herspring (cmr in the us and russia)

8/6/2019 Herspring (CMR in the US and Russia)

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Armed Forces & Society

http://afs.sagepub.com/content/35/4/667The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X09332140

2009 35: 667Armed Forces & SocietyDale Herspring

ApproachMilitary Relations in the United States and Russia : An AlternativeCivil

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Armed Forces & Society

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CivilMilitary Relations

in the United States and Russia

An Alternative Approach

Dale HerspringKansas State University

The key to understanding civilmilitary relations in polities such as Russia and the

United States is military culture. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics

or norms of behavior. Some such as executive leadership, respect for military expertise,

and a clear chain of command are critical and exist in both the American and Russian

militaries. Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin and George Bush II, and

Putin and George Bush I), this article maintains that in those instances when military

culture was ignored in either country (e.g., a lack of executive leadership, little respect

for military expertise, and lack of a clear chain of command), conflict not only existed

but also was acerbated. Conversely, in cases where the civilians were firmly in charge

but respected military culture, conflict was minimized. Senior military officers felt freeto express their opinions and had the perception that their views were always taken

seriously.

Keywords: U.S. military; Russian military; civilmilitary relations; military culture

If a lion stands at the head of an army of lions, victory is assured. If a lion stands at the

head of an army of asses, the chances are fifty-fifty. But if an ass stands at the head of

an army of lions, you can call it quits.

General Alexandr Lebed, On Leadership (Russian, no date)

Traditionally, there has been an aversion to the idea of conflict when studying

civilmilitary relations in established political systems. To some, its mere existence

suggests that those in uniform are either refusing or threatening to refuse to carry out

the orders of their civilian masters. This, in turn, can lead to an overemphasis on the

idea of control. As James Burk put it, The question raised is whether (or to what

degree) uniformed elites follow the command of civilian political elites.1 While

there is no question that political control is important, this article argues that conflict

is healthy when it is regulatedin a mature, stable political system such as the United

States or Russia.

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668 Armed Forces & Society

As a consequence, it follows that focus should be on nature of interactions

between the military and its civilian masters. The key to healthy civilmilitary

relations is to create and maintain a situation in which the relationship between thetwo sides is constructive and both sides respect the other. That does not mean an

absence of conflict. Rather, I am talking about a situation in which the civilian

leadership makes the final decision, but senior military officers feel free to express

their opinions and have the perception that their views are taken seriously, although

not always adopted. Here, the task is not to eliminate conflict, it is to channel it in a

positive direction. On the other hand, acerbated or unregulated conflict between the

civilian and military leadership can undermine military effectiveness. It can lead to

what Zoltan Barany called institutional decay. As Barany defined the term,

institutional decay in the American or Russian militaries refers to anything thatinhibits the military from carrying out its mission.2

Focus on Conflict

Conflict between civilian officials and the militarys high command is ubiquitous.

Every countrys budget is finite, and the civilian leadership must decide how much

and on what to spend its treasury. That inevitably brings the civilian leadership into

conflict with the military. The navy always believes it needs more ships, the air forcemore planes, and the army more troops, tanks, and other weapons. The same may be

true of the means for achieving national goals. Civilians may prefer more emphasis

on the use of force, only to learn that senior military officers are in favor of greater

use of diplomatic means.

Perhaps the best way to define healthy conflict is to state its primary characteristics.

The first characteristic is that military and civilian elites are definable but not

necessarily homogenous it their views of the policy process. Civilians tend to look

at force and the use of force differently from those in the military. However, some

civilians are more hawkish than the military, while others will do almost anything toavoid the use of forceand the same thing is true of the armed forces. In other

words, it would be overly simplistic to assume that because a group of individuals

all wear the same, or similar, uniforms, they think alike.

The second characteristic is that the military agrees with Clausewitz; it is always

subordinate to civil authorities, even when policy actions appear wrong headed.

After all, every individual who takes the oath of office as an officer in a mature

political system agrees to accept civilian supremacy. It is a given.3 For officers in

political systems where the process has been bureaucratized and routinized, control

is seldom the critical issue.The third characteristic is that civilmilitary relations are interactive; influence is

notthe critical issue.4 While there is no doubt that military influence is important

for example, to what degree a general is able to persuade his or her civilian

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Herspring / U.S. and Russian CivilMilitary Relations 669

counterpart to purchase this or that weaponif too much emphasis is focused on

military influence (which is another word for control), one runs the risk of

overlooking the interactive nature of the relationship. It is the interaction betweencivil and military leaders that helps define healthy conflict.5

The fourth characteristic is that the policy process need notbe a zero-sum game.

Instead, as Gibson and Snider noted, when it comes to most issues, the two sides will be

involved in what they called an Area of Overlap and Tension.6 To effectively utilize

military power, it is necessary to relate issues such as national resources, demography,

political objectives, and the definition of war, including strategy, to the military tools

available to achieve foreign policy goals. This assumes that while civilians are in charge,

both sides are interested in learning from the other and that when positions are put forth,

they are both prepared to compromise. There are times when both military and civilianofficials will be wrong; they will need someone from the other side to point out a policys

problems. Indeed, if that is absentperhaps the military is forbidden to speak up or is

ignored by political authoritiescivilians run the risk of ordering the military to do

something for which it is not prepared. Deborah Avant emphasized the positive impact

of the military when she observed that a military that uses its expertise to influence

policy may be a good thing if it creates policy more likely to achieve a countrys goals

in the international system.7

So where does this leave us? Short of a military coup, the approach that will

provide the highest extent of military interaction is one in which there is whatSarkesian and Connor called constructive political engagement.8 As the authors

noted, The problem is to develop a relationship that is appropriate and acceptable

to both civilians and the military, while insuring that the military has an appropriate

and realistic role in the political decision-making process. The goal is to ensure that

the interrelationship is symbiotic. In other words, a constructive political engagement

is one in which senior officers feel free to express their opinions while accepting

civilian supremacy in decision making.

