June the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clements, "convinced" the inhabitants of two hamlets to move about five miles, near the village of Le My, where the Marines had already established a strong presence............"I influenced their decision by honesty, sincerity, and a hell of a lot of H & I fires." "This permitted the battalion to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign based upon the situation as it appeared to the (Vietnamese) people on the ground. This privileged position permitted a great deal of person-to-person confidence to develop, and along with it, a personal commitment to the government cause."


The American troops in their enclave bases had been spared the brunt of the enemy offensive which was concentrated around Saigon and in the central highlands. But shortly after midnight on July 1, 1965 the marines guarding the air base at Da Nang gottheir first taste of heavy Vietcong firepower. Late on the night before, a heavily armed VC attack force consisting of a specialoperations company and motor company crossed the Cau Do River south of Da Nang. By midnight they reached the southeastern perimeter of the air base, knowing that the outer portion of the southern perimeter was guarded by ARVN troops rather than U.S. Marines. Digging under the outer perimeter fence, a thirteen-man demolition team then crossed an open area and cut a hole in the inner perimeter fence. A single marine sentry, hearing something in the dark, threw an illumination grenade.At that moment the enemy opened fire and ten demolition's experts raced onto the airfield. They destroyed an F-102 Corvair and two C-130 transport planes and damaged another F-102 and C-130. Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig immediately sent a reinforcing squad from Company C of his 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. But in those few minutes the enemy withdrew from the field. By 7:AM Company B from 1/9 was searching the area for the sappers. Fourteen suspects were rounded up, but none was connected to the attack. ARVN soldiers did find a wounded North Vietnamese intelligence officer who told them that the attack had been planned and rehearsed for over a month.


Fire at Cam Ne

On July 2, 1965 one day after the attack, General Walt sought authorization form the ARVN I Corps commander, General Thi, to extend the marine TAOR (tactical area of responsibility) south of the air base to include the area five miles south of the Cau Do River, the direction from which the attack came. On July 20 General Thi reluctantly agreed, acknowledging that his men could not guarantee the security of the air base. But the extension of the TAOR presented the marines with a new problem. The area south of the Cau Do was densely populated and sympathetic to the VC. Contact between marines and Vietnamese civilians was bound to increase as the marines attempted to secure the area. Within two weeks a Zippo cigarette lighter would ignite the tense situation on the ground and on the American television screen.

William R. Melton Squad Leader,

Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines 1965

Take what happened at Cam Ne. At the beginning of August we got word that Company D was going to a known Vietcong village called Cam Ne. It was the same area where another company had been a little earlier and run into some real trouble. To get to the village we came up along a river on amtracs and debarked a short distance away. Just as we formed for attack the enemy took us under fire, wounding four men from another platoon. So we went in there and destroyed the village. Those were our orders. In fact, I had asked our platoon commander before we set off, and he said if they fire on us we can destroy the village. The unfortunate part of it was that one of the men in our platoon used a Zippo lighter to set fire to one of the houses, and that got on television because we had Morley Safer of CBS News with us. Boy, he did us a job.


Operation Starlite August 17, 1965

Perhaps the most important outcome of Operation Starlite was its psychological lift. In the first major engagement between American troops and Main Force Vietcong soldiers the Americans has been victorious. Had the American forces lost - a real possibility given their inexperience - the effects might have been severe indeed. The old tactics of the VC, which had worked so well against ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), failed to rout the marines. So the enemy learned a lesson as well; it would be many months before they would again stand to fight against the marines.

For the marines, Starlite, or the Battle of Chu Lai as it became known in their lore, took on an almost mythical importance. For those marines who came later and for whom the landings at Iwo Jima and Inchon Beach were the glory of another generation, the Battle of Chu Lai remained for many months the only evidence of what the marines could do if the enemy stood and engaged. Now, in late August 1965 the number of marines - and soldiers, airmen, and sailors -arriving in Vietnam was no longer a trickle, but a torrent. Fateful decisions had been made in Washington, by one man, sitting alone in his office: the president of the United States.


Operation Gloden Fleece August 30, 1965Another marine program proved more productive than County Fair. On August 30, 1965, Huynh Ba Trinh, the chief of Hoi Hai Village, visited the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, to ask the marines to provide security for his people during their September rice harvest. Each harvest, the village chief explained, the VC demand a sizable portion of the rice yield. What the VC took usually amounted to the only surplus the villagers could sell in the marketplace. Already, the village chief knew, the insurgents had moved into the area to collect the rice.

Lieutenant Colonel Verle Ludwig, commander of the 1/9 Marines, agreed to ward off the Vietcong and devised a project called Golden Fleece. When the rice harvest began on September 10, companies from the 1/9 saturated the area around Hoi Hai Village, conducted night ambushes, and set up cordons around the harvesters working in the fields. After a major unsuccessful fight with the marines on September 12, most of the VC left. The marines met only sporadic resistance during the rest of the harvest. Golden Fleece was an economic success because it preserved the harvest and it was also a psychological success. The marines proved they could defend the villagers, and they forced the Vietcong to increase their rice levy in other areas, thereby diminishing their popular support there.

Control over rice had been an important element of the war in Vietnam, and the success of Golden Fleece reinforced this fact among the marines. Soon other marine units, often working together with ARVN troops, took up rice protection at harvest time. Emphasis on the technique also spread south among U.S. Army units. Not all subsequent Golden Fleece operations proved successful, in part because sometimes ARVN troops pilfered from the harvests they were assigned to protect. But the technique became a standard component of military operations conducted at harvest time.

Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig

April 1966 ActionApril 1966 Action• Colonel Simmons compared the role of his regiment to that of the "ham in the

sandwich," the filler to absorb the shock of the confrontation between the two opposing sides. This situation could only benefit the Communist. The 9th Marines had to revert to the defensive because of the threat to the security of Da Nang created by the polarization of the ARVN forces into hostile factions. With the abandonment of several government outposts along Route 4 and vast amounts of ammunition, the VC not only rearmed at GVN expense, but also reentered the area the Marines had just cleared during Operation Kings.

• On 16 April, an old enemy, the R-20 "Doc Lap" Battalion, attacked one of the companies from Lieutenant Colonel Donahue's 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines in position north of the abandoned 39th Ranger outpost at Phung Thu. Company H, commanded by Captain Everette S. Roane, had established defensive positions north of Route 4, and put a squad ambush south of the road. Suddenly, at 0400, the enemy opened up with recoilless rifle and mortar fire. Simultaneously, the enemy launched two company-size assaults, one from the southeast and the other from the southwest. The attack from the southwest, about 100 men, ran into a Marineambush and stalled. According to the Marine squad leader, his men "shot 12-15 VC for sure-most likely more." At dawn the following morning, the squad found two enemy bodies in front of its position. The approximately 150-man force attacking from the southeast reached the north side of Route 4, but was unable to penetrate the Marine Company’s perimeter.

April 1966 Action Continued…April 1966 Action Continued…• Many VC were shot as they crossed the road and went down into the

paddy in front of the 2nd Platoon. At one point, 22 VC were shot as they attempted to remove bodies. During the lulls in illumination, as bodies would be removed and more VC would cross the road, there would be more bodies.

• At first light, the Marines counted 12 enemy bodies, but estimated killing another 63. Company H had not gone unscathed, suffering seven dead and 37 wounded, largely as a result of the enemy's recoilless rifle and mortar attack.

• In mid-April the 9th Marines resumed the initiative, following the temporary standoff of the political crisis. Originally, the regiment planned to follow Kings with a one-battalion operation beginning on 10 April in the An Hoa region south of the Ky Lam and Thu Bon. Though unable to meet the original date, the 9th Marines completed its revised order for Operation Georgia. The mission was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines.

The May 1966 The May 1966 -- Ky Lam Campaign Ky Lam Campaign (The Lost Patrol "B" 1/9)(The Lost Patrol "B" 1/9)

• The Ky Lam Campaign, named after the river, was to be a three-phased advance. At the end of May 1966, the forward battalions were to reach Phase Line Brown, a line which extended from below Dai Loc in the west and followed the La Tho-Thanh Quit Rivers eastward, with the exception of a 2,000 meter-wide horseshoe-shaped salient extending south 5,000 meters along both sides of Route 1 to just above Dien Ban. In June, the regiment was to begin the second phase of the operation, securing all of Route 4 west of Route 1 and extending the Marines' lines down to the Ky Lam. During July, the 9th Marines, in the final phase of the campaign, was to advance southward in the region east of Route 1 and incorporate the city of Hoi An in its area of responsibility.

• The heaviest fighting in the early stages of the campaign was in 1/9's zone of action. On 10 May, they had established the battalion's forward command post in Dai Loc. Company B was on the eastern bank of the Vu Gia, 3,500 meters south of Dai Loc to provide a covering force for units leaving the Georgia area of operations. That morning, Company A, 9th Marines crossed the Vu Gia in LVTs and rejoined its parent battalion at Dai Loc. After the river crossing, Company A, prepared for a clearing operation around the town of Dai Loc, which Company B made preparations for a similar operation in southern Dai Loc District above the Thu Bon.

