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TRANSCRIPT
Open Board meeting
Presenter
14:00 Welcome and introductions Declarations of interest Minutes of meeting 24 July 2019 Chair's update
HSE/19/M05 Verbal update
Chair
14:15 Chief Executive's Report Finance and performance review
HSE/19/34 Verbal update
Sarah Albon David Murray
14:45 1) Carcinogens and mutagens, revised Workplace Exposure Limit values - consultation outcome 2) Consultation on Approved Code of Practice supporting the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPIR19) – Consultation Outcome and Response
HSE/19/35 HSE/19/36
Kären Clayton/ Sarah Mallagh
15:30 HSE Board Openness, Transparency and Engagement
HSE/19/37 Teresa Quinn
16:00 Review of the impact of the Sentencing Guideline
HSE/19/38 Tracey Anderson
16:30 Meeting ends
Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/A06
Meeting Date 11 September 2019 FOI Status Open
CM9 Ref 2019/218936
AGENDA HSE Board Meeting 11 September 2019
Location: Make UK, Tothill Street, London, SW1H 9NQ
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HSE Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/34
Meeting Date: 11 September 2019 FOI Status: Open
Type of Paper: For discussion Exemptions:
CM9 Reference: 2019/250032
Chief Executive’s Report
This report highlights recent HSE activities and achievements to take forward our Business Plan for 2019/20.
Following HSE’s publication of fatal injury statistics in July, Hugh Gaffney MP (Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill) hosted a Westminster Hall debate on the increase to 29 worker deaths in 2018/19 in Scotland (17 in 2017/18). The increase was largely attributable to deaths in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector (from 3 to 13) though the number for that sector for the previous year was notably low. The debate provided an opportunity for the then Minister, Justin Tomlinson, to explain the reasons and the wider context of HSE’s work across GB and in Scotland to reduce workplace deaths. The Minister reiterated that occupation, industry and duty holder attitudes are key drivers of risk rather than geographical location. He also spoke warmly of HSE, recognising our world-leading technical knowledge and willingness to challenge, adapt and work with the widest range of stakeholders.
Following Ministerial Portfolio changes announced 31 July 2019, Lords Minister Deborah Stedman-Scott now has responsibility for Health and Safety.
Lead and engage with others to improve workplace health and safety
Discovering Safety is an exciting programme of work funded by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation. Led by a team in HSE’s Science Division working in partnership with University of Manchester, amongst others, it aims to improve workplace health and safety performance globally, by using data and novel analytical techniques to provide new insights that will impact safety outcomes, identify improvements and develop industry endorsed solutions. At the centre of the programme is HSE’s 40 years of health and safety data. This will be combined with other international data, to extract new knowledge to help deliver better understanding of workplace risk and improve approaches to protect people and assets.
Waste and recycling: Statistics show that the waste industry’s injury rate is “significantly worse” than the all-sector average, with manual handling related to 35% of injuries resulting in more than seven days off work. HSE has updated its research in this area and has warned that improvements to health and safety is a priority. The researchers make recommendations that the waste management industry captures the key features of best equipment design in a benchmark for designers and customers, and that the industry continues to seek to design out manual handling risks before new waste collection vehicles enter widespread use. We are continuing to work with the industry to improve manual handling at kerbside collections and are using the research to assist future compliance interventions.
Agriculture – delivering behaviour change and achieving compliance: In response to the stubbornly unchanged fatal injury rate in this sector (a rise of 6 to 39 in the latest annual statistics), HSE has started a blended intervention programme with farmers which is aimed at delivering improvements. The programme was developed following insight research and includes: training targeted at farmers most at risk of accidents, supported by
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inspections; communications; new guidance and consistent messaging aimed at achieving behaviour change through stakeholders such as the Farm Safety Partnerships. To complement this strategy and programme, the HSE Chair has also written to stakeholders to emphasise the importance of effective risk management to prevent fatalities and drive good health and safety performance.
Provide an effective regulatory framework
New convention on violence in the workplace: HSE colleagues recently attended the centenary conference of the International Labour Organisation1(ILO) in Geneva, where a new Convention on violence and harassment in the world of work was adopted. This followed months of collaborative work between DWP (who took overall lead), HSE and other government departments in determining and agreeing the UK’s position on the proposed Convention and its wording to ensure it aligns with our current laws and practices. We provided evidence regarding the Health and Safety at Work etc Act and the current guidelines adopted in the UK regarding violence and harassment in the workplace.
The Convention’s final text was agreed at the conclusion of the Conference and will likely be ratified by the UK in due course. Whilst HSE will not be leading on ratification we have already begun the process of reviewing its obligations against HSE’s policies. We continue to work closely with the other government departments involved to ensure a consistent regulatory and policy approach to violence and harassment in the world of work.
EU Exit: Since the referendum of June 2016, HSE has been fully involved in government work to prepare the United Kingdom for Brexit. Secondary legislation has been passed to correct the law if required for a No Deal scenario. This would ensure that the legal requirements, and the protections these provide, would be the same as they are now. Systems, operations and processes have also been updated to ensure the continued effective trade and safe management of chemicals, civil explosives and workplace equipment & machinery to safeguard human health and the environment. HSE preparations were communicated with affected stakeholders in advance of 29 March and engagement has continued since with those groups most affected by the preparations. Further communication work is underway alongside the Government’s public information campaign.
Secure effective management and control of risk
Securing compliance with the law: We completed 86 prosecutions between 1 June 2019 and 31 August 2019, with 82 of these resulting in at least one guilty verdict (conviction rate 95%). There were four prosecutions with individual fines over £1 million.
Delphi Diesel Systems Ltd: A fine of £1m was issued to the car and commercial vehicle component manufacturer after two workers sustained significant burn injuries when a vapour of a flammable chemical which was being used to clean a distillation tank, ignited and caused an explosion during a cleaning operation. Both employees suffered significant burn injuries, with one employee’s injuries being so serious they could not return to work for over two months.
Clancy Docwra Ltd: A fine of £1m was issued to the construction company after a worker was fatally injured when struck by an excavator mounted vibrator (EMV) attached to a 35-tonne excavator during night-time construction work in Stratford, London. Clancy Docwra was also ordered to pay costs of £108,502.30. Daniel Walsh, the site supervisor and
1 The ILO is the only tripartite U.N. agency which brings together governments, employees and workers of its 187
member States to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work tor everyone
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operator of the excavator at the time of the incident was also given a 6 month custodial sentence, suspended for 12 months and ordered to pay costs of £15,000.
Valero Energy UK Ltd: Valero Energy UK Ltd and B&A Contracts Ltd have both been fined (£5m (£2.5m for each of two offences) and £120k respectively) after pleading guilty to two breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act when an explosion killed four workers and seriously injured another at an oil refinery in Pembrokeshire in 2011.
Young and inexperienced workers: Two recent prosecutions have highlighted the consequences of not providing adequate and appropriate training and supervision to young and inexperienced workers. HSE has guidance to support both employers and young people to recognise workplace risks and understand their responsibilities.
West Phoenix drill rig: Following an investigation into the HCR release on the West Phoenix drill rig, HSE has sent a report to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, recommending prosecution for the gas release.
Forestry inspections: In December 2018, the Board was informed of a limited inspection programme targeting manual chainsaw use and welfare at 54 sites (involving 64 duty-holders). There were different enforcement actions taken, ranging from Notices of Contravention to Improvement Notices. Some follow up visits have taken place to take forward actions required as a result of our enforcement action. Forestry Industry Safety Accord (FISA), which represents a large majority of duty-holders in this sector, acted on the inspection initiative and has set up a working group to develop new guidance on welfare provision which will soon to be issued. HSE is also developing new operational guidance to support our inspectors. A further programme of 50 visits are planned for 2020/21 to continue the momentum that has gathered.
Reduce the likelihood of low-frequency, high-impact catastrophic incidents
H21: The H21 project, funded through the Ofgem Network Innovation Competition, is focussed on how Northern Gas Networks (NGN) can safely introduce 100% hydrogen, a cleaner form of energy, into their existing networks in Leeds and then the North of England. HSE is supporting the H21 project by constructing a bespoke test rig on the HSE Science and Research Centre site in Buxton and providing input to the scientific evidence base required for introducing hydrogen into the networks. The rig is being used to test a range of existing pipeline assets for leaks using natural gas, nitrogen and then hydrogen. The rig was officially opened on 4th July by the NGN Chief Executive Mark Horsley at an event attended by 80 invited guests from across industry and government, including Ofgem and BEIS who are at the forefront of the industrial strategy and are commissioning a range of other hydrogen for heat related projects. The event received attention from a range of media including press, radio and TV.
Major hydrocarbon releases: Since HSE’s Energy Division Director’s letter to all offshore oil and gas production operators in April 2018, there has been a significant programme of engagement and intervention on the prevalence of hydrocarbon releases (HCRs), including the sharing of examples both of recent major HCRs to demonstrate the concern, and of good practice. In response, Oil and Gas UK (OGUK) has developed an industry wide improvement plan which will be launched at the OGUK Health, Safety and Environment Conference on 6 November 2019.
Work with the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) and Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment & Decommissioning (OPRED): Following HSE’s investigation into a significant hydrocarbon gas release during a drilling operation on the West Phoenix drill rig, and working with joint Competent Authority partners, OPRED, we concluded that the Well Operator, the Anasuria Operating Company Limited (AoC) no longer had the capacity
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to meet the requirements as the appointed Well Operator. As a result, the OGA, who has responsibility for the Petroleum Licensing Regulations, withdrew AoC’s Well Operatorship and appointed a new competent Well Operator. HSE is working with OGA via an Industry workshop to reinforce requirements for Well Operatorship.
Step Change in Safety Elected Safety Representative Event: HSE is supporting a unique Step Change in Safety event on 18 September 2019 to recognise the 30th anniversary of the Offshore Safety Representative and Safety Committee Regulations. As well as celebrating what has been achieved in the last 30 years, the event will launch new, HSE supported guidance from Step Change in Safety for safety representatives, asset managers and onshore asset leaders.
Shale Gas: Cuadrilla recently restarted hydraulic fracturing in Lancashire. HSE’s latest site inspection on 25th July found no significant issues. However there have been a series of micro-seismic events at the site and the Oil & Gas Authority (OGA) has ordered a suspension of activity while it examines seismic data. The well is currently shut in until the OGA is satisfied that the seismic events can be managed in accordance with the hydraulic fracture plan. HSE has reviewed monitoring and pressure test data and are satisfied that there are currently no well integrity issues at the site. We continue to monitor the situation.
Also, the National Audit Office is reviewing HMG’s shale policy objectives. We have provided regulatory information and a report is due in early autumn.
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Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/35
Meeting Date: 11 September 2019 Meeting type: Open
Type of Paper: For decision FOI Exemptions (if applicable):
CM9 Reference: 2019/253794
Carcinogens and Mutagens, revised Workplace Exposure Limit values – Consultation outcome
Kären Clayton
FOR DECISION
The Board is invited:
To note the outcome of the public consultation on introducing into the GB
regulatory regime binding occupational exposure limit values taken from the
amended Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive 2004/37/EC.
To approve an updated list of Workplace Exposure Limits to be published in
“EH40/2005 Workplace Exposure Limits”.
KEY INFORMATION
1. The European Commission is undertaking a programme of phased amendments to the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (CMD) to introduce Binding Occupational Exposure Limit Values (BOELVs) for a range of carcinogens. The Directive containing the first Phase of amendments was adopted on 27 December 2017 and set 11 new BOELVs and revised 2 existing ones.
2. The BOELVs were based on the opinions of a committee of independent experts (The Scientific Committee on Occupational Exposure Limits) after review and examination of scientific and epidemiological data on the substances concerned. Those opinions were then subsequently considered and supported by a tripartite committee (the Working Party on Chemicals) on which the UK was represented by an HSE official. Further work was then done at European level to identify the potential socio-economic impact before the final BOELVs were included in the Directive.
3. As the Directive was adopted while the UK was still a member of the EU, HSE embarked on a project to introduce the BOELVs into the GB regulatory system. As part of this, the Board approved a consultation document on the HSE’s proposals in January 2019 (HSE/19/05). The consultation began on 15 April 2019 and ended on 7 June 2019.
4. The consultation proposed that the list of HSE Board-approved Workplace Exposure Limits (WELs) in the publication “EH40/2005 Workplace Exposure Limits” be updated to include the limit values from the amendment to CMD. WELs are given legal force under the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (as amended) (COSHH).
5. The consultation on the proposed limits was publicised via HSE’s COSHH e-Bulletin and Construction e-Bulletin, which between them have around 215,000
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subscribers. In addition, trade associations representing key industry sectors were notified and asked to inform their members of the consultation. This included the Chemical Industries Association, the Welding Institute, the Mineral Products Association, and the British Coatings Federation. The members of HSE’s Partnership groups on construction, welding and quarrying (who represent a wide cross-section of stakeholders for those sectors) were also informed.
6. The webpage containing the consultation document was viewed 11,192 times during the consultation period and 33 responses were received. The overall response to the consultation was positive and the majority of respondents agreed that updating the WELs in HSE publication EH40/2005 is the most appropriate way of implementing the revised BOELVs. In the 33 responses received, no specific further costs were identified. A report on the consultation responses is attached at Annex 1.
7. In the event of a ‘no-deal’ exit from the EU there will not be a legal requirement for the UK to implement the Phase 1 amendment to CMD. However, the revised exposure limits are the result of independent expert analysis of scientific and epidemiological data and HSE officials believe that their introduction will be of benefit in improving the protection of health of GB workers.
8. Employers are already required by the COSHH Regulations to reduce exposures to carcinogens to as low as is reasonably practicable. Nevertheless, the revised WELs will provide useful exposure benchmarks for employers to enable them to gauge the effectiveness of their control measures, and in some cases offer additional protection to workers.
9. We therefore recommend that the Board should approve the revised WELs for inclusion in a revised Table 1 in EH40 Workplace Exposure limits.
10. A revised Table 1 “List of approved workplace exposure limits” from EH40/2005 Workplace Exposure limits is attached at Annex 2 for Board approval. This reproduces the entire table, and the revised entries are highlighted for the convenience of Board Members.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS/OPPORTUNITIES
11. HSE’s initial findings indicated that implementation costs will be minimal. In the 33 responses received during consultation, no specific further costs were identified. For most of the substances, where adequate controls are already in place and properly used and maintained, there should be no additional costs to business.
ADDITIONAL REGULATORY CHANGES
12. The application of the revised WELs to some parts of the maritime sector is the subject of a separate consultation by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) to amend the relevant Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessel Regulations. The Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland (HSENI) is carrying out its own consultation exercise - drawing extensively on the documents prepared by HSE. Gibraltar will be amending its own legislation.