Comparing Militaries

In the past, there have been a number of attempts to compare civilmilitary

relations in different countries. One of the first was the book cowritten by Samuel

Huntington and Zbiniew Brzezinski.9 Huntington wrote the section on the U.S.

military, while Brzezinski wrote the chapter on the Soviet military. While it was

useful in its day, the book lacked a common conceptual framework. Then there was

an effort to look at the impact of revolutions on civilmilitary relations as well as a

number of books that looked at geographical regions.10

The latter usually includedan introduction that laid out a common conceptual framework (often the question of

how democratic civilmilitary relations are). Unfortunately, while some contributors

tried to incorporate this conceptual framework, others did not.11



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There also have been efforts to compare civilmilitary relations in different

countries; one of the best known is Michael Deschs much acclaimed Civilian

Control of the Military. While Desch is to be commended for making the effort tocompare this process in four different polities, there are serious problems with the

analysis. For example, without having done in-depth research on the topic, Deschs

look at civilmilitary relations in Russia during the Yeltsin period was superficial.12

The Problem

The real problem, however, is what kind of a conceptual framework to utilize in

comparing civilmilitary relations. How do we ensure that we are looking at thesame political processes in the two countries?

In a recent book he edited on civilmilitary relations in Latin America,13 David

Pion-Berlin suggested in his introduction that the study of civilmilitary relations

could be broken down into three parts: the rationalist, which focuses primarily on the

decision maker; the structuralist, which studies institutions; and the culturalist,

which looks at the subject.14 While rationalist studies, such as the now classic work

by Peter Feaver,15 look at rewards and punishment in an effort to determine how and

why military officers obey their civilian leaders, it seems to me that many officers

obey for neither reason but out of a sense of duty. Furthermore, it is not clear thatone will be able to obtain such data in depth in more than one polity.

Comparing the United States and Russia

There are a number of reasons why a comparison of the U.S. and Russian

experiences is warranted. First, institutionally, the Russian and American militaries

resemble each other in many ways. They are both highly bureaucratized and

institutionalized militaries. Second, with the exception of General DouglasMacArthur, neither has faced a serious problem with political obedience from the

military. Political obedience has been a sine qua non. Third, both militaries are

prepared to (and have) engaged in conflict. I am not suggesting that they are on a

equal plane when it comes to war-fighting capability. They are clearly not. Russia is

far behind the United States when it comes to modern weapons and equipment, for

example. The key question is how to compare these two militaries.

Military Culture

In their study of military culture in the United States, Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs

defined culture as the prevailing values, philosophies, customs, traditions and

structure, that over time, have created shared individual expectations within the



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or her deputies lead; this is something the military expects. Failure to do so not only

undermines morale but also, more important, creates confusion and even chaos

inside the armed forces.

2. Respect for military expertise. While generals and admirals acknowledge the

primacy of civilian leadership and are prepared to follow whatever order they receive

from such authorities, they also expect civilian officials to show respect for the

expertise they have gained in 30 or more years of military service. What that means

is that while the military is prepared to carry out whatever order it receives, it expects

civilian authorities to listen to what they say and take it into consideration as they

make key national security decisions.

It was the late Richard Neustadt who, with the American polity in mind, commentedthat the power of presidential politics, is the power to persuade.21 A president, whether

Russian or American, a minister of defense, or secretary of defense will have a better

chance of getting senior military officers to accept his policies enthusiastically if the

generals and admirals believe they are part of the process. Similarly, key officers who are

left out of the decision-making process can become obstacles to the smooth enactment

of political decisions through bureaucratic obfuscation.

3. Clear chain of command. Nothing upsets military operations more than unclear

orders or a confused chain of command. It creates confusion and even chaos, as thecommanders try to figure out what the senior officers or civilian officials wanted

them to do or whose orders they should obey.

Comparing U.S. and Russian CivilMilitary Relations

First, the data. The data are taken from a wide variety of sources, primary

materials including newspaper articles, official sources, and secondary materials

including a variety of articles and books.Second, given space limitations, this study focuses on two different periods in

Russia and two in the United States. The commonality between them was that in one

case civilmilitary relations were more or less symbiotic (the George H. W. Bush or

Bush I and Putin periods), while in the other instance (the Yeltsin and George W.

Bush or Bush II periods) relations were very difficult, at times chaotic. The question

therefore is, what can military culture tell us about each country individually and,

more important, about comparing civilmilitary relations?

It is also important to emphasize that the methodology used in this article is

qualitative, not quantitative. Each of the characteristics noted above is analyzedduring all four periods. Furthermore, rather than attempting to quantify the degree

of respect or disrespect, each of the three country discussions evaluates the level of



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respect on a national basis; for example, the preponderance of evidence indicates

that the Yeltsin regime showed little respect for military expertise. These conclusions

are charted to see what factors were most associated with the creation of constructivepolitical engagement and which ones undermined it.

The Case Studies22

The key question to be asked is, how similar or different were the four periods?

Based on intuition alone, the George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin administrations

would seem to bear striking similarities, as would the George H. W. Bush and the

Vladimir Putin administrations. Just how similar were these administrations, andhow much does an examination of these four periods tell us about the value of

military culture as a vehicle for comparing diverse political systems?

The Yeltsin Administration

1. Executive leadership. Yeltsin provided almost no political leadership for the

military during his tenure. Take, for example, the case of military reform. If the

generals hoped to be successful, they had to have strong support from the president.

