The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 17 | Number 2 | Article ID 5462 | Sep 01, 2020

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Heavenly Soldiers and Industrial Warriors: Paratroopers andJapan’s Wartime Silk Industry

Jürgen Paul Melzer

Abstract: This essay explores new aspects ofwartime Japan’s industrial mobilization byanalyzing how the country’s struggling silkindustry persistently exploited the emergingmyth of Japan’s paratroopers. With theoutbreak of the Pacific War, Japan’s silkmanufacturers suffered from a ban on luxurygoods and the collapse of the U.S. exportmarket. After several spectacular Japaneseairborne operations, the Dainippon SilkFoundation successfully campaigned for thelarge-scale production of parachutes. Silk nowwas a material for military consumption, andsilk weaving companies became designatedmunitions factories that publicly compared theself-sacrifice of their young female workerswith that of the death-defying paratroopers.

Keywords: Airborne Operations, Propaganda,Silk Manufacturers, Wartime Mobilization ofYoung Women.

A few months before the Pearl Harbor attack,the Japanese military added a novel type ofairborne infantry to its war machine. Japan’snew paratroop units, set up secretly andquickly sent into action, were to have a long-lasting impact on the country’s home front andindustry. To examine this remarkablephenomenon, I first explore the establishment

and deployment of Japan’s paratroopers. Goingbeyond a mere account of military operations Ithen investigate the interactions among Japan’smilitary men, media producers, and businessleaders. I will show how these actors used theparatroopers’ early exploits as powerfulpropaganda material and instrumentalizedthem to help keep Japan’s silk industry inbusiness.

T h e u p s a n d d o w n s o f J a p a n ’ s s i l kmanufacturing during WWII have receivedscant attention.1 The majority of previousstudies on Japan’s silk production have focusedon its remarkable rise during the Meiji period(1868–1912), when Japan became the world’sleading silk producer.2 As the country’sgreatest earner of foreign capital, silk financedthe lion’s share of the Meiji state’s ambitiousarmament program and thus played a crucialrole in Japan’s victory in the wars against China(1895) and Russia (1905).3 I offer a fresh viewof the silk–warfare connection by reversing theline of inquiry to ask: what was the impact ofthe Pacific War on Japan’s silk industry?

Connecting the history of Japan’s militaryexpansion with that of the country’s economicmobilization, my investigation also adds newinsights to earlier scholarship on the wartimestate’s botched efforts at “administrativeguidance.”4 Powerful business interestsskillfully played the system of the NewEconomic Order to commence a massproduction of parachutes that far exceededactual military demand, resulting in aconsiderable waste of precious resources andmanpower. Thus, I propose that Japan’s silkindustry is both a striking and instructive

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example of Japan’s inefficient wartimeeconomic control.

The silk industry also deftly promoted itsimportance for the war effort by having itsyoung factory workers join paratroopers asprotagonists of Japan’s wartime propaganda.Building on previous studies on Japan’s“thought war” and on workers in the munitionsindustry, I will lay out how the “heavenlysoldiers” of the airborne infantry and the“industrial warriors” of the silk factoriesbecame integral parts of the propagandamachine.5

A New Type of Combat

During the interwar period, all major powersexperimented with a wide range of newtechnologies and doctrines that were to changethe battlespace of the future.6 Using parachutesfor airdropping soldiers over enemy territorywas a promising way to deploy infantry unitsbehind the frontline. These groups of highlymobile soldiers could carry out groundoperations practically anywhere. They couldalso count on the element of surprise. Thebui ldup of paratroops turned into atransnational endeavor. In 1935 the SovietUnion carried out a maneuver with a massdeployment of 6,000 paratroopers. One yearlater the commander of the Luftwaffe,Hermann Göring, established Germany’s firstparatroop battalion. In 1940 the U.S. Navy andArmy established their first parachute units.

With the outbreak of WWII in Europe, Japaneseefforts to set up an airborne infantryintensified. The successful deployment ofGerman paratroopers during the May 1940invasion of the Netherlands impressedJapanese observers and provided a strongincentive for the Japanese to rapidly build uptheir own parachute units. Japanese planners

also learned that the element of surprise wasthe decisive advantage of an airborne attack.Therefore, they agreed that the country’s newparatroopers had to be trained in utmostsecrecy. However, the Japanese Army and Navykept to their long-standing tradition ofinterservice rivalry by deciding not to joinforces but to proceed independently.

The army’s new “Air Raiding Corps”

In fall 1940 Lieutenant Colonel KawashimaKeigo of the Hamamatsu Bomber Flight Schoolreceived the order to train 70 officers as theJapanese Army’s first parachute troopers. Yet,all that Kawashima could refer to were a bookabout the training of Soviet paratroopers andseveral photographs taken by an Asahi Shinbuncorrespondent that showed the training of U.S.paratroopers.7 The instruction of the futureparatroopers began in an empty airship hangar.Their daily practice included gymnasticexercises that, according to one source, earnedthe group the nickname “Kawashima Circus.”8

The training also included frequent visits to theYomiuri amusement park in Tamagawa, Tokyo.The group joined civilian thrill seekers at thepark’s 70-meters-high parachute tower tofamiliarize themselves with “high-altitude”drops (see figure 1). To conform with theclassified nature of their unit, all men had toexchange their military uniforms with that ofuniversity students and even received the ordernot to use any military language or vocabulary.9

Then, on February 20, 1941, the first fivesoldiers made successful jumps out of a flyingaircraft.

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Figure 1: The jump tower at Yomiuri’samusement park in Tamagawa, Tokyo.(Courtesy of Japan Aeronautic Association)

After this initial success, pressure onLieutenant Colonel Kawashima to build up asufficiently large paratrooper unit increased,especially after news about the massdeployment of 10,000 German paratroopersduring the invasion of Crete arrived in Japan inMay 1941.10 In the same month the army movedits parachute training division fromHamamatsu all the way to Baicheng in centralManchuria. The army officials expected thatlarge-scale training could be carried out moresecretly there than in Japan. Yet, in August1941 the parachute training division movedback to Japan, and by the end of the year thearmy’s first Kūchū Teishinbutai (AirborneCorps) was ready for combat.11 It consisted oftwo regiments with 760 men each and oneflying brigade of 50 transport aircraft.12

The word teishin as part of the newly

established unit’s name has an importantsymbolic connotation. It can be translated into“dashing ahead of the others” and suggests anaggressive and elitist esprit de corps that wasto become a defining feature of Japan’sparatroopers. Such elitism was further fueledby the army’s doctrine not to copy the Germanstrategy of massive paratrooper deployment,but to train only a limited number of cracksoldiers for surprise attacks. Another distinctsign of the paratroopers’ special status wastheir uniform badge that featured the goldenkite (kinshi). This fabled bird is associated withthe legendary origins of the nation. Accordingto the eighth-century chronicle Nihon Shoki,the golden kite helped Japan’s first emperor,Jimmu, defeat his enemies by blinding themwith the dazzling light of its feathers.

The navy’s new “Special Naval LandingForces”

In November 1940, the Japanese Navyestablished its own paratroop research team of26 officers under the leadership of LieutenantYamabe Masao. One month later high-rankingmembers of the Navy Ministry and the NavyAviation Headquarters discussed how to equipand deploy the new airborne infantry. As aresult, the navy’s paratroopers were to use onlylight firearms in order to keep them highlymobile after landing. Furthermore, they wereorganized as small self-contained units thatcould carry out swift surprise attacksindependently.13 Naval planners also began toset up several scenarios that included thecapture of the Tarakan Island oil field (off thenortheastern coast of Borneo) and an attack onGuam. In August 1941, the Naval General Staffordered two parachute units with 750parachutists each to be set up by the end ofOctober. Even though Yamabe considered thisa “totally unreasonable demand,” by mid-November each unit member had completed

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the required two or three training jumps.14 Nowthe Navy had two parachute units ready fordeployment: the 1st and 3rd YokosukaTokubetsu Rikusentai (Special Naval LandingForces).

