history of asean

Festina Lente: An Introductory Sketch of the

History of ASEAN

Andrew J. Crozier

The term Southeast Asia is today a readily understood geographical and eco-nomic-political concept. Thus, when mention is made of the Association of South-east Asian Nations, there is in the mind of even the least well-informed listener/ reader a rough idea of the area and states that such an association must embrace. It was not always so. While the concept of Southeast Asia had some currency among scholars prior to 1939, it was one that had scarcely any vogue outside the realm of academe. What catalyzed the definition of a distinct region was the Second World War. The Japanese ‘by destroying colonial distinctions between the individual trees…set off the long process whereby Western politicians were forced to recog-nize the forest as a whole and in its own right, and to specify its borders’ (HALL, 1968, p. 7). War promoted the concept of Southeast Asia in three ways: first, and not least because of Britain’s greatest military catastrophe, the area became visi-ble; secondly, the term was legitimated in the formation South-East Asia Com-

mand, placed under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten, at the Anglo-American Quebec Conference of 1943; finally, war conferred also upon Southeast Asia a political connotation (CROZIER, 1999, pp. 37-9; MCCLOUD, 1992, p. 12; FIFIELD, 1992, p. 20). It should also not be overlooked that a book published by K.M. Panniker in 1943, entitled The Future of South-East Asia: An Indian View,did much to establish Southeast Asia conceptually.

Given the importance of Southeast Asia in the history of Britain’s global impe-rial adventure it is surprising and somewhat baffling that modern analyses of the British Empire still refer so fleetingly to the region. This is all the more puzzling in that Britain’s involvement in the region over a period of some three centuries did so much to confer upon it its modern configuration. Within the British Empire there can be no doubting the importance of Malaya, which, prior to 1939, ac-counted for some one third of the world’s tin and a considerable proportion of global rubber production, most of which was exported to the United States. This made Malaya a vitally important dollar earner, whose trade was worth more than that of New Zealand and exceeded more than half that of India. Yet even magiste-rial studies of the British imperial experience, such as that of Cain and Hopkins, cannot find space to discuss Britain’s role in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Thai-land (CAIN/ HOPKINS, (1993a and 1993b). Undoubtedly, the historical profes-sion still reflects the obsessions of nineteenth century empire builders with India, China and the Dominions. Southeast Asia might, however, right at the end of the British imperial experience have come into its own.

14 Andrew J. Crozier

By 1945 it was clear that Indian independence would have to be conceded, al-though it was hoped to do so on terms that would preserve special links with the imperial system. Furthermore, as a result of the war and the increase in American political and economic influence, Britain had lost her dominating position in China. Such a bleak imperial prospect did not, however, precipitate imperial with-drawal, but rather imperial retrenchment in which Southeast Asia was to play an important part. In 1947 the British Foreign Office produced a Stock-Taking Memorandum on the Far East, which was surprisingly upbeat. If Britain went about the matter with sufficient energy, it was thought that she could regain her fair share of the China trade. Southeast Asia, though, was conceived as being of cardinal importance in such a revival. It was considered that the region was a sig-nificant link in the chain of Commonwealth defence, with British leadership being recognised in even non-British territories. The memorandum stated:

It should not prove impossible in the course of the next few years to build up a regional system, with Singapore as its centre, which should not only strengthen the political ties be-tween the territories concerned and facilitate defensive strategy, but also prove of consider-able economic and financial benefit to the United Kingdom. This is an area from which we may hope to derive products with soft currency (e.g. sugar, vegetable oils, tea and coffee) which may enable us to cut down our purchases from hard currency areas. In short, South East Asia is an area to which we should devote close attention and where we should make every effort to try to improve our position (NATIONAL ARCHIVES UK).

Furthermore, a Cabinet Office memorandum sent to Lord Louis Mountbatten in February 1946 stated:

Before the war South East Asia was a comparatively unimportant and little known area. The war has demonstrated its political, economic and strategic importance. At present the existence of South East Asia Command provides a link between the various territories which did not previously exist. But the functions of South East Asia Command are dwin-dling as the various civil governments prepare to take over…Yet there will be many prob-lems of common concern to some if not all of the territories in the area, and consideration has therefore to be given to the desirability of some representative of His Majesty’s Gov-ernment who can look at the problems of the area as a whole and who can promote co-ordination of the views and needs of the British territories involved and relate them with developments in the non-British territories in the area ( STOCKWELL, 1995, No. 71).

It would, of course, be inappropriate to suggest any causal link between British imperial needs in the late 1940s and the foundation of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. The major purpose, however, of these in-troductory remarks has been to attempt to demonstrate that, for the principal impe-rial hegemonic power in the region during the immediate post-war period, the structural situation in the area and the world in general suggested the need to inte-grate the territories over which it had direct or indirect control, and those in which it had influence, into a synchronized whole.

