hhuman development reportuman development report

Human Development ReportHuman Development Report

A LOOK AT THE NEW ‘US’. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATIONA LOOK AT THE NEW ‘US’. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION

El Salvador (IDHES) 2005El Salvador (IDHES) 2005

HumanHumanDevelopment Report forDevelopment Report forEl Salvador (IDHES) 2005El Salvador (IDHES) 2005A look at the new ‘Us’.A look at the new ‘Us’.The impact of migrationThe impact of migration

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Published by:United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). San Salvador, 2005

Board of DirectorsAna Vilma de Escobar, Beat Rohr, José Jorge Simán, Ana Cristina Sol, Aronette Díaz, Juan Valiente, Carlos Quintanilla Schmidt and José Mauricio Loucel

Young Academics Advisory BoardRodrigo Chávez, Carlo Giovanni Berti, Xochitl Hernández, Claudia Cristiani, Lucía Borjas Chávez, Juan Felipe Gutiérrez Ramírez, David Gallardo, Manuel Delgado, Georgina Hernández Rivas, Everardo Rivera

Executive Secretariat CNDSÁlvaro Magaña, Yanira Quiteño

CoordinatorWilliam Pleitez

Editing and publication teamCarlos AcevedoKatharine Andrade-EekhoffMiguel Huezo MixcoAlvaro MagañaWilliam PleitezCharles Schnell

ProofreadersMargarita Marroquín ParducciTania Góchez Fernández

Statistical CoordinatorJimmy Vásquez

Outreach and communicationsMiguel Huezo MixcoMorena Valdez Vigil

Translated byFabien Lefrançois

Design and layoutComunicación Gráfi ca, El Salvador

Cover designRomeo Galdámez (Cover photographs from UNDP and La Prensa Gráfi ca archives)

Printed byImpresos Multiples S.A. de C.V.

With the fi nancial support of:

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN EL SALVADOR, A DEVELOPMENT IN EL SALVADOR, A CONTRADICTORY RELATIONSHIPCONTRADICTORY RELATIONSHIP

This Human Development Report for El Salvador (IDHES), in line with previous Reports, seeks to present a systematic, comprehensive vision of the country’s reality. It identifi es major changes and trends and establishes which of those foster human development and which do not. The analytical framework for this report is the issue of international migration from El Salvador, and specifi cally its impact on various dimensions (economic, social, political, cultural, etc.) of the lives of those who emigrate and those who remain in the country.

The issue has undoubtedly gained central importance for the mass media, offi cials and politicians, academics, business people and above all the general public. However, to the surprise of the authors, until now the issue has not been explored suffi ciently or rigorously enough. In consequence, much of what is being said on migration and its impact is based on generalized stereotypes and not on the actual reality, which is much more complex.

The fundamental conceptual framework used for the analysis is the human development focus, born more than two decades ago as a counterweight to dominant currents in development studies at the time, which prioritized economic growth and largely overlooked the impact on people. As long as the economy grew in a stable macroeconomic environment, the fact that a signifi cant part of the population did not benefi t from it did not matter much. Poverty, inequality, infant mortality, illiteracy, unemployment, environmental degradation and insecurity

could thrive: as long as there was economic growth, there would be enough resources to solve those problems.

The human development concept stemmed precisely from the realization that despite decades of strong economic growth, poverty levels (sometimes extreme) around the world had not been reduced signifi cantly. The human development concept seeks to assess economic development not in monetary terms per se, but rather in terms of options, opportunities, and well-being for actors in development, i.e. people in a given location. Human development focuses on health care, education and employment opportunities, as well as income and access to services. It argues that the purpose of an economic system should be to manage human potential, and that the main wealth of a country resides in its people, who are key to improving the present and building the future.

Because it takes away and deprives a country from its main source of wealth, international migration can be seen as the antithesis of human development, or as a hemorrhage of human development. Migration results largely from insecurity and a lack of employment and opportunities in the home country. A considerable part of the economically active population seeks better fortune in richer countries. Young people entering productive life are especially prone to emigrate. Families are separated, communities are torn apart, when their most outstanding members look for a new fate in a purported promised land.

In El Salvador there is a risk of brain drain signifi cant enough to weaken the human resources the country can rely on for its economic and business development, therefore affecting its growth and

OVERVIEWOVERVIEW Human Development Report for El Salvador 2005.A look at the new ‘Us’. The impact of migration

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OVERVIEWOVERVIEW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR (IDHES) 2005 A LOOK AT THE NEW ‘US’. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION

performance. A recent World Bank study examining this risk in labor-exporting countries concluded that 39.5 % of Salvadorans with a university degree live outside the country.

In this regard, Enríquez Cabot warns that while two thirds of the global economy is already knowledge-based, many countries not only fail to invest in their people, but also do not seem too concerned with the fact that their most qualifi ed citizens emigrate. In a knowledge economy, Cabot adds, if human rights are not looked after and people are not provided opportunities, emigration grows rapidly, and it is often the most outstanding who leave fi rst. New globalization technologies grant a lot of power to the better-informed and better-trained, and give them more freedom to decide which fl ag to swear allegiance to, where to invest, or where to build a real or virtual community.

Is it not a human development failure that dynamic young people, who should be the foundation of the next productive generation, emigrate despite the high risks of theft, attacks, rape and even loss of life? And since migrants are forced to uproot themselves and make their way to unknown destinations in search of jobs and an income, is this not a return to classic economic development, where money matters and people do not? All these facts point to the conclusion that migration and human development are antithetical.

However migration can also be seen as a resource for people, who decide to run all those risks in order to clear themselves a path towards human development. Families and communities adopting this strategy usually get access to opportunities that they lacked back home. Through hard work and

sacrifi ce, many migrants became well-off and, with others who are still in a diffi cult situation, send support to their loved ones and to a lesser extent to their communities, thus contributing to reduce poverty levels and improve human development. In addition, they help other family members and friends emigrate to their new places of residence, where they have settled, formed families and bought homes.

In that sense, migration has encouraged autonomous solutions to problems of poverty and lack of human development. Without waiting for offi cial programmes, migrants have succeeded in making development happen for themselves and their families, by investing human and social capital, i.e. their own wits, work and sacrifi ces, with the support of social networks. Their children who still live in El Salvador achieve higher education, live in better houses, and if prospects in the country are not bright enough, they can always follow their parents’ example. As for children of migrants who were born abroad, they are bilingual, better educated and sometimes have both nationalities. They have access to better health care, educational opportunities and income than if their parents had not migrated. Will their families and communities not enjoy a signifi cantly higher level of human development than if they had not migrated? Poverty is usually worse among communities in El Salvador where nobody has migrated.

Why should human development have to wait for offi cial programmes, when people fi nd a path forward through their own initiative? Who could question that migration, by taking the country’s main wealth where it can be put to better use and have access to options, also induces human development, benefi ting those remaining as much as those

Salvadorans are creating a country with transnational

features, with migrants strengthening

bonds back home and at their new

destination, coming and going between

the two, with one foot in each

country. It is hard to say whether this new ‘transnational homeland’ will last

or not

4

OVERVIEWOVERVIEWHUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR (IDHES) 2005 A LOOK AT THE NEW ‘US’. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION

who leave? How can bonds between these various components of ‘Salvadoran-ness’ be rebuilt and strengthened, in order to gather them around a common project towards higher living standards?

This Report also helps understand patterns of behavior that might otherwise seem absurd. For instance, why do opinion polls identify unemployment as one of the main national problems, while at the same time the Ministry of Agriculture reports a shortage of workers to harvest coffee? Why has the price of farmable land risen so much, while the agricultural sector has been stagnating for so long? Why are so many shopping malls being built, all apparently packed with customers, when the pace of economic growth has been slow for the past decade? The various chapters of this report discuss these issues, as well as others having to do with the diversity of the dynamics generated in El Salvador as a consequence of international migration.