• Allied intelligence sources indicated that the R-20 Battalion had re-infiltrated this area. A report received on 11 May stated that a company of the battalion was in the hamlet of Do Nam near a small finger lake, 2,000 meters northwest of Company B's position.

The May 1966 The May 1966 -- Ky Lam Campaign Ky Lam Campaign ContinuedContinued……

• On the morning of 12 May, one of Company B's patrols unexpectedly came upon the enemy. The 14-man patrol squad had left the company CP at 0630, moving east. One hour later, the patrol reported that it had come under small arms fire and captured a VC suspect. Encountering no further resistance, the Marines continued their patrol. At 0830, the squad leader radioed back that a water buffalo was in its path. Captain Henry ordered the squad to avoid the animal, but "if threatened by it, they were given permission to shoot." In the squad's next report, about 30 minutes later, the Marines stated that they had wounded the buffalo and were giving chase to finish it off. Fifteen minutes after that, the patrol reported harassing fire and seeing Viet Cong fleeing to the east "and that the patrol was giving physical pursuit." The patrol leader asked for supporting mortar fire. Company B's mortar section fired an 81mm ranging round, but the patrol was unable to observe its impact. Captain Henry ordered his mortars to cease firing, fearing that they might hit his own men. About that time, the company sent out a second squad to follow the route of the first patrol. The second squad came under small arms and mortar fire itself. The Marines countered with mortar fire from the companies base area, which silenced the enemy's weapons. About 1030, the squad leader reported hearing a 'heavy volume of small arms fire, mortars, M79s, and hand grenades due east of their position," near the village of Do Nam. Believing that he had found the missing Marines, he asked for an aerial observer. An Army AO {aerial observer} happened into the area and reported an apparent firefight in the vicinity of the action recently reported by the second squad. The Army aircraft dropped a red smoke grenade in the village of Do Nam and fired four rockets into a trench line in front of the Marines. Making another pass, the Army AO threw out two messages to the Marines below, informing them that there were 20 VC in the trench line.

The May 1966 The May 1966 -- Ky Lam Campaign Ky Lam Campaign ContinuedContinued……

• By 1145 Company B had established a 500-meter defensive line near the village of Hoa Tay, 500 meters southwest of the second squad's position. By 1230, the entire company was heavily engaged. The company's 81mm and 60mm mortars failed to silence the enemy's weapons and Capt. Henry asked for artillery and air support. After an artillery mission fired by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, the action died down for about 20 minutes. At noon, the enemy opened up again with small arms and mortars, but by this time F-4Bs from VMFA-542 were overhead. The jets' first runs on the entrenched VC in Do Nam once more temporarily silenced the enemy. Following the air strikes, about 1320, Captain Henry's men spotted two Marines crossing an open field toward their lines. Henry ordered "a base of fire and mortar fire" to cover the two men. Both Marines were from the first patrol and badly wounded. The company commander asked them, before they went under sedation, where the rest of the squad was. The men vaguely pointed in a general direction to the northeast and said they were all dead. Before being overrun, the wounded men claimed that the patrol had killed 30 of the enemy. Shortly after 1330, the 1st Battalion commander decided to reinforce his Company B. After some initial problems in obtaining helicopter support, he moved Company D and a platoon from Company A to link up with Capt. Henry's company. By 1815, the three Marine units were consolidated in a 360-degree defensive perimeter around the hamlet of Hoa Tay.

• The afternoon of May 13 Company B recovered the bodies of the 12 missing Marines near the western tip of the small finger lake.

The Lost Patrol “B” 1/9The Lost Patrol “B” 1/9

The Story Of How The 1The Story Of How The 1stst

Battalion, 9Battalion, 9thth Marines Earned the Marines Earned the NicknameNickname

“The Walking Dead”

There is a valley about 15 miles south of Da Nang, Republic of South Vietnam, which has ALWAYS been a strong hold of the Viet Min. Neither the Japanese nor the French could ever establish a garrison in that valley, many tried and died, but none could. That was until some genius noticed the 1st Bn. 9th Marines were getting a little fat and sassy hanging around the airbase and Marble Mountain. Everything out side of our wire was undisputedly controlled by Victor Charlie [“VC”, “Viet Cong”, or “Charlie”], including the village at the bottom of the hill. Our mission was to Search and Destroy the enemy and all of his support. Charlie found out within weeks we were not the Japanese or the French and he couldn't hold his own in fighting us man for man. So he changed his tactics to harassing & sniper fire, mines & booby-traps, he would only take us on if he out numbered us 10 to 1, or he had a good escape route. Dodge City, Indian Country, Arizona Territory, Hand Grenade Alley are just a few of the names given to areas we fought the enemy. Marine Corps history of the Battalion states that we were in hundreds of company size operations in our first year in country.

At first 1/9 became infamous as the 'Zippo', battalion, because we had operational orders to burn and kill everything if a Vill was deserted when we entered. Villagers ran or hid when we swept through their Vill, so we burned most of them.

A lineman from 9th Engineers, running wire out to our hill was captured, tortured and mutilated. It seems from that day forward, all illusions of codes of conducts and humanity seemed to end. The sweeps to find Charlie became very vicious. And Charlie got better at making & placing his mines, which were horrific. Dozens of our men were cut in half, or were decapitated. It seemed like we lost a couple of our friends everyday. We were all insane with fear and hatred.

None of the events in our Valley escaped Hanoi. During a speech in early spring of 1966, Ho Chi Minh said the phrase "Di bo chet" (The Walking Dead) to describe the Marines in the Valley, He meant us, that we were already dead, just had not been buried yet. During the same event, General Vo Nguyen Giap promised President Ho and the Vietnamese people that he would liberate the valley as a birthday present for Ho.

It just happened that within weeks of the speech, on May 12th, Bravo Company stepped into a VC Boot camp. For 4 days we fought a VERY fierce series of battles that saw a lot of our brothers die, and it gutted the military options of General Giap. On Ho's birthday, the grunt companies Alpha, Bravo, Charlie & Delta re-enforced H&S Company and dug in around the hill for their attack, it was a non-event. Bravo, with the support of Alpha and Delta, had destroyed them at the village of Ho Thay. Hanoi Hanna had labeled us 'The Walking Dead', and played our song 'No-Where to Run, No-Where to Hide, which we were very proud of.

I remember Captain Hart's reaction when General Walt told him that Ho & Giap had promised to wipe us out. He said, "Lew, does this mean they'll be coming to us? And we won't have to keep looking for them little bastards?“ You can thank a patrol of 14 Marines from Bravo Company that on May 12th 1966 paid a very high price for 1st Battalion 9th Marines to be proudly known as the ” Di bo Chet”, “The Walking Dead

Operation Liberty Operation Liberty -- June 1966June 1966• By mid-June General Kyle could expect to have three Marine infantry

regiments consisting of eight battalions at Da Nang. He planned to reduce the extensive 9th Marines TAOR by assigning the 1st Marines to the eastern flank while the 3rd Marines took over that part of the 9th Marines TAOR west of the Yen River. In effect, Kyle visualized a shoulder-to-shoulder advance to the Ky Lam. The operation, codenamed Liberty, was scheduled to begin on 7 June, with the 9th Marines bearing the brunt of the campaign in its initial stages.

• The 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines was to continue its two-company holding action in the An Hoa region. All the remaining infantry companies were assigned tot he three forward battalions, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on the eastern flank, the 2nd Battalion 9th Marines in the center, and the 1st

Battalion 9th Marines on the western flank. Thus each forward battalion was to consist of five infantry companies instead of the usual four, with three companies deployed to the front and two to the rear. The advancing battalions were to secure Route 4 by 20 June 1966 and reach the Ky Lam by the end of the month.

• On 7 June Operation Liberty began with heavy preparatory artillery fires. Marine artillery neutralized 35 objective areas in front of the advancing infantry. Initially, the enemy countered the Marine offensive with only small arms fire and mines. The mines were the more deadly of the two.

Operation Liberty Operation Liberty -- June 1966 June 1966 Continued…Continued…

• On 18 June 1966, Company C, 9th Marines, operating 2,000 meters south of Dai Loc, came under heavy mortar and small arms fire, suffering eight wounded. The company asked for supporting air and artillery, which ended the enemy resistance.

• 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines underwent a similar attack on 22 June in the hamlet of La Hoa, immediately east of the railroad and 4,000 meters north of the Ky Lam. Marines once more called upon supporting arms, including naval gunfire from the destroyer USS Marton (DD 948), to silence the enemy.

