hegemony and middle east

8/6/2019 Hegemony and Middle East

1/32

1

Omar Abdulkader

Kriedie

Iran: Past and Present

8 June 2011

Hegemony and Middle East: Yesterday to Tomorrow

Abstract

The information presented will argue that American foreign policy is one of

the most crucial factors shaping politics in the Middle East. Also, since interests

within the Middle East are so great because of its strategic location, militaristic

aggression could very easily be taken by hegemonies if democracy takes hold. The

reason is since democracy requires for a government to subordinate itself to the will

of the people, effectively removing subordination by any hegemonic system. The

interests of the masses would take hold, thereby taking precedent over the interest

of hegemonies. Thus, any threat to the flow of oil, arguably one of Americas main

interests in the region, could lead to US military aggression if the Arab Spring

threatens to follow through--large-scale conflict is expected to occur. Also, Irans

rise to preeminence in the region would have the same consequences. A historical

progression and analysis of: hegemony and power, origins of hegemonies and

Americas role as one in the Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Irans roles as the

main players under such a hegemonic framework, and finally the rhetorical tactics


2/32

2

used, will provide the context for the final conclusion. Ultimately, power can be seen

acting on what is most strategically beneficial for its very legitimacy.

Section I: Introduction to Hegemony and Power

We believe no more in Bonapartes fighting merely for the liberties of the seas,

than in Great Britains fighting for the liberties of making. The object is the same, to

draw on themselves the power, the wealth, and the resources of other nations.

Thomas Jefferson

Domination of one country over another has been a theme in human history

that has existed for millennia. This can be seen from the time of Nubian domination

over Egypt in 1200 BCE, as with Spartans over the Peloponnesian League, and

Persias over the known world in 336 BCE. Although such domination has

occurred across different eras, time-spans, and regions of the world-some more

frequently than others-certain basic themes have existed throughout. In order to

understand these themes one must be familiar with the more acute term to describe

group-group domination on a national level: hegemony. The political, economic,

ideological, and or cultural power exerted by a dominant group over another

constitutes hegemony and entails tasks serving the interest of the formers

collectivity or system, in effect the subordination of the latter.

The basis for these hegemonies are cultural institutions that maintain them

and allow them to not only exert their influence on others, but also on their very

own population at home (Said, 7). For the institutions at home, scholars like Gramsci

and Said explain these by differentiating between civil and political society. A non-


3/32

3

totalitarian civil society is made up of socializing agents: schools, families, and

unions, that establish culture and thereby norms, values, and ideas voluntarily (Said,

7). As a result, through consent, legitimacy is provided to the system in power by

adopting socializing agents that those very systems have control of. On the other

hand, political society serves to establish legitimacy by direct domination through

state institutionsthe army, police, and central bureaucracy (Said, 7). Even for the

hegemonic institutions abroad there is a complex system similar to the one at home

that varies between consent-soft power- and direct domination. Again, the degrees

to which each are used, within different eras, and by different powers all vary,

however, all serve for the same function of establishing legitimacy for the ruling

elite to dominate over another.

At home and abroad, systems of power can be seen to be most concerned

with maintaining that very position of power or at least maintain that position

which may allow them to exert power. Such a distinction is crucial because systems

of power and the ruling elite that make them up are many times seen as a monolith

in a Hobbesian fashion, that act purely in their own interest as Said discounts in

commenting on imperialism ..nor is it representative and expressive of some

nefarious western plot imperialist plot to hold down the oriental world (12).

Although some veracity maybe found, the truth of the matter is that to different

degrees, based on their circumstances, people are affiliated to certain factors that

they identify themselves withrace, religion, gender, nationalism, family, and

interests, etc.and so act in manners to accommodate those different identities; for

members of the ruling elite, one factor is power. So whether it is the ruling elite,


4/32

4

member of a family, or even person in pursuit of some desire, humans act in ways in

order to maintain those personal inclinations or relations they identify themselves

as part of, ultimately according to the circumstance they are in. Some of those

circumstances can be controlled and others cannot, but an important aspect to this

is the outcome in and of itself-the very circumstances that are directed by different

circumstances. As briefly mentioned earlier, one of those circumstances are

hegemony that can be analyzed within the basic framework of the system of power,

that is at home and abroad, which use institutions to ultimately establish legitimacy

to allow for the ruling elite to maintain their positions (Shapiro, 17). A full

understanding of such a system is much more complex than members of the ruling

elite and requires an understanding and .geopolitical awareness into aesthetic,

scholarly, economic, sociological.texts.not only of geopolitical distinction ..but

also of a whole series of interests.a certain will to understand, in some cases

control.what is a manifestly different world..that is by no means in

direct.political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven

exchange with various kinds of power ( Said,12). Thus, systems of power are truly

an amalgamation of different factors that take their own roles to maintain the very

structure that allows for it to exist, and so requires dynamic political, economic, and

militarily rationale for the maintenance of such a system, namely hegemony.

