history of philosophy and conceptual...

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPTUALCARTOGRAPHY

NATHANIEL GOLDBERG

Washington and Lee University

There are many reasons for philosophers who are not historians ofphilosophy to study the history of philosophy. Those reasons includeavoiding reinventing the wheel, recognizing the historical contingencyof their own views, and appreciating their historical roots. There arealso many reasons for them not to study the history of philosophy.These reasons include avoiding existing wheels that may also trans-port scientific inaccuracies or moral repugnancies, recognizing thatthe historical contingency of every view does not mean that the histor-ical roots of every view must be made explicit, and appreciatingintradisciplinary division of labor.My aim in this paper is not to answer whether philosophers who

are not historians of philosophy should study the history of philoso-phy. That answer is complicated and deserves more space than avail-able here. My aim is instead to articulate and argue for a modest useto which philosophers who are not historians of philosophy might putthe history of philosophy. Thus even those who are not historians ofphilosophy have reason not to dismiss that history. Moreover, thoughthe use is modest, apparently no one else has articulated or arguedfor it explicitly. The use for the history of philosophy that I have inmind is in conceptual cartography.Some topics demand detailed analyses, others analyses that are

more programmatic. The present topic demands both. Hence, while Ido offer specific formulations of specific claims, I also cast a wide netat the issues in play. In §1 I explain what I mean by ‘conceptual car-tography’. In §2 I explain what I mean by using the ‘history of philos-ophy in conceptual cartography’. In §3 I discuss how and why onemight use the history of philosophy as such. In §4 I consider objec-tions. In §5 I conclude.

1. Conceptual Cartography

Roughly, ‘geography’ sans qualification may be defined as the studyof the physical environment and human interactions with it. ‘Cartog-raphy’ may itself then be defined as the practice of depicting thatenvironment—or, as one cartography textbook puts it, “the makingand study of maps” (Robinson, Morrison, Muehrche, Kimerling, andGuptill 1995, 9). While some (Crampton 2010, 42) argue that ‘map’

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itself has no definition, let us follow that textbook in defining a ‘map’as a “graphic representation of the geographic setting” (Robinson,et al., 9).1 A graphic representation moreover presupposes graphicacy.While literacy is a way of communicating with written language, andarticulacy is a way of communicating with spoken language, graphi-cacy is a way of communicating with drawings, paintings, plans, anddiagrams (9). Maps employ graphicacy by choosing objects in theenvironment, selecting relevant features of those objects, and then sys-tematically transforming those features into signs that stand for them.The relevant features might include distances between objects, as wellas their individual size, composition, temperature, economic output,languages spoken, or others. The transformations involve scalingdown these objects proportionally to one another (10–11).Recently cartographers have begun taking a philosophical stance

toward their discipline. Denis Wood (1992) emphasizes the interest-specificity of maps (passim) and conjectures that the way in whichchildren draw hills matches the way in which hill signs developedhistorically (ch. 6). John Brian Harley (2001) applies MichelFoucault’s analysis of power to map construction and Jacque Derridas’notion of deconstruction to the map genre (passim), and asks whetherthere can be an ethics of maps (ch. 7). Jeremy W. Crampton (2010)relies on Foucault’s notion of discourse and Immanuel Kant’s notionof critique to explain cartography and graphic information science;the latter studies systems that capture, display, manipulate, and storegeographic information. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2016), himself aphilosopher, expands philosophical reflections on cartography to gra-phic information science more broadly, discussing elements of digitalmap generalization.While geography sans qualification may be the study of the physical

environment and human interactions with it, we might understandconceptual geography as the study of the conceptual environmentand such interactions. Conceptual cartography and conceptual mapsmight themselves be understood correlatively. Let me specify furtherwhat I mean by ‘conceptual cartography’ per se by building on whatGilbert Ryle means by ‘logical geography’ (1949/2000, intro) andlater ‘cartography’ (1962/2009).In introducing his approach to the philosophy of mind, Ryle men-

tions mental concepts (or predicates): “‘careful’, ‘stupid’, ‘logical’,‘unobservant’, ‘ingenious’, ‘vain’, ‘methodical’, ‘credulous’, ‘witty’,‘self-controlled’ and a thousand others” (1949/2000, lix–lx). He thenexplains:

1 See John Brian Harley (2001, 35) for an alternative definition inspired by Michel Fou-cault, which questions the notion of representation. Though Denis Wood (1992)accepts the above definition (1), he nevertheless maintains that “all maps, inevitably,unavoidably, necessarily embody the authors’ prejudices” (24). I broadly agree withWood but regard such “prejudices” more as interests.

