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HEIDEGGER"5 AANALPSTS aF TRUTH IN BErNG AND TIHE

B.A. (Hans,), Simon Fraser University, 1989

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMEMT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

WASTER OF ARTS

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autorisation.

1 herecy 2rafi$ += S i r a n ;rase:' Ufi ~ V ~ T S i f y ?nne r . ~ T . I *,: :Z;I;~

- y +hes;s, c rc jec t sf exsended essay ( t h e t i + f e of k 2 i c h I - - sharri p e i p w \

-:ngle copies only for suck users or i n r e s w n s e to 3 reque:,t i rcn ;ne

-l;rary of any oSher university, or ot-kar eGuca+ t ~ w ! i r , ~ + i TL;? i ~ r a , , , ~ : i

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d m multipte copying sf this work f a r s c 5 ~ l a r l y uurposes s p y On granted

z r publication of this uclrft for fzr3r?lal gain ~, ' ;a) ! t.p ,? i i ~ ~ ~ ~ l

without my writtec permission.

Being and T i m e contrasting it witb the traditional theories

such as correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories

(afthough Weideggergs own account is similar to certain

modern coherence-pragmatist theories such as Davidson*~),

Neideqger argues that the dominant traditional theories of

truth depend on an ontology originating in ancient Greece

that does not adequately capture the nature of human

- existence and its relevance to truth. I also discuss

Weideqger ? s o m ontofogy, centered on his conception of

nDasein,n arguing that it provides a more adequate and

fundamental account of human existence. Finally, 1 discuss

the view of truth emerging from Heidegger's ontology. For

Heidegger we discover truths about entities within the

world, but we are not ourselves such "entities." The truths

w e discover axe not absolute, however; they are relative to

what he describes as the adisclosuxeM of the world, a

paradigm-creating series of events determfning the way the

warld is understood, Any theory of truth, for Heidegger,

depends on activity and he uses this thesis, articulated as

RSeing-in-the-wr)rIdR in Being and T i m e , +,a criticize the

tendency of the traditional theories of truth to emphasize

passive representation, subject/object metaphysics, and the

search for abso2utes.

iii

. * . ABSTRACT ................................. . . . . s A . . + . . . * * * e > ~ ~

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i k r

7 G' Notes for the Introduction ............................... L 2

CHAPTER ONE: HEfDEGGER AND REALISM ....................... 2 7 '7 1.1: The Origins of SubjectfObject Metaphysics ...........,

1.2. Heidegger's Objectians to Cartesianism .............. 3 5 1.3. The Occurrent and the Available ..................... 4 1 1.4. Heidegger" View o f Language ........................ 4ft Nates for Chapter One ................................... - 5 7

.......................... CHAPTER TWO: BEIWG-IN-THE-WORLD 6 0 2.1. The Nature of Dasein ................................ 61 2.2. Being-in ............................................ 64

..... 2 . 3 . The World ..............................*.... *I 1 2 . 4 . Care .. ................*.............................. 7 5 2.5. The Nature of Reality ............................... 7 8

. Wotes f o r Chap te r Two ............................... U 6

CHAPTER THREE: HEIDEGGER ON TRUTH ....................... '0-/ 3.1. The Shift from A l e t h e i a to Truth .................... 8 7 3.2. Traditional Theories of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 3.3. The Nature o f Assertion and Truth as Uncovering ..... 96 3.4. Truth as Disclosure ................................. 301 3.5. The Shift from Uncovering to Agreement .............. 1 0 5 3 . 6 . The Nature and Presupposition of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 8 N o t e s f o r Chapter Three .................................. 115

............................................... CONCLUSfON 3 1 6 ................................. Notes %or the Conclusion 121

............................................... REFERENCES 122

iv

TEITRODUCTION --- -

r n t h i s thesis, I attempt to explicate Heidegger's

conception of truth as it appears in sections 43 and 44

Being and Time.r My aim is primarily exegetical rather

tkan criticaf, Heidegger's concern in B e i n g and Time is

not with epistemological theories of justification

regarding whether w e can know what is true, nox is he

concerned with genealogical theories of knowledge regarding

how we come to know what is true. Rather, his concern is

with the ontological foundations of truth itself. The

relevant question, therefore, is not: given the truth that

p, what justification could be provided for X's belief that

p is true? Nor is it the question: given the truth that p,

how did X come to believe that p is true? Rather, the

relevant questions are: what conditions must be satisfied

in order fox there to be such a thing as truth or

knowledge? Are these conditions absolute? What sorts of

entities, if any, are suitable bearers of truth? What is

the ontoloqical status of such truth bearers? What

conditions identify the things we ordinarily call true

(such as propositions, judgements, and beliefs) --

correspondence with objective reality (e.g., facts or

states of affairs); internal coherence among, for example,

judgements, beliefs, or pact ices; use•’ ulness in or

consequences fcr our everyday fives; or something

altogether different?

Page - 1

To answer these questions our ~ Q G U S m u s t be on

a n t o l o g y rather than an epistemoiogy; Heidegqer believes

ontology determines how we undensta~d ourselves, the w o x i d ,

and the relationship between ourselves and the world.

Thus, ontofogy dekermines trow we understand such key

concepts as truth, knowledge, and reality; antology

explains the o s i q P n s of these concepts in our deepest

understartding of t h e nakure of reality. Indeed, Heideqqer

Believes the epistemological enterprise as a whole f i . e . ,

the assumption that it is intelligible to ask whether and

how we can know anything at all] grows out of our

commitment to a specific ontology. If he is correct, then,

although epistemology and ontology axe dialectically

Interdependent, investigatkons into the nature of the

ontology of truth in Western philosophy are logically prior

to episternofoqicaf enquiry: all questions about

justification and knowledge acquisition will already

presuppose some understanding of our own nature, of the

nature of the world, and of our mode of access to the world

inherent in this particular ontology, Furtherrnora,

Weldeggex believes the ontology enabling us to make sense

of epistemologicaf issues also underlLes all traditional - -

theories of truth, Thus, any investigation into the nature

of truth must also begin with ontology.

According to the ontology of truth assumed by most

Western philosophers, Heidegger argues, the world hasi an

objective structure that is in the sense of

Page - 2

';

.ndependent of human interpretation or activity. Human

beings represent for Nre-presenttr) this struct~re in

propositions, mental images, beliefs, or theories. This

vaguely dualistic metaphysical picture makes it possible

for us to see truth as a relation between our

representations of the world and the world as it is in

itself, and to see philosophy as the discipline whose job

it is to describe the nature of this relation. To see how

Heidegqer supports the claim that traditional theories of

truth rely on this ontology, let us consider the

traditionally dominant types of theories: correspondence

theories, pragmatic theories, and coherence theories.

According to correspondence theories, truth is a

relation between something representational (such as a

pxoposition, mental image, judgement, or even a theory) and

an objective, independent reality (objects, facts, and

states of affairs as they are in themselves). According to

early versions of pragmatic theories, such as those offered

by William Janes and the early John Dewey,= truth is a

relation between something mental or intentional (such as

an idea, belief, or hypothesis) and its consequences or

uses in an objectively xeal world. Thus correspondence

theories and early pragmatic theories rely on the

ontological distinction between representatiens of reality

and reality itself lor between the mental and the

of things that could either correspond u r f a i l ta

correspond or, i n the case ef pragmatic theories, one t y p e

of entity whose truth i s depezdent an its consequences for

another type cT entity,

Heideggex believes ~Zassical (ideafist? coherence

theories also rely on this distinction, though it is less

obvious how they do s o . 9 Classical coherence t h e o r i e s m a k e

truth a reiatioc among various tokens of one type of

representation -- for example, logical consistency [or

mutual support) among all propositions, all mental images,

all ideas, or all theories -- without making reference to

an independent, objective world. An obvious objection to -

coherence theories is they lead to the counter-intuitive

conclusion that a proposition, for example, "aboutf* an

objective fact may be *trueH fi.e., meet the test of

coherence) without there actually beinq any such objective

fact. HeideggerEs objection, however, is more subtle. It

is that coherence theories depend on the existence of at

least one side of the traditional representation/reallty

distinction. That is, while coherence theories avoid the

need to account for any connection between representations

and reality, they still rely upon there being a self-

ccntained realm of representation by means of which t r u t h

is defined and reality characterized. Our common-sense

intuition that truth must be tied to the abjectlve world

simply reintroduces the other h a l f of the underlying

ontology, namely the assumption that there Is an

Page - 4

obiectiveIy real arid mind-independent world that t r u t h is

about, Coherence theories, t h e n , re jec t t h e need for

finkage between representations and xeality, while holding

onto the idea of agreement among representations as the

best characterization o f truth, whatever the connection

Between experience and reality.

Kith both coherence and correspondence theories, then,

we have true representations (propositions, beliefs,

judgements, theories}, and in both cases the question of

truth concerns the relationship either among

representat ions (coherence! or between representations and

objective reality fconrespondence). The main difference

between the two is simply that for coherence theories the

relation exists between tokens of one type of entity while

far correspondence theories the relation exists between

tokens of two types of entities. Therefore, both coherence

and correspondence theorists must ask the same question:

what is the nature of this truth-relation? For Heidegger,

then, cohezence and ccrtespondence theories share the same

ontology: both involve a relation between things, and both

understand the nature af that relation as something to be

discovered . Weideqqer 's own view is that correspondence,

pragmatic, and coherence theories of truth are HprivativeH

or Eerivcd f r o m a deeper, maze "pnrfim~riiial*~ understanding

of truth, an understanding devoid of the ontological

distinctions and commitments underlying traditional

Page - 5

conceptions cf tr7:th. Poliowing H e i d e g g e x , 1 w r i l oaf:

t h i s more fundament31 understanding ?f t r u t h " t r u t h as

d i s c l a s ~ r e , ~ ~ I t is a sense cf truth closely zc*nnez+efl

w i t h wh3t Heideqyer calls " t h e being of e n t i t i e s f ' hecause

the being of entities [ h o w entities are a s t-tpposcid t o w A i ~ t

entities are] ks what is d i s c l o s e d by human activity.

According to Weidegqer, d i s c l o s u x e is the a c t i v i t . y ~ j f

pzoducing underlying frameworks, ontologies, and r o o t

metaphors- T h e framework underlyiny the Western w c ~ r l d vicw

is that the world has an objective structure, indcpeniler~t:

of human activity and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Thks undez l y i n g

framework has fed variously ta the ontt;f uqies c;.;tf

materialism [the view that reality consists c n t i r c l y of.

properties inhering in portions of extended matter:,

ideal i s m Ithe view that reality consists e n t i r e l y af. nori-

extended i d e a l oz mental entitiesf, and d u a l ism f the v i e w

that reality consists af a combinat i o n of ment.al e n t i t it:;

and physical entitles). While these untnloqies differ in

detail, all three share the vicw t h a t reality c Q n s i c ; t s nf

static, o c c ~ ~ r e n t ~ things unaltered in t h e i r fur ,damentd~l

nature by human activity and interpretation: ~3bje r t s a r e

mental entities; reality always consists exclucivaly ~ t f

L r l E one, exclusively af t h e other, o r of a c m n t i n a t i ~ n ~f " " -

two a ~h~ ---C r v i L -A+- m=r=ph~+ emerging from our underlyixg

f r a a e ~ a r k casts knowing as a type of Rbeho2dinya: the v i e w

that knowledge is gained primarily by autonomous,

Page. - f,

individual representexs engaging in detached observation or

contemplation of reality, The underlying Eramework, out of

which var fous ontologies and root metaphors grow, allows

entities to emerge as entities of a certain sort -- in the

predominant modern view of reality, as self-contained,

material things governed by abstract causal principles --

and sa makes i t possible to discover how things are in the

world by discezning the principles underlying the structure

and behavior of these occurrent things,

Discoverfnq how things are in the world involves

ascribing some determination to entities through providing

descriptions of them based on the overall framework and

Intelligible only within the overall framework. Science,

far example, is a mechanism of discovery, describing

reality in term of mass, energy, molecular structure,

causal laws, etc., expressed in certain mathematical

formulae. This description relies on the disclosure of

entities as isolable, substantial, quantifiable things.

Hefdegger maintains that traditional theories of truth are

also mechanisms of discovery made possible by the

dfselosure o f the world as an objectively structured

reality consisting of occurrent things. Thus, while

tfaditlsnaf theorfes of t ruth m y make intexesting and

L --A, w a r a n t &, c o n t r i l m t i t n s to auz understanding of how things

are fn the wf:rXS, they are nevertheless sugerven3ent,

thtoaeticd constructs pzesupposing the specific disclosure

of the world that des of discovery poss ibf e .

Page - 7

In his own discussion of truth, Heideqqer attempts to

disclose the natuxe of traditional theoxies as mechanisms

of discovery based on a disclosure. That is, Heidegger

does not himself present a theory of truth. Rather, he

attempts to outline the origins and limitations of

traditional theories of truth, arguing that they cannot

characterize reality at its deepest level, and so have no

valid claim to absolute authority. He argues further that

all theory is rooted in interpretation, and so the concept

of truth should be seen as evolutionary and hermeneutical,

rather than as fixed or absolute,

Heidegger maintains t h a t our understanding of t r u t h as

correspondence is based on a momentous disclosure, centered

on the early Greek notion of aletheia, While the Greek

word @aletheiae? is ordinarily translated as "truth, "

Heidegger maintains that a f e t f i e i a did not originally mean

what we mean by "truth-" Rather, for the pre-Socratics, it

meant the "unhiddennessH of entities or t h e "clearing"

within which entities "showed themselves." Ale the ia ,

Heidegger argues, contained no distinction between the

knower and the known, and hence no distinction between

representations and reality, The notion of truth as

correspondence arose out of the Parmenidean/Platonic

ontological distinction between universal and particular,

- -2 auuc Zater on, the wistoteLian qrarmatical distinction

between subject and predfcate that was built into the

eariiez distinction, As a result of these distinctions,

t r u t h came +a be associated with revealing the general

attribuees ef particufar entities ! i . e , , discovering

univexsality in pariicalars) and with a beholding subject

who accomplishes this revealing through some mode of

representatisn C l . e . , characterizing universality in

p a r t i c u l a r s > . Thus, while Aristotle never speaks of

represeneations and Plato does so only fleetingly, they

nevertheless made the fundamental distinctions out of which

the view of knowledge as representation and the view of

truth as correspondence were to emerge. After Plato and

Arfstotie, accuracy of mental or linguistic representation

gradually became the hallmark of truth.

In chapter three of this thesis, I discuss the

derivation of truth from a le the ia and contrast Heideggerts

notion of disclosure with the traditional view of truth as

correspondence. Little time is spent discussing the

details or various formulations of the classical theories

of truth, not because they are uninteresting or unimportant

but because, once again, Heidegger believes that all such

theonies share the same fundamental characteristic, namely,

the ontological separation of representation and reality.

Coherence and pragmatic theories of truth will be mentioned

onZy in passing because, as Bernd Magnus points out in

Heldegger3s Metahistory of Philosophy:

Heidegger would probably collapse all such distinctions [as those between correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth1 as derivative. We is not unaware of possible

Page - 9

objections which could be raised by historians o f philosophy. I t is simply that Heidegger uses the concept of agreement,..,, in a broader sense, which includes all kinds o f t'ag~eementw; idea to thing, thing to consistently related ideas, and ideas to their verifiable (or discernible) consequences.'

For the most part, then, in this thesis only the phrase

ticorrespondence theoryv will be used. This should,

however, be understood to include a l l the other traditional

theories of truth as well.

As we have seen, Heidegger traces the origins of our

fundamental framework back to ancient Greece. Because he

believes that this framework has largely determined the

subsequent history of Western philosophy, he finds i t

necessary to approach his conception of truth via a

discussion of the origins of traditional ontology. In

other words, because Heidegger believes tha t our

philosophical interests and commitments are determlned, or

at least greatly influenced, by the tradition we have

inherited from our ancestors, he says it is necessary to

understand the ontology of this tradition before any real

progress can be made on questions concerning t h e nature of

reality or the nature of truth as they have been discussed

within it. In giving an example of the profound influence

of the traditional framework on our world-view, Heidegger

says the Parmenidean interpretation of Beings as

objectively determinate reaiity was adopted by F i a t o and

Aristotle and ''has, in its essentials, travelled the path

that leads through the Dlsputationes metapfiysicae of Suarez

to the smetaghysics' and transcendental philosophy of

modern timesn € 2 2 3 . Such an interpretation, once original

and controversial, has become an integral part of our own

world-view.

Furthermore, Heidegger notes that when a world-view

becomes firmly entrenched, as ours undoubtedly has, certain

possibilities of thought are precluded. One set of

beliefs, even if a variable set, takes on the character of

virtual self-evidence and becomes the foundation for our

understanding of the world and ourselves. He says that

Wthe ontology which has thus arisen [from the Greek

interpretation of Being] has deteriorated to a tradition in

whfch it gets reduced to something self-evident -- merely

material for reworkingti 1221. As a result, we neglect to

question the assumptions behind the wfoundationsw of our

knowledge, and so are repeatedly stuck with the problems

that grow out of our world-view, problems which remain

unsolvable from within our set of presuppositions.

Heideggex asks, *Is it accidental that no headway has been

made with this problem [of correspondence1 in over two

thousand years?" 1216-71,

Because Heidegger believes the entrenchment of a

world-view precludes original possibilities of thought, he

says i t is necessary to @destroyn the tradition oE ontology

before any new metaphors can take hold. To destroy the

tradition, f n Heidegger's sense, is to loosen the hold it

has over us, to come to understand it as the source of our

Page - 11

philosophical view point, and to recapture some of its

original "positive possibilitiesH f221 now lost to us.