Conclusions:

All that has been discussed so far is crucial to the understanding that power

in any form can be followed from the most basic individual level of us or me

versus them. For this particular essay, hegemony is an aggregation of this


5/32

5

framework, in which basic human characteristics are reflected on anything they

create, namely systems of power and the hegemonies they establish. Also, since

people establish these hegemonies, however different the circumstances maybe, the

essence in itself of maintaining power and hegemony is still there and serves to keep

the ruling elite in the position they are in. People, events, and situations come andgo,

but the ultimate human circumstance of power always exists, in whatever context

and reason it maybe. Therefore, it isnt farfetched to say that according to certain

circumstances dire procedures could be taken to maintain that power. Historical

records of past hegemonic systems could, at the very least, provide the proper

perspective and context to analyze such a topic on hegemony in the Middle East and

how it is maintained. We may even be able to shed insight on the direction events

will take in the near future, in particular importance with the current Arab Spring.

Section II: Hegemony in the Middle East

Since hegemony is able to carry out its policies only through other

governments complying with their lack of sovereignty, the actual citizens of those

governments are in effect approving of being ruled over by outside powers. As a

result, to different degrees, direct domination-forceful tactics- is more accepted by

the population in subordinated client states, the third world (middle east in

particular), accounting for the lack of human rights (Khalidi). Thus, leaders of

countries under hegemonies are able to carry out brutal tactics to achieve their

political goals because of their populaces already subordinated position. Expanding

even more, regions that are heavily influenced by hegemonies face substantially

greater military and political conflict than others. For this very reason its not


6/32


7/32

7

Syria, and so doesnt constitute the archetype Orientalism established by European

powers. Nonetheless, the institution has served as a westernizing agent as one of

the top universities in the region, proliferating western culture and so legitimizing

western hegemony.

Western hegemony has also played a part in the greater Middle East, namely

Iran. Russia defeated Persias militarily several times from 1803-1804 and thereby

entered into the region and implemented a make Persia obedient and useful policy

(Kriedie, Iran Past II PP). As with other hegemonic powers, Russias aspirations for

domination were directed towards controlling the markets. The corporate elites are

the ones who benefit most from this client-state relationship by monopolizing the

markets, in effect the economy (Chomsky). The British eventually entered into the

realm and became the main competing force against Russian hegemony over Persia.

The British on the other hand not only saw Persia for its lucrative markets, but also

as a buffer zone protecting its substantial investments in India ( Kriedie, Iran Past II

PP). Ironically, competition between Britain and Russia over domination of Persia is

what averted colonization, however, still created the most complete and

extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom (Kriedie,

Iran Past II). As a result of economic concessions to the West, Persian masses slowly

began to rise up and oppose western influence, allowing different opposition groups

to take hold against a common enemy-western influence-and rally popular support.

The British even went so far as to try to turn Persia into its own protectorate with

the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 (Kriedie). The plan did not take hold and so a

different route to achieve the same end of economic subjugation was taken. The


8/32

8

Persian central government was to be centralized to ensure a more stable situation

to allow for the steady flow of oil from Persia. Both the Russians and British enjoyed

their fair share of meddling and re-shaping of the Persian government to suit their

hegemonic aspirations. This was seen in the forced dissolution of the Majles, which

effectively ended the constitutional movement (Kriedie, Iran Past II PP).

Conclusions:

The same theme continues to run along this picture: hegemony is driven by

economic and corporate ambition; with the states used as the driving force of

hegemonic policy to ensure that conditions of subjugation are maintained. Those

elites that take part and implement such policy are the responsible men that are

worthy to do so in behalf of the beast, the masses that dont know what is best for

themselves. (Chomsky, 6) Thucydes explains this simply yet bestlarge nations do

what they wish, while small nations accept what they must. Ultimately, since it has

been established that enormous interests and efforts go into maintaining hegemonic

systems, and that as a result dire ends would be expected to achieve those goals.

Furthermore, a discussion on the current hegemonic power could be a step towards

understanding and predicting the direction of events in the Middle East. The current

hegemony in the region is the US, and so a brief discussion on how it came to be will

lay the foundations for our discussion on yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Section III: The American Connection

In the 1850s, American trade in the Middle East became substantial enough

for the US to try to create a commercial treaty with the Persian Empire. However,


9/32

9

the local population was not greatly impressed with American commercial,

political, and religious ideas and so American trade remained stagnant in the next

few decades (Modigs, 1). Also, Britain remained hegemonic throughout the region,

and so despite a few efforts, American imperial ambition wasnt able to enter

(Kriedie, Iran Past II PP).

America established itself as hegemony in the region after it emerged

unparalleled after WWII, with France removed by legalistic maneuvers and Britain

declining as a junior partner in the region (Chomsky). During the Second World

War, from 1939-1945, U.S foreign policy plans on the postwar period were created

and presented by the War and Peace Studies project and Council on Foreign

Relations. Of concern was to expand the needs of the US in a world in which it

proposes to hold unquestioned power and hegemonic power in a system of world

order, as told by elites a number of decades later (Chomsky, 225). From these

discussions the idea of a Grand Area, encompassing the Western Hemisphere-the

Monroe Doctrine, Far East, and former British Empire was planned to be

subordinate to the needs of the US economy (Chomsky, 130).