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It is, however, one thing to know how to apply such concepts, quiteanother to know how to correlate them with one another and withconcepts of other sorts. Many people can talk sense with conceptsbut cannot talk sense about them; they know by practice how tooperate with concepts, anyhow inside familiar fields, but they can-not state the logical regulations governing their use. (lx)

Whether or not many people actually can talk sense with but notabout concepts, Ryle is right that the skills differ. Being able to saythat a ripe tomato is red differs from being able to say that nothingtotally red can simultaneously be totally blue. The former presupposesknowing, as an empirical matter, that ‘red’ applies to tomatoes. Thelatter presupposes knowing, as a conceptual matter, that ‘red’ and‘blue’ cannot simultaneously be applied in totality to objects. Accord-ing to Ryle, talking about concepts (or expressing propositions mak-ing conceptual claims) engages in logical geography:

To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal thelogic of the propositions in which they are wielded, that is to say, toshow with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsis-tent, what propositions follow from them and from what proposi-tions they follow. (lx)

That an object is totally red is inconsistent with its simultaneouslybeing totally blue. It follows from these (or these entails), as a con-ceptual matter, that an object can be either totally red or totally bluebut not both simultaneously. That in turn follows (or is entailed by)both red’s and blue’s being a color, which is a visual property ofobjects’ surfaces.Later Ryle (1962/2009) redescribes the distinction between talking

sense with and talking about concepts in terms of concepts being “op-erated with” and being “operated on” (437, original emphases in allquotations passim), respectively. We operate with red when we apply itto tomatoes. We operate on red when we determine that nothingtotally red can simultaneously be totally blue.2 Ryle describes “aninhabitant of a village who knows well every house, field, stream, roadand pathway in the neighbourhood and is, for the first time, asked todraw or consult a map of his village” (440–41). Such an inhabitant isto operate not only with but also on his knowledge of the village. “Hehas, so to speak, to translate and therefore to re-think his local topo-graphical knowledge into universal cartographical terms” (441). Localtopographical knowledge of concepts concerns talking sense, or oper-ating, with them. For Ryle, a conceptual villager would be any compe-tent speaker of a language. Universal cartographical knowledge of

2 Ryle redescribes the distinction in terms of concrete and abstract assertions, respec-tively, and analyzing adverbs and nouns, respectively, as well (1962/2009, 438).

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concepts concerns talking about, or operating on, them. A conceptualcartographer would be a philosopher.My notion of conceptual cartography extends Ryle’s notion of logi-

cal geography, and later cartography, in three ways. First, while Ryleintends logical geography or cartography to apply to ordinary-language concepts, I intend conceptual cartography to apply to ordi-nary-language as well as philosophical ones. While Ryle would havephilosophers analyze concepts expressed by predicates such as ‘care-ful’, ‘stupid’, and ‘logical’, I would have them analyze conceptsexpressed by predicates such as ‘empiricist’, ‘rationalist’, and ‘tran-scendentalist’; ‘contractarian’ and ‘libertarian’; and if not a thousandthen at least many others. These concepts are entire philosophicalviews. As a logical behaviorist, Ryle might have trouble analyzing ‘em-piricist’, but such trouble would not differ in kind from analyzing‘careful’. Though I am neutral on different accounts of concepts, anysuch account must allow sensory predicates, such as ‘red’, behavioralpredicates, such as ‘careful’, and philosophical predicates, such as‘empiricist’, all to express concepts—since they all do. Behavioral andphilosophical predicates may or may not reduce without remainder toprimitive predicates, nor may sensory predicates be primitive. Regard-less let us regard concepts as whatever is expressed by predicates ofany kind. Whatever is so expressed might be behavioral dispositions(as Ryle wanted), Fregean senses, causal-theoretical referents, func-tions from possible worlds, speaker’s intentions as or as not recog-nized by audiences, moves in a language game, or something else.However construed, concepts are the epistemological correlate ofmeanings. Just as ‘red’, ‘careful’, and ‘empiricist’ each possessesmeaning, however construed, each likewise expresses a concept, how-ever primitive or complex.Second, while Ryle’s logical geography or cartography limits the rel-

evant relations between concepts to the logical ones of consistencyand entailment, conceptual cartography includes these logical rela-tions and other conceptual ones also. Roughly, ‘empiricist’ describesthe view, or someone holding the view, that all significant knowledgederives from experience; ‘rationalist’, that all such knowledge derivesfrom reason; and ‘transcendentalist’ (of the Kantian or neo-Kantiansort), that, though all knowledge starts with experience, it does notthereby derive from experience. Transcendentalism, the view, is there-fore inconsistent with both rationalism and empiricism, the views, andneither entails nor is entailed by the others. Yet transcendentalismalso relates to rationalism and empiricist differently by incorporatingdifferent elements of each. It does so by promulgating a more compli-cated model of knowledge than either of the others, (at least) bifur-cating starting conditions from derivation. While consistency andentailment relations exist among transcendentalism, rationalism, andempiricism, philosophically fruitful comparisons among all threerequire conceptual tools more robust than the merely logical.

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And third, while Ryle’s logical geography or cartography is meantto clarify confusion in and resolve tension between concepts, concep-tual cartography as a form of cartography involves making maps.Conceptual cartographers choose objects, or concepts, in the concep-tual environment, selecting relevant logical and extralogical featuresof those concepts, and then systematically transforming those featuresinto signs—or objects in conceptual space—that stand for them. Therelevant features might include similarities and differences—the dis-tances between the concepts themselves—as well as individual proper-ties of particular conceptual interest. The transformations involvescaling down those objects proportionally to one another. Ryle com-pares those who do not know how to talk about concepts to “peoplewho know their way about their own parish, but cannot construct orread a map of it” (1949/2000, lx). Conceptual cartography analyzeslogical and extralogical relations among concepts and in turn con-structs maps that those or other people can read. Rationalism mightbe drawn as a large territory, maybe a continent of views, at one endof the map. Empiricism might be drawn as an equally large territoryat the other. Transcendentalism might be drawn higher or lower onthe map than both of these though nevertheless touching each at apoint. Other views could then be drawn relative to each. Maybe posi-tivism would be relatively close to empiricism, in the vicinity of tran-scendentalism, and far from rationalism. Maybe absolute idealismwould be in positivism’s opposite spot.Regardless of the accuracy or utility of this particular map, concep-

tual cartography is the practice of mapping how concepts generally(including philosophical views) relate conceptually (including logi-cally and extralogically). Next I offer a more detailed example of con-ceptual cartography to explain how the history of philosophy mightbe used in it.