• By the end of the month, all three Marine regiments reached Phase Line Green and the operation ended. VC resistance to the Marines advance had been scattered and ineffective. The 9th Marines observed that the lack of major enemy resistance gave plausibility to the thesis that the momentum of Operation Liberty prevented them from gaining any degree of initiative and uprooted them "from what had been a relatively secure operating area." That regiment alone claimed to have recovered 40 square miles from the VC. The Marines were once more optimistic about pacifying the extensive Da Nang enclave

Operation Buffalo Operation Buffalo -- July 2, 1967July 2, 1967• Operation Buffalo began on 2 July utilizing 1st Battalion, 9th Marines in and around Con Thien.

Companies A and B operated north-northeast of the strong point near a former market place on Route 561, while Company D, Headquarters and Service Company, and the battalion command group remained within the outpost perimeter. Company C was at Dong Ha at the 9th Marines command post. In an attempt to counter this NVA maneuver, it was decided to send two companies of 1/9 ("A" and "B" Cos.) into the area (1,200 yards east of Con Thien and north of the Trace) which had just been swept during the last few days in June. This is the reason the two companies were there on 2 July.

• That morning, Company B, a company which gained a reputation for finding the enemy during earlier actions at Khe Sanh, walked into the heaviest combat of its Vietnam assignment. It had moved a mile east of Con Thien the day before in company with Company A to conduct a sweep north of the cleared trace. At 0800 on the 2nd, both units began moving north. Company A was on the left. Company B moved along Route 561, an old 8- to 10-foot-wide cart road bordered by waist-high hedgerows. The road led to trouble; two NVA battalions waited in prepared positions.

• Company B's movement started smoothly and by 0900 the 2d Platoon had secured its first objective, a small crossroads 1,200 meters north of the trace. There was no contact. As the 3d Platoon and the command group moved up the trail, enemy sniper fire started. The 3d Platoon and Captain Coates' command group moved to the left to suppress the enemy's fire, but as they pushed north the NVA fire intensified, halting the platoon. Captain Coates directed his 2d Platoon to shift to the right in a second attempt to outflank the Communist position; at the same time he ordered the 1st Platoon forward to provide rear security for the company. The 2d Platoon tried to move, but enemy fire forced it back onto the road. The number of wounded and dead mounted as NVA fire hit the unit from the front and both flanks. To worsen matters, the enemy began pounding the Marines with artillery and mortars.

• Shortly after the sweep began, Company A tripped two Claymore mines and the need for casualty evacuation delayed its movement. Afterward, Captain Slater moved his company eastward to help Company B, but could not link up because of heavy small arms fire. Soon the company had so many casualties that it was unable to fight and move simultaneously.

Operation Buffalo Continued…Operation Buffalo Continued…• Company B's position deteriorated. Enemy artillery and mortar fire cut off the 3rd Platoon and the

command group from the 2nd Platoon. The NVA troops then used flamethrowers to ignite the hedgerows on both sides of Captain Coates' unit, as well as massed artillery in close coordination with a ground attack. Many of the Marines, forced into the open by the flamethrowers, died under the enemy fire.

• Down the road, the 1st Platoon also took heavy punishment as it tried to push its way up to the lead elements of the company. North Vietnamese troops swarmed against the platoon's flanks, but air support arrived and the platoon commander, Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns, directed strikes against the enemy. The air strikes disrupted the enemy assault and the 1st Platoon reached what was left of the 2nd Platoon.

• The 1st Battalion command post at Con Thien heard the crackle of small-arms fire from the 0930 action, followed by a radio report that Company B had encountered a dug-in NVA unit. The first assessment of enemy strength was a platoon, then a battalion, and ultimately a multi-battalion force. When the firing began to increase, Lieutenant Colonel Schening alerted his Company C, at Dong Ha, to stand by to be heli-lifted into Company B's area. Lieutenant Colonel Schening dispatched a rescue force composed of four tanks and a platoon from Company D. Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, went with the small force to take command of Company B if link-up could be made. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the battalion intelligence officer, went also because he was familiar with the area where the enemy engaged Company B. The remainder of the battalion command group remained at Con Thien.

• The small rescue force moved down the cleared trace from Con Thien to the junction of Route 561 without incident, but as it turned north up the road it came under fire. A North Vietnamese unit, trying to encircle Company B, had moved south and was opposite Captain Radcliffe's small force. Helicopter gunships and the fire from the four tanks dispersed the enemy. Company C began arriving by helicopter and Captain Radcliffe ordered the Company D platoon to secure the landing zone and evacuate casualties. As the lead elements of Company C came into the zone they met a heavy artillery barrage, which wounded 11 Marines.

• The Marines set up a hasty defense, making maximum use of the tanks' firepower, and brought the dead and wounded into the perimeter. The Marines then loaded their casualties on the tanks. The rescue force found it impossible to recover all the bodies immediately; some bodies remained along the road.

Operation Buffalo Continued…Operation Buffalo Continued…•• During the battle, friendly and enemy supporting arms engaged inDuring the battle, friendly and enemy supporting arms engaged in a furious duel. In the first few hours of a furious duel. In the first few hours of

the engagement Marine aircraft dropped 90 tons of ordnance durinthe engagement Marine aircraft dropped 90 tons of ordnance during 28 sorties. Artillery fired 453 g 28 sorties. Artillery fired 453 missions, while Navy destroyers fired 142 5missions, while Navy destroyers fired 142 5--inch rounds into enemy positions. The NVA force fired 1,065 inch rounds into enemy positions. The NVA force fired 1,065 artillery and mortar rounds during the day at Gio Linh and Con Tartillery and mortar rounds during the day at Gio Linh and Con Thien; more than 700 rounds fell on hien; more than 700 rounds fell on Lieutenant Colonel Schening's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines alone.Lieutenant Colonel Schening's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines alone.

•• When the necessity of carrying the increasing numbers of woundedWhen the necessity of carrying the increasing numbers of wounded brought the company to a halt, brought the company to a halt, Company ACompany A’’s 3s 3rdrd Platoon established a hasty landing zone in the rear of the comPlatoon established a hasty landing zone in the rear of the company. After the first pany. After the first flight of medevac helicopters departed the zone, the enemy hit tflight of medevac helicopters departed the zone, the enemy hit the 3he 3rdrd Platoon with mortars and assaulted Platoon with mortars and assaulted the position. 2the position. 2ndnd Platoon and company command group moved to reinforce the 3Platoon and company command group moved to reinforce the 3rdrd Platoon.Platoon. The enemy The enemy advanced to within 50 meters of Company A's lines before small aadvanced to within 50 meters of Company A's lines before small arms and artillery fire broke up their rms and artillery fire broke up their attack. Enemy pressure and the remaining casualties kept Companyattack. Enemy pressure and the remaining casualties kept Company A in the defensive position until the A in the defensive position until the NVA force withdrew later in the evening.NVA force withdrew later in the evening.

•• At 1500 3At 1500 3rdrd Battalion, 9Battalion, 9thth Marines were ordered to move by helicopter to Lieutenant ColoneMarines were ordered to move by helicopter to Lieutenant Colonel Schening's l Schening's assistance. Three companies and the command group of the 3assistance. Three companies and the command group of the 3rdrd Battalion were in position north of the Battalion were in position north of the trace by 1800.trace by 1800.

•• After landing, Major Woodring assumed operational control of ComAfter landing, Major Woodring assumed operational control of Companies A and C of the 1panies A and C of the 1stst Battalion. Battalion. The combined force made a twilight attack on the enemy s left flThe combined force made a twilight attack on the enemy s left flank, while elements of Company B and ank, while elements of Company B and the platoon from Company D holding the landing zone pulled back the platoon from Company D holding the landing zone pulled back to the Con Thien perimeter in to the Con Thien perimeter in expectation of an attack on the outpost. The increased pressure expectation of an attack on the outpost. The increased pressure provided by the 3provided by the 3rdrd Battalion caused the Battalion caused the enemy to break contact. enemy to break contact.

•• 11stst battalion lost 53 killed, 190 wounded, and 34 missing. Not untibattalion lost 53 killed, 190 wounded, and 34 missing. Not until 5 July did the battalion complete the l 5 July did the battalion complete the recovery efforts that reduced the number of missing to nine, butrecovery efforts that reduced the number of missing to nine, but the number of dead increased to 84.the number of dead increased to 84. The The battalion established no accurate count of enemy killed. battalion established no accurate count of enemy killed.

•• On 3 July BLT 1/3 from SLF Alpha joined the 9On 3 July BLT 1/3 from SLF Alpha joined the 9thth Marines and tied in with 3/9Marines and tied in with 3/9’’s right flank. The s right flank. The regiment planned a drive north to recover missing bodies and pusregiment planned a drive north to recover missing bodies and push the NVA out of the Lang Son area, h the NVA out of the Lang Son area, only 4,000 meters northeast of the Con Thien perimeter. only 4,000 meters northeast of the Con Thien perimeter.

Operation Buffalo Continued…Operation Buffalo Continued…• The attack started early the morning of the 4th. The 3rd Battalion encountered heavy resistance from

concealed enemy positions southwest of the site of Company B's engagement on 2 July. A prolonged fight followed, involving tanks, artillery, and close air support. By 1830 when the final Marine assault ended, 3rd

Battalion, 9th Marines had lost 15 dead and 33 wounded. BLT 1/3 had 11 wounded during the same action. The same day BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo joined the operation; the battalion landed by helicopter north of Cam Lo at LZ Canary and moved west and then northward on the western edge of the battle area toward Con Thien.