As the war went on it became clear that Western Europe would join the

Grand Area as with the oil-producing nations in the Middle East. America didnt

want Middle Eastern oil for its own consumption, it was the worlds largest oil

exporter, but as a lever for world domination.. (Chomsky,24). Europe, similarly

industrialized and advanced, was feared to go off into its own direction and become

a Third Force. To counter such measures, Europe was kept dependent on America

by transforming it into relying on oilthe Marshal plan aid after WWII shifted


10/32

10

Europe from internally abundant coal supplied to US-controlled oil supplies. The

same thing was done in Japan (Chomsky and Achcar, 54). Also, in the 1940s, the US

saw world oil production fall from seventy to fifty one percent, while in the Middle

East it rose from seven to sixteen percent (Fandy). As result, America needed a way

to maintain its industrial advantage with the changing dynamic of oil availability,

which it wasnt able to maintain anymore. All of this was in hopes of dominating in

the post-war era. The Middle East happened to provide for these hegemonic wants.

President Truman expresses this best:

Thus the world oil center of gravity is shifting to the Middle East where

American enterprise has been entrusted with the exploitation of one of the

greatest oil fields. It is in our national interest to see that this vital resource

remains in American hands, where it is most likely to be developed on a scale,

which will cause a considerable lessening of the drain upon Western Hemisphere

reserves.

Furthermore, President Eisenhower himself commented on the Middle East

as the most strategically important area in the world (Chomsky, 48). Also, The

strategic importance of the region is the great petroleum reserves and global power

accorded by control over them(Chomsky, ix). Such domination over resources

and wealth in the region, namely oil, ensures a substantial flow of profit to the West

and maintains industrial economies. So, the greatest material prize in world

history, as named by the State Department, would surely call for great measures to


11/32

11

maintain those interestsa very consistent foreign policy. The start of this can be

seen with the formation of ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) in Saudi in

1947, which included kicking out the French and British (Fandy). Later, after the

CIA backed a coup in Iran in 1953, Operation Ajax, America was in control of 40% of

Iranian oil at the behest of reinstating the dictatorial Shah. America set its

hegemonic domination of the region by the mid 50s and virtually complete

domination of Saudi Arabia (Chomsky).

The entrance and imposition of American hegemony into Iran is very telling

of American foreign policy tactics in the region. The Mutual Defense Pact was signed

between the US and Iran in 1950 and recognized that Iran wascrucially strategic for

the containment doctrine against Soviet expansionism. This was threatened though,

along with Britains monopoly over the oil, when newly elected PM Mossadeq kicked

out Mohammed Reza Shah and nationalized the oil (Keddie). As mentioned earlier,

the US went in and forced a coup against Mossadeq, thereby reinstating the Shah

and maintaing strategic interests in the country. America can be seen effectively

stifling radical nationalism in such a case. To stifle nationalism is in reality stifling

democratic sentiment which if takes hold, as was with the election of Massadeq,

would greatly harm hegemonic ambitions in the region. Thus, a major trend can be

seen from then on: America subordinating populations throughtactics contradictory

to democracy- to quell nationalism and popular opinion in order to maintain

hegemonic aspirations.

The British used a similar framework when they were hegemons in the

region by establishing the Arab Faade. This terminology was used by the British


12/32

12

Foreign Office in describing weak compliant rulers.., namely oil producing states,

whose absorption by Britain was cloaked by ..constitutional fictions.. (Chomsky,

161).If such a cost effective system went out of hand with the indigenous

populations not passively submitting, airpower and poison gas was used to bomb

niggers. (Chomsky 161). The US used the same British framework, but added the

nuance of peripheral states, preferably non-Arab , serving as the Nixon

administration calledlocal cops on the beat (Chomsky). These states are to be

used to keep order in the region and quell national sentimentdemocracy. Thus,

with the political headquarters in Washington, America is able to have a foothold in

the region, and intervene only when dire circumstances call for it to (Chomsky).

Conclusions:

As a whole, through quelling nationalism and establishing client

governments and subordinating power, American hegemony serves to stabilize

the region to allow for national interests to be maintained. In other words, the US

seeks to create proper conditions that allow for the continuation of large profits for

corporations and the ruling elitethe beneficiaries of such a system. To be even

more specific, oil corporations are the ones most influencing American foreign

policy in the region. In the aftermath of the Cold War, oil became even more focused

on in the region with the Soviets out of sight.Again, systems of power are seen trying

to create circumstances that allow them to maintain their very power-their

identity. Ultimately, in a highly demanding capitalistic world, legitimacy of power

requires such an exploitation of resources and so subordination of other

populations. The focal point of those interests is the resources.Basically, although


13/32

13

not near to a full explanation, the powerful want to rule, but need to attend to the

peoples wants to allow them, in whatever form the circumstances call for. As the

way Orientalists were able justify expansion into the Middle East, American

hegemony is carried by the control of social and economic life..kept within

institutions with top-down authoritarian control, while the participation of the

beast to be limited to the diminished public arena (Chomsky, 6). Through such a

framework, the US reinforces regimes to implement and maintain its imperial

interests, some of the main players being: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and previously Iran.