2. Situating Landmarks

Using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography involvestwo steps. One is using the history of philosophy to situate landmarkson a conceptual map. The other is situating views, historical or con-temporary, relative to those landmarks. In this section I discuss thefirst step. In the next I explain how and why one might perform thesecond.Elsewhere (Goldberg 2015, chs. 1, 7) I have shown how the history

of philosophy can be used to situate landmarks concerning the con-tent of concepts and meaning of terms. Here I discuss how it can beused to situate landmarks concerning the metaphysics of empiricalproperties. Empirical properties are properties that cannot be knownwithout experience. On my simplified story, I use two axes toconstruct a map on which I situate different historical views.

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The first axis concerns subjective sources constitutive of those proper-ties. I understand subjective sources to include such things as mindsor the specific perceptual or conceptual capacities inherent in them.I can extend the cartographic image as follows. On a two-dimensionalmap of the Earth, the Prime Meridian is at zero longitude. It cantherefore be understood as the vertical, and on my model subjective,axis. The greater the distance from the Prime Meridian that a philo-sophical view is, and so the greater the number of degrees longitudethat it has, the greater the role that subjective sources are to itsaccount of empirical properties. The analogy with this map is imper-fect, since distances, and degrees, from the Prime Meridian can beeast or west. For simplicity’s sake I consider only those east. I alsoleave the notion of distance intuitive and comparative albeit in a waythat should become clearer as I proceed.The second axis concerns objective sources constitutive of empirical

properties. I understand objective sources to include such things astranscendent objects that exist independent of minds and their capac-ities; worldly objects that exist similarly; or the world or reality itself,in itself, or considered in itself, if construed in a subject-independentway. We might then imagine the objective axis as the Equator at zerolatitude. The greater the distance from the Equator that a view is, andso the greater number of degrees latitude that it has, the greater therole objective sources are to its account of empirical properties. Dis-tances, and degrees, from the Equator can themselves be north orsouth. For simplicity’s sake I consider only those north. I again leavethe notion of distance intuitive and comparative.3

All maps are interest-specific, and I have chosen these two axesbecause doing so satisfies my interest of relating historical viewsaccording to their subjective and objective sources. Further, I under-stand these sources, rather than falling on a continuum, or singleaxis, as being distinct, and so as so falling on two axes. That isbecause (as we hear below) degrees of subjectivity and objectivity varyindependently of one another. One view can be twice as objective asanother without having any subjective source, while another can bemore objective than subjective without its subjectivity being of a lessdegree. Different philosophical views can have sources that are dis-tinctly subjective and objective, rather than merely some degreedcombination thereof. As for individual degrees of subjectivity or objec-tivity—and so distance from my axes—as I have said, I leave theseintuitive and comparative. Here are examples. A view according towhich empirical concepts have two objective sources I understand astwice as far from the Equator as a view according to which they haveonly one. Likewise a view according to which all empirical concepts

3 The view that the subjective/objective distinction collapses is mappable also. As Iexplain below, it occurs where the Prime Meridian and Equator intersect: zero longi-tude, zero latitude.

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have subjective and objective sources I understand as twice as far fromthe Prime Meridian as a view according to which only some empiricalconcepts have subjective and objective sources while others have onlyobjective ones.4

Choosing a conceptual coordinate system, though interest-specificand in that sense conventional, is not without constraint. If it is to bevaluable, then like anything philosophical that is valuable one mustbe able to defend it. Here that involves defending the system’s overallaccuracy, consistency, explanatory value, and simplicity in represent-ing philosophically relevant features. Choosing such a system there-fore shares similarities with Rudolf Carnap’s (1950/1988) position onchoosing linguistic frameworks, since those are to be chosen based onsimilar pragmatic virtues. Nonetheless, while a Carnapian linguisticframework establishes the language within which statements internalto the framework can be meaningfully articulated,5 philosophicalviews that one situates on a conceptual coordinate system have alreadybeen meaningfully articulated in a language. A conceptual coordinatesystem permits one to map ways in which these views relate to oneanother.I illustrate this first step in using the history of philosophy in con-

ceptual cartography—using that history to situate landmarks—byselectively drawing on the history of philosophy directly. Whether ornot the history of Western philosophy in particular consists of a seriesof footnotes to Plato, I understand him as maintaining that empiricalproperties are the properties that they are purely in virtue of objectivesources. For Plato, different kinds, or species, of objects have theempirical properties that they do because these “species [have] . . .natural joints” (Phaedrus 265e). Nature, or the empirical world, comescarved. It has “real classes” (Statesman 262b).

Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If wemake the cut in whatever we choose and with whatever tool wechoose, we will not succeed in cutting. . .. If we try to cut contraryto nature, . . . we’ll be in error (Cratylus 387a).6

These “species,” or “real classes,” do not depend on how we choose tocut. They are “really,” or objectively, there. They are in the objectsthemselves—on my view, that qualifies Plato as a realist—and withluck, diligence, and intellect we might discover them.Moreover, Plato explains these natural joints, which determine

these species and real classes, by appealing to supernatural forms.

4 By taking distances from axes as intuitive and comparative I am inspired by DavidLewis’s (1973/2001) taking distances between possible worlds (understood in termsof similarity between worlds) to be the same.

5 See Goldberg (2015, 146–62, 219–24) for more on Carnap (1950/1988).6 The Phaedrus translation is Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff’s; Statesman, C. J.Rowe’s; Cratylus, C. D. C. Reeve’s—both in John M. Cooper (1997).

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Plato’s forms are archetypes of empirical properties, which transcendthe natural world. As self-subsisting, they are ultimately transcendentobjects. “[W]e say that there is something that is equal. I do not meana stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of thatkind”—anything in the natural world—“but something else beyond allthese, the Equal itself” (Phaedo 74a).7 To grasp the forms is in Plato’simage to emerge from a cave to a realm of pure thought (Republic514a–520a). As the medievals explain, for Plato, the forms exist “anteres,” or ontologically prior to the objects in the world whose specia-tion they make possible. The forms are in fact constitutive of empiri-cal objects and their properties. We start down the path of knowingthese forms by experiencing the empirical properties of which theyare archetypes, abstracting to the forms themselves. Yet those empiri-cal properties themselves, as empirical rather than formal (or purelyintellectual), cannot be known without experience.I understand Aristotle as agreeing that all empirical properties

are the properties that they are purely in virtue of objectivesources. He likewise agrees that species have natural joints and nat-ure real classes. Empirical properties are again in the objects them-selves—Aristotle, like Plato, is a realist—and both allow that withluck, diligence, and intellect we might discover them. Unlike Plato,however, Aristotle does not explain natural joints by appealing tosupernatural forms. For Aristotle, though there are forms, they, likeeverything else, exist within the natural order. They are not tran-scendent objects. For Aristotle, the forms exist only “in rebus,” or inthe objects in the world whose speciation they make possible.Indeed, “one part of the thing,” or object, “is matter and the otherform.” Nevertheless, when we ask, “Is there a sphere apart fromthe individual spheres or a house apart from bricks?” we mustanswer ‘no’ (Meta 1033b18-20).8 Regardless the forms remain consti-tutive of empirical objects, insofar as they make those objects thespecies that they are, and of empirical properties, insofar as theyjust are those properties when fully actualized in empirical objects.While Plato countenances two objective realms, the natural and thesupernatural, Aristotle countenances only one, the natural. Even so,for both, we can know these empirical properties, and ultimatelytheir forms, only with experience.On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate both Plato’s and Aris-

totle’s views on the Prime Meridian, some degrees north of the Equa-tor. According to each, empirical properties are constituted entirelyby objective sources—the natural and supernatural world, for Plato;the natural (and only) world, for Aristotle. According to both, there-fore, the subjective contribution to empirical properties is nil.Nonetheless I situate Plato’s view twice as far north, and so having

7 The Phaedo translation is G. M. A. Grube’s, in Cooper (1997).8 The Metaphysics translation is J. L. Ackrill’s (1988).

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twice as many degrees latitude, as Aristotle’s. Plato countenances twoobjective sources; Aristotle, one. Because for Aristotle empirical prop-erties have no less a subjective contribution than they do for Plato—each has zero—I situate each at the same number of degrees longi-tude, viz., zero.The Hellenistic, Roman, and European Middle Ages witnessed elab-

orations, incorporations, and rejections of Plato’s and Aristotle’sviews. They were worked out by themselves, against local competitors,and then in Jewish, Islamic, and ultimately Christian contexts. Noneof this is conceptually trivial. Nonetheless not every point on a mapneed be a landmark. The so-called “fathers of modern philosophy”—Ren�e Descartes and John Locke—each retained elements of theirmedieval predecessors. Yet each also sufficiently broke from them thatit is not uncommon for histories of philosophy to move from ancientto modern. When Descartes explains: “Several years have now passedsince I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in myyouth I had taken to be true” (AT 17; 1641/1999, 13), the opinionsthat Descartes has in mind include Aristotle’s views that in his youthhe studied at the Jesuit College of La Fl�eche. Locke in turn reactsagainst Descartes by denying the existence of innate ideas (1689/1979, I–II), whose existence was central to Descartes’ own rejection ofAristotle.Let me likewise turn to the moderns. In situating landmarks on my

conceptual map, I focus not on Descartes’ or Locke’s views on innateideas but on Locke’s view on empirical properties. Unlike Plato orAristotle, Locke countenances two different kinds of empirical proper-ties. Primary qualities—Locke names bulk, extension, figure, mobility,motion, solidity, and texture (1689/1979, II.viii.9–10)—are empiricalproperties “utterly inseparable from the body” (II.viii.9). They are realbecause they are essentially a part of, and so in, the body or object.An object is solid because of its inherent composition. That composi-tion is constitutive of the empirical property. Moreover primary quali-ties produce ideas directly in us through experience.Secondary qualities—“colors, sounds, tastes, &c.,” according to Locke