• 3/9 decided to move a reinforced company 1,500 meters to the north-northwest to cover their left flank. Company A, 9th Marines, which now included the survivors of Company C, and a detachment from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, were chosen to complete the task. Company A moved into position without opposition and established a strong combat outpost. Company A's composite force dug concealed fighting positions and sent reconnaissance patrols north in an attempt to discover where the enemy crossed the Ben Hai River.

• As 3rd Battalion advanced, they encountered increasingly heavy artillery fire and by 1600 they could go no further. Company B, BLT 1/3, Commander climbed a tree to spot for air strikes and artillery fire in front of his position. An aerial observer radioed that a large enemy force was approaching his position. The AO had spotted a 400-man force crossing the Ben Hai River heading directly for the two battalions. After the sightings, both battalions, less Company A, came under heavy, accurate artillery fire. Between 500-600 rounds hit the 3rd Battalion's position and about 1,000 landed on BLT 1/3. The enemy, still in column formation, was unaware that it was heading directly into Company A. The Marines opened fire at less than 150 meters distance. When the enemy formed and attacked, heavy accurate artillery was walked to within 75 meters of the perimeter. The few NVA that penetrated the perimeter were killed and all lines held.

• In the early evening some NVA soldiers crept close enough to hurl hand grenades into the Marine lines. One of Company C fire-team leaders, Lance Corporal James L. Stuckey, responded by picking up the grenades and throwing them back toward their source. He was wounded when the third grenade exploded as it left his hand. He continued, however, to lead his fire-team for the rest of the night without medical assistance.

• For the rest of the night, enemy small arms and mortar fire harass ed Company A, but the NVA units were withdrawing. First light revealed 154 enemy bodies strewn around Company A's perimeter; the defenders had 12 casualties. Among the wounded Marines was Lance Corporal Stuckey; only tattered flesh remain ed where his hand had been.

Operation Buffalo Continued…Operation Buffalo Continued…• While the attack on Company A took place, the rest of what intelligence officers later determined to have

been the 90th NVA Regiment assaulted the two Marine battalions. To add to the effect of their preparatory fires, the attacking North Vietnamese threw fused blocks of TNT into the Marine positions to keep the Marines down as the assaulting troops moved in. The Marines countered with supporting arms; flare ships, attack aircraft, helicopter gun-ships, naval gunfire, and all available artillery concentrated their fire on the attacking enemy. By 2130, the Marines had repelled the assault and the Communist forces began withdrawing to the north.

• On 7 July, enemy artillery scored a direct hit on the command bunker of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Con Thien, killing 11, including First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the intelligence officer who had gone to the aid of Company B, 9th Marines on 2 July. Eighteen others sustained wounds; one was the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schening. The cause of the damage was a 152mm howitzer round, which penetrated five feet of sand bags, loose dirt, and 12x12-inch timbers.

• By 8 July the Marines raised the NVA casualty count to more than 800. Hundreds of bodies covered the scarred battleground, some half buried, others in pieces, all surrounded by a carpet of battered equipment and ammunition.

• Operation Buffalo closed on 14 July 1967. The Marines reported enemy losses as 1,290 dead and two captured. Marine losses, in contrast, totaled 159 killed and 345 wounded. The most savage aspect was the heavy employment of supporting arms by both sides. Of the known enemy killed, more than 500 came from air, artillery, and naval gunfire. In addition, supporting arms destroyed 164 enemy bunkers and 15 artillery and rocket positions, and caused 46 secondary explosions. To accomplish this, Marine aviation used 1,066 tons of ordnance, Marine and Army artillery consumed more than 40,000 rounds, and ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet fired 1,500 rounds from their 5- and 8-inch naval guns. On the other hand, enemy artillery accounted for half of the Marine casualties during the operation and posed a constant threat to the Marine logistical support installations.

• The July fighting around Con Thien reaffirmed the Marines' faith in supporting arms. In spite of the appearance of SAMs and the presence of excellent, long-range Communist artillery, the Marines could prove that the latest enemy offensive had failed. Con Thien had held and at least one first line enemy regiment was in shambles. The Buffalo victory did not breed overconfidence, but the body-strewn wasteland along the DMZ provided mute evidence of the effectiveness of III MAF's defenses.

Battle For Hill 64 Battle For Hill 64 –– Feb. 8, 1968Feb. 8, 1968• At 0420, 8 Feb, 1968 a reinforced battalion from the 101D Regiment, 325C NVA

Division launched an attack against the 1st Plt A/1/9, which occupied Hill 64 some 500 meters west of the 1/9 perimeter at Khe Sanh. Following their usual pattern, the North Vietnamese tried to disrupt the Marines artillery support with simultaneous bombardment of the Khe Sanh combat base. To prevent friendly reinforcements from reaching the small hill, the enemy also shelled the platoon's parent unit and, during the fight some 350 mortar and artillery shells fell on 1/9 positions.

• The enemy soldiers poured into the trench line and attacked the bunkers with RPGs and satchel charges. They also emplaced machine guns at the edge of the penetrations and pinned down those Marines in the Eastern half of the perimeter that were trying to cross over the hill to reinforce their comrades. The men in the northeastern sector, led by platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach, Jr. counterattacked down the trench line and became engaged in savage hand-to-hand fighting. While rallying his troops and directing fire from atop an exposed bunker, Lieutenant Roach was mortally wounded.

• From the sheer weight of numbers, the North Vietnamese gradually pushed the Marines back until the enemy owned two thirds of the outpost. At that point, neither side was able to press the advantage. Pre-registered mortar barrages from 1/9 and artillery fire from Khe Sanh Combat Base had isolated the NVA assault units from any reinforcements but at the same time the depleted 1st Plt was not strong enough to dislodge the enemy.

Battle For Hill 64 Battle For Hill 64 –– Feb. 8, 1968 Feb. 8, 1968 Continued…Continued…

• A relief force of approximately two squads of volunteers, led by Captain J.J.M. Radcliffe, Alpha Company Commander, Shortly after daylight, made its way to the eastern slope of the hill. With a squad-size force along the southeastern side to block any enemy reinforcements along the trail, the remainder of the small force made contact with the shattered fragments of the 1st platoon. In addition to Lt. Roach, the platoon sergeant, S/Sgt. McKinney and the platoon radio operator, PFC Rizzo were KIA and two of the three-squad leaders were out of action. Capt. Radcliffe consolidated the remaining members of the platoon, placing a small squad size force on the north, a squad of the relief force under Cpl. Jay Enzinna on the south, and took a small force of approximately nine Marines to include the company gunnery sergeant, Camile D. Hont, two radio operators, and Cpl. Clopton to move down the center of the position. The north and south squads were to coordinate their counter-attack to retake the position with the force in the center, thus preventing any NVA attempts to breach 'Alpha' company's efforts to re-gain the outpost. In close hand-to-hand combat including a continuing exchange of grenades (ours were far superior), the marines moved forward slowly, their efforts hampered by the NVA who had over-run and occupied many of the bunkers. Realizing that some of the bunkers under NVA control and the trench lines contained wounded Marines, the relief force did not use LAAWs to blow the bunkers for fear of inflicting further Marine casualties.

• The NVA attempted at least twice to stop the Marine force but were re-buffed. As quickly as tactically sound, but slowly, the Marines regained the hill. NVA bodies blocked the trench lines, clogged the bunkers, and were strewn over the western approaches to the hill. Attempts by the NVA to come up the western slope of the position were stopped by the supporting fires from Bravo and Delta companies, fires from 1/9's and 81's and from a tank within 1/9's lines. Capt. Radcliffe and Cpl. Genty, the former radio operator who was over-due to rotate home, stopped one NVA element attempting to come up the slope, and stymied either a counter-attack or an effort to retrieve NVA casualties by firing into a platoon size force coming out of the tree line and elephant grass at the bottom of the hill.

Battle For Hill 64 Battle For Hill 64 –– Feb. 8, 1968 Feb. 8, 1968 Continued…Continued…

• The rain, fog and winds reduced the effect of supporting arms. Fixed wing close air support was minimal until long after daylight. The first air on station was RVN sky-raiders, propeller driven, slow moving and bomb-loaded. They were dropping in the suspected enemy staging areas and within 50 yards of the base of the western approaches.

• Upon securing the position, the priorities were: casualty treatment and evacuation, accounting for personnel, equipment, and ammunition, evacuation of POWs (at least four were alive among the 150 plus NVA bodies on the position and the western slope), and removing our KIAs. A lack of personnel, the battle fatigue of those still able to function, and the losses of the leaders - Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, & Squad Leaders, slowed these efforts.