Early successes

During the initial phase of the Pacific War,Japanese paratroopers staged two spectacularmissions in the southwestern part of the MalayArchipelago. Their successful takeover of keyinstallations secured Japanese air superiorityand vital resources for further expansion. Thefirst combat jump of navy paratroopers waspart of the Japanese effort to occupy Celebes inpreparation for an assault on Australia.15 Theparatroopers were to capture the strategicallyimportant Langoan airfield close to the city ofManado (see figure 2). The takeover was toensure that no enemy aircraft could attackJapan’s advancing naval infantry. On January11, 1942, 28 converted Mitsubishi G3Mbombers dropped 334 soldiers of the 1stYokosuka Special Naval Landing Forces overthe airfield. To minimize their exposure toenemy fire and to avoid a dispersal over a widearea, the paratroopers jumped from an altitudeof only 150 meters, which left them less than30 seconds in the air before touchdown. Withinfive hours the troopers occupied the airfield.The next day, after a second drop, 74 additionalparatroopers joined the first group to attackand occupy the town of Manado.

Figure 2: Airborne operations of theJapanese Navy (blue) and Army (red).(Map by author.)

The army’s first large-scale deployment ofparatroopers aimed directly at the rich oilresources of the Dutch East Indies.16 InSeptember 1940 Japanese envoys commencedtalks about oil imports with Dutch East Indiesofficials, who, even after the defeat of theNetherlands by Nazi Germany, still controlledthe region.17 In January 1941 these negotiationsfailed. The situation escalated with the start ofthe U.S. oil embargo in August 1941 that leftJapan with only a two-year oil stockpile.

Already in summer 1940 Japanese Armyofficials began to prepare a forcible takeover ofPalembang oil fields in South Sumatra (seefigure 2), whose output alone exceeded Japan’stotal oil consumption at that time.18 In addition,a nearby refinery was a high-value target as itproduced much-needed high-octane aviationgasoline. A quick surprise attack would give theDutch no time to destroy their industrialinstallations in order not to let them fall intothe hands of the Japanese. First lieutenantŌshiro Takashi, together with about 50soldiers, meticulously prepared for the captureof the oil refinery. They familiarized themselves

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with the devices of Nippon Oil Corporation’sTsurumi oil refinery near Yokohama, wherethey learned how to operate valves and shutoffdevices and how to fight a fire once it hadbroken out in such a highly explosiveenvironment. 1 9

The army decided to drop two raiding groupsthat were to hold the Palembang airfield andtwo refineries until ground troops could arrive.On February 14, 1942, a fleet of 67 aircraftflew into the area and airdropped theparatroopers together with equipment andweapons stored in special containers. By theend of the day, the 240 soldiers of the firstattack group had taken the airfield. The secondgroup of 89 men occupied and secured theShell Oil BPM refinery. Even though a time-delayed bomb destroyed parts of the facility,the refinery was operational again by earlyApril 1942.20 The Palembang takeover was ofgreat strategic importance. In 1943, thecombined crude oil output in the Japanese-occupied southern region reached nearly 50million barrels. Of those, 14.5 million barrelswere shipped to Japan, covering 44 per cent ofthe country’s total oil consumption.21 Historianshave noted that without this unexpectedlyplentiful supply of oil, the Japanese could nothave maintained their offensive expansionwhich highlights the significance of theparatroopers’ exploit.22

Paratroopers in Japan’s WartimePropaganda

Within days after their initial deployments,Japan’s paratroopers saw their role changeradically. Secret shadow warriors turned intomedia stars that were thrust into the limelight.To better understand this process, it helps toconsider that close control of the mass mediawas a defining feature of Japan’s wartimepropaganda efforts. The Naikaku Jōhō Kyoku

(Cabinet Information Bureau), established inDecember 1940, supervised and censored thecountry’s press, radio, and movie industry.23

Interestingly, the bureau’s tight control led toan unprecedented interaction of all types ofmed ia . Newsree l s , magaz ines , andmovies—together with singers, painters, andbook illustrators—eagerly absorbed, digested,and publicized encouraging reports of thesuccesses in the Dutch East Indies. Such newsmet with a receptive public, which wasdesperate for a boost to morale, especiallywhen Japanese troops on the Chinese mainlandseemed to be stuck in a quagmire.

Soon Japanese moviegoers could immersethemselves in the action over the South Pacific.In early February 1942, the newsreel NipponNews featured a report under the title “Celebessurprise tactics – our paratroopers’ splendidbaptism of fire.”24 The producers skillfullystrove for maximum impact, combining strikingpictures with dramatic music and an exuberantvoice-over. Spectators were kept on the edgesof their seats, watching paratroopersdescending on the combat zone to the powerfulsound of Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries.”25

The narrator’s enthusiastic voice and colorfullanguage added to the drama. Emphasizingthat the paratroopers’ “immortal militaryachievements will go down in military history,”he reported how the Japanese transport aircraftwith their “magnificent silver wings” carry the“warriors of the sky” (sora no senshi) all theway to the enemy’s bases in Celebes. Themoment they approached the drop area, their“pure white parachutes” (junpaku no rakkasan)opened like big flowers in the cerulean sky,and, one after another, the paratroopersdescended from heaven. The audience thencould follow the brave warriors landing, pickingup their weapons, and mopping up the nearbyenemy.

The media machinery rapidly gatheredmomentum when Japan’s leading wartimemagazine entered the fray. The Cabinet

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Information Bureau’s own journal, ShashinShūhō (Weekly Photographic Report),celebrated the “first paratroop units of theImperial Army and Navy” on February 25,1942, just ten days after the successfulPalembang takeover. The journal featured anarticle about the victories at Celebes andSumatra that was illustrated with dramaticpictures of the deployment of Japan’s airbornesoldiers. Echoing the words of the newsreelcommentator, one caption praised the “purewhite parachutes” popping up in the sky “likelarge-flowered white chrysanthemums.” Afollow-up article guided readers step-by-stepthrough the paratroopers’ rigorous training:from initial ground exercises up to the firstactual jump out of an aircraft. The authoremphasized the spiritual and aesthetic qualitiesof the parachute to which the young recruitsentrusted their lives and whose immense reliefof seeing a fully opened parachute above themwas mixed with an “intense sense of itsbeauty.”

The strategic significance of the paratroopers’early exploits was also brought home to theJapanese public. A newsreel on the Palembangtakeover informed audiences that Americanand British companies had made an enormousinvestment in the nearby oil field resulting in ayield of 2.8 million tons of oil every year.26

Japanese soldiers were shown patrolling infront of a smoking industrial complex, and thecommentator explains the importance of thesurprise attack: the Japanese paratroopers hadsuccessfully thwarted the enemy’s scorched-earth tactics and secured the most importantfacilities of the oil refinery. These great militarygains would boost the construction of a newEast Asia while the problems of the UnitedStates and Britain were mounting. Thenewsreel scene then changed to the Timoroperation that the Navy Paratroops launched inlate February 1942. Japanese bombers wereshown in formation flight, showering their hugebombs on the enemy’s military facilities. Thencountless little white dots could be seen from

high above. From a bird’s eye view theaudience experienced the strong visual, if notsymbolic, contrast between the pure white ofthe attackers descending from the sky and theblack fumes associated with those attacked onthe ground. The background voice explainedthat in view of the black smoke of the burningcity, the attack forces opened their parachutes“like large white flowers in the sky.” Eventhough the airborne assault turned out to beineffective, the report concluded that, withtheir successful surprise attack, the navyparatroopers had won another impressivevictory over the American, British, and Dutchenemies.