—“are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce vari-ous sensations in us by their primary qualities” (II.viii.10) when weexperience them. Secondary qualities are dispositional, real, andrelational. They are dispositional because they are powers, or poten-tialities, in the objects to produce effects, what Locke classifies as“sensory ideas,” in us via experience. They are real because they arein the objects. And they are relational because they are the proper-ties that they are in virtue of being disposed to produce effects inus (again via experience). An object is red because its inherent com-position is disposed to cause normal human beings under normalconditions of observation to perceive it as red. Something about theobject, its dispositional base, and something about the subject, her

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mind or specific perceptual or conceptual capacities, are jointly con-stitutive of its being red.9

Hence, for Locke, objective sources are constitutive of primaryqualities. Because they are relational, objective and subjectivesources are constitutive of secondary qualities. On my conceptualmap, therefore, I situate Locke’s view both east of the Prime Merid-ian and north of Equator. Since, however, the objective source istwice as relevant—it is constitutive of both primary and secondaryqualities, while the subjective is constitutive of only the secondary—Isituate his view farther north than east, at a greater number ofdegrees longitude than latitude.George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant both use Locke’s view as their

starting point but travel in different conceptual directions. Berkeleytravels to a location marked by idealism. Misidentifying Locke’s sec-ondary qualities with their effects, specifically sensory ideas in ourmind, Berkeley urges that all empirical properties are those ideas.Though we still experience ideas, they are nevertheless constituted bythe mind—ours or ultimately God’s (1713/1979, 64). And, since theyare ideas, they exist only within the mind. “[T]heir esse is percipi, noris it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds orthinking things which perceive them” (1710/1982, §3). Indeed, forBerkeley, there is nothing besides ideas and minds having them.There is only the subjective. Moreover, because these ideas, and soempirical properties, are not in objects themselves but in subjects,they are not real but are ideal. Nor without any objective base arethey dispositional, as were Locke’s. Because they are purely subjective,however, they might be understood as relational—relational to a sub-ject. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate Berkeley’s view onthe Equator some degrees east of the Prime Meridian. The objectivecontribution to empirical properties is zero, while the subjective con-tribution is positive.Kant travels to a location marked by globalism and transcendental-

ism. We can see this by comparing Kant’s and Locke’s view on disposi-tionalism, realism, and relationalism. First, while, for Locke, onlysome empirical properties are dispositional because they are powers, orpotentialities, in objects to produce effects in us via experience, forKant, all empirical properties are dispositional. Kant (1783/2010, 4:29–170) claims that all empirical properties are secondary qualities.10

All empirical properties are the properties that they are in virtue ofboth subjective and objective sources. Both sorts of sources constitutethem all.

9 See Goldberg (2008, 469; 2011, 730–31; 2015, 34) for more on this reading of JohnLocke (1689/1979).

10 See Hilary Putnam (1981, essay 3), James Van Cleve (1995), and Rae Langton(1998/2004, ch. 7).

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Second, for Kant as for Locke, all empirical properties are real,because they are in the objects. Kant, however, does not understandobjects as Locke does, viz., as configurations of primary qualities. Heinstead understands them as things-in-themselves, or noumena, whichwe cannot know but about which we can think. Nonetheless, for Kant,empirical properties are empirically real because they are in the objectsinsofar as we experience them. Yet they are also transcendentally idealbecause we can know those objects only insofar we experience them.And third, while, for Locke, only some empirical properties are rela-

tional, because they are the properties that they are in virtue of beingdisposed to produce effects in us, for Kant, all empirical propertiesare relational. As for Locke, an object is red because normal humanbeings under normal conditions of observation would perceive theobject as red. For Kant, an object is solid for similar reasons. Heexplains: “We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, andso on only from the human standpoint” (1787/1998, A26/B42).Space, extended beings, and so on—and a fortiori all their empiricalproperties—are the properties that they are relative to us.On my conceptual map, recall, I situated Locke’s view farther north

than east. Some empirical properties are the properties that they arein virtue of subjective and objective sources, while others are theproperties that they are purely in virtue of objective sources. BecauseKant globalizes Locke’s secondary-quality view, every empirical prop-erty shares equally in both subjective and objective sources. Hence, Isituate Kant’s view as far north of the Equator as east of the PrimeMeridian, at the same number of degrees longitude and latitude.The point at which the Prime Meridian and Equator meet is the

point at which I situate the final historical view considered, GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s. I understand Hegel as explaining themetaphysics of empirical properties not, like Plato, by giving the onlyconstitutive role to objective sources; nor, like Locke, by giving a par-tially shared constitutive role to subjective and objective sources; nor,like Berkeley, by giving the only constitutive role to subjective sources;nor, like Kant, by giving a fully shared constitutive role to both kindsof sources. Instead Hegel maintains that the distinction between sub-ject and object is itself spurious. “[E]verything turns on grasping andexpressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject”(Hegel 1807/1976, §17). If what is True can be expressed not only assubstance, or an object, but equally as a subject, then all empiricalproperties are the properties that they are in virtue of sources thatcan themselves be counted equally as subjective and as objective. Sothe distinction between such sources is nil. The distinct constitutivecontribution of subjective and objective sources is therefore also nil.Experience reveals the world as it really is because the subjective/ob-jective distinction dissolves. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situ-ate Hegel’s view at zero longitude, zero latitude. It sits at the center