Thus, the conditions of these states very much direct and are directed by American

foreign policy, part of the overall objective of maintaining interests, namely oil.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel take center stage of the level of stability of

American interests in the region, and so if substantially affected by the Arab Spring,

these states could cause conditions leading to catastrophic measures.

Section IV: Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran

Before the Islamic Revolution, America controlled the region through a

tripartite alliance among Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel (Chomsky). All three states

played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of oil to the US until the Islamic

Revolution in 1979. Before then, Israel and Iran had security ties, and were none-

Arabs in an Arab region helping maintain the Arab Faadethe stability of the

Indian Ocean Basin: the quiet in the eye of a hurricane Senator Henry Jackson even

spoke of this as the tacit alliance of Israel-Iran-Saudi Arabia as a solid base for US


14/32

14

power in the region..(Chomsky, 248).Saudi Arabia was technically at war with

Israel and Iran at this time-a theme of strategic interest over policy that runs across.

The alliance between Saudi Arabia and America is rather complex. Ever since

the subordination of Saudi oil with creation of ARAMCO in 1947, Saudi Arabia has

been the crown jewel in the region for American interests27% of world oil supply

(Fandy). Only 10% of Americas oil use is from the Persian Gulf, and Americas

interest in oil from there is to guarantee oil for Europe and Japan, in effect maintain

control over them (Chomsky). As a result, American foreign policy in the region has

been focused on Saudi Arabia first, its oil. The complexity arises with the Saudi

Arabias legitimacy as the guardian of Islamic holy places, including the Dome of

the Rock in East Jerusalem; effectively annexed by Israel (Parsi). So the Saudis have

a stake for there to be Arab control over Jerusalem. However, since Israel is an

effective force against nationalist sentiment, the Saudis have a stake in Israeli

power as well. Saudi Arabias government to alarge extent holds reign over the

country and oil as long as the people comply, and so the last thing wanted is

nationalist sentiment (Chomsky). America also wants this Saudi monarchy-Al Saud-

to stay in its place to easily subordinate the oil, the Arab Faade. As a result,

America has accepted and even supported practices by the monarchy to remain in

power including suppression of dissent, human rights abuses, and the exclusion of

the population from political participation (Fandy). Thus, the cops on the beat-

Israel and previously Iran-serve Saudi interest within the overall framework of

American hegemony, which in and of itself serves the main Saudi interest to

maintain power.


15/32


16/32

16

very minimal role in maintaining this relationship, especially compared with

business and military lobbies like Lockheed Martin (Chomsky). The relationship is

neatly set out in a memorandum for the National Security Council:

if we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and hold Persian Gulf oil by force if

necessary, a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West

power left in the Near East.

Unlike Israel and Saudi Arabia, Irans alliance with the US has suffered

geopolitical instability. Since the end of WWII, the Shah and the US shared strong

strategic alliances. The Shah chose the clear choice of aligning himself with the US

instead of the Soviets for a number of reasons. First of all there had been centuries

of battle between Iran and Russia, and so the Shah was naturally suspicious of the

Soviets, the first Western subjugators into Iran (Parsi). Secondly, the communist

ideology was a great threat to the Shahs rule because it supported pro-Soviet

opposition groups such as the Iranian Tudeh Party (Parsi). Alliance with the US

though would provide Iran economic and military assistance, preventing Soviet

adventurism in the region, thereby protecting the Shahs rule. Also, even though

Iran voted against the partition of Palestine and creation of Israel in the UN Special

Committee on Palestine, the Shah chose to keep an alliance with Israel. Iran chose to

vote this way from a strategic standpoint to avoid antagonism from the Arab world

(Parsi). Furthermore, an alliance with Israel proved to be beneficial by absorbing

the attention and resources of the Arab states, which were Irans traditional


17/32

17

rivalries in the region (Parsi, 20). Thus, as its close friend Israel did after the 1967

War, Iran played the part of cops on the beat in the region by maintaining a strong

army, helping maintain the flow of oil as part of a tripartite alliance with Israel and

Saudi Arabia. Such an alliance was of course tacit under the overall interests.

Although a major blowback to Israel, the Islamic Revolution didnt shut ties

between Israel and Iran. Israel continued to support Iran after the Revolution in

order to better its relations with Khomeini as a counter to Israels Arab enemies

(Parsi). Just one example of such continued ties was the Iran-Contra Scandal. This

single event highlighted that dealings and alliances between Israel and Iran, and the

US for that matter, occur when deemed strategically necessary. It was Tehrans

strategic interest to maintain ties with Israel post revolution in an effort to re-

establish relations with the US. As a whole, For years, Israel remained willing to do

business with Iran, even though the mullahs in Tehran were screaming for an end to

the Zionist entity (Parsi, 2).

