heuristics as social tools

New Ideas in Psychology 20 (2002) 49–57

Heuristics as social tools

Barnaby Marsh*

Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94,

D-14195 Berlin, Germany

Abstract

Psychological models of judgement and decision making assume that people use heuristics

to make inferences when faced with constraints in time, information, or processing capacity.

This paper explores the use of heuristics in social interaction. Extending the concept of

heuristics to social domains can be used to construct better understandings of behavioural

regularities, especially when such regularities are not easily predicted by or accounted for in

conventional models of rational choice. r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Heuristics; Rules of thumb; Satisficing; Problem solving

1. Introduction

Life is a process of choices, and an individual’s life course is dependent on howsuch choices are made. Making the best choice, or even a good choice, is not alwaysan easy task. The information needed may not always be available, and it might notbe possible to consider all options as fully as desired because of limitations in timeand cognitive processing power (Simon, 1955; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC ResearchGroup, 1999; Marsh, 2000). These frequent dilemmas can be solved by usingheuristics. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that enable individuals to makeevaluations on the basis of one or a few simple rules or cues, thereby avoiding theprocessing and time costs related to exploring an exhaustive set of possibilities. Theymay be used to search for options, to construct and categorize perceptions, or tochoose between competing options. To date, many judgement and decision-makingheuristics have been proposed and tested (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 2000;

*Tel.: +49-30-824-06466.

E-mail address: [email protected] (B. Marsh).

0732-118X/02/$ - see front matter r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), but the issue ofhow people use heuristics in their daily social interactions has remained largelyneglected. This is surprising, since in the social interaction domain problemssuch as imperfect information, structural complexity, and fleeting opportunities aretypical, and the ability to render swift and effective judgements can be particularlycrucial. Specifically related questions include whether there are systematic patterns inways that people address elementary social problems such as seeking friends,forming groups, selecting mates, and in forming cooperative relationships, and if so,whether such patterns are reflective of regularities in the structure of the socialenvironment.Before such issues can be addressed, it is necessary to resolve two points of

possible confusion. The first is what qualifies as a ‘‘pattern’’ of behaviour, andthe second, what will qualify as a ‘‘heuristic’’ in the social sense. While ‘‘patterns’’of behaviour can be found on many scales (e.g. social role-playing in families, actsof aggression towards enemies in times of war, trends of increasing intimacywhen building friendships, etc.), they are difficult to address descriptively becausethey can occur in many forms and are subject to continuous change. Here, thisproblem can be addressed only superficially, either by referring to ‘‘patterns’’ ofbehaviour that have been documented explicitly in the social psychology literature,or to those behavioural regularities which are so generally known or commonplacein our daily experience as to make objection unlikely. ‘‘Heuristics’’ are likewiseproblematic, in part because of the range of meanings that the term has acquired indifferent fields and even within fields (see Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999 for a briefhistory). As used here, the term ‘‘heuristic’’ will be used in the general psychologicalsense, that is, to refer to cognitively based shortcuts that are used to solvedifferent types of real ecological problems. Different types of heuristics may beused for tasks of search, assessment, and the selection of options. Search heuristics

can be thought of as strategies for how to find meaningful knowledge when inspecific environments. An example of a fast, simple, and effective ‘‘default’’ searchheuristic is to use whatever search method worked best in the past for a problemjudged to be similar. By using this ‘‘commonsense’’ rule, an individual can thusavoid the costs associated with searching haphazardly, or in exploring environmentsthat might never provide the type of information being sought. Assessment heuristics

are then used to assess the products of search, typically by ordering and rankingknowledge (including options) according to a specific criterion, which will changeaccording to an individual’s immediate or specific needs. Finally, selection heuristics

are used to select between a finite set of alternatives, generally by picking theoption having the highest rank, although other conventions can also be used,such as a stopping rules which simply discontinues search as soon as any option thatmeets a pre-established aspiration level is met or exceeded. These different kindsof heuristics work together in solving decision problems. Because in-depthexplorations of how heuristics work have been made elsewhere (e.g. Kahneman &Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer et al., 1999), further detailsare not discussed here. It is important to note, however, that heuristics in socialcontexts are not merely extensions of heuristics that have been studied in non-social