13. Board paper HSE/19/05 explained that the WEL for Respirable Crystalline Silica (RCS) remains unchanged at 0.1mg/m3 but that it is currently disapplied in underground coal mines by the Mines Regulations 2014 (MR2014) which
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replace it with an action limit of 0.3mg/m3. Agreement has been reached with the MCA to include the changes to MR2014 in the statutory instrument it is using to introduce the other changes to the WELs.
14. Additional lower limits for Hardwood dust and Chromium VI (scheduled to come into effect in 2023 and 2025 respectively) are included in the CMD amendment. However. these additional lower limits did not form part of the consultation and will be considered separately at a later date.
IMPACT ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS/REGIONS
15. No additional impact has been identified for the Devolved Administrations. Representatives of the Devolved Administrations have previously been made aware of the proposals and will be notified of the outcome of the public consultation and the decision of the HSE Board.
HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS
16. If the Board agree to proceed, the Minister will be informed and a revised edition of “EH40/2005 Workplace Exposure Limits” will be published including the updated “Table 1 - List of approved workplace exposure limits”. Publication will be announced by means of a press release and highlighted on the HSE web pages. We will also use other methods to further communicate the change, for example, through a link that will be sent to subscribers to the HSE COSHH e-Bulletin.
17. HSE has undertaken stakeholder engagement throughout the negotiation and consultation process with relevant internal and external stakeholders, and has provided regular update briefings to MCA, HSENI and Gibraltar.
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION CONSIDERATIONS
18. The implementation of the Directive deals with the introduction of WELs in the workplace and will apply equally to all relevant employers to protect all of their workers who may be exposed to the substances in question (but not to the self-employed unless they are creating risk to others). There are no other equality, diversity or inclusion issues to be considered.
CLEARED BY
Kären Clayton
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Annex 1
CONSULTATION REPORT
CD287 - Carcinogens and Mutagens – Revision of limit values in “EH40/2005 Workplace Exposure Limits”
Executive Summary
This consultation relates to proposals for the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/2398, which amends Directive 2004/37/EC and introduces 11 new binding occupational exposure limit values (BOELVs) and amends 2 existing BOELVs to help protect workers from the ill-health effects of exposure to carcinogens and mutagens in the workplace.
As the Directive was adopted while the UK was still a member of the EU, HSE embarked on a project to introduce the BOELVs into the GB regulatory system and, as part of that process, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) held a public consultation between 15 April 2019 and 7 June 2019. The consultation sought views on 2 specific areas:
1 The assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed changes as set out in the draft Impact Assessment produced by HSE.
2 The proposed implementation of new BOELVs through amendment of the Workplace Exposure Limits (WELs) in Table 1 of HSE’s publication “EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits”.
Views were received from a wide range of sectors and organisations which included:
Industry sectors eg woodworking, welding and chemicals
Health and safety professionals
Trade Unions
Trade Associations
The overall response to the consultation was positive, with the majority of respondents agreeing that updating the WEL’s in HSE publication EH40/2005 was the most appropriate way of introducing the revised limits.
Introduction
This report presents a summary of the outcome of HSE’s public consultation on proposals to implement the GB Directive (EU) 2017/2398, which amends Directive 2004/37/EC. BOELVs are set to help protect workers from the ill-health effects of exposure to hazardous substances. In the case of CMD this is in relation to substances that are carcinogens or mutagens. The amending Directive (2017/2398) adds 11 new BOELVs and amends 2 existing BOELVs in the original CMD.
The original CMD contained BOELVs for 3 carcinogenic substances (Hardwood dust, Benzene and Vinyl Chloride Monomer). In GB these limit values were
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transposed as WELs in the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) publication “EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits”. The same approach was proposed for implementation of the new/revised limits in the latest amendment to the Directive. The WELs in Table 1 of EH40/2005 are binding. The requirement to comply with WELs is set out in regulation 7(7) of the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (as amended). The BOELVs listed in the amending Directive were based on the opinions of a committee of independent experts (The Scientific Committee on Occupational Exposure Limits) after review and examination of scientific and epidemiological data. Those opinions were subsequently considered and endorsed by the EU Working Party on Chemicals (WPC) (a sub-group of the tripartite Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work (ACSH)) - on which the UK Government was represented - and by the ACSH itself. An analysis of the socio-economic impact of the revised BOELVs was also undertaken before the Directive was published. HSE officials consulted GB industry stakeholders during the WPC discussions on the BOELVs. The views of industry and workers at European level were also directly represented on the WPC.
The final BOELVs in the Directive were agreed by the European Council (including the UK) and European Parliament. This consultation related to the BOELVs scheduled for introduction in 2020. The amendment to CMD also contains additional, lower BOELVs for hardwood dust and Chromium VI compounds, scheduled for introduction in 2023 and 2025 respectively. These additional limits were not part of this consultation and will be subject to further consideration at a later date. Previous communications with stakeholders Ongoing stakeholder engagement has been an integral part of negotiating and transposing the Directive. HSE contacted representatives from industry sectors potentially affected by the Directive. Several key stakeholders from industry were contacted. Some of the representatives were from trade and professional associations and bodies, who obtained and passed on views from their members and shared information with them to increase awareness further. Their feedback was then used to inform HSE’s negotiating position early in the process. This enabled HSE to receive valuable early insight on policy proposals and on the key issues for industry together with evidence on potential implementation costs. Public consultation
The formal public consultation ran from 15 April until 7 June 2019 (8 weeks). HSE agreed to accept late responses from the Chemicals Industry Association until 19 June 2019. The launch of the public consultation was communicated via the HSE Website and through the HSE COSHH and Construction e-bulletins (which between them have
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over 200,000 subscribers). HSE also directly contacted individuals/companies and trade associations to inform them of the start of the consultation. The webpage containing the consultation document was viewed 11,192 times during the consultation period. Of these, 1124 visits to the consultation webpage were from recipients of the COSHH e-Bulletin and 284 visits from the construction e-Bulletin. Respondents were encouraged to reply using the online questionnaire but they could also use a Word version of the questionnaire (available via HSE’s website) or respond by email. General narrative responses were also received from respondents and these are included in the consultation analysis. This analysis is designed to be read in conjunction with the consultative document (CD287) at: https://consultations.hse.gov.uk/hse/carcinogens-mutagens-revision-of-limit-values/ Response demographics A total of 33 responses were received from a range of industry sectors and organisations. 28 responses were received via the on-line consultation and 5 responses by email. Responses by organisation type The majority of responses were from industry and trade associations representing industry.
Consultancy 3 responses
Industry 18 responses
National and Local government 1 response
Private Individual 2 responses
Professional body 2 responses
Trade Association 4 responses
Training organisation 2 responses
Trade Union 1 response
Industry responses by size of business The responses from industry represented businesses ranging in size from 15 to 5700 employees
1000+ employees 7 responses
250 – 999 employees 5 responses
50 – 249 employees 2 responses
10 – 49 employees 4 responses
All responses were analysed to establish if there were any common themes.
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Summary of responses
Question 1
Q.1 The findings of the impact assessment (IA) suggest there is unlikely to be any significant additional costs to business from complying with the revised workplace exposure limits (WELs) following implementation of Phase 1 of the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (CMD). Based on your knowledge and understanding of the changes, do you agree or disagree with the IA finding?
17 (52%) respondents agreed with the findings of the IA. This included 65%
industry and 12% trade association responses. In total, 50% of trade
associations that responded agreed with the findings of the IA.
8 (24%) respondents disagreed with the IA findings and provided
comments relating to following substances:
Hardwood dust – There was a concern from a training company that as many
businesses in the sector are micro or SME, and often lag behind standards in larger
companies, that there would be cost implications in achieving compliance.
HSE response: Those businesses that are already compliant with the current
occupational exposure limit, should have no issues in meeting the lower limit to be
introduced in 2020. The CMD contains a transitional period before the limit reduces
further in 2023. This further lower limit, scheduled to come into effect in 2023, was
not the subject of this consultation and will be considered seperately at a later date.
Chromium (VI) Compounds – There was concern from a private company
undertaking chrome plating and grinding services that reducing the limit any lower
than the current limit would incur costs for installation of exhaust ventillation.
A private powder coating and galvanising company stated that the revised exposure
limits will almost certainly entail improved PPE. They also advised that there are
suitable alternatives for the use of chromate for surface treatment of alluminium, and
authorisation [under the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation & restriction of
Chemicals Regulations (REACH)] should not be given now that alternative
technology is available.
Another private company undertaking chrome plating thought the costs associated
for the initial limit to come into effect in 2020 would be reasonably affordable, but
was concered that the further reduced limit due to be to be introduced in 2025
following a transitional period would necessitate significant investment and create
significant barriers to effective operation of plating processes such as Chromium
plating. It also stated its view that new measuring equipment would need to be
developed for the lower limit as it is not currently possible to detect such a low
concentration.
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A trade association also commented that there would be difficulty in measuring to the
2025 limit.
An organisation representing safety and health professionals believed that the
impact for the revised WEL for Chromium (VI) process-generated may be
underestimated. It stated its belief that large-scale indoor welding such as tanks
and structures will require the use of more innovative Local Exhaust Ventilation
(LEV) solutions, rather than seeking to rely on the use of Respiratory Protective
Equipment (RPE) to mitigate exposure. It did not provide any specific data to
support this view, however.
HSE response – Use of some Chromium (VI) Compounds are now restricted under
REACH Regulations and require authorisation for use. HSE is aware of industry
concerns regarding the further reduction to the Chromium VI limit included in CMD
(and scheduled to come into effect in 2025). This further lower limit was not the
subject of this consultation and will be considered seperately at a later date.
Respirable Crystalline Silica (RCS) – Although the GB WEL for process-generated
RCS will not change, RCS has been added to the CMD as a carcinogen and the
entry in EH40/2005 will be noted to reflect this. A trade association representing the
Quarries Sector was concerned that adding a ‘cancer’ notation to the RCS entry in
EH40/2005 would impact the industry e.g. it could be used by anti-quarrying
pressure groups when companies are seeking planning permission for quarry
working in areas where RCS will be generated. They are also worried about public
relations as the general public may become alarmed that the quarry close by is
working minerals that are categorised as human carcinogens.
HSE response - RCS generated by a work process is already considered to cause
lung cancer and needs to be controlled accordingly. The World Health
Organisation’ International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has given RCS a
Group 1 classification (agent is carcinogenic to humans). The WEL for RCS has not
changed.
6 (18%) Respondents answered ‘Unsure/don’t know’ to Q1.
2 (6%) Did not answer Q.1
Q.2 The new WELs will be introduced in an update of the HSE publication EH40/2005 http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/eh40.pdf. Do you agree that this is the most appropriate way of updating the WELs?
28 (85%) respondents agree that EH40/2005 is the most appropriate way of
updating the WELs.
1 (3%) respondent disagrees that EH40/2005 is the most appropriate way of
updating the WELs leaving the following comment:
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Should asbestos be included?
HSE response: Asbestos has its own set of Regulations setting out the minimum
standards for the protection of employees from risks related to exposure to asbestos.
The Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012
2 (6%) Respondents answered ‘Unsure/don’t know’ for Q.2
2 (6%) did not answer Q.2.
General comments
A trade union had doubts about setting limits for known carcinogens and was
unhappy with the limit for Respirable Crystalline Silica, believing it should be lower.
HSE response: The binding occupational exposure limits contained in the
amendment to the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive are based on review of the
scientific and epidemiological data by a committee of independent experts.
Conclusion
The overall response to the consultation was positive, and the findings of the impact
assessment provide a fair reflection of the potential impacts to business. The
majority of respondents agree that updating the Workplace Exposure Limits in HSE
publication EH40/2005 is the most appropriate way of updating the WELs.
From the responses received there have been no additional costs identified for
inclusion in the impact assessment. For most of the substances, where adequate
controls are already in use and properly maintained and used, there should be no
additional costs to business.
HSE has noted the concerns raised about the impact of further, lower limits for
hardwood dust and Chromium (VI) compounds scheduled for introduction in 2023
and 2025 respectively. These additional limits were not part of this consultation and
will be subject to further consideration at a later date.
In the event of a ‘no-deal’ exit from the EU there will not be a legal requirement for
the UK to implement the Phase 1 amendment to CMD. Nevertheless, the revised
exposure limits are the result of independent expert analysis of scientific and
epidemiological data and, based on the response to the consultation, HSE believes
that their introduction will be of benefit in improving the protection of health of UK
workers.
HSE therefore recommends that the revised exposure limits be introduced in the UK
through an update to its publication “EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits”.
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Annex 2
Table 1: List of approved workplace exposure
limits (as consolidated with amendments) 17. This list is legally binding, as it reproduces the list of workplace exposure limits (WELs) which have
been approved by the Health and Safety Executive. The limits are given in ppm and mg.m-3. The
conversion method is given in paragraphs 68–69. The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Regulations 2002 impose requirements by reference to this list.
18. However, the entries in the column headed ‘CAS number’ are not part of the approved list of WELs.
The workplace exposure limits of the dusts included in the list below refer to the inhalable dust
fraction, unless otherwise stated.