At the end of the Cold War and defeat of Saddam Husseins Iraq in 1991, the

geopolitical interest between Iran and Israel separated. Absent of any real enemy,

Israel and Iran found them in a rivalry to re-define the regional order. Israel feared

it would suffer if Iran emerged as the superpower in the region (Chomsky, 32).

Similarly, Iran feared that Israels pre-eminence would threaten its regime. As a

result, the Israelis began their PR campaign of painting Iran as a radical, irrational

mullah run regime (Parsi). The purpose was to keep Washington on Israels side.

The US truly began to be convinced of Israeli rhetoric once the possibility of suicidal

clerics getting their hand on the bomb was interjected into the political discourse.


18/32

18

Therefore, the allegiance of Western states to Israel was longer a matter of choice

or mere political interest, but rather of survival, or at the very least of a struggle of

good against evil (Parsi, 3). However, it wasnt directed towards US government

elites, specifically neoconservatives in the Bush administration, but towards the US

Congress, American people, and world (Ritter, 112). The American foreign policy

objective under the Bush Administration was regime change, and not none-

proliferation and disbarment (Ritter). This is not to say that Irans nuclear dilemma

wasnt a threat, but that the foreign policy itself was directed toward removing the

entire regime, which comes with the removal of nuclear weapons. Israel plays a

great role in this by providing misleading intelligence information to the IAEA and

thereby casting doubt and fear against Irans nuclear ambitions (Ritter, 51). For a

while now, Israel has been trying to push the US into military action against Iran.

Iran today is one of the major threats to American hegemony in the region.

Recently, Congress has passed another round of sanction against Iran, increasing

penalties on foreign companies. Also, the Obama Administration has been

expanding its offensive ability in the African Island Diego Garcia, a base used for

attacking the Middle East and Central Asia (Chomsky). Military equipment that has

already been dispatched there includes nuclear-powered-guided-submarines and

387 bunker busters, powerful bombs that only come short to nuclear weapons. They

are aimed specifically at Iran (Chomsky). Also, although denied by Saudi Arabia, the

head of the Mossad has assured Netanyahu that Saudi Arabia is allowing an open

corridor to bomb Iran (Mahnaimi and Baxter). Some view this as America gearing

up for the total destruction of Iran (Plesch).


19/32

19

One of the main focuses of all of these threats is on Iran seeking nuclear

weapons capability. The threat though is not militaristic. Irans strictly defensive

military doctrine and its spending is low, less than 2% of Americas. Even Irans

nuclear ambitions are for deterrent purposes and certainly not offensive, especially

with its already limited capacity to exert force beyond its borders (Chomsky). Just

from a simple cost benefit analysis, Iran has nothing whatsoever to gain by using its

nuclear weapons, and everything to lose. Furthermore, Iran hasnt acted

aggressively beyond its borders for centuries, besides invading two Arab islands in

the 70s with US backing (Chomsky). The prominent political scientist Martin Van

Cleveland confirms Iran seeking nuclear weapon capability for deterrence,

especially with the invasion of Iraq in 2003--"after the invasion the Iranians went

crazy for not having developed any atomic weapon (Chomsky, 83).

Beyond deterrence, the other focus on all these threats is Irans will to

expand influence in the region. Although trampling on nationalist sentiment in its

own country, Iran is supporting nationalist sentiment in the region, namely Hamas

and Hezbollah. Iran supports such organizations as proxy parties to combat its main

threat in the region, Israel, in order to set off pressures trying to de-stabilize its

regime (Cook). For the Americans this is very dangerous and through a labyrinth of

terminology, Iran is destabilizing the regime. The de-stabilization occurring is of

stable conditions that allow America to pursue its interests to maintain the flow of

oil.So a threat to Israel is a serious threat to the oil flow.

With slight deviation, Obama has continued Bushs policy of regime change,

within the overall framework of containing Iran as long as possible, until it poses a


20/32

20

serious enough threat to hegemonic interests and so military action would be

required (Chomsky). The situation in its most extreme projections is that "The U.S.

will have to confront Iran or give up the Middle East (Etzioni). A scenario has been

thought up that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and possibly

other states will move toward the new Iranian superpower Indeed, American

interests would greatly be put at risk.

Conclusions:

American foreign policy is seen directing the course taken by Saudi Arabia,

Israel, and Iran. Saudi Arabia and Israel are the main players in the region

supporting Americas hegemonic interests, while Iran is in the forefront opposing.