B. Marsh / New Ideas in Psychology 20 (2002) 49–5750

contexts (e.g. in the general sense of Dashiell, 1935, p. 1097; see alsoFiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 5); rather, they can be understood as sometimes beingindependently evolved or developed from features of the environment that donot exist outside the social domain, such as in relation to shared beliefs amongsocial groups.Before moving on to explore how heuristics might work in social contexts, two

additional points need to be explicitly recognized. The first is that none ofthe heuristic processes outlined above necessarily require conscious awareness onthe part of the agent. Rather, we can think of heuristics as being the rules by whichknowledge (both internal and external) is filtered and selected before being passedto the decision-taking realm that is consciously sensed. In this vision, an importantfunction of conscious awareness might be to ‘‘double-check’’ resulting productsbefore further action is taken. The second point is made with respect to the originof heuristic rules, a topic which continues to remain neglected and poorlyunderstood in the literature, probably because of inherent ambiguity. Whileit is reasonable to suppose that some features of information processing systems(including heuristics that they produce) arise from cognitive architecturespre-imposed by Darwinian selection, the great majority of heuristics are undoubtedlyformed and modified as the individual responds and adjusts to differentenvironments. As such, heuristics can be understood in two ways: first, relativeto individual life history and how the problems have been understood and solvedin this context, and second, in terms of how dimensions of the problem are likelyto have been understood and solved over larger expanses of time. In this light,social heuristics can be understood as having their origins concurrently onseveral levels. In cases where social environments are relatively stable over longperiods of time, we might expect to find the presence of mental mechanismswhich facilitate some types of reactions and not others. An example can be drawnfrom empathetic reactions to proximate others. For instance, consider the spreadof emotions in crowd contexts; panic may spread to otherwise indifferentbystanders when the crowd is fleeing, while feelings of positive emotion mayspread when the crowd is jubilant. In the case of participants, the feelings may beintensified beyond what any individual would experience if alone. In other cases, theorigin of the heuristic may be more subject to social forces in the subjectsenvironment, and particularly, those forces that are relatively stable (e.g. culturalnorms, such as norms of fairness, see Axelrod, 1984; Fehr & Gachter, 2000). Theseheuristics may stem more from ‘‘ways of doing things’’ that are transmitted withinone’s culture and/or passed between generations, perhaps as folk wisdom, maxims,or proverbs.

2. Candidate social heuristics

Candidates for social heuristics can be found by looking for patterns in ways thatpeople tend to respond to commonly faced social problems. Examples from varioussocial domains follow below.

B. Marsh / New Ideas in Psychology 20 (2002) 49–57 51

2.1. Social affiliation

A significant amount of time may be spent meeting others and buildingfriendships. Several heuristic rules can assist this process. For instance, in facilitatingcontact with others, people may use non-verbal cues such as an open posture andsmiling face, which signal openness and friendliness (see Argyle, 1991 for anoverview of non-verbal cues people are found to use) paired with conversational

maxims that amplify sincerity and relevance (Grice, 1975). People may unconsciously‘‘mirror’’ each other’s mannerisms in posture, gaze, and speech style (e.g. Morris,1977; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Message importance may also be amplified byrepetition of a statement or position (see Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997) andby using rhetorical questions that are meant to elicit empathic reactions (Burnkrant &Howard, 1984).

Focusing on similarity, such as similar interests, values, and social tastes can beinstrumental in facilitating trust and the development of friendship, even whenindividuals have little else in common. Veteran’s groups, illness survivors’ supportgroups, professional associations, and alumni clubs provide examples of howcommonly shared interests, backgrounds, or experiences can be used in bringingpeople together. Likewise, those who share similar interests may rely on each otherin deciding which social groups to join, and the presence of a friend who alreadybelongs to a given group can be an incentive to join. Health clubs, country clubs,and community centers take advantage of this principle in recruitment. Conversely,individuals may emulate individuals in groups they aspire to join by adaptingsimilar consumption habits, manner of dress, and preferred recreational activity.Consider, for instance, the common advice given to interviewees to ‘‘dress the part’’for the job desired: individuals who appear in attire which transgresses a givenprofessional norm may have more difficulty ‘‘fitting’’ an interviewer’s preconceivedsearch image. Just as an interviewee in a tweed jacket and bow tie may not meetexpectations for the position of CEO of a major corporation, the intervieweeappearing in a $2,000 pinstripe suit with lizardskin shoes may disappoint theexpectations of search committee for a faculty position in field biology, irrespectiveof other qualifications. Examples of efforts to ‘‘fit’’ within a given social group arewidespread, ranging from dress fads at school to politicians on the campaign trailwho select modes of dress on the basis of audience they seek to persuade. In this case,the practice of touring factories, visiting schools, and holding babies is likely to sendimplicit messages and cues suggestive of being part of a constituent’s in-group, eventhough the elected position itself has little subsequent involvement with individualsat these levels.A related heuristic is the practice of social comparison (e.g. Festinger, 1954;