Thanks to migration, many Salvadorans were able to clear themselves a path in new places, where opportunities are much broader than where they came from. Sharpening their wits and organizational capacities, family and community groups have learned how to reduce the hazards of the journey and facilitate social and labor insertion in the receiving community. The destination is usually known in advance, increasing chances of success, the benefi ts of which will then be shared. But these opportunities come at a high price, and costs fall upon migrants themselves, their families living in other locations, and communities that lose leaders and qualifi ed people.

In addition, migrants keep their connection with their homeland and their community through bonds that are strengthened in

various ways, from remittances and transfer of technical knowledge, business know-how and entrepreneurial practices, to trade, tourism, communications, community-based development, political support and cultural change.

Migrants should be a full part of a new country project that can only be a common, plural endeavor. One of the main goals of this project, as the title of this Report suggests, would be shaping a new ‘Us’, i.e. a social imaginary that allows all parts of ‘Salvadoran-ness’ to feel they belong to a common subject. This new ‘Us’ will be a source of shared purpose, experience and values. This is a cultural endeavor in the broadest sense, and should be undertaken from all fi elds of social, political and economic life.

Indeed Salvadorans are creating a country with transnational features, with migrants strengthening bonds back home and at their new destination, coming and going between the two, with one foot in each country. It is hard to say whether this new ‘transnational homeland’ will last or not. It might turn out to be a transition, a shelter from identity confl icts generated by the environment in the new places of residence. Or it could be the base for a new ‘Us’ currently taking shape and that involves Salvadorans in both places, from both places. In any case, this is how bottom-up human development happens, i.e. not as a governmental project and without theoretical ambitions, but as a participatory exercise involving families and communities that have taken this path. By looking at migration as an opportunity for human development, despite its cost and setting aside the responsibilities of the country and its successive governments, our goal is to highlight the example set by hundreds of thousands of Salvadoran adventurers

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Box 1Box 1

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR (IDHES) 2005

The Human Development Report for El Salvador (IDHES) 2005, “A Look at the New ‘Us’. The Impact of Migration” investigates the various dynamics generated in Salvadoran society as a result of international migration. It includes ten chapters prepared by a multidisciplinary team composed of more than 60 experts, on economic, social, political and cultural issues.

Human Development Reports present independent and objective analysis, statistics and other relevant data, looking at national priorities through a human development lens. They are a wide-ranging tool to monitor progress and challenges facing a country. The Salvadoran Report (IDHES) is issued every two years and is commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the National Council for Sustainable Development (CNDS). Similar Reports are issued in 134 other countries. UNDP Headquarters issue a global Report each year.

CONTENTS

Ch. 1. Dynamics of Salvadoran International Migration attempts to gauge two emerging migration phenomenon: fi rst, fl ows of Salvadorans to developed countries, especially to the US, for which estimates vary greatly; and second, a more recent, less-studied fl ow that could become signifi cant: Central Americans migrating to El Salvador.

Ch. 2. Migration, Remittances and Human Development of Salvadorans in the US and El Salvador depicts various aspects of the life, work and welfare of Salvadorans residing in the US. It also looks at the impact of migration and remittances on the socioeconomic status of Salvadorans who remained in El Salvador.

Ch. 3. The Macroeconomic Impact of Migration and Remittances: the Need for a New Growth Model argues that the lack of an appropriate policy framework has generated a consumerist, import-oriented economy. This prevents the country from making the most of the growing volume of remittances to generate demand for national products, and trigger a saving and investment process that would form the basis for sustained growth.

Ch. 4. The New Economy Induced by Migration looks at some of the sectors of the national economy that have benefi ted the most from activities undertaken by Salvadoran communities residing abroad. It argues that activities carried out in this new economic action framework can help make viable some strategic options for the country’s growth and development.

Ch. 5. Migration Dynamics, Rural Livelihoods and Management of Natural Resources argues that the economic transformation induced by the deepening migration phenomenon is broadening opportunities for some families. However it also generates widening gaps between regions and increasing disparities within rural areas at the local level.

Ch. 6. Local Dynamics and Migration compares sociodemographic characteristics of municipalities with the highest and lowest levels of international migration. It reviews a range of studies on the topic from the past 15 years, and outlines possible strategies in order for dynamics induced by migration to act as a springboard for local development.

Ch. 7. Migration and Transformations in the Family analyzes the impact of international migration on family structures in El Salvador, and sets forth evidence showing the inaccuracy of perceiving migration as synonymous with family disintegration and one of the main reasons for gang problems and the crime wave that affects the country.

Ch. 8. Salvadoran Migration through the Gender Lens analyzes how gender relations affect migration’ and vice-versa. It claims there is not enough evidence to assert categorically that gendered relations are becoming more equitable. This fi nding contradicts the theory that sees migration as an empowering factor for women.

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MAIN FINDINGSMAIN FINDINGS

Four main messages emerge from the ten chapters in this Report (See Box 1). They show how relevant the issue of international migration is to understanding El Salvador in the current state of affairs, as well as its main limitations and opportunities in terms of human development.

who initiated this transformation from the bottom up. Analyzing their experience and examining its economic, social, political and cultural consequences hopefully helps do justice to their leading role in choosing this path towards globalization for the country.

Ch. 9. Migration and Cultural Diversity: Towards a New ‘Us’ argues that migration is an engine for cultural change that generates opportunities for human development. This change is not a by-product of economic transformations, but rather a fundamental component of the type of society currently being built. It recommends designing and implementing a cultural policy involving both Salvadorans ‘from here’ and ‘from there’.

Ch. 10. Citizenship and Migration in the Era of Globalization analyzes various aspects of citizenship, specifi cally how it interacts with migration dynamics. It also looks at the impact of migration on the sense of belonging that Salvadorans residing abroad feel toward their country of origin. It examines policies and programmes designed by the Salvadoran government and other actors to strengthen the various aspects of citizenship for Salvadorans residing abroad. Lastly it looks at the debate around the right to vote for Salvadorans who have emigrated.

The Statistical Annex contains the most recent indicators on El Salvador today. It also includes statistics on Salvadorans in the United States.

MIGRATION HAS BECOME THE MAIN WAY EL SALVADOR TAKES PART IN GLOBALIZATION

As a consequence of globalization, a majority of countries have intensifi ed their relations with the rest of the world. Economically speaking, some of the main variables countries look at to measure success in the new context are exports, levels of

foreign direct investment, percentage of the population with Internet access, number of new patents registered, etc. These are all top-down ways of taking part in globalization. However poor people also participate increasingly in globalization processes, particularly through migration.

According to the UN’s World Economic and Social Survey 2004 on international migration, at the start of the 21st century around 175 million people (almost 3% of the world’s population) live outside their native country. Migrants, however, account for more than 20% of El Salvador’s population (see Chapter 1). They send remittances to 22% of Salvadoran households, which represent more than 16% of the GDP, 133% of total exports (including the net value of ‘maquila’ exports), 52% of imports (excluding ‘maquila’ imports), 655% of foreign direct investment, 140% of the fi scal burden, 91% of the national budget, 202% of social spending, and 86% of the trade defi cit (Chapter 3).