Much British thinking on imperial issues in the late 1940s was predicated upon the assumption that Britain’s imperial mission, mutatis mutandis, would stretch way into the foreseeable future. Within, however, a comparatively short period of time, the continued decline of Britain’s economic position, coupled with the rise and clamour of nationalism and demands for independence, ensured that within

Festina Lente 15

twenty years the British imperial presence in Southeast Asia would come to an end. It proved impossible to deny independence to Burma (Myanmar) or even to maintain effective informal links as she opted not to join the British Common-wealth; Thailand, that fascinating example of informal empire, had already in the 1930s begun to fall into the political and economic orbit of the United States, a process that was hastened by the war and developments thereafter; in Malaya the British presence lingered on because of the needs of the so-called Emergency, but the country was effectively independent by 1957 to be expanded into Malaysia in 1963 as the British territories in Kalimantan (Borneo), Sarawak and Sabah, be-came independent and merged themselves into the Federation of Malaysia. Singa-pore too became a member for a short period, but the ill-starred relationship came to an end in 1965 when Singapore became a separate state. Only in Brunei did Britain stay on until 1984. In Indo-China the French, whom the British had been anxious to reinstall in 1945 as a means of ensuring their own continued presence in Southeast Asia, were effectively ousted by the middle 1950s, leaving in their wake the independent states of Laos, Cambodia and North and South Vietnam. Fi-nally, the Dutch were compelled to leave Indonesia in 1949 and the Philippines were conceded formal independence by the United States in 1946.

All these countries, however, achieved their independence in a much-changed world. Japan was, of course, well on her way to becoming an economic super- power and the United States had in many respects, witness the Vietnam War in the 1960s, replaced Britain as the hegemonic power in the region. But the historic verities of Asian history were also beginning to reassert themselves. Indian inde-pendence and the slow and painful reorganisation of China under Communist leadership implied potential future domination of this region, which had for centu-ries served as the interface between Chinese and Indian culture. Moreover, the rul-ing doctrine of Marxism in China was not welcome among most of the ruling el-ites in Southeast Asia. If the external context in which Southeast Asia found itself in the post-war era was potentially threatening, rivalries and disputes between the newly independent states and internal conflicts within them could only serve to weaken the region further internationally. Myanmar-Thai relations, for example, have been through many vicissitudes during the past fifty years, centring on fron-tier problems relating to minority populations and the trade in opium and timber; during the 1960s Indonesia attempted to crush the development of the Malaysian Federation by ‘confrontation’; and there have been internecine strife and genocide in Vietnam and Cambodia.

By the middle of the 1960s it was clear to some of the political leadership in Southeast Asia that combination was the answer to the area’s external and internal threats. If the newly independent states of Southeast Asia did not hang together then they would be hanged separately. In other words, many of the structural fac-tors that had induced the British to see the future of the area in co-ordination and integration began to work on the leaderships of the newly independent states in the region. One of the most important individuals in the creation of ASEAN, Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, did not, however, see things in quite this light. In his view the states of Southeast Asia had been compelled by their colonial masters to live in ‘cloisins etanches’ in a state of isolation from one another and


he was clearly unaware that the British had had every intention of co-ordinating the Southeast Asian territories over which they had had direct and indirect control (THANAT KHOMAN, 1992, p. xvii).

That similar pressures to those that induced the British to begin to consider Southeast Asia as a whole were impacting on the post-colonial leadership in Southeast Asia can be seen in the varied motives that lay behind the formation of the forerunner of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961. The Malayan prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the President of the Philip-pines, Carlos P. Garcia, were the principal proponents of this grouping. The Tunku believed that regional co-operation was essential for dealing with communist sub-version in the region, while Garcia and the government of the Philippines empha-sised the need for political and economic emancipation (VELLUT, 1965, p. 65). During talks with President Garcia of the Philippines and Tunku Abdul Rahman held at Manila in January in 1959 agreement was reached on a proposal for a Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty.

There was, nevertheless, considerable rivalry between Kuala Lumpur and Ma-nila for leadership of the region. In March 1959 the Malayan government sent President Garcia a grandiloquently phrased proposal, entitled ‘The Tunku Abdul Rahman Plan for a Treaty of Friendship and Closer Association between the Countries of South-East Asia in Economic, Cultural and Allied Matters’, which eventually emerged as the Garcia-Rahman Plan. Nevertheless, in advance of its completion on 28 October 1959, the Tunku unilaterally invited all prospective in-terested parties to send representatives to Kuala Lumpur to discuss the scheme. Understandably, there was outrage in Manila prompting the Philippines foreign minister, Felixberto Serrano, to write to President Garcia in the following terms:

While full credit should be given to the Tunku, it would not be fair to our country to make it appear in his invitation that he alone is asking the other countries to subscribe to this idea. As a matter of fact you will recall that the idea was broached by you to Premier Rahman when he was here, and, Mr. Rahman, grasping its implications, immediately ac-cepted it (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, p. 267).

