history and analysis of conflict in the...

C H A P T E R 2History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro

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2History and Analysis of

Conflict in the Bangsamoro

Bangsamoro Development Plan

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A. A Brief History of the Bangsamoro StruggleThe history of conflict in Mindanao can be traced back

to Spanish colonization in the 16th century. By then,

Islam had already taken root in Mindanao,9 having

been introduced in the 13th century by Arab traders and

promoted by missionaries from Indonesia and Malaysia

in the 15th and early 16th centuries. In line with Islamic

tradition, a governance structure was in place in the form

of Sultanates.10

The ability of the Muslims to thwart successive attempts

of the Spanish colonial forces to subjugate them set

their people apart from the northern inhabitants of the

Philippine archipelago, most of whom were conquered

and converted to Christianity. Deep distrust and

suspicion11 were cultivated by the colonizers among

the Christian converts against their Muslim brothers as a

way of ensuring their control of most of the country and

its inhabitants. Intermittent wars were fought between

the Spanish invaders and their local Christian allies and

Muslim fighters throughout three centuries of Spanish

colonial rule.

The advent of American colonial rule did little to

change the situation. The American regime passed a

series of land laws12 that favored settlers and private

corporations at the expense of the Moros. This, along

with the implementation of land titling programs in

Mindanao anchored in a property rights13 regime alien to

the customs and traditions of the Moros, led to massive

dispossession of Moro lands by settlers and private

investors.

After the Philippines gained independence from the

United States, a series of land resettlement programs in

Mindanao in the 1950s and 1960s further accelerated

this dispossession. The resettlement programs were

undertaken to ease the social unrest spawned by the

Communist-led Huk rebellion in the islands of Luzon

and the Visayas and, purportedly, to further develop

Mindanao by exploiting its vast natural resources.14

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, tension increased

between the settlers and Moros as land scarcity grew and

centuries-old distrust continued between the two groups.

The contemporary armed conflict between the

government in Manila and the Moros was triggered

by the Jabidah massacre in 1968,15 which led to the

establishment of the first Moro separatist groups initially

with the founding of the Moro Independence Movement

(MIM) and eventually the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF).

The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand

Marcos in 1972 transformed the conflict from a

simmering rebellion into a full-blown war. Ultimately

realizing that he could not achieve total victory against

History and Analysis ofConflict in the Bangsamoro2


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the Moro combatants, Marcos initiated the signing of

the 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF. Under this

agreement, the MNLF would drop its separatist goal in

favor of creating an autonomous government for the

Moros. In the years that followed, the conflict returned

to being a low-intensity rebellion, with the Central

Government in Manila implementing its own definition

of autonomy for the Moros.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the Tripoli Agreement,

the MILF led by Chairman Salamat Hashim, formally

broke away from the MNLF in the signing of instrument

December 30, 1977. Chairman Salamat distinguished the

MILF from the MNLF by stressing not only a nationalist

but also an Islamic agenda.

Following the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986,

under the government of President Corazon Aquino,

a new Philippine Constitution was enacted in 1987

that included provisions for autonomy in Muslim

Mindanao and the Cordillera Region. This opened further

negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and led to

the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between

the GRP and MNLF during the administration of President

Fidel V. Ramos. The agreement provided for the creation

of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and

Development (SPCPD) as a transitory institution before

the establishment of an expanded region to be known as

ARMM.

The MILF distanced itself from the agreement but

committed to not standing in the way of peace. However,

noncompliance by both sides to the peace agreement

and failure to deliver the peace and economic growth

promised to MNLF constituents resulted in increased

support across the region for the MILF. The MNLF’s

credibility was further eroded in 1998 when the new

administration of President Joseph Estrada did not give

full support to the peace agreement.

In 2000, concerned about the MILF’s growing strength,

the Estrada regime declared an “all-out war,” resulting

in the displacement of more than a million people, with

high human and physical costs to the entire country.

Following Estrada’s impeachment and ouster in 2001,

President Gloria Arroyo reversed her predecessor’s

aggressive policy and declared an “all-out peace” stance

toward the MILF. Peace negotiations began but broke

down when the government unilaterally attacked MILF

positions in 2003, resulting in the displacement of more

than a half a million people.

Later that year, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with

the MILF paved the way for resumed negotiations, which

culminated in the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The MOA-AD provided

for greater autonomy for the Bangsamoro to govern their

affairs and an expanded ARMM territory. However, it

was challenged in the Philippine Supreme Court and

was ruled unconstitutional. There followed another

major outbreak of armed violence between some MILF

forces and government troops, displacing some 700,000

people.