The first war song in praise of the paratroopersappeared in April 1942, when the Japaneserecord company Victor launched its “DivineSoldiers of the Sky” (sora no shinpei).27

Accompanied by a military band, the song texttook the colorful imagery to a new level. Itcontrasts the “bluer than indigo” sky with theparachutes’ pattern of “one hundred thousandpure white roses” that opened in almost notime. The song went on to praise the men of thesurprise attack corps who descended from thesky and sacrificed their red blood withoutregret while relentlessly attacking the enemy.The song’s title was carefully chosen. Theorigins of the expression shinpei reach back atleast to the Heian period.28 Remarkably, it cantranslate as not only “soldiers dispatched bythe gods” but also “soldiers with divineprotection” or even “divine troops.”

Soon the armed forces composed their ownv e r s i o n s . T h e “ S o n g o f t h e A r m y ’ sParatroopers” (rikugun rakkasanbutai no uta)added the stock image of cherry blossoms: “ourdescent will be like that of the immaculatelywhite blossoms that fall from countless cherrybranches and are filled with the wind.” The“Song of the Navy’s Paratroopers” (kaigunrakkasanbutai no uta) chose the image of whitepeonies scattered in the bright blue sky. To besure, aside from indulging in such flowery

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aesthetics, the songs also celebrated themartial prowess of the airborne troops: “Whilewe entrust our body to the parachute, we lookout for the enemy’s position below. We surprisehim like a strong gale and smash his defense inan instant.”29

Within a few months Japan’s movie industrytook up the paratroopers’ cause as well. InSeptember 1942 , the f i lm companyNipponeigasha released its Sora no Shinpei, a55-minute documentary on the training of thearmy’s paratroopers. The movie was supportedand supervised by the Army Aviat ionHeadquarters and clearly belongs to the genreof kokusaku (national policy) films that fullycomplied with the government’s wartimeideology.30 The film followed a group of youngsoldiers through all stages of their training,starting form initial gymnastics, parachutepacking, leaps from a mock-up aircraft and ajump tower up to their first deployment out of aflying aircraft. The movie and its eponymoustheme song became widely popular. It was evenscreened in the occupied territories with thelocal audience reportedly waving their handsand stamping their feet to greet “the saviors”descending from the sky.31

The feats of Japan’s airborne infantry alsoinspired Japanese painters, who rendered thenow already well-established imagery on large-scale canvas. Tsuruta Gorō (1890–1969)submitted his Heavenly Soldiers Descending onPalembang (see figure 3) to the First GreaterEast Asia War Art Exhibition, which was held atthe Tokyo Metropolitan Art Museum fromDecember 3 to December 27, 1942.32 Themonumental oil painting covered five squaremeters and showed in the foreground threeparatroopers who have just landed and shedtheir parachutes. They are fighting animaginary enemy on the left with pistols andhand grenades. The larger upper part of thepicture is dedicated to a huge number ofairborne troops still descending, with theirwhite parachutes against the backdrop of a

blue sky with scattered clouds. The battlescene draws much of its dynamic tension fromthe contrast between the apparently slowvertical movement of the parachutists who arestill in the air and the forceful horizontal thrustof those already fighting on the ground.

Figure 3: Photographs like this might haveinspired Tsuruta Gorō when he painted hisDivine Soldiers Descending on Palembangin 1942. (Courtesy of Japan AeronauticAssociation). Click here to see how theartist added color and action.

Even more dramatic images appeared inseveral illustrated children’s books. The picturebook Sora no chūtai (The squadron of the sky)was published in 1943 (see figure 4). In itspreface an army official openly declared thatthe book’s purpose was to “whip up aviationideology among [Japan’s] young citizens.”33 Onechapter was devoted to the pursuits of a groupof paratroopers who are dropped deep insidethe enemy’s territory to take over an airfield.Colorful illustrations showed the brave warriorsjumping head-first out of their transportaircraft, which are defying intense fire fromantiaircraft guns. Then their parachutesopened, and the blue sky was filled with “bigwhite flowers.” After touchdown, the “brave

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warriors” picked up their airdropped machineguns and flamethrowers and, supported byfighter aircraft and dive bombers, started theirassault. Soon the enemy soldiers surrendered,and the paratroopers waved their Rising Sunflags with cheers of “banzai.”

Figure 4: These two pages from Sora nochūtai show the Japanese airborne troopsplunging into battle while their transportaircraft defy the enemy's artillery.

Another 1943 book, Shōkokumin no tamenorakkasan monogatari (A story about parachutesfor young citizens), instructed its youngreaders how the parachute even transcendedits material aspects to embody the “holy spiritof Japan.” Therefore, the text continued,Japanese paratroopers paid deep respect totheir parachutes. Before each jump theyworshiped their parachutes with respectfulbows and silent prayers. Even after touchdown,in the heat of battle and with parachutesscattered all over the terrain, great care wastaken not to step on any of them.34

A Godsend to Japan’s Silk Industry

While the media engaged in such idealisticglorification of the airborne soldier and his silkparachute, Japan’s silk industry was bound toreap great material benefits from theparatroopers’ exploits. To better understandthis game-changing process, we have toconsider that silk manufacturing in Japan hadexpanded rapidly during the Meiji era butexperienced an equally dramatic decline in theTaisho and early Showa periods.35 Starting inthe 1920s , Rayon, made f rom cheapregenerated cellulose, began to drive silk out ofthe world textile market.36 Soon after the startof the war with China, Japanese s i lkmanufacturers received another major blow. InMarch 1938, the Japanese Diet passed theNational Mobilization Law, which drasticallyl imi ted the product ion o f so -ca l led“nonessential” (fuyō fukyū) civilian goods thatincluded most of Japan’s silk products. Thesituation worsened in 1940 when thegovernment promoted the slogan “Luxury Isthe Enemy” and issued a new ordinance thatstrictly controlled the production and sale ofluxury goods. Under these conditions, Japanesesilk makers placed all their hopes on continuingU.S. demand for their products. Yet, on July 25,1941, in response to Japan’s invasion ofsouthern Indochina, the U.S. government frozeJapanese assets in America, leading to theeffective collapse of the U.S. export market.

While Japan’s silk industry seemed bound toslump, a promising new strategy emerged: therevival of the country’s silk production byincreasing domestic industrial and militarydemand.37 The Dainippon Silk Foundation,founded in 1892 to promote Japan’s silkindustry, became a major force to implementthis idea. In March 1940, the foundationinaugurated its new Silk Science ResearchInstitute as a response to increasingcompetition by artificial fibers. After the U.S.embargo, pressure increased on the research

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institute to ensure the survival of the country’ssilk industry with the development of a noveltype of strong silk that would open an entirelynew market of industrial and military goods.The institute was confident that “adequateprocessing” could make a silk thread strongand tough enough for fishing nets, electricinsulation, and even cogwheels. The institute’sambitious program included genetic researchon silkworms to combine the advantages ofJapanese, Chinese, and European silk. Such animproved silk would also lend itself to a vastarray of military applications. Researchersstated that it would be possible to develop silkfor military use that would be 16 to 20 timesstronger than the standard silk strand. Theinstitute’s specialists also hailed experimentsthat proved that s i lk would becomeincreasingly valuable for military supplies, suchas strong and thin artillery powder charge bagsand—above all—parachutes.