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Acetaldehyde 75-07-0 20 37 50 92
Acetic acid 64-19-7 10 25 20 50
Acetic anhydride 108-24-7 0.5 2.5 2 10
Acetone 67-64-1 500 1210 1500 3620
Acetonitrile 75-05-8 40 68 60 102
o-Acetylsalicylic acid 50-78-2 - 5 - -
Acrylaldehyde (Acrolein) 107-02-8 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.12
Acrylamide 79-06-1 - 0.1 - - Carc, Sk
Acrylic acid 10 29 20* 59* *STEL in relation
to a 1-minute
reference period
Acrylonitrile 107-13-1 2 4.4 - - Carc, Sk
Allyl alcohol 107-18-6 2 4.8 4 9.7 Sk
Aluminium alkyl
compounds
- 2 - -
Aluminium metal
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
7429-90-5
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Aluminium oxides
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
1344-28-1
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Aluminium salts, soluble - 2 - -
Page 2 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
2-Aminoethanol 141-43-5 1 2.5 3 7.6 Sk
Amitrole 61-82-5 0.2
Ammonia, anhydrous 7664-41-7 25 18 35 25
Ammonium chloride, fume 12125-02-9 - 10 - 20
Ammonium sulphamidate 7773-06-0 - 10 - 20
Aniline 62-53-3 1 4 - - Sk
Antimony and compounds
except stibine (as Sb)
- 0.5 - -
r-Aramid respirable fibres 26125-61-1 0.5
fibres/
ml
- -
Arsenic and arsenic
compounds except arsine
(as As)
- 0.1 - - Carc
Arsine 7784-42-1 0.05 0.16 - -
Asphalt, petroleum fumes 8052-42-4 - 5 - 10
Azodicarbonamide 123-77-3 - 1.0 - 3.0 Sen
Barium compounds,
soluble (as Ba)
- 0.5 - -
Barium sulphate
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
7727-43-7
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Benzene 71-43-2 1 3.25 - - Carc, Sk
Benzyl butyl phthalate 85-68-7 - 5 - -
Benzyl chloride 100-44-7 0.5 2.6 1.5 7.9 Carc
Beryllium and beryllium
compounds (as Be)
- 0.002 - - Carc
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 117-81-7 - 5 - 10
Bis(chloromethyl) ether 542-88-1 0.001 0.005 - - Carc
Bisphenol A 80-05-7 - 2 - -
Bornan-2-one 77-22-2 2 13 3 19
Boron tribromide 10294-33-4 - - 1 10
Page 3 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Bromacil (ISO) 314-40-9 1 11 2 22
Bromine 7726-95-6 0.1 0.66 0.2 1.3
Bromoethylene 593-60-2 1 4.4 - - Carc
Bromomethane 74-83-9 5 20 15 59 Sk
Butane 106-97-8 600 1450 750 1810 Carc, (only
applies if Butane
contains more
than 0.1% of
buta-1,3-diene)
But-2-yne1,4-diol 110-65-6 0.5 - - Carc
Buta-1,3-diene 106-99-0 1 2.2 - - Carc
Butan-1-ol 71-36-3 - - 50 154 Sk
Butan-2-ol 78-92-2 100 308 150 462
Butan-2-one
(methyl ethyl ketone)
78-93-3 200 600 300 899 Sk, BMGV
2-Butoxyethanol 111-76-2 25 123 50 246 Sk, BMGV
2-(2-Butoxyethoxy) ethanol 112-34-5 10 67.5 15 101.2
2-Butoxyethyl acetate 112-07-2 20 133 50 332 Sk
n-Butyl acrylate 141-32-2 1 5 5 26
n-Butyl chloroformate 592-34-7 1 5.7 - -
sec-Butyl acetate 105-46-4 200 966 250 1210
tert-Butyl acetate 540-88-5 200 966 250 1210
Butyl acetate 123-86-4 150 724 200 966
Butyl lactate 138-22-7 5 30 - -
2-sec-Butylphenol 89-72-5 5 31 - - Sk
Cadmium and cadmium
compounds except
cadmium oxide fume,
cadmium sulphide and
cadmium sulphide
pigments (as Cd)
- 0.025 - - Carc (cadmium
metal, cadmium
chloride, fluoride
and sulphate)
Page 4 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Cadmium oxide fume (as
Cd)
1306-19-0 - 0.025 - 0.05 Carc
Cadmium sulphide and
cadmium sulphide
pigments (respirable dust
(as Cd))
- 0.03 - - Carc (cadmium
sulphide)
Caesium hydroxide 21351-79-1 - 2 - -
Calcium carbonate
- inhalable dust
- respirable
1317-65-3
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Calcium cyanamide 156-62-7 - 0.5 - 1
Calcium hydroxide 1305-62-0 - 1 - 4 Respirable
fraction
Calcium oxide 1305-78-8 - 1 - 4 Respirable
fraction
Calcium silicate
- inhalable dust
- respirable
1344-95-2
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Captan (ISO) 133-06-2 - 5 - 15
Carbon black 1333-86-4 - 3.5 - 7
Carbon dioxide 124-38-9 5000 9150 15000 27400
Carbon disulphide 75-15-0 5 15 - - Sk
Carbon monoxide* 630-08-0 20
----------
30
23
-------------
35
100
-------
200
117
-------
232
BMGV
----------------------
Limits applicable
to underground
mining &
tunnelling
industries ONLY
until 21/8/23
Carbon tetrachloride 56-23-5 1 6.4 5 32 Sk
Cellulose
- respirable dusts
- inhalable
9004-34-6
-
-
10
4
-
-
20
-
Chlorine 7782-50-5 - - 0.5 1.5
Page 5 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Chlorine dioxide 10049-04-4 0.1 0.28 0.3 0.84
Chloroacetaldehyde 107-20-0 - - 1 3.3
2-Chloroacetophenone 532-27-4 0.05 0.32 - -
Chlorobenzene 108-90-7 1 4.7 3 14 Sk
Chlorodifluoromethane 75-45-6 1000 3590 - -
Chloroethane 75-00-3 50 134 - -
2-Chloroethanol 107-07-3 - - 1 3.4 Sk
1-Chloro-2,3epoxypropane
(Epichlorohydrin)
106-89-8 0.5 1.9 1.5 5.8 Carc
Chloroform 67-66-3 2 9.9 - - Sk
Chloromethane 74-87-3 50 105 100 210
1-Chloro-4-nitrobenzene 100-00-5 - 1 - 2 Sk
Chlorosulphonic acid 7790-94-5 - 1 - -
Chlorpyrifos (ISO) 2921-88-2 - 0.2 - 0.6 Sk
Chromium 7440-47-3 - 0.5 - -
Chromium (II) compounds
(as Cr)
- 0.5 - -
Chromium (III) compounds
(as Cr)
- 0.5 - -
Chromium (VI)
compounds (as Cr)
- 0.01
0.0251
(process
generated)1
- - Carc, sen,
BMGV
Cobalt and Cobalt
compounds (as Co)
- 0.1 - - Carc (cobalt
dichloride and
sulphate), Sen
Copper fume (as Cu) 7440-50-8 - 0.2 - -
Copper and compounds:
dust and mists (as Cu)
- 1 - 2
1 ‘Process generated’ refers to exposures to Chromium (VI) Compounds generated as a result of a work process, such
as fumes from welding.
Page 6 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Cotton dust
(see paras
19–21)
- 2.5 - -
Cryofluorane (INN) 76-14-2 1000 7110 1250 8890
Cumene 98-82-8 25 125 50 250 Sk
Cyanamide 420-04-2 0.58 1 - - Sk
Cyanides, except HCN,
cyanogen and cyanogen
chloride (as Cn)
- 5 - - Sk
Cyanogen chloride 506-77-4 - - 0.3 0.77
Cyclohexane 110-82-7 100 350 300 1050
Cyclohexanol 108-93-0 50 208 - -
Cyclohexanone 108-94-1 10 41 20 82 Sk, BMGV
Cyclohexylamine 108-91-8 10 41 - -
2,4-D (ISO) 94-75-7 - 10 - 20
Diacetyl 431-03-8 0.02 0.07 0.1 0.36
Dialkyl 79 phthalate 83968-18-7 - 5 - -
Diallyl phthalate 131-17-9 - 5 - -
Diatomaceous earth,
natural, respirable dust
61790-53-2 - 1.2 - -
Dibenzoyl peroxide 94-36-0 - 5 - -
Dibismuth tritelluride 1304-82-1 - 10 - 20
Diboron trioxide 1303-86-2 - 10 - 20
1,2-Dibromoethane
(Ethylene dibromide)
106-93-4 0.5 3.9 - - Carc, Sk
Dibutyl hydrogen
phosphate
107-66-4 1 8.7 2 17
Dibutyl phthalate 84-74-2 - 5 - 10
Dichloroacetylene 7572-29-4 - - 0.1 0.39
1,2-Dichlorobenzene
(ortho-dichlorobenzene)
95-50-1 25 153 50 306 Sk
Page 7 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
1,4 Dichlorobenzene
(para-dichlorobenzene)
106-46-7 2 12 10 60 Sk
1,3-Dichloro-5,5-
dimethylhydantoin
118-52-5 - 0.2 - 0.4
1,1-Dichloroethane 75-34-3 100 - - - Sk
1,2-Dichloroethane
(Ethylene dichloride)
107-06-2 5 21 - - Carc, Sk
1,2-Dichloroethylene,
cis:trans isomers 60:40
540-59-0 200 806 250 1010
Dichlorofluoromethane 75-43-4 10 43 - -
Dichloromethane 75-09-2 100 353 200 706 BMGV, Sk
2,2’-Dichloro-
4,4’methylene dianiline
(MbOCA)
101-14-4 - 0.005 - - Carc, Sk, BMGV
Dicyclohexyl phthalate 84-61-7 - 5 - -
Dicyclopentadiene 77-73-6 5 27 - -
Diethylamine 109-89-7 5 15 10 30
Diethyl ether 60-29-7 100 310 200 620
Diethyl phthalate 84-66-2 - 5 - 10
Diethyl sulphate 64-67-5 0.05 0.32 - - Carc, Sk
Dihydrogen selenide
(as Se)
7783-07-5 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.17
Diisobutyl phthalate 84-69-5 - 5 - -
Diisodecyl phthalate 26761-40-0 - 5 - -
Diisononyl phthalate 28553-12-0 - 5 - -
Diisooctyl phthalate 27554-26-3 - 5 - -
Diisopropylamine 108-18-9 5 21 - -
Diisopropyl ether 108-20-3 250 1060 310 1310
N,N-Dimethylacetamide 127-19-5 10 36 20 72 Sk, BMGV
N,N-Dimethylaniline 121-69-7 5 25 10 50 Sk
N,N-Dimethylethylamine 598-56-1 10 30 15 46
Page 8 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Dimethoxymethane 109-87-5 1000 3160 1250 3950
Dimethylamine 124-40-3 2 3.8 6 11
2-Dimethylaminoethanol 108-01-0 2 7.4 6 22
Dimethyl ether 115-10-6 400 766 500 958
N,N-Dimethylformamide 68-12-2 5 15 10 30 Sk
2,6-Dimethylheptan-4-one 108-83-8 25 148 - -
Dimethyl phthalate 131-11-3 - 5 - 10
Dimethyl sulphate 77-78-1 0.05 0.26 - - Carc, Sk
Dinitrobenzene, all
isomers
25154-54-5 0.15 1 0.5 3.5 Sk
Dinonyl phthalate 84-76-4 - 5 - -
1,4-Dioxane 123-91-1 20 73 - - Sk
Diphenylamine 122-39-4 - 10 - 20
Diphenyl ether 101-84-8 1 7 2 14
Diphosphorus
pentasulphide
1314-80-3 - 1 - 2
Disphosphorus pentoxide 1314-56-3 - 1 - 2
Diquat dibromide (ISO) 85-00-7 - 0.5 - 1
Disodium disulphite 7681-57-4 - 5 - -
Disodium tetraborate,
anhydrous
1330-43-4 - 1 - -
Disodium tetraborate,
decahydrate
1330-96-4 - 5 - -
Disodium tetraborate,
pentahydrate
11130-12-4 - 1 - -
Disulphur dichloride 10025-67-9 - - 1 5.6
2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol 128-37-0 - 10 - -
6,6’-Di-tert-butyl-4,4’thiodi-
m-cresol
96-69-5 - 10 - 20
Diuron (ISO) 330-54-1 - 10 - -
Page 9 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Emery
- inhalable dust
- respirable
1302-74-5
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Endosulfan (ISO) 115-29-7 - 0.1 - 0.3 Sk
Enflurane 13838-16-9 50 383 - -
Ethane-1,2-diol
- particulate
- vapour
107-21-1
-
20
10
52
-
40
-
104
Sk
Ethanethiol 75-08-1 0.5 1.3 2 5.2
Ethanol 64-17-5 1000 1920 - -
2-Ethoxyethanol 110-80-5 2 8 - - Sk
2-Ethoxyethyl acetate 111-15-9 2 11 - - Sk
2-ethylhexan-1-ol 104-76-7 1 5.4
2-Ethylhexyl chloroformate 24468-13-1 1 8 - -
Ethyl acetate 141-78-6 200 734 400 1468
Ethyl acrylate 140-88-5 5 21 10 42
Ethylamine 75-04-7 2 3.8 6 11
Ethylbenzene 100-41-4 100 441 125 552 Sk
Ethyl chloroformate 541-41-3 1 4.5 - -
Ethyl cyanoacrylate 7085-85-0 - - 0.3 1.5
Ethyl formate 109-94-4 100 308 150 462
Ethylene oxide 75-21-8 1 1.8 - - Carc, Sk
4-Ethylmorpholine 100-74-3 5 24 20 96 Sk
Ferrous foundry
particulate
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Flour dust See para 25 - 10 - 30 Sen
Fluoride (inorganic as F) 16984-48-8 - 2.5 - -
Fluorine 7782-41-4 1 1.6 1 1.6
Page 10 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Formaldehyde 50-00-0 2 2.5 2 2.5
Formamide 75-12-7 20 37 30 56
Formic acid 64-18-6 5 9.6 - -
2-Furaldehyde (furfural) 98-01-1 2 8 5 20 Sk
Germane 7782-65-2 0.2 0.64 0.6 1.9
Glutaraldehyde 111-30-8 0.05 0.2 0.05 0.2 Sen
Glycerol, mist 56-81-5 - 10 - -
Glycerol trinitrate 55-63-0 0.01 0.095 0.02 0.19 Sk
Grain dust See para 26 - 10 - - Sen
Graphite
- inhalable dust
- respirable
7440-44-0
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Gypsum
- inhalable dust
- respirable
10101-41-4
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Halogeno-platinum
compounds (complex co-
ordination compounds in
which the platinum atom is
directly co-ordinated to
halide groups) (as Pt)
See paras
27–28
- 0.002 - - Sen
Halothane 151-67-7 10 82 - -
Hardwood dust
(inhalable fraction)
See paras
41–42
- 3 - - Carc, Sen,
If hardwood
dusts are mixed
with other wood
dusts, the WEL
shall apply to
all the wood
dusts present in
that mixture.