• The order to evacuate the position, despite having re-taken it and having complete control of it, was slowly carried out. Wounded and dead were carried down the eastern slope and loaded onto otters. Once this was accomplished, two otters were loaded with weapons, both US and NVA, and taken to the battalion position. Weapons, equipment, and personal gear that couldn't be removed because of the lack of personnel and the time restraint to clear the position, were blown in place.

• Later in the day after the 1st platoon's area had been cleared, an air strike was called on it; bombs and napalm shook the hill and created an eerie look which now that the fog and rain had vanished could be seen from Khe Sanh Combat Base as well as the positions on 381, 861, and 915 (1050).

• Marine casualties were 23 KIA and 29 WIA. NVA losses were 152 KIA and over 60 weapons captured.

Operation Dewey Canyon Operation Dewey Canyon -- 19691969• A year after the Tet Offensive of 1968, military intelligence reports indicted a massive enemy

buildup in the already heavily enemy-controlled A Shau. Plans at this stage of the war were for a decreasing role for US ground troops, and transfer of responsibility for combat actions to the soldiers of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN). But the enemy strength in A Shau posed a threat that demanded an immediate American effort to deny the enemy his sanctuary, capture his supplies, and prove that the A Shau would no longer be a haven. Primary responsibility for this mission fell to the men of the 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Reinforced) FMF.

• Headquartered 50 miles northeast of the A Shau at Vandergrift Combat Base under the command of Colonel Robert H. Barrow, the 9th Marines boasted three battalions to be marshaled for the formidable task. The mission would be one of the last major offensives conducted by US Marines in Vietnam. It would be tough, it would be deadly, but it would be in the tradition of the US Marine Corps, an engagement fought valiantly and successfully.

• The commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division, headquartered out of Da Nang, was Major General Raymond G. Davis. General Davis referred to the 9th Marines as the "Mountain Regiment" and his "Strike Force Regiment". As Operation Dewey Canyon began on January 22, 1969, General Davis had good reason to pay close attention to the efforts of his Marines. Operation Dewey Canyon would send General Davis' son, Lieutenant Miles Davis, into harms way.

• Phase I of Operation Dewey Canyon primarily involved the movement and positioning of air assets. Phase II, the movement of the 3 battalions of the 9th Marines out of Vandergrift Combat Base began on January 31st.

• From January 31 until February 10, 1969, 2/9 continued its movement south, flanked by 1/9 and 3/9. By February 10th the three battalions were poised and ready to enter Phase III, the incursion into A Shau. Along the way they had built numerous firebases with names likeHenderson, Tun Tavern, Shiloh, Razor, and Cunningham, to provide artillery support and maintain supply routes.

Operation Dewey Canyon Operation Dewey Canyon -- 1969 1969 Continued…Continued…

• Phase II of Operation Dewey Canyon was under way. Far to the south of Vandergrift the 3rd

Battalion, 9th Marines were crossing the Da Krong River only 13 kilometers from Laos. The following morning the Marines of 1/9 and 2/9 began moving out of their firebases as well, heading southward and towards the North Vietnamese Base Area 611 that ran from the north boundary of A Shau and into Laos.

• Triple-canopy jungle made movement difficult and two weeks of continuous fog and heavy monsoon rains removed any possibility of personal comfort and made resupply difficult. The enemy moved freely through the A Shau at night on roads they would carefully camouflage during the day with movable trees and shrubs ingeniously planted in containers. As they moved, the Marines were subjected to heavy artillery fire from NVA guns inside Laos. At night, more troops and weapons moved down the Ho Chi Minh trail. General Davis caused a slight stir on the home front when a newspaper reported a remark made in a personal conversation. "It makes me sick," the 3rd Marine Division C.G. had said, "to sit on this hill and watch those 1,000 (enemy) trucks go down those roads in Laos, hauling ammunition down south to kill Americans with."

• By February 20th the Marines had moved all the way to the Laotian border. While the enemy played their deadly game of hide-and-seek, raining death on young American Marines and then quickly scurrying across the border into the safety of Laos.

• The policy of US commanders had always been that units could enter Laos or Cambodia, only when American lives were endangered by enemy forces therein. Colonel Barrow saw the danger his own men faced from within and, despite the very real possibility of sacrificing his distinguished military career, ordered Hotel Company, 2/9 to cross the border and set up ambush positions INSIDE Laos. (This plan was approved by General Creighton Abrams, commander of all U.S. Forces in Vietnam after it took place)

Operation Dewey Canyon Operation Dewey Canyon -- 1969 1969 Continued…Continued…

• With elements of the 9th Marines now operating inside Laos, the other battalions moved out to take up positions along the border. On the morning of February 22nd, the 1st Battalion was in place on a ridge overlooking Laos. The Marines of 1/9 called themselves the Walking Dead. On this day, for one company in particular, the name would be all too real.

• As dawn broke on the forested hillside overlooking Laos, Alpha Company 1/9 was sent out to look for and destroy a suspected enemy force operating in the region. 3rd platoon had made contact with them the previous day, and now the Company was looking to finish the fight. In addition, First Battalion was low on water. A detail from Charlie Company was dispatched to get resupply from a stream below, Alpha Company leading the way to provide security. As they reached the stream, the enemy appeared.

• The NVA seemed to be everywhere, popping up out of hidden spider holes to rain devastating machinegun and small arms fire on Alpha Company and Charlie Company water detail, while enemy mortars fell on the embattled Marines. The suddenness and the ferocity of the attack caught the Marines by surprise, many falling wounded in the initial onslaught.

• Quickly Lieutenant Fox moved out, working his way through the heavy jungle overgrowth to gain a position where he could assess the situation and direct his platoon leaders. Deadly missiles struck the foliage and bamboo palms around him. Fox located a sniper's position, quickly killing the enemy with his M-16 rifle before moving on.

• As Lieutenant Fox deployed his platoons, two enemy mortar rounds landed in his position, killing his radiomen and air and artillery observers. Shrapnel stuck the lieutenant in the shoulder but, despite the bleeding wounds, he grabbed both radios and continued to direct the movements of his Marines.

• The lieutenant who led Lieutenant Fox's 2nd platoon was seriously wounded, and Lieutenant Fox instructed his executive officer to take command of that platoon. When his platoon leader in the 3rd platoon was killed, Lieutenant Fox quickly moved in to fill the void and take command. He personally destroyed one position while continuing to should orders and give encouragement. Coolly he spoke into the radio to coordinate aerial and artillery support for his Marines.

Operation Dewey Canyon Operation Dewey Canyon --1969 1969 Continued…Continued…

•Heedless of his battered body, Lieutenant Fox began organizing his survivors in establishing a defensive position. As corpsmen moved about to locate and treat the wounded, Fox refused aid, setting himself to the tasks leadership demanded. By late afternoon his Marines had secured their position, and Delta Company 2/9 arrived to relieve them. Ten of Lieutenant Fox's brave Marines had died and, of the 153 men who had joined him that morning in the patrol down from the ridge, only 66 were able to continue the mission the following day. Despite his wounds, and determined not to leave Alpha Company leaderless, Lieutenant Fox was among them. •As the enemy fire continued unabated, the executive officer Lieutenant Fox had sent to 2nd Platoon was killed, and another of his lieutenants was wounded. Though wounded himself, Lieutenant Fox was the only officer in Alpha Company still capable of leading the resistance. This he did with calm professionalism, his Marines repulsing a final enemy assault during which the Company Commander was wounded a second time.

Operation Dewey Canyon MapOperation Dewey Canyon Map

1st Battalion 9th Marines

Statistics In VietnamDuring Service in the Vietnam War, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, 3rd

Marine Division, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force, earned by Bravery and Sacrifice, an Honor and Reverence, unique in the history of the United States Marine Corps (USMC).

• The Battalion endured the Longest Sustained Combat and suffered the Highest Killed In Action (KIA) rate in USMC history.

• The Battalion was engaged in combat for 48 months, from June 16, 1965 to July 14, 1969.

• The Battalion sustained KIA 48 of the 48 months of its Vietnam War service.

• With a typical Battalion unit strength of 800 Marines, the KIA to unit strength rate was 76%.

• The Vietnam War Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C., honors the supreme sacrifice of 618 Marines of the Battalion.

• Ho Chi Minh, the President of the North Vietnamese Enemy Armed forces, nicknamed them Di Bo Chet (The Walking Dead.) in early spring of 1966.