The s i lk parachutes of the Japaneseparatroopers had already proven theadvantages of conventional silk. With its lightweight, high elasticity, and great tensilestrength, it was the ideal material forparachutes.38 A silk parachute is easy to packand fits into a small container. It can alsowithstand the strong mechanical forces duringopening. Yet, the Silk Science ResearchInstitute’s researchers argued that a parachutemade from their advanced silk would have aneven much greater impact resistance andwould be unrivaled by any other parachute theworld. In an article published in December1942, Suzuki Shirō, one of the institute’sscientists, assured that the continuing study ofsilk fiber would lead to a wide range of furtherimprovements. In his view the Americanembargo was a blessing in disguise that wouldboost the further development of Japanese silk.Suzuki concluded: “We will win the fiberwar!”39 Such an empathic battle cry forcefullyexpresses how Suzuki and his colleagues wereanticipating the revival of Japan’s silk industryunder wartime conditions.

A “New Economic Order” and Japan’swartime silk production

As the scientists fought their fiber war in thelaboratories, Japan’s paratroop units foughttheir first battles in Southeast Asia. Theirspectacular successes and immense visibility inthe media came as a godsend to Japan’sbattered silk industry and generated invaluablesupport for the lobbying of the Dainippon SilkFoundation. After the victorious Manado andPalembang operations, both the Japanese Armyand the Navy decided on large-scale massproduction of parachutes.40 Yet, when themilitary passed the order to Japan’s silkweaving industry and cord makers to increasetheir output, they soon learned that Japan’s silkproduction capacity had declined dramatically.As a consequence of Japan’s wartimeexigencies, a large number of mulberry fieldshad been turned into farmland for foodproduction, and most silk manufacturers,suffered from a severe labor shortage aftertheir workers had been assigned to munitionsfactories or conscripted for military service.Aware of this production bottleneck, themilitary appealed to both the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Ministry of Commerce toboost silk production for parachutes.

The government’s direct involvement in Japan’swartime silk industry was part of Japan’stransition toward a controlled wartimeeconomy that became known as the “NewEconomic Order.” The Sanshigyō Tōseigaisha(Sericulture Control Company) was set up inMay 1941. As a stock company i t wascapitalized at ¥80 million, with half of the stockheld by the government and the rest by variousbranches of the sericulture industry.41 Thecompany took full control of all aspects of silkproduction and sales in Japan: it established asystem of fixed prices and quality control,distributed silkworm eggs and silkworms, and

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bought cocoons from farmers and sold them tosilk-reeling manufactures. It also purchased theraw silk from the silk-reelers for resale toweaving manufacturers and textile makers.42

Soon the government’s sway over Japan’s silkproduction tightened further. The Jūyō SangyōDantai Rei (Important Industrial CorporationsOrdinance) was promulgated in August 1941. Itallowed the government to establish so-calledTōseikai (Control Associations) for Japan’s keyindustries. These influential government-controlled cartels were authorized to allocateresources, set up production quotas, anddetermine prices. In October 1942, the Ministryof Commerce and Industry ordered theestablishment of four Control Associations inthe fiber industries. One of them was the JinkenKinu Tōseikai (Rayon and Silk ControlAssociation) headed by Kumura Seita, thepresident of the Rayon fibers manufacturerTeikoku Jinken.43 Kumura’s appointment was inline with an implicit agreement that the headsof all Control Associations had to be civilianbusinessmen. As historians of Japan’s wartimeeconomy have po in ted out , such anarrangement had important consequences.Throughout their existence the ControlAssociations could dodge the military’s fullcontrol and more often than not followed theirmember companies’ interests rather than theexigencies of the war economy.44

Backed by a powerful institution and revitalizedby soaring military demand, Japan’s silkindustry transformed from an ailing producero f luxury goods in to an apparent l yindispensable part of Japan’s war machine. Arevision of the “Raw Silk Inspection Rules”(kiitokensakisoku) set up a new standard for“aviation silk” (kōkūyōkiito) that had to besignificantly stronger than ordinary raw silk.Building on the efforts of the Silk ScienceResearch Institute, the silkworms used for theproduction of this type of silk were new hybridsderived from different silkworm varieties. By1944 the quality of parachute silk had

considerably improved. As an incentive to boostproduction, the Control Association fixed theprice of aviation raw silk higher than that ofordinary raw silk and—with silk production nowbeing part of Japan’s munitions industry—alsofacilitated access to sufficient raw material.

Weaving the silk fabric

Wartime developments also allowed Japan’s silkweaving industry not only to survive but toprosper. The weavers of Fukui prefecture arean illuminating example of this remarkabledevelopment.45 Already in the 1880s the Fukuigovernment promoted the production ofhabutae, a plain-weave silk fabric.46 A favorablecoastal climate, low wages, and efficientcooperative system further helped to establishFukui’s reputation as Japan’s “textile kingdom.”Mechanization of silk looms proceeded quickly,and by 1895 Fukui’s silk weavers produced halfof Japan’s habutae silk fabric.47 Advances inelectrification and transport—in 1914 theKatsuyama Electric Power Company wasestablished, and the Keifuku Railroad beganoperation—further spurred production.48

Like many other branches in Japan’s textileindustry, Fukui’s weavers suffered fromwartime control measures. Let us recall thatthe 1938 National Mobilization Law devastatedJapan’s silk industry facing a severe shortage oflabor, raw material, and machinery. Thesituation escalated with the start of the PacificWar, when the government enforced itsprogram of metal collection that began with therequisition of charcoal braziers, iron kettles,cookpots, kitchen knives, farming tools, andeven altar fittings and statues from Buddhisttemples. By 1943 the weaving industry becamea target of metal collection as well. As many as40 per cent of weaving machines in Fukuiprefecture were confiscated, and their ironparts were delivered to munitions factories.

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Many companies faced the stark choice ofchanging or shutting down their businesses. Tostem the decline of a whole industry, Fukui’sprefectural government launched a campaignto increase the number of factories engaging inarmaments production.

While many silk weavers converted theirproduction to aircraft parts or communicationequipment, some companies had fewerproblems with continuing their originalbusiness. One of them was Matsubun, a majorproducer of habutae in Katsuyama in thenortheastern region of Fukui. Already in 1925 ithad established itself as the army’s mainsupplier of parachute fabric. As it turned out,habutae, with its light weight and superiorstrength, was the ideal material for parachuteproduction, earning the fabric the name of“parachute silk.” Weaving silk for militaryparachutes became a successful survivalstrategy. In 1943 Matsubun, together withKaytay and two other Katsuyama weavingcompanies, were appointed as factories underarmy supervision (rikugunkantoku kōjō). As oneKaytay official put it: “During wartime weproduced habutae for parachutes as a munitionindustry in Katsuyama. That was how we couldretain our machines, our personnel, and ourtechnology.”49

Fujikura: A parachute maker takes off

One manufacturer reaped the greatest profitsfrom the parachute boom. Fujikura, founded in1901, initially engaged in the production ofrubber and electric wire. In June 1913, thecompany began experimenting with silk andcotton fabric for balloons, airships, andaircraft.50 Fujikura also engaged in theresearch and design of parachutes andpresented its first rescue parachute for balloonand airship crews in 1919. In May 1928, thecompany secured orders from the NavyMinistry for the production of the Type 89parachute. In 1934, after receiving another

navy order of 600 parachutes, large-scaleproduction of parachutes began. In October1939 Fujikura set up its new branch, FujikuraAviation Industry, that successfully establisheda monopoly on parachute production in Japan.