However, all three states are serving their own interests, sometimes through the

interests of others. Under the name national interests, the interests of these states

are foremost for the ruling power to stay in power. However, the sole leader doesnt

seem to be as important as maintaining the entire system of power governing the

state-thousands of government officials, bureaucracies, lobbies, military,ect. Much of

what the states are doing is very harmful to their countries, but what matters most

for the central powers is to maintain their positions, and reaping all the benefits that

comes with the job-the individual interests and motives for power. In the case with

Israel and Saud Arabia, without American support, the very real prospect of an

absence of any legitimacy would occur, and so the ruling government would

inevitably be removed either by the populace or an outside source. The same goes

with Iran, however, the Ayatollahs legitimacy has stemmed from anti-Zionism,

Islam, and fighting for justice-all of which are greatly contradicted by the actual


21/32

21

actions. Nevertheless, the interests of these players cannot be overtly expressed,

and must be hidden by an outward appeal for their actions to continue. Here, the

line is created between rhetoric and action, in which action is seen defining the

interests.

Section VI: Veiled Rhetoric-Interests Exposed

Since the revolution both Israel and Iran have veiled the fundamentally

strategic conflict- common interests-by framing the situation between themselves

on ideological terms, ideological threats (Parsi). Israel did this in order to paint a

picture to the world of Iran as an irrational regime that is fanning all the flames in

the Middle East, in an effort to convince Washington that conventional deterrent

strategies against the suicidal Mullah regime is impossible (Parsi). Using similar

tactics, the Ayatollah used rhetorical threats against Israel for strategic interests. As

mentioned earlier, the rhetoric was ratcheted up in 1992, with the removal of Iraq

as a regional player, exposing even more Israel and Irans interestin achieving a

great-power status (Parsi).Saudi Arabias interest was exposed to be in maintaining

relations with America in order to sustain a strong oil economy.

At the end of 1992, Israel began to voice its threats. Renowned scholar Trita

Parsi described the situation simply--inflammatory rhetoric employed by Rabin

and Peres was unprecedented (Parsi). Blame on the Israel-Palestinian conflict was

put on Irans meddling. In front of the Knesset, Rabin announced that the problem of

Iran was a struggle against murderous Islamic terrorShiite Fundamentalism

and Death is on our doorstep with the threat of Iran. Ironically, only five years

earlier Rabin was invoking the strategic partner Iran was, all the time anti-Zionist


22/32

22

rhetoric was being relayed from Tehran (Parsi). Israels policy towards Iran changed

from a strategic ally to seeking its internationalisolationism, once it had the

possibility of gaining influence in the region. Israel didnt want the world,

Washington in particular, to see Israel and Iran as two rivals for preeminence in a

disordered region, Israel framed the clash as between the sole democracy in the

region and an illiberal theocracy that was anti-west, that is against western

interests (Parsi). Thus, Irans nuclear dilemma entered the game, and Israel framed

the question to the international community, how can there possibly be any

tolerance for an irrational regime seeking nuclearcapabilities (Parsi)? Thus,

allegiance to Israel by the Western states continued.

In the lead-up to and just after the Revolution, Khomeini established much of

his legitimacy and charisma among both the Iranian and Arab populace by his

strong stances against Zionism and the State of Israel (Kriedie). Many thought that

the new Islamic regime in Iran would rally support for the Palestinian cause across

the region and bring back the fight against Israel to the forefront. All of this

rhetorical zeal was soon to be uncovered as merely a faade, as the case with the

Israelis, to gain strategic interests (Parsi). This was first seen only days after the

Revolution when Arafat and 58 PLO officials showed up in Tehran uninvited to meet

the Ayatollah. Arafat and his men were greeted kindly and escorted to a high hotel.

However, relations turned sour shortly after when Arafat and Khomeini held a

meeting. To Arafats surprise, Khomeini was very critical of the PLO and their leftist

and nationalistic tendencies. Khomeini argued for the need to get to the Islamic

roots of the Palestinian issue. Both men never met again. Later decisions and


23/32

23

actions by the Ayatollah shed light on his lip service to the Palestinian cause only to

achieve his strategic interest. The policy was was to avoid getting entangled in the

Palestinian conflict (Parsi), furthering its own.

Furthermore, the Iran-Contra Affair exposed Israel, Iran, and Americas

humanistic rhetoric and threats from opposing regimes as the determinates for the

course of action, all to be merely a faade. The rhetorical threats were concerned the

economic and strategic interests of the elite, realpoltik, veiled by ideology and

appealing motives for the courses of action. In the Scandal, the US agree to sell

arms to Iran, illegally, to fund the Nicaraguan Contras where the US was

undertaking state terrorism to also secure its strategic interests in the region. As

expected to maintain its strategic alliance with the US, Israel went ahead to be the

middleman and deliver the arms to Iran. During 1981, when Khomeini was

planning to buy arms from Israel, the hostile rhetoric against the state was

ratcheted up with the introduction of Al-Quds-Day, Jerusalem Day, in Ramadan.

Also, Khomeini decided against sending Iranian F-14 jets to Lebanon where the PLO,

with Lebanon and Syrian allies, were fighting Israel (Parsi). In such a crucial and

defining war in 1982, Khomeinis decision to not supply the Palestinians with F-14s

at the very least indicates that he isnt wasnt ready to take an active role on the

Arab side against Israel. If the Ayatollah was genuinely supportive of the Palestinian

cause he wouldve been ready to support the Arab side against Israel anytime,

especially with the dwindling map of Palestine and increasing strength of the Israeli

Occupation. For arguments sake, if not anytime, Khomeini would have supported

the Arabs that time in 1982 when the conflict was from the outset deemed game


24/32

24

changing (Chomsky). Thus, beyond verbal condemnations Khomeini was seen to

show little support to the Palestinian cause, and ironically more dealings with the

Israelis than Palestinians up until that point.