Heidegger believes that if we are able to do this, we will

be able to make explicit at least some of the

presuppositions implicit in our ontological commitments,

begin to free ourselves from the grip of subject/object

ontol~gy,~ and ultimately to understand correspondence

theories of truth as mechanisms of discovery.

In Being and Time, Heidegger goes beyond the

destruction of the tradition. He also presents a positive,

alternative ontology -- that of being-in-the-world

which, he says, is more primitive and fundamental than the

metaphysics of subjects and objects. This primitive sense

of being, centered on activity and action, is still with

us, though it has been obscured by the conception of Being

as that which is v*p~esentft to the mind (or, more recently,

as the objective reality described by science). This

conception of Being has been the predominant metaphysics

since Plato first began the separation of reality into the

two parts of knower (subject) and known (object).

Heidegger 's basic premise is that Dasein (roughly

hvean being or human activity) is essentially interpretive

of itself and the world. Dasein and world are interdefined

by Daseints activities and each is dependent on the other

for its being. It is because traditional philosophers have

been working within the Platonic/Aristotelian disclosure

that Dasein has interpreted itself as an occurrent thing ( a

self-contazned mental substance, a rnind/body, a rational

animal, etc.f and has interpreted the world as a domain of

occurrent objects. Descartes ' Meditations on First

Philosophy is perhaps the most transparent example of the

interpretation of Being to which Heidegger objects.

Indeed, in Heidegger and the Problem of K n o ~ Z e d g e , ~ ~

Charles Guignon casts Being and Time primarily as a

reaction against Cartesianism. The ontology of being-in-

the-world may then be seen as an alternative to or even

necessary precondition for the emergence of subject/object

metaphysics.

Perhaps the best way to introduce the ontology of

being-in-the-world is to discuss Heideggerts rejection of

the traditional notion that knowledge about the world can

be attained best (or only) through disengaged

contemplation, by assuming a detached theoretical attitude.

As Hubert Dreyfus says in his recent study of B e i n g and

Tf me :

From Platois theoretical dialectic, which turns the mind away from the everyday world of "shadows, '@ to Descastes ' s preparation for philosophy by shutting himself up in a warm room where he is free from involvement and passion, to Humels strange analytical discoveries in his study, which he forgets when he goes out to play billiards, philosophers have supposed that only by withdrawing from everyday practical concerns before describing things and people can they discover bow things xeally are.==

Heidegger's objection to this view is three-fold.

First, he maintains the very notion of attaining a

Page - 13

theoretical attitude presupposes that the world has an

objective structure that ean be observed or studied as it

is in itself, That is, it presupposes that one can detach

or disengage human activity and interpretation from the

world and still be left with an intelligible, structured

reality to study. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing

that the world bas a structure only in relation to human

concerns, activities, and interpretations; the identity of

entities within the world is a function of their place in

an over-arching framework of purposive, meaningful

activity. For Heidegger, it does not make sense to speak

of the structure of the world independent of the

determinations conferred on it through human disclosuxe.

Indeed, f a r Heidegger, the very notion that the world has a

structure "in itselfn is intelligible only within the

framework of traditional ontology.

Secondly, Heidegger rejects the implicit assumption

that human beings are self-contained individuals or

subjects of thought and experience who can be detached from

the world in which they ordinarily reside. Heidegger

traces this modern, subjectivist view to Descartesv

ffinventionw of the mind as the mechanism for grasping

universals. This invention transformed the

universal/particular distinction of the Greeks and

Scholastics into subject/sbject metaphysics; both

distinctions are implicit in the Greek disclosure of truth

Page - 14

as discuvery, I n his s t u d y of Being and Tine, Charles

Guiqnon says:

[With Descaxtesl the subject becomes the center around which all other entities revolve as ttobjectsn of experience: the self is the "sub- j ec tumn -- that which is "thrown undert* and underlies beings,,,-What makes a person unique is now seen as t h e bidden, private riches of his inne~most mental realm, ..,[ghat ernesgesl is a picture of the inner self as completely self- defining, with no essential bonds to anything else in the cosmos.x2

Hcidegger argues, against the tradition, that the

shared, p ~ b l i c "we-worldH always takes precedence over any

'+innern realm of experience or private grasp of meaning ox

truth. For Meidegqer, individuals always exist within, and

are defined by, a common institutional framework of roles,

and norms of behavior and equipment use. P3

[The individual is always] contextualized in equipmental contexts, in a culture, and in history. These contexts define the self without residue -- the Cartesian mind as a center of experiences divides out without remaindex. What makes us unique as individuals is not an "internal spacew or substantial self distinct from our roles in the world.. ..In this way [Heideggesf attempts to retrieve from oblivion an earlier understanding of the self as inextricably woven into the wider context of a community and a cosmos. 5 4

Heideggex does not deny that we can experience

ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects via

intentional states, but he maintains that this is a derived

and intermittent condition, presupposing a much more

fundamental involvement in a shaxed, public world. Our

Page - 15

ability to understand ourselves as conscious s u b j e c t s is

dependent on our familiarity with a specific disclosure of

the world. And, disclosure is a communal or globa l

activity, not an individual, subjective process of thought,

judgement, or representation. Thus, Heidegger may be

called an anti-individualist; in his view there is no

private, individual self distinct from or more fundamental

than the public roles one assumes in the everyday public

world.

Finally, Heidegger rejects the view, implicit in the

theoretical attitude, that our primary mode of access to

the world is in the form of beholding independent reality

with the eye or the mind. Heidegger argues that our most

fundamental way of being is characterized by activity and

involvement with the world, by concern for and interaction

with the entities w e encounter in our daily lives, not by

detached observation and contemplation. This interaction

is governed by a network of tacit, communal rules of use

and interpretation that make up the public, social world.

The most primitive of these rules are pre-intentional, pre-

linguistic norms of behavior and use, giving us a pre-

theoretical understanding of what entities are and how they

behave which must always already be in place before it Is

possible for us to gain theoretical knowledge about t h e m -

Understanding is activity-based; it is more primitive than I

subjective contemplation and theoretical thinking.

Heidegger says :

Page - 16

fklfi sight for insight for that matter1 is grounded primarily in understanding .... f f I n t u i t i o n f l and "thinkingft are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones, Even the phenomenological +@intuition of essences" is grounded in existential understanding. [I471

Anothex way of putting this point is to say that one must,

at some level, always, already understand what one is

looking for before it is possible actually to look for it

or to know whether one has found it. Because

understanding, unlike intuition and thinking, is pre-

intentional and pxe-linguistic, it involves a far deeper

interconneetion between Dasein and world than that allowed

by beholding. Fox this reason, Heidegger argues that

beholding cannot be the fundamental characterization of our

understanding of the world.

The picture emerging from these considerations is one

in which human beings and the rest of the world are,

through the communal activity of being-in-the-world,

essentially interdependent and mutually defining, rather

than divided into ontological categories based on

ontological type-distinctions such as consciousness/matter,

form/content, and universal/particular,

Although it will be necessary to make brief excursions

into other sections of Being and Time, this thesis

considers particularly those sections explicitly devoted to

the nature of reality and the nature of truth: section 43

"Dasein, wosldhood, and realityw and section 44 "Dasein,

Page - 17

disclosedness, and truth." The structure of these two

sections is roughly as follows.

SECTION 43: DASEIW, WORLDHOOD, AND RBALITX

Heidegger begins by pointing out that philosaphers

have traditionally interpreted Being in terms of entities

within the world and construed entities within the world as

occurreat things: isolated, substantial objects, located in

space/time with no tefeofogical connection to that

space/time. Substantiality has thus become the primary

characteristic of

Section 43ta):

The question

confused with the

"reality. "

of what reality signifies

question of the existence

h a s been

of the external

world. This has happened because reality has traditionally

been taken to consist of occurrent things and b e c a u s e Zt

has long been held that reality can best be understood

through objective observation and contemplation. However,

if we begin with the assumption that the world consists of

occurrent objects, go on to ask epistemological questions,

and use the method characterized as beholding to answer

these questions, we will discover that the only thing

certain is indeed something "inner." T h u s the need to

prove the existence of the "external" world arises.

Even Kant fell prey to this problem: he called it the

"scandal of philosophy and of human reason in generai* that

there is still no cogent proof for the existence of t h i n g s

Routside of us* which would do away with skepticism.

Page - i8

Heidegger maintains, however, that the scandal of

philosophy is not that such a pzoof has yet to be given,

"but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and

againm [ 2 0 5 1 . The demand fon such proofs arises only

because the charactex of the being who requests pxoofs and

does the proving has not been properly understood.

Traditional attempts to determine the nature of

reality have gone awry because they have focused on

epistemologfcal issues (i.e., whether and how Dasein can

have access to reality) while leaving the ontological

presuppositions upon which epistemology is based

unguest i oned .

Section 43(b):

The term "realityw stands for the being of entities

occurrent within the world. Thus, an analysis of neality

is possible only if the phenomenon of "within the

wor2dnessM is clarified first. But, the phenomenon of the

world is a basic constituent of being-in-the-world, Thus,

an analysis of reality is possible only in connection with

an ontological analysis of being-in-the-world.

Nevertheless, positive contributions have been made by

philosophers who have attempted to analyze reality without

reference to any explicit ontological basis. For example,

Dilthey and Schefer have noted that reality is given

primarily in resistance to impulse and w i l l , not in

thinking or apprehending. Heidegger notes that in any

experience of resistance or willing something must already

Page - 19

have been d i s c l o s e d as w h a t m e ' s will i s > u t f o x . T h u s ,

in any experience 0 5 resistance to will Dasein f i n d s itself

already a m i d s t a totality OR involvements, slready I:; 3

d i s c l o s e d warfd. Experiences of resistanre, Cher e f ~ r r , do

not disclose the world for t h e first time; they presuppil:je

that the worla has been d i s c l o s e d already.

Section 43Cc):

Because nepresent inc ; is j u s t a n o t h e r way 1-f b ~ i r q - i n

the-world, attempts to work out an analysis of r e a l i t y

cannot be based on representing but must be trared t c j

beinq-in-ttr~-~ar1-d. That IS, representing Is -1 n?echan!sm

o f filscovery, an activity based on the

PPatonic/Aristatelian disclosure of the world. Disclusur~

is r e l a t e d to Dasein's most fundamental act ivitles a n d

involvement with the world,

Neideqgex points o u t t h a t in early G r e e k philasoyky

t r u t h was understood to have a fundamental t a n n e c t i c ~ r r w i t h

being; it was n o t made a theme for theatfes of judgement o r

knowledge as i t is today. Heidegqez stresses the

connection between truth and being and, i n doing s o , s h o w s

how our modern notion of t r u t h as correspondence ts d e r i v e d

fro= a more fundamental notion of t r u t h .

Secl5on +I$a)z

The mast dPffieult question facing adherents cf

correspondence t h e o r r e s is Row something representatlfmal

can carrespond te gbjective reality, Rather than trying t o

answer t h i s queskfm, Heideggox maintains t h a t t h e question

has afreaay been dfs tor ted by the untologlcalfy unclarified

separation of representations and reality. In approaching

t h e questfun of truth from the standpoint of traditional

metaphysics, we not anly begin at an impasse, we presuppose

t h e very t h i n g at issue: we presuppose that truth is a

relation between representations and reality.

Heideggex says that assertions are not

~epresentations; they are tools for calling attention to

relevant aspecks of a sdtuation ~ccurrlnq within an already

- dlsclose8 world- Ta say that an assertion is true

signifies that it uncovers the thing It is about in the

"howa of its being, zelative t o a disclosure. The entities

that are uncovered are true -in a second sense.w The being

who does the uncovering, Dasein, is true in a more

fundamental sense.

Truth as correspondence has come to be seen as basic

rather than derived from a more primordkaf notion of truth

because the two terns involved in the cozrespondence

relation -- assertions (or ludqements) and objects (or

states of a f f a i z s ) -- have themselves come to be seen as

basic rather than dsrhved from discourse Cor telling) a d

~quipaent reap~ctfvefy, Heldegger says that discourse

belongs essentially to those beings who disclose the world.

DEscourse I s a way of uncovering entities within the wosld,

Page - 21

but it is also a way of conveying how

worfd have been uncovered, Discourse

usually takes the form of assertion.

entities within the

of the latter sort

In this way,

assertions became toals for passing on information about

entities within the world, But, because entities within

the world have been taken to be occurrent things and

because these things are what assertions are about,

assertions themselves come to be seen as occurrent, as

tokens of representation. Thus, truth comes to be seen as

an occurrent relation between occurrent things.

Section 4 4 f c ) :

Because truth, in its deepest sense, is referred back

to the being or a c t i v i t y of Dasein, there is truth only in

so far as Dasein is and for so long as Dasein is. This

does not mean that truth is subjective. The world is, in

every case, already disclosed for individual Dasein.

In all of this w e have presupposed t h a t there is

t r u t h . B u t this is nothing like an idle or groundless

presupposition on our part. Rather, we must presuppose

that there is truth because we posses the sort oE being

P3hos5 activities disclose the world and discoven entities

with in the worfd, I t is only on the basis of thexe being

The thesis itself is divided

Chapter one contains an

into three chapters.

account of Heideggerts

wdestruction* of the history of metaphysics. The first

section traces the development of subjectfobject

metaphysics from Parmenides to Descartes. The second

section contains a brief discussion of Heideggerfs

objections to Cartesianism and introduces two aspects of

Heidegger's proposed alternative. Section three, entitled

HThe Occurrent and the Available," explores Neideggerfs

contention that entities within the world are defined in

terms of human purposes, rather than in terms of abstract

physical properties. The fourth section contains a brief

discussion of Heidegger's view of language and the

connection between language and metaphysics.

CHAPTER TWO

The bulk of chapter two is devoted to a discussion of

being-in-the-world. This is divided into three sections:

the nature of Dasein (the being who is in the world), the

notion of being-in (a contrast between the "inH of spatial

inclusion and the "infi of non-spatial involvement), and the

notion of the world (a contrast between traditional

definitions and Heidegger8s technical sense of taworldw).

These three sections are followed by a section on "caretf:

Heldeqqer's characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-

Page - 23

world. The final

discussion of the

science.

section of

nature of r

chapter two is devoted to a

sality as understood in

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter three deals directly with Heideqger's

conception of truth and is divided into six sections. The

first section deals with the shift that occurred in Plato

and Aristotle from the pse-Socratic notion of a l e t h e i a to

the modern notion of truth as correspondence. The second

section deals with some of Heideqgsrts objections to

traditional theories of truth and with Weideggerts attempt

to clarify the notion of agreement. In the third section,

1 discuss the nature of assertion and Heideggex" notion of

truth as uncovering. The fourth section contains a

discussion of truth as disclosure -- Heidegger's more

fundamental notion of truth -- and the notion of being "In

the truth and the u n t r ~ t h . ~ Fifth is a discussion of

assertion, and the shift that occurred from uncovering to

agreement. And finally, there is a discussion of the

nature of truth and the presupposition that there is truth.

NOTES FOR THE IN1PRODUCTION

zUnless otherwise noted all references to Heidegger are from: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962).

'See: William James, Pragmatism (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Warvard University Press, 1975) 97-104. James says, for example, #True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, cozroborate, and verify." James also says true ideas are those that are "useful," that mwork,*z that "pay," or that **help us to deal. ..with either the reality or its b e f ~ n g l n q s , ~

See also: John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Enlarged Edition (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1965) 156. Dewey says, for example, "If [ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems J succeed in their off ice, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, txue. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon they are false. ... The hypothesis that works is the true one.

=Many of the points Heidegger uses to criticize traditional versions of coherence and pragmatic theories of truth cannot be used to criticize more recent versions of these theories such as those formulated by Donald Davidson and the later John Dewey.

V h e German word translated as t@primordialw by Macquarrie and Robinson is @ursprunglich.~~ Because Heidegger clearly believes there are degrees of ursprunglich, a better translation may be afundameatalw or "primitive." I will substitute one of these terms where it is appropriate.

SThe German word translated as wdisclosev@ by Macquarrie and Robinson is Herschliessen.w This is contrasted with "entdeckenfF translated as ndiscoverw or wuncover.fi Discovery pertains to entities within the world; disclosure pertains to the world itself.

@Following Hubert Dreyfus, I will translate the german term 'i~~rhsndena as a~ccurrent. I *'Vorhandenf* is translated as Rpresent-at-handw by Macquarrie and Robinson.) This term refers to entities whose primary characteristic is substantiality -- the static, independent objects of Cartesian enquiry. I will translate the german term %uhandenM as *available. f 'fZuhanden is translated as wzeady-to-handa by Macquarrie and Robinson.) This term

refors to entities whose primary characteristic is useablity -- the context-dependent equipment Heidegger takes to be basic. See section 1.2 for a discussion of the occurrent and the available,

7Bernd Magnus, H e i d e g g e r *5 Hetabistory of Phil oscphyr Amor Fati, B e i n g and Truth (The Hague: Martinus Mijhof f , 1970) 74 *

BThe term "Being*' (with a capital "BW) will be used to refer to the traditional conception aceoxding to which Being is occurrent. "Being*! skauld be understood as a noun. The term "being" !with a small "bf') will be used to refer to Heidegger's conception of being as activity-based. Here, *#beingw is a gerund.

"I use the phrase 3isubject/ob3ect ontologyw to refer roughly to the metaphysics underlying traditional theories of truth and knowledge. Thus, "subjeet/object ontology" should be understood to include all dualistic schema5 -- the Platonic ideal/real, the Cartesian mind/body, and all other versions of the representation/reality distinction such as mental imaqe/reality, language/world, etc.

loCharles B. Cuignon, Heidegger and the P r o b l e m of Knowledge (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983)

"Hubert Dreyfus, B e i n g - i n - t h e - W o r l d : A Commentary on Heidegger ' s B e i n g and Time, Division One f Cambr idge, Mass : H I T Press, 1991) 6.