It was not until mid-2010, with the newly elected

government of President Benigno Aquino III, that

negotiations resumed. In early 2011, President Aquino

personally met Chairman Murad in Tokyo to assure him

of his government’s sincerity in seeking lasting peace

with the MILF. In October 2012, the GPH and MILF

peace negotiating panels, through mediation by the

Malaysian Government, reached a breakthrough and

signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

(FAB).

A series of negotiations provided the details of the FAB,

which are contained in four annexes pertaining to: (1)

Transitional Arrangements and Modalities; (2) Wealth

Sharing and Revenue Generation; (3) Power Sharing;16

and (4) Normalization. The signing of the Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro signaled the start of a new

phase in the relationship between the MILF and the GPH

and the difficult task of implementing the peace accord

as embodied in the proposed BBL.


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B. Conflict and Development Analysis of the BangsamoroConservative estimates of deaths due to wars in

Mindanao put the fatalities at nearly 120,000 from 1970

to 1996, with even higher figures for protracted and

cyclical displacement.17 Purely economic assessments

of the costs of conflict range from a conservative USD 2

to 3 billion for the period from 1970 to 200118 to USD

10 billion for the period from 1975 to 2002.19 The latter

considers not only direct output losses but also other

factors, such as forgone investments and capital flight.

Using USD 10 billion as the reference figure and based

on the average exchange rate between 1975 and 2002

of PhP 22.5 to the US dollar, this amounts to PhP 225

billion or around PhP 8.3 billion per year—losses that

have translated to profound social and economic impacts

and forgone opportunities for both the Bangsamoro and

the Philippines as a whole.20

As a development plan for a conflict-affected area, the

BDP is anchored in an understanding of the complex

security, justice, and economic factors that drive and

perpetuate conflict and its corresponding development

costs. The 2005 Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for

Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected

Areas in Mindanao21 illustrates how injustice in its

various manifestations underpins the historical conflict

in the Bangsamoro. These forms of injustice escalate into

structural violence and armed confrontation because of

certain key triggers, including competition for scarce

natural and mineral resources, crime (e.g., cattle rustling,

kidnapping), local election disputes, and government

policies, such as the declaration of “all-out war” against

the MILF by the Estrada administration, among others.

In response to the cycles of violence and insecurity

driven by widespread economic marginalization and

political disenfranchisement in the Bangsamoro, the

CAB, specifically the Tripoli Agreement of 2001,

commits the parties to three interlocking aspects of the

peace process: (1) Security Aspect (2) Rehabilitation,

Humanitarian and Development Aspect, and (3)

Ancestral Domain Aspect. While much work remains

to be done in support of structural and security

sector reform, particularly in the transition period,

the full implementation of the CAB will require

targeted socioeconomic responses that will enable

the Bangsamoro to immediately feel the benefits of the

peace dividends and improve their overall welfare.

The signing of the CAB is a significant step in reducing

incidences of state-minority contestation, or vertical

conflict, which pits non-state armed groups against

government forces. Data from the GPH Coordinating

Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) (see

Figure 1) show no armed skirmishes between the GPH

and MILF since the breakthrough in peace negotiations

in 2012, which provided an enabling environment for

stable communities and continuous socioeconomic

delivery.22

Other drivers of conflict in the Bangsamoro area take the

form of inter-communal (between political and ethno-

linguistic groups) and inter-elite violence (rido or local

clan feuds, such as over political posts and control over

Source: GPH-CCCH Info Brief (March 2012)

Figure 1: Annual Trend of GPH-MILF Armed Skirmishes (2002–2014)


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resources).23 While distinct, these horizontal conflicts

are often closely related to the vertical conflict, and

one spills over into the other.24 Another driver of

conflict is the prevalence of the shadow economy,

or “nonconformist economic activities”25 such as the

illicit weapons and drug trade, kidnap-for-ransom

activities, informal credit and land markets, and cross-

border trade, as it intersects with the prevalence of

warlordism and clan-based violence. Economic rents

from the shadow economy are used to consolidate

political influence and patronage, reinforcing overall

insecurity and further undermining weak institutions.26

Injustice and insecurity are central to the narrative of

failed development in the Bangsamoro. Economic

development by itself cannot address the historical

grievances of the Bangsamoro or the insecurity that

affects large parts of the Bangsamoro territories. But

development can play a part in supporting the political

and security transitions that will play out in the coming

period. Accordingly, the BDP is a peacebuilding

plan that analyzes and addresses development issues

through the lens of conflict. It is driven by a strong

intention to address injustice and directly tackle

sources of discontent that drive conflict. The priorities

in this Plan are therefore different from those in the parts

of the Philippines that are not affected by conflict.