Conclusions:

Two levels of analysis can be extrapolated from the rhetoric put forth by

Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The first is the way in which policy and doctrine

frequently change in order to suit American policy, which is the main director of

politics in the regime, all else acting as a result. This relates to Israel and Saudi

Arabia. Now, this isnt to say that they are completely subdued into acting based on

American foreign policy, but since their very legitimacy is in the hands of American

support, then its fair to say that much of their actions are in order to maintain that

legitimacybased on the framework of American foreign policy. The second is that

Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia can be seen to act in a manner to foremost safeguard

their interestsmaintain the system of power. As a result, policy and doctrine

frequently change to meet their interests, which for Israel and Saudi is American

hegemony, and for Iran the removal of that hegemony. Both levels of analysis

compliment each other, and all fall under, at least with Israel and Iran, achieving

great power status. Again, great-power status for Israel ensures support from

America, in effect the legitimacy of the system of power. For Iran, great power status

deters off hegemonic interests from the region, thereby securing its system of

power, gaining legitimacy by not complying with those hegemonic interests.


25/32

25

Section VII: The Arab Spring and Tomorrow

The Arab Spring caught much of the world by surprise on December 18,

2010. It officially started when Mohammed Bouazizi, a jobless graduate, lit himself

on fire after police seized his cart of fruits and vegetables, effectively destroying his

very livelihood (Blight and Pullman). A series of protests erupted which became

increasingly violent up until President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali bowed out and fled to

Saudi Arabia. The uprisings spread to Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt,

Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Mauritania,

Sudan, Oman, Lebanon, and finally Syria. Although these events occurred

exclusively, many of them share a lot in common. Foremost, all of these countries

were and are, to different degrees, headed by dictatorial regimes. Also, many of

these regimes were/are close allies to the US including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,

Bahrain, Jordan, and even Libya, just to name a few. The grievances of these

protesters in all the countries included being denied fundamental rights by their

dictatorial leaders, and a deterioration of the economic and social fabric of their

societies. All of these grievances have been ongoing, as long as the dictatorial

regimes have been existentseveral decades for some (Khalidi). Much hype has

been made about the role of social media as a new factor and how it has been the

cause, or at least major cause, for the success and continuation of these

uprisings.Although Facebook and Twitter in dynamic fashions are recent, Arab

nationalist networks whose broadsheets disseminated strategies for civil

disobedience throughout the region in the years after World War I are not new.

(Anderson) True, modern tools of social networking can be argued to be more


26/32

26

effective in their strategies for civil disobedience. However, much of the discussions

have been short-cut by only mentioning the effectiveness of such a tool today,

versus the past, and most importantly what that tool has specificallydone---

amplified Arab nationalism. Therefore, a true discussion on the Arab Spring would

greatly involve Arab nationalism and the factors that have hindered it from

developing in the Arab world. With that, analysts could take a look at those stifling

factors and possibly act on reversing them in an effort to progress democracy in the

region.

The current outlook of the situation reveals how America is continuing to

seek its interests in the region, with little or no deviation in policy at the moment

(Chomsky). In Libya, America has extended its neoconservative military doctrine of

war, ironically with the humanistic rhetoric of intervention (Lobe). True, American

intervention may very well have deterred a genocide, but the manner in which

selective intervention can be seen used in only Libya, which so happens to be a

major oil producer, reflects on the holistic American policy in the region. Also, in

President Obamas recent speech on the Arab Spring on May 19th, 2011, one of the

countries not mentioned was Saudi Arabia-the country with the largest oil supply.

Very likely, American foreign policy experts are strategizing on how to

maintain and safeguard the flow of oil from the region, which has been for decades

to safeguard the flow of oil through quelling Arab Nationalism. Such a system has

included proxy states and many wars a coercive tactics. Thus, the dilemma for

American foreign policy strategists arises with Arab Nationalism striking the region,


27/32

27

as a major topic of discussion across not only within the region, but also around the

world.