="See chapter 2.2 of this thesis for a discussion of equipment use.

I4Guignon, 19.

CHAP! PER OWE

HEIDEGGER AND REALISM

Heidegger believes subject/object metaphysics

originated in ancient Greece through a re-interpretation

of certain key concepts. This re-interpretation created

a new world-view: one that has dominated our concepts of

knowledge, truth, reality, and selfhood since Plato.

Because subjectfobject metaphysics is the basic

metaphysics of the West, it will be necessary to outline

its origins and to discuss some of Heideggerfs objections

to it before going on to discuss the alternative ontology

of being-in-the-world.

% . I : THE ORIGINS OF SUBJECT/O%JECT METAPHYSICS

Heidegger says that subject/object metaphysics began

explicitly with Parmenides and was firmly entrenched by

Plato and Aristotle [1001. For his part, Parmenides was

the first to raise the general question about the nature

of Being (i-e., the ultimate nature of reality). To

characterize Being, Parmenides drew a contrast between

"the way of seeming* and Nthe way of truth." The way of

seeming was identified with the beliefs of mortals who

wrongly suppose that things exist at some times and not

at others t i . & , , that change is real) and that some

things contain less Being than others (i-e., that there

are differences between things). The way of truth, on

Page - 27

the other hand, was identified with the divine, The way

of truth teffs us that the object of thought and

knowledge exists and must exist. Real Being is eternal,

ungenerated, and indestructible. No distinctions can be

made in it; it does not move or change; it does not admit

of degrees or qualitative differences. Parmenides

concluded that mortals are wrong to assume that Being is

many (i.e., that change and difference are fundamental

characteristics of Being) based on the information

conveyed to them by the senses (the way of seeming) when

reason (the way of truth) tells us that Being is one and

unchanging.

Parmenides8 influence on Plato was direct and

profound. As David Furley says in his article,

*Parmenides of EleaN:

Plato inherited from Parmenides the belief that the object of knowledge must exist and must be found by the mind [reason] and not by the senses. He agreed that the object of knowledge is not something abstracted from the data of sense perception but a being of a different and superior order.=

In Pfato, the objects of knowledge are, of course, the

Platonic forms, which have all of the characteristics

ascribed to Being by Parmenides; they were eternal,

untreated, and unchanging. In the early and middle

dialogues, the Platonic forms were conceived along the

lines of arithmetical and geometrical objects, and so

they provided Plato with eternal objects sought through

Page - 28

t h e a r t o f d i a l e c t i c , d i r e c t l y comparab le t o t h e o b j e c t s

{truths) sought by a r i t h m e t i c and geomet ry . I n h i s

d u a l i s t i c o n t o l o g y , P l a t o c o n t r a s t e d t h e forms w i t h

c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g , s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s , which wer

s a i d t o owe t h e i r s t r u c t u r e t o t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i

forms.

n t h e

Plate's t h e o r y of fo rms p r o v i d e d a n e x p l a n a t i o n of

how human beings c c u l d u n d e r s t a n d u n i v e r s a l c o n c e p t s s u c h

as Wisdom o r V i r t u e and i d e n t i f y i m p e r f e c t p a r t i c u l a r

i n s t a n c e s of them i n t h e s e n s i b l e w o r l d . I t a c c o u n t e d

f o r o u r a b i l i t y t o make sense o f d e f i n i t i o n s , s t a n d a r d s ,

and paradigms, of immutable t h i n g s ( s u c h as numbers ) , of

(Cartesian) inner realm of consciousness and certainty.

In "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient,?' Wallace

Matson suggests that the Greeks had no way to divide the

events of the inner realm from the events of the external

world,

The Greeks did not lack a concept of mind, even of a mind separable from the body. But from Homer to Aristotle, the line between mind and body, when drawn at all, was drawn so as to put the processes of sense perception on the body side.. , .ffSensationtf was introduced into philosophy precisely to make it possible to speak of a conscious state without committing oneself as to the nature or even existence of external ~ t i m u l i . ~

One of Descartes' major contributions to philosophy

was to sharpen up and reposition what had been a vague

distinction between mind and body. Tn this way,

Descartes invented the distinction in its modern sense.

The novelty in Descartes' treatment of the distinction

fay in the notion of a unified, inner space that

accounted for sensation and perception, the grasp of

universals, the idea of God, moods, thought, and all the

rest of what we now call mental. Rorty s a y s :

Once Descartes had invented that tpprecise sensett of "feeling" in which it was wno other than thinking," w e began to lose touch with the Aristotelian distinction between reason-as- grasp-of-universals and the living body which takes care of sensation and motion. A new mind-body distinction was required -- the one which we call that "between consciousness and what is not consci~us."~

Paqe - 30

It is difficult to say with certainty why Descartes

repositioned the line between the mental and the

physical. It is probable, however, that he was

attempting to provide a foundation of indubitable truths

that could justify the discoveries of science as absolute

truths about nature, rather than describing scientific

discoveries as mere heuristic devices for fallible

humans, as Galileo was forced to do. When Descartes

fcund himself unable to doubt that he was in pain when he

could still doubt that " 2 + 2 = 4," he moved sensations,

moods, and the like into the realm of the mental because

they seemed to have an air of certainty even more

fundamental than the truths of mathematics and physics.

Once mind was no longer synonymous with the faculty of

reason (i.e., for Descartes the mind was also conscious),

something other than the ability to grasp universals had

to serve as a mark of the mental. Descartes chose

indubitability as the essential mark of consciousness and

the demarcatio~ he based on it has remained more or less

intact: philosophers still argue within the parameters

established by Descartes even in their almost universally

declared rejection of Cartesian metaphysics.

universal; truth had to be Parmenidean. Plato settled on

the (immaterial) forms as the true objects o f knowledge

because the sensible world, as Heraclitus had pointed

out, was in a state of constant flux. Plato's

metaphysics, however, is notoriously problematic; the

difficulties in it center on the relation between

universals and particulars, between form and matter. How

do particulars participate in or resemble the forms? How

can Parmenidesf one and Weraclitus' constant flux be

synthesized? Platofs philosophy left a chasm between the

forms and sensible objects, between universal concepts

and concrete particulars. And, because particulars were

held to be pale imitations of the forms, the sensible

world was deprived of most of its reality and meaning.

The early philosophical works of Platots more down-

to-earth pupil, Aristotle, may be seen as an attempt to

rectify this situation. Aristotle rejected the

transcendence of the forms but retained the Platonic view

that knowledge (at least scientific and metaphysical

knowledge) was of the universal and real. The job of

philosophy was then to find a way to retain the

permanence and universality of the objects of knowledge

without relying on metaphysically distinct forms.

Aristotie did thi eloping his c o n c e p t of Essence

and locating esse sensible pazticulars,

identifying the object of knowledge with the visible form

of sensible objects themselves. Some of the Platonic

Page - 32

forms were transformed into biological categories ( e . g , ,

genus, Animal; species, Man), immanent in particulars and

essential to their development. Other Platonic Eorms

were transformed into metaphysical categories (e.g.,

quality, quantity, number), characteristic of and

essential to all sensible particulars. Essence and

substance, rather than the sort of universal truths

characteristic of mathematical abstraction, became the

central concepts in Aristotle's philosophy. Indeed, in

Book VII of the Metaphysics, Aristotle suggests that

essence determines identity* He says: "The question as

to the Being of a being is the question as to Its

essence. w s

At times, however, Aristotle links the notion of

essence so closely to the notion of substance that they

are virtually indistinguishable. For example, in chapter

five of the Categories, Aristotle calls the essences or

natures of particulars "secondary sub~tances.~~'~ The

history of philosophy since Aristotle is filled with

attempts at distinguishing the material (or physical)

from the formal (or structural) aspects of substances.

By the time of Descartes (ox, at least, in

Descartes) there is essentially no difference between

essence and substance: thought [broadly construed) is the

sole essextfaf attribuke of mental substance {mind] and

extension is the sole essential attribute of physical

substance (matter). But Descartes does not explain what

Page - 33

a substance

to say that

is the only

is apart from its essential praFerty , except

is the existence of an essence fand t h a t ~ ~ ? d

substance for w h i c h existence is essential 1 +

Hind is thought; matter is spatfo-temporal extension. Ry

making extension the so le essential p r o p e r t y o f physical

substance, Descartes succeeded i n purging the physical

world of the spiritualistic and teleologica3 dimensions,

surviving in Christian theology from Platu" sand

Aristotle's accounts, thus rendering the physical world

an appropriate object of a new kind of study: one

focussing on the essences of thfngs as described by the

laws of mechanical motion. The division between mental

and physical was complete, As Rorty puts it, was

more like a distinction between two worlds than l i k e a

distinction between two sides, or even gaxts, of a human

being. H a

The details of Cartesian dualism have chanqed, but

the metaphysical contention that there is an unbtidqeablc

gap between the meatal and the physical - - that

individuals are pximarily subjects of experience, trapped

in private, inner worlds and that the entities around us

are primarily isolated bits of extended m t t e ~ in which

accidental properties Inhere -- remains, It is this v i e w

that HePbcqger s e e k s to sdestroy.e

' S m-mmrms TO cmmsIzwwn

According ts Charles Guiqnon, Descartes' philosophy

1s an attempt to find a foundation for scientific

inquiry, and shnuld be seen as an attempt to overcome the

wave of skepticism and relativism that swept through

sixteenth century Europe.

The revalutionary advances in science and technology, new discovexies abroad, abrupt shifts in demographic patterns, the breakdown of traditional political and economic structures ... fall1 proved to be incomprehensible within the traditional framework of medieval thought. Most significant among these dislocations was the protest Launched by Luther in 1517, Luther challenged the authority of the Church and the traditional conception of reason, insisting on the absolute authority of individual conscience in interpreting Scriptuxe. As a result of these sudden transitions, the traditional standards for knowledge had been undermined by the beginning of the seventeenth century, and there was no Longer any universally binding criterion that could provide assurance of beliefs in science, morality, or ~eligion.~

By the early seventeenth century, the traditional

understanding of the universe as a teleologically ordered

structure of synbols containing the story of human

salvation, and made intelligible to man by divine

revelation, had lost its authority in intellectual

circles- The collapse of the medieval framework,

tagether w i t h t h e absence =L any obvious alteznative, fed

to an unprecedented sise in reflgious and moral

~elativisa and skepticism, Even the most cherished

Page - 35

beliefs, the fundamental tenets of Christianity, were

subjected to doubt.

Descartes proceedez by means of a method of

investigation that would lead to certain and Indubitable

truths: truths uncolored by any presuppositions or

caltural prejudices, upon which we could rebuild an

edifice of true beliefs. (The Parrnenidean/Platonic

conception of truth survives in Descartes conception.)

To this end, again like Parmenides and Plato, Descartes

~esofved to disengage himself from active involvement

with the wozlG, to set aside all cares and passions, and

to be an unbiased spectator of all that passed before

him. ft was only after assuring himself that he had

indeed achieved the standpoint of pure objectivity, of

the dispassianate, rational observer that Descartes began

his investigation into t h e sources of understanding and

universal truths about particulars.

According to Meideqger, however, Descartes' attempt

to reach a punely objective standpoint was itself laden

with tacit philosophical presuppositions. In disengaging

himself from active involvement with the world, setting

aside a l l cares and passions, resolving to be a spectator

objectivity, what he could know about those objects

concerned their abstract physical properties and not

their sensible features.zo Heidegger maintains that

Descartesg apparently (by now to us) innocuous starting

point distorted the actual epistemological situation of

the enquiring subject. Indeed, Heidegger goes further

than this, arguing that the very notion of attaining a

completely objective view of the world must be brought

into question,

Descartes' conviction that a purely objective

standpoint for the discovery of universal truths could be

attained was Based on presuppositions, inherited from the

ancient Greeks, committing him to a picture of the world

as an independently structured reality represented by

subjects in thought and experience. The first of these

presuppositions grew out of the Parmenidean

interpretation of Being. According to this

interpretation, the true objects of knowledge are

unchanging with respect to their defining

characteristics; they have an objective structure that

can be grasped by the mind ithe source of the "pure light

of reasontt championed by the Enlightenment). Even though

m o d e r ~ accounts of substance (such as Descartes' and

* - hucke'si differed from those given by the ancient Greeks,

they retain& the prinsipie of an objectiveiy distinct

neality represented by knowing subjects who grasped the

universal laws of science and metaphysics.

This conception of reality guarantees the existence

of absolute truths about the world that can, in

principle, be discovered by human (or divine) reason and

that, when discovered, can provide a foundation for

knowledge. According to Heidegger, however, science,

Cartesian rationalism, Platonic dualism, Aristotelian

essentialism, and Christianity do not confirm the view

that the world has an objective structure so much as they

presuppose it. The structure is said to be "projected1'

onto nature in such a way that only those aspects of

nature conforming to it are allowed to show up. Nature

is then defined in terms of the features picked out by

the projection. Furthermore, for Heidegger, the world is

not, as most of the philosophical tradition and

scientific community have taken it to be, a collection of

ready-made objects whose independently determinate

essences await our discovery. Rather, it is a sphere of

significance constituted by human concerns and activities

-- of which science is only one. This sphere, what

Heidegger calls a "world," is dependent on those concerns

and activities for its being or reality. I discuss these

points in greater detail in chapter two.

The second presupposition Heidegger identifies

fnvofves Descartesf xeliance on the scientific method of

investigation. Heidegger believes this method grew out

of the Parmenidean/Platonic fascination with theoretical

abstractness. It is the idea that the universe is

Page - 38

ultimately understandable, that there discoverable,

universa7 principles underlying the profusion of

phenomena. We are urged to observe the phenomena before

us, to reflcct critically upon the source of our beliefs

in the underlying elements of reality, and to devise

certain universal criteria of correctness for those

beiiefs. Guignon calls this unitizing and generalizing.

The first component of the ideal method, uuitixirg, begins by regarding reality as dissolved into basic units. The concern of unitizing is to find the discrete, simple tibits" that mbke up the world....The second component ... involves a process of generalizing. The goal of generalizing is to find regular, orderly relations among the units arrived at by unitizing, in order to show how they are combined into the organized whole of nature.lX

The method of unitizing and generalizing presupposes

that entities can be decontextualized -- taken from their

places in specific situations -- and understood as

interchangeable bits of matter governed by universal

causal laws, Heidegger believes this method of

investigation to be based, in part, on the

subject/predicate model of language that originated with

Aristotle, but was to a high degree implicit in Plato.

On this model the paradigmatic unit of meaning is the simple predication in which the subject terrfi refexs to or picks out some object in the world and the predicate term ascribes some property to it. This picture of language leads us to see the world as made up of so many self- identical things with attributes -- the substanee/aecident ontology. l2

Page - 39

I

Heideggef @s attack on this method is two-fold.

F i r s t h e develops ax alternative to the

scientific/Cartesian view that reality consists of

discrete, isolable bits of matter. On Heideggerts view

the identity of an entity is not, as it was for

Descartes, a function of the properties (size, shape,

color, etc.1 the entity possesses, but a function of the

role it plays in a system of rule-governed, purposive

activity. On this view the question "what is it?t# is

often equivalent to the question "what is it for?," a

question that can be answered only from within a wider

context of use. I discuss this in greater detail in

section 1.3,

Second, Heidegger argues that the subject/predicate

model of language is derived from a more general use of

language to point out or call attention to certain

aspects of an already meaningful situation. On this view

sentences are not molecular structures built up out of

atomic elements; words do not get their meanings by

referring to entities or properties. For Heidegger,

language is a unified whole rather than as a composite

built up out of discrete elements. The meanings of words

and the grammatical st~ucture of sentences is grounded in

the practices of a community. Dreyfus rightly says:

On Heideggerrs phenomenological account words as used in everyday talking do not get their meaning from anywhere. Once one has been socialized into a community's practices, as

Page - 40

long as one dwells in those practices rather than taking a detached point of view, words are simply heard and seen as meaningful.z3

1 discuss Heidegger9s view o f language in greater detail

in section 1.4.

To sum up, Heidegqer argues that if we begin with

the same ontological presuppositions Descartes began with

(i.e., the presupposition that the world has an objective

structure whose unde~lying principles can be grasped by

the mind, and that this structured is captured by the

subject/predicate model of language) and go on to

formulate epfstemological questions critically fi.e. in

keeping with the method of unitizing and generalizing),

as Descartes did, then what we will find *'as proximally

and solely certain is lindeedl something merely 'innerttf

12063. In other words, if we adopt the two ontological

presuppositions mentioned above, we will eventually reach

the same skeptical conclusions Descartes (ought to have)

reached. For this reason, Heidegger believes we can

escape skeptical conclusions only by questioning

Descartes' initial starting point. To this end,

Heideqger urges us to set aside our common sense view of

reality and examine our everyday way of being.

Deszarkes began his investigation with the

presupposition that the world consists of static,

occurrent objects located in space. On this view the

identity of an entity is a function of its physical

properties and is independent of its relation to ather

entities. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing that the

identity of an entity is a function of the role it plays

in a context of activity, a function of its "place" in a

referential network organized in terms of human purposes.