Miller & Prentice, 1996), which can be used for both self-assessment and to setrealistic aspiration levels for a wide range of problems. Social comparison usesjudgements about a specific role model, or a targeted reference class of people to set astandard to which others are compared (including oneself). Social comparisoncan thus be used to quickly identify ways that individuals are similar or dissimilar,and this information can be used to adapt accordingly. Also related is the practice of


social imitation, which can be used in deciding on the proper tone to adoptfor a given social occasion or interaction, while at the same time reaffirmingone’s solidarity with a group (see below). Social imitation can also permit indi-viduals to bypass at least some of the risks related to na.ıve trial and errorlearning, such as which leader to follow, where to eat, or how to complete a specifictask.

2.2. Heuristic use in social groups

Being a member of a group often permits individuals to better assert or defendtheir interests, particularly when adversaries are too powerful to face alone. Seekingstrength or safety in numbers is a heuristic that can be used in many contexts;social group settings provide individuals with greater physical and emotionalsecurity, enabling them to cope with situations in ways that they might not other-wise be able to if alone. Similar tendencies can be found throughout nature(e.g. forming a herd, flock, or school when threatened; predators such as wolves,lions, and hyenas forming into groups for more effective hunting). The social

comparison and social imitation heuristics mentioned above are likely to be usedwidely in group contexts. Social groups often have core traditions and beliefswhich define them and which serve to enhance group solidarity. In defending

norms, individuals may focus on what they see as their group’s virtues, whiledownplaying or denigrating qualities of opposition groups, resulting in increasedintra-group polarization (see Sherif, 1966; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969).Peer pressure may function to promote group solidarity and confidence (see Stoner,1961; Janis, 1982) and individuals deviating from group norms may be rejected(e.g. Asch, 1952, Schachter, 1959). There are nonetheless cases where individualswith divergent ideas are successful in overcoming pressure, advancing theirideas, and getting such ideas accepted. Issues such as formal authority,charisma, and rhetorical skills aside, Moscovici and his colleagues (1969, 1974) instudies of social groups found that moderacy and consistency in the message is one ofthe most important issues in determining whether a deviant position is likely tobe accepted; these qualities lead to perception that minority members ‘‘have aposition, that they believe in it, that they maintain it even in the face of disapprovaland criticismythey illustrate certainty that makes the majority question itsposition, and offer stability towards which a majority can move’’ (Moscovici &Nemath, 1974, p. 248).

2.3. Mate search and assessment

Mate attraction and assessment can be considered as a problem of sequentialsearch: individuals encounter only a small number of potential candidates at a time,and decisions need to be made on when and how to interrupt the search process toinvestigate candidates further. Because finding a mate involves not only makingselections, but being selected, mate aspiration levels need to be made with respect toone’s own mate quality. Inferences regarding one’s own mate value can be made on


the basis of what types of potential mates are attracted and how much interest theyexpress; aspiration levels can be set and modified accordingly. Those searching formates have the incentive to appear as desirable as possible, while being sensitive toexaggerated signals given by others. This issue has been examined extensively withinevolutionary contexts, with the predictive outcome being that signals most difficultto fake are those which are costly to produce (see Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997 for anoverview). For instance, size and physical condition can be reliable indicators ofhealth because they require success in acquiring resources and resisting disease. Inhumans, cues which correlate to social efficacies may be used (e.g. physicalattractiveness, social status, and wealth; see Krebs & Davis, 1993; Buss, 1988, 1989,1994). Such evaluative processes do not need to be conscious; often, impressions areconstructed subconsciously and individuals feel a resulting attraction or repulsion(e.g. Ellis, 1992, p. 282).