Not only was money involved, but also the presidents office would be needed toovercome bureaucratic obstacles within the military. As Colonel General Igor

Rodionov put it, If military reform is now at an impasse and the Armed Forces, per

se (i.e., the Army and Navy) have been reduced to a desperate state, this is primarily

the fault of the countrys political leadership, which has completely removed itself

from the management of military reform.23 What is even worse than his lack of

leadership is that Yeltsin provided a military budget that created chaos and made

military reform impossible. Consider the following: instead of providing the money

for military reform and thereby giving the generals the stability and predictability

any senior officer needs to plan, Yeltsin repeatedly cut the military budget. When thegenerals begged him for more money, he ignored them. In 1991 the military budget

stood at $324.5 billion. The next year it was down to $86.93 billion; in 1993 it was

down to $74.1 billion, and in 1994 it was $71.7 billion.24 Indeed, the situation with

the budget would get so bad that soldiers would be sent out to pick mushrooms, and

a bank would supply the militarys hats and boots during the first war in Chechnya.

In 1997, he cut the budget another 20 percent. As General Rokhlin commented,

That amount would not even cover the cost of six months of the salaries and ben-

efits mandated by Russian law.25 By the end of his tenure, the military budget had

fallen from $142 billion dollars in 1992 to $4 billion in 1999, a 98 percent decrease!26

The bottom line was that it was disingenuous for him to expect the Army to remain

combat capable at a time when he was starving it for funds.



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Take another example. In May 1996, Yeltsin called for the formulation of a National

Security Concept. The military was excited. Finally a document that will define the

course of Russian security policy! Unfortunately, while it provided some idea of whereYeltsin was taking the country, most of it was vague. The military was looking for

leadership, specific guidelines; instead, it was given ambiguous and fine-sounding

language. Not the kind of leadership from Yeltsin that the military was seeking.

Yeltsins leadership style was too chaotic, too unpredictable, too focused on

keeping himself in power to effectively deal with the countrys deep-seated problems.

Indeed, when it came to leadership, the generals found Yeltsin seriously lacking.

They may not have liked the direction he would have taken the military, and they

would probably have fought him behind the scenes. However, Russian officers

believed that at least they had a right to expect the president to show leadership.

2. Respect for military expertise. When he came to power, Yeltsin was convinced the

cold war was over and therefore did not need the military as might have been the case in

the past. With that in mind, he asked himself, why worry about the armed forces? They

would not be needed in the immediate future. As a consequence, he made it clear that he

did not respect the high command and made no effort to hide it.

The military resented Yeltsins attitude. This became evident in the aftermath of

his order that Russian Army tanks become involved in the 1993 attack on the state

Duma. The generals wanted no part of being involved in politics and felt Yeltsinwould not listen to them. This was why General Grachev demanded that Yeltsin put

his order in writing. They were not about to have himlike Gorbachevuse

military force and then blame them if anything went wrong.27

The generals were especially upset at Yeltsins refusal to consider their advice when

it came to the First Invasion of Chechnya. They complained about the operationthe

Army was in no condition to carry out such an operation. Yet Yeltsin insisted. The

military was so upset about being ordered to invade when there were insufficient

weapons, equipment, and, most of all, training that approximately 540 officers resigned

rather than serve in the warincluding some of the most senior generals in the army(e.g., Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, the Deputy Commander of Ground Forces, who

was ordered to take command of the operation but refused).28 By April 1995, 557 officers

had been fired, and criminal proceedings had begun against 11 of them.29

As the generals had predicted, the invasion was a military disaster. Troops who had

never trained together were sent to fight together (e.g., reservists, airborne, regulars, naval

infantry, border guards were put in the same unit). By February 24, 1995, 1,146 men had

been killed and another 374 were missing and presumed dead.30 Yeltsin then blamed the

army for the serious losses suffered by Russian troops in Chechnya. The situation

between Yeltsin and the military became so bad that retired General Lev Rokhlinmounted an unsuccessful effort to have him removed.31

Yeltsin further undercut the generals ability to deal directly with their troops in

1994, when he issued a presidential decree that subordinated all force organs to the



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president. As a result, the military lost its ability to be heard by members of the

legislative. They now worked directly for the president.

3. Clear chain of command. The First Chechen War illustrated the chaotic nature of

command relationships in the Russian Army under Yeltsin. Grachev was not only named

commander of a potential invasion but also told to negotiate with the Chechens about the

regions future as well. In fact, Yeltsin and the Security Council tied his hands to such a

degree that he was unable to be effective. Throughout the Chechen operation, Yeltsin

interfered and countermanded the generals orders. To make matters worse, the chain of

command constantly changed. At one point it was under the command of the army, at

another it was the Interior Ministryand then that changed back to the army, then back

to Interior. Between 1994 and 1996, there were over eight changes of senior commandin Russian forces.32 It was organizational chaos.

The Russian General Staff had a variety of functions, but even if they were operational

they were traditionally subordinated to the defense minister. Yeltsin was concerned about

this arrangement; it gave the defense minister too much power. So in 1995 Yeltsin told

his colleagues that he intended to detach the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense

and create two parallel structures. The 1996 Law on Defense did exactly that. Over time

this would result in constant confusion and at times even chaos as the line of authority

became blurred. The Chief of the General Staff and the defense minister sometimes had

differences of opinionand that happened frequently when General Igor Sergeyev wasdefense minister and General Anatoli Kvashnin was Chief of the General Staff. The

consequence was organizational chaos. Who were the soldiers supposed to follow? The

defense minister or the Chief of the General Staff?