The economic impact of migration in El Salvador is not limited to remittances. Migrants, in addition to sending remittances

7


to their relatives, undertake a variety of economic activities through which they maintain links with their country of origin. They use communication services to keep in touch with their relatives, as well as money wiring, cash transfer and courier services. They want ‘nostalgic’ products, and invest in El Salvador (buying land, livestock, real estate, and small businesses, among others). Once their stay in the destination country is legalized, they use air transport to travel to their home country for various purposes, including ethnic tourism. In consequence, a number of activities are expanding. There are now more air routes between the US and El Salvador and air traffi c has increased tenfold in the past 14 years, to reach fi gures close to 1.5 million travelers a year. International phone communications have increased in similar proportions in the past 6 years, to reach over 2 billion minutes a year. Salvadoran banks open branches in the US, and together with microfi nance companies, form alliances with international courier fi rms to provide cheaper remittance transfer services. The

number of international tourists visiting El Salvador, many of them Salvadorans who live abroad, has increased fi vefold in the past 14 years, reaching almost 1 million visitors a year. In consequence tourism, revenues have increased more than twentyfold (Chapter 4).

Parallel to these expanding activities mainly controlled by major companies, a mosaic of small businesses specializing in providing services to the Salvadoran diaspora and their families has emerged. They are a vibrant component of the informal and semi-formal economy in El Salvador, and courier a considerable amount of remittances, goods and services from and to El Salvador. Maintaining these services is essential in order to maintain the links between the diaspora and the communities of origin.

Moreover, as those links grow stronger, patterns of consumption in the country are evolving, just as dressing habits and housing designs change. Similarly, many products that before were considered an exclusive feature

Table 1Table 1

Variable US$ (in millions) Remittances, as

a percentage of:Remittances 2,548GDP 15,824 16Exports (including net maquila) 1,918 133Imports (excluding maquila) 4,891 52Foreign direct investment 389 655Fiscal burden 1,820 140Budget 2,794 91Social expenditures 1,263 202Trade deficit 2,973 86

Macroeconomic significance of remittances in El Salvador, 2004

Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvado

Remittances 2,548

Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador

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or at least part of the Salvadoran identity are increasingly used by foreigners. On the other hand, for thousands of Salvadoran families, products typically considered ‘foreign’ have now become a part of the diet. However there is a major contradiction in this means of insertion into the globalization process. While economic globalization policies do away with trade barriers between countries -- a process the United States has invested considerable resources into -- migration faces increasingly high barriers and restrictions, and therefore takes place mostly without involvement of the State. Despite restrictions, undocumented migration keeps on growing, facing exclusion in the countries of origin and at destination and generating problems and costs on both sides. In consequence, this issue is slowly making its way into the political agenda of various countries. It is hard to predict how fast these

Figure 1 Figure 1

Changes in the sources of hard currency1978 and 2004

Traditionalagricultural exports Remittances Maquila Non-traditional exports

outside Central America

Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador

MIGRATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO CREATE A MIGRATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO CREATE A YET UNKNOWN EL SALVADOR. MEANWHILE, YET UNKNOWN EL SALVADOR. MEANWHILE, PEOPLE STILL CARRY OUT ASSESSMENTS PEOPLE STILL CARRY OUT ASSESSMENTS AND MAKE PLANS FOR A COUNTRY THAT HAS AND MAKE PLANS FOR A COUNTRY THAT HAS CEASED TO EXISTCEASED TO EXIST

Migration has opened a gateway of opportunities, challenges and changes in the economic, political, social and cultural fi elds. This is comparable only with what happened in El Salvador with the introduction of coffee growing. The coffee economy had a deep impact not only on the economy, but

debates will yield results, however there is a possibility that they will attract more public attention along with the increasing trade integration between countries in the region, in particular those participating in NAFTA and CAFTA.

1978

2004

9


also on the landscape, habits, educational cycles and identity symbols. It is probably not an overstatement to say that the current importance of migration can be equated with the signifi cance of the rise of the Creoles [people of Spanish descent born in Latin America, in this case El Salvador, N. del T.] understood as the rise of a new social, economic and political group that would exert a long-lasting infl uence on the future of the country.

Migration has constantly infl uenced the country’s life, but it was not until the mid-1970s that it started playing a prominent part in its economy, politics and culture, to the point that migration is now making the need for a radical national transformation more visible.

As a consequence of this particular form of participation in globalization processes, El Salvador now faces a myriad of new features, expectations and attitudes, and a diversity that makes it hard to fi nd a common denominator. Migration is forcing the country to rethink some basic national features. Migrants transcend national borders and their identities are not set in advance as the exclusive product of the values that traditionally defi ne being Salvadoran. This reinforces the feeling that the population’s sense of belonging to a territory, an identity, a set of values and a common language is eroding (Chapter 9). Similarly, because of migration, many families have been forced to adopt new ways of functioning: more heads of households are women; children and parents are separated; roles within the household are reassigned; relatives outside of the nuclear family are more active; etc. Migrants’ family members have improved their capacity to provide for their own basic material needs. On the other

hand, they have been deprived of parental help or guidance on issues such as protection and security, the production and reproduction of social norms, values and attitudes, and fi nally the affection and support their emotional and physical growth requires (Chapter 7). At the local level, in addition to the increased fragmentation of families, land tenure is changing, the most productive workforce leaves, as do community leaders, and new groups of excluded people are starting to emerge (Chapter 5 and 6). Migration has also induced changes in gendered relations, although there is not enough evidence to conclude that progress is being made towards more equitable relations (Chapter 8).

Among the transformations that are taking place, many are a result of public policies, but migration is often seen as the cause. One of those is the urbanization of the countryside, exemplifi ed by the fact that rural employment in sectors such as commerce, industry, construction and services (typically urban activities) is now equivalent to the agricultural sector. Abundant cash available through remittances to import food and the increasing penetration of activities with no connection to land into rural areas make agriculture look increasingly irrelevant to the country’s development (Chapter 5). As a consequence, the country’s economy is now based on services rather than agricultural exports (Chapter 3).

In short, migration has helped make El Salvador a new country that is still not fully aware of itself. In consequence, a new concept of the State is missing, and so is an appropriate public policy framework to deal with the transformations the country has experienced. A basic feature of this new country is that its main reference point is now its population, rather than its

Migration is forcing the country to

rethink some basic national features.

Migrants transcend national borders

and their identities are not set in

advance as the exclusive product of the values that

traditionally defi ne being Salvadoran

10


territory. In other words, to understand today’s El Salvador, the challenges it faces and its potential, one has to look not only at the socioeconomic, political and cultural dynamics at play within the national territory, but also at those initiated by Salvadorans living abroad.

Lack of awareness and knowledge of this new ‘transnational country’ means people still carry out assessments and make plans for a country that has ceased to exist, therefore widening the gap between results and expectations in the various spheres of public policy.

412451

400

259

396

513

200

400

600

1980 1998 2004

Agropecuario No agropecuario

Figure 2Figure 2 Evolution of rural employment, 1980, 1998 and 2004.(in thousands of people employed)

Agricultural Non-agricultural

Source: Calculated on the basis of data from “Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM)” [Multipurpose Household Surveys] 1980, 1998 and 2004

LINKS WITH ITS MIGRANTS OFFER EL LINKS WITH ITS MIGRANTS OFFER EL SALVADOR A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO SALVADOR A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME A NATION WITH HIGH HUMAN BECOME A NATION WITH HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENTDEVELOPMENT

More than one fi fth of Salvadorans live in the world’s richest countries, mostly in the United States. They undoubtedly enjoy higher living standards than they used to in their country of origin, even though they are clearly less well-off than the average US citizen.

Estimates show that the poverty rate for Salvadorans residing in the US is 7 percentage points higher than for US citizens, while their income per capita represents less than half the income of US citizens. With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.944, US citizens would outrank Salvadorans residing in the country by thirty places in the global HDI ranking (UNDP, 2005).