For Heidegger our everyday world is characterized by

a bewildering variety of activities. We are involved in

day to day tasks, concerned with the completion of our

projects, absorbed in the multitude of mundane

undertakings which constitute our daily fives -- eating,

commuting, cleaning, dressing, writing, etc. It is true,

of course, that we can sit back and contemplate the

entities before us as Bescartes did, but a more basic,

pre-theoretical way of encountering these entities is to

use them in achieving our goals. Heidegger says:

The less we just stare at [an entity], and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more does our relationship to it approach the primordial, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is. 1 6 9 1

In our activities, we do not ordinarily encounter

entities as mere substances with properties accidentally

located here rather than there. Most of the time, we

enc~unter them as t o o l s available for our use, gear which

we manipulate i n order to get on with the task at hand,

things that are familiar and significant to us because

they have a 8*placew in our world. Because we are

involved in goal-oriented interactions with most of the

entities around us, entities are seen primarily as

extensions of ouzselves, not just physical extensions but

extensions of o u r concerns and interests. Heidegger

calls the mode of being of such entities ttavailableness91

( 8 ' s u h a n d e n h e i t H ) ; Re refers to these entities themselves

as nequipmentfVHzeug")x4 or sometimes as "the available"

( zuhanden) ,

Heidegger says :

Taken strictly, there "isw no such thing as an equipment .... Equipment is essentially "something in-order-ton. ... fAnd3 in the "in- order-to" as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. [ 6 8 1

In other words, equipment always refers to other

equipment i e . g . , hammers refer to nails and boards) and

are assigned a function in a context of purposive

activity (e.g., hammers are assigned a function in

building and fixing). Any given item of equipment is

defined by the role it plays in an equipmental nexus and

a functional context. A single piece of cloth, for

example, may be used as a bed-sheet, a wrap-around skirt,

a table cloth, a curtain, etc. The cloth is not simply

in conjunction with a mattress and blankets in order to

sleep comfortably, and so on.

Equipment is defined by its function fits in-order-

to) in a referential whole, but it is also caught up in

means/end relationships even broader than functional

roles. In order for equipment to have a function, it

must fit into a context of meaningful activity, activity

that makes sense because it is "for-the-sake-ofv

something, activity that makes sense of things having a

function. Dreyfuc puts it this way:

Hammers make sense by referring to nails, etc. But how does the activity of hammering make sense? Equipment makes sense only in the context of other equipment; our use of equipment makes sense because our activity has a point .... To take a specific example: I write on the black board in a classroom, w i t h a piece of chalk, in order to draw a chart, as a step towards explaining Heidegger, for the sake of my being a good teacher.l5

There are two major differences between the

occurrent and the available, First, while the occurrent

can be characterized independently of a subject and

context, the available can be chanacterized only in

relation to a subject and context: the available is

always available to someone for some purpose. Thus, the

nature of the available cannot be understood without

reference to a context (what it is available along with),

a purpose (what it is available for), and a subject (to

whom it is available).

Page - 4 4

Second, while the occurrent comes to us as

meaningless bits of matter which must later be invested

with significance, the available derives its significance

from its context. Consider the example Heidegger gives

when discussing signs, one particular type of equipment.

Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position indicates the direction the vehicle will take .... This sign is an item of equipment which is available to the driver in his concern with driving . . . . [Itl is available within the world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. 1 7 8 1

When we are actively engaged with the world as

drivers or pedestrians, the red arrow comes to us not as

a meaningless bit of colored plastic whose significance

we must discover or interpret. Rather, in our

familiarity with vehicles and traffic regulations, we

understand the arrow first as an indicator of the

direction the vehicle will take. There is no separate

act of interpretation, no inference drawn from basic

beliefs, no judgement made regarding the meaning of the

arrow, The significance of the arrow does not lie in its

physical properties, but in the role it plays: the arrow

is in order to indicate direction for the sake of

preventing injury to people. It is only after we

disengage ourselves from our involvement with the world

of traffic, set aside our concern for our own safety, and

Page - 45

just stare at the indicator that we notice it is a

colored object of a certain size and shape, and wonder

how it gets its meaning.

For Heidegger, availableness and occurrentness are

not two different but equally basic characterizations of

entities within the world. We can understand entities as

occurrent because w e are able to decontextualize them in

the way Descartes decontextualized everything including

himself. We can step back and just stare at them,

contemplate them as brute things, focus our attention on

properties while ignoring context and purpose. We can,

in other words, understand occurrentness as

decontextualized availzbleness. We cannot, however,

invest the occurrent with value independent of Daseln's

interests; tools do not have properties of usefulness

independent of the contexts of activity in which they

gain their identity as tools. The following passages

from Weidegger will help to clarify this point.

No matter how sharply we just look at the Houtward appearancew of things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything available. 1691

When something cannot be used -- when, for instance, a tool definitely refuses to work -- it can be conspicuous only in and for dealings in which something is manipulated. Even by the sharpest and mast persever inn 3 "percept iontp and "representation* of things, one can never discover anything like the damaging of a tool. f 354 1

When we are using a tool cixcumspectively, we can say ... that the hammer is too heavy or too

light, Even the [simple predication] proposition that the hammer is heavy can ... signify that the hammer is not an easy one ... that it will be hard to manipulate. 13601

Dreyfus adds:

When the hammer I am using fails to work, ... I have to deal with it as too heavy, unbalanced, broken, etc. These characteristics belong to the hammer only as used by me in a specific situation. Being too heavy is certainly not a property of the hammer, and although the philosophical tnadition has a great deal to say about properties and the predicates that denote them, it has nothing to say about such situational characteristics ... like "too heavy for this job.wz6

In short, we cannot account for availableness in teLms of

occurrentness,

The important point here is that the available does

not have characteristics or identities independent of

human activities and interpretations (i.e., norms of

use). If Heidegger is correct in claiming that the

available is closer to the primordial than the occurrent,

it follows that entities cannot be fundamentally

characterized "in themselvesH and so the fundamental

structure of entities themselvesw cannot, even in

principle, be discovered by a beholding subject. Thus,

the PlatonicjCartesian project of determining the

underlying structure of reality and using this structure

as a foundation for knowledge cannot even get started.

The ontological significance of the available is closely

connected with t h a t of being-in-the-world - Chapter ! tic

contains a discussian of being-in-the-world,

1 - 4 : HEIDECGWZ'S VIEW OF LhHGUAGE - Heidegger believes t h e substancefattribute b3ntsfag>A

u n d e r l y i n g the scientific e n t e r p r i s e , and the Uartesiarl

search for its foundation, d e r i v e s i ts p l a u s i b i 1 i ty

largely from the subjertfpredicate model ~f Xanyaage,

Heidegger attributes the origins of this model to

Axkstotfe's theory 02 grammar, formulated i n D e

Interpretatiane, where Ar istotf e draws a d i s t inck imt

between nouns, verbs, and adjectives, suygesrs t h d t

spoken utterances signify ideas in t h e s o u l , and u u t l i r t e s

the truth conditions to+ assertion, x 7 Ort both t h ~

Aristotelian and modern w r s i n n s of t h i s model, w o r d s g e t

their meanings by zeferring, in some p a x t i c r ~ f a r way, f a

entities/properties in a correspondence relation. The

basic function of language is to predicate properties t r ~

subjects in simple assertions f i . e . , to r e p r e s e n t t h e

connection between s u b s t a n c e s and attzitutezf, Lanyuaqe

is treated as a set sf (occurrentj lexica3 items t o be

used in various combinations according to + h e r u l e s o f

syntax, r u l e s which represent substance/attribute

re lat ions, A13 other form sf language a r e t r ea t ed 35

derivatives o f simple predication. Wittqensteinis

Tracta tus Logico-Philosophicus, published at the

beginning of t h i s century, -just as Pleidegger was writing

Page - 4 8

B e i n g and T i m e , h a s been an irrf f u e n t i a l example of t h i s

duz irrg t h e same peri.rcd as Being and T i m e , Heidegger says:

Lanp= ,um-3e is not i d e n t i c a l with t h e sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary; fnstead,..frnguage i s as Dazein is.- ,it exists - Z b

In Being and T i m e , ht s a y s :

Language is a totality of words -- a totality i n which d i s c o u r s e Fot telling1 has a nworldlym being of its own; and as an entity within the warfd, this totality thus becomes something which we may came aczass as available, f2611

Guiqnon suggests that the Heidegqer of Being and

Time alternates between tuc. views of the n a t u r e of

language, both of which are incompatible with the

Aristotelian view mentioned above and discussed in

Wittgenstein's Tractatus* Euignon calls these the

Rinstrumentalist* v i e w and the aconstitutiveR view,7Q On

the instrumentalist view, language is one type of

equipment available within the wozld and, along with

atRex types, h e l p s m a k e the world intelligible but is not

dtself the most basic too4 of interpretation available t o

Dascin. The primary functian of language on this view is

Page - 4 9

t~ reveal or point c u t c e r t a i n aspects of a n a l r e a d y

intelligible situation, As Guignan says:

From t h e instrurnentalis18s standpoint, our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the nunsemantic significance of the contexts in which we find aurseZves..,-Afthaugh language may play a very important role in making the world intelligible, it is itself possible only against the background of an understanding t h a t is n o n l i ~ g u i s t I c . ~ ~

The constitutive view of language is more radical

tin the sense that it i s further from the Aristotelian

tradition) and resembles the v i e w espoused bn

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Here

language serves as a sort of template through which we

first come ts understand ou~selves and the world.

Language literally constitutes t h e world by making i t

possible to characterize entities.

Whereas the available is ontologically defined by its pXace in a total context, language plays the role of generae ing those contexts of activity and making possible the f a c t that there are such contexts at all.,.-Language on this view inhabits ou+ lives and shapes the sikuatians in which we find ~urselves.~'

Language, then, is not scmething merely available that

can { b u t need not1 be used ta point out things that have

independent identitfes and propexties- Rather language

constitutes intelliglbifity itself; if there were nn

language, there would be no identities and no attributes.

Page - 50

The prior articulation of the world in language is so all-encompassing that there is no exit from the maze of language. We can never encounter a world as it is in itself, untouched by the constituting activity of linguistic schemati~ations.~~

Because the grammar of public language determines the

essences of entities within the world, there is no

nonlanguage-bound way to distinguish between the way

ti-iings are in themselves and the way we describe them or

talk about them in our everyday lives. That is, the

contrast w e in fact draw between language (the way we

talk about things) and reality (the way things are in

themselves) is itself a language-bound distinction.

It is clear from his later writings that Heidegger

eventually explicitly adopted the constitutive view, In

the Introduction to Hetaphysics, written in 1935,

He idegger says :

Words and language are not wrappers in which things are packed for the intercourse of talking and writing. It is in words and language that things first come into being and aze. 2 4

And, in a much later essay entitled "On the Nature of

Language,?? written in f957/8, he says:

Only where the word for the thing has been found i s the thing a thing. Only thus is It .... The word alone gives being to the thinq,,,,The being of anything that is resides in the word.==

Page - 51

In Being and Time, however, Heidegger fails to

distinguish between these two views of language and, as a

result, appears to switch back and forth between them.

Dreyfus suggests that this apparent vacillation is not

entirely due the Heidegger's text but is, in part,

attributable to the Macquarrie/Robinson translation of

the German word "reden as wdiscourse. " Dreyfus says

tfdiscourseg@ is too formal and too linguistic for what

Heidegger includes under this term.

Rede ordinarily means talk, but for Heidegger rede is not necessarily linguistic, i.e., made up of words. So I shall translate rede by "telling,@' keeping in mind the sense of telling as in being able to tell the time, or tell the difference between kinds of nails.?=

The translation of nredeM as "tellingw casts the

Heidegger of Being and Time primarily as an

instrumentalist and results, I believe, in the most

coherent reading of the text.

The intelligibility of being-in-the-world . . . expresses itseJf as telling. The totality- of-significations of intelligibility is put into words. 11613

[Dasein discloses I *fsignifications" : upon these, in turn is founded the being of words and of language. 1871

The existential-ontological foundation of language is telling. [I601

[Tlelling expresses itself for the most part In language. l 3 4 9 1

'*en fully concrete, telling ... has the character of speaking -- vocal proclamation in words. f323

Page - 52

The main difference between the instrumentalist view, on

which language is one mode of telling, and the simple

predication model of language is that on the former view

assertions are context-dependent and derive their meaning

from the role they play in the larger context of

purposive activity, while on the latter view assertions

have a fixed meaning independent of the context in which

they are uttered and derive their meaning by referring to

entities/properties. The use of language as a whole is

grounded in the practices of the community; it is subject

to communal norms which are themselves dependent on still

more primordial communal norms of use and activity.

The transition from language as interpretation to

language as predication occurs in three stages. At the

most primitive level, assertions are a way of calling

attention to something, of pointing something out within

an already meaningful context, Dreyfus gives the

following examples:

If, in a shared context, something needs attention, language can be used to point out characteristics of the work in progress. Thus, while involved, I can point out, "The hammer is too heavy," Clearly, it is not too heavy in isolation, but it is too heavy for this specific job, and I point this out to someone on the j o b with me. What I let him/her see is the shared problem, not some representation or meaning I have in mind.27

At the second level asserting is a way of calling

attention to a specific characteristic of the item or

activity in question.

In pointing out the characteristic of the hammer that needs attention I can "take a step back" from the immediate activity and attsibute a "predicatew ("too heavyff) to the hammer as rfsubject." This singles out the hammer and selects the difficulty of the hammering from a lot of other characteristics, such as its being "too loud," thus narrowing our attention to this specific aspect of the total activity.2e

At the highest level, the assertion is cut off from the

context altogether, yielding a theoretical assertion. A

property (heaviness) is predicated of a subject (the

hammer). Heidegger says:

Within this discovering of occurrentness, which is at the same time a covering-up of availableness something occurrent which we encounter is given a definite character in its being-occurrent-in-such-and-such-manner. Only now are we given any access to properties or the like. I1581

According to Heideggex, then, the primary function

of language is to communicate relevant aspects of a

situation within a world whose structure has already been

articulated through activity. The subject/predicate

model of language is derived from this situated use of

the language whole. The derivation that takes place here

is similar to the derivation of occurrent objects from

available equipment: both consist of the

decontextualization of essentially context-dependent

Page - 5 4

entitles into isolable things and the fragmentation of an

essentially holistic phenomenon into discrete pieces.

Because Heidegger believes the very possibility of

decontextualizing and fragmenting presupposes prior

participation in a inter-dependent whole, he suggests

that we begin our investigations by examining the nature

of the whole. That is, rather than beginning with

questions regarding the underlying structure of occurrent

particulars, questions concerning how individual

occurrent words attach on to individual occurrent

objects, and questions about haw isolated mental subjects

can have access to independent physical objects, we

should begin by examining the nature of the entire

phenomenon of being-in-the-world. In this way Heidegger

hopes to show that subject/object metaphysics is derived

from being-in-the-world when both physical reality and

language are regarded as dissolvable into distinct

categories, rather than as being essentially inter-

dependent.

Heidegger is concerned with undermining the

subject/predicate model of language because the

subject/predicate model lends plausibility to

subject/object metaphysics. That is, the

subject/predicate model enables us to see language

primarily as a means of representing reality; a language

consisting of subjects and predicates maps neatly onto a

reality consisting of substances and attributes. In

arguing that the instrumentalist view of language is more

basic than the subject/predicate model, Heidegqer does

for language what he did for reality when he argued that

the available is more basic than the occurrent. He

deprives language of its static, absolute character,

tying it essentially to human purposes and activities.

For Heidegger both practical and linguistic telling

is dependent on the prior structural articulation of the

world. This structural articulation is based on the

wdisclosedness" of the world which is in turn dependent

on Daseinis being in-the-world. Chapter two contains a

discussion of the ontology of being-in-the-world and,

derivatively, a discussion of the world's disclosedness.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

&David J. Furley, "Parmenides of Eleal"n The Encycl'upedia of Philosophy, volt 6, ed . Paul Edwards (New York: Macrnillan Publishing C o . Inc. & The Free Press, 1967) 50.

2Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) 40.

3Wallace Matson, "Why I s n ' t the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?" in Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl, ed. Paul Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966) 101.

SAr istotle, Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross (London, 1 9 4 8 ) lO28b3.

@Aristotle, Aristotles ' s Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. 3 . L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) 2 a l l .

7The difficulty involved in distinguishing between the notions of essence and substance in Aristotle is further complicated by the subsequent history of philosophy. For example, Alasdair HacZntyre says: "[In Aristotlel the name given to the ~eing that the intellect grasps is ousia, which W. D. Ross renders as essence, following Quintilian and Seneca, who translated it as essentia. . . .Augustine used substantia and essentia without difference of meaning, and Boethius translated ousia as substantia. * Alasdair MacIntyre, "Essence and Existencev? in The Encyclopedia of ~ h i l o s o ~ h ~ , Vo1 - 3 , 59- 60

*Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1 9 8 3 1 21.

1 0 F o ~ example, Descartes begins with the wself-evidenttg claim that we first perceive feature of things and then draw inferences from thos~, perceptions to the things themselves. He says, fox example: tlIWlhen looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men..,,And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge

Page - 57

these to be men," And later he says: 'tI judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that 1 see it." Both of these quotations are from: Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophyf1 in The Philosophical Works of Deseartes, voi.i, trans. Elizabeth S , Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 155-6

131bid., 219,

x4flEquipmenttt is a technical term. It does not refer to a certain type of entity, but to those entities with which Dasein has a certain type of relationship. That is, an entity is an item of eqiiipment if and only if it plays a role in a use-context. Therefore, equipment is identified in terms of Daseinfs interests and its ontological status cannot be accounted for by means of traditional substance/attribute metaphysics. Even such apparently independent and objective entities as the objects of theoretical physics are part of a broader explanatory context.

lsHubert Dreyf us, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger 's Being and Time, Division One (Carnbr idge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991) 92.

17Martin Heideggex, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) 5 8 ,

="Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology trans. Albert Kofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) 258,

lSSee the section entitled nThe Nature of Daseinw in chapter two of this thesis for a discussion of Heide7gerVs use of the term

"=Guignon, 118-4.

' 3 f b i d . , 119.

24Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, T r a n s . Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1851) If.