When Yeltsin left the scene, he left behind ten years of neglect. The Armed Forces

were in a disastrous condition as a result of Yeltsins refusal to listen to his generals

or provide even the minimal amount of money necessary to keep it going, let alone

modernize and reform it. Military morale was at rock bottom, and rebuilding the

armed forces would be a very long and difficult undertaking.33

The Putin Administration

Compared to Yeltsins, for the military, the Putin administration was a breath of

fresh air, a positive change.

1. Executive leadership. Beginning with his emergence as Prime Minister in

1999, it was clear that Putin was prepared to provide executive leadership. One of

the first things he did was to call a meeting of all of the agencies involved in the war

in Chechnya to try to impose some order on military operations. This was standardprocedure for Putinintervene, but only if absolutely necessary. He also announced

he would accept personal responsibility for Chechnya.



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Once he took over as president, Putins primary goal was to reintroduce stability

and predictability into the military. It is impossible for senior military officers to plan

if they do not know how much money they will receive or what is expected of them.Similarly, most generals tend to be flexible and nonideological. This was also Putins

pragmatic approach to leadership: If this idea worked, then use it. Forget about its

ideological significance.

Putin demonstrated his leadership role in dealing with Chechnya while he was still

Prime Minister by flying down to Grozny in a jet fighter, which, if nothing else,

emphasized his connection to the war.34 Another observer, in discussing his leadership

in dealing with Chechnya, commented, Another factor, perhaps the most important one,

for the success of the invasion was the resolve and direction demonstrated by the political

leadership in Moscow, namely Vladimir Putin as acting Prime Minister.35

There was one area where Putin pushed the generals, and that was the idea of

professionalizing the Russian armed forces. For Putin and many of the generals,

large armies based on the use of mass forces backed up by hundreds if not thousands

of tanks and artillery were a thing of the past. It not only was out of date (look at the

Western militaries) but also cost too much. While some generals (Kvashnin comes

to mind) did everything they could to undermine this experiment, others were in

favor, believing that the future was in high technologynot in the mass of troops.

The important point is that Putin showed leadership, and since that time the Russian

military has gradually moved in that direction (in spite of many problems and stopsand starts). His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic.

Putin also showed that he was a leader when it came to budgeting money for the

military. In 2000, when Putin assumed the presidency, the military budget was (in

billions of rubles) R146; by 2006 it was up to R498.76.36 In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin

also pushed hard for salary increases. The militarys salary was raised several times,

but it remained far below civilian salaries in large part because of inflation.

2. Respect for military expertise. Putins approach in dealing with the high com-

mand was in striking contrast to that of Yeltsin. Putin made it clear to the generalsthat he was interested in their ideas on the use of force. On August 16, 1999, Putin

sent Interior Ministry troops to Dagestan, where they, together with local security

forces and some military units, engaged the Chechens. Fighting lasted three weeks.

It involved Russian heavy aerial bombing, rocket attacks from Russian helicopter

gunships and artillery assaults.37 Most pleasing from the generals standpoint was

Putins response when they asked to use the highly destructive fuel oil explosives.

This was a politically risky action. Putin approved the plan and made it clear to them

that they were the ones fighting the war. Many think that it was this decision to use

fuel oil explosives that did the trick.38

For Putin, the generals ran the military.Similarly, while Putin may have been the major lever pushing the military to

become a professional force, once it appeared that the senior military staff was



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dedicated to the idea, Putin receded in the background and permitted the generals

who understood the military to implement the new program. The same was true of

training exerciseswhich had been almost nonexistent from 1999 to 2001. He foundthe money for them, but it was up to the generals to decide what kind of exercises to

put on. He gave them time to adapt and listened to them.

3. Clear chain of command. Putin understood the importance of a clear chain of

command. Furthermore, it was clear to him that the constant bickering between

Kvashnin and Sergeyev had to stop. Early on in his administration, he ordered both

generals to silence their debate and come up with realistic policy proposals. 39

However, in spite of Putins comments, the battle between the two senior officers

raged on. Finally, on March 28, 2001, the Kremlin announced that the defense min-ister had stepped down to become a presidential advisor.40 He was replaced by Sergei

Ivanov, a former KGB general and a close friend and confident of Putin. That

removed one part of the problem.

Unfortunately, Kvashnin continued to fight with the defense ministerin this

case Ivanov. Consequently, on June 14, the Duma changed Article 13 of the Law on

Defense to mention only the Defense Ministry: Oversight for the Armed Forces of

the Russian Federation is carried out by the defense minister via the Defense

Ministry.41 From now on the Chief of the General Staff worked for the defense

minister. Putin then fired Kvashnin. Furthermore, operational matters were takenaway from the General Staff and given to the Ministry of Defense.

The generals and admirals were not overjoyed at some of the ideas Putin forced

on themfor example, a professional militarybut they were appreciative of his

leadership. For the first time since 1999 they were getting back to the world of

stability and predictability. Putin may have argued with this or that general about

what he believed should be done, but from all appearances he appears to have treated

all of them with respect. The senior officers also appreciated the clear chain of

command that he created. No longer would senior officers have to put up with the

confusion and inefficiencies that come from not knowing who to obey.

The Second Bush Administration42

1. Executive leadership. Georg W. Bush is the first president with an MBA, the

first who had been a CEO. He let it be known that he favors a corporate model of

political leadership.43 For practical purposes, this meant, as Bing West put it,

President Bush presided more than decided, acting like the chairman of the board

rather than the chief executive. . . . Once he selected an option, he considered his job

done.44

The primary result of this leadership style was that it placed primary controlof the military in the hands of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Bush was not

about to get involved in how Rumsfeld ran the Pentagon. Bush did meet with senior



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officers on more than one occasion, and he provided general guidance on policy, but

he left it up to Rumsfeld to decide how and what advice the Pentagon would provide

to the president.Unfortunately, from the militarys standpoint, Rumsfeld provided too much leadership.