n-Heptane 142-82-5 500 2085 - -
Heptan-2-one 110-43-0 50 237 100 475 Sk
Heptan-3-one 106-35-4 35 166 100 475 Sk
n-Hexane 110-54-3 20 72 - -
Page 11 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
1,6-Hexanolactam
dust only dust
and vapour
105-60-2
-
-
1
10
-
-
3
20
Hexan-2-one 591-78-6 5 21 - - Sk
Hydrazine 302-01-2 0.01 0.013 0.1 0.13 Carc, Sk
Hydrogen bromide 10035-10-6 - - 3 10
Hydrogen chloride
(gas and aerosol mists)
7647-01-0 1 2 5 8
Hydrogen cyanide 74-90-8 0.9 1 4.5 5 Sk
Hydrogen fluoride (as F) 7664-39-3 1.8 1.5 3 2.5
Hydrogen peroxide 7722-84-1 1 1.4 2 2.8
Hydrogen sulphide 7783-06-4 5 7 10 14
Hydroquinone 123-31-9 - 0.5 - -
4-Hydroxy-4methylpentan-
2-one
123-42-2 50 241 75 362
2-Hydroxypropyl acrylate 999-61-1 0.5 2.7 - - Sk
2,2’-Iminodi(ethylamine) 111-40-0 1 4.3 - - Sk
Indene 95-13-6 10 48 15 72
Indium and compounds
(as In)
- 0.1 0 0.3
Iodine 7553-56-2 - - 0.1 1.1
Iodoform 75-47-8 0.6 9.8 1 16
Iodomethane 74-88-4 2 12 - - Sk
Iron oxide, fume (as Fe) 1309-37-1 - 5 - 10
Iron salts (as Fe) - 1 - 2
Isobutyl acetate 110-19-0 150 724 187 903
Isocyanates, all (as –NCO)
Except methyl isocyanate
-
-
0.02 -
-
0.07 Sen
Isoflurane 26675-46-7 50 383 - -
Isoocytl alcohol (mixed
isomers)
26952-21-6 50 271 - -
Page 12 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Isopentane 78-78-4 600 1800 - -
Isopropyl acetate 108-21-4 - - 200 849
Isopropyl chloroformate 108-23-6 1 5.1 - -
Kaolin, respirable dust 1332-58-7 - 2 - -
Ketene 463-51-4 0.5 0.87 1.5 2.6
Limestone
- total inhalable
- respirable
1317-65-3
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Liquefied petroleum gas 68476-85-7 1000 1750 1250 2180 Carc (only
applies if LPG
contains more
than 0.1% of
buta-1,3-diene)
Lithium hydride 7580-67-8 - - 0.02
Lithium hydroxide 1310-65-2 - - - 1
Magnesite
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
546-93-0
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Magnesium oxide (as Mg)
- inhalable dust
- fume and respirable dust
1309-48-4
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Malathion (ISO) 121-75-5 - 10 - - Sk
Maleic anhydride 108-31-6 - 1 - 3 Sen
Manganese and its
inorganic compounds (as
Mn)
-
-
0.2
0.05
-
-
-
-
Inhalable fraction
Respirable
fraction
Marble
- total inhalable
- respirable
1317-65-3
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Mercaptoacetic acid 68-11-1 1 3.8 - -
Mercury and divalent
inorganic compounds
including mercuric oxide
and mercuric chloride
(measured as mercury)
- 0.02 - -
Page 13 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Methacrylic acid 79-41-4 20 72 40 143
Methacrylonitrile 126-98-7 1 2.8 - - Sk
Methanethiol 74-93-1 0.5 1.0 - -
Methanol 67-56-1 200 266 250 333 Sk
2-Methoxyethanol 109-86-4 1 3 - - Sk
2-(2-Methoxyethoxy)
ethanol
111-77-3 10 50.1 - - Sk
2-Methoxyethyl acetate 110-49-6 1 5 - - Sk
(2-methoxymethylethoxy)
propanol
34590-94-8 50 308 - - Sk
1-Methoxypropan-2-ol 107-98-2 100 375 150 560 Sk
1-Methoxypropyl acetate 108-65-6 50 274 100 548 Sk
Methyl acetate 79-20-9 200 616 250 770
Methyl acrylate 96-33-3 5 18 10 36
3-Methylbutan-1-ol 123-51-3 100 366 125 458
Methyl cyanoacrylate 137-05-3 - - 0.3 1.4
Methyl formate 107-31-3 50 125 100 250 Sk
4,4’-Methylenedianiline 101-77-9 0.01 0.08 - - Carc, Sk, BMGV
Methyl ethyl ketone
peroxides (MEKP)
1338-23-4 - - 0.2 1.5
Methyl methacrylate 80-62-6 50 208 100 416
2-Methylcyclohexanone 583-60-8 50 233 75 350
Methylcyclohexanol 25639-42-3 50 237 75 356
Methyl isocyanate
(as –NCO) 624-83-9
0.02
Sen
N-Methylaniline 100-61-8 0.5 2.2 - - Sk
n-Methyl-2-pyrrolidone 872-50-4 10 40 20 80 Sk
5-Methylheptan-3-one 541-85-5 10 53 20 107
5-Methylhexan-2-one 110-12-3 20 95 100 475 Sk
2-Methylpentane-2,4-diol 107-41-5 25 123 25 123
Page 14 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
4-Methylpentan-2-ol 108-11-2 25 106 40 170 Sk
4-Methylpentan-2-one 108-10-1 50 208 100 416 Sk, BMGV
2-Methylpropan-1-ol 78-83-1 50 154 75 231
2-Methylpropan-2-ol 75-65-0 100 308 150 462
Methyl-tert-butyl-ether 1634-04-4 50 183.5 100 367
Mica
- total inhalable
- respirable
12001-26-2
-
-
10
0.8
-
-
-
-
MMMF (Machine-made
mineral fibre) (except for
refractory ceramic fibres
and special purpose
fibres)
5mg.
m-3 and
2 fibres/
millilitre
Molybdenum compounds
(as Mo)
- soluble compounds
- insoluble compounds
-
-
5
10
-
-
10
20
Monochloroacetic acid 79-11-8 0.3 1.2 - - Sk
Morpholine 110-91-8 10 36 20 72 Sk
Neopentane 463-82-1 600 1800 - -
Nickel and its inorganic
compounds (except nickel
tetracarbonyl):
- water-soluble nickel
compounds (as Ni)
- nickel and water-
insoluble nickel
compounds (as Ni)
-
-
0.1
0.5
-
-
-
-
Sk, Carc
(nickel oxides
and sulphides)
Sen (nickel
sulphate)
Nicotine 54-11-5 - 0.5 - 1.5 Sk
Nitric acid 7697-37-2 - - 1 2.6
Nitrobenzene 98-95-3 0.2 1 - - Sk
Nitroethane 79-24-3 20 62 100 312 Sk
Nitrogen dioxide* 10102-44-0 0.5 0.96 1 1.91 Does not apply
to underground
mining and
tunnelling
industries until
Page 15 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
21/8/23
Nitrogen monoxide* 10102-43-9 2
----------
25
2.5
------------
30
---------
---------
----------------------
Limits applicable
to underground
mining &
tunnelling
industries ONLY
until 21/8/23
Nitromethane 75-52-5 100 254 150 381
2-Nitropropane 79-46-9 5 18 - - Carc
Nitrous oxide 10024-97-2 100 183 - -
Orthophosphoric acid 7664-38-2 - 1 - 2
Osmium tetraoxide (as
Os)
20816-12-0 0.0002 0.002 0.0006 0.006
Oxalic acid 144-62-7 - 1 - 2
2,2’-Oxydiethanol 111-46-6 23 101 - -
Ozone 10028-15-6 - - 0.2 0.4
Paracetamol,
inhalable dust
103-90-2 - 10 - -
Paraffin wax, fume 8002-74-2 - 2 - 6
Paraquat dichloride (ISO),
respirable dust
1910-42-5 - 0.08 - -
Pentacarbonyliron (as Fe) 13463-40-6 0.01 0.08 - -
Pentaerythritol
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
115-77-5
-
-
10
4
-
-
20
-
Pentan-2-one 107-87-9 200 716 250 895
Pentan-3-one 96-22-0 200 716 250 895
Pentane 109-66-0 600 1800 - -
Pentyl acetates
(all isomers)
50 270 100 541
2-Phenylpropene 98-83-9 50 246 100 491
Page 16 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Phenol 108-95-2 2 7.8 4 16 Sk
p-Phenylenediamine 106-50-3 - 0.1 - - Sk
Phorate (ISO) 298-02-2 - 0.05 - 0.2 Sk
Phosgene 75-44-5 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.25
Phosphine 7803-51-2 0.1 0.14 0.2 0.28
Phosphorus pentachloride 10026-13-8 0.1 0.87 0.2 2
Phosphorus trichloride 7719-12-2 0.2 1.1 0.5 2.9
Phosphorus, yellow 7723-14-0 - 0.1 - 0.3
Phosphoryl trichloride 10025-87-3 0.2 1.3 0.6 3.8
Phthalic anhydride 85-44-9 - 4 - 12 Sen
Picloram (ISO) 1918-02-1 - 10 - 20
Picric acid 88-89-1 - 0.1 - 0.3
Piperazine 110-85-0 - 0.1 - 0.3 Sen
Piperazine dihydrochloride 142-64-3 - 0.1 - 0.3 Sen
Piperidine 110-89-4 1 3.5 - - Sk
Plaster of Paris
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
26499-65-0
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Platinum compounds,
soluble (except certain
halogeno-Pt compounds)
(as Pt)
- 0.002 - -
Platinum metal 7440-06-4 - 5 - -
Polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB)
1336-36-3 - 0.1 - - Sk
Polyvinyl chloride
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
9002-86-2
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Portland cement
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
65997-15-1
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Potassium cyanide (as
cyanide)
151-50-8 1 5 Sk
Page 17 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Potassium hydroxide 1310-58-3 - - - 2
Propane-1,2-diol
- total vapour and
particulates
- particulates
57-55-6
150
-
474
10
-
-
-
-
Propan-1-ol 71-23-8 200 500 250 625 Sk
Propan-2-ol 67-63-0 400 999 500 1250
Propionic acid 79-09-4 10 31 15 46
Propoxur (ISO) 114-26-1 - 0.5 - 2
Propranolol 525-66-6 - 2 - 6
n-Propyl acetate 109-60-4 200 849 250 1060
Propylene oxide 75-56-9 1 2.4 - - Carc
Prop-2-yn-1-ol 107-19-7 1 2.3 3 7 Sk
Pulverised fuel ash
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Pyrethrum (purified of
sensitising lactones)
8003-34-7 - 1 - -
Pyridine 110-86-1 5 16 10 33
2-Pyridylamine 504-29-0 0.5 2 2 7.8
Pyrocatechol 102-80-9 5 23 - -
Refractory ceramic fibres
and special purpose fibres
- total inhalable dust
- respirable fraction
5mg.m-3
0.3 fibre/millilitre
- - Carc
Resorcinol 108-46-3 10 46 20 92 Sk
Rhodium (as Rh)
- metal fume and dust
- soluble salts
-
-
0.1
0.001
-
-
0.3
0.003
Rosin-based solder
flux fume
8050-09-7 - 0.05 - 0.15 Sen
Rotenone (ISO) 83-79-4 - 5 - 10
Page 18 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Rouge
- total inhalable
- respirable
1309-37-1
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Rubber fume See paras
33–37
- 0.6 - - Carc, limit
relates to
cyclohexane
soluble material
Rubber process dust See paras
33–37
- 6 - - Carc
Selenium and compounds,
except hydrogen selenide
(as Se)
- 0.1 - -
Silane 7803-62-5 0.5 0.67 1 1.3
Silica, amorphous
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
-
-
6
2.4
-
-
-
-
Silica, respirable
crystalline
(respirable fraction)
- 0.1 - - Carc (where
generated as a
result of a work
process)
Silica, fused respirable
dust
60676-86-0 - 0.08 - -
Silicon
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
7440-21-3
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Silicon carbide
(not whiskers)
- total inhalable
- respirable
409-21-2
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Silver (soluble compounds
as Ag)
- 0.01 - -
Silver, metallic 7440-22-4 - 0.1 - -
Sodium azide
(as NaN3)
26628-22-8 - 0.1 - 0.3 Sk
Sodium 2-
(2,4-dichlorophenoxy)
ethyl sulphate
136-78-7 - 10 - 20
Page 19 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Sodium cyanide 143-33-9 1 5 Sk
Sodium hydrogen sulphite 7631-90-5 - 5 - -
Sodium hydroxide 1310-73-2 - - - 2
Softwood dust See paras
41-42
- 5 - - Sen,
If softwood
dusts are mixed
with hardwood dusts, the WEL
for hardwood
dusts shall
apply to all the
wood dusts
present in that
mixture.
Starch
- total inhalable
- respirable
9005-25-8
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Styrene 100-42-5 100 430 250 1080
Subtilisins 1395-21-7
(Bacillus
subtilis BPN)
9014-01-1
(Bacillus
subtilis
Carlsberg)
- 0.00004 - - Sen
Sucrose 57-50-1 - 10 - 20
Sulfotep (ISO) 3689-24-5 - 0.1 - - Sk
Sulphur dioxide 7446-09-5 0.5 1.3 1 2.7
Sulphur hexafluoride 2551-62-4 1000 6070 1250 7590
Sulphuric acid (mist) 7664-93-9 0.05 The mist is
defined as the
thoracic fraction
Sulphuryl difluoride 2699-79-8 5 21 10 42
Talc, respirable dust 14807-96-6 - 1 - -
Page 20 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Tantalum 7440-25-7 - 5 - 10
Tellurium and compounds,
except hydrogen telluride
(as Te)
- 0.1 - -
Terphenyls, all isomers 26140-60-3 - - 0.5 4.8
Terphenyl, hydrogenated 61788-32-7 2 19 5 48
1,1,2,2-Tetrabromoethane 79-27-6 0.5 7.2 - - Sk
Tertiary-butyl-methylether 1634-04-4 50 183.5 100 367
Tetracarbonylnickel (as Ni) 13463-39-3 - - 0.1 0.24
Tetrachloroethylene 127-18-4 20 138 40 275 Sk
Tetraethyl orthosilicate 78-10-4 5 44
1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane
(HFC 134a)
811-97-2 1000 4240 - -
Tetrahydrofuran 109-99-9 50 150 100 300 Sk
Tetrasodium
pyrophosphate
7722-88-5 - 5 - -
Thallium, soluble
compounds (as TI)
- 0.1 - - Sk
Thionyl chloride 7719-09-7 - - 1 4.9
Tin compounds, inorganic
except SnH4, (as Sn)
- 2 - 4
Tin compounds, organic,
except Cyhexatin (ISO),
(as Sn)
- 0.1 - 0.2 Sk
Titanium dioxide
- total inhalable
- respirable
13463-67-7
-
-
10
4
-
-
-
-
Toluene 108-88-3 50 191 100 384 Sk
p-Toluenesulphonyl
chloride
98-59-9 - - - 5
o-Toluidine 95-53-4 0.1 0.5 - - Carc, Sk
Tributyl phosphate,
all isomers
126-73-8 - 5 - 5
Page 21 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene 120-82-1 1 - 5 - Sk
1,1,1-Trichloroethane 71-55-6 100 555 200 1110
Trichloroethylene 79-01-6 100 550 150 820 Carc, Sk
Trichloronitromethane 76-06-2 0.1 0.68 0.3 2.1
Triethylamine 121-44-8 2 8 4 17 Sk
Triglycidyl isocyanurate
(TGIC)
2451-62-9 - 0.1 - - Carc
Trimellitic anhydride 552-30-7 - 0.04 - 0.12 Sen
Trimethylbenzenes, all
isomers or mixtures
25551-13-7 25 125 - -
3,5,5-trimethylcyclohex-
2enone
78-59-1 - - 5 29
Trimethyl phosphite 121-45-9 2 10 - -
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene 118-96-7 - 0.5 - - Sk
Tri-o-tolyl phosphate 78-30-8 - 0.1 - 0.3
Triphenyl phosphate 115-86-6 - 3 - 6
Tungsten and compounds
(as W)
- soluble compounds
- insoluble compounds and
others
7440-33-7
-
-
1
5
-
-
3
10
Turpentine 8006-64-2 100 566 150 850
Vanadium pentoxide 1314-62-1 - 0.05 - -
Vinyl acetate 108-05-4 5 17.6 10 35.2
Vinyl chloride 75-01-4 1 2.6 - - Carc
Vinylidene chloride 75-35-4 2 8 5 20
Wool process dust See para 43 - 10 - -
Xylene, o-,m-,p- or mixed
isomers
1330-20-7 50 220 100 441 Sk, BMGV
Yttrium 7440-65-5 - 1 - 3
Zinc chloride, fume 7646-85-7 - 1 - 2
Page 22 of 22
Substance CAS Number Workplace exposure limit Comments
Long-term exposure
limit
(8-hr TWA reference
period
Short-term
exposure limit
(15-minute
reference period)
The Carc, Sen
and Sk notations
are not
exhaustive.
ppm mg.m-3 ppm mg.m-3
Zinc distearate
- inhalable dust
- respirable dust
557-05-1
-
-
10
4
-
-
20
-
Zirconium compounds
(as Zr)
- 5 - 10
*The 4th IOELV Directive recognised that there are specific challenges in relation to the limits
for carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and nitrogen monoxide for the underground mining and
tunnelling industries. In recognition of the challenges in these industries the Directive
includes an additional transitional period for these substances in these industries until 2023.