Soon Fujikura’s unique position paid off nicely.In summer 1940 a high-ranking army officerpaid a confidential visit to the company’smanagers. He informed them about the army’splan to establish several paratrooper units andasked for Fujikura’s cooperation in the project.One week later a navy officer visited thecompany as well and submitted a similarrequest.51 These visits were important. With theupcoming large-scale orders from both thearmy and the navy, Fuj ikura startedpreparation for mass production at threedifferent sites. The Ebahara factory in thesouthwestern suburbs of Tokyo employed 2,000workers and aimed for a monthly productioncapacity of 4,000 parachutes. Two more plantsin central Tokyo at Nihonbashi and Honjo, witha combined workforce of 4,500 workers, couldinitially reach a monthly output of 5,000parachutes.52 According to a former Fujikuraemployee, the company steadily increased itsannual production from 4,500 parachutes in1939 to a staggering 105,000 in 1945.53

Another source corroborates these figures,stating that Fujikura produced a total of about300,000 parachutes between 1939 and 1944.54

Such a quantity is curious considering that thestrength of Japan’s paratroopers at any giventime barely exceeded three thousand men, ofwhich a significant part never engaged in acombat jump.55 What is more, after 1942, thenavy’s paratroopers did not carry out any morecombat jumps for the rest of the war. Thearmy’s paratroopers were redeployed only inDecember 1944 when they joined the Battle ofLeyte. Why, then, could Fujikura continue toboost its production? It follows from the abovethat the company could bui ld on theparatroopers’ early victories and rely onsuccessful propaganda. Both emphasized the

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importance of parachutes for winning the warand induced the military to place large orders.Furthermore, appointed as an importantsection of Japan’s munitions industry andsupported by a powerful Control Associationunder civilian leadership, Japan’s silkp r o d u c e r s , r e e l e r s , w e a v e r s , a n dmanufacturers gained new self-confidence andbegan to relish the prospect of substantialprofits. As a result, all manufacturers involvedin the parachute production chain could initiateand maintain their mass production regardlessof actual military demand.

To be sure, conspicuous waste of limitedresources is a defining feature of any wartimeeconomy. As is well known, each warringnation engaged in notoriously expensivearmament projects that turned out to be ofdoubtful military use, such as the Germanheavy railway gun Gustav, the U.S. giant flyingboat Spruce Goose, and the Japanese battleshipYamato. It might be argued that most of thesecostly developments failed because theirfeasibility and operational advantage wereunpredictable. In contrast, Japan’s wastefulmass production of parachutes was the resultof poor coordination of supply and demand.Even though the Japanese Army and Navystopped all paratroop operations after February1942 for nearly three years, precisely duringthis period Japan’s parachute makers boostedtheir production on an unprecedented scale.This suggests that the Rayon and Silk ControlAssociation could successfully lobby for anincrease in silk production. On the other hand,the resulting inefficiency and poor economiccontrol were, of course, especially damaging tothe Japanese economy, which was desperatelystruggling with dwindling labor and materialresources.

Parachutes and the Mobilization of

Young Women

In many ways the paratroopers’ saga is closelyinterwoven with that of the workers atFujikura’s factories. Both would come to sharea common narrative of devoted volunteers,determined warriors, and, ultimately, patrioticself-sacrifice. Before Fujikura could establishitself as a major segment of Japan’s wartimeindustry a serious problem had to be solved.The company’s dramatic production increaserequired an equally massive workforceexpansion—a major challenge at a time whenmilitary conscription caused a severe laborshortage. To compensate for the lack of malefactory workers, Fujikura began to recruit girlsand women as volunteer workers from all overJapan. Mass recruiting was successful, andsoon these female volunteers made up about ahalf of the factory workers. After silk reelingand weaving parachute production alsodeveloped into a highly gendered workplace.56

Fujikura’s management aimed to furtherimprove production capacity by boostingworkers’ morale. The book Rakkasan o tsukurukokoro (The spirit of making parachutes) thatthe company published in 1943 celebrated theimportance of the Fujikura workers and theirproducts. In the preface Fujikura’s president,Matsumoto Arata, noted: “Our braveparatroopers entrust their lives to Fujikura’sparachutes. We are aware of this heavyresponsibility and put our hearts and souls intoevery single stitch and rivet. At the same time,we are proud of our rewarding duty. . . . We areindustrial warriors (sangyō senshi) entrustedwith this decisive work.”

The book featured several contributions fromFujikura’s employees. Such primary sourcesmust, of course, be handled with caution. Theynevertheless suggest an attitude that goesbeyond the purely material aspects ofparachute production. One worker declaredthat “before the paratroopers carry out their

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crucial missions, they put their parachutes onan altar and pray for victory. Likewise, withevery stitch, we Fujikura workers instill ourwishes for victory into each parachute.” Afactory girl from Fujikura’s Honjo plantcontributed a poem that draws a telling parallelbetween the young factory girls and thesoldiers on the battle front:

We young maidens brace up our frailbodies for the country.

Today we will stitch the white silk again.

While we make parachutes our mind ispure,

strong, and calm just like the white silk.

When we are stitching with our sewingmachines our mind

is just like that of a soldier carrying hisgun to the battlefield.57

These grandiose texts could be easily dismissedas a company’s effort to instill a higher purposein their employees’ work. Yet, as a historicaldocument the book reveals an importantconflation of wartime Japan’s mobilization andindoctrination. An already well-establishedmyth of the self-sacrificing heavenly warriors atthe front now extended to the parachuteweavers and seamstresses whose nimblefingers perform delicate but decisive work.Thus, the young parachute seamstresses foundthemselves caught up in the effort to win thewar both as laborers in the munitions industryand as subjects of Japan’s wartime propaganda.

The rich symbolism of young women laboringto support their countrymen’s struggle on thewarfront was not lost on Japan’s military andcivilian opinion makers. The selfless devotion offactory girls became a recurring theme that the

media impressed upon Japan’s youth. Take, forinstance, the previously mentioned 1943 bookShōkokumin no tame no rakkasan monogatari(A story about parachutes for young citizens)that was endorsed by the army’s aviationheadquarters and the navy’s press section. Theauthors told the “young people of the Empire”about the young girls (otometachi) who werebearing a tremendous responsibility for allstages of parachute production, from raisingsilkworms to silk reeling and textile weavingand finally making parachutes. The textcontinues:

These young girls put their effort with alltheir heart into every single silk thread. . .. They devote all their life to parachuteproduction and even hesitate to take timeto eat. They work hard even though theybleed from their small fingers. Japan’sbrave paratroopers cannot forget theseyoung girls’ sincere devotion. Therefore,the Japanese paratroop is the strongest inthe world.58

Such praise for young female workers’participation in the war effort, overdramatic asit may seem, was part of a national campaign toincrease war production. Historians havepointed out that the Japanese state initially wasreluctant to recruit women for labor service.59

Yet, when the draft of men for military servicetook a heavy toll on the workforce, thegovernment turned to the two largest sourcesstill available for mobilization: students andunoccupied females. Already in November 1941compulsory registration for women between 16and 24 began.60 Over the course of the PacificWar, pressure on women to join the labor forcecontinuously increased. In 1943 the newlyestablished Joshi Kinrō Hōkoku Tai (Women’sPatriotic Labor Corps) began to enlistunmarried women who were 14 to 25-yearsold.