25Martin Heidegger, "On W a y to Language, Trans. & Row, 1971) 62-3 .

the Nature of Languagew I n On the Peter D. Hertz ( N e w York: Harper

Heidegger argues that subject/object metaphysics

emerged from the Parrnenidean interpretation of being as

objectively structured and "presented" to the mind for as

it is ffre-presentedtr by the mind). It should be made

clear, howevew, that Heidegger does not believe

subject/object metaphysics is wrong or that we should get

back to the correct view of the pre-Socratics. If he

did, Re would be committed to the view that there is a

single correct interpretation of the nature of Being -- a

view Heidegger clearly rejects. Puzthermoxe, Heidegger

realizes that the Parmenidean interpretation of Being has

had many culturally significant effects. It has led us

to decontextualize objects and study them as isolated

portions of matter, and thus to formulate the laws of

science as the expression of that interpretation. This

has made possible the very existence of science and

technology and has established them as defining

characteristics of Western civilization.

Heidegger also believes, however, that the

Parmenidean interpretation has no special claim to

authority as the deepest account of the structure of

reality. Intked , to understand subject/object

metaphysics snd the interpretation of Being upon which it

is based as an absolutely accurate representation of

Page - 6 0

reality at its deepest level is to adhere to a specific

interpretation while ignoring the fact that it is an

interpretation. On Heideggeris view, what is basic to

Dasein's nature is interpretation itself. Interpretation

is, therefore, connected directly to the phenomenon

Heidegger describes as being-in-the-world.

Heidegger says being-in-the-world is a single,

"unitaryw phenomenon presupposing the interdependence of

Dasein and world. It is nothing like the joining

together of a subject and objects within the world where

subjects and objects are taken to be static, independent,

occurrent things. Because being-in-the-world is more

than the sum of its parts, it cannot be broken up into

components and pieced back together 1531. Nevertheless,

it will be helpful to examine briefly the phenomenon of

being-in-the-world in terms of its three constitutive

elements: the being who is, in each case, in the wozld,

the activities of being-in, and the constituted nature of

the world. I begin with the nature of the being who is

in the world,

2.1: THE NA"PURB OF DASBIN

Heidegger calls the being who is in the world and

does the interpreting " D a ~ s i n . ? ~ He chooses this term

primarily because it is not tied to any historical

interpretations of pe~sonhood and so does not carry with

it any philosophical baggage. Literally, "DaseinW means

Page - 62

"being there . * I n c o l l o q u i a l German, however, i t mesns

roughly "everyday human existencew and so Heidegqer u s e s

t h e t e r m " B a s e i n n suughly tc r e f e r t a human beings.l Hut

we are n o t t o think o f D a s e i n as a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t of

thing as Descaztes t r i e d t o d o * Heidegger's goal is ta

discover w h a t makes human beings different from m e x e

o b j e c t s with prope r t i e s and he finds this diffeEcncr in

the way human beings are involved w i t h t h e w o z l J t h r t - # u g h

t h e i r activities -- m a n i p u l a t i n g t h i n g s , t a k i n g t h i n g s

apart, putting things together. Thus, Dasein is n o t to

be c o n s t r u e d independently of its activities in the

world. It is nut a tatf~nal a n i m a l , a mindbbady, a

c o n s c i o u s subject, a C a r t e s i a n f ' I , " a Kantian ego , n r any

other traditional conception of human beings relying on

the substance/attribute picture of reality. Rather,

'"DaseinW refers to human b e i n g , i n t h e s e n s e of7 t h e humat!

w a y of b e i x 2 g . l Dasein is a w a y of engaging ux

interacting w i t h the world, a k i n to the

culturalXhistorical/racia1 heritage shaxed, for example,

by members of t h e Jewish community, Gut with a scope

fncfusive of ail peoples: a s o r t a • ’ fundamental culture

shared by all humans. Dasein can be u n d e s s t o s d a s d

gerund as well as a noun: dasein-ing is the activity c ~ f

%eing human through activity in the world, O n e cant+

take Dasein out sf the world within which it h a s its

identity. One can't treat Dasein like a substarrce w j 4 h

attributes.

Heidegger user She t e r m 3Eexis tencet t to r e fe r

generally t a the activities of Dasein. We says that

D a s e i n possesses the character of a "who" r a the r t h a n 3

" w h a t w 1 4 5 1 and the "who" a t taches to activities,

Existence d ~ e s n o t simply mean oriented in Newtonian

space or having tcaporaf duration. It is rather a

pazticular w a y of being involving purposive, usually

rule-governed aecivlty: enquiring, seeking truth, and

taking a stand fin belng through interpretation of self

and others, Thus, trees and socks and even dogs and cats

d~ not wexist" in Heidegger's sense because they are not

invalved w i t h the M G ~ L ~ i n the required w a y .

It shoufd be noted that, for Reidegger, cultures and

institctions e x i s t as well as individual human b ~ i n g s

3ecause the concerns, attitudes, and practices of

cultures and ins%ltutisns, like those of individual human

beings, contain an interpxetation of what it means to be

that culture ar instituti3n- So, "the whole question of

whether Dasein 3s a generaf t e r m ur the name f o r a

specilic entity is undercut by Heideggexss more basic

i n t e r e s t i n the 5.23~ ~f Eeinq t h a t tindividuali human

beings, cuftuxes an5 instktutians share.ng

reiection of individualisa implicit in Heidegger's

aczaunt sf Cartesianism- Because individual Daseinss

Page - 6 3

possibilities, c u l t u r e c a n n o t be a composite made up of

i n d i v i d u a l s ; i t 3s more than the sum of i t s parts. T h a t

i s , because the meaning and organization of cultuses

defines narms (the "in-order-ta'sf* and Nfor-the-sake-uf-

w h i c h k s " available ta i n d i v i d u a l Daseinl, t h e normative

o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d meaning @ f a c u l t u r e rnus"be t a k e n as

basic or loqicaffy prior to the desizes, interests, and

even identities of indiviauals. Through t h e i ~

participation In a culture, individuals are socialized

into a particular understanding of themselves and t h e

woxld and, until they are, ind iv idua l s a r e n u t Uasein.

This point is discussed i n greater d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 2 . 4 .

The second component af being-in-the-world i s the

phenomenon of being-in, Meideggex begins h i s discussion

of being-in by calling attentian to the f ac t that the

preposition Rinn h a s various meanings- One s u c h meaning

is that of spatial inclusion. Water may be i n a glass ,

for example, or a coat may be in a c iose t . "By t h i s "inq

we mean the relatianship of being which t w o entities

extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to

their lacation in that spaceR ZSSE, The theozetical

extension of the " i n z of spatial inclusion i s Newtort ian

space; reality is taken to Be the c~lfecti2n of entitles

in that space, This is the s ~ t t of n l n " pertaining t n

occurrent things, It is not, however, the s o r t essential

to the being-in nf Dasein. In section 44fb), Heidegger

says:

[Tlhe u l t i m a t e business of philosophy is to preserve t h e force of t h e most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the cornman understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems, ( 2 2 0 1

Regarding the HinH of spatial inclusion as ontologically

basic is, Heidegger argues, one such ffsource of psuedo-

problems." For this reason, Heidegger reminds us that

the preposition " i n f f is derived from "innan" meaning Ifto

residen and #habitare" meaning "to dwellvf [ 5 4 1 . These

words axe meant to convey a sense of invofve~ent in and

familiarity with transcending mere spatial location, It

is the sense conveyed by expressions such as being in

love, being in the army, or being in business: non-

spatial involvement~ playing a crucial role in an

individual's interpretation of self and world. The

being-in of Dasein's being-in-the-world is, then, meant

to convey a sense of Dasein's involvement in and

familiarity with the world, a sense of the dependence of

Dasein's identity an that involvement and the roles

provided within the world.

Weideqger maintains the pFinfi of involvement is more

-r ,,,,.,,,,al 8 ma WR i than the @ i n f i of spatial inclusion. It s h o u l d

he noted that Heideggex seems to use the terx

Rprfmordial* in two different ways. At times he seems to

use it in t h e sense of wontologically basic* or

" f ~ n d a m e n t a l , ~ a t o t h e r times i n t h e sense of

t f h i s t o r i c a l l y ear ly" o r t 'pr i r n i t i v e . " As Chaxlus Guignon

p o i n t s o u t , however, "what must be u n d e r s t o o d is t h a t ,

f o r He idegger , t h e s e two s e n s e s of ' p r i m o r d i a l t amount t o

the same thingeW4 The i n t e r p - r e t a t i o n of b e i n g u n d e r l y i n g

s u b j e c t / o b j e c t m e t a p h y s i c s h a s p l a y e d such a n i m p o r t a n t

r o l e i n o u r philosophical t r a d i t i o n and h a s become s o

pe rvas ive i n o u r wor ld-view t h a t it h a s t a k e n on a

v i r t u a l l y s e l f - e v i d e n t c h a r a c t e r . For He idegger , t h e

o n l y way t o escape t h e m o n o l i t h i c c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h i s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t o e v a l u a t e t h e t r a d i t i o n a s a whole .

He idegger a l s o b e l i e v e s , however, t h a t t h e r e is no

n e u t r a l v a n t a g e p o i n t f r o m which we c a n c a r r y o u t s u c h a n

e v a l u a t i o n . S i n c e t h e o n l y ways of e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e

world open t o u s are t h o s e p a s s e d down by o u r a n c e s t o r s

and c o m p r i s i n g o u r c u l t u r e , t h e o n l y a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n is

t o r e t u r n t o r o o t s of o u r h e r i t a g e and t r y t o d i s c o v e r

p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , p o s s i b l e ways o f

understanding t h e wor ld , t h a t w e r e c l o s e d o f f t o u s

d u r i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t uf t h e s c i e n t i f i c world--view.

B y p o i n t i n g out t h a t t h e " i n " of spatial i n c l u s i o n is

derived f r o m t h e n i n n of invo lvement , Heidegger is a l s o

p o i n t i n g back t o a t i m e before t h e d i s t i n c t i o n had been

brawn. He is showing us a fork i n t h e road. Our

further and further from t h e o t h e r s i d e a l m o s t t o the

point of having forgotten thexe ever w e r e o t h e x options.

Heideggerfs rejection of spatial inclusion in favor

of involvement as the primordial metaphor of being-in is

associated with his rejection cf abstract reasoning in

favor of "understanding" as an explanation of how we make

sense of the wo~ld. In short, Heidegger denies that

knowledge can entirely be characterized in terms of

theories of perception, intentionality, and the like, all

of which rely heavily on metaphors derived from the "inff

of spatial inclusion to describe constructs such as

"inner representations" and the "external world," the

lfmental'f and "physical realms, or fflogical space,

"semantic space," and "physical space."

For Heideqger, our ability to act appropriately in

various situations, our immediate grasp of the

significance of signs, our everyday activities and

undertakings are not ultimately grounded in the kind of

metaphysical distinctions that have emerged since Plato.

Rather, they are based on a multifarious set of shared

skills, practices, and discriminations into which we have

been socialized and which must remain firmly in the

background if we are to function in our day-to-day

dealinqs. French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu gives

the following example of this process of socialization.

He s a y s :

A whole group and a whole symbolically structured environment ... exerts an anonymous, pervasive pedagogic action.,..The essential part of the modus opezandi which defines

Page: - 67

practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining the level of d i s c o u r ~ e . ~

For Heidegger, there simply is nothing inner

tuninterpreted perceptions, self-evident truths,

backgrount5 beliefs, sub-conscious inferences) that could

provide a grounding or foundation for knowledge. Our

shared skills, psactices, and discriminations are nwn-

intentional and non-discursive. We are not, for

Heidegger, intentional beings at birth and, to pursue the

metaphor, we are never intentional beings distinct f r o m a

cultural perspective -- our beliefs and interests are

constituted By a particular culture, similar to the

precedence of Wittgenstein's forms of life to language.

Our skills, practices and discriminations are not a b o u t

anything in the way beliefs and propositions are about

things and they cannot, even in principle, be

systematically spelled out as intentional.

An example will help to clarify why Heidegqer

rejects the "in" of spatial inclusion in favor of the

"in" o f involvement and how the "inn of involvement is

partly pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic, Consider the

relationship between business people and business. Being

in business is constitutive of being a business p e r s o n .

That is, one cannot be a business pexssn w i t h o u t b e i n g in

business and if one is in business then o n e is i p s 0 f a c t n

a business person, One can, however, be (spatially) jn a

place of business without being a business person and

business people need not remain (spatially) in places of

business to be business people. The ftwarld of business, ''

in turn, exists only because of and in relation to the

business people who constitute it. That is, there could

be nu worfd of business without the shared practices,

values, beliefs, and activities of business people.

Because of this mutual interdependence, neither business

people nor the world of business could exist without the

involvement of the one "inft in other. Indeed, without

this mutually constitutive involvement it would not even

make sense of speak of business people being in places of

business since neither business people nor the world of

business would exist. Furthermore, being in business is,

at least to some extent, pre-theoretical. Through

involvement in the world of business, business people

frnay) acquire certain pre-theoretical skills, practices,

attitudes, habits, etc. which (may) pervade their lives

and calor their outlook in other areas: one begins

Winvesting in leisure timeRn "maintaining a family

support network, fs fyoptirnizing career potential, " or what

have you.

Heidegger argues that the same is true of Dasein and

worfd. Being-in(vo1ved)-in-the-world is constitutive of

Through activity Dasein creates an understanding of the

worfcl, an interpretation that makes the world

intelligible, %%at w e (Daseinl take entitles to be like,

what we find important or noteworthy about them, is a

function of the way we are involved with them, Ti-, a

large extent, our involvement determines the being s f

entities. Laszlo Versenyi puts it this way:

To say that Dasein is always characterized by being-in-the-world means not only that Dasein is always involved in a great variety of essential relationships with all sorts of other beings without which (relationships) it c o u l d not exist but also that these beings and the world itself are dependent for their mode o f being un Daseinrs relations to them. They too would not be what they are but for these relationships, which are thus essential not only to Dasein but also to everything in its world .... fWords like1 "utensil" and '$mere thingw ifor example] are not terms for different kinds of ontic beings; they designate different relations of Dasein to them.6

Heidegger phrases it in more poetic terms: "The

botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow;

the 'source' which the geographer establishes for a river

is not the 'springhead in the daletft L7Ol.

T h e way we are involved with entities is, in t u r n , a

function of our self-interpretations: of how we

understand ourselves and our world, of the roles we each

have assumed, and of the roles available ts us within our

cultural and historical context, It is because the ~ o l e s

of bath poet and geographer are available in oux society,

because each r e f e is familiar to us, t h a t we can

understand He5deqqerfs rivex as both a geographical

*sourceR and a wspringhead in the dale," Which way a

person is inclined to see t h e r iver depends on haw t h a t

person sees herself and on what she takes to be important

about the n a t u r a l world.

2 . 3 : The World

The interdependence of Dasein and world gains

plausibility from Heidegger's complex reinterpretation of

"world." In Being and Time, Heidegger lists four

different meanings of the term. The first two meanings

are based on the "in" of spatial inclusion and have been

taken to be basic by traditional Western philosophers.

I ) The world is the totality of objects of a certain sort. For example, the physical world consists of all the physical objects located in space.

2) The world is "a set of particulars specified in terms of the essential characteristics of the entities that make up that set."7 The physical world, for example, is defined by what all physical objects have in common, eg. substance or energy.

Heidegger maintains, however, that these two senses of

*worldw rely on a confusion between entitles within the

world and the world itself. The world is not a great

container filled with objects, nor can it be built up out

of the entities within it, as the positivist and

empiricist traditions have attempted to do, because the

identity of at least s o m e entities is dependent on their

relationships to other entities, equipmental contexts,

purposive activities, etc.

Page - 71

A more fundamental way of understanding the world is

based on the "in" of involvement. Thus, Heidegger lists

two additional senses of "world."

3) The world is "that 'wherein' a Eactical Dasein as such can be said to 'livet" [651. It is the entire configuration of beliefs, values, habits, interests, techniques, mannerisms, e t c . shared by the members of a community.

This sense of world is reflected in expressions such as

€*the child's world," 'Ithe world of fashiofi," "the

business world," or when we speak of two people "being

worlds apart," or of wanting to "be a part of that

world." I will use the term "sub-worldH to refer to t h e

worlds of definition three.

4fwThe worldff refers to the most genexal systems of equipment and practices shared by the sub-worlds of definition 3.

It is the network of very general systems o f beliefs,

values, skills, etc. common to members of all the various

sub-worlds. The presence of these general systems makes

possible the existence of particular variations of

b e l i e f s , values, skills, practices, etc. within t h e sub-

worlds.

It is important to note that Heidegge1's w o r l d s (the

third and fourth s e n s e s aSove) are always public "we-

taken as some private sphere o f experience and mean ing ,

which is self-sufficient and intelligible in itself, and

Page - 72

so more fundamental than the shared public world.we

Rather, my world is constituted by the unique blend of

sub-worlds in which I dwell and by the roles I assume

within those worlds.

Dreyfus provides a useful example to help clarify

the difference between the traditional definitions of

world (one and two) and Heidegger's definitions (three

and four), and why Heidegger takes the latter senses to

be basic. He says: "It helps here to contrast the

physical world (sense number

with the warZd of pPlysics --

1) -- as a set of objects --

a constellation of

equipment, practices, and concerns in which physicist

dwell.?fs The world of physics, in the sense just

mentioned, determines the nature of the objects belonging

to the physical world and the underlying characteristics

shared by all such objects, The world of physics is,

therefore, logically priox to the physical world. It

"createsH the physical world by establishing such things

as paradigms, standards of justification and evidence,

physical laws, etc. thereby determining which entities

count as physical and w h y they count as such. Thus, the

world of physics is directly, and the physical world

derivatively, dependent on physicists for its being. The

reason it seeras so strange to say the physical world is

dependent on Dasein for its being is that the world of

physics has determined that the physical world is

independent of human activity. Indeed, this independence

Page - 73

has been made one of the defining characteristics of the

physical world. But HeideggerTs point is that the

physical world would not have any defining

characteristics whatsoever were it not for the work of

physicists and hence the physical world could have no

being without the activities of physicists.