Nevertheless, what is important is that this proposal was received with particu-lar enthusiasm in Thailand, where the Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman was very enthusiastic about economic co-operation. It was clearly in the minds of all the statesmen concerned that the prosperity that economic co-operation might bring would offset the attractions of communism. As Singapore’s prime minister articulated it some sixteen years later: ‘The basic question is how to ensure con-tinuing stability by stimulating economic development to resolve social and politi-cal problems. Otherwise, increasing disaffection and discontent fuel incipient in-surgencies into full-scale revolutions’ (IRVINE, 1982, pp. 47-8). Likewise Presi-dent Marcos of the Philippines argued that: ‘The principal danger and threat against our individual states should be subversion and the economic crisis…Social or economic development, when utilised as an instrument of social justice, will answer these two questions, and thus the concentration on our economic prob-lems’ (IRVINE, 1982, p. 47). In Thanat’s view economic co-operation should ex-tend throughout the entire region. He was, however, unsuccessful and when ASA

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was formally established in July 1961 it comprised only Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. Moreover, it was a loose rather than tight organisation that empha-sised economic co-operation, although, of course, with an eye to combating the at-tractions of communism (TURNBULL, 1992, p. 615).

In the circumstances of the time, however, ASA was little more than a state-ment of intent and the obstacles in the way of complete regional co-operation re-mained formidable. Although ASA did not overtly deal with security matters its members were aligned with the principal Western powers and in many respects its primary raison d’être was the containment of communism. Both Thailand and the Philippines were allies of the United States and Malaya was tied to Britain in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty. For President Sukarno of Indonesia ASA was a most unattractive proposition and, indeed, Indonesia had been all but ignored in the negotiations leading up to the tabling of the ASA proposal. In Jakarta it ap-peared as a neocolonialist inspired organisation, closely bound up with the West. The opposition of Indonesia was well articulated by the Indonesian foreign minis-ter, Sumitro, who stated: ‘The spirit behind the proposal [ASA] is…anti-this and anti-that…and Indonesia does not want any part in a negative policy in interna-tional affairs’ (FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 13 JULY 1961). Indone-sian hostility was further stimulated in 1963 when Malaya determined to form the Federation of Malaysia by incorporating the former British colonies on Kaliman-tan. There then ensued the period of confrontation, which was only to come to an end with the fall of Sukarno. Even more inauspicious for the future of ASA was the dispute that flared up in 1962 between the Philippines and Malaya over the fu-ture of Sabah when in June of that year the Philippines formally laid claim to it. As a means of solving these problems, President Macapagal of the Philippines proposed that the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya should constitute a ‘Greater Malay Confederation’, to which the Indonesian foreign minister, Subandrio, gave the name ‘Maphilindo’, a concoction made up of the first syllables of the names of the putative member countries. Maphilindo, though, could only have limited ap-peal and was not a realistic prospect. In so far as it was accepted, it was as a means of satisfying Philippino amour propre and of papering over ‘the serious remaining differences between the three countries’ (IRVINE, 1982, p. 10). Furthermore, it could only have appeal to the Malay speaking states of Southeast Asia and not the region as a whole.

In 1965 and 1966, however, two events took place that were to help resolve the differences between thre Malay-speaking states. In November 1965 the election of President Marcos in the Philippines resulted in a downgrading of the Sabah dis-pute in Manila. Meanwhile during the previous month an abortive coup in Indone-sia indicated the fragility of Sukarno’s position; by March the following year he had been effectively deposed. The real ruler of the country was now General Su-harto who became Acting President in 1967. The consequence of these changes was a willingness in Jakarta to bring confrontation to an end.

This turn of events was very much to the liking of Thanat Khoman, the Thai foreign minister, who was to play a formidable role in the creation of ASEAN. He had for many years been suggesting the establishment of a Southeast Asia group-ing and had written articles arguing the case for such a step while a young diplo-


mat. Thanat’s most important argument for the creation of such an organisation was ‘the fact that, with the withdrawal of the colonial powers, there would have been a power vacuum which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains’. Secondly, he believed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), founded in 1954 largely on American initiative and to which only Thai-land and the Philippines acceded, was weak because some of the principal mem-bers were located far from the region. It was, therefore, essential in his mind ‘to build co-operation among those who lived close to one another and shared com-mon interests’. Thirdly, he thought ‘the need to join forces became imperative for the Southeast Asian countries in order to be heard and to be effective’. For Thanat this was ‘the truth that we sadly had to learn’. Finally, it was ‘common knowledge that co-operation and ultimately integration serve the interests of all – something that individual efforts can never achieve’ (THANAT KHONAM, 1992, pp. xvii-xviii). In addition two further points should be made. Thanat was very clear that the American presence in Southeast Asia was by no means ‘necessarily permanent or desirable’. Throughout his career a determining factor in his promotion of re-gional co-operation was the need for ‘regional cooperation as a supplement to, and eventual replacement for, the American alliance’ (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, p. 269). Thanat was also impressed by the example of the European Community. He wrote:

It should be put on record that, for many of us and for me in particular, our model has been and still is, the European Community, not because I was trained there, but because it is the most suitable form for us living in this part of the world – in spite of our parallel economies which are quite different from the European ones (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, p. 269).

Given Thanat’s mindset, once there was an evident will among the states of Southeast Asia to put past disagreements behind them, he became active in medi-ating a solution to confrontation and the Philippine claim to Sabah. He was so successful that, in effect, one can speak of a revival of ASA from March 1966. During the preceding months a number of discussions took place between Malay and Indonesian officials with a view to bringing about a cessation of confronta-tion, which was achieved in a formal agreement in August of that year. This was preceded by formal talks between Malaysia’s deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, and Indonesia’s foreign minister, Adam Malik, which took place between 29 May and 1 June in Bangkok under the auspices of Thanat. It was, in fact, the brokering of this dispute, and the Malay-Philippine dispute over Sabah, by Thanat Khanom that was decisive in launching a new organisation that would facilitate co-operation between the states of Southeast Asia. At the end of the May-June talks Adam Malik made it clear that a new regional grouping had been discussed and he thereafter ‘remained at the forefront of subsequent diplomatic endeavours to establish such a grouping, with active support from Thanat’ (IRVINE, 1982, p. 10). Later the latter recalled:

At the banquet marking the reconciliation between the three disputants, I broached the idea of forming another organization for regional cooperation with Adam Malik [the for-eign minister of Indonesia]. Malik agreed without hesitation but asked for time to talk with

Festina Lente 19

his government and also to normalize relations with Malaysia now that the confrontation was over. Meanwhile, the Thai Foreign Office prepared the draft charter of the new institu-tion. Within a few months everything was ready. I therefore invited the two former mem-bers of the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA), Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indo-nesia, a key member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S. Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, to see me about joining the new set-up. Although the new organiza-tion was planned to comprise only the ASA members plus Indonesia, Singapore’s request was favourably considered (THANAT KHONAM, 1992, p. xviii).

At the beginning of August 1967, therefore, an historic meeting of foreign min-isters took place at Bang Saen, a coastal resort to the south-east of Bangkok, which resulted in the signature and publication of the Bangkok Declaration, 8 Au-gust 1967.

This was the result of much hard work and give and take. The historical and po-litical backgrounds of the various participants varied sharply. Nevertheless, the congenial surroundings of Bang Saen and goodwill and good humour on the part of the participants resulted in success. The Bangkok Declaration established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the name being suggested by the Indonesian foreign minister. The purposes of ASEAN were described as the acceleration of ‘economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations’; the promotion of ‘regional peace and stability through abiding re-spect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship of among countries of the region’; the promotion of ‘active collaboration and mutual assistance’ in eco-nomic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative matters; the provi-sion of mutual assistance in training and research facilities in respect of the educa-tional, professional, technical and administrative fields; more effective collabo-ration regarding increased agricultural activity, the expansion of trade, and trans-port and communications facilities; the promotion of Southeast Asian studies; and the development of links with similar international organisations. The Bangkok Declaration also provided for institutional machinery. There was to be an annual meeting of foreign ministers chaired by in rotation by the host country, with spe-cial meetings as required; a standing committee chaired by the host foreign minis-ter consisting of the ambassadors of the participating powers; ad-hoc and perma-nent committees for specific subjects; and national secretariats in each country to deal with the work of ASEAN in the separate states (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1988, pp. 27-8).

ASEAN as outlined in the Bangkok Declaration was clearly an intergovern-mental organisation that did not aim at supranationalism. Nonetheless, the found-ing fathers of the association were clear that national advancement and security could only be accomplished through regional co-operation. The Philippine foreign minister at the time, Narciso Ramos, spoke as follows:

The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia (with) each country pursuing its own lim-ited objectives and dissipating its meagre resources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavours of sister states carry the seeds of weakness in their capacity for growth and the self-perpetuating dependence on the advanced, industrial nations. ASEAN, therefore, could


marshal the still untapped potentials of this rich region through more substantial united ac-tion (FLORES/ ABAD, 1997, pp. 12-3).

Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister, envisaged Southeast Asia be-coming ‘a region which can stand on its own feet strong enough to defend itself against any negative influence from outside the region’. This he thought was not impossible given the population and raw material resources of the region; the very real differences between the various peoples he opined could be overcome through goodwill and understanding (FLORES/ ABAD, 1997, p. 14). Tun Abdul Razak, the deputy Malaysian prime minister, and, like those mentioned above, a signatory of the Bangkok Declaration, stated:

We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia must get together and form by ourselves a new perspective and a new framework for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of Southeast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with our own ideals and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny (FLORES/ ABAD, 1997, p. 15).

For Razak the establishment of ASEAN was a milestone in that direction. The Singaporean representative at Bang Saen made it clear that the signatories were not against anything and anybody, but for a stable and not a balkanised Southeast Asia, which he argued should be the preferred option of those with goodwill to-wards the region (FLORES/ ABAD, 1997, p. 15). The Bangkok Declaration rep-resented, therefore, the vision of these men, who believed in the elaboration of ASEAN by small, but incremental steps; who believed in the states of the region working together on the basis of voluntary and informal arrangements which might eventually lead to more binding and institutionalised agreements. Neverthe-less, it should be borne in mind that the Bangkok Declaration represented a leap in the dark. As the Singaporean representative, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, recalled in 1974:

You may recollect that at the first meeting in 1967, when we had to draft our commnique, it was a very difficult problem of trying to say nothing in about ten pages, which we did. Because at that time, we ourselves having launched ASEAN, were not quite sure where it was going or whether it was going anywhere at all (FROST, 1990, p. 5).

ASEAN came into being at a most wretched time in the history of parts of Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War was in full flood, shortly to be followed by the tragedy of Cambodia. It was not until the fallout from these events had finally set-tled that ASEAN was to be further enlarged in the 1990s. There had, however, been one accession in the 1980s. On achieving full independence, Brunei Darussa-lam joined in 1984. By this time ASEAN had become a prestigious institution and, once the former French colonies that constituted Indo-China had achieved a cer-tain equilibrium, there was an overwhelming inclination to join. Thus a fully united Vietnam became a member in July 1995 to be followed by Laos in July 1997 and Cambodia in April 1999. Myanmar that mysterious country, joined with Laos in 1997. By the beginning of the twenty-first century ASEAN, therefore, embraced all the states comprising Southeast Asia. Such was its standing that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was able to pronounce on 16 February

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2000: ‘Today, ASEAN is not only a well-functioning, indispensable reality in the region. It is a real force to be reckoned with far beyond the region. It is also a trusted partner of the United Nations in the field of development…’ (http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm).

Nevertheless, for the first decade of its existence ASEAN for many commenta-tors achieved little: ‘ASEAN appeared to many observers to be merely an empty shell within which reverberated the sound of insincere rhetoric and unfulfilled promises’ (JORGENSEN-DAHL, 1982, p. 48). Its raison d’être appeared as vague as much of the diplomacy that had surrounded its original negotiation, in which the claimed main purpose of the proposed combination, the economic co-operation and development of its members was hardly discussed (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, p. 271). It was described as being ‘long on words and short on performance, concentrating on the differences of opinion that must inevitably arise between regional partners rather than on their capacity to reach agreed regional positions through discussion and compromise’. It was said that its greatest achievement was merely to have survived (IRVINE, 1982, p. 37). Such progress as it had made was modest. There had been some inexpensive social and cultural projects. Economic co-operation had been limited to an approach to Japan regard-ing the production of synthetic rubber in 1973, while the previous year a dialogue with the European Community had been initiated (FROST, 1990, pp. 5-6).

Until the mid-1970s the Bangkok Declaration was virtually the only constitu-tional instrument binding the membership of ASEAN together (JORGENSEN-DAHL, 1982, p. 45). In November 1971, however, a start was made in the accu-mulation of what might be called a kind of acquis associational when the five constituent powers signed a declaration of intent to make every effort to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality ‘free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers’ (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1988, pp. 34-5). More significant, though, was the first ASEAN summit that took place in Bali in 1976 which produced the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1988, pp. 39-42).