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on my map, with Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and Kant’sviews at different distances surrounding it.Admittedly Hegel calls his view ‘absolute idealism’. The ‘idealism’

suggests that everything is in the mind or subjective. The ‘absolute’,however, signals that what is subjective is all encompassing and in thatsense also objective or real. Hegel elsewhere explains: “What isrational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (1821/1991, 20). Therational is traditionally construed as the purview of the mind. Hegelhimself construes the actual as having “external existence” and soconcerning objects. Because, for Hegel, empirical properties aretherefore in the objects, his idealism is a kind of realism. Hegel col-lapses the distinction, which is why I situate his view at the coordi-nates zero, zero.

3. Situating Views Relative to Those Landmarks

As I explained, using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartogra-phy involves two steps: using the history of philosophy to situate land-marks on a conceptual map, and situating historical or contemporaryviews relative to those landmarks. In the previous section I gave anexample of the first step. Here I explain how and why one might per-form the second.How is simple. Once the history of philosophy is used to situate

such landmarks, philosophers can situate other views relative to thoselandmarks by appealing to what they select as the views’ relevant fea-tures. Consider my map. Someone like Saul Kripke might situate hisessentialism (1980/2005) about the metaphysics of empirical proper-ties near the landmark that is Aristotle’s. Someone like Hilary Putnammight situate his early realism (1975a/1979, 1975b/1979) about theirmetaphysics in the vicinity of the same landmark, his middle internalrealism (1978/2010, 1981) nearer to Kant’s, and his later pragmatism(2002) nearer to Hegel’s. As I suggest elsewhere (2015, ch. 2), some-one like Mark Johnston (1989, 1993) or Crispin Wright (1988, 1989,1992/1999, 1993) might situate his local response-dependence nearLocke’s landmark, while someone like Philip Pettit (2002, pt. 1)might situate his global response-dependence near Kant’s.11 Admit-tedly, neither Kripke, Putnam, Johnston, Wright, nor Pettit himselfneeds to situate his view relative to any such landmarks. Nor does any-one else. Regardless each could.Philosophers could also retain my coordinate system and landmarks

but use them more restrictively, situating views on the metaphysics ofparticular kinds of empirical properties, like color or natural- or

11 Putnam (1981, 63) and Philip Pettit (2002, 18–20, 50, 90, 96–115) do both remarkthat their views are similar to Immanuel Kant’s. Yet neither articulates nor argues forusing the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography directly.

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social-kind properties, rather than generally. They could retain thesystem but replace the landmarks, situating views on the metaphysicsof ethical or esthetic rather than empirical properties. Plato’s objec-tivist and Hume’s subjectivist views about either might serve as land-marks.12 Or they could change systems and landmarks altogether.Normative ethical views might be situated on a map with three axes:one, the degree to which a view is aretaic; two, the degree to whichit is consequentialist; and three, the degree to which it is deontolog-ical. Its landmarks might include Aristotle’s, Kant’s, and John StuartMill’s ethical theories.13 Semantic views on the content of propernames might themselves be situated on internalist and externalistaxes. Locke’s view that words, and therefore proper names, expressideas (1689/1979, III.ii) might be one landmark, while Mill’s viewthat “[p]roper names are attached to the objects themselves” (1843/2001, I.ii.5) might be another.Why philosophers might situate their views relative to historical

landmarks are many. For starters, doing so helps others (and perhapsthemselves) appreciate how those views relate to these historical land-marks. It thereby makes the contours of their views clearer. Philoso-phers can then navigate through the conceptual landscape generallyby appealing to something potentially familiar.Moreover historical landmarks are both epistemologically privileged

and ontologically positioned. They are epistemologically privilegedbecause, though not everyone knows every historical view, many doknow the major ones. From their own training as, and of, students,even philosophers who are not historians of philosophy are almostnever completely historically ignorant. And those who are often havecolleagues who are not. Historical landmarks, in conceptual as muchas physical space, can be useful for locals and tourists. Nor need his-torical views directly favor anyone in any current debate. History pro-vides personal neutrality. Different contemporary philosophers canappeal to different historical views existing independently of theirown in the conceptual landscape. Though selected by present philoso-phers, they are views of past philosophers—personally neutral thin-kers—by which present philosophers might navigate.These historical landmarks are ontologically positioned because

philosophers have historically developed their views partly in responseto their predecessors’. It is no coincidence that the map that I con-structed has landmarks occupying positions usefully relative to oneanother. Aristotle designed his views partly in response to Plato’s;Locke, partly in response to medieval scholasticism, itself

12 Though he discusses the metaphysics of ethical and esthetic properties in severallocations, Plato (Republic 514a–520a) is his most famous statement of his objectivistview. David Hume (1739–40/2000, III; 1751/1998) intersperses his subjectivist viewon the metaphysics of ethical and esthetic properties.

13 Aristotle (Irwin 1999), Kant (1785/1999, 1788/1999), and John Stuart Mill (1861/2002) express their most famous ethical views.