Page 1 of 4
Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/36
Meeting Date: 11 September 2019 FOI Status: Open
Type of Paper: For decision Exemptions:
CM9 Reference: 2019/250074
Consultation on Approved Code of Practice supporting the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019
(REPPIR19) – Consultation Outcome and Response
Kären Clayton
FOR DECISION
The Board is invited:
To consider and comment on the evaluation and response to the consultation
on the proposed Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) supporting the new
Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019
(REPPIR 19) at Annex A (summarised at paras 10 – 11 below);
To approve the proposed ACOP text at Annex B; and
Note the next steps, specifically:
o Seeking the Minister’s consent to publish the ACOP (para 14); and
o The arrangements for publishing the ACOP and guidance (para 14).
KEY INFORMATION
Background
1. Transposition of the emergency preparedness and response requirements of the Basic Safety Standards Directive (BSSD) has been through the repeal and replacement of REPPIR 2001 with REPPIR 19. The transposition is led by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), with close support from HSE, The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). REPPIR makes arrangements for the assessment of nuclear and radiological emergency scenarios, the consequences of these scenarios and the production where appropriate of on-site (operator-owned) and off-site (Local Authority (LA) owned) emergency plans, along with providing information to the public in these off-site planning zones. Operators and LAs are co-duty holders under REPPIR.
2. REPPIR 19 came into force 22 May 2019 and contains provisions for a 12month transition period for compliance with duties for those duty holders already subject to the previous REPPIR requirements. The Regulations are made under The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. They will be supported by a publication of guidance and ACOP.
3. The previous REPPIR 2001 was supported only by Guidance on Regulations, a statement of good practice which, if followed, usually means a duty holder will be doing enough to comply with the law. However, we believe that the introduction of an ACOP for REPPIR19 is justified. An ACOP is statutory guidance, and therefore different to good practice guidance. If a duty holder
Page 2 of 4
follows an ACOP they will be meeting their statutory duties. If they do not follow the advice in ACOP they may still meet their duties, but it will be for them to demonstrate the approach they have taken is equivalent and meets the expected standards. The burden of proof is in effect reversed.
4. For this reason, ACOPs tend to be used sparingly within an outcome-focussed and goal-setting legislative framework in which duty holders are expected, and given the freedom, to think about their approach to demonstrating compliance, so as to encourage active management and continuous improvement.
5. Previous Board papers have explained why we believe introducing an ACOP is justified (most recently HSE/19/12). In summary, the decision to publish an ACOP to support REPPIR19 is designed to reflect the policy approach to the transposition and to ensure greater consistency to both the assessment of emergency scenarios and the resultant emergency planning arrangements across the civil nuclear, non-nuclear and defence sectors.
Development of the supporting publication
6. Work on the proposed ACOP (and associated guidance) has been led by ONR who have the expertise in nuclear and radiological emergency planning. A Steering Group, established by ONR to ensure stakeholder needs are met, has overseen the work, although drafting has been carried out by technical experts within ONR. The Steering Group included representatives from duty holders (operators and LAs); HSE; MOD; The Scottish Government; BEIS; and Public Health England. The Group has met frequently over the past two years.
Consultation Process
7. ONR managed the consultation on behalf of HSE which ran for 8 weeks from 10 April 2019 to 5 June 2019, with an extra 3 weeks for LAs to respond as the launch was during their pre-election period this year.
8. Two stakeholder events were run during the consultation for both licensed operator and LA duty holders, one in London and one in Glasgow. These were free and arranged by the Society for Radiological Protection. Almost 100 attended across both events. HSE also ran a webinar for the duty holders in the non-nuclear sector and their LAs, with over 50 duty holders joining.
9. ONR officials have produced the report of the consultation at Annex A with close support from HSE. HSE officials are content the report fairly reflects the consultation responses.
Consultation Outcome and Response
10. Substantive responses to the consultation were received from nearly 50 organisations/individuals representing a wide range of sectors with most comments from duty holders, broadly equally split between operators and Local Authorities. The bulk of the technical comments came from operators, which was anticipated as the ACOP is technically complex.
11. In relation to the specific questions, the following common themes emerged:
Overall responses supported the introduction of ACOP to aid duty holder compliance with REPPIR 19;
Responses on the ACOP associated with Regulations 4-7 (Hazard Evaluation, Consequence Assessment and Consequences Report) and
Page 3 of 4
Schedule 3 (Assessment of Consequences Requirement) made up almost 50% of the responses;
A number of respondents requested additional wording on describing the adequacy of the operator’s emergency plan;
Contradictory responses for some of the specific questions were evident perhaps reflecting issues with clarity of the draft ACOP, which have been addressed in revisions to the proposed text; and
A number of respondents were concerned the proposed ACOP required a disproportionate and unnecessary amount of detail in some of the reports to be submitted to the regulator.
12. HSE officials are content that the issues raised by those who responded to the consultation have been addressed with amendments which clarify and/or simplify the ACOP text as appropriate. Colleagues in BEIS and MOD are similarly content, as too is the Steering Group (which includes duty holder representatives) who oversaw the drafting of the text.
13. The Board is asked to note and comment on this summary and the report of consultation at Annex A.
Publication of Code of Practice and Guidance
14. Following HSE Board approval we will seek Ministerial consent to publish. The ACOP and guidance publication will be an HSE ACOP and guidance publication which we aim to publish September - October 2019 as a downloadable pdf from the ONR website clearly signposted from HSE’s website. A hardcopy priced publication will also be available.
Timing
15. The Board is asked to consider and approve the proposed ACOP text at Annex B so Ministerial consent can be sought for publication in September – October 2019.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND BUSINESS RISKS/OPPORTUNITIES
16. The development of ACOP (and guidance) is funded from within existing budgets, with BEIS funding the ONR drafting team. Joint HSE/ONR working on the package has reduced the resource HSE would have otherwise needed to complete the work. The impact on duty holders of introducing ACOP was accounted for in the final de minimis impact assessment published in October 2018 as part of the Government’s Response to the consultation on the policy approach to transposition. This impact was rolled-up into an overall one-off, Year 1 familiarisation cost.
17. During development there has been some misunderstanding by some stakeholders of the role and purpose of an ACOP and this has been reflected in some of the consultation responses. This is a perception issue we will continue to manage by clear explanatory communication.
IMPACT ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS/REGIONS
18. The new Regulations do not apply in Northern Ireland who have made their own REPPIR19 as they did with REPPIR 2001. HSENI currently have no plans
Page 4 of 4
to introduce any supporting guidance material. Officials continue to work together. The Regulations and supporting ACOP and guidance apply across Great Britain and the Scottish and Welsh Administrations have been involved in the development of both. There are no specific Devolved impacts, and the Regulations and ACOP are drafted to reflect the differing approaches in for example, emergency services, Local Government and public health arrangements.
HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS
19. Extensive consultation with duty holders and other key stakeholders has taken place throughout the development of this ACOP and guidance material. The primary forum has been the Steering Group developing the material but we have shared drafts more widely with duty holders. HSE specifically alerted 35 non-nuclear operators across 17 LAs to the consultation and availability of material as HSE’s records suggest these duty holders in particular may have more significant duties under REPPIR19. We noted particular engagement activities with them in paragraph 8. The civil nuclear and defence sectors used the operator and LA forums to alert duty holders.
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION CONSIDERATIONS
20. The ACOP and guidance publication provides advice for duty holders considering for example, vulnerable populations as part of their determination of planning zones and the preparedness and response arrangements. The provision of information to persons living in planning zones will also need to reflect inclusivity considerations.
CLEARED BY: Kären Clayton, Director Chemicals Regulation Division, Redgrave Court BOOTLE; Email [email protected]
Contact: Clare McNicholas; HSE Radiation Policy; Redgrave Court, BOOTLE: Tel: 020 3028 4844
ANNEX A
Response to the Consultation on Proposed Approved Code of Practice for the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019
Executive Summary Directive 2013/59/EURATOM lays down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. As part of the transposition, the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 20191 (REPPIR 19) were laid in parliament on 27th March 2019. To accompany the Regulations, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has produced an Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). ONR consulted on the ACOP between 10th April and 5th June 2019, with an extension until the 27th June 2019 for Local Authorities to account for the local election period, to seek views on:
the usefulness and clarity of the proposed ACOP in helping dutyholders meet legal duties (Q1 – Q2);
specific areas of the ACOP (Q3 – Q7); and
any impacts with the introduction of ACOP (Q8).
In total, responses were received from 47 organisations/individuals representing a wide range of sectors including:
industry;
local and national government;
category 1 responders2;
consultants;
non-departmental public bodies;
non-governmental organisations; and
professional bodies. The highest proportion of comments were from dutyholders (28), broadly split between
operators and Local Authorities, with the bulk of the technical comments coming from
operators. This was anticipated as some of the ACOP is technically complex.
Analysis of the consultation responses, in relation to the specific questions, identified the
following common themes:
Overall responses supported the inclusion of ACOP to aid dutyholders’ compliance
with REPPIR 19.
1 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/703/contents/made
2 Category 1 responders as defined in the Civil Contingences Act – such as Blue Lights emergency
services
Reponses on the ACOP associated with regulations 4-7 (Hazard Evaluation,
Consequence Assessment and Consequences Report) and schedule 3 (Assessment
of Consequences Requirements) made up almost 50% of the responses.
A number of respondents requested further guidance on what variable factors
needed to be considered in developing an adequate operator’s plan.
Contradictory responses for some of the specific questions were evident, and where
we were able to we sought clarification; we considered this reflected on the clarity of
the ACOP and we addressed these issues in revisions to proposed ACOP text.
A number of respondents were concerned that the ACOP required a disproportionate
and unnecessary amount of detail in some of the reports to be submitted to the
regulator.
Overall, the responses to the consultation have shaped the ACOP to make it more user
friendly and led to improved clarity and focus in a number of areas. We have paid particular
attention to specific comments made on regulations 4-7 and schedule 3; making extensive
modifications to both the structure and the wording of the ACOP to improve the logical flow
of the text. For instance, our expectations on how the operator should conduct the hazard
evaluation and on what basis they should advise the Local Authorities on the most
appropriate technical distance for a Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), have been
more clearly articulated. To further aid understanding we have added an extra flow diagram
in the guidance to illustrate the process.
Where contradictory comments were made we have either modified the wording to aid
understanding of the proposed ACOP text or provided additional guidance where further
ACOP was not considered appropriate. For example, we have restructured and simplified
the text of the ACOP for regulation 8 and added a definition of a DEPZ in the guidance.
Where necessary, we have sought clarification of comments to ensure we fully understood
their intent.
Other areas where we have added, or modified, text relate to regulations 10, 11 and 12 on
the contents and adequacy of emergency plans and testing thereof; regulation 15 on
cooperation between employers; and regulation 8(6) on how to determine whether a new
development in the local area constitutes a change which requires a re-determination of the
detailed emergency planning zone. In addition, the ACOP associated with reporting of
assessments made under regulations 4 and 7 has been revised to enable operators to
reference, as far as possible, their existing safety justifications.
Introduction This report presents the response to the outcome of the public consultation on the ACOP that supports the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019. ONR produced the draft ACOP and managed the consultation on behalf of HSE. The REPPIR 2001 Regulations were supported by guidance alone, with no ACOP. The decision to introduce ACOP to support REPPIR 2019 reflects both changes to the policy intent for nuclear and radiological emergency planning in Great Britain and associated changes in Regulations. The purpose of introducing the ACOP is to ensure greater consistency in the planning process, for example in the assessment of emergency scenarios and the setting of detailed emergency planning zones, which will now be set by the Local Authority rather than the Regulator. Together, these changes suggest a role for statutory guidance through ACOP to assist both operator and Local Authority dutyholders by setting out a preferred approach to complying with their legal duties. The ACOP is statutory guidance. If a dutyholder follows the ACOP, they will be meeting their statutory duties. If they do not follow the advice in the ACOP, they may still be meeting their duties, but it will be for the dutyholder to demonstrate the approach they have taken is equivalent to the ACOP and therefore meets these expected standards. In effect, the burden of proof is reversed. The REPPIR ACOP was developed and drafted, wherever possible, in line with the following principles which are common to all ACOPs issued by HSE:
The means, methods or standards are those that dutyholders are normally expected to use/meet to achieve compliance;
The nature of the issue being addressed means that in most cases dutyholders are strongly encouraged to pursue the approach the ACOP material describes i.e. the ACOP should be relevant to all sectors;
The ACOP expands upon a duty in the Regulations without replicating any requirements elsewhere in the Regulations, and does not introduce a new duty;
The ACOP is short, clear, concise, specific and unambiguous. It should not link to other sites or publications, nor have much if any explanatory material or contain examples; and
HSE and/or ONR must have vires in that area. The Regulations and ACOP are accompanied by more detailed guidance which provides further information and examples of relevant good practice. Three general and five specific questions were asked within the consultation
document3 and are set out in the analysis of responses below. In particular, ONR sought views on:
Whether stakeholders understood the ACOP (question 1);
3 http://www.onr.org.uk/consultations/2019/reppir-2019/reppir-acop-consultation-document.pdf
Whether the ACOP provided clear advice in its totality (question 2), and in particular the sections covering the Local Authority’s duty to determine the detailed emergency planning zone (question 3); testing emergency plans (question 5); and publication of the consequences report (question 6);
Whether all variable factors to be considered in preparing the operator’s emergency plan had been included (question 4);
Whether dutyholders agreed with the proposed process for calculating the minimum distance from which to determine the detailed emergency planning zone (question 7); and
Whether there were any impacts on introducing the new ACOP that HSE or ONR should be made aware of (question 8).