Medal Of Honor Recipients & Medal Of Honor Recipients & Other AwardsOther Awards

Second Lieutenant Leims, John H.Second Lieutenant Leims, John H.U.S. Marine Corps, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division

Iwo Jima, 7 March 1945

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of Company B, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, on 7 March 1945. Launching a surprise attack against the rock-imbedded fortifications of a dominating Japanese hill position, Second Lieutenant Leims spurred his company forward with indomitable determination and, skillfully directing his assault platoons against the cave-emplaced enemy troops and heavily fortified pillboxes, succeeded in capturing the objective in the late afternoon. When it became apparent that his assault platoons were cut off in this newly won position, approximately four hundred yards forward of adjacent units and lacked all communication with the command post, he personally advanced and laid telephone lines across the isolating expanse of open, fire-swept terrain. Ordered to withdraw his command after he had joined his forward platoons, he immediately complied, adroitly effecting the withdrawal of his troops without incident. Upon arriving at the rear, he was informed that several casualties had been left at the abandoned ridge position beyond the front lines. Although suffering acutely from strain and exhaustion of battle, he instantly went forward despite darkness and the slashing fury of hostile machine-gun fire, located and carried to safety one seriously wounded Marine and then, running the gauntlet of enemy fire for the third time that night, again made his tortuous way into the bullet-riddled deathtrap and rescued another of his wounded men. A dauntless leader, concerned at all times for the welfare of his men, Second Lieutenant Leims soundly maintained the coordinated strength of his battle-wearied company under extremely difficult conditions and, by his bold tactics, sustained aggressiveness and heroic disregard of all personal danger, contributed essentially to the success of his division's operations against this vital Japanese base. His valiant conduct in the face of fanatic opposition sustained and enhanced the highest traditions of the United States Marine Corps.

Private First Class Witek, Frank P.Private First Class Witek, Frank P.U.S. Marine Corps, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division

Guam, 3 August 1944

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, during the Battle of Finegayan at Guam, Marianas, on 3 August 1944. When his rifle platoon was halted by heavy surprise fire from well camouflaged enemy positions, Private First Class Witek daringly remained standing to fire a full magazine from his automatic point-blank range into a depression housing Japanese troops, killing eight of the enemy and enabling the greater part of his platoon to take cover. During his platoon's withdrawal for consolidation of lines, he remained to safeguard a severely wounded comrade, courageously returning the enemy's fire until the arrival of stretcher bearers and then covering the evacuation by sustained fire as he moved backward toward his own lines. With his platoon again pinned down by a hostile machine-gun, Private First Class Witek, on his own initiative, moved forward boldly ahead of the reinforcing tanks and infantry, alternately throwing hand grenades and firing as he advanced to within five to ten yards of the enemy position, destroying the hostile machine-gun emplacement and an additional eight Japanese before he, himself, was struck down by an enemy rifleman. His valiant and inspiring action effectively reduced the enemy's fire-power, thereby enabling his platoon to attain its objective, and reflects the highest credit upon Private First Class Witek and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Sergeant Sergeant Singleton, Walter K.Singleton, Walter K.U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine DivisionGio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, 24 March 1967.

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Sgt. Singleton's company was conducting combat operations when the lead platoon received intense small arms, automatic weapons, rocket, and mortar fire from a well-entrenched enemy force. As the company fought its way forward, the extremely heavy enemy fire caused numerous friendly casualties. Sensing the need for early treatment of the wounded, Sgt. Singleton quickly moved from his relatively safe position in the rear of the foremost point of the advance and made numerous trips through the enemy killing zone to move the injured men out of the danger area. Noting that a large part of the enemy fire was coming from a hedgerow, he seized a machinegun and assaulted the key enemy location, delivering devastating fire as he advanced. He forced his way through the hedgerow directly into the enemy strong point. Although he was mortally wounded, his fearless attack killed 8 of the enemy and drove the remainder from the hedgerow. Sgt. Singleton's bold actions completely disorganized the enemy defense and saved the lives of many of his comrades. His daring initiative selfless devotion to duty and indomitable fighting spirit reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and his performance upheld the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

Captain Fox, Wesley L.Captain Fox, Wesley L.U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division

Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, 22 February 1969

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as commanding officer of Company A, in action against the enemy in the northern A Shau Valley. Capt. (then 1st Lt.) Fox's company came under intense fire from a large well-concealed enemy force. Capt. Fox maneuvered to a position from which he could assess the situation and confer with his platoon leaders. As they departed to execute the plan he had devised, the enemy attacked and Capt. Fox was wounded along with all of the other members of the command group, except the executive officer. Capt. Fox continued to direct the activity of his company. Advancing through heavy enemy fire, he personally neutralized 1 enemy position and calmly ordered an assault against the hostile emplacements. He then moved through the hazardous area coordinating aircraft support with the activities of his men. When his executive officer was mortally wounded, Capt. Fox reorganized the company and directed the fire of his men as they hurled grenades against the enemy and drove the hostile forces into retreat. Wounded again in the final assault, Capt. Fox refused medical attention, established a defensive posture, and supervised the preparation of casualties for medical evacuation. His indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger inspired his marines to such aggressive action that they overcame all enemy resistance and destroyed a large bunker complex. Capt. Fox's heroic actions reflect great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and uphold the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

Medal RecipientsMedal Recipients11stst Battalion 9Battalion 9thth Marines Vietnam WarMarines Vietnam War

MEDAL OF HONOR (2)

Name Rank Co. Date Age Hometown

Fox, Wesley L. 1stLt A 2/22/69 40 Round Hill, Virginia

Singleton, Walter K. Sgt A 3/24/67* 22 Memphis, Tennessee

NAVY CROSS (17)


Burns, Leon R. SSgt B 7/2/67 -- ----------------------

Christman, William J. III 2ndLt A 2/22/69* 23 Gaithersburg, Maryland

Duff, Barry W. Cpl C 5/21/66* 21 Baltimore, Maryland

Herron, Lee R. 1stLt A 2/22/69* 23 Lubbock, Texas

Holmes, Walter C. Sgt B 11/27/65 -- -----------------------

Howell, Gatlin J. 1stLt IO-1/9 7/2-7/67* 31 Colma, California

Hunnicutt, Hubert H. III Cpl C 4/16-18/68 23 Lutz, Florida

Keys, William M. Capt D 3/2/67 -- ----------------------

Malone, George M. 2ndLt A 2/22/69 -- ----------------------

Monahan, Robert E. LCpl D 5/28/67* 20 Swedesboro, New Jersey

Rivers, Jettie Jr. 2ndLt D 5/14-15/67* 34 Nashville, Tennessee

Sadler, Charles D. Cpl A 5/21/66 -- ----------------------

Medal Recipients ContinuedMedal Recipients Continued……NAVY CROSS (17)


Slater, Albert C. Jr. Capt A 7/6-7/67 26 -----------------------

Stewart, Michael E. LCpl A 5/13/67* 18 Culpepper, Virginia

Stuckey, James L. LCpl C 7/6/67 21 Seminole, Florida

Thoryk, Barry L. Cpl A 4/4/68 -- ------------------------

Wilhelm, Mack H. HM3 D 2/19/69 23 Rockport, Texas

SILVER STAR (53)


Aaron, Robert J. Jr. 1stLt A 3/24/67 -- --------------------------

Alderette, Arnold L. Cpl A 2/8/68 -- --------------------------

Baird, John R. Jr. LCpl A 2/22/69* 19 Oak Lawn, Illinois

Beyerlein, David Sgt A 2/22/69 -- --------------------------

Blocker, Eugene SSgt A 2/21/67

Bollinger, Larry C. HM- A 5/21/66

Broquist, Steven A. 2ndLt D 5/14/67 22 Champaign, Illinois

Caceres, Edgardo LCpl B 5/12/66* 21 Tacoma, Washington

Chacon, David A. LCpl A 2/22/69* 20 Gilcrest, Colorado

Chapman, Darrell H. LCpl A 2/22/69 20 Claremont, N.H.

Medal Recipients ContinuedMedal Recipients Continued……SILVER STAR (53)


Chapman, William W. SSgt B 8/22/68

Christy, Howard A. Capt A 5/21/66 Provo, Utah

Clark, Robert N. Jr. 2ndLt D 3/4/67* 24 Indianapolis, Indiana

Connell, George M. 1stLt C 5/21/66 23 Cheverly, Maryland

Connelly, William 1stLt C 4/16/68

Creel, John B. Jr. 2ndLt A 9/9/65

Curd, James H. R. Capt 3/4/67

Curd, James H. R. Capt C 3/24/67

Dartt, Robert J. Cpl C 12/25/65 Maunie, Illinois

Davis, Earl R. SSgt B 5/12/66

Davis, Edward D. PFC C 7/6/67

Dias, Raymond R. III Pvt A 4/16/68

Festa, Donald Capt A 3/3/67

Gugle, Larry E. LCpl C 4/16/68 20 Ottumwa, Iowa

Gomez, Harold Cpl A 2/21/67* 20 East Chicago, Illinois

Medal Recipients ContinuedMedal Recipients Continued……SILVER STAR (53)Name Rank Co. Date Age Hometown

Hutchinson, Edward L. Jr. Capt C 7/12/67 26 Merritt Island, Florida

Jacques, Raymond J. Jr. Sgt B 5/12/66

Jadlow, Robert L. 1stLt B 5/12/66

Jensen, Robert R. SSgt A 2/22/69

Keys, William M. Capt D 3/5/67

Lefefe, Anthony T. Sgt C 7/6/67

Libutti, Frank 2ndLt C 7/2/67

Lopinto, Frank T. LCpl B 4/27/67 19 Lindhurst, N. Jersey

Maxim, Robert J. Cpl B 8/24/67

Minehart, Russell E. Sgt B 7/12/65

Morgan, Edward E. LCpl D 2/18/69

Myers, Donald F. Sgt C 2/13/69

Northington, William C. LCpl A 2/22/69 20 Prattville, Alabama

Pace, Simone J. 2ndLt A 5/21/66

Parr, William T. Cpl C

Medal Recipients ContinuedMedal Recipients Continued……SILVER STAR (53)Name Rank Co. Date Age Hometown

Price, Thomas H. Cpl B 3/2/67

Radcliffe, Henry J.M. Capt A 2/8/68

Ruiz, Jose Cpl C 4/16/68* 24 New York, N.Y.