Conclusion:

As shown throughout this paper, Arab Nationalism has been hindered in the

Middle East through a steady policy across history with Europe and now America to

further their hegemonic interests. A logical corollary to help establish these

nationalistic sentiments then would be to stop the factors that are hindering their

development. Since those factors stem from the context of American hegemony

the support of the Arab Faade and cops on the beatthen what is most needed is

to go against and remove American hegemony. Now, a false dichotomy could be

constructed from such a framework, whereby democracies in the Middle East can

onlydevelop without hegemony. The point though is not that hegemony has to be

completely extracted, but that in analyzing precedent and the way systems of power

operate, a simple cost-benefit analysis would make it inconceivable for nationalism

and hegemony to continue under the current context. Regardless of the way in

which policy and doctrine are newly drawn up to accommodate for the current

situation, the interest involved will still exist, and all else will be done in order to

safeguard that interest. As discussed, American hegemony isnt the only factor, in

which it could only be maintain through the compliance and subservience of client

regimes. The two main ones, Israel and Saudi Arabia, have relatively stable systems

of power, despite their horrid human rights records. The interests of these countries

also come into play, but moreso with Saudi Arabia and not Israel. Israel has virtually


28/32

28

no alternative than to serve American demands (Chomsky, 165). Saudi Arabia

though, with or without America still has its oil, and so can seek other sources and

relationship to protect its economy and power system. Whether the system of

power or economic interests comes first, or whether theyre intertwined, is a topic

for later discussion.

Ultimately, if the Arab Spring takes hold, particularly in Saudi Arabia,

American hegemony over its oil could be threatened. Therefore, if conditions stay as

they are and American foreign policy is maintained in the region, coercion would

likely be Americas course of action. Also, since the Saudi monarchy and American

hegemony are at stake, military intervention by the US is likely to take place, in

whatever situation it may be. Ultimately, although we can only speculate, yesterday

and today can provide the proper framework for hegemonys influence on

tomorrow in the Middle East.

Works Cited


29/32

29

Anderson, Lisa. "Demystifying the Arab Spring | ForeignAffairs."Home | Foreign

Affairs. Web. 10 June 2011. .

Blight, Garry, and Sheila Pulham. "Arab Spring: an Interactive Timeline of Middle East

Protests | World News | Guardian.co.uk."Latest News, Comment and Reviews

from the Guardian | Guardian.co.uk. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Burt, Jo-Marie, and Coletta Youngers. "U.S. Oil Policy in the Middle East | FPIF."

Foreign Policy In Focus | International Affairs, Peace, Justice, and Environment.

Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Chomsky, Noam. " Chomsky: What's At Stake in the Issue of Iran : Information

Clearing House - ICH."INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE.NEWS,

COMMENTARY & INSIGHT. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Chomsky, Noam, and Anthony Arnove. The Essential Chomsky. New York: New, 2008.

Print.

Chomsky, Noam. "Chomsky on IRAN and USA Israel (WAR DRUMS)."Noam

Chomsky - Deterring Democracy. Web. 10 June 2011. .

Chomsky, Noam.Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians.

Cambridge, MA: South End, 1999. Print.


30/32

30

Chomsky, Noam, Gilbert Achcar, and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom.Perilous Power: the

Middle East & U.S. Foreign Policy : Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and

Justice. Boulder: Paradigm, 2007. Print.

Chomsky, Noam.Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance. New

York: Metropolitan, 2003. Print.

"The Containment Myth | Middle East Research and Information Project."MERIP Home

| Middle East Research and Information Project. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Cook, StevenA. "Unholy Alliance: How Syria Is Bringing Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia

Together - StevenA. Cook - International - The Atlantic." The Atlantic News

and Analysis on Politics, Business, Culture, Technology, National, International,

and Life TheAtlantic.com. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

DiPaolo,Amanda.Zones of Twilight: Wartime Presidential Powers and Federal Court

Decision Making. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010. Print.

Hutchins, Matthew W. "Noam Chomsky: Iran Pursuing Nuclear Weapons out of Fear -

News." The Harvard Law Record - Harvard University Law School. Web. 10

June 2011. .

"The Iranian Threat." Chomsky.info : The Noam Chomsky Website. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Lind, Michael. "Let's End America's "Middle East First" Policy - War Room -


31/32

31

Salon.com." Salon.com - Salon.com. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

"Middle East Policy (Chomsky) - Wikisource." Wikisource, the Free Library. Web. 10

June 2011. .

November, Early. "Noam Chomsky Speaks Up."Matrix Masters. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

"Oil Imperialism and the US-Israel Relationship, Noam Chomsky Interviewed by Roger

Hurwitz, David Woolf & Sherman Teichman." Chomsky.info : The Noam

Chomsky Website. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United

States. New Haven: Yale UP, 2007. Print.

Ritter, Scott. Target Iran: the Truth about the White House's Plans for Regime Change.

New York: Nation, 2006. Print.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 2003. Print.

"Saudis Give Nod to Israeli Raid on Iran - Times Online." The Times | UK News, World

News and Opinion. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Shapiro, Martin. Courts. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981. Print.

"TR Document Retrieval."DTIC Online. Web. 10 June 2011. .

"Under the Veil of Ideology | Middle East Research and Information Project."MERIP


32/32

Home | Middle East Research and Information Project. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

"US Neo-cons Urge Libya Intervention - Features - Al Jazeera English."AJE - Al Jazeera

English. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

Walt, Stephen M. "Can the United States 'control' the Middle East? (Nope) |

Stephen M. Walt." Stephen M. Walt | FOREIGN POLICY. Web. 10 June 2011.

.

hegemony and middle east

Documents