However, calculations also show that in 2004 the income of Salvadorans living in the US was equivalent to 127% of El Salvador’s GDP for the same year. This means migration has created a ‘country’ of Salvadorans abroad with more economic weight than El Salvador itself. Their income per capita is almost six times the GDP per capita in El Salvador, and their poverty rate (18.5%) is nearly half that of their fellow nationals in El Salvador.

Better health and nutrition conditions in North America also mean life expectancy of Salvadorans in the US (in particular of children who emigrated and those born there) has risen, and is now signifi cantly higher than the average life expectancy back home. Education levels (measured by the combined net enrollment in elementary

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Grupo poblacional IDHIngreso anual per

cápita ($ corrientes)

Tasa de pobreza a/ Voz y rendición de cuentas b/

Estados Unidos 0.944 29,845 d/ 11.5 1.24Salvadoreños en EUA 0.851 13,833 18.5Salvadoreños en El Salvador 0.731 2,342 34.6 0.21

Estabilidad política y ausencia de

violencia b/Imperio de la ley b/ Efectividad de

gobierno b/

Indice de percepción de la

corrupción c/

Estados Unidos 1.18 1.58 1.58 7.6El Salvador 0.62 -0.65 -0.25 3.6

a/ El dato para los salvadoreños en EUA corresponde al año 2000, utilizando la línea de pobreza de ese país.

c/ El valor de este índice va entre 0 y 10 (la puntuación más alta es la mejor). Datos para 2001. Fuente: Transparency International.

d/ Per capita personal income, del Bureau of Economic Analysis del Department of Commerce de EUA, para el año 2000. http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/drill.cfm.

Datos de desarrollo humano e indicadores de gobernabilidad seleccionadossegún nacionalidad y país de residencia

Fuente: Gammage (2005) a partir del censo de EUA y elaboración propia a partir de EHPM 2004, DIGESTYC (1995) y PNUD (2005).

b/ El valor de este índice va entre -2.5 y 2.5 (la puntuación más alta es la mejor). Datos para 2000-2001. Fuente: Banco Mundial.

Table 2Table 2

school, secondary school and university, and adult literacy rates) are now higher than in El Salvador. These combined variables mean the 2004 HDI for Salvadorans living in the US would have reached a level of 0.851 (Chapter 2). This is comparable to levels registered for Chile, Estonia and Lithuania, situating them around the 40th place in the global ranking, more than sixty places higher than Salvadorans residing in El Salvador (HDI of 0.722, 104th place out of 177 countries, according to the Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads).

For Salvadorans who are now a part of the North American productive system, the main evolution is perhaps a change in mentality. Some migrants come from tiny villages, and in the course of a few months become active participants in some of the most advanced cities in the world. Some of them, however, end up experiencing social exclusion in these megalopolises too. After being denied the opportunity to realize their dreams in their country of origin, they are excluded from enjoying everything their new place of residence has to offer.

Selected human development and governance indicators, by nationality and country of residence

Population group

United States CitizensSalvadorans in the USSalvadorans in El Salvador

HDIAnnual income per capita (in current US$)

Poverty rate /aVoice and

accountability b/

Political stability and absence of

violence b/Rule of law b/ Government

effectiveness b/Corruption

perception index c/

United StatesEl Salvador

Source: Gammage (2005) on the basis of US Census data, authors on the basis of “Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 2004” [Multipurpose Household Survey], Census and Statistics Offi ce El Salvador (DYGESTIC) 1995, and UNDP (2005)

a/ Data for Salvadorans in the US is for the year 2000, using the US poverty lineb/ Values on this index go from -2.5 to 2.5 (the higher the value, the better). Data for 2000-2001. Source: World Bankc/ Values on this index go from 0 to 10 (the higher the value, the better). Data for 2001. Source: Transparency International. d/ Per capita personal income, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. Data for 2000 http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/

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Migrants who have made signifi cant progress in terms of income per capita, poverty reduction, HDI and change in mentality, maintain strong ties with their home country, especially with their relatives and communities. Through remittances, they have helped thousands of relatives back home temporarily escape poverty, and achieve higher levels of well-being, by improving housing, sending children to school longer, subsidizing health care costs and providing ‘pensions’ for the elderly (Chapters 2 and 6).

If instead of thinking of migration as having created a ‘country’ of Salvadorans in the US, we see them as a component of a new El Salvador, the cross-border national income of that new country for 2004 would have reached US$ 37,781 million (US$ 21,957 million for Salvadorans in the US added to US$ 15,824 million of El Salvador’s GDP). As for the cross-border national income per capita it would have reached US$ 4,528, assuming a total population of 8,344 million Salvadorans (6,757 millions in El Salvador and 1,587 millions in the US). Seen that way, El Salvador’s national income per capita would be only 15% below that of Costa Rica’s.

Strengthening ties with Salvadoran migrants offers a unique opportunity for the new, transterritorial El Salvador to achieve high levels of human development. However, there is a risk that these ties will weaken with time, creating a country without citizens, unless timely policies are implemented to strengthen the economic, social, political and cultural integration of migrants to the new country they have helped create (Chapter 10). For this reason, this report argues that the main cultural challenge currently facing El Salvador is building a new ‘Us’ that fully embraces the diversity of a country

transformed by migration, that promotes the integration and reconciliation of the population (residing within and outside the territory) with their country of origin, and dismantles the structures that generate social exclusion (Chapter 9).

THE COUNTRY’S GREATEST CHALLENGE: ALLOWING THOSE WHO STAY TO ENJOYTHE OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SUPPOSES, AND THOSE WHO GO, TO DO SO WITHOUT RELINQUISHING THEIR RIGHTS

In the current globalization context, an increase in migration fl ows is to be expected, given the higher levels of interaction and interdependence between countries resulting from an intensifi cation of trade, fi nancial and technological fl ows. This is true not only for the US, Europe and Japan, but also for all countries actively involved in the various streams of international relations. The problem is that the number of people emigrating from countries with high levels of human development is very limited. In some cases they even benefi t from incentives to compensate this uprooting. On the other hand, many more people emigrate from countries with low or medium levels of human development, often against their own will and because of a lack of opportunities. They usually emigrate without being able to fully exercise their human rights. In other words, the key factor is whether migration is the product of top-down or bottom-up globalization.

Until now Salvadoran migration fl ows mostly exemplify a bottom-up form of globalization, in the sense that a majority of people who emigrate do so without

13


papers (Chapter 1). They risk seeing their fundamental rights violated, including their right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination, their right to life, to physical integrity and security, and their right to justice, among others (Chapter 10).

The problem with these migration fl ows is that without an appropriate public policy framework in place, as seems to be the case for El Salvador, they can trigger a vicious circle that perpetuates itself indefi nitely. The circle starts when illegal emigration increases due to a lack of employment opportunities. This increase in turn generates a growing fl ow of remittances to the country, causing an appreciation of the exchange rate. This appreciation, given the strong trade liberalization currently prevailing in the country, generates a sharp increase in imports, so that “as money comes in, money goes out”. The increase in imports caused by exchange rate appreciation displaces local production, particularly in the agricultural and industrial sectors. This displacement of local production inhibits investment and creates unemployment and under-employment. Unemployment and under-employment in turn cause further emigration, which in addition to generating more remittances, also produces family fragmentation, and perpetuates the vicious circle.