On issues such as transformation and the war in Iraq, he told the military not only what

he wanted but also what conclusions he expected them to reach. To make matters worse,

the generals were often excluded from meetings with the secretary and the president and

therefore in many cases did not know what had been decided.

2. Respect for military expertise. The most notable characteristic of Rumsfelds

reign was his almost complete distrust of the uniformed military. He believed the

militarys task was simply to carry out his orders. He began his administration byholding secret meetings on the future of the military while excluding the generals

from them. He primary concern was implementing a policy of military transforma-

tion (e.g., greater reliance on high tech weapons that would compensate for large

numbers of troops). It was then up to the military to quietly implement it even if

was undefined and even if doing so made it impossible to carry out the missions

assigned to it. He did his best to exclude the Armys Chief of Staff, General Eric

Shinseki, who had made considerable headway in transforming the army from a

tank-heavy force to a lighter force.45 Meanwhile, he cancelled a key weapons pro-

gram under less than honorable conditions.Rumsfeld was also dismissive of military advice in the lead up to and in the

invasion of Iraq. For example, he openly interfered with the Armys massive

planning document, the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). The

TPFDD for Iraq was an unbelievably complex master plan governing which units

would go where, when, and with what equipment, on which planes or ships, so that

everything would be coordinated and ready at the time of attack.46 As a result, when

the U.S. forces arrived in Iraq, they lacked both numbers and the right kinds of

troops. Why? Because Rumsfeld had pulled them out of the TPFDD.

Furthermore, in planning for the invasion, Rumsfeld was determined to prove thesuperiority of his transformation policy. The United States would invade Iraq with

minimal numbers of troops, thereby showing that his high-tech shock and awe

policy was not only viable but also the best way to fight a war. This is why he refused

to accept Tommy Franks number of 480,000 troops and instead beat him down until

the United States invaded with about 145,000far too few to deal with the

postcombat period. He also convinced Franks notto deploy the 17,500 troops of the

First Cavalry Division in Iraqan action that deprived the military of troops badly

needed to stabilize the country.

To make matters worse, Rumsfeld and his colleagues assured the Army that theissue of posthostilities operations (or Phase IV as the military called it) had been

fully taken care of prior to the invasion. In fact, almost nothing had been done. The

civilians had ignored the militarys concern because they were convinced what an



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Iraqi refugee had told themthat they would be greeted with open arms, that the

new Iraqi government would quickly take over, and that the Americans could leave

shortly after liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.Worst of all, Rumsfeld and his colleaguesin particular Jerry Bremer, who had

been sent to Iraq to set up the Coalition Provisional Authoritytook two steps

opposed by the military that had disastrous resultsthe disestablishment of the

Baath Party and the dismemberment of the Iraqi military. The result, especially from

the latter action, was an influx of thousands of Iraqis into the insurgency.

Rumsfeld continued to ignore those who disagreed with him throughout his time

in office.

3. Clear chain of command. There were problems with the chain of commandunder Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld wanted only officers who agreed with him in key assign-

ments. As a result, he passed on the promotion of all officers at the three-star rank

and above. If he did not like a senior officers political views or approach to trans-

formation or leadership, the officer was doomed to retirement. On many occasions,

Rumsfeld participated in the selection of officers at the two-star level.47 He also

went out of his way to select officers he believed he could controlthe most obvious

being General Richard Myers, a devotee of high tech and an Air Force officer who

believed in showing deference to the civilian leadership.

Another example comes from Iraq. While General Ricardo Sanchez was incommand of American troops and Paul Bremer was in charge of the Provisional

Command Authority, neither was in charge of operations in Iraq, and neither was on

speaking terms with the other. Furthermore, both reported to Rumsfeld. The result

was a constant bureaucratic struggle between the army and the State Department.

One of the worst examples of the confusion of this situation came from the first

attack on the city of Fallujah by the Marines. The Marines reported through a

military chain of command, while Bremer was dealing directly with Rumsfeld or

Condi Rice at the White House.

It is not surprising that the military reacted negatively to Rumsfelds interferenceand attempts to micromanage its actions in Iraq.

The First Bush AdministrationGeorge H. W. Bush

1. Executive leadership. Although he did not try to micromanage security poli-

cies, George H. W. Bush expected to be consulted on policies involving the use or

the threat of the use of military force. Bush permitted the military and the defense

department to work out policy recommendations, but he was closely involved in

making key decisions.This was evident in the invasions of Panama and Kuwait. First, consider the

invasion of Panama. After Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriegas forces

had attacked U.S. forces in the Panama Zone, General Colin Powell met with Bush



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the afternoon of December 16, 1989. He brought Bush up to date on what had

happened. Bushs prime concern was to avoid a repeat of the failed attempt to rescue

American hostages in Iran as well as to preclude the kind of interservice rivalry thathad taken place in Grenada. After hearing Powells explanation of the situation on

the ground, Bush said, Okay, lets do it.48

The situation was similar when it came to the decision to oust the Iraqis from

Kuwait. On August 2, the day after the Iraqis had crossed into Kuwait, the National

Security Council met, with the president in attendance. General Norman Schwarzkopf,

the individual in charge of U.S. forces in the region, briefed the president on the

situation. Bush insisted that the United States respond.