What precipitated the Bali Summit and gave it significance was the surprisingly rapid turn of events in Indochina that had ended in total communist control of the region by 1975. This was ‘the obvious catalyst for the speeding up and implemen-tation of a wider and more concrete ASEAN co-operation’ (IRVINE, 1982, p. 39). In the weeks before the convening of the Bali Summit the members’ economic ministers for the first time became directly active in the life of the organisation when they met in Jakarta in November 1975 to prepare the basis of the forthcom-ing meeting of heads of government. This was a major turning point because the Bali Summit was to mark the beginning of a much more serious emphasis on eco-nomic co-operation. It was the Declaration of ASEAN Concord that was to be the vehicle for this containing as it did a quite precise economic agenda. The central focus of the organisation’s activity was now to be not so much the annual meeting of foreign ministers, but rather the regular meetings of economic ministers (JORGENSEN-DAHL, 1982, pp. 51-2). In the wake of the Bali Summit the ASEAN economic ministers determined that the current ASEAN permanent, spe-


cial and ad hoc committees should be folded up and replaced by committees com-posed of senior officials in five areas of activity: food and agriculture, trade, commerce and transportation, industry and finance and banking. The previously existing committees were formally subsumed into the new five at the second ASEAN summit in August 1977. It was determined that ‘the economic commit-tees would be responsible to the economic ministers who in turn could communi-cate directly with heads of government’ (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, pp. 280-1). These changes clearly presaged the beginnings of serious, if steady, advance in the economic field. The year 1976 was also significant in that a central secretariat in Jakarta was now established consisting of a secretary-general, three bureau di-rectors and supporting staff (MORRISON/ SUHRKE, 1978, pp. 280-1; ABAD JNR, 2003, p. 34).

The TAC provided that in their relations with one another the signatories should be guided by mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; expressed the expectation that all nations should have a right to conduct their national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; asserted the principle that none of the signatories should interfere in the internal affairs of any of the others; declared that peaceful means should be the appropriate method of resolving disputes be-tween members and renounced the use of force; and, finally, promised effective future co-operation among the signatories. This was the charter of political and se-curity dialogue and co-operation that aimed at maintaining stability in Southeast Asia by co-operation on the basis of self-confidence, self-reliance and mutual re-spect. Significantly, since the foundation of ASEAN and the conclusion of the TAC in 1976, no inter-state tension has escalated to armed confrontation amongst ASEAN members. Chapter IV of the TAC provided the mechanisms through which disputes should be resolved peacefully. Article 13 enjoined the signatories to avoid disputes, but, where they are inevitable, it stipulated that ‘they shall re-frain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations’. Article 14 authorised the estab-lishment of a High Council composed of representatives of each of the powers which, where no mutually agreed solution to a dispute could be reached, could, under Article 15, recommend means of arbitration or act as an arbitrator itself.

The accompanying Declaration of ASEAN Concord (DAC) also took the asso-ciation further. It was agreed that there should be summit meetings as and when necessary and that there should be more serious co-operation in the social and cul-tural fields. It was the economic section, however, that contained the most detailed commitments. Section B (3 i) of the DAC stated:

Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and in-crease their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.

(3 ii) obliged the member states of the association to ‘progress towards the es-tablishment of preferential trading arrangements’ that would be appropriate and

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unanimously agreed. (3 iii) envisaged co-operation directed at expanding intra-ASEAN trade, while the following provision stated:

Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products b seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting com-mon approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.

Clearly the aim of ASEAN was not merely co-operation and security, but also economic development, essential if the member states were collectively and singly to maintain genuine independence (ABAD JNR, 2003, p. 34).

By the end of the 1980s ASEAN progress was evident if still slow. Intra-ASEAN trade still only accounted for 20 per cent of the organisation’s total trade, the bulk of which was external with the main trading partners being Japan, the USA and Europe. Manufacturing accounted for 28 percent of ASEAN’s total ex-ports, agricultural products for 30 percent and metals and minerals for 42 percent. ASEAN members, however, provided ‘most of the world’s traded rubber, tin and some vegetable oils…’. They also provided the bulk of Japan’s timber require-ments and much of her foodstuffs (FROST, 1990, pp. 10-1). While economic ini-tiatives post-1976 may have been pursued cautiously, the achievements were, nonetheless, significant. ASEAN had ‘developed strength and cohesion’ and other states were demonstrating an interest in closer asscociation. Moreover, not one state had shown signs of wanting to abandon the organisation (FROST, 1990, p. 28). As Thanat Khonam put it in 1992, while the spirit of true partnership was often still lacking and while there was a lack of political will, trust and sincerity at times, ‘yet each and everyone in their heart realizes that the advantages of ASEAN accrue to them all, and no-one is thinking of leaving it!’. In his view further eco-nomic co-operation was the key to the future and he attributed great importance to the creation of a single and unified market in Southeast Asia (THANAT KHONAM, 1992, p. xx).