How can this vicious circle be brought to an end? This is the other great challenge facing El Salvador, not only in order to reactivate economic growth, but also to resume progress towards human development. The policies and recommendations outlined in the various chapters of this report aim to help Salvadoran society fi nd the most appropriate answers to this question. On these answers depends whether in the future those who remain in the country enjoy the options and

OTHER FINDINGS AND CHALLENGESOTHER FINDINGS AND CHALLENGES

In addition to the general conclusions mentioned above, other fi ndings emerge from this Report’s analysis of Salvadoran reality. These are crucial in order to understand and better manage the new country that is now El Salvador.

HOW MANY SALVADORANS RESIDE ABROAD AND HOW MANY LEAVE THE COUNTRY EACH YEAR? THE INFORMATION CHALLENGE

International migration in El Salvador started evolving signifi cantly in quantitative and qualitative terms from 1970 on, when its main destination ceased to be Central America and it was redirected in much greater quantities towards the United States. Migration fl ows intensifi ed even more during the 1980s when the armed confl ict erupted in El Salvador. Migration paused in the early 1990s before picking up speed again from 1996 on (Chapter 1), coinciding roughly with the start of an era of sluggish economic growth that still affects the country (Chapter 3).

The various sources of information available on recent international migration concur on only one point: their current size has no equivalent in Salvadoran history. For this reason, migration currently bears upon every aspect of the country’s life, affecting Salvadorans’ human development in a complex way, wherever they are. This being said, estimates vary greatly according to the

opportunities that high human development supposes, while those who emigrate are able to do so without relinquishing their rights.

Until now Salvadoran

migration fl ows mostly exemplify a bottom-up form

of globalization, in the sense that a

majority of people who emigrate do

so without papers and risk seeing their

fundamental rights violated

14


source of the data -- offi cial US sources or Salvadoran ones.

Estimates based on offi cial US data are the lowest (between 655,000 and 1,272 million people, using various samples from the 2000 US census). However these calculations could be underestimating the number of Salvadorans living in the US, as censuses struggle to register ethnic groups, minorities, undocumented migrants and poor people.

On the other end, calculations based on offi cial Salvadoran statistics on migration fl ows, number of deported people, and estimates by the various consulates in the US, produce higher estimates: between 2.5 and 3.3 million migrants, of which 95% are thought to reside in the US and Canada. These fi gures could well be infl ated: combined with 1995 population projections based on recent Salvadoran censuses, they would imply a negative population growth rate, or that fl ows of Salvadoran migrants were substituted with fl ows of a similar magnitude from other countries. None of these conjectures seems credible, though the latter could be backed by data from the Salvadoran Migration Offi ce. However, careful analysis points to serious fl aws in this Offi ce’s record system, in particular for nationals from other countries leaving the country after visiting it and Salvadorans re-entering the country. From these fi gures it could be inferred that more than 20% of the population have emigrated in the past 35 years. But the key fi nding here is rather the urgent need for the country to set up a statistical system and a research institute specializing in migration. It will otherwise remain particularly diffi cult to comprehend the various dynamics at play in Salvadoran society, and gaps between

expected results and the ones actually achieved in the various areas of public policy will keep on widening.

GEOGRAPHY OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES: DIVERSE REALITIES

In 2004, 22% of households in El Salvador received remittances, which amounted to US$ 2,458 million, or 16% of GDP. However national averages conceal geographic disparities. In four departments (La Unión, Cabañas, Morazán and San Miguel), over 30% of households received remittances, while in La Paz and Ahuachapán the proportion is less than 15% (Chapters 2 and 5).

Differences are even sharper among municipalities. In a group that includes 37 municipalities (14.1 % of the total), most of them located in the central and western parts of the country, less than 10% of households received remittances. In another group of 13 municipalities (5% of the total), more than half the households received remittances. 12 out of these 13 municipalities are located in the departments of La Unión, Morazán and San Miguel. The most extreme cases are the municipality of Santa Catarina Masahuat (Sonsonate department) where 0.6% of households say they received remittances, and the municipality of Concepción de Oriente (La Unión department), where households receiving remittances accounted for 63%. The signifi cant regional disparities of migration are mirrored even within municipalities themselves. Municipalities with low overall migration levels may include neighborhoods with high migration levels, and vice-versa (Chapter 5).

15


Map 1Map 1

Households receiving remittances, by municipality

Percentage of households receiving remittances

Source: Calculated using “Mapa de Pobreza” database, 2004 [Poverty Map database, 2004]

MIGRATION REDUCES POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, BUT DOES NOT ELIMINATE THEIR STRUCTURAL CAUSES

Every time a poor person leaves her or his country, the numerator used to measure the country’s poverty rate decreases. However this is not by far migration’s only contribution to poverty reduction, mostly thanks to remittances migrants send to relatives still residing in the country of origin.

In 2004, assuming no one in El Salvador had received remittances, the national level of households in extreme poverty would

have been 7 percentage points higher, with a sharper increase for rural areas (+8.8 points) than for urban ones (+5.9 points). Interestingly, 26% of households receiving remittances were poor, while the poverty rate among families not receiving remittances reached 37%. Barely 6% of remittance-receiving households lived in extreme poverty, whereas this fi gure reached 14% for families who did not receive remittances (Chapter 2).

Were it not for remittances, El Salvador would also be a signifi cantly more unequal country. Based on the 2004 data, the Gini coeffi cient for income distribution among

0 to 9.9010 to 19.9020 to 29.9030 to 39.9040 to 49.9050 or more

16


households not receiving remittances is 0.52 [a measure of inequality, the Gini coeffi cient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (where everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (where one person has all the income), Translator’s note.]. By contrast, the Gini coeffi cient among remittance-receiving households is 0.44, which refl ects a signifi cantly more equitable income distribution. Moreover, at the national level, the Gini coeffi cient for income distribution per capita would rise from 0.50 to 0.54 if remittances were removed as a component of households’ income.

Even so, it should be stressed that the impact

Receptores de remesas

No reciben remesas


No reciben remesas


No reciben remesas

Incluyendo remesas en el ingreso familiar

Pobreza extrema 5.7 14.5 4.6 9.8 7.6 22.5Pobreza relativa 20.1 22.5 19.6 20.9 21.0 25.3No pobres 74.2 63.0 75.8 69.4 71.4 52.2

Excluyendo remesas del ingreso familiar

Pobreza extrema 37.3 14.5 30.9 9.7 48.5 22.5Pobreza relativa 18.8 22.5 19.1 20.8 18.4 25.3No pobres 43.9 63.0 50.0 69.5 33.0 52.2

Coeficiente Gini con remesas 0.44 0.52 0.42 0.48 0.43 0.48Coeficiente Gini sin remesas 0.61 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.65 0.48

Fuente: Elaboración propia con base en EHPM 2004.

Tasas de pobreza extrema y relativa, y desiguadad de ingresossegún la condición receptora de remesas de los hogares, por área rural y urbana

Hogares ruralesHogares urbanosTotal nacionalVariable

Table 3Table 3

Extreme and relative poverty rates and income inequality for households receiving or not remittances, in rural and urban areas

of migration and remittances on poverty and inequality may well be only temporary. The problem is that affected municipalities are not making the most of this increase in households’ income to foster productive activities that would make the current increase in welfare sustainable, once remittances stop fl owing in.