For the short term, the Plan recommends actions

and interventions that will promote stabilization

and strengthen the legitimacy of the Bangsamoro

Government. The Plan recognizes that how development

is implemented in the Bangsamoro matters as much as

how much is spent. Based on the principles described

in the next chapter, the BDP promotes distribution of

resources based on need and equity, to ensuring fair and

equal access to development opportunities for all in the

Bangsamoro. The Plan gives priority to development

approaches that are people-centered and that bring

communities together for joint planning and decision-

making, as these have been proven to build the necessary

social cohesion.

As a conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding plan, the BDP

is ultimately built around developing stronger institutions

that will deliver better services, more effective justice, and

decent jobs and livelihood for the Bangsamoro people.

Such institutions will require open and transparent

governance, partnerships between government and civil

society, and a willingness to openly engage with citizens.


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9 See Rodil (2009), Houben (2003), and Abubakar (2005).10 There were four sultanates, namely: the Sultanate of Sulu, which was based in Sulu but also ruled the neighboring islands and coastal areas of

what is now known as the Zamboanga Peninsula; the Sultanate of Maguindanao, which covered the south-central portion of Mindanao Islands; the Four Principalities of Lanao, which ruled the eastern and central portion of Mindanao; and the Sultanate of Kabuntalan in Maguindanao. For historical accounts of the rise and fall of the Sultanates in Mindanao, refer to Majul (1973 and 1985), Tan (1977, 1989 and 1993), Muslim (1994), Tanggol (1993), and Rodil (2009).

11 In fact, the Spaniards used the term “Moros” to refer to the Islamized inhabitants of Mindanao to distinguish them from the Christian inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas.

12 Refer to the 1902 Philippine Bill, which effectively upheld Spanish cadastral laws; the 1902 Land Registration Act, which established the requirement of a “Torrens title” as proof of land ownership; and the 1905 and 1918 Public Land Acts, which determined all unregistered and untitled lands to be owned by the State, and that such public lands may be claimed and registered through the free patent system.

13 This is the Regalian doctrine, which was first introduced during the Spanish colonial period and became the basis for all land laws as established in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions. It stipulates that all lands of the public domain and other natural resources belong to the King of Spain and later to the State as the natural successor.

14 See Majul (1973 and 1985), Tan (1977, 1989, and 1993), and Mastura (2004).15 This involved the killing of at least 28 young Moro military trainees by their superiors to prevent a leak of the Philippine Government’s intent of

fomenting unrest in Sabah, to which the Sulu Sultanate has a claim. 16 An Addendum on Bangsamoro Waters complements the “Annex on Power Sharing.”17 See World Food Programme and World Bank (2010). 18 Using an exchange rate then of PhP 54.5 to USD 1, this will amount to PhP 108 to PhP 158 billion for the entire period or around PhP 5.0–7.5

billion per year. See Barandiaran (2002).19 See Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005). This is further supported by the United Nations Development Programme (2005). 20 Average exchange rate calculated using data from World Bank World Development Indicators (1975–2002). 21 See World Bank et.al (2005). The 5-volume report is divided into sectoral concerns, namely: human development, rural development, finance and

private sector development, local governance and institutions, and an integrative report which serves as the fifth volume. Each sectoral report rendered a discussion of the current situation in their sector, identified the problems, formulated recommendations to address these problems, and identified the menu of activities that need to be undertaken and their funding requirements. The recommended activities were divided into three implementation periods: “immediate term” (start at year 1 but implementation can go beyond year 1); “short term” (start in year 2 but implementation can go beyond 1 or 2 years); and “medium term” (start in year 4 and 5 but implementation can go beyond 2 or 3 years). To obtain the data for the needs assessment, the study employed key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and analysis of secondary data. More than 3,000 individuals and representatives of institutions served as respondents of the study coming from 19 municipalities in 7 provinces considered as Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs).

22 See the “GPH-CCCH Update Report” (2012).23 State-minority contestation is also known as “vertical conflict” in conflict literature; inter-elite and inter-communal contestations are classified as

“horizontal conflict.”24 See Adriano and Parks (2013) for additional information on the typology of conflict in the Bangsamoro.25 Lara and Schoofs (2013).26 Ibid.

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