Sankey, David H. PFC A 7/6/67

Simms, James W. 2ndLt D 2/11/69 24 Carrolton, Missouri

Simms, James W. 2ndLt D 2/26/69* 24 Carrolton, Missouri

Simon, Jerry W. LCpl A 5/21/66

Smith, Charles L. PFC A 3/4/69* 18 Oklahoma City, OK.

Smith, George W. LtCol CO-1/9 3/18/69

Talone, James R. 1stLt B 8/22/68

VonHarten, William R. LtCol XO-1/9 3/4-5/67

Wallace, Paul H. 1stLt A 4/4/68

Wright, Edward R. LCpl D 2/11/69

• Reference: Honor the Warrior by Billy Meyers (with assistance from Medals & Awards Branch in Clarendon, Virginia and later Quantico, Virginia and the Marine Corps Historical Center and the Command Museum MCRD, San Diego)

• * indicates posthumous award

““THESE GOOD MENTHESE GOOD MEN””I now know why men who have been to war yearn to reunite. Not to tell stories or look at old

pictures. Not to laugh or weep. Comrades gather because they long to be with the men who once acted their best, men who suffered and sacrificed, who were stripped raw, right down to their humanity. I did not pick these men. They were delivered by fate and the U.S. Marine Corps. But I know them in a way I know no other men. I have never given anyone such trust. They were willing to guard something more precious than my life. They would have carried my reputation, the memory of me. It was part of the bargain we all made, the reason we were so willing to die for one another.

I cannot say where we are headed. Ours are not perfect friendships; those are the province of legend and myth.

A few of my comrades drift far from me now, sending back only occasional word. I know that one day even these could fall to silence. Some of the men will stay close, a couple, perhaps, always at hand.

As long as I have memory, I will think of them all, every day. I am sure that when I leave this world, my last thought will be of my family and my comrades.....such good men.

from "These Good Men" by Michael Norman

““AlwaysAlways FaithfulFaithful””Here are those who have borne the battle

Those, in the crucible of combat, tried.Tempered and turned of the finest mettle,These were The Sons of America's Pride!

The First Battalion of The Ninth Marines,Hammered and forged in the fires of Hell;

Built of their blood and their broken dreams,A legend for scribes, unborn, to tell.

They fought like Warriors and they died like men‘Till their page of history was stained blood red;And they earned from foe as well as from friend

That Honorable title, "The Walking Dead"!

These were the Sons who stepped forward bravely--Courage and Strength and Faith un-tried;

To fight as the Valorous "Always Faithful".These are The Sons of America's Pride!---

(C)1997 Doug Todd

Statistics About The Vietnam Statistics About The Vietnam WarWar

All statistics were Courtesy of the VFW Magazine and the Public Information Office, HQ CP Forward Observer -1st Recon April 12, 1997.

In Uniform And In CountryIn Uniform And In Country……• Vietnam Vets were 9.7% of their generation. • 9,087,000 military personnel served on active duty during the Vietnam Era (Aug. 5,

1964-May 7, 1975). • 8,744,000 military personnel were on active duty during the war (Aug 5, 1964 -

March 28, 1973). • 3,403,100 (Including 514,300 offshore) personnel served in the Southeast Asia

Theater (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, flight crews based in Thailand, and sailors in adjacent South China Sea waters).

• 2,594,000 personnel served within the borders of South Vietnam (Jan. 1, 1965 -March 28, 1973)

• Another 50,000 men served in Vietnam between 1960 and 1964. • Of the 2.6 million, between 1 - 1.6 million (40 - 60%) either fought in combat,

provided close support or were at least fairly regularly exposed to enemy attack. • 7,484 women served in Vietnam. (6,250 or 83.5% were nurses)

• Peak troop strength in Vietnam was 543,482 (April 30, 1968)

CasualtiesCasualties……• Hostile deaths: 47,378 • Non-hostile deaths: 10,800 • Total: 58,202 (Includes men formerly classified as MIA and Mayaguez casualties).

Men who have subsequently died of wounds account for the changing total. • 8 nurses died -- 1 was KIA. • Married men killed: 17,539 • 61% of the men killed were 21 or younger. • Wounded: 303,704 -- 153,329 hospitalized + 150,375 injured requiring no hospital

care. • Severely disabled: 75,000 -- 23,214 - 100% disabled; 5,283 lost limbs; 1,081

sustained multiple amputations. • Amputation or crippling wounds to the lower extremities were 300% higher than

in WWII and 70% higher than Korea. Multiple amputations occurred at the rate of 18.4% compared to 5.7% in WWII.

• Missing in Action: 2,338 • POWs: 766 (114 died in captivity)

Draftees VS. VolunteersDraftees VS. Volunteers……• 25% (648,500) of total forces in country were draftees. (66% of U.S. armed forces members

were drafted during WWII.)• Draftees accounted for 30.4% (17,725) of combat deaths in Vietnam. • Reservists killed: 5,977 • National Guard: 6,140 served: 101 died. • Total draftees (1965 - 73): 1,728,344. • Actually served in Vietnam: 38% • Marine Corps Draft: 42,633. • Last man drafted: June 30, 1973.

Race & Ethnic BackgroundRace & Ethnic Background……• 88.4% of the men who actually served in Vietnam were Caucasian; 10.6% (275,000) were

African American; 1% belonged to other races. • 86.3% of the men who died in Vietnam were Caucasian (includes Hispanics); 12.5% (7,241)

were African American; 1.2% belonged to other races. • 170,000 Hispanics served in Vietnam; 3,070 (5.2% of total) died there. • 70% of enlisted men killed were of North-west European descent. • 86.8% of the men who were killed as a result of hostile action were Caucasian; 12.1% (5,711)

were African American; 1.1% belonged to other races. • 14.6% (1,530) of non-combat deaths were among African Americans. • 34% of African Americans who enlisted volunteered for the combat arms. • Overall, African Americans suffered 12.5% of the deaths in Vietnam at a time when the

percentage of African Americans of military age was 13.5% of the total population. • Religion of Dead: Protestant -- 64.4%; Catholic -- 28.9%; other/none -- 6.7%

SocioSocio--Economic StatusEconomic Status……• 76% of the men sent to Vietnam were from lower middle/working class backgrounds. • Three-fourths had family incomes above the poverty level; 50% were from middle income

backgrounds. • Some 23% of Vietnam vets had fathers with professional, managerial or technical occupations. • 79% of the men who served in Vietnam had a high school education or better when they

entered the military service. (63% of Korean War vets and only 45% of WWII vets had completed high school upon separation.)

• Deaths by region per 100,000 of population: South -- 31%, West -- 29.9%; Midwest -- 28.4%; Northeast -- 23.5%.

Winning & LosingWinning & Losing……• 82% of veterans who saw heavy combat strongly believe the war was not lost by the U.S. but

was lost by the South Vietnamese, and that the American Military was denied the right to win because of lack of political will.

• Nearly 75% of the public agrees it was a failure of political will, not of arms.

Honorable ServiceHonorable Service……• 97% of Vietnam-era veterans were honorably discharged. • 91% of actual Vietnam War veterans are proud to have served their country. • 90% of those who saw heavy combat are proud to have served their country. • 66% of Vietnam vets say they would serve again if called upon. • 87% of the public now holds Vietnam veterans in high esteem!!!!!

Here are statistics from the Combat Area Here are statistics from the Combat Area Casualty File (CACF) as of November 1993. Casualty File (CACF) as of November 1993.

• Average age of 58,148 killed in Vietnam was 23.11 years. (Although 58,169 names are in the Nov. 93 database, only 58,148 have both event date and birth date. Event date is used instead of declared dead date for some of those who were listed as missing in action) [CACF]

• Five men killed in Vietnam were only 16 years old. [CACF]• The oldest man killed was 62 years old. [CACF]• 11,465 KIA’s were less than 20 years old. [CACF]

Deaths Average Age Total 58,148 23.11 years Enlisted 50,274 22.37 years Officers 6,598 28.43 years Warrants 1,276 24.73 years E1 525 20.34 years11B MOS (Infantry) 18,465 22.55 years

Myths & Facts About VietnamMyths & Facts About Vietnam

"No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now. Rarely have so many people been so wrong about so much. Never have the

consequences of their misunderstanding been so tragic."