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By August 1944, the government’s rhetoric andcoercion intensified, and the myth of theparatroopers once more inspired the homefront. The Women’s Patriotic Labor Corpschanged its name to the Joshi Kinrō Teishintai(Women’s Labor Volunteer Corps). Theexpression teishin was a direct reference to theArmy’s Kūchū Teishinbutai (Airborne Corps)and its paratroopers, who had all volunteeredfor high-risk missions. Military language andorganizational patterns kept on spreading inthe civil sphere. Now women enlisted in Japan’smunitions industry were designated assangyōsenshi, industrial warriors. A new policyorganized them like military commandos intosmall, tightly knit groups that were assigned tospecial production tasks.61 According to onesource, 473,000 women had joined theWomen’s Labor Volunteer Corps by March1945.62

The militarization of the home front furtherescalated with the mobilization of ever-youngerJapanese for participating in the “decisivebattle.” The “Student Labor Law,” issued inAugust 1944, led to the mobilization of abouttwo mil l ion students for work. Youthrecruitment intensified in March 1945, whenthe cabinet approved the “Outline of educationmeasures for the decisive battle.”63 The newpolicy allowed for a one-year closure of allschools above the elementary school level. NowJapanese middle schools and high schools wereto carry out duties deemed “vital for winningthe decisive battle,” such as munitionsproduction and air-raid defense. By July 1945,the number of mobilized students hadincreased to over 3.4 million: 1.5 million ofthem were young women, with nearly half ofthem engaged in war production.64

Again, a look at Fukui prefecture’s parachuteweavers might help conceptualize the realityconfronting those behind these numbers. By1944 young female students between 12 and 16years of age from Katsuyama city girls’ highschool, Katsuyama Seika girls’ high school, Ōno

junior high school, and Ōno girls’ high schoolwere mobilized. They wove silk for parachutesin textile factories, while others producedaircraft parts at metal processing works (seefigure 5). As members of the student corps theywore mandatory nametags and armbands.While commuting to their workplaces, theywore cloth air-raid hoods (bōkūzukin) that, in asad irony, still identified them as non-militarypersons.

The discourse around female workers’ self-sacrifice as industrial warriors reached a newdimension that gave rise to an even strongermyth to inspire the country’s workforce.Fol lowing the Munit ions Minis try ’sexhortat ions to turn “ factor ies intobattlefields,” the young girls in Katsuyama, asin factories all over Japan, had to show theirdevotion by wearing hachimaki headbands withthe characters kamikaze written on them (seefigure 6), the name given to the pilots of thespecial attack units who sacrificed their livesduring suicide attacks on the enemy.65 Such anincreasingly desperate militarization of studentfactory workers once more mirroreddevelopments at the battlefront, whereparatroopers were sent into the fray in a last-ditch effort to turn the tide of the war.

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Figure 5: Recent high school graduatesinspecting habutae silk fabric for

parachutes. (Courtesy of Kaytay Texinno Inc.)

Figure 6: Young factory workers withkamikaze headbands. (Courtesy of Kaytay

Texinno Inc.)

The Brief Return of the HeavenlySoldiers

After their deployment in early 1942, Japan’sparatroopers were conspicuously absent fromthe battlefield for nearly two years. On atactical level, it seemed to be increasinglydifficult to bring the troops close enough totheir target without exposing them to enemyfire.6 8 To make things worse, Japaneseparatroopers had lost their most valuable asset.After the large-scale airborne operations in theearly phase of the war, military planners couldno longer rely on the surprise factor.Furthermore, the summer 1942 losses at theBattle of Midway and during the Guadalcanalcampaign halted Japanese expansion andforced the military into a defensive war. Afterthis fundamental change in strategy, even the

early advocates of airborne assaults began todoubt the efficiency of deploying paratroopersfor offensive surprise attacks.69

Only after U.S. troops under General DouglasMacArthur landed on Leyte in October 1944did plans to airdrop paratroopers into enemy-held territory reemerge. When the advancingU.S. forces began extending their airsuperiority over large parts of Leyte, theJapanese Army commanders decided to deploytheir paratroopers once more. The 3rd and 4thraiding regiments received the order torecapture five airstrips in the American-occupied Leyte Valley in the northeast of theisland (see figure 2). On December 6, a firstwave of nearly five hundred paratroopersjumped out of their planes but landed far fromtheir targets. U.S. antiaircraft fire downed 19transport aircraft, and most of the 20 aircraftthat made it back to their airfield were heavilydamaged. A second wave took off with fourtransporters and two heavy bombers. One ofthem crashed and the rest returned because ofbad weather. On the following day, the armycanceled the operation. A second attempt todrive back U.S. troops ended in disaster aswell. Between December 8 and 14, more than480 paratroopers were dropped over theValencia airfield, about 15 kilometers north ofthe city of Ormoc. Yet, during the followingweek it became obvious that the Japanesetroops could not stop the U.S. advance, and,while suffering heavy losses, the Japaneseretreated.

Even though the Leyte airborne operationended in failure, it still served the propagandamachine at home. The December 20, 1944,edition of Shashin Shūhō for the first timeshowed paratroopers preparing for theircombat jump on its title page.70 The textexplained that the same “divine warriors” whohad been fighting at Palembang now had beensent into the “decisive battle” over Leyte. Themagazine exhorted readers to continue theirfight on the home front. All Japanese were told

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that they should follow the example of theparatroopers who risk life and limb and dashtheir bodies against the enemy. In an obviousrefence to the kamikaze suicidal attacks(taiatari kōgeki), the word taiatari was printedin big letters over the title page. Even in thefinal stages of the war, the glorification ofJapan’s paratroopers continued. The TokyoMetropolitan Art Museum opened its WarRecord Painting Exhibition (sensō kiroku gaten)on April 11, 1945.71 This was just one monthafter the devastating firebomb attacks of March9–10, 1945, that became known as the Bombingof Tokyo and cost the lives of 80,000 to 130,000people. Yoshioka Kenji (1906–90), who alreadyhad made his name with several large-formatwar paintings, contributed The TakachihoParatroop Unit Attacking an Enemy Airfield onLeyte . With i t s huge s ize and imagecomposition, his painting clearly echoedTsuruta Gorō’s Heavenly Soldiers Descendingon Palembang. However, its material (color onpaper) and its rough painting style suggest thatthe artist had to cope with material shortageand time pressure.

Paratroopers once more featured prominentlyon the silver screen—albeit in a slightlydifferent format. The animated film Momotarō,Divine Warriors of the Sea (Momotarō Umi noShinpei) was released in April 1945. Thefeature-length movie had been produced underthe guidance of the navy’s informationdepartment. Its protagonist, Momotarō, wasthe well-known hero of one of Japan’s mostpopular folktales. The film reenacted theCelebes invasion with Momotarō and hisfriends as part of a large parachute unit whojump out of their transport aircraft under heavyenemy fire. After landing in enemy territory,they gather their canons and machine gunsfrom airdropped containers and chase away afrightened enemy who eventually surrenders.The movie’s final scene shows young cartooncharacters back in Japan playfully reenactingthe paratroopers’ feat by climbing onto a treeand jumping into a contour line of America

marked on the ground. The obvious messagewas that for Japan’s paratroopers, defeating theenemy would be child’s play.

The climactic Battle of Okinawa that lastedfrom April to June 1945 was the last time thatJapanese airborne troops were sent intocombat. Of the Army’s paratroopers, 168members who had been reorganized as GiretsuKūteitai (Heroic airborne unit) took part in adesperate one-way mission.72 On May 23, 1945,twelve Mitsubishi Type 97 heavy bombers tookoff from Kyushu, each with 14 soldiers onboard. They were heading toward U.S. airbasesin Okinawa, where they were to deploy thetroopers after crash-landing on the Kadena andYontan airfields. Four bombers returnedbecause of engine trouble, and most of theremaining aircraft were shot down by U.S.antiaircraft guns. Only one airplane was able tomake a belly landing at Yontan airbase. TheJapanese troopers who survived the crashlanding stormed out of their airplane. Throwinggrenades and incendiary bombs they destroyedor damaged over 30 U.S. aircraft and set aquarter of a million liters of fuel on fire. Withinan hour, U.S. reinforcements arrived, and inthe ensuing fighting, all Japanese soldiers werekilled.

Conclusion

The historical significance of Japan’sparatroopers transcends their actions on thebattlefield and reveals complex connectionsamong warfare, propaganda, and nationalmobilization. Initially set up to overwhelm theenemy by surprise, Japan’s airborne troopsproved to be surprisingly effective in theglorification of the battle front. Their earlysuccesses were eagerly absorbed by Japan’sgovernment-directed propaganda; and even inthe final stage of the war, the public image ofthe death-defying “heavenly soldiers” persisted.