The metaphysical priority of involvement is a l s o

true at the global level (the world of definition four),

Global Dasein's activities allow entities within the

world to show up in certain ways, t o have certain I defining characteristics: the world is ~ d i s ~ l o s c d , ~ as I

defined that term in the introduction. I return to this

point in section 2.5, It should be remembered that for

Heidegger the available is more primordial (i-e., bo th

mole fundamental and more primitive) than the occurrent.

It should also be remembered that in order f o r the

available to be available it must fit into a context of

purposive, rule-governed activity, There must be a

reason for doing things, a right way to do things and a

right way to use things. This rule-govesnedness is, for

Heidegger, what distinguishes human from non-human

activity. A bird" nest-building activities, for

example, are purposive, but not rule-governed. There is

no normatively {though there may be an instlnctuallyj

right way for a bird to build a nest, and there i; no way

a bird could understand its activities as purposive

Page - 7 4

activities by, f o x example, articulating the rules

governing them.

T h e r e is a right way to use equipment in rule-

governed activities and it is this normative aspect of

equipment usage that determines what entities axe. That

is, what something is in a use-context is a function of

what it is used for when it is used as "anyone would use

i t But, the activity of Dafein is logically prior to

the assignment of functions to the available, logically

prior to there being equipment; the world must be in

place, so to speak, before entities within the world c a n

be discovered as entities within the world. Dasein's

being-in-the-world is, thus, constitutive of entities,

even when entities are taken to be occurrent.

2 - 4 : CARE

Dasein has been defined as the being for whom being

is an issue (1911 and who takes a stand on being through

its participation in the world, Heidegger calls Dasein's - way of being-in-the-world "care":

[Carel is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. It has .*2othing to do with tqtribulation,a 3=wlanch0ly,~ o r the "cares of fife," though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein, These -- like their opposites, "gaietyR arid "freedom from caree -- are onticalPyza possibfe only because Dasein, when undexstod ontologically, is care. f57P

The ontafogical cmcep t care has a three fold structure:

"Being-alxeady-in* refers to t h e fact that

always ffthruwr~w i n t o a previously characterized

D a s e l n i s

WCSLIZ~, a

wozld not of its own creation and n o t under its own

control but whase already articulated s t r u e t 3 ~ r e Daseln

absorbs through socialization. Dasein always e x i s t s i n

and is defined by a common institutional framewark uE

interdefined norms of behavior and use. Thxouqh its

being-already-in, its thnuwnness into a particular

cultural and historical epoch, Dasein acquires a template

or framework for understanding t h e world +

"Being-amidst" r e f e r s t o the fact the? Dase ii-1

inhabits or dweffs i n t h e world, amidst the entities

within the world* Dasein t e n d s E a " f a l f H into the

dominant intexpretation c > f its c u l t u r e , to he preoccupied

with individual details, sbscxbed in the available and

the in-order-to, and so ts lose sight of i t s own

thrownness [being-already-in) and projection (being-

ahead-of-ikse12Et f f F a l l e n n e s s " is t h e a f s u m p t i o r ~ t h a t

one's *concerns= Ear entities within tne wsrid a x e

absolute; one Ffaf;s i n withw t h e predominant

interpretatian w i t b a u t undeestandinq I t s s r i g i n s or

t h e possibilities d i s c l o s e d through being-already-2n and

Page - 7 6

with t h e m as .",key .t-ta:,dr - . :F!i;.x D a ~ e i n In each *case, t h e

fdefinition 4 3 ; specialized g roups disclose f o r

The activities af tke scientific commun i ty , f u r example,

t h e i r methods, paradigms, and c o n c e r n s allow c e r t a i n

types of entisies and c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s t o r e v e a l

themse lves and hence c-co be discaverer?; disclosure m a k e s

d i s c o - ~ e t y ~ ~ z s i b k ~ , B g t what is d i s c l o s e d depends, i n

t u r n , on the ac t iv i t ies sf t h e qraup. The sub-world

disclosed b y srie group, the re fore , h a s no spec ia l c l a i m

tc a u t h o r i t y and t h e d i s r c - ~ e r i e s made about entities

Heidegger hel ir-i.e.cl s,k-,at- the r o l e D a s e i n ' s care

s t r u c t u r e plays i n determining t h e s t r u c t u r e of the world

has been covered : ~ p Bz the ascendency of t h e scientific

wcrfd-view. S c i e n ~ e ctnarasterizes the world as t h e sum

R o t 2 t )of cccaxrex: entities w i t h i n t h e world, governed Gy

characteristk @E being.. , . l i k e any o t h e r entity, Dasein t o o is accorrent as xea2, . . . T h e other modes of being become defined negatively and p r i ~ a k l ~ z e l y w i t h regard to Reality. 12ClJ

Ano&her w a y ~f puetinq t h i s point is t o say t h a t when

Oasein f a l l s intu the dominant interpretation of b e i n g ,

t h e framework and me?hodafagy presupposed i n t h a t

interpretation is l e f t unquestioned. I n o u r case t h e

daminant reaf is= of cur interpretation i s mast c3 earl lt

manifest i n our belief t h a t science tells u s a b o u t the

woxld as it is in itself and o u r adaption o f the

scientific method as a paradigmatic mode of enquiry ta be

emula ted i n sther 3iscipfines,

Under this frasewjrk, t h e world r e v e a l s i t s e l f as

being a cenzain way, specifically as c ~ n s i s t $ n g of

aSSectively quantifiable, Independent s u b s t a n c e s , O n l y

sshat can be quantified Il,e,, what is s u b s t a r t t i d l 1 is

qravnded i n sci ermt i f ic +t.iesry becontrss ne-r r.1 y '*:r;t-3b jecf i V P "

and waesthetic," But , Heidegger believes t h e s c i c i i t : f i c

T h e r easan the scientific world-view and t h e search

g r i p on u s c a n be Z o ~ n d i n the very fact t h a t Dasein is

care , When Gasein i s t h r o w n i n t o a w o r l d a l r e a d y

understood t~ be the sum total of e n t i t i e s w i t h i n t h e

world, and e n t i t i e s within the world are already

understoad to be a c c u r r e n t things, there is a t e n d e n c y

Ear Dasein tc naderstand i t s e l f as an o c c u r r e n t t h i n g f a

rnind/body, a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l , etc,) and t o concexn itself

w i t h pushing back &he boundaries of discovery with regard

t~ itself v i a scientific enquiry, w k f i e ignoring t h e

fundamental dirc lozure t f kke world, i ts own t h r o w n n e s s

i n t a t h e world , a n d its p r s j e c t i o n of the frarnewozk o n t o

entities within the w ~ r l d , In short, Dasein ignores i ts

roots i n being-in-the-war13 as the activity af

interpretatian; E t substitutes discovery within the

4 3 f c ) , Weidegqer reminds u s :

A l l nsdes af being 2 2 entities within t h e world are founiled on0-32og ica2 ly upon t h e xstldhood nf t h e wuald, and azcaxdingly upon t h e phenomenon of b e i n g - i n - t h e - w ~ ~ r i d , From this there arises t h e insight that ammg the modes of being o f entities wikhin t h e warid, reality f u r d e z s t o o d as pure ~ c r u r r e n t n e s s F has no p r i 2 z i Q - , and that rcakity i s a kind sE being which cannot even characterize anything l i k e the warld or Basein in a x a ~ which is o n t o l o g i c a l l y appr~priate. 1211-32:

Reality cvnnct charactenize Dasein and world in an

account f o r t h e vesy involvement t h a t is t h e source of

Dasejn is "aheadn OF itself oz p r o j e c t s itself i n t o the

f u t u r e is to say that Dasein cannot f u l l y be c a p t u r e d by

t h e "scientificm undesstanding a• ’ i t s e l f as a n occurrent

being. Science c a m u t a c c o u n t •’ow the disefosure of t h e

world as ontalogically occurrent because science is based

on a d i s c l a s u r e ; It does n o t itself disciose,

In section 4 3 f c ) , Heidegger attempts t a clazify t h e

distinction k e t w e e n what he ca l l s r e a l i t y a n d t h e r e a l ,

reality. Meideqger h e r e w5es t h e t e r m " r e a l i t y q r to ~ e f r r

ta t h e world as character ized by s c i e n c e , R e a l i t y is the

t o t a l i t y a• ’ objectively s t r u c t u r e d , i r3ficspertdently

e x i s t i n g , occurrent e n t i t i e s loca ted i n space. H T h e

real ," on the o t h e r hand , is just w h a t e v e r i t is; i t is

completely uncharacterized and uncharartcrizab3ez except,

o f course, th rough Dauein's interpretaticns. G i v i n g t h e

r ea l a charaekerlzatisn would essentially a l t e r its w a y

real into a framewcxk, for example, u n d e r s t m d i n y

z e a l as Qccuzrect. Reic2egger t ~ i e s to evoke i n i 3 5 a

sense of the rea l by discuzsing what w o u l d be i f Uasein

d i d not exist. Re says:

When Dasein ~ C P S no t e x i s t , "indepar~det ice" *'isn n a t either, nox m i s H the *in itself," In s u c h a case th5s ssrt of t h i f i g r a n be nei%her understoad nar not unders tood . I n such a case

Paqe - $ 2

even entities within the world can neither be discovered nQr lie h i d d e n . In such a case it canno t be s a i d t h a t entities axe, n o r can it be said &hat t h e y a re n o t , f 2 1 2 f

T h e pervasiveness of sub3ectfsbject metaphysics should be

apparent from t h e fac t that the words Xeideggex places in

quotation marks deindependence," "is," "in itself") have

a l l acquired t h e meanings they have w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k

of subject/~bfrct metaphysics, This is not intended to

b e a d e f e n s e of i d e a l ism, nor is i t i n t e n d e d t o have

great impact an auz view of reality or an the scientific

enterprise, Heidegger's only objection to science is

that it misunderstands its own foundation and so

B u t rlowF as iang as there is an understanding of being and therefare an understanding of u c c u r r ~ n t n e s s , it can indeed be s a i d that i n t h i s case entities will still continue to be, f 2121

Heideqger'f paint is t h a t reality is a human construct,

as ckaracterizatian a•’ the real, p o s s i b l e o n l y o n t h e

b a ~ i s of Easein's being-in-the-world. W i t h ~ u t Dasein

ever having, been ~2 suck characterization could ever

have been qives. Entities wlthin the w o s l d could never

have been d i s c f o s e d as cnkities w i t h i n k h e world. But

reality has been d i z s l o s e d by Dasein and o c c u r r a n t things

Rave been disclcse8 as p e r m n e n t , independently e x i s t i n g

enr i ties. Thus ?5e zontinued existence of occurrent

Page - 4 3

t h i n g s is assured by the w a y Dasein h a s d i s c l o s e d

r e a l i t y .

The r e a l is i n d e p e n d e n t of D a s e i n but reality e x i s t s

o n l y in relation t~ Dasein because reality is w h a t D a s e i n

discloses. Thus when Heidegger says "being h o t

entities) is dependent upon the understanding o f beinq;

that is ta say zeality inat the r e a l ) is dependent upon

caretv 12123 he is warning us t h a t in o u r investigations

reality (understood as a particular chaxacterization o f

the real) must not be made basic, b u t m u s t always be

traced back t o the being of D a s e i n . Dreyfus calls this

position "hermeneutic x e a l i s m " and n o t e s t h a t , for

hermeneutic realists, the realism that is part of t h e

practices of science " c a n n g t be used t o justify t h e c l a i m

that the object of science exist independently of t h e

activity of the scientists, nor c a n t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g

d i c t a t e what structure the science's objects m u s t

have*Nx3 f254f. I discuss D r e y f u s ' characterization o t

HeideqgerFs pasitian as hermeneutlc realism a little more

f u l l y in the conclusion,

Heidegger has attempted ta p r e s e n t a c o h e r e n t

alternative to traditional metaphysics, one t h a t

describes the origins of the metaphysics s f subjects and

obfects and prsvides ghat Heidegqer believes to he a mote

f a i t h f n f portrayal of the human situation. f f his

p n ~ 3 e c t succeeds, its l m p l i c a t i s n s will rewerborate

t h r a u g h a u t the philosophical en te r pz ise because Ifeidegqer

Page - 8 4

is cmghasizing activities in t h e world ra ther t h a n s t a t e s

i n t h e ~ ~ i n d es the primary medium of representation.

This is a a a j o ~ Zeparture from traditional s~bjectiobject

metaphysics, Eortanately, our cgncern is only with its

implications fox trzditional theories of truth, I turn

nr)w to a discussion a• ’ these implications amil of

Heldegqer's own cunception of t r u t h *

NOTES FOR CHAPTER T W

xHuberf, L , Dreyfus, B~ing-z*r?- the- -wordd: A Com?rre-ntary i-tn Heidegger fs Beicg and T i m e , D i v i s i o n O n e i Canbx iclge, Massachusetts: The HIT Press , 13911 1 3 .

4Ckarles B , Guignun, Heideggex and the P r o b l e m of Knowledge I fndianapalis, I n i l i a n a : Hacket P a ~ b l i s h i n q O D . , 99831 78.

"Pierre Bourdieu, D u t f iae of a Theory ~i Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fress, 1 9 7 7 1 8 7 .

6Laszlo Versenyi , Heidegger, Being , and Trut tt i New tlaverr and London: Yale University Press, 1 3 6 5 ) 1 0 - 1 3 .

lPHeidegq?r uses the term "onticaltyW to mean r auy t t ly ' ' i n actual casesm; t h e %ezm "anticu and i t s variatians x e k e r to entities at +he level of "dis~overy,'~ # ' O r 4 t i c a l l y n is contrasted with amtcf sy icaf ly, 'f mednicg rauqhi y t h e d e e p e s t leveln; nontologica3gf and j t s variations refer t o " b e h q " and the level of d i s c l o s u r e ,

zrMacquarrie and R a b T n s ~ n translate the German "scin &:if' as "being-alongside, " W~wevex, I will follow Dreykc?> i n translating it as *being-anidst-"

==John Wauyeland, mDassin's Disclosedness" i n The Southern Jou-rnaf GE Pki2cscrphy 11983 1 Val. 2 8 , SrzppTemc.tl!r - 64.

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used as a t e r m fes entity i n the sense of " t h a t w h i c h

s h o w s itself" ; S 3 J ; , Heidegger concludes f rom t h i s t h a t

p r i o r t o P i a t o a 3 e t h e i a was n o t a theme f o r a t h ~ u r y of

knowledge or judgement bat was u n d u r s t o a d as havi r lq a

p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l connection with B e i n q deeper t h a n cind

logically pxiaz ro t h e msdern n u t h ~ n o f ~ x u t h as

agreement.

Heidegger rezninds US t h a t t h e G r e e k w o ~ d " a l e t - h e l a , "

means literaify, r%n&lt-cove~ed. " Hie says :

( A l e t h e i a meant f t a k l ng entities atft o f < h e i r hiddenness and letting them he s e e n i n t h e i r unhiddenness f their uncovexedricss) . i 239 3

Truth Guncoverednrss) i s somethinq t h a t m u s t always first be wres ted from entities. E r ~ t j t i e s g e t s n a t c h e d nut o f their h i d d e n n c s s , 1 2 2 2 1

To translate this wcx3 as "truth,'>rid, above a l l , to deflfie t h i s expression c ~ r ~ z e p t u a f l y i n theoretical ways, i s E q cover up the rnealiirig o f what t h e :pre-3acratic E G r e e k s irrade '-'se2 f - evldentlyH basic, $ 2 2 9 ;

In Being and Time Heidegger traces the shift in the

its meaning 3s cgrrectness uf judgement o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

back t o AristatLe, Wtwever, in a later essay entitled

''Platots Doctrine of T r u t h , " Weidegger l x a t e s t h e shift

one step f u r t h e r back, i n Ffatais allegory 2 f the cave.

This allegory is meant to be an illustration of the

essence of education, but Keidegyer maintains *!that what

underlies PZato's thinking i s a change in t h e eseence of

t r u t h .

4s t i l - 2 Irrkabitants of the cave move through t h e

various stayes af t h e i r edwzakion t h e y are expose? to a

series of images hec2ming 2rugressivef y more *'real1* as

the yxisoners move clsser tck the s o u r c e G • ’ knowledge.

But, these imagez 3ispfay themselves s n f y in t h e l ~

aoutward appearance," And Heideqger says :

P l a t o does not take t h i s BoutwarE appearanceH as a mere waspeck". , . . In G r e e k ilouttr:ard appearancew is eidos or idea .... Actording to P l a t s , i f man 2i3 not have these ideas before his gaze as t h e respective noutwazd appearance" uf things, living creatures, men, numbers, and t h e gods, then he would never be able ta perceive k h i s az that particular thing as a house , as 3 tree, or 35 a

Because ideas induce uchld4enness f i . e = , enab le us tz

perceive t h i s or ?ha% particafar t h i n g as the thing it

and put under t h e e ~ n t r o l af t h e idea , f n making this

shift, F f a t o m c v e s t h e essence of truth f ro= t h e

unh id r l enness ~f entities to t h e ideas t h a t permit

unhiddenness, Hei&e;ger says that when tks i dea becames

"the master permitting unhiddenness..,the essence of

truth++.shifts its abode to t h e essence cf t h e i d e a . " >

Central ko the educatian a• ’ the inhabitants of t h e

cave is the painful process of l o o k i n g at brighter and

b r i g h t e r images ( i r e + , grasping higher and higher I d e a s )

u n t i l at fast they are able to s t a r e at t h e s u n l i . e . )

grasp t h e idea of the jood).