Previous communications with stakeholders
In drafting the ACOP in the consultation document, ONR took advice from the REPPIR Guidance Development Steering Group (RGDSG) in developing the scope and content of the document. The RGDSG, which was chaired by ONR, consisted of representatives from:
HSE;
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS);
the Ministry of Defence (MoD);
the nuclear industry, in the form of the Chair and Deputy Chair of the Nuclear Emergency Arrangements Forum (NEAF);
Local Authorities, in the form of the Chair of the Local Authorities Working Group (LAWG) on radiation emergency matters;
Public Health England, Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (PHE CRCE);
the emergency services, in the form of the Chair of the Blue Lights Working Group (BLWG);
The Welsh Government;
The Scottish Government; and
ONR’s ACOP and guidance drafting team. The group met 23 times from April 2017 to support the development of the ACOP and supporting guidance, noting that detailed work, particularly on ACOP, could not start until the Regulations were available in draft form (in September 2018). Early drafts of the ACOP were shared amongst the members of the RGDSG but also more widely across both industry and Local Authority dutyholders. Written comments were sought and received from 20 different organisations on these early drafts which assisted in the development of the version that was later issued for the statutory public consultation. A steer was sought from the RGDSG at its meeting held on 3-4th July 2019 (i.e. following the consultation) on areas where there had been disagreement between the consultees. Any decisions that were made based on the advice provided by the RGDSG are reflected in the analysis of responses below.
Public consultation The formal public consultation ran for eight weeks from 10th April 2019 until 5th June 2019. The period was extended for Local Authorities until 27th June 2019, as some of the consultation took place during the pre-election period for local government. The launch of the public consultation was communicated via the ONR website and was sign-posted on the HSE website. Additionally, e-mails were sent to stakeholders with a particular interest including known dutyholders, Local Authorities and non-governmental organisations. Only comments received by email or in writing were considered in making changes to the ACOP. Any comments provided on the Regulations themselves were discounted as the Regulations completed parliamentary process on 22nd May 2019 and came into force on that day. Where comments were received that did not directly refer to the questions asked, they were nevertheless considered against the relevant parts of the ACOP. All comments received were collated and considered as having equal status. Where we have received specific comments on the ACOP that have resulted in changes, other than editorial, we have noted this in the response below. Where we considered it was not appropriate to modify the ACOP we have added guidance to support understanding and noted this in the response too. Our response is designed to be read in conjunction with the consultative document: http://www.onr.org.uk/consultations/2019/reppir-2019/reppir-ACOP-consultation-document.pdf Consultation events HSE ran a webinar focusing on its dutyholders on 15th May 2019. The purpose of the event was to introduce the draft REPPIR ACOP and provide an opportunity for dutyholders to ask questions. A series of presentations were provided followed by questions and answers. Around 50 operators and Local Authority dutyholders joined the webinar. In addition, ONR ran two consultation workshops, one in Glasgow on 17th May 2019 and the other in London on 29th May 2019. There were over 70 attendees at each workshop. A series of presentations were provided to introduce the policy intent, provide an overview of the changes to the Regulations and to introduce the ACOP. These were followed by facilitated discussion groups at which participants were encouraged to raise issues and ask questions. Whilst this gave an opportunity for discussion, all comments made at the workshop also had to be made in writing to be included in the consultation.
Response demographics Responses to the consultation were received from a wide range of stakeholders including those from industry, MoD-owned establishments, local government, non-departmental public bodies, Category 1 responders, non-governmental organisations, professional bodies, consultancies and individuals.
All responses were analysed to establish common themes. Not all respondents answered each of the questions and therefore, the total response figures are not the same for each question.
Response by sector
Sector Number of responses
Category 1 responders 3
Consultancy 3
Industry 9
Local government 11
UK Government Departments 2
Members of the public 2
MoD or MoD-owned establishments /organisations
8
Non-departmental public body 3
Non-governmental organisation
3
Professional bodies 2
Other 1
Total 47
Comments by regulation The respondents made around 600 specific comments on the ACOP and guidance. An approximate breakdown of these comments by regulation is shown in the chart below.
Analysis of responses For respondents providing general narrative responses, these were counted in the numbers of reported responses only when they actively selected an option. However, the issues raised in the narrative response were included in the qualitative summary of respondents’ comments.
Question 1: The proposed ACOP is:
Please provide reasons for your answer. For example, if not, which parts are not easy to understand and why?
Easy to understand
29 Not easy to understand
7 Total 36
80% of the respondents to this question thought that the ACOP was easy to understand although many of these thought there were specific areas that required clarification. The tone of the comments reflected a view that the ACOP was beneficial and welcomed as an aid to compliance. The minority of responses that thought the ACOP was not easy to understand thought that there was inconsistency across the document, with clarity needed in a number of areas. Both those that thought the ACOP was easy to understand and those that did not provided detailed comments on specific sections where they thought there could be improvements. Of those that thought the ACOP was easy to understand there was a general view that, in the main, the ACOP set a minimum standard of adequacy. Some respondents thought that there was a need for more ACOP, more prescription, or that more clarity was needed in certain areas. On the other hand, other respondents thought that some sections were overly prescriptive or not relevant to the specific regulation. A significant number of detailed comments made were directly relevant to other questions in the consultation document and have been dealt with in those responses. This is particularly true of the response to comments on regulations 4-7 and schedule 3 and regulations 8, 10 and 12. HSE/ONR Response: All of the detailed comments provided were reviewed to determine where improvements could be made to the clarity or detail of each particular section of ACOP.
Question 2: Do you think that the proposed ACOP:
Provides clear advice on what to do? Does not provide clear advice on what to do? Please provide reasons for your answer. For example, if not which parts are not clear and why?
Provides clear advice
22 Doesn’t provide clear advice
12 Total 34
65% of respondents that answered this question thought that the ACOP provided clear advice on what to do, which compared to 35% who did not. Nearly all of the respondents, whether or not they thought the ACOP was clear, provided comments on specific areas where further clarity was requested. We have considered all the detailed comments provided in turn to determine how the ACOP and guidance can be made clearer. Respondents’ comments The following paragraphs summarise the most significant of these specific comments about individual parts of the ACOP:
Regulations 4-7, Hazard Evaluation and Consequence Assessment A couple of respondents wanted clarification either through guidance or ACOP that where an operator claims exemption from the Regulations through regulation 3(2), it was still necessary to undertake a Hazard Evaluation under regulation 4 to justify that this was the case. The significance of this comment is that when an evaluation is performed under regulation 4 the output needs to be sent to the relevant regulator whereas the assessments performed under regulation 3 are not required to be shared with the regulator. Given the greater complexity of assessments performed under regulation 3(2), HSE/ONR agrees with this comment and considers that the assessment should be shared with the regulator. In HSE/ONR’s view this objective can best be achieved by making a change to the guidance for regulation 3(2), referring the dutyholder to the need to perform a hazard evaluation under regulation 4. One respondent requested that the REPPIR risk framework diagram could be referenced in the ACOP at the end of regulation 4 rather than in the ACOP for regulation 5 to ensure it is applied at the conclusion of the hazard evaluation report, rather than at the start of the consequence assessment. HSE/ONR agrees with this comment and has amended the ACOP for regulation 4 to include reference to the risk framework diagram. A number of comments noted that the wording of the ACOP for regulation 4(2) was not clear. This part of the ACOP covers how the radiation dose to persons off-site following a radiation emergency should be calculated for the purposes of the hazard evaluation required under the regulation. It was suggested that use of the word “maximum” was problematic as it could drive gross conservatism into the assessment since it was difficult to determine what was meant. This could lead to disproportionate levels of emergency planning to the detriment to both the public and operator. It might also prevent operators from using their existing safety justifications to support their hazard evaluation, which goes against the policy intent for REPPIR 2019 as this would require dutyholders to completely revise their existing safety submissions. This comment was also raised by numerous dutyholders at the second consultation meeting in London. Two respondents also added that the words “equivalent dose” needed to be added to the ACOP text in order to cover all exposure pathways. This enhances public protection by ensuring that events resulting in release of specific nuclides, for instance radioactive iodine, are considered when setting planning distances and that the relevant protective actions are considered. HSE/ONR agrees with these comments and the text of the ACOP has been amended. The word “maximum” has been removed and instead it has been made clear that the calculation should be performed for the most exposed persons off-site assuming no urgent protective actions are implemented. Otherwise, providing the operator performs a suitable, conservative assessment the decision on what technical assumptions are made is a matter for the operator to decide. A couple of respondents challenged the ACOP for regulation 4(3), which introduces an annual effective dose of 1 mSv as the threshold for determining whether a consequence assessment under regulation 5 is required. The respondents stated that they consider this to be an expansion on the requirements of the Regulations which state that the criteria for determining whether a radiation emergency is possible is whether a hazard could result in serious consequences, which in their view corresponds to a dose that is greater than 1 mSv. HSE/ONR does not agree with this interpretation since regulation 3(2) uses 1 mSv as the threshold for exemption from the Regulations for a radiation emergency situation; as such it is appropriate to also use this value for the ACOP for regulation 4(3). Thus HSE/ONR has rejected this comment.
A number of comments were also made about the ACOP for regulation 4(7) - reporting of the hazard evaluation - arguing that it should be made clear that the list of contents for the hazard evaluation report can be met by referencing safety assessments for example, to avoid the need to continually update the hazard evaluation when updates to the safety assessment occur. Defence sites also noted that some of this information would in fact be sent to the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) rather than to ONR. HSE/ONR accepts these comments, noting that for emergency planning purposes only significant changes would result in a change to either the extent or content of emergency plans. The text of ACOP has been amended accordingly and moved into guidance. A number of comments were made about the ACOP for regulation 5, including clarifying that only HSE dutyholders have to consider the need for an outline planning zone (OPZ) as other dutyholders have default distances for their OPZs set by schedule 5. HSE/ONR accepts that this part of the ACOP could be made clearer and so the ACOP text has been extensively rewritten. As with the reporting of the hazard evaluation under regulation 4(7), a number of comments were made about the reporting of the details of the assessment of consequences, made to the regulator under regulation 7(6). This is as opposed to the consequence report (CR), which is sent to the Local Authority (and then copied to the regulator). Specifically, the ACOP for regulation 7(6) (f) and (g) was criticised for being potentially too open-ended and work-intensive. Again, defence sites noted that some of the information would in fact need to be sent to DNSR rather than to ONR. HSE/ONR accepts that the wording for these particular items was not well drafted and could be misinterpreted and so the text of ACOP has been amended accordingly and moved into guidance.
A few comments were made on the clarity of language used in the ACOP under regulation 6, for example on the use of hazard/risk terminology and the terminology used to describe records produced as part of the hazard evaluation and consequences assessment processes. HSE/ONR accepts these comments and the ACOP has been amended to improve clarity of language. Specifically, the ACOP now refers to ‘a change in the scope of the hazards and risks’ in the interpretation of whether a material change has occurred and the terminology used to refer to the records produced has been amended to align with the Regulations. Regulations 10-11, Emergency Plans
A few respondents requested changes or clarification to the wording used in the ACOP for regulations 10(1) and 11(1) describing adequate emergency plans. Some requested further guidance on what the ‘underpinning capabilities’ are which are referred to in the ACOP. A couple of respondents made general comments about the appropriateness of the ACOP in describing an adequate plan. For both the operator’s plan and the off-site plan the ACOP describes adequacy, including the need for the required capabilities to be in place and readily available so the plan is ready to be implemented if required. HSE/ONR agree that more guidance on these capabilities would be useful and have provided some examples in the guidance. The ACOP for regulation 11(1) has also been amended to remove reference to the provision of equipment under regulation 10, as this is more relevant to the operator’s plan. We have also made a few minor changes to the ACOP describing adequate plans to improve clarity of language.
Several respondents commented on the term ‘seeking assurances’ used in the ACOP under regulation 11 to describe an adequate off-site emergency plan. These responses stated that this is inconsistent with the guidance, which uses the term ‘seek confirmation’ and also expressed concerns that Local Authorities are being asked to undertake a regulatory role. This comment had also been raised by dutyholders at stakeholder events. HSE/ONR agrees that the inconsistency in terminology between the ACOP and the guidance could be confusing and the ACOP has thus been amended to use the term ‘seeking confirmation’. The Local Authority is not expected to undertake a regulatory role but should seek confirmation from organisations with a role in the plan, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the required capabilities are in place and readily available. This is to provide the Local Authority and the regulator with confidence that the plan is adequate and could be implemented without delay when required. Several respondents also commented on the ACOP for regulation 11(5), requiring the Local Authority to consult with the Public Health England (PHE) Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE). The majority raised potential cost implications and a few respondents queried why the ACOP only identifies PHE and not the other statutory consultees. Regulation 11(5) however requires consultation with PHE so this part of the ACOP has been provided to specify that the Local Authority should consult a particular part of PHE (PHE CRCE) on certain radiological protection matters. HSE/ONR agrees that the ACOP as worded could nevertheless be too broad, so the phrase ‘in addition to any other matters the Local Authority considers appropriate’ has been removed from the ACOP to restrict the matters to be consulted on more clearly. Regulation 12, Review and Testing A few respondents requested that the ACOP includes more focus on demonstrating an effective response and highlighted that an adequate test could identify improvements to the plan. A few respondents also thought that it could be difficult for a test to demonstrate some of the areas listed in the ACOP, for example that the plan meets all of the requirements of Schedule 7. HSE/ONR agrees that an adequate test may identify improvements which could be made to the plan so an additional point has been added to the ACOP to capture this. We have not made any changes to the other items listed in the ACOP. Here we judge that in relation to points (a) and (b) in this part of the ACOP, the plan should be prepared in accordance with Schedules 6 and 7 and the test should demonstrate this to the extent possible within the scope of the agreed test scenario. A few respondents requested further ACOP or guidance on particular matters such as ensuring other organisations participate in the test. A couple of these responses suggested providing further guidance on demonstrating the adequacy of the listed requirements, perhaps in the National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response
Guidance 4(NNEPRG). The ACOP for regulation 15(1-4) relating to consultation and cooperation duties on employers has therefore been amended to include a
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-nuclear-emergency-planning-and-response-
guidance
requirement for employers of any other person whose participation is reasonably required by an emergency plan, to participate in a test of that plan as required. A couple of respondents commented on the phrase ‘all changes’ used in the ACOP for regulation 12(1) on recording the review of the plan, requesting further clarity. This part of the ACOP has thus been amended slightly to make it clearer that it is referring to changes resulting from the formal review of the plan. A few respondents requested that further consideration be given to the level of detail required by the ACOP for regulation 12(8) on the report on the outcome of the test with a couple of respondents highlighting security considerations. We agree and have amended the ACOP under regulation 12(8) to say that only ‘significant’ actions should be included within the report on the outcome of the test. Supporting guidance on these actions has also been added to provide advice on the level of detail which should be included.