By 1992 ASEAN was indeed able to move further forward in economic co-operation with the Agreement on The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area concluded at Singapore on 28 January. The rationale for this was clear, for there was a conviction that preferen-tial trading arrangements within ASEAN would strengthen the economic resil-ience of the individual members and the association as a whole by expanding in-vestment and production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange earnings. Article 4 of the agreement provided for the reduction of existing tariff rates to 20% within the time frame of 5 to 8 years from 1 January 1993, while the subse-quent reduction of tariff rates from 20% or below was to be accomplished in seven years. There can be no doubt that the strategic objective of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was to increase the ASEAN region’s competitive advantage as a single production unit. It was anticipated that the elimination of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers among the member states would promote greater economic effi-ciency, productivity and competitiveness (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1992, p. 5). The fifth ASEAN summit held in Bangkok in 1995 adopted an accelerated sched-


ule for the completion of the AFTA in a ten year time frame rather than the origi-nal fifteen (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1999, pp. 23-4).

The fourth ASEAN summit of 1992 also made changes to the function of the ASEAN secretariat. First, the Secretary-General became such for ASEAN as a whole and not merely the secretariat itself. Secondly, the secretariat was made properly professional by the introduction of ‘open and competitive recruitment’. Finally, the Secretary-General would be able to ‘initiate policies for the considera-tion of concerned ASEAN bodies’ (ABAD JNR, 2003, p. 34). The early 1990s were also significant for the beginning of the rapprochement with Indochina that would be fully effected by the end of the decade. In 1986 the communist Hanoi government had set out on the road to the creation of a market mechanism econ-omy with the introduction of the policy of doi moi or ‘renovation’. By 1991 the Chairman of Vietnam’s State Pricing Commission, Pham Van Tiem, was making public noises about ‘institutionalising’ Indochina-ASEAN relations. From the point of view of Hanoi there were several advantages that would accrue from the normalisation of relations with ASEAN, such as the prospects of attracting foreign direct investment and reducing dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1991 state-ments made by the leadership in Hanoi reassured ASEAN regarding the sincerity of change of course as did the departure of most of the Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay which removed the putative threat to the region’s sea lanes (ACHAR-YA, 1993, pp. 43-5).

In 1995 the ASEAN leaders meeting in Kuala Lumpur adopted the so-called ASEAN Vision 2020 which called for partnership in dynamic development, the purpose of which was the encouragement of closer economic integration within the region. The Vision document stated that the parties involved would undertake to:

…advance economic integration and cooperation by undertaking the following general strategies: fully implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area and accelerate liberalization of trade in services, realise the ASEAN Investment Area by 2010 and free flow of investments by 2020; intensify and expand sub-regional cooperation in existing and new sub-regional growth areas; further consolidate and expand extra-ASEAN regional linkages for mutual benefit, cooperate to strengthen the multilateral trading system, and reinforce the role of the business sector as an engine of growth (ASEAN SECRETARIAT, 1999a, pp. 6-7).

The Ha Noi Plan of Action of 1998 was the first of a series of plans of action which it was hoped would help accomplish the ASEAN Vision (ASEAN SECRE-TARIAT, 1999b, pp. 7-27; TAY, 2003, p. 493).

It could, of course, be contested that all these agreements and plans constituted so much flummery. Yet the statistics tend to confirm the benefit of actual co-operation and commitment. Between 1993 and 1996 exports between ASEAN countries expanded from US$43 billion to almost US$80 billion in 1996, repre-senting an annual growth of some 28 per cent. Inevitably the share of intra-regional trade as a percentage of ASEAN’s total trade rose from 20 to almost 25 per cent. Interestingly, and perhaps a sign of increasing prosperity, tourists from the ASEAN countries themselves accounted for an increasingly important share of tourism in the region. In 1996, of 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN, 40 per-

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cent or 11.2 million came from within ASEAN itself (http://www.aseansec.org/ 64.htm). Today ASEAN is a major economic actor, having a total population in excess of 500 million, an area of 4.5 million square kilometres, a Gross Domestic Product of $737 billion and a total trade of US$720 billion (http://www.aseansec. org/64.htm). From 1995 until the economic crisis of 1997 it is evident that ‘the provisions of AFTA were gradually implemented’, although targets were not al-ways fulfilled. Moreover, during the economic crisis of 1997-8 governments within ASEAN continued to see intra-regional trade as the means of ending it, witness the agreement of the AFTA signatories at the 1998 Hanoi Summit to ac-celerate the implementation by 2002 rather than 2003 of the tariff reduction to be-low 5 per cent on all items in the ‘Inclusion List’ (STUBBS, 2003, p. 209). In ad-dition, ASEAN has become a major economic partner for the European Union (EU). In 2002 the EU was ASEAN’s second largest export market and the third largest trading partner after the United States and Japan. In 2002 EU exports to ASEAN are estimated to have totalled 30 billion Euros, while EU imports from ASEAN were valued at 62 billion Euros. The EU, therefore, maintained its com-mitment to keep its markets open after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (http://europa.eu.int/commexternal_relations/asean/intro/).