Moreover, numerous stories and anecdotes refl ect a so-called disincentive effect of remittances on the willingness to work for a signifi cant part of the population benefi ting from this type of support. The key explanation for this would be that in addition to being a formal transfer, remittances tend

VariableNational total Urban households Rural households

Including remittances in the family’s income Extreme poverty Relative poverty Not poor

Source: Calculated on the basis of data from “Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) 2004” [Multipurpose Household Survey 2004]

Receiving remittances

Not receiving remittances





Excluding remittances from the family’s income Extreme poverty Relative poverty Not poor

Gini coeffi cient with remittancesGini coeffi cient without remittances

17


Box 2Box 2

THE MIGRANT’S CROSS

Along the way, migrants meet countless people, organizations or entities that can contribute to the success or failure of their endeavor. To some extent, these elements personify ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ in society. The Migrant’s Cross is an attempt to picture some of these elements. More elements could of course be incorporated, and situated in more than one quadrant, depending on the context, the circumstances and each reader’s perspective. For example, Minutemen watching the southern border of the United States to stop undocumented migrants are considered ‘evil’ from a migrant’s standpoint, who associates them with potential failure to enter US territory. However from the perspective of those who think migration generates insecurity and makes the US vulnerable to terrorism, Minutemen can be seen as ‘good’. Similarly, ‘coyotes’ would all be considered evil by US immigration offi cers, whereas for many Salvadoran communities ‘coyotes’ can guarantee a safer, more successful journey.

• Community support and advocacy organizations• Legal support services• Couriers/travellers

GOODGOOD

• Casa del Buen Pastor• Humanitarian support organizations• Shelters

• ‘Casas del Migrante’• Grupo Beta• Salvadoran consulates

EVILEVIL

FAILUREFAILURESUCCESSSUCCESS

• Counterfeit document industry• ‘Good coyote’/effi cient/trustworthy

• Minutemen• ‘Evil coyote’/ criminal/con man• Organized crime• Corrupt offi cials and migration offi cers

Source: Authors, based on discussion groups

18


Box 3Box 3

THE CRUCIFIXION OF MIGRANTS IN THE MASS MEDIA

Many representations of migrants can be found in the mass media. These representations shape people’s opinions and help them picture who migrants are, therefore serving as building blocks to determine who are the ‘heroes’ and the ‘villains’. Migrants are sometimes depicted as good people experiencing failure, as in the case of people amputated on the ‘Death Train’, abandoned in the desert, or deported children.

Additionally, some businessmen, professionals, athletes and political leaders are presented in the media as good and successful. However, those who are deported, regardless of whether or not they have a criminal record or may be linked to gangs, are systematically depicted as the ‘villains’. Are these representations accurate and can they be generalized? Or do they contribute to reinforce stereotypes that further divide us? It is important for a society to debate this type of issues.

• Business people• Athletes• Politicians• Permanent residents, people with dual citizenship, Temporary Protection Status benefi ciaries

GOODGOOD

• ‘Death Train’ victims• People abandoned in the desert• Deported children• Female victims of organized crime

• ‘‘Ungrateful people” who abandon their families

EVILEVIL

FAILUREFAILURESUCCESSSUCCESS

• ‘Illegal’ workers• Deportees• Deportees with criminal records• Deported young people with links to gangs

Source: Estudio sobre las representaciones de los y las migrantes en la prensa escrita de El Salvador 1984-2004, PNUD, junio, 2005 [Study on migrants representations in Salvadoran newspapers 1984-2004, UNDP, June 2005]

19


to increase the opportunity cost of working, and therefore the reserve salary for which benefi ciaries are willing to seek employment on the labor market. Remittance-receiving households usually do have a higher reserve salary than the rest of the population and show a higher level of inactivity. However this should not be seen as evidence of a remittance-induced incentive to adopt a ‘rent-seeking’ behavior or to ‘laze around’. Indeed these are the very same people who emigrate in the absence of opportunities, and once reached their new destination work two shifts a day or more (Chapter 2).

MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: MIXED RESULTS

Morazán, Cabañas and La Unión are the three departments in El Salvador with the highest rates of remittance-receiving households, but also with the lowest HDI levels. At fi rst glance this could seem contradictory, especially when most households probably have a higher income now than ever before. Two factors explain it, however. First, these departments were the most affected by the armed confl ict, in addition to having the lowest levels of human development historically. Second, while they have seen their income increase, these departments are also losing the most educated parts of their population. Therefore, the relative weight of illiterate and less-educated people is increasing.

This second factor is also relevant for most remittance-receiving households, regardless of the department, municipality or area of residence. Indeed, according to the 2004 Multipurpose Household Survey (“Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples – EHPM”

2004), the illiteracy rate for people over 15 years old from remittance-receiving households (19%) is higher than for families not receiving remittances (17%). People over 15 from remittance-receiving households spend 6.47 years in school on average, less than people over 15 in families not receiving remittances (6.67 years).

On the other hand, members of remittance-receiving families show higher enrollment rates at every level of the educational system. This seems to indicate that remittances also allow school age family members to attend school longer. Unfortunately in many cases higher education is seen as an investment that needs to be made profi table through further emigration.

For numerous families remittances are also an important mechanism for asset accumulation, especially as far as housing is concerned. The disparities in housing conditions between remittance-receiving families and others are substantial, e.g. in terms of material used to build houses and access to basic services such as electricity and running water (Chapter 2).

MAKING THE MOST OF THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL: THE NEED FOR A NEW GROWTH MODEL

For the past 15 years El Salvador has fostered a growth model aiming to overcome the country’s high dependence on traditional agricultural exports, and turn the country into a platform for investment and labor-intensive exports. However, the country has become a service economy that grows at a slow pace and depends more and more on remittances to fund the growing level of imports.

Remittances also allow school age family members to attend school

longer. But higher education is

sometimes seen as an investment that needs to be made profi table, through further emigration

20


Economic performance has certainly suffered from a number of adverse external factors and natural catastrophes in the past few years. But at least three other factors help explain poor performance: lack of competition and weak regulation in some key economic sectors; high stakes placed on economic sectors with weak productive linkages and low fi scal return; and the model’s incompatibility with the new features of the national economy, i.e. a service economy highly dependent on migration and remittances.

To resume growth, the country needs a new growth model allowing it to make the most of its potential: the highest national income per capita in its history, more than 20% of the population living in the world’s richest countries, an appropriate geographic position to set up a regional logistical center, a privileged access to US markets once CAFTA comes into force, and its good sovereign risk ratings, among others.

The new growth model should take into account fi ve assumptions. The fi rst is that El Salvador’s main wealth lies in its people, including those living abroad. The second is that in a development process, production should precede consumption, which is why the trend of recent years, when consumption exceeded production, must urgently be reversed. The third assumption is that, while it remains hard to predict how migration fl ows and remittances will evolve, it is the country’s duty to make the most of the opportunities they generate, and be prepared for the moment when they cease to grow. The fourth assumption is that in order to grow El Salvador must urgently fi nd a long-lasting solution to inconsistencies between its exchange rate policy and its trade policy. Lastly, change requires political will.

In addition nine lines of action should be taken into account when formulating the new growth model El Salvador needs: adopt well-paid formal employment for all as the main long-term goal; substantially increase investment in education, science and technology; develop state capacity to launch strategic initiatives allowing the country to permanently reinvent itself; remedy the inconsistencies between exchange rate policy and trade policy; create an effi cient, honest bureaucracy; adopt free competition policies and relevant regulation so that through their expansion, key sectors can stimulate competitiveness in the rest of the economy; turn the migration economy into a pillar for growth; regain the capacity to plan development; and launch fi scal and fi nancial reforms allowing the country to fi nance development with its own resources (Chapter 3)

POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN A CONTEXT OF INTENSE MIGRATION: THE NEED FOR DIFFERENTIATED ANSWERS

International migration is a fundamental strategy adopted by Salvadoran families to secure subsistence. However, the more migration affects rural areas, the more disparities emerge between rural households. Households with migrants accumulate more assets (land, livestock, education, among others). Households without migrants, on the other hand, remain dependent on the land for food security, but have fewer opportunities to acquire it.