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incorporating much of Aristotle’s; Berkeley and Kant, both partly inresponse to Locke’s; and Hegel, partly in response to Kant’s. Similarpatterns are historically ubiquitous. The history of philosophy con-tains views ready to be situated as landmarks on a map because histor-ical views—philosophical and otherwise—are responsive to oneanother. The history of philosophy unfolds dialogically. Though thatunfolding does not aim at any particular goal, it nevertheless origi-nates from philosophers’ reading each other’s work and agreeing ordisagreeing with it when formulating their own. It is no wonder thatappropriately spaced historical landmarks are there for the situating.

4. Objections

I have articulated and argued for a modest use to which philosopherswho are not historians of philosophy might put the history of philoso-phy. There are many objections to all this. Let me consider six. As Iexplain, the initial three all turn out to be irrelevant and false, whilethe final three all turn out to be able to be handled.

Objection 1. Philosophers, contemporary and historical, often docompare their views to those from the history of philosophy. Some-times these comparisons involve mapping conceptual connectionsin ways that I have suggested. One might therefore object that myproject is not novel.

This objection is irrelevant and false. It is irrelevant because novelty isnot a criterion of truth. It is false because both my articulating andmy arguing for using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartogra-phy are novel. Admittedly, whenever a philosopher contrasts her viewwith someone else’s by delineating points on which they do or do notcontact, she is engaging in conceptual cartography to some extent.Likewise she may appeal to historical views when doing so. Regardlessonly I have articulated the view that one could situate various histori-cal views as conceptual landmarks and situate other views relative tothem. Likewise only I have argued that the history of philosophy,because of its dialogical nature, can be used to situate landmarks ona conceptual map—where such historical landmarks would be bothepistemologically privileged and ontologically positioned.

Objection 2. Whether using the history of philosophy or not,engaging in conceptual cartography requires that a philosopherlearn about others’ views when she could be developing her own.One might therefore object that doing so is unnecessarily taxing.

This objection is also irrelevant and false. It is irrelevant because myaim is to articulate and argue for a modest use for the history of

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philosophy, viz., in conceptual cartography. It is not to argue that allphilosophers should so use it. It is false because one way to developone’s view and express it to others just is to compare and contrast itwith—and so situate it in conceptual space relative to—other views.That involves engaging in conceptual cartography in some form andto some degree. So engaging in it is to that extent not unnecessarilytaxing. Ryle himself writes “that the philosophical examination of aconcept . . . can never be the examination of that concept by itself,but only the examination of it vis-�a-vis its neighbour-concepts, andthen vis-�a-vis their innumerable neighbours too” (1962/2009, 444). IfRyle is right, then some degree of his logical geography or cartogra-phy, or my conceptual cartography, is unavoidable. There are alsothose who engage in conceptual cartography to a great degree.Though he does not appeal to the history of philosophy, Daniel Den-nett (1986), himself Ryle’s student, discusses what he calls “the logicalgeography of computational approaches” to cognitive science. Else-where he (Dennett 1989) situates contemporary views on intentional-ity relative to the North Pole of “mentalism” and South Pole of“behaviorism.” John Haugeland (1990/2000, ch. 7) meanwhile situ-ates similar views around a baseball diamond. Neither finds engagingin conceptual cartography unnecessarily taxing, nor should we.14

Objection 3. Whether or not engaging in conceptual cartography isunnecessarily taxing, one might object that using the history of phi-losophy in it is. There might be three reasons to think this. First,historical views are often obscure. Second, not all philosophersknow enough historical views to make this use feasible. And third,contemporary views can work at least as well as historical ones in sit-uating landmarks on conceptual maps.

This objection is irrelevant for the same reason that the previousone is. My aim is not to argue that all philosophers should use thehistory of philosophy in conceptual cartography but to suggest thatthey might. It is false because each of the three reasons just men-tioned is false. Regarding the first, while historical views are oftenobscure, they are not always so in all details. Though many of Plato’scommitments regarding empirical properties might be obscure, thathe believes that species have “natural joints” and that nature has “realclasses” independent of how they might be perceived by us is not.Regarding the second, while not all philosophers might know enough

14 See David Wagner (2013) on metaphors of “perfect” maps from Jorge Luis Borges,Lewis Carroll, and Josiah Royce, compared with remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein andCharles Sanders Peirce. Cartographic language is so common that Martin Dodge, RobKitchin, and Chris Perkins begin the first chapter of their book on the philosophy ofcartography by employing it without comment (and perhaps even self-recognition):“In this opening chapter we explore the philosophical terrain of contemporarycartography” (2009, 1).

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historical views to use the history of philosophy in conceptual cartog-raphy, as we heard above philosophers who are not historians of phi-losophy themselves likely know something about the history ofphilosophy or someone else who does. Resources are there for thetaking. Finally, regarding the third, while philosophers can use histori-cal views as landmarks, they can use contemporary ones also orinstead. Nonetheless, as we heard, there are advantages to using his-torical ones, including epistemological privileging and ontologicalpositioning.

Objection 4. Situating historically disparate views as landmarks on asingle conceptual map removes those views from their historicalcontext. It therefore treats them anachronistically, which, onemight object, does them injustice.