Question 3: The requirements specified in proposed ACOP (a & b) under regulation 8(1) are:
If it is not easy to understand, please tell us why.
69% of respondents thought the specified ACOP was easy to understand compared with 31% that thought it was not. Those that thought the ACOP was not easy to understand suggested a range of different means of improving the clarity of the text. Five respondents thought that the ACOP could be expanded to include particular sections of guidance, specifically, guidance that relates to the Local Authority accepting the operator’s recommendation of the minimum geographical extent of the detailed emergency planning zone and not being required to have the expertise to verify the technical basis for the minimum extent set by the operator. Four respondents thought that the purpose of having a detailed emergency planning zone was not clearly defined. One responder believed that the detailed emergency planning zone (for reactor sites particularly) should be based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance on suggested precautionary action zone (PAZ) area size, as published in IAEA GS.G 2.1. HSE/ONR Response: The ACOP text for regulation 8(1) has been amended to reflect the comments received regarding this part of the ACOP’s clarity including restructuring and simplification of the text.
Easy to understand
24 Not easy to understand
11 Total 35
The suggestion to move guidance related to the Local Authority’s acceptance of the operator’s recommendation of the minimum geographical extent into ACOP was not accepted. Changing this into ACOP wouldn't prevent the Local Authority from using a technical consultant to obtain an independent view of the operator’s recommendation if they so choose. A definition of “detailed emergency planning zone” has been added to the supporting guidance for REPPIR. Setting the detailed emergency planning zone based on IAEA’s default PAZ area sizes does not reflect the policy intent and therefore no change was made in this regard.
Question 4: Proposed ACOP under regulation 10(2) lists four variable factors. Are there other variable factors we could include as ACOP? If yes, please tell us what these are and why they should be included.
Yes 17 No 19 Total 36
53% of respondents thought that there were no other variable factors that should be included as ACOP compared to 47% who thought there were. Nearly all of those that thought there were other factors provided details of what these should be, and one respondent suggested that the ACOP should not limit consideration of variable factors to the four categories listed. A number of respondents requested more detail on the ACOP clause (a) text (the aspects of the Schedule 3 requirements used in consequence assessments) and the ACOP clause (d) text (the multiple factors which could materialise in parallel). A few respondents requested that the ACOP clause (c) text (on the availability of personnel) is more specific to those personnel who are trained/required by the plan. A few respondents requested greater clarity on the measure for the severity of the emergency. HSE/ONR Response: We agreed with a number of the additional factors that were suggested but decided that these all fall within the categories already covered by the ACOP text. We have nevertheless added some of these additional examples to the guidance. We have also amended the ACOP to make it clear that those factors listed are the minimum which should be considered. We have amended (c) in the ACOP to make it clearer that it relates to personnel with a role in the operator’s plan. Further guidance has also been added to provide clarity on the ACOP text at clauses (a) and (d).
Question 5 - Is the proposed ACOP (B) under regulation 12(1):
If not please tell us why.
Easy to understand
27 Not easy to understand
9 Total 36
75% of respondents thought the ACOP was easy to understand while 25% disagreed. All the respondents that disagreed and some of the respondents that agreed provided comments requesting greater clarity on a wide range of issues, not just those covered by ACOP (B), although still related to testing of emergency plans. These included a few comments requesting greater consistency in the ACOP on the description of adequacy, and other individual comments relating to testing. Regulation 12 is discussed in more detail under question 2. In relation to ACOP (B) under regulation 12(1), a small number of respondents requested greater clarity on the term ‘work with ionising radiation’. A couple of respondents requested more detail on the timescales for completing the test in advance of work commencing.
HSE/ONR Response: HSE/ONR has decided to move the proposed ACOP text into guidance. This has allowed us to rephrase the text and remove the reference to ‘work with ionising radiation’.
Question 6 - Is the process for deciding what to exclude from a consequence report set out in proposed ACOP (B) under regulation 21(10):
If it is not clearly set out, please tell us why.
59% of respondents thought that the process for deciding what to exclude from a consequences report was clearly set out and 41% disagreed. Several respondents highlighted that the ACOP sets out the process for requesting approval to exclude information, not for deciding what information to exclude as the consultation question suggests. Some of these respondents thought that the ACOP should provide criteria on what information could be redacted. Several respondents requested changes to give further clarity to the process set out in the ACOP. Two respondents commented on the need for transparency, with one respondent suggesting information should not be excluded on the grounds of commercial sensitivity.
HSE/ONR Response: The intent of the ACOP under regulation 21(10) is to set out a process for requesting approval to withhold information, redacting such information and publishing the redacted report. We have decided that inclusion of criteria for excluding information within the ACOP would be overly prescriptive; however, guidance is provided to give examples of the types of information which may be withheld and sources of independent advice.
The ACOP has been amended to reflect the comments made regarding clarity of the process.
Clearly set out
21 Not clearly set out 15 Total 36
The regulation allows for information to be excluded for reasons of commercial confidentiality; however, the ACOP sets out a transparent process for requesting approval to withhold information from the published report.
Question 7 - Do you agree that the proposed process set out in ACOP Schedule 3(7-8), is the most appropriate way for the operator to identify the minimum geographical area for the detailed emergency planning zone? Yes/No If not, please tell us why.
Yes 13 No 18 Total 31
Question 7 on the ACOP for schedule 3 was the only specific question on ACOP that produced a negative response. The ACOP for schedule 3 was also the one that resulted in the largest number of specific comments (see earlier graph giving number of comments by regulation - the consequence assessment received 20% of the total number of comments). The general feedback was that the ACOP was cumbersome and unclear. Specific points included concerns about the time periods used in calculating the effective dose to members of the public that determine the required distances for the urgent protective action zones and the detailed emergency planning zone. It was argued that these were inconsistent since the former was based upon short term doses while the later was based upon the annual dose received. Other comments argued that the choice of conservative weather conditions was too restrictive; that there should be scope for using the upper and lower Emergency Reference Level (ERL) when determining the recommended distances; and that there should be scope for the operator to exercise technical judgement in determining the final recommended planning distances. HSE/ONR Response: Given the number and range of comments received, HSE and ONR have extensively reviewed the ACOP text for schedule 3 resulting in the text being significantly revised to address the points raised. The time period for the dose assessment has been changed to be consistent between the urgent protective actions and the detailed emergency planning zone. The operator has also been given scope to exercise technical judgement on the appropriate choice of weather based upon likelihood and also for the determination of the recommended planning distances. The text has also been revised to improve clarity and logic. The only comment that has not been accepted is the suggestion to move towards using the upper ERL for the determination of the detailed emergency planning zone. HSE/ONR’s view is that the lower ERL should be recommended for determining the detailed emergency planning zone as this will bound all possible urgent protective action zones that the Local Authority may determine.
Question 8 Are there any impacts on introducing this new ACOP that we should be aware of?
Yes 25 No 8 Total 33
Where comments were made on the possible impacts associated with the introduction of the new ACOP, these tended to repeat the comments made to the previous questions above and there were few new discernible themes. A small number of respondents had concerns over costs.
Two respondents thought that there may be potential inadvertent implications from the introduction of the ACOP for regulation 8(6), which focuses on change of land use as a factor in considering whether or not a redetermination of the detailed emergency planning zone is required. Two respondents thought that the ACOP for regulation 11(5) enhances PHE’s statutory consultation role and could create a bottleneck if multiple Local Authorities approach PHE at a similar time. HSE/ONR Response: The ACOP text for regulation 8(6) has been modified to take into account the concerns raised regarding these potential inadvertent implications. The focus has been shifted from planning applications to actual new developments in the local area and additional supporting guidance has also been added. The concern raised on PHE resources was however rejected as this was a topic that was consulted on during the Government’s consultation on the policy intent. Comments on costs were also rejected as these are not a matter for the ACOP.
ANNEX B
Approved Code of Practice supporting the Radiation (Emergency
Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019
REPPIR 2019 REGULATION ACOP TEXT
Regulation 4: Hazard evaluation
Regulation 4(1-4)
(1) The operator of any premises to which these
Regulations apply must make a written evaluation
before any work with ionising radiation is carried
out for the first time at those premises.
(2) The evaluation required under paragraph (1)
must be sufficient to identify all hazards arising from
the work undertaken which have the potential to
cause a radiation emergency.
(3) Where the evaluation required under paragraph
(1) does not reveal any hazards having the potential
to cause a radiation emergency, reasons for such a
conclusion should be set out in that evaluation.
(4) Where the evaluation required under paragraph
(1) does reveal the potential for a radiation
emergency to occur, the operator must take all
reasonably practicable steps to—
(a) prevent the occurrence of a radiation
emergency; and
(b) limit the consequences of any such
emergency which does occur.
The hazard evaluation should determine:
(a) the potential consequences of each radiation
emergency in terms of the effective dose (and
where relevant, equivalent dose to the thyroid)
to the most exposed persons outside the
premises assuming no urgent protective actions
are implemented, and
(b) the likelihood of the consequence occurring.
Evaluating a low likelihood for a radiation emergency to
occur should not be used as a reason for discounting the
hazard from having the potential to cause a radiation
emergency. Operators should consider the possibilities
for radiation emergencies with extremely low likelihoods
but with significant or catastrophic consequences.
Where the hazard evaluation concludes there is no
hazard with a potential to cause a radiation emergency
there is no need to perform a consequence assessment
under Regulation 5. The justification for such a
conclusion should be based on the limited radiological
consequences of any hazard (which should be less than
1 mSv effective dose over the period of a year).
Where the hazard evaluation concludes there is a
potential for one or more hazards to cause a radiation
emergency the operator should collate the results of the
hazard evaluation for input into the REPPIR risk
framework (Appendix 2, Figure 3) to support the
consequence assessment required under regulation 5.
Regulation 5: Consequence assessment
Regulation 5(1-2)
(1) Where the evaluation undertaken under
regulation 4 reveals the potential for a radiation
emergency to occur, the operator must make an
assessment, in accordance with Schedule 3, to
consider and evaluate a full range of possible
consequences of the identified radiation
emergencies, both on the premises and outside the
premises, including the geographical extent of those
consequences and any variable factors which have
the potential to affect the severity of those
consequences.
Evaluation of a full range of possible consequences.
(A) To assess a full range of possible consequences the
operator should:
a) determine a full range of radiation emergencies
using the REPPIR risk framework (see
paragraph B);
b) collate the source terms associated with each of
these radiation emergencies to create a suitable
and sufficient range of source terms; and
c) undertake the consequence assessment for each
of these suitable and sufficient source terms in
accordance with Schedule 3.
(2) The assessment required by this regulation must
be completed within two months after the day on
which the hazard evaluation required by regulation 4
is completed.
(B) To determine a full range of radiation emergencies
the operator should:
(a) include a number of the most bounding cases
within the detailed emergency planning zone,
and where relevant the outline planning zone of
the REPPIR risk framework (Appendix 2,
Figure 3);
(b) include a sufficient number of radiation
emergencies to enable the operator to
demonstrate in a transparent way how it has
determined the recommended geographical
extents for the detailed emergency planning zone
(and where relevant the outline planning zone)
and the recommended distances for sheltering,
evacuation and the administration of stable
iodine tablets; and
(c) include as sensitivity studies any radiation
emergences that lie in the outline planning zone
of the REPPIR risk framework but close to the
boundary of the detailed planning zone. The
sensitivity study should assess what the
implications are of increasing the likelihood of a
radiation emergency by one order of magnitude.
Regulation 6: Review of hazard evaluation and consequence assessment
Regulation 6(1-4)
(1) Where the operator proposes a material change,
or where a material change occurs, in the work with
ionising radiation to which an operator was required
to make an evaluation pursuant to regulation 4(1),
the operator must make a further assessment to take
account of that change.
(2) For such time as the work with ionising
radiation in respect of which an evaluation made
pursuant to regulation 4(1) continues, the operator
must, within 3 years of the date of the completion of
the last evaluation (whether made in accordance
with regulation 4(1) or this paragraph), or longer, if
agreed by the regulator, either—
(a) make a further evaluation; or
(b) if there is no change of circumstances which
would affect the last consequences report
required by regulation 7, make a
declaration to that effect.
(3) Where a declaration is made in accordance with
paragraph (2)(b), a copy of that declaration must be
provided to the local authority and to the regulator,
within 28 days of the making of the declaration.
(4) The further evaluation required by this
regulation must comply with the provisions of
regulation 4(2) to (4), and regulation 5, where
applicable.
Operators should consider a ‘material change’ as a
change in their work with ionising radiation which has
the potential to change the nature or scope of the
hazards and risks associated with the work which would
affect the previous hazard evaluation in a way that may
require amendments to:
(a) the operator’s arrangements for the prevention
of radiation emergencies or mitigation of the
consequences of radiation emergencies;
(b) the operator’s emergency plan; or
(c) the local authority’s off-site emergency plan.
A record of the further evaluation and assessment made
under 6(1) and 6(2)(a) should either take the form of
updates to the previous details of the hazard evaluation
and consequence assessment sent to the regulator under
regulations 4(7) and 7(6) respectively, or provide new
such records for the premises.
The declaration required by regulation 6(2)(b) should
state that the previous consequence report under
regulation 7(1) continues to provide the necessary
information for the local authority to prepare an
adequate off-site emergency plan. The operator will need
to demonstrate that there has been no change in
circumstances or material change which would affect the
previous hazard evaluation or consequence assessment
required by regulations 4(1) and 5(1).
Regulation 8: Detailed emergency planning zones
Regulation 8(1)
(1) The local authority must determine the detailed
emergency planning zone on the basis of the
operator’s recommendation made under (paragraph
2) of Schedule 4 and may extend that area in
consideration of.