The National Security Council (NSC) met again on October 31. At that meeting,

Powell laid it out for the president. Now, if you, Mr. President, decide to buildupgo for an offensive optionthis is what we need.49 After Powell had discussed

the additional resources required, Bush approved and told Powell to get to work on

the operation. Finally, it is also worth noting that when it came to terminating the

successful effort to oust Saddam, Bush asked for the input of all of his advisors and

commanders, but he himself made the decision to break off hostilities.

2. Respect for military expertise. George H. W. Bush was not a micromanager. He

allowed the military professionals to handle operational matters, justify the military

budget, and work out new force structures and military doctrines.Bush expected the military to come to him with plans. This was evident in both

military actions. In planning the invasion of Panama, Powell argued for a massive

use of force, and Bush approved. When it became obvious that there was a high

probability that military force would be used to get rid of Panamanian dictator

Manuel Antonio Noriega, Powell met privately with Generals Maxwell Thurman

and Carl Stiner. He asked them to come up with an invasion plan that the chiefs

approved, and Powell briefed it to the president. Bush and Powell met from time to

time to polish various aspects of the operation. For his part, Bush asked only to be

kept abreast of what was happening while leaving the fighting to the military.As was the case in the invasion of Panama, planning for the First Gulf War was left

almost entirely in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. True, Bush would frustrate the

military, expanding his charge to the armed forces to not only keep Saddam Hussein

from invading Saudi Arabia but also, by suddenly expanding his order, throw the Iraqis

out of Kuwait. But the important aspect of this military action was that Bush trusted his

commanders. The planning and implementation of military actions was almost entirely

in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. Furthermore, as noted above, Bush was careful

to get inputs from his generals before calling a truce in this military action.

3. Clear chain of command. During this Bush administration, the chain of command

was clear. This is evident from several examples. During the Panamanian invasion, the



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However, as much as Rumsfeld may have been determined to introduce change in the

U.S. military, he simply did not care what the military thought. He knew what he wanted

and was not concerned about the uniformed militarys response. The result was constant

conflict. Evolutionary change is different. Take, for example, Putins approach. He

wanted change but in a direction that appears to have coincided with the views of the

majority of senior officers. He was careful to respect military culture while pushing for

change. For example, when faced with the seemingly never-ending conflict he had

between his two most senior officers, he gradually removed the first, then the second, and

changed the relationship between the General Staff and the defense ministry.This brings us back to the hypothesis presented in the beginning of this article;

namely, that violating the canons of military culture acerbates conflict. This certainly

happened under Yeltsin and Bush II. Similarly, the opposite took place under Putin

and Bush I. This is not to suggest that there was no conflict in the civilmilitary

relationship in either country during those four administrations. There was. Powell

had run-ins with Cheney, and Admiral Crowe was furious when he found out that

General Woerner had been fired without him having been consulted. Similarly, there

were Russian officers who strongly opposed Putins favoritism toward conventional

forces over the Strategic Rocket Forces or his strong push for a smaller, moreprofessional military. This kind of disagreement will always be a part of civil

military relations in every country.

Lest the reader get the wrong impression, despite the foregoing, the level of

conflict or institutional decay has not been the same in both countries. It was far

worse in Russia under Yeltsin than it was in the United States under Rumsfeld. The

U.S. military is continuing to fight two wars despite a plethora of problems. The

difference between the two countries is that Yeltsins lack of leadership and

disrespect went far beyond that of Rumsfeld, and, just as important, it went on not

for six years but for almost ten years. Furthermore, despite Rumsfelds arrogance indealing with the military, Washington continued to buy weapons systems, bring in

new equipment and training techniques, and pay the military well by standards of

Table 1

Comparison of Military Attitudes

Military Attitude toward:

Characteristic Yeltsin Putin Bush I Bush II

Executive leadership - + + +

Respect for military expertise - + + -

Clear chain of command - + + -

Note: = military attitude toward regime behavior is generally negative; += military attitude toward

regime behavior is generally positive.



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the past. Russia, meanwhile, did little. Planes did not fly, ships did not sail, and the

army did not train for more than ten years.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that this story is incomplete. It is based on anin-depth study of civilmilitary relations in two countries during two time periods. But

does it hold for other polities? It would, for example, be very useful to look at the

experiences of another established, bureaucratized military forcethat of Canada. In

1968, Canadian Forces went through a period when senior civil authorities showed open

disrespect for the countrys military leaders as the various services were forced to unify,

an action that led to mass resignations on the part of Canadian officers. Similarly, one of

the characteristics of civilmilitary relations in Germany has been an effort to civilianize

military culture by introducing the concept of Innere Fhrung.51 It would be useful to

compare that period using the three characteristics of military culture presented here andcompare the Canadian and German experiences with the American and Russian. Other

country studies along the same line would also be useful.

Someone once said that the comparative approach is the ultimate test for any model

or paradigm. Whether we want to admit it or not, all polities are culturally bound.

Feavers model mentioned previously represents a major contribution to the field.

However, to validate it, it must be applied elsewhere in other polities to determine its

universal validity. Unfortunately, such a study would demand the same in-depth

knowledge of another polity that Feaver has of the American system. That, in turn,

requires languages and in-depth knowledge of another culturefor example, do rewardsand punishments mean the same to military officers in Brazil or Ghana or China as they

do in the United States? We are scratching the surface when it comes to understanding

the dynamics of civilmilitary relations. But at least it is a beginning.

Notes

1.James Burk, Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,Armed Forces & Society 29, 1(Fall 2002): 7.

2.Zoltan Barany,Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2007), 7.3.One can, of course, point to the actions of Douglas MacArthur in openly defying the orders of his

commander in chiefPresident Harry S. Trumanbut that was a rare exception to the rule in both of the

countries discussed here. See Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from

FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 77-78, 81. Some have seen parallels

between MacArthur and Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov, but as Timothy Colton argued in his major work on

the Soviet Main Political Administration, the clash between these two men was more of personality conflict

that a civilmilitary dispute. See Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The

Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

4. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesman and Cold War Crisis (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1991), 5; Richard Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United StatesToday,Naval War College Review 55 (Summer 2002):8-59.