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During Japan’s long retreat, the paratroopers’military significance all but vanished. At thesame time, their importance for boosting thenation’s morale and confidence rapidlyincreased.

Japan’s new type of warfare also had a wide-reaching impact on the country’s silk industry.With the collapse of a lucrative export market,government restrictions on “nonessential”goods, and impending seizure of its machinery,a once-thriving industrial sector seemed to bedoomed to extinction. Yet researchers began todevelop aviation-grade silk fiber; businessmencleverly navigated Japan’s New EconomicOrder; and company leaders readily respondedto increasing military orders. Silk turned from aluxury item into an integral part of an all-important military implement. Thus, Japan’ssericulturists, silk weavers, and parachutemakers not only thrived but also were able to

commence large-scale production that by farsurpassed actual military demand.

The dynamic re la t ionsh ip be tweenparatroopers and parachute makers also shedsnew light on the mobilization and militarizationof the home front. With the massive hiring ofyoung women for parachute production, themyth of the paratrooper merged with thenotion of the self-sacrificing factory worker.Drawing on the image of heavenly soldierssupported by frail maidens in the factories, themobilization of women and students for allsectors of Japan’s munitions industry entered anew stage. Branded as industrial warriors andorganized like military commandos, youngworkers threw themselves into the escalatingbattle of the factories to fight an increasinglyhopeless war.

Jürgen Paul Melzer is a former paratrooper and jumpmaster. He received his Ph.D. in EastAsian Studies from Princeton University and is presently Professor and Director of JapaneseStudies at Yamanashi Gakuin University where he teaches Japanese history. He is the authorof Wings for the Rising Sun: A Transnational History of Japanese Aviation (Harvard UniversityAsia Center, 2020). His current work focuses on the history of military flight training duringWWII that compares the recruiting, training programs, and preparedness of Japanese airmenwith those of the Allied powers.jmelzer001@gmail.com

Acknowledgements: The author wishes to thank Sheldon Garon for his invaluable commentsand suggestions. Research for this essay greatly benefitted from the cooperation withMatsumura Hideyuki, the director of the Hataya Memorial Museum at Katsuyama. He is alsograteful for the very helpful advice that h received from Steve Gump, Christopher Mayo, SeijiShirane, and Evan Young during the final stage of the project.

Notes1 One noteworthy exception is the production of balloon bombs, a small fraction of which wasmade from rubberized silk. See Robert C. Mikesh, Japan’s World War II Balloon Bomb Attacks

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on North America (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1973), pp. 61-63; and RossCoen, Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America (Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press, 2014), pp. 31-33.2 Patricia Tsurumi, Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990); and David G. Wittner, Technology and the Culture ofProgress in Meiji Japan (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 43-71.3 Between 1898 and 1900 overall revenues from silk export amounted to over 90 per cent ofJapan’s expenditure on the imports of warships, weapons, machinery, iron, oil, andsteamships. See Nakamura Masanori. Nihon no rekishi dai 29 kan Rōdōsha to nōmin[Japanese history vol. 29: Workers and peasants] (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1976), p. 89.4 Hooks and Jussaume show in their case studies of Japan’s aluminum and aircraft industrieshow, during the war, “the Japanese state became less intrusive and ultimately morecivilianized; the U.S. became more interventionist and militarized.” Gregory Hooks andRaymond A. Jussaume, “Warmaking and the Transformation of the State: Japan and the U.S.in World War II,” in Yamanouchi Yasushi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Narita Ryuichi, eds., TotalWar and ‘Modernization’ (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998), pp. 61-94.5 Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda (Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press, 2006); and Benjamin Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival War: Mass Culture on theHome Front, 1937–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 67-104.6 Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1996).7 Tanaka Kenichi, Aa junpaku no hanaoite: rikugun rakkasan butai senki [Pure white flowersadorning their shoulders: An account of the battles of the army paratrooper units] (Tokyo:Gakuyō Shobō, 1972), pp. 1-13.8 Boeicho boeikenshujo senshishitsu, Rikugun kōkū no gunbi to un’yō 2 [The army’s aerialarmament and operations 2] (Tokyo: Asagumoshinbunsha, 1974), p. 309.9 Tanaka, Aa junpaku no hanaoite, pp. 12-13.10 The Battle of Crete (20 May–1 June 1941) received considerable day-to-day coverage inJapanese newspapers, beginning with “Chichūkai no eijūyōkichi doku, kureetashima wokōgeki seieibutai wo taikyōkūyu” [Main British bases in the Mediterranean, German attack onCrete, massive airborne operation of elite troops], Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, May 21,1941.11 Boeicho boeikenshujo senshishitsu. Rikugun kōkū no gunbi to un’yō 2, p. 309-10.12 Ministry of War, “Daiichi teishinshūdan” [The first Attack Group], October 1941, JapanCenter for Asian Historical Records (hereafter JACAR) Ref.C12121031900.13 Nihon Kaigun Kokushi Hensan Iinkai. Nihon Kaigun kokushi 2 Gunbi hen [The history ofJapanese naval aviation 2 (armaments)] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1969), p. 929.14 Ibid., p. 931.15 For details see Nihon Kaigun Kokushi Hensan Iinkai. Nihon Kaigun kokushi 2 Gunbi hen, p.935.16 For a full account see Okamoto Takeyoshi and Horikawa Tatsumi, Nanpo shinko rikugunkoku sakusen [The Army’s air strategy during the southern advance] (Tokyo: AsagumoShinbunsha, 1970), pp. 490-505; Gordon L. Rottman and Takizawa Akira, Japanese ParatroopForces of World War II (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005), pp. 27-44.17 Minoru Nomura, “The Petroleum Question” in Akira Iriye, ed., Pearl Harbor and the Coming

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of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s,1999), pp. 145-46. More on the strategic importance of oil can be found in Miwa Munehiro,Taiheiyo Senso to sekiyu: senryaku busshi no gunji to keizai [The Pacific War and oil: Militaryaffairs and the economy of strategic goods] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 2004).18 Ishii Masamichi, Rikugun nenryōshō Taiheiyō Sensō sasaeta sekiyu gijutsushatachi notadakai [The Army’s fuel arsenal: The fight of the fuel technical experts that supported thePacific War] (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2002), pp. 106-12.19 Ogura Akira, “Parenban sekiyu butai no tsuisō [The reminiscence of the Palembang oilcorps],” in Heiwa kinen jigyō tokubetsu kikin, ed., Gunjin gunzoku tanki zaishokusha gakataritsugu rōku dai yon kan (heishi hen) [The pain of soldiers and of people who served astemporary civilian employees of the military: Volume 4 (soldiers)], (Tokyo: Heiwa kinen jigyōtokubetsu kikin, 1994), pp. 175-85.20 Ibid., p. 176.21 Ishii, Rikugun nenryōshō, p. 196.22 Nomura, “The Petroleum Question,” p. 146.23 For details see Gregory James Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 200-206.24 Nippon news #88, released on February 9, 1942.25 Already in May 1941 the German newsreel Wochenschau used the “Ride of the Valkyries”as background music for their coverage of the airborne invasion of Crete.26 Nippon news #93, released on March 17, 1942.27 The lyrics can be found in Kitajima Noboru, ed., Shōwa ryūkōkashi [A history of popularsongs of the Shōwa era] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1977), p. 137.28 According to Nihon kokugo daijiten [Comprehensive Japanese dictionary] (Tokyo:Shōgakukan, 2006) the term shinpei appeared already in Keikokushū, an 827 CE collection ofChinese poetry.29 For the text of both songs see Fujikura Kōgyō KK. Rakkasan o tsukuru kokoro [The spirit ofmaking parachutes] (Tokyo: Fujikura Kōgyō KK, 1943), p. 1. In striking contrast to thesemorale boosters, one of the most popular songs sung by WWII U.S. paratroopers, “Blood onthe Risers,” tells the gloomy story of a “rookie trooper” who forgot to hook his static line andfalls to his death.30 For more details on how Japanese movie makers followed the censor’s standards of thekokusaku films see Peter B. High, The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the FifteenYears’ War 1931–1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), pp. 376-81.31 Shashin Shūhō, January 20, 1943, pp.10-11.32 There is an interesting parallel: The German painter Wilhelm Baitz submitted a similarmonumental painting “Die Fallschirmjäger” (The paratroopers) to the Große DeutscheKunstausstellung that was held in Munich in 1942 under the auspices of Adolf Hitler.33 Niizeki Kennosuke, Sora no chūtai [The squadron in the sky] (Tokyo: Nakamura shoten,1943), quote taken from the book’s preface by Major Nishihara Masaru.34 Taira Satoru and Matoda Sei, Shōkokumin no tameno rakkasan monogatari [A story aboutparachutes for young citizens] (Tokyo: Kin no hoshi sha, 1943), pp. 162-67.35 For a detailed account of Japan’s prewar silk industry see Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyōshibunseki [An analysis of Japan’s sericulture industry] (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai,