L i b e r a t i o n l f s r the cave dxellersl does not t a k e place in t h e mere ac t of getting f r ee from t h e c h a i m and does n o t zsnsist m c r r t y i n he inq u n t r a m ~ e l e d , , . .Actruz?f libexaticn f i e s in t h e steadiness wl' th w h i c h one turns frowarrfs k1ha t m a n i f e s t s i t s e f f in its outward appearance and is in th3s manifesting t h e most unbidden. (emphasis added ) "

P l a t o himself says, ' ' t u rned t 2 w a x d s t t : i n q s t h a t ; a r e b c i n y

A r ~ s ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 i 5 c k ~ 3 j + 5 { s e n s e percepti*;$c 2 and R G ~ S fz Ic:e::"al perizer*+ian F- of s T s p 1 ~ aaf-tmres; 3 ~ e 3; j isys tz::~?; +,tic? canrno: be f a l s e . m x - A - -- i k i ? $ + * - t f E a i s P "-- A p - A z L j r -ye - 2 - 2 W-pG S% -2 x - r . . * synihefis, x t x i c ~ 3s fz~2zd i n djsc*-~rs iq~sr tf ; in)rinq :cr 223ge:sftr;t! :dianac;sis j 323 igi 3

particular 2se cf L a n q z a g ~ Cfogosl which r e p r e s e n t s thst thinkinq, namely i n asser t ion i iagrts ag3pha,atii:~=isl.'

Aristotlo, then, the s y m t h e t i c s t r u z t u r o s f a s s e r t iotr

judgements to be true; ar f a l s e hecause o n l y at the l e v c l

uf synthesis is it pass i t l e that t h i n g s will be conhine?

in thought which are mt combined i n reality* Wcfdegyew

says :

I n the final chapter of t h e Bonk I X of h i s Metaphyslcs,,+,where A r i s t o t e l i a n t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e B e i n g of beings reaches its peak, unhiddenness is t h e basic f e a t u x e o f B e i n g h o l d i n g sway aver everything. But at the same time A~istotle can say: "The f a l s e and t h e t r u e are not in the act [itself) . . . b u t in t h e understanding. Where t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a k e s an a s s e r t i o n i n order t o pass judgment is the place of truth and f a l s e h o ~ d and t h e i r difference. The a s s e r t i o n is true i n so fax as it is compared t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i s t h e r e f o r e likeness, T h i s e s s e n t i a l d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h c o n t a r n s n o f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e t o a le the ia i n t h e s e n s e cf ~ n h i d d c n r i e s s . ~

It is this Hessential d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h w that Heideggex

has in- mind when, irr section 4 4 f a f o f Being and T i m e , he

says. "Aristotle, the f a t h e 1 of l o g i c ( a n d grammarl, n o t

only assigned truth to t h e j u d g m e n t ao its p r i m n r d i a l

t r u t h as unktidde:;nrss " c r diselosedness f . However, he

apprsaches t h e f ioticr: 0% truth as unhiddenness by fitst

pc i ln t ing c u t t h e aza'ifr problem inherent in all

coarespapdence theories. At t h e beqinnrng of section

44fa f Heidegger says traditional correspondence t h e o r i e s

of truth are c h a ~ a c t s r i z e d by the following theses: I f

The locus of truth is assertion o r judgement; 2 ) t h e

essence of t r u t h f ies in the *agreementM of the judgement

with its object, Heidegyer a l s o says, 3 ) A r i s t o t l e

a s s i g n e d t r u t h to the judgement and set t h e going

definition of truth as agreement E 2 1 4 1 . That is, with

P l a t o and ktistotle a theory of t r u t h was established.

It was a thearetical device in t h a t i t used terms like

*agreementw and *judqementn in a way different from the

way in which t h e y had previously been used. From Plato

and Aristotle to Descartes and Kant, truth has been

understood as adaequatio i n t e l lectus et re i : agreement

Eor "7ikeningnf af iudjement with its object 1 2 1 4 1 ,

But what dues it mean to say a judgement agrees with

an object? The relationship cannot be one of equality

because judgements and objects are *not of the same

on representation correspor,ds w i t h a n o b j e c t oi s t a t e o f

Rather than try t o answer this question head-on t-3y

giving t h e a c c o u n t ~f r e p r e s e n t a t i c 9 n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e

thear ists have been waiting far, Heidegger r i r a in ta i r~s t h a t

the question bas already been " p e r v e r t e d " i n t h e v e r y w a y

it has been approached: perverted "by the antologically

unclarified separation of the real and the idealM 1 2 1 7 1 ,

The German word translated as "gezverted" by Macquarrje

and Robinson is nabkehrw meaning literafly "to tuwn

away.w The point Heidcqyer is making here, then, i s tklat

with t h e Platonic separation of reality i n t o u n i v e r s a l

and p a r t i c u l a r , and subsequent re-workings of tttis

separation into distinctions between the mental and t h o

physical 5r nepresentatianr and reality, questions

concerning the nature of t r u t h were t u r n e d away f r ~ m

questions atout the unhiddenness of entities and

h % n s f ~ r m e 5 i ~ t s questions about the nature of

zcrrespc3ndenre. I f w e t a k e the antology o f being-in-the-

world ser ious iy , h ~ u e v e r , we wiff se2 that the separation

G E representation and reality is a theoretical c o n s t r u c t

based on one specific interpretation of being. And, as

such, it has nu :'- - 3 claim to special priority, contrary

to what Aristutic dairrtained in his history of

philosophy, Indeed, w e will see that problems concerning

the natu~e af this correspondence are, in principle,

impossible to solve.

However, if Heidegger is to show that the

correspondence theory of truth is not monolithic, he must

g i v e an account of truth that does not involve the

subject/object distinction. How, then, are we to

appsoach the subject of truth? Heideggex tells us that

truth becomes phenomenally explicit when knowledge

wdemonstrates itseldm as true. Thus, we are to clarify

the notion of truth (and the relationship of agreement)

by examining the "phenomenal context of demonstration"

t 2 1 7 1 . Seidegger g ives the following example of such a

demonstration:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that "the picture on the wall is hanging askeweH This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns around and perceives tho picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? €217)

WE may 3e ir-;cfined t o say t h a t what g e t s

demonstrated is an agreement between a belief and the

thing in q u e s + i c m - The demonstration af this

correspnndence results in '*knowfedgem" Meideyger says

that whether this is correct 3epends on our

interpretation of "what is knownw and s~ on o u r

understanding of what agrees with what. What docs net

get demonstrated is an agreement between a

ftrepresentation" of the real picture, in the form of a

belief or mental state, and the real picture itself. How

is the man able to recognize his mental state as a

representation of the picture on the wall? Conversely,

if the man is able to recognize the representation of the

picture, why can he not recognize the unmediated p i c t u r e

itself? Of what use is the representation?" In

demonstrating the truth of an assertion we do not compare

a representation with a real object fcorrespondence); n o r

do we compare one representation with another

representation (coherence),

Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the real thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; b u t neither is it an agreement between "contents uf consciousness* among themselves. ( 2 1 8 1

Heidegger says what one Hhas in mindn when one makes an

assertion is the real thing and nothing else [ 2 1 7 1 . No

representations are relevant to the truth of the belief

CIZ j~dgerrg~nf Tyj. s g p p o s e they are ncjt o n l y relies a n the

r e p r e s e n t a t i c r t i z e a l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n , it a l s c !%belies the

phenomenal facts of the caseH f 2 1 8 1 .

The truth o f t h e assertion I f t h e picture is hanging

askeww gets demonstrated when the man who utters it turns

around and sees the picture hanging askew: "sees fv n o t i n

t h e s e n s e of "represents to himself," but "sees" in the

sense of notices or confirms his suspicion or belief that

the picture is hanging haphazardly or in a way t h a t is

out of the ordinary and "seesff that the picture requires

straightening. The demonstration takes place in the

activity of turning around, looking, straightening the

picture, etc., or even in the act of neglecting to

straighten t h e picture and simply getting on with other

t h i n g s , The t r u t h is demonstrated in finding out what is

t h e case.

3 - 3 : THE NATURE: OF ASSERTION AND TRUTH AS UNCOVERING

At the primordial level, assertions are not to be

understood as representations of any sort. They are to

be understood as speech acts, linguistic acts of

interpretation (or discovery) and, even more

fundamentally, as acts of interpretation they are

grounded in Dasein's non-discursive background

understanding of the world (the world's disclosedness)

and are essentially tied to the context in which they are

uttered.

Z e k d e ~ w e r 3 - cZa4rs t h a t at the mare bas ic l r v e i o f

understanding asserting Is a way of p o i n t i n g to t h e

relevant obSect, of directing a t t e n t i o n ta the entity or

activity i n question. A t t h e level of \2iscovery, the

truth of an assertion gets demonstrated when the entity

cr activity shows itself as being the way it was said to

be in the assertion, This is the pre-Sooratic sense o f

truth described by A r i s t o t l e .

[The entity or activity1 shows that it.,.is just as it gets pointed out in the a s s e r t i o n as being -- just as it gets uncovered as being. [2193

The assertion "the picture is hanging askew," for

example, was demonstrated t o be true when the picture

showed itself as being just as it was pointed out i n the

assertion as being. No representations are necessary

here; assertoric language simply picks out ceItain

features of the world, calls attention to one aspect of

the surrounding totality.

To uncover or discover an entity is to show it as

being a certain kind of thing or as being a certain way.

Thus the essence of assertion is the uncovering or

discovering of beings rather than the synthesizing of

nouns and verbs into likenesses of reality. The

uacgvers the ball in the "how" of its being. The

uncnverLng of entities within the world, however, always

takes place relative to the structural disclosure of the

world as a whole- The subject/predicate structure of the

assertion !"The ball is red*' is pre-determined by tk#e

(already articulated) categorial structure of language as

ascribing properties !predicates] to objects (subjects)

according to the template "The is " and the

(already articulated) categorial structure of reality as

consisting of substances with attributes, established as

the essence of linguistic representation by Aristotle in

De Intergretatione, Substance/attribute ontology implies

and is implied by subject/predicate language. The

structure of the world is disclosed. The "howw of this

particular entity within the world is discovered relative

t~ the disclosurea Heidegger says:

To say that an assertion t r u e f t signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, "letsu the entity **be semt9. . . in its uncoveredness. The being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as being-uncovering. 1 2 1 8 1

"Being-uncoveringw (truth) is not a relation

between two things. Rather, it is the activity of

revealing or uncovering entities as being of a certain

character, as having some determination or other relative

to the categories set up through disclosure and manifest

in the grammar a• ’ language. Asserting is one possible

example, T pick ap an entity and use it in ordex to

hammer n a i l s 5 n t o wca3, 1 revea l t h a t e n t i t y as b c i n q uf

a certain s o r t , T-e,, t h e s a r t which is suitable f o r

d r i ~ i n g naifs i n t a wsod- As Hark O k r e n t says i n

Hel'degger rs Pragmat i s m :

[For Weidegger 1 these p r a c t i c a l acts of interpxetation, a s well a s a s s e r t i o n s , can be t r u e . For s u c h an act t o be t r u e i t m u s t succeed in using the thing as the t h i n g i t is attempting 2o use it as. I f the a c t s u c c e e d s , t h e thing is revealed to be as it has been taken to be fintexpretcd as being1 in t h e praeticaf activity.2a

It must be xemembered, hawever, that individual Uasein is

always part of a communal way of being. T h e r e f o r e , i t : i:j

not my act which must succeed but a n y m e ' s a c t , T h a t is,

anyone (though not everyone] must succeed in using the

thing as t h e thing one is attempting to use it as when

one is attempting to use it as anyone wauld use it. I

may get along very nicely using a blanket to c o v e r a

window, but still one uses b l a n k e t s tn k e e p waxm i n bed

and one uses drapes t o cover windows. What I r evea l by

succeeding in mls-using the blanket is not that this

blanket is really a drape, but that it works nicely w h e n

used as a drape, It should be noted, however, t h a t t h e r e

practices; one

practices wher~

practical acts

time aberrations c a n becone communal

w i d e l y accepted,

arques , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t w i t h o u t

3f intezpretation there c o u l d be 93

linguistic truth. I n other words, finguistically

characterizing entities as substances with attributes

[ t h e of assertitni is dependent on uncovering

something as something through practical activity (the

It,sw of interyxetation). To see why this is so, we must

l e t u r n to Heideggerfs c la im that truth becomes explicit

in the phenomenal context of demonstration. The t r u t h o f

an assertion is demonstrated when the entity in question

shows itself as being the way it was said to be in the

assertion. But, how is it possible fox an entity to show

itself as being a certain way? Only, Heidegger says,

through the entities already playing a role in a context

of rule-governed, p u r p o s i v e activity. Dasein's

activities give entities some determination; they let

entities show up as being like (or failing to be like)

they were said to be in the assertion. Thus, before an

assertion can be true ar false, the object of the

assertion must already have been (non-linguistically)

assigned a function in a context of purposive activity.

3 . 4 : TRUTH -45 DISCLOSURE

disclosedness: a ~ d k h i s structure is artiouiated ( t h e

world is d i s c ? s s e d 3 through t h e activities of qlohal o r

communal Daseln, The entities t h a t are ancovexed o r

discovered within the wolld are t h u s said t o be t r u c ~ n l y

"in a second sense."

Uncovering is a way o f b e i n g f o r being-in-the-- world. C i r c u r n s p e c t i v e concern, or even that- concern in which we tarry and look a t something, uncovers entities within t h e w o r l d , These e n t i t i e s become t h a t which has b e e n uncovered. They a r e "true" i n a second s e n s e . f 2203

Being-true-as being-uncovering, is a way n f being for Dasein, What makes this vexy ancovezing poss ib le m u s t n ece s sa r i l y he c a l l e d "true" in a still mare primordial sense,. . .What is primarily "truer8 -- t h a t is uncovering - - is Dasein. t2201

Global Daseints activities disclose the w o r l d l i n e s s of

the worl3. That is, they s e t up a world ( d e f i n i t i o n s 3

and 4, Chapter Two) that allows entities within the wnrld

to show up u n d e r descriptions, available c o n t e x t s , e t c ,

and hence t o be discovered. Only through Dasein's

activities can truth get a grip a n the world. So, Dasein

as bring-in-the-world characterized by care is the

p~i rnary conditicn for t r u t h . However, even t h i s

condition is subject to c h a n g e with a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e

d i s c l o s u r e .

Page - 101

T r u t h h e r e is ~ c t a ~ o r z e r p s n d e n c e between beliefs 02

propositions arid t h e w - ~ r l d b u t f l o w s out 2f the communal

practices and activities that i d e n t i f y e n s t i e s t h r o u g h

t h e practices and f m c t i a n s possible within the world.

B e c a u s e t r u t h is always r e l a t e d to Daseinis

activities, Dasein i s , as HeiGegger says i n section

4 4 ( b ) , ontoIogicafly -in the truthe 12213. That is,

ind i v i d u l l Dasein always operates within a framework,

making it possible for that Basein to discover t r u t h s

a b o u t the warld; traditionafly "being L Q the t r u t h w h a s

been being able to represent occurrent entities.

Heideyger is quick to point out t h a t Z h i s does n o t mean

Dasein is always or in each case "introduced to all t h e

truth" f22lI. Ontically f i . e . , in actual cases), Dasein

can be mistaken, wrong, believe falsehoods, etc. The

following remarks wiff h e l p to clarify what Heidegger

means wben he says Dasein is ontologically " i n the

truth. '?

Since Plato and A r i s t o t l e , truth has come to be

understood as the activity of uncovering how things are

in the world, Individual Dasein uncovers or discovers

truths through individual acts of interpretation, t h r o u g h

"seeingH entities as substances with attributes. Such

Page - 102

szructure sf what Is ?Iisc:csed, 35 we?: & Y t h e

~fra~aic"Lfllst i 25 ar,& .3i;cer:rr4r3 .st i f;:fi$; L>yt? X:,T i;j 3fi? sari!. i t i 4l::

within t f te w ~ r r - j 3 l " f c ~ i , p a ~ ~ z ~ z 2 1 " ~ ~ ~ a;f- s;;~=;d:;~i, 2zrc_. j - 1 ;

dependent an 71~b3f Dsseia'r p*>rpc>ses, q4;rzccr rat:, sk i f i :;, s m" prae"tizes, &=, rrrierg f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a r j " ~ ~ $ 6 5 3 a p x z *-'-";t"'" - L - v C f

s j g n ~ f i c ~ ~ ~ ~ f s r i;-czf, jt a ~ ~ s > ~ s t fpe s ~ r r e ' c 3 tip

i ~ : a ce r t a in w a y , ,a w ~ y , b-;p, r;l;t frhe 9rfTj" ;dc~)r, k t z , s t

waafd really i s in ik=ePf, ife:?eqger r e a l -Gr2a:x

f is t ha-fe a n a b s c l c t e estractgre. Ra the r , it confnxms to

- 5 ~ ir;f f n i k e -~sr ie t ;8 sf t n k e r p r e t a t i s n s wiEh no one

ir3<s7r-ref - & v 3tit;s &527 ::;?re a-csratp t h a n a n y : > t h e r , ks

t he beitig nhc 4 2 e u t h e i n t ~ r p z e t j f i g a n d t h e uncovering,

Gase in is bel r tg-~~rksc :=~er ing i% , e . , D a s e i n if the way of

beEr~g & i s h H~idegqer ha5 defined as t r u t h ] , Thus Dase i n

is c j n t o l o y i c s l l y *Sn $ h e ' z u t h " by allowing t h e world t a

t:ntrat,tr ttecitiu.; w h e ~ * 1% =31Zsrws the world to show up in

one way i t ; i m * . 1 l t 3 n e w , ~ l y c f c ~ e s o f f n t h c r possible ways

In which #:he raarld .-;cr~.ld .=fio.,.i itself ,. Noc all possible

dcterrninatians oE e:&tE ELes can show t h r ~ u g h at once

because when one i f i terpzetation g a i n s pzirnacy is pushes

o t h e r possible interyretatisns ink$: the background, This

i s w h a t happened tc k h e pre-3acratJc notion uS truth as

unhidbenness when PZato2Aristotfe made truth caxrectness

uf representation; tke earlier interpretation was simply

pushed a s i d e , Therefore, by o p e n i n g u p o n e sphere a • ’

siqnificance Dasein is closing o f f others, Furthermore,

becausc Dasein projects its possibilities into t h e

future, Dasein c a n s e a ~ t l y R3ssurnes* t h a t ixvth has yet to

be rrnrrr,;sert;d, T r a t h , like Dasein, i s always "not: yet , "

always s t i l l ts be diseovere3. T r s t h and u n t r u t h are

J Thezelore , k e e c a w e f s e i n c a n n e v e r be completely J

:\represented ta i t se l f , Dasein is a l s o o n t ~ : ~ f a g i c a E l y " i n

the u n t r u t h , " T r u t h goes w i t h d i s c l o s u r e , T h e ~ e is !la

Heldegger maintains that h i s definition of t r u t h as

uncovering is mare primitive [both histarically and

ontologicallyf than the definition o E truth as

cozrespondenee. T s 3 show this, Heideqqer prr3poscz t.o s h o w

how truth o n d e ~ z k m d as . q x c e m e n t i s d e r i v e d f r o m t r u t h

undexstood as *3isclosednesn. Heidegger says that

discourse [or telling] is a n essential feature of

Daseinfs disclssedness* I t is thronqh discourse for

telling) in general and assertion in particular th+3t

Dasein expresses itself abcut t h e entities it u n c c ~ v r r s

f 2 2 5 - 4 1 . B u t assertions not only c o n t a i n the

uncoveredness of the entities they a r e a t o u t , t h e y a l s o

preserve i t . The assertion becomes sameth ing avai:atle

within the world t h a t can be taken up and s p o k e n a g a i n .