2.4. Reciprocal exchange

One of the most common problems in reciprocal exchange is to find partnerswho are trustworthy and dependable. Assessments can be made on the basisof a partner’s reputation: are there ways of knowing whether a potential partnerhas behaved honorably in the past? A common strategy to reduce search effortis to seek those who are already familiar. This may mean family members, workassociates, or friends. Selecting from a familiar group can increase the chances ofknowing a person’s reputation, and provides some security in that violations of trustmay be damaging to reputation. Zajonc’s (1968) finding that repeated exposure toothers leads to positive feelings and liking may be related, in the form of greatertrust. This effect has been reported in over 200 studies (see Bornstein, 1989 for areview).Once a reciprocal relationship has been established, efforts may be made to

maintain and strengthen it. Argyle and Henderson (1985) identified norms thatpeople tend to adhere to in cooperation. These include actions which demonstrate

ongoing commitment and engaging in mutual consultation to ensure that individualinterests are recognized and frustration avoided. In general, reciprocal relationshipscan be maintained if channels of communication are kept open between theinteractants and when the rules of reciprocity are agreed upon by all parties. Evenwhen incentives are very small, there is evidence that people will tend to treat othersfairly (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; see also Adams, 1965; Walster,Berschied, & Walster, 1973; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), and gametheoretical models suggest that in repeated interactions, giving others the benefit ofthe doubt can be an effective cooperative strategy (see Axelrod, 1984).

3. How good are social heuristics?

Social heuristics make use of cues and conventions to solve potentially complexsocial choice problems with limited time, energy, and computational resources.


However, speed and efficiency can sometimes lead to sacrifices in accuracy, or mayto lead to errors in judgment. Drawing inferences on the basis of resemblance withpast experience or presumed similarity is very common example, as in the case of USPresident Harry Truman placing trust in Josef Stalin because Stalin’s persona wasjudged to be similar to that of a supporter from the Midwest (May, 1973, as cited inNisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 39). Similarly, generalization from past experiences canresult in failure to adapt to an environment that is changing, and reliance on in-group preferences and socially transmitted stereotypes can result in unfair socialprejudices. Many other ‘‘failings’’ of social judgement can be suggested (e.g. Nisbett& Ross, 1980, pp. 38–41), although additional thought needs to be given to why sucherrors exist. While some heuristics may occasionally lead to poor inferences, theymay produce generally accurate inferences using a fraction of the time and effort thatwould otherwise be necessary if options were to be considered more carefully.Furthermore, it is important to question how easily deleterious tendencies are subjectto change as individuals gather more information. Many demonstrations of‘‘failings’’ in human judgment are derived from experimental designs where subjectsare given single choices with no feedback. Almost universally, tests are needed whichput subjects in environments where decisions incur real costs and where there arerepeated decisions of the same type.This paper has attempted to outline social heuristics in the broadest possible

way. Many of the candidate heuristics outlined are robust enough to be appliedacross a range of problem solving contexts. For instance, the heuristic captured bythe phrase ‘‘when in doubt, follow others’’ can be used is virtually any situationwhere one is unsure what social actions are appropriate. Who to follow, andprecisely how and when to follow is left unspecified; these details depend on howmuch information one has about the situation, one’s prior experience, and thestructure of the environment. In other cases, there may be a question of whatinformation to take into account. The common investment adage to ‘‘buy low andsell high’’ provides a concrete illustration. While possible to specify formalconditions to establish definitions of ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’, many variables will remainopen to debate: should we look at historical price levels, and if so, over what timeperiod? Can past prices really predict future prices? What about externalconsiderations such as market conditions, technological developments or pendinglegal action that may affect prices? For problems being solved in social contexts thereare at least as many variables to take into account; applying heuristic rules, likesetting criteria for determining ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ must be made on the basis of howindividuals apprehend the situation, which are determined by an individual’sknowledge and past experiences. Such a priori ambiguity does not necessarily pointto the uselessness of postulating likely heuristics, however. As we have seen, there aregeneral tendencies in how people respond to specific types of problems. Socialpsychology and its branches, such as social psychology, developmental psychology,business psychology, psychology of war, and many others are able to provide anincredible wealth of information on regularities in human response to specific typesof social problems. The next step is to attempt to understand such regularities asadaptive solutions.


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heuristics as social tools

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