Moreover, the land they usually get access to is low quality, which only adds to environmental degradation and poverty. This contradiction also affects the availability of

21


vital environmental services such as water, more and more in demand due to growing urbanization. As the poorest depend on subsistence agriculture and own less land, compensation schemes paying wages in exchange for conservation work could generate opportunities for this core group of poor people who cannot migrate or diversify.

The key aspect, however, is that poverty reduction and environmental management policies should factor in the various dynamics at play within localities themselves, as there is no one-size-fi ts-all solution that can work for the entire country. Given the diversity and complexity of families’ strategies across the country, policies and interventions must be designed taking into account local realities and specifi cities (Chapter 5).

SALVADORANS ABROAD AND REMITTANCES: A SOURCE OF OPPORTUNITIES, NOT AN ENGINE FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

The group of municipalities with the highest emigration levels and reporting the highest rates of remittance infl ow features the following characteristics, in comparison with the group at the other end of the spectrum: lower masculinity rate, higher percentage of female heads of households, higher unemployment rate, higher income per capita, lower poverty rates, and lower tax revenues compared to the total reported income. One conclusion and one hypothesis can be inferred from this data.

The conclusion is that the strong infl ow of remittances does not lead to more dynamic local economies. Remittances greatly contribute to improving economic welfare and reducing poverty, but their

multiplying effects evaporate quickly from the local level, therefore contributing little to local employment creation. The fl ipside of the increase in economic welfare is that municipalities are quickly losing their most productive workforce, and many community leaders.

As for the hypothesis, it is that in municipalities with the highest migration rates, migration and remittances can contribute to local development, but cannot be its engine. Migration and remittances cannot solve structural problems, as they are in fact a consequence of those problems. However, with an adequate policy framework in place, migration can provide new opportunities to tackle structural problems. For this reason, in order to minimize costs and make the most of the opportunities induced by migration for local development, El Salvador should design and implement local development strategies and a national master plan. The challenge is to turn non-competitive areas into territories that create opportunities for people. Concrete, rigorous and up-to-date proposals are available. What is now needed is political will, and mechanisms to guarantee implementation capacity and sustainable funding. In municipalities most affected by migration, migrant communities should be key partners once these processes are under way (Chapter 6).

SOCIETY’S DEBT TO MIGRANTS: FAMILY POLICIES

Migration has a strong impact on the family, which is usually considered the basic unit of society. The impact is sometimes positive, for example an increase in the family’s income, and higher education for the younger remaining family members. But

Another gap in migration studies that needs to be fi lled is the issue of violence as a

product of social marginalization,

in a society in transition where

migration creates new inequalities and

affects the social fabric

22


many consequences are negative: parents and children separated, a heavier domestic burden falling on some family members, lack of emotional support, hindered emotional and physical development for the youngest, families rebuilt with relatives of both spouses, etc. These impacts and others mentioned earlier are part of the social costs of migration, which left unaddressed could have even more serious consequences in the future.

According to El Salvador’s Constitution, the State is responsible for enacting adequate legislation, creating appropriate agencies and services for the integration, the welfare and social, economic and cultural development of the family (Art. 32). Therefore, a specifi c family policy should urgently be designed and implemented. Such policy could include the following elements, among others: promote processes that help reunite families, improve institutions to strengthen the family in El Salvador, extend school hours to a full day, adopt labor policies that mirror transformations of the family, enforce more effectively laws to protect families, implement local strategies to strengthen the social fabric and build citizenship, and set up programmes to engineer and disseminate civil and moral values (Chapter 7).

MIGRATION THROUGH THE GENDER LENS: THE NEED FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

The gender focus is crucial in order to understand migration. Migration affects everyday life in many ways, contributing to a redefi ning of gendered roles in productive activities, and progressively in reproductive activities. These changes are most visible in the US, where work pressures have forced

a redistribution of reproductive tasks within the household. However, aging and feminization in communities of origin and changes registered in the economic and demographic dependence rates also affect roles and responsibilities, the sexual division of labor, and economic, social and political participation of women (rural women in particular) in El Salvador. It is only recently that these changes have started to be documented in El Salvador. Therefore, more knowledge is needed on the impact of migration on the negotiation of gendered roles and identities, and on women’s empowerment in the social, political and economic fi elds, abroad and in communities of origin, outside and within the household. More information and investigation is necessary in order to devise policies, programmes and strategies to improve living conditions of individuals and households affected by migration, at home and abroad, and understand and strengthen transnational linkages.

Another gap in migration studies that needs to be fi lled is the issue of violence as a product of social marginalization, in a society in transition where migration creates new inequalities and affects the social fabric, leading to the formation of extended families and the absence of parents of working age. In this context, sexual and intra-family violence can be seen as a way to control women’s behavior, in a society experiencing changes in the construction of gendered roles.

Lastly, more efforts are needed to gain a better understanding of the impact of migration on household demographics and on the communities of origin. Given these demographic and cultural patterns, proponents of a productive use of remittances should better analyze

23


Indicadores Santa Catarina

Masahuat, Sonsonate

Concepción de Oriente, La Unión

Indicadores demográficos Número de hogares 1,702 1,496 Población total 8,635 6,449 Índice masculinidad 1.02 0.76 Índice masculinidad de población entre 15 y 24 años 1.00 0.66 Personas por hogar 5.07 4.31 % Jefes de hogar mujeres 15.7% 41.5% Indicadores educativos Tasa de alfabetización 15-24 años masculino 95.7% 82.8% Tasa de alfabetización 15-24 años femenino 73.0% 89.2% Ratio de mujeres alfabetas, con respecto a hombres entre 15 y 24 años 0.76 1.62 Escolaridad promedio 3.2 2.9 Indicadores de empleo Tasa de participación bruta (PEA/Población total) 35.6% 22.9% Tasa de participación global (PEA/Población en edad de trabajo) 48.6% 29.6% Ocupados por hogar (promedio) 1.68 0.8 Tasa de desocupación 6.9% 19.3% Dependencia económica 2.02 4.41 Indicadores sobre remesas, ingresos y pobreza Hogares que reciben remesas (%) 0.6% 63% Total remesa familiar mensual $1,069 $206,055 Remesa por hogar mensual $107 $219 Ingreso total (mensual) $346,122 $395,641 Ingreso per cápita anual $481 $736 Tasa de pobreza 75% 39% Total IVA recaudado (2004) $27,876 $15,155

Table 4Table 4 Comparing the extremes: Santa Catarina Masahuat, Sonsonate, and Concep-ción de Oriente, La Unión

Demographic indicatorsNumber of householdsTotal populationMasculinity indexMasculinity index for population between 15 and 24 years of ageNumber of persons in the household% female headed households

IndicatorsSanta Catarina

Masahuat, Sonsonate

Concepción de Oriente,La Unión

Source: Calculated using “Mapa de Pobreza” database, 2004 [Poverty Map 2004]; and Finance Ministry, General Tax Offi ce, Fiscal Programming and Evaluation Unit, Distribution of VAT and rent tax payments, tax retentions and cash payments

Educational indicatorsMale literacy rate, 15-24 year oldsFemale literacy rate, 15-24 year oldsRatio of literate women to men, 15-24 year oldsAverage years of schooling

Employment indicatorsGross participation rate (EAP/Total population)Global participation rate (EAP/Population in age of working)Average number of people employed, per householdUnemployment rateEconomic dependence ratio

Indicators on remittances, income and povertyHouseholds receiving remittances (%)Total amount of remittances per monthMonthly remittance per householdTotal monthly incomeAnnual income per capitaPoverty rateTotal VAT collected, 2004

24


CULTURE, THE ELEMENT THATCAN CEMENT THE COUNTRY’S DIVERSITY AROUND A NEW ‘US’

This Report argues that the main cultural challenge currently facing El Salvador is building a new ‘Us’, which in turn will induce cultural changes that help Salvadoran society identify its goals, foster values and practices that depart from exclusionary patterns typical of this society, and promote tolerance, integrity, solidarity and respect for life. At the same time, this cultural change should generate full acceptation of the cultural diversity of the new country created by migration, and bring about national reconciliation. In this sense, culture can offer much to human development, and this means essentially placing a substantial focus on the need for a unifying national project.