This objection can be handled. Whenever anyone engages in his-tory, of philosophy or otherwise, anachronism remains a risk. Onesolution is never to engage in history. Another is to engage in it care-fully, which is required here. Nor need merely comparing differentviews be anachronistic. Often philosophical views can be understoodequitable in terms. Moreover using the history of philosophy in con-ceptual cartography is often so focused that the risk of anachronismis minimal. I did not compare Plato’s and Hegel’s metaphysical viewsgenerally or even their views on the metaphysics of empirical proper-ties generally. I instead compared their views on the metaphysics ofempirical properties concerning subjective and objective sourcesspecifically.

Objection 5. Using the history of philosophy productively in concep-tual cartography requires choosing complex concepts, or views,selecting relevant features, and systematically transforming thosefeatures into markers in conceptual space. In my own example thisinvolved simplifying Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Locke’s, Berkeley’s, Kant’s,and Hegel’s views on the metaphysics of empirical properties con-cerning subjective and objective sources, ignoring the rest of theirviews on metaphysics (and much else), and ignoring other viewsaltogether—which, one might object, does all such views injustice.

This objection too can be handled. All cartography requireschoices, selections, and systematic transformations. These in turnrequire simplifying and ignoring phenomena. There is good reasonfor this. Maps are models not copies. They are meant not to duplicatewhat they represent but to display its relevant features. And what isrelevant is relative to the interests of their users. Mercator, polar, andother maps differ drastically from the geographic setting that theyrepresent. We should expect no less from the conceptual kind. Fur-ther, historians of philosophy themselves simplify and ignore views

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when engaging in the history of philosophy for its own sake. Discus-sions of Kant’s view on the Antinomies simplify his view on theSchematism, if they include it at all. They might even simplify his viewon the Antinomies themselves to communicate it better. And theycompletely ignore Kant’s views on the moral law and the beautifuland the sublime. Not every feature of every view makes it into worksin the history of philosophy. We should expect no less from historicalviews used in conceptual cartography.

Objection 6. Using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartogra-phy is a metaphilosophical activity that should remain neutral amonghistorical views that it might map. Yet, one might argue, instead ofremaining neutral, it presupposes Hegel’s philosophy of history inparticular. Thinking that historical views can function as landmarkspresupposes that, as Hegel maintains, history “presents us with arational process” (1857/2004, 9). Moreover, while I situated Hegel’sview on the metaphysics of empirical properties as a landmark—andhis philosophy of history is implicated in that view15 —even those notsituating any of Hegel’s views would also rely on Hegel’s notion thathistory is to some extent or in some way rational. That explains theircommitment to the history of philosophy as a source for appropri-ately spaced conceptual landmarks in the first place.

This objection also can be handled. There is no avoiding presup-posing some philosophical view when engaging in metaphilosophy.Because Hegel is a groundbreaking philosopher of history, it is unsur-prising that his comes up. Nonetheless I am not relying on anythingspecific to Hegel in my metaphilosophical project, nor need anyoneelse. Hegel holds that history must unfold in a specific way, the his-tory of philosophy itself beginning with concerns about sense cer-tainty and continuing through to Kant’s positing the thing in itself.Hegel also holds that history is being carried by Spirit toward a deter-minate end, philosophically culminating in his own absolute idealism.I neither hold nor rely on any of those tenets, nor need anyone elseusing the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography either.The only metaphilosophical presupposition that anyone using the

history of philosophy in conceptual cartography does need to holdis that philosophers develop their views partly in response to theirpredecessors’. They read, elaborate on, and break with the views ofthose preceding them. Philosophy is not done in a vacuum. That isso in the present as much as it was in the past. Philosophical viewsbuild on one another diachronically. There need be no deeperexplanation for that than that historical and contemporary

15 For George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “everything turns on grasping and expressingthe True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (1807/1976, §17) because thetemporal succession of views in the history of philosophy matches the logical succes-sion of views leading to the True.

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philosophers are influenced by those who came before. Thatexplains why the views that I considered above can all be situatedas landmarks relative to one another.So any metaphilosophical presupposing of Hegel is slight. Indeed

the chief metaphilosophical view that I am presupposing is notHegel’s but Plato’s. Plato is metaphilosophically committed to philos-ophy as dialogue. In conversation, as Plato illustrates, views can belaid out for dialogical participants to inspect. Unlike Plato, however, Iam urging that the history of philosophy itself consists in dialogicallyresponsive work. While Plato’s philosophy takes the form of dialoguesbetween his contemporaries, I am urging that the history of philoso-phy be seen as taking the form of dialogues between historicalphilosophers. And that Platonic, even if not quite Plato’s own,metaphilosophical commitment is why in Hegel’s own famous phrase“[r]eason is in history” (1830/1971, §549). Historical views are dialogi-cally and therefore rationally responsive to one another. Because his-tory is rational in that minimal sense, the history of philosophy offersviews that can be situated as landmarks in conceptual scape relative toone another. Philosophers can then situate their own views relative tothose landmarks when explaining them. Regardless, that metaphilo-sophical commitment does not presuppose much else from Hegel,Plato, or other philosophers.16

5. Conclusion

I do not know whether philosophers who are not historians of philoso-phy should study the history of philosophy. Nothing that I have saidanswers the question. I do, however, know that using the history of phi-losophy in conceptual cartography is a modest use to which philosopherswho are not historians of philosophy might put it. Using the history ofphilosophy as such could help us know our way around not merely ourphilosophical parish but also parts of the larger philosophical world.

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