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1972).36 In 1905 the British company Courtaulds Fibres produced the first commercial viscoserayon. The Japanese firm Teikoku Jinzokenshi (Tejin) took up rayon production in 1927.37 It should be noted that many Japanese companies implemented this policy. Notableexamples are the producer of nitrogenous fertilizer Nichitsu branching out into explosives orthe piano maker Nihon Gakki converting its production into the making of aircraft propellers.See Barbara Molony, Technology and Investment: The Prewar Japanese Chemical Industry(Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990), pp. 216-26; andUnited States Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division, Japan Musical InstrumentManufacturing Company (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) (Washington, DC: USSBS, 1946), pp. 1-12.38 Silk, with its unique qualities, would eventually be challenged by synthetic fiber. In summer1942 the U.S. military began testing nylon parachutes—ironically as a response to thedwindling stock of imported Japanese silk. During the Pacific War, Japan’s artificial fiberindustry produced its own version of nylon called “nylon 6,” but Japan never engaged in large-scale nylon production.39 Nihon Sangyō Keizai Shinbun, December 19 and December 20, 1942.40 Tanaka Kenichi, Oozora no hana: Kūteibutai zenshi [Flowers in the wide open sky: Acomplete history of paratroopers] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō 1984), pp. 267-68.41 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, April 20, 1941.42 Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, March 1–March 9, 1941.43 Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, August 24, 1941.44 Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 153; and Mark R. Peattie, IshiwaraKanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1975), p. 219.45 In addition to Fukui weavers in other prefectures such as Ishikawa, Yamagata, andYamanashi took up the production of parachute fabric as well.46 Edward Pratt, Japan’s Protoindustrial Elite: The Economic Foundations of the Gōnō(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), p. 34.47 Hataya kinenkan yumeōre Katsuyama, Orimono no machi, Kiryū to Katsuyama [The textiletowns Kiryū and Katsuyama] (Katsuyama: Hataya kinenkan yumeōre Katsuyama, 2012), p. 10.48 Matsumura Akira, Katsuyama no kigyō [The textile industry in Katsuyama] (Katsuyama:Katsuyama kyōiku iinkai, 1981), p. 2.49 Arai Yoshiyasu, president of Kaytay Texinno Inc., in 2011, quoted in Hataya kinenkan,Orimono no machi, p. 40.50 Fujikura Industry Co., Ltd , “Fujikurakōgyō Kabushikigaisha” [Fujikura Industry, Inc.],January 30, 1936, JACAR Ref.C05035280400.51 Tanaka. Oozora no hana, p. 251.52 Ibid., p. 269.53 Tanaka gives the following numbers in Oozora no hana, p. 270: 1939: 4,500; 1940: 5,000;1941: 12,000; 1942: 68,000; 1943: 94,000; 1944: 105,000.54 See Fujikura Kōsō OB-kai website. (accessed March 30, 2020).55 A total of about 1,400 paratroopers were deployed during the 1942 campaign in the DutchEast Indies. About one thousand airborne infantrymen saw action in the Philippines in late

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1944.56 Janet Hunter argues that already in prewar Japan the demand for cheap labor together withrapid advances in industrialization resulted in a predominantly female textile workforce. JanetHunter, “Gendering the Labor Market: Evidence from the Interwar Textile Industry.” InBarbara Molony and Kathleen Uno, eds., Gendering Modern Japanese History (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), pp. 359-92.57 Poem composed by Oki Tsuruma in Fujikura kōgyō, Rakkasan o tsukuru kokoro [The spiritof making parachutes] (Tokyo: Fujikura kōgyō KK, 1943), pp. 205-6.58 Taira, Shōkokumin no tameno rakkasan monogatari, pp. 154-60.59 See Regine Mathias, “Women and the War Economy in Japan” in Erich Pauer, ed., Japan’sWar Economy (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 65-84; and Yoshiko Miyake, “DoublingExpectations: Motherhood and Women’s Factory Work Under State Management in Japan inthe 1930s and 1940s,” in Gail Bernstein, ed., Recreating Japanese women, 1600–1945,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 267-95, 268.60 Thomas R. H. Havens, Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), p. 92.61 Ministry of Munitions, “Joshiteishintaiseido kyōka hōsakuyōkō” [Policy outline to strengthenthe system of the corps of women volunteer workers], March 18, 1944, JACARRef.A14101249000.62 Japan Employment Security Association, (accessed March 30, 2020).63 Ministry of Education, “Kessen kyōiku sochiyōkō” [Outline of education measures for thedecisive battle], March 17, 1945, JACAR Ref.A14101334400.64 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Civilian, Manpower, Food and CivilianSupplies Division, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower(Washington, DC: USSBS, 1947), pp. 13, 73.65 See the Munitions Ministry’s pamphlet that aims to bring the kamikaze ideology intoJapan’s factories. Gunjushō kōkūheiki sōkyoku, Kamikaze (Tokyo: Gunjushō kōkūheikisōkyoku, 1945), pp. 23-25. For the “kamikazefication of the home front,” see David C.Earhart, Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 2008), pp. 409-59.66 Source: Matsumura Akira, Katsuyama no kigyō [The textile industry in Katsuyama](Katsuyama: Katsuyama kyōiku iinkai, 1981), p. 45.67 Ibid., p. 45.68 The Navy became painfully aware of this dilemma during the capture of the Koepang airbase in Western Timor (see figure 2) on February 20 and 21, 1942. Based on the Manadoexperience, where enemy fire had killed many parachutists even before touchdown, thedesignated drop zone was about twelve kilometers northeast of the airfield. Yet, when thefirst paratroopers finally arrived at the airfield it had already been taken by Japanese groundforces.69 Yamabe Masao, Kaigun rakkasan butai: Eikō to kutō no senreki [Naval paratroopers: Warrecords of glory and hard struggle] (Tokyo: Kyō no wadaisha, 1994), pp. 253-54.70 I am obliged to David Earhart for pointing out this illustration in Certain Victory, p. 438.71 Yasushi Masuko, “‘Saikan Houkoku’ and War Art Exhibitions,” Nihondaigaku daigakuinsōgō shakai jōhōkenkyūka kiyō, No. 7 (2006), pp. 515-26.

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72 For more details on the Giretsu Kūteitai see Akimoto Minoru, Rakkasan butai: Tekichū nikōka suru "Sora no shinpei" no tatakai [Paratroopers: The fight of the “heavenly soldiers” whodropped into the middle of the enemy] (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2009), pp. 317-28.