This new ‘Us’ requires designing and implementing a cultural policy that involves components of ‘Salvadoran-ness’ within and outside the territory, and promotes a refreshed identity, open to universal values. Building this new ‘Us’ should go hand in hand with new formal and informal education initiatives, in which society as a

whole, institutions, businesses, mass media, artists and intellectuals all participate.

In addition, until now cultural changes induced by migrants have received very little attention. Migrants are inducing cultural changes that are not just a by-product of economic transformations, but rather a fundamental component of the society currently being built. In that sense, they are not just another segment among the various Salvadoran identities. They are rather an axis around which we must rethink all other identities. Migration is an engine for cultural change that provides new opportunities for human development.

The perception of migrants in various sectors of Salvadoran society can be outlined using two ‘circles’. On the one hand, a virtuous circle is formed when migration, through remittances, generate macroeconomic stability, improve living standards and help fi ght poverty. The vicious circle, on the other hand, is when migration is associated with negative patterns and behaviors, such as reluctance to work, consumerism and disdain for the national identity. Similarly, deported people are often pictured as a menace to Salvadoran society (‘maras’ gang members and criminals), even though this is not backed by offi cial statistics. There is also a perception that migrants’ success and lifestyle induce more people to take their chances and emigrate. Much of what is being said about migrants is based on stereotypes and intolerant stances that do little to assist in fully integrating this component of ‘Salvadoran-ness’.

the socioproductive context into which remittances fl ow. The impact of migration in terms of losing working age populations (mostly men), the formation of extended households out of several families, and the high incidence of households headed by and supported by women, affects needs and development opportunities in each community. Communities with high rates of demographic and economic dependence need a range of public services different from those with lower dependence rates (Chapter 8).

25


THE RISK OF A COUNTRY WITHOUT CITIZENS

This trade-off also takes its toll in the long run, when it comes to building a national project. Although situations vary, most people living abroad lack permanent legal status, and the Salvadoran state has not been able to guarantee them a more active participation in the country’s political life. In this context, the sense of belonging and identity can fade with time, and remittances can run dry. There are other types of cross-border interactions, such as visits to and from the home country, participation in migrants’ organizations, affi liation to a Salvadoran political party, and transnational business. However these are very limited in the case of Salvadorans (compared with migrants from other countries), as Salvadoran migrants lack two basic elements: legal stability in the US through permanent residence or dual citizenship, and more proactive, coherent policies of the Salvadoran state to devise a national project across borders.

The fi rst step would be to work jointly with Salvadorans abroad, religious leaders, entrepreneurs, and other countries in the region to assess and promote comprehensive changes in migration-related legislations in the US, Central America, Mexico and Canada. At the same time as comprehensive reforms are being designed, initiatives should be taken to improve and increase legal stability for Salvadorans abroad through existing mechanisms, i.e. processes to obtain permanent residence and naturalization. In addition it is crucial to highlight that the relevance of migrants for the country does not lie only in their economic power, but also in their participation as citizens. And the most fundamental right of citizens in a democracy is the right to vote. This is why no

SEEKING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS AT THE COST OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE PRICE OF UNDOCUMENTED EMIGRATION

Full citizenship implies guaranteeing all nationals the exercise of their social, civil and political rights. Salvadorans abroad are improving their social standards, by reducing poverty, increasing their income and their Human Development Index (HDI). By reaching new levels of social and economic stability that would have been impossible in El Salvador, migrants and their families experience changes in their own living conditions and expectations that distinguish them from their communities of origin still affected by exclusion. As long as this welfare differential persists, emigration will be seen by many Salvadorans as a way to improve their social and economic standards (Chapters 2 and 10).

However, in addition to benefi ting only those who successfully emigrate and settle down, socioeconomic improvements come at a high price in terms of relinquishing one’s civil and political rights.

The ordeal facing those who decide to emigrate without papers is the subject of countless horrendous stories. Accounts of amputations on the ‘Death Train’, of being thrown in jail with ordinary criminals along the way, of assaults and robberies, rapes of women and children, traffi cking of minors, death in the desert and many more, exemplify the very high price of migration, usually concealed underneath the glitter of remittances.

Culture is called to play a key role in the integration

of Salvadoran-ness, wherever it

is located. There is no better cement

than culture to build strong identity ties

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effort should be spared to ensure that votes of citizens residing abroad are factored in for the 2009 presidential elections. As mentioned above, linkages between Salvadorans living abroad and the country have diversifi ed, but remain scarce and weak. There should be more determination in the implementation of policies and programmes with Salvadoran entrepreneurs, migrants’ organizations, the second generation of Salvadorans abroad, artists and sports associations, among others (Chapter 10).

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In conclusion, the central issue is how to make the most of the immense potential that migratory dynamics offer to rebuild El Salvador on new foundations. Salvadorans living and working outside of conventionally accepted territorial borders cannot be left out of this process, considering that they represent at least one fi fth of the population and that their economic, political, social and cultural contribution is essential to the country. Excluding them would mean losing the high potential they have to offer for El Salvador’s development. Without an inclusive national project – involving Salvadorans from ‘here’ and those who have emigrated – El Salvador will not achieve the political unity and national identity it needs to improve human development, bridge social gaps and broaden opportunities, so that living with dignity in the country becomes a viable option for all.

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Migration is transforming Salvadoran society. Thanks to migration, many Salvadorans were able to clear themselves a path in new places and get access to much broader opportunities than where they came from, often paying a high price in return. Migrants also keep their connection with their country and community of origin through bonds strengthened in various ways, from remittances and transfer of technical knowledge, business know-how and entrepreneurial practices, to trade, tourism, communications, community-based development, political support and cultural change.

It is often overlooked that migration has opened a gateway of opportunities, challenges and transformations for El Salvador in the economic, political, social and cultural fi elds, only comparable with what happened in the country with the introduction of coffee growing. It is probably not an overstatement to say that the current importance of migration is as signifi cant as the rise of the ‘Creoles’ in their time, understood as the rise of a new social, economic and political group that would exert a long-lasting infl uence on the future of the country.

More than 20% of Salvadorans are migrants. The remittances they send are equivalent to over 16% of the country’s GDP, and 133% of its exports, including net maquila exports. Migrants should be a full part of a new country project that can only be a common, plural endeavor. One of the main goals of this project, as the title of this Report suggests, should be shaping a new ‘Us’ that would also be a source of shared purpose, experience and values.

This Report also helps understand patterns of behavior that might otherwise seem absurd. For instance, why do opinion polls identify unemployment as one of the main national problems, while at the same time the Ministry of Agriculture reports a shortage of workers to harvest coffee? Why has the price of farmable land risen so much, while the agricultural sector has been stagnating for so long? Why are so many shopping malls being built, all apparently packed with customers, when the pace of economic growth has been slow for the past decade?

These issues and others having to do with the diversity of dynamics generated by international migration in El Salvador are discussed in this Report, which should set a new milestone in the debate on migration and its role for the present and future of Salvadoran society.

Human Development Report for El Salvador 2005Human Development Report for El Salvador 2005

ISBN 99923-845-6-5ISBN 99923-845-6-5

hhuman development reportuman development report

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