The 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century also witnessed impor-tant political developments within ASEAN. Twenty-four years after the declara-tion making ASEAN a zone of neutrality, a treaty was concluded in Bangkok that committed the signatories to making Southeast Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone. This was an important step not only because of the commitment to eschew the manufacture and detonation of nuclear devices, but because of its environmental implications. Article 3(3) bound the signatories not to ‘dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any radioactive material wastes’ or to ‘dispose of radioactive material or wastes on land…’ Nevertheless, the right of member states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was safeguarded (http://www.aseansec.org/2082.htm).

Perhaps, however, the most important general political development in recent years has been the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (DAC II) at a meeting in Bali in 2003. DAC II declared that:

An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, sta-bility and shared prosperity in the region.

Within the Security Community the High Council of the TAC was to continue as the main component. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, was, however, to be the principal forum for dialogue that would promote confi-dence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region. Section A 10 promised co-operation over a whole range of issues:

The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mecha-nisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of


mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibil-ity of being the primary driving force of the ARF (http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm; FUKUSHIMA, 2003, pp. 276-9).

In many respects, though, it was Section B, which elaborated the ASEAN Eco-nomic Community, that marked a decisive step forward. This would be the realisa-tion of the process of economic integration as outlined in ASEAN Vision 2020. It was B 3 that was the critical provision:

The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and pro-duction base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for busi-ness complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain. ASEAN’s strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and en-hancing ASEAN’s economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Invest-ment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mecha-nism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes.

This document also called for the implementation of both liberalization and co-operation measures and enhancement of co-operation and integration in other ar-eas, such as human resources development, infrastructural matters and communi-cations. Section C of DAC II adumbrated the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community which promised collaboration in the raising of the standard of living of the disad-vantaged, improving educational opportunities and collaboration in fighting AIDS and SARS (http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm).

Although economic co-operation and development are today at the forefront of ASEAN’s activities, there are some commentators who see a hidden agenda of ‘security’ as its primary rationale. According to Michael Leifer, while ASEAN does not have the form or structure of an alliance and its ostensible concern is with economic development, it is best considered as a security organisation. He writes:

…although its [ASEAN’s] members have engaged in cooperative enterprise directed against protectionist practice by industrialized states, a common denominator has been a desire for mutual protection on the part of conservative governments which wish to uphold the status quo.

Yet ASEAN cannot assume the structure of a formal alliance because there is really no common external threat. Nonetheless, ASEAN is

…a security organization because its members share a common interest in preventing radical internal political change. Indeed the five governments which established the Asso-ciation…bear a resemblance in outlook and priorities to those which adhered to the Act of Holy Alliance.

Conflict avoidance in the interests of conservative stability was the name of the game (LEIFER, 2003, pp. 265-7; LEIFER, 1989, pp. 1-16).

Festina Lente 27

While there is for this writer considerable truth in this assessment, it still re-mains valid that during the almost forty years since ASEAN was established it has in many ways become a success story both collectively and from the point of view of the individual nations. One only has to consider the enormous economic pro-gress in the Malaysian Republic to see how much the region has advanced. Indi-vidual success stories cannot of course be attributed to ASEAN alone, but collabo-ration and dialogue in the region have undoubtedly contributed to the stability necessary for success. In many ways the ASEAN region is much more politically and culturally diverse than its comparator, the European Union. Supranationalism has, therefore, been to some degree irrelevant to the success of ASEAN which has been marked by a cautious intergovernmentalism on the part of its members. The collaboration has also had to be marked by a certain degree of tolerance. Without wishing to provoke controversy, democracy in ASEAN is a somewhat elastic con-cept; or, as one authority has put it, each state has its own negation of the democ-ratic principle. It is, though, surely better to pursue policies of constructive en-gagement, as Thailand did towards Myanmar, and to have a somewhat authori-tarian state such as the latter within ASEAN than to have her disgruntled on the sidelines. Undoubtedly combination in the ASEAN region has enabled the indi-vidual states that are part of the association to exercise a political and economic independence greater than could have been achieved by going it alone. It is sig-nificant that, despite all the fluctuations of fortune within the individual states over almost forty years ASEAN has not only been a constant, but has increased in membership as well as developed institutionally. Writing in 1992 S. Rajaratnam stated:

…creating and managing within a brief period of only 25 years, an ASEAN community of…economically and industrially underdeveloped peoples who had no experience of ad-ministering a modern, complex multi-racial regional organization verges…on the miracu-lous (RAJARATNAM, 1992, p. xxiv).

The same words easily hold true today. To get where they are today the states of ASEAN had hurried slowly.

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