President Nixon

Myth: Most American soldiers were addicted Myth: Most American soldiers were addicted to drugs, guiltto drugs, guilt--ridden about their role in the ridden about their role in the

war, and deliberately used cruel and inhumane war, and deliberately used cruel and inhumane tactics.tactics.

The Vietnam War has been the subject of thousands of newspaper and magazine articles, hundreds of books, and scores of movies and television documentaries. The great

majority of these efforts have erroneously portrayed many myths about the Vietnam War as being facts.

President Nixon

The facts are:The facts are:• 91% of Vietnam Veterans say they are glad they served [General Westmoreland]• 74% said they would serve again even knowing the outcome [General Westmoreland]• There is no difference in drug usage between Vietnam Veterans and non-veterans of the same

age group (from a Veterans Administration study) [General Westmoreland]• Isolated atrocities committed by American soldiers produced torrents of outrage from antiwar

critics and the news media while Communist atrocities were so common that they received hardly any attention at all. The United States sought to minimize and prevent attacks on civilians while North Vietnam made attacks on civilians a centerpiece of its strategy. Americans who deliberately killed civilians received prison sentences while Communists who did so received commendations. From 1957 to 1973, the National Liberation Front assassinated 36,725 South Vietnamese and abducted another 58,499. The death squads focused on leaders at the village level and on anyone who improved the lives of the peasants such as medical personnel, social workers, and schoolteachers. Atrocities - every war has atrocities. War is brutal and not fair. Innocent people get killed. [President Nixon]

• Vietnam Veterans are less likely to be in prison - only 1/2 of one percent of Vietnam Veterans have been jailed for crimes. [General Westmoreland]

• 97% were discharged under honorable conditions; the same percentage of honorable discharges as ten years prior to Vietnam [General Westmoreland]

• 85% of Vietnam Veterans made a successful transition to civilian life. [Lt. General McCaffrey]• Vietnam veterans' personal income exceeds that of our non-veteran age group by more than 18

percent. [Lt. General McCaffrey]• Vietnam veterans have a lower unemployment rate than our non-vet age group. [Lt. General

McCaffrey]• 87% of the American people hold Vietnam Vets in high esteem. [Lt. General McCaffrey]

Myth: Most Vietnam veterans were drafted.Myth: Most Vietnam veterans were drafted.

The facts are:The facts are:• 2/3 of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. 2/3 of the

men who served in World War II were drafted. [General Westmoreland]

• Approximately 70% of those killed were volunteers. [Lt. General McCaffrey]

Myth: The media have reported that suicides Myth: The media have reported that suicides among Vietnam veterans range from 50,000 among Vietnam veterans range from 50,000 to 100,000 to 100,000 -- 6 to 11 times the non6 to 11 times the non--Vietnam Vietnam

veteran population.veteran population.

The facts are:The facts are:• Mortality studies show that 9,000 is a better estimate. "The CDC

Vietnam Experience Study Mortality Assessment showed that during the first 5 years after discharge, deaths from suicide were 1.7 times more likely among Vietnam veterans than non-Vietnam veterans. After that initial post-service period, Vietnam veterans were no more likely to die from suicide than non-Vietnam veterans. In fact, after the 5-year post-service period, the rate of suicides is less in the Vietnam veterans' group." [Doctor Houk]

Myth: The domino theory was proved false.Myth: The domino theory was proved false.

The facts are:The facts are:• The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian

Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 because of America's commitment in Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism would have swept all the way to the Malacca Straits that is south of Singapore and of great strategic importance to the free world. If you ask people who live in these countries that won the war in Vietnam, they have a different opinion from the American news media. The Vietnam War was the turning point for Communism. [General Westmoreland]

• Democracy Catching On - In the wake of the Cold War, democracies are flourishing, with 179 of the world's 192 sovereign states (93%) now electing their legislators, according to the Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Union. In the last decade, 69 nations have held multi-party elections for the first time in their histories. Three of the five newest democracies are former Soviet republics: Belarus (where elections were first held in November 1995), Armenia (July 1995) and Kyrgyzstan (February 1995). And two are in Africa: Tanzania (October 1995) and Guinea (June 1995). [Parade Magazine]

Myth: The fighting in Vietnam was not as Myth: The fighting in Vietnam was not as intense as in World War II.intense as in World War II.

The facts are:The facts are:• The average infantryman in the South Pacific during World War II saw about 40

days of combat in four years. The average infantryman in Vietnam saw about 240 days of combat in one year thanks to the mobility of the helicopter.

• One out of every 10 Americans who served in Vietnam was a casualty. 58,169 were killed and 304,000 wounded out of 2.59 million who served. Although the percent that died is similar to other wars, amputations or crippling wounds were 300 percent higher than in World War II. 75,000 Vietnam veterans are severely disabled. [Lt. General McCaffrey]

• MEDEVAC helicopters flew nearly 500,000 missions. Over 900,000 patients were airlifted (nearly half were American). The average time lapse between wounding to hospitalization was less than one hour. As a result, less than one percent of all Americans wounded who survived the first 24 hours died. [VHPA 1993]

• The helicopter provided unprecedented mobility. Without the helicopter it would have taken three times as many troops to secure the 800-mile border with Cambodia and Laos (the politicians thought the Geneva Conventions of 1954 and the Geneva Accords or 1962 would secure the border) [General Westmoreland]

Myth: Air America, the airline operated by the Myth: Air America, the airline operated by the CIA in Southeast Asia, and its pilots were CIA in Southeast Asia, and its pilots were

involved in drug traffickinginvolved in drug trafficking

The facts are:The facts are:• The 1990 unsuccessful movie "Air America" helped to establish the myth

of a connection between Air America, the CIA, and the Laotian drug trade. The movie and a book the movie was based on contend that the CIA condoned a drug trade conducted by a Laotian client; both agree that Air America provided the essential transportation for the trade; and both view the pilots with sympathetic understanding. American-owned airlines never knowingly transported opium in or out of Laos, nor did their American pilots ever profit from its transport. Yet undoubtedly every plane in Laos carried opium at some time, unknown to the pilot and his superiors.

• For more information see http://www.air-America.org

Myth: The American military was running for Myth: The American military was running for their lives during the fall of Saigon in April their lives during the fall of Saigon in April

1975. 1975.

The facts are:The facts are:• It was a "civilian" (Air America)

Huey not Army or Marines.• It was NOT the U.S. Embassy.

The building is the Pittman Apartments. The U.S. Embassy and its helipad were much larger.

• The evacuees were Vietnamese not American military.

• The person that can be seen aiding the refugees is Mr. O.B. Harnage, a CIA case officer and now retired.

Myth: Kim Phuc, the little nineMyth: Kim Phuc, the little nine--yearyear--old Vietnamese old Vietnamese girl running naked from the napalm strike near Trang girl running naked from the napalm strike near Trang

Bang on 8 June 1972, was burned by AmericansBang on 8 June 1972, was burned by Americans..• No American had involvement in this

incident near Trang Bang that burned Phan Thi Kim Phuc. The planes doing the bombing near the village were VNAF (Vietnam Air Force) and were being flown by Vietnamese pilots in support of South Vietnamese troops on the ground. Even the AP photographer, Nick Ut, who took the picture, was Vietnamese. The incident in the photo took place on the second day of a three-day battle between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) who occupied the village of Trang Bang and the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) who were trying to force the NVA out of the village. Recent reports in the news media that an American commander ordered the air strike that burned Kim Phuc are incorrect. There were no Americans involved in any capacity. "We (Americans) had nothing to do with controlling VNAF," according to Lieutenant General (Ret) James F. Hollingsworth, the Commanding General of TRAC at that time.

Sources:Sources:• [President Nixon] No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon • [Parade Magazine] August 18, 1996 page 10.• [CACF] (Combat Area Casualty File) November 1993. (The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam

Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, DC

• [General Westmoreland] Speech by General William C. Westmoreland before the Third Annual Reunion of the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association (VHPA) at the Washington, DC Hilton Hotel on July 5th, 1986 (reproduced in a Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association Historical Reference Directory Volume 2A)

• [LtGen. McCaffrey] Speech by Lt. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, (reproduced in the Pentagram, June 4, 1993) assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Vietnam veterans and visitors gathered at "The Wall", Memorial Day 1993.

• [Dr. Houk] Testimony by Dr. Houk, Oversight on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 14 July 1988 page 17, Hearing before the Committee on Veterans' Affairs United States Senate one hundredth Congress second session. Also "Estimating the Number of Suicides Among Vietnam Veterans" (Am J Psychiatry 147, 6 June 1990 pages 772-776)

• [VHPA 1993] Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association 1993 Membership Directory page 130.• [The Vietnam Experience] Time/Life series books "The Vietnam Experience" published in

multibook series in mid 80's by Boston Publishing Company

history of the 1st battalion 9th marines - walking dead...

Documents