5.For an essay arguing the critical importance of influence, see Kobi Michael, The Dilemmabehind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations, Armed Forces & Society 33, 4 (2007):

518-46.



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6.Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence:A Look at the National Security Decision-making Process,Armed Forces & Society 25, 2 (1999): 195.

A similar argument is contained in Risa A. Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of

Strategic Assessment(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), esp. chap. 1, in which she argues

that when divergence over security and corporate interests are not entrenched and profound, importance

obstacles to strategic assessment are absent. Ibid., 5. Obviously, if the lines between the military and

civilians are entrenched, then a constructive relationship is very unlikely.

7.Deborah Avant, Conflicting Indicators of Crisis in American Civil-Military Relations,ArmedForces & Society 24, 3 (1998): 383.

8. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert J. Connor, Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-firstCentury; War, Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 19.

9. Zbiniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (Westport, CT:Greenwood, 1982).

10.Jonathan R. Adelman,Revolution, Armies and War(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1985).11.E.g., J. Samuel Fitch, ed., The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1998); Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson, eds., The Political Role

of the Military (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996); Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Communist Armies in

Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982); Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., The Military

and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boulder, CO: Westview, 199); Andrew Cottey, Timothy

Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, Democratic Control for the Military in Post-communist Europe;

Guarding the Generals (London: Palgrave, 2002); Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., Civil-Military

Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). There are, of course, hun-

dreds if not thousands of single-country studies. For example, Alfred Stepans Rethinking Military

Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) has had a major

impact on scholars of civilmilitary relations all over the world.12. Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1999), see esp. 39-66 and compare his analysis with this writers The Kremlin and the High Command

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). In the end, the Russian military was far less of a threat to

political control than Desch assumed. In fact, it was in a state bordering on chaos given Yeltsins lack of

leadership and respect for the military.

13.David Pion-Berlin, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 2001), 1-35.

14.Ibid., 1715.Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants; Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

16.Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, and T. O. Jacobs,American Military Culture in the Twenty-firstCentury (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2000), 3. Also see Edgar

Schein, Organizational Culture,American Psychologist45, 2 (1990): 110.

17.Nick Jans with David Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers, and Climate and HowThey Affect Military Capability (Canberra: Australian National Defense University, Strategic and National

Studies Centre, 2002), 39.

18.One may argue that paramilitary forces such as the police also require the individual to put his orher life on the line in carrying out his or her duties. That is true, of course, and that is why some of the

militarys cultural characteristics are shared by police forces. However, the military is more removed from

civilian society and is trained to use more complex forms of violence. For a discussion of civilian military

culture, see Thomas Langston, The Civilian Side of Military Culture, Parameters (Autumn 2000): 21

19.For a more detailed discussion of military culture, see Williamson Murray, Does Military CultureMatter? Orbis (Winter 1999): 27; John Hillen, Must US Military Culture Reform? Orbis (Winter

1999): 43; and Williamson Murray, Military Culture Does Matter, FPRI Wire 7 (January 1999): 2,

http://www.fpri.org.



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20.The following statement of the main characteristics of U.S. military culture is based on a varietyof sources, including many discussions with military officers as well as the authors thirty-three-year

association with the U.S. Navy and a variety of academic studies. See, for example, Jans with

Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed, 42-53; A. J. Bacevich, Tradition Abandoned: Americas Military in a

New Era, National Interest58 (Summer 1997): 3; John Allen Williams, The Military and Modern

Society, The World and I14 (September 1999): 311; Edgar R. Puryear,American Generalship: Character

is Everything: The Art of Command(Novato, CA: Presidio, 2002), 1-43; Peter Maslowski, Army Values

and American Values,Military Review 70, 4 (April 1990): 10-23; Betts, Soldiers, Statesman and Cold

War Crisis, 157-58; Richard H. Kohn, How Democracies Control the Military,Journal of Democracy

4, 8 (1997): 140; Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap between the Military and Society, Atlantic

Monthly 280, 1 (July 1997): 66-77; Cultural Demolition in the Military, Washington Times, November

20, 1998; Peter Feaver, The Gap, Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding, National

Interest61 (Fall 2000): 29-37; Gregory D. Foster, Failed Expectations: The Crisis of Civil-Military

Relations in America, Brookings Review 15 (Fall 1997): 46-48; and Elliot Cohen, Supreme Command:Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002). Also see articles in Peter

Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National

Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

For comments on Russian military culture, the author has relied on his own extensive contact with Russian

military officers as well as a variety of academic studies. See, e.g., Herspring, The Kremlin and the High

Command; Pavel K. Baev, The Challenge of Small Wars for the Russian Military, in Russian Military

Reform, 19922000, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McCermott (New York: Frank Cass, 2003), 189-202;

Alexandr Golts, The Social and Political Condition of the Russian Military, in The Russian Military Power

and Policy, ed. Steven F. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 80; Anatol Lieven,

Chechnya: The Tombstone of Russian Power(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), citing General

Vrobyev, 293; Christopher C. Losksley, Concept, Algorithm, Indecision: Why Military Reform Has Failed inRussia Since 1992, Slavic Military Studies 14, 1 (March 2001): 1-26; Michael Orr,Manpower Problems in

the Russian Armed Forces, 19921993, no. D62 (Camberley, UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict

Studies Research Centre, February 2002), 8; Michael Orr, Reform and the Russian Ground Forces, 1992

2002, inRussian Military Reform, 19922000, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McCermott (New York: Frank

Cass, 2003), 136; Brian Taylor, The Russian Military Outside Politics: A Historical Perspective, PONARS

Policy Memo, 2 (October 1997); Robert Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics (New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Publishing, 1998), 9-12, 57-58.

21. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidency: The Politics of Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990), 11.

22.It is important to note that the Russians, either civilians or military, have had little to say about

military culture or civilmilitary relations. As one Russian writer put it, Russian authors mainly stressthe problem of civilian control of the military. Civilian control is defined not only in the narrow sense, as

a control of the government over the military and this understanding implies an elected civilian head of

the military. So civil-military relations are mainly understood as an interaction between the government

and the military, while in foreign studies this term has a broader meaning, for example, the interaction

between the whole society and the military. Or as she put it elsewhere in her article, Russian authors

tend to view the military as a closed system separated from the rest of society. Olga Filippova, Civil-

Military Relations: The Comparative Analysis of Russian and Foreign Approaches to the Issue, Post-

Soviet Armies Newsletter5, 2 (2006). Nevertheless, a reading of Russian materials or discussions with

Russian officers makes it very clear that they expect civilian authorities to respect their organizational

culture. The critical question is, how similar or different is the process in both countries? Are there certain

commonalities that are critical to creating symbiotic civilmilitary relations? If so, what are they and whatis their impact in more than one polity?

23.Cited in Michael J. Orr,Rodionov and Reform, no. C92 (Camberley, UK: Royal Military AcademySandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1999), 3.



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24.For the Yeltsin period, this writer relied on Russian Military Budget, Global Security.org, ascited in Steven Miller, Moscows Military Power: Russias Search for Security in an Age of Transition,

in The Russian Military Power and Policy, ed. Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press, 2004), 1-42.

25.Robert V. Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, 478.26.Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2003), 308.

27.Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 74.28.Olga Oliker,Russias Chechen Wars, 19942000 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 9-10.29.Moscow Times, April 18, 1996.30.As quoted in Lieven, Chechnya, 111.31.Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 127-29.32.Gregory J. Celestan, Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya (Ft.

Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, August 1996), 11.33.This section covers up to March 2007, when Ivanov was replaced by Anatoliy Serdyukov, whocontinued to serve under newly elected president Dmitri Medvedev.

34.Putin and the Chechen War: Together Forever,Moscow Times, February, 11, 2004.35.C. W. Blandy, Moscows Failure to Comprehend, in The Second Chechen War, ed. Anne Aldis,

Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 40 (London: Strategic and Combat Studies

Institute: September 2000), 17. His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic. He

gradually forced the defense minister out, and a short time latter forced the Chief of the General Staff to

retire. He also changed the relationship between the defense minister and the Chief of the General Staff

so that the latter was not only clearly subordinate to the former but also forbidden to interfere in opera-

tional matters.

36.As cited in Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 174.37.Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 2004), 101.38.C. W. Blandy, The Storm, Part IThe Invasion of Avaristan, no. P30 (Camberley, UK: Royal

Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2000), 41.

39.Hope Glimmers for Reform,Moscow Times, March 29, 2001, via Johnsons Russia List, March29, 2001.

40. Steven J. Main, The Strategic Rocket Forces, 19912002, no. D66 (Camberley, UK: RoyalMilitary Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, July 9, 2003), 26.

41.Federalnyi zakon Ob oborone, April 24, 1996. http//www.mil.ru/articles/articles3863.shtml.42.The primary focus is on Donald Rumsfelds tenure as Secretary of Defense. While Robert Gates

adopted a very different approachmuch as Minister of Defense Dmitri Serdyukov has in Russiaevents

are too current to permit the kind of conclusions needed for a study of this type.43. Fred I. Greenstein, The Changing Leadership of George W. Bush: A Pre and Post 9/11

Comparison, in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, ed., Eugene R. Wittkopf and James

McCormick, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 359.

44. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: RandomHouse, 2008), 362.

45.Shinseki would later testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. When asked by SenatorLevin (D-MI) how many troops were needed for an invasion of Iraq, he responded, Something on the

order of a hundred thousand. Rumsfeld was furious, and Wolfowitz undercut him by stating that his

views were wildly off the mark. Dale R. Herspring, Rumsfelds Wars: The Arrogance of Power

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 124-25. There has been a debate on the appropriateness of

Shinsekis testimony in Armed Forces & Society: see discussions by Damon Coletta, Courage in theService of Virtue: The Case of General Shinsekis Testimony before the Iraq War, Armed Forces &

Society 34, 1 (October 2007): 109-21; and Paul Camacho and William Hauser, Civil-Military

RelationsWho Are the Real Principals? A Response to Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of



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General Shinsekis Testimony before the Iraq War, Armed Forces & Society 34, 1 (October 2007):

122-37.

46.James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad,Atlantic Monthly 293, 1(January-February 2004): 15.47.Herspring,Rumsfelds Wars, 13.48.Colin Powell,My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 425.49.Ibid.50.As has been stressed previously, I am not trying to quantify the relationship, nor to show correla-

tions. Rather, this is a notional charge, based on the preceding material.

51.This term is almost impossible to accurately translate. Technically it means inner leadership, butin practice it is tied to the German effort to civilianize military culture to the maximum degree

possible.

Dale Herspring, a university distinguished professor at Kansas State University and a member of the

Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of 12 books and more than 80 articles dealing with U.S.,

Russian/Soviet, German, and Polish civilmilitary relations.Address for correspondence: Dale Herspring,

Kansas State University, Department of Political Science, Waters Hall 240, Manhattan, KS 66506; e-mail:

[email protected].

herspring (cmr in the us and russia)

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