In section 44!b), Heidegger says :

The assertion which i s e x p r e s s e d is about -..-he 3ul,,cLhinq, arid i n w h a t it is abotlt kt-, coritairis t h e uncoveredness of these entities, This uncoveredness is pr es~rved i n wha r is expressed. What is expressed becomes, a s jt w e r e , something available w i t h i n the world which can be can be taken up and spoken again . f 224 2

Fage - 105

While the assertisra takes c n the chs~acter s f equipment

The assertion expressed becomes an item sf equipment

available within the world by means of which the

oncuveredness of the entity is preserved. That is,

subject/predicate language reflects and preserves

[When this occurs1 Now to demonstrate that Ithe assertion] is something which uncovers means to demonstrate how the assertion by which the uncoveredness i s preserved is r e l a t e d to these entities. [emphasis added) ( 2 2 4 1

The assertion is said to cvntain something that holds for

the object C224i. But the kind of being belonging to the

object and to the assertion is misunderstood when both

object and assertion are taken to be occurrent: when

entities are taken to be fundamentally substances with

attributes and assertions are taken to be fundamentally

syntheses of subjects and predicates. As a r e s u l t t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two shows itself as an agreement

G E ~ W G ~ c c u r r e n t k~ings, 3 n agreement w h i c h i s i t s ~ l f

sccurrent, and s e c2rresponilerice t h e o r y i s bazn . Hej.deyger bel ieves that t h i s is a neces sazy o u t c o m e

given the kind ai being Dasein possesses .

Dasein, in its concernful absorption [with the wozfdl, understands itself in terms of what i t encounters within the w a r l d , The u n c a v e r e d n e s s [of entities1 which belongs to uncovering factivity of Daseinl, is somethinq that w e come across proximally [and for the most part1 within the world in that which has falreadyl been expressed,-..Our understanding of being [in general] is such that e v e r y entity i s understood in the first instance as o c c u r r e n t . 12251

when we come across an assertion, we understand it

first as an occurrent thing with a static

subject/predicate structure that is about a n o t h e r

occurrent thing with a static substance/sttribute

structure. Our equation of m x u r r e n t n c s s and b e i n g is so

pervasive, once the view that language consists a • ’

occurrent lexical items hooked on to the world has been

established, as it was by Aristotle, the q u e s t i o n af

whether truth is an occurrent relation (agreement of

assertion and object 2 Hcan not came a1 i ve a t af f *f L2%5 1 .

The issue has been settled; correspondence between

language and world becomes an unquestionable

characteristic of t r u t h .

Page - 107

3 - 6 : THE NATURE AE3D PRESUPPOSlTION OF TRUTH

In section 4 4 ! c 3 , Heideqger himself asks the

question: "Does this signify that all truth is

obvious

*subjectivet?" H t s reply: *If one interprets

*subjectivef as 'left to the subject's discretion', then

it certainly dues not" 1227f. Because disclosing and

uncovering are global activities, Heidegger in no way

makes truth wsuhjective?f or relative to individual acts

of interpretation. Furthermore, within a disclosed

framework, the characteristics of the entities themselves

limit the possibilities of both individual and global

interpretation, If, for example, while building my

bookshelf, f grab a bag of marshmallows or a light bulb

o~ something similarly unsuitable for hammering, and

attempt to use it t5 drive nails into the wood, my

practical act of interpretation is bound to fail. The

failuxe, of course, does reveal a truth: that

marshmallows and light bulbs are unsuitable for

hammering. The point here is simply that within a

disclosure the possibilities of interpretation are

limited by the entities in such a way as to preclude the

subjectivity or relativity of truth.

Nevertheless, Heidegger eoes make truth depend on

the existence a% Dasein because it is only through

Daseints discfosive activities that entities can emefge

as entities af such-and-such-a-sort, that entities can be

entities with defining characteristics within the world.

Things iike Lightbulbs and bags of marshmaliows ate

entities that emerge within a disclosure; they exist at

the level of reality, n o t at the level of the real as

Heidegger distinguished them in section 4 3 i e ) . The real

(whatever is outside the disclosure) does not have any

defining characteristics and so can be aceuxately

characterized in an infinite variety of w a y s . Thus, o n l y

within a disclosure are the possibilities of

interpretation limited, However, because the practices

that disclose the world are global practices and because

the real does not have a structure in itself, truth, even

at the level of disclosure, is neither subjective n o r

relative.

Furthermore, although Dasein's activities take platre

within purposive contexts, the most fundamental of these

activities are not intentianal. The relation between the

hand and the hamm~r, for example, is not intentional

because it is non-propositional, It i s even u n p e r c e i v e d ,

until something goes wrong, When Dasein is hammering,

the question of truth does not arise. But if the hammer

breaks, Dasein's concern must switch over to

Ndeliberationw in the form "if -- t h e n " e . g . , "if i

am to continue with my project, then I must get a new

When Dasein" s u n c e r n switches nves t o

deliberation, Dasein's activities become p r o p o s i t i o n a l

and intentional, However, Dasein and being---in-the-world

cannot be completely alinguisitic. Dasein is essentially

Page - 105

a lanquaqe us i r iq be ing , but there are also precondition

ks langaage in teinj-in-the-world,

As Heidegger has already noted, disclosedness (the

basis of all truths) is an essential feature of Dasein

and o n l y of Dasein. Heidegger concludes from this:

"There isn t r u t h o n l y in so f a r as Dasein is and so l o n g as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, aze they disclosed. 52261

This holds equally for contingent truths, physical laws,

and truths of logic,

Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever -- these are true only as long as Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and mcoveredness, cannot be. 5 226 5

To say that there could be no truth without Dasein says

equally that there could be no falsehood without Dasein.

Before Newtoc's laws were discovered, they were not "truew; it does not follow that they were false, ox even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this v'restrictionH imply that the being-true of "truthsN has in any way been dirninished.[226-71

This restriction does imply that without Dasein the real

(whatever is independent of Dasein) would not have been

characterized (made into reality). The world would not

have been disclosed, entities within the world would not

Page - 110

have been uncovered, assertions would not have been made,

correspondence would not have arisen, n o t h i n g would be

true and nothing fa lse .

To say that before Newton his laws were n e i t h e r true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein.

This is not to say that physical laws, truths of logic,

ar reality are only contingent.

Once entities have been uncovered, t h e y show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand they always were. Such uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to "truth." [ 226-227 I

Here we should recall Heidegger's claim that " b e i n g ( n o t

entities) is dependent upon the understanding of being . . . reality [how entities are disclosed through Uasein's

activities1 lnat the real) is dependent upon care" 123.21.

At the end of section 44(c), Heidegger asks: "Why

T h e t a c k Heldegc j~r I s taking h e r e is sirnifar to one

commonly fovnd i n h i s f a k e r w o r k s where he says s u c k

things as: "Language brings entities as entities into t h e

Open [beingl for the first time.flzx Language ascribes a

determination to entities; gives them a place in the

world and lets them be entities of such and such a sort.

In the say way, truth brings Dasein into being, lets

Basein n e x i s t * s in Heidegger's technical sense of the

term (inyui~e, interpret, take a stand on things).

But the operation of bringing Dasein into being is

not itself completely linguistic. Rather, it is founded

on being-in-the-world as forms of understanding and

disclosure that make language possible. Aristotle's

H6isclosure* of the world as consisting o f substances

with attributes goes hand in hand with the language of

subjects and predicates and the subsequent forms of

"discoveryw or uncovering based upon subjzctiobject

metaphysics.

Heideqger says that "presnpposingW means

understanding wsomething as the ground for the being of

some other entity" l2281. Thus, to say we presuppose

t r u t h means w e understand truth as the ground for our own

being, It must constantly be kept in mind that Dasein is

not a thinq but the activity of Dasein-ing and that

Dasein-ing always takes place in the w o s l d . The primary

activity of Dasein-ing is the search for truth. Dasein

does this by disclosing the world and discovering

Page - 112

e ~ c i z i e s wit hi^ t k e w o r l d . S o , t h e prcsuppozition t h a t

there i s t r u t h is t he necessary c o n d i t i o n f a x C a s e i n ' s

"existenc~.~

We must " m a k e " the presupposition of t r u t h because it is one that has been "made" a l r e a d y with the being a f t h e "we." 1 2 2 8 1

Dasein never f r e e l y decides t o come into D a s e i n : Dasein-

inq I s thrust upon Dasein and with it the p r e s u p p o s i t i o r l

that t k e r e is truth is also thrust upon Dasein, This is

why Heideqger says:

The usual ref3tation a•’ that skepticism which denies either the being of "truthig oz its cognizability, stops half way. What it shows , as a formal argument, is simply that i f anything gets judged, truth has been presupposed. .. .One here fails t o recoqrlize t h a t even when nobody judges, truth already g e t s presupposed in s o far as Dasein is at a l l . 1228-91.

And later, preminiscent of Wittgenstejn's and I J a v i d s u n ' s

rejection of global skepticism:

k sceptic can n o more be r e f u t e d than the being of truth can be " p r ~ v e d . ~ And i f any sceptic of the kind who denies the truth factically is, he does not even need t o be r e f u t e d . 12231

If we can't make sense of D a s e i n without Dasein's

interconnection to the world through its activities

Ci-e., no activities, no Daseinf, it makes nc> sense t o

question the existence of the world. Easein's a c t i v i t y

has a self-confirming character istic. Searcftirtg f cr

Page - 113

t r u t h i e an activity taking place i n the wsrld that has

been discfosed i n a certain %fay- The pressppositiar: t h a t

there is t r u t h makes it G o t h possible f o r and necessary

that Dasein discloses and discovers. But the

philasophical traditian has thought of representation in

such a way that s h e nature of the search for truth has

heen covered-over. Basein tends to fall into the world

and f o r g e t that it is interpreting the world, f a r g e t that

cansciousness 3rd representation are interpretations, and

forget that the primary phenomenon of truth has been

covered-over by aur understanding of being a s

7Gary S t e i n e r "Hei3eggerrs Reflection on AZetheia: Mercaly a T e r t n i n o l o g i c a l S h i f t ? " i n A u s l e g u n g , va1.13, No.1, 4 1 .

8Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine o f T r u t h , " 2 6 6 -

CONCLUSION

Heidegger a rgues t h a t t h e W e s t e r n wor ld -v iew Is

based on certain implicit nntologic~l presuppositions

that were i n h e r i t e d from the ancient G r e e k s . The mast r i I i m p o r t a n t of %ese presuppositions are: l i There is a

fundamental ontological distinction between knowers and

t h c object sf knowfedge. 2 ) The primary mode of access

knowers have to the object of knowledge is disinterested

observation or contemplatian. 3 ) T r u t h consists in

dccuracy of royresentatiac.

These presuppositions have led to a p i c t u r e of

reality according to which: I f There is a way the o b j e c t

of knowledqe (the world, reality, etc.1 is in itself,

independent of human activity and interpretation. 2 )

T h e r e is a way knowers {human beings, representers, etc.)

take the world to be, which may or may not be an accurate

representation of reality. As a correlative of t h i s

o c c u t r e n t relation between reality and representations of

reality.

U s i n g the ontology a f being-in-the-world, Heidegger

argues that the traditional ontological picture and its

corresponding view of truth as correct representation,

does not adequately capture the nature of human existence

or the xelevance a•’ human existence to truth- By

focusing on concerned activity rather than on

Page - 116

disinterested "beholding," and on m e t a p h o r s s f

involvement rather than spatial inclusion, Heidpgqer i::

able to escape traditional conclusions, w i t h a l l . o f their

inherent problems, regarding the nature of zcaiity arid

the nature of truth, First, Heidegqer argues that

construing entities as available (i. e- , character i x i n q

them primarily in terms of their f u n c t i o n ) is a mare

fundamental way of understanding t h e m than i s r o n ~ f . r t t i n q

them 35 occurrent (i.e., characterizing then p r i m a r i l y I n

terms of substance/attribute) . T h i s is meant; t o s h o w

that any c o n c e p t i o n of the structure and identity of

entities within the world is dependent on U a s e i n ' s

purposes, concerns, and activities, i . e, , to sliow t h , i t

there is no way entities within the world are "in

themselves," i n d e p e n d e n t o f human interests. S e c o n d ,

Heidegger characterizes being -in-the-wor ld as a type r ) f

involvement in a system a • ’ human practices that a r c

necessary for the emergence of entities within t , h p w o r l d .

This is meant to show that both knowers and the object o f

knowledge are interdefined through the practices i n w l ~ i c h

they are involved. Under the framework o f be i rig- i n - t l i ~ -

world it is, theref ore, jmpossi h l e to c h a r a c t e r i z e trittki

as an occurrent relation between the i n d e p e n d e n t realms

of representation and reality.

Heidegger, however, does n o t reject as wrong

traditional subject/object metaphysics or its

complementary view of truth as some form of

l i m i t a t i o n s of the traditional view: i . e , , t o show its

r o o t s in a particular interpretation, itself rooted in a

pdrticular cultural and historical epoch. In so doing,

Heideyger tries to show the inability of traditinnal

metaphysics to provide an absolute characterization of

reality at its deepest level. Indeed, Heidegger goes

further than this, arguing that "realityv is always a

particular characterization of "the real." The real does

not have a determinate structure; it is infinitely

dense.

-

Heidegger wants to retain both the common sense view

that facts about the world are discovered rather tl-,an

invented and the philosophical view that "the realff is

indetexminate independent o f the projection of a

framework. To accomplish this Heidegger's philosophy

functions at two levels: the ontic and the ontological.

Ontically (i.e., in particular cases) facts within the

world can be discovered by individual Dasein. However,

the ontic is essentially dependent upon the ontological.

Ontoloyically the world is disclosed, for Heidegger,

through the activities of global Dasein. Traditional

subjectlobject metaphysics and its accompanying view of

truth as correspondence are reserved a place at t h e l e v e l

of ontical discoveries within the world. At the higher

levels, Heidegger is a realist in the limited sense that

he believes there is an independently existing level of

Page - 118

occurrent reality. T o r e - q u o t e an important passi?qc

discussed in section 3.5,

But now, as long as there is an uriderstanclinq of being and therefore an understanding of occuruentness, it can indeed by said that in this case entities will still contintle to be. [ 2 1 2 3

Heidegger also xecognizes, however, that despitc

playing the role of determining our understanding u f key

philasophical concepts, ontology is ultimately

interpretation. We always work within a cultural and

historical perspective, within a language and a v a g u e l y

defined range of concepts which limit t h e ways i n which

we can understand or characterize t q t h e real." Perhaps

even more fundamentally, we are limited by biology, by

the narrow range and limited power of our ability t o

sense and perceive, and by our limi t:ed capacity to

reason.

It is not the case, however , that we could access

the real if we had more diverse and powerful senses, or

if we had more acute powers of reason. T h e zeal , , t o r

Heidegger, cannot be characterized in an a h s o l u t e sense,

from God's point of view (which is not d p o i n t oE v j e w ) ;

it can only be contrasted with particular

characterizations of reality, e . g . , as occurrer i t ,

Attempts, such as that made by Dreyfus in his 3 c c o u n t of

hermeneutic realism, to portray science as " g e t t i n g a t

Page - 119

u l t i m a t e causal powersw and religion a s "getting at

ultirr~atse saving powers ," and that, therefore, both t h e

scientific and religious accounts can be Vxue?! u f the

real, seem t o m i s s t h e pointe2 They imply that "u l t imate

characterizations" are open-ended or incommensurable, but

nevertheless directly about the real. But, there is nu

independent criterion of ultirnaticity except from within

an interpretive framework. Dreyfus seems ta want to have

it both w a y s . He wants t o have a traditional ultimate

c:haracterization of the real and to have a hermeneutical

account of truth. For Heidegger, however, the real is

simply open to an infinite number of interpretations, no

one of which can be picked out as the most fundamental.

What is fundamental f o r him is Daseinfs interpretive

dct ivity.

REFERENCES -

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