(a) local geographic, demographic and
practical implementation issues;
(b) the need to avoid, where practicable, the
bisection of local communities; and
(c) the inclusion of vulnerable groups
immediately adjacent to the area proposed
by the operator.
The detailed emergency planning zone must be based on
the minimum geographical extent proposed by the
operator in the consequences report and should:
(a) be of sufficient extent to enable an adequate
response to a range of emergencies; and
(b) reflect the benefits and detriments of protective
action by considering an appropriate balance
between;
i. dose averted; and
ii. the impact of implementing protective
actions in a radiation emergency across
too wide an area.
In defining the boundary of a detailed emergency
planning zone, geographic features should be used for
ease of implementing the local authority’s off-site
emergency plan. Physical features such as roads, rivers,
railways or footpaths should be considered as well as
political or postcode boundaries, particularly where
these features and concepts correspond with other local
authority emergency planning arrangements.
Regulation 8(3)
(3) The local authority must inform the operator and
the regulator, within two months of having received
the consequences report under regulation 7, of the
determination made under paragraph (1).
The information provided to the operator and the
regulator by the local authority of the determination of
the detailed emergency planning zone should include:
(a) a description of the area;
(b) a map showing the extent of the area including
any pockets of detailed planning within the
outline planning zone as per Schedule 6, Part 2,
Chapter 2, 3(b)(ii); and
(c) suitable justification for the determination.
Regulation 8(5-6)
(5) On receipt of the local authority’s confirmation
of the detailed emergency planning zone, the
operator must record the detailed emergency
planning zone as finalised.
(6) The local authority may re-determine the
detailed emergency planning zone -
(a) if there is a change in the local area which
necessitates such a re-determination; or
(b) if the local authority deems it appropriate as a
consequence of the operator’s consequences
report made after an evaluation in accordance
with regulation 6(1) or 6(2)(a).
In order to understand if a change in the local area
necessitates a re-determination, the local authority
should consider developments within or adjacent to the
detailed emergency planning zone taking into account
their potential impact on the effectiveness of the
emergency plan.
Re-determination of the detailed emergency planning
zone should follow the approach set out under regulation
8(1)-(5).
Regulation 9: Outline planning zone
Regulation 9(3)
(3) The operator and the local authority may
HSE regulated sites
Where an outline planning zone is not considered
propose in relation to a site falling within paragraph
(1)(b), that the site has no outline planning zone. necessary, the justification for the decision should be
recorded by the operator in writing. This decision
should reflect the results of the operator’s hazard
evaluation and consequence assessment as required by
regulations 4 and 5 and Schedule 3 and take into account
whether existing arrangements and capabilities (e.g. for
the 2017 Regulations, COMAH, CCA) are sufficient.
Regulation 10: Operator’s emergency plan
Regulation 10(1)
(1) Where the operator has made an evaluation in
accordance with regulation 4(1) which shows that a
radiation emergency might arise, the operator must
make an adequate emergency plan designed to
secure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the
restriction of exposure to ionising radiation and the
health and safety of persons who may be affected by
radiation emergencies identified by the evaluation.
The operator should prepare the plan in accordance with
the requirements of regulation 10 and the associated
Schedules and should ensure the plan:
(a) is a written document, or set of documents; and
(b) can be put into effect without delay when
required by:
(i) providing the necessary information,
instruction and training and making the
necessary equipment available, in accordance
with regulations 10(6)-10(8); and
(ii) ensuring any other underpinning capabilities
required to implement the plan are in place and
readily available.
a. Regulation 10(2)
b. (2) When preparing an emergency
plan, as required by paragraph (1), the
operator must take into account—
(a) the steps the operator has taken under
regulation 4(4); and
(b) the consequences assessed in accordance
with regulation 5, including any variable
factors which might affect the severity of the
emergency.
The operator should consider variable factors, including
where relevant:
(a) the Schedule 3 requirements used in
consequence assessments;
(b) conditions in the affected facility, conditions
affecting infrastructure or conditions affecting
several facilities at once;
(c) availability of employees with a role in the
operator’s emergency plan; and
(d) multiple factors which could materialise in
parallel.
Regulation 11: Local authority’s emergency plan
Regulation 11(1)
(1) Where premises require a planning zone
under either or both of regulations 8 or 9, the local
authority must make an adequate off-site emergency
plan covering that zone or zones.
The local authority should prepare the plan in
accordance with the requirements of regulation 11 and
the associated Schedules and should ensure the plan:
(a) is a written document, or set of documents; and
(b) can be put into effect without delay when required
by ensuring that prior information has been
supplied in accordance with regulation 21 and by
seeking confirmation, so far as reasonably
practicable, from responding organisations that:
(i) the necessary information, instruction and
training has been provided and the
necessary equipment for restricting
exposure has been made available, in
accordance with regulation 11(6); and
(ii) any other underpinning capabilities
required to implement the plan are in place and
readily available.
Regulation 11(5)
(5) In preparing an off-site emergency plan,
pursuant to paragraph (1) or in reviewing such a
plan pursuant to regulation 12(1), the local authority
must consult—
(a) the operator of the premises to which the
plan relates;
(b) Category 1 responders in whose area in
which the premises to which the emergency
plan relates is situated;
(c) Category 2 responders (where appropriate)
in whose area in which the premises to
which the emergency plan relates is
situated;
(d) each health authority in the vicinity of the
premises to which the plan relates (if that
health authority is not a Category 1
responder);
(e) the Agency;
(f) Public Health England;
(g) in addition to Public Health England, if the
premises to which the emergency plan
relates is in—
(i) Wales, Public Health Wales, and
(ii) Scotland, Health Protection
Scotland; and
(h) such other persons, bodies or authorities as
the local authority considers appropriate.
The local authority should consult PHE’s Centre for
Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards to
confirm its understanding of the following matters,
where relevant:
(a) the planning of urgent protective action as part
of the off-site protective action required by
Schedule 6, 2(f);
(b) the application of reference levels required by
regulation 20; and
(c) PHE’s role in the off-site emergency plan.
Regulation 12: Reviewing and testing of emergency plans
Regulation 12(1)
(1) Each operator or local authority who has
prepared an emergency plan pursuant to regulation
10 or 11, as the case may be, must, at suitable
intervals not exceeding 3 years unless otherwise
agreed by the regulator—
(a) review and where necessary revise the plan
for which they are responsible; and
(b) test that plan, taking reasonable steps to
arrange for all those with a role in the plan
to participate in the test to the extent
necessary to ensure that the plan is
effective.
The result of a review of an emergency plan should be
recorded, including actions to address any
recommendations. Where the review requires changes to
the emergency plan these should be managed through
the use of an auditable system which tracks and logs the
changes from inception to completion of implementation.
Regulation 12(2, 5, 6 & 7)
(2) The test required by paragraph (1)(b) need not
An adequate test of the operator’s emergency plan or
detailed planning in the off-site emergency plan should
extend to testing a local authority’s emergency plan
so far as it extends to the outline planning zone,
unless—
(a) a test is necessary in order to review or
revise the plan, as required under
paragraph (1)(a); or
(b) the regulator requires a test.
(5) In determining how the off-site emergency plan
is to be tested, the local authority must cooperate
with—
(a) the operator; and
(b) any Category 1 responders in whose area
the premises to which the emergency plan
relates is situated.
(6) A review or test of the plan required by this
regulation must take into account any lessons
learned from—
(a) past emergency exposure situations, whether
at the operator’s premises or not; and
(b) the United Kingdom’s participation in
emergency exercises at national and
international level.
(7) The test of the plan, required by paragraph
(1)(b) must be adequate to test the ability to
implement the plan in question, but the operator or
the local authority, as the case may be, may for the
purpose of determining the extent of that test, bear in
mind—
(a) the length of time since the last test of the
plan;
(b) the extent of the testing undertaken on the
last occasion;
(c) any activation of the plan as a response to a
radiation emergency since the last test; and
(d) any revisions of the plan made by the review
required under paragraph (1)(a).
demonstrate:
(a) that the plan meets the principles and purposes
of an emergency plan set out in Schedule 7;
(b) that the plan meets the requirements of
regulations 10 or 11 (as appropriate), and the
appropriate paragraphs of Schedule 6;
(c) that the plan can be practicably implemented
and will be effective in the response to a
radiation emergency to secure, so far as
reasonably practicable, the restriction of
exposure to ionising radiation and the health
and safety of workers and members of the
public;
(d) the completeness, consistency and accuracy of
the emergency plan and other documentation
used by responding organisations;
(e) the adequacy of the equipment and facilities and
their operability;
(f) the competence of emergency responders to
carry out the duties identified for them in the
emergency plan; and
(g) whether any reasonable improvements can be
made to the plan.
An adequate test of outline planning in the off-site
emergency plan should demonstrate:
(a) that the plan meets the principles and purposes
of an emergency plan set out in Schedule 7;
(b) that the plan meets the requirements for outline
planning in regulation 11 and the appropriate
paragraphs of Schedule 6;
(c) that the plan provides a credible basis for a
response to a radiation emergency in the outline
planning zone by demonstrating that high level
actions have been identified, including where
capabilities could be obtained from and how
(this may be through expansion of arrangements
in the detailed emergency planning zone where
one exists);
(d) the completeness, consistency and accuracy of
the emergency plan and other documentation
used by responding organisations;
(e) the competence of emergency responders to
carry out the duties identified for them in the
emergency plan; and
(f) whether any reasonably improvements can be
made to the plan.
Regulation 12(8)
(8) After completion of the test required by
paragraph (1)(b), each operator or local authority,
as the case may be, must prepare a report on the
outcome of the test within 3 months of the conclusion
The report on the outcome of the test should:
(a) contain an overview of the exercise;
(b) highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the
emergency plan as shown by the exercise,
of the test.
focussing on areas where the plan was
insufficient, or could not be implemented;
(c) highlight areas where the operator’s emergency
plan and the off-site emergency plan were not
aligned (where both plans are tested together);
(d) include any lessons identified and
recommendations to resolve these, including any
required changes to the plan; and
(e) include any significant actions associated with
part (d) with an assigned action owner and
agreed time to complete the action and
implement any change.
Regulation 13: Cooperation: operator and local authority
Regulation 13(1)
(1) The operator and the local authority must co-
operate in respect of their duties to prepare
emergency plans to ensure that—
(a) the operator’s emergency plan and the
local authority’s off-site emergency plan
operate effectively both independently and
in conjunction;
(b) communication between the operator and
the local authority is expedited during any
radiation emergency; and
(c) communication between the operator and
the local authority and any organisation
which is responding to the radiation
emergency is expedited.
Communication methods should be agreed between the
operator and the local authority and any other
responding organisations and these methods recorded in
the operator’s and/or the off-site emergency plan(s) as
appropriate.
Regulation 14: Cooperation between local authorities
Regulation 14(1-2)
(1) A local authority may request, in writing, the
cooperation of another local authority in order to—
(a) make or review its off-site emergency plan; and
(b) test its off-site emergency plan as required
under regulation 12(1)(b).
(2) Where a local authority has made a written
request of another local authority under paragraph
(1), the local authority which has received such a
request must, as soon as reasonably practicable,
cooperate in assisting the requesting local authority
in both making and testing the off-site emergency
plan.
Where the co-operation of another local authority is
requested, the lead local authority should provide the
cooperating local authority with details of the activities
that the cooperating local authority is required to carry
out to assist in the drafting, review and / or testing of the
off-site emergency plan, along with associated timescales
for completion.
Where the assistance of another local authority is
requested, a clear description of the role of that
cooperating authority together with its responsibilities
should be included in the lead local authority’s off-site
emergency plan.
Regulation 15: Consultation and cooperation: employers
Regulation 15(1-4)
(1) In performing the duties imposed on an
Duties on Operators
In relation to regulations 4(1), 5(1), 6(1), 6(2), 7(1) and
operator under regulations 4(1), 5(1), 6(1) and (2),
7(1) and 10, that operator must consult any other
employer who carries out work with ionising
radiation on the premises and take into account
relevant matters arising from that consultation.
(2) Any employer who carries out work with
ionising radiation at premises to which these
Regulations apply must cooperate with the
operator of those premises or the local authority in
whose area the premises is situated by providing
information or otherwise to the extent necessary to
ensure that the operator or local authority, as the
case may be, is able to comply with the operator
and the local authority’s duty to prepare an
emergency plan.
(3) Any employer of any other person whose
participation is reasonably required by any
emergency plan required under these Regulations
must cooperate with the operator or the local
authority, as the case may be, in the exchange of
information or otherwise to the extent necessary to
ensure that the operator or the local authority is
enabled to comply with the requirements of these
Regulations, insofar as the operator or the local
authority’s ability to comply depends on such
cooperation.
(4) The cooperation required by an employer
under paragraphs (2) and (3) extends to cooperation
in the testing of emergency plans where such
cooperation is necessary to secure compliance with
regulation 12.
10, the operator should:
(a) request the details of relevant employers’ work
involving radioactive material in advance of
drafting the hazard evaluation, and at each
review of that evaluation.
(b) consult any employers on the premises that have
a role in the operator’s emergency plan on that
role when drafting the plan, or on any changes to
that role on revision.
(c) consider how relevant information obtained from
the consultation with employers informs the
hazard evaluation, the consequence assessment,
reviews of either the evaluation or the
assessment, or the operator’s emergency plan.
Duties on Employers on Premises
Employers should:
(a) on request, provide the operator with a
description of their work with ionising radiation
that involves radioactive material on the
premises, advise the operator of any material
change to their work with radioactive material
on the premises, wherever practicable prior to
that change.
(b) put into place any reasonable measures that
enable them to carry out their role in the
operator’s emergency plan within an agreed
timeframe.
(c) Participate, as required, in the test of the
operator’s or the off-site emergency plan(s).
Duties on Employers
Employers of any other person whose participation is
reasonably required by an emergency plan should:
(a) on request and in an agreed timeframe, provide
to the local authority or to the operator, details of
procedures, employees, training, equipment or
any other relevant information that is required to
enable the local authority or the operator to
perform their duties under these Regulations;
(b) Put into place any reasonable measures that
enable them to carry out their role in an
emergency plan in an agreed timeframe; and
(c) Participate, as required, in the test of the
operator’s or the off-site emergency plan(s).
Regulation 20: Reference levels
Regulation 20(1-2)
(1) The operator or local authority which has
Operators and Local Authorities should determine
reference levels for persons or groups of persons that
may be affected by the radiation emergency and/ or for
prepared an emergency plan in accordance with
regulations 10 or 11, as the case may be, must
ensure that the emergency plan prioritises keeping
effective doses below a 100 mSv reference level.
(2) The operator or local authority must record
in the emergency plan for which it is responsible the
appropriate dose level for each emergency worker as
determined by the employer in accordance with
regulation 18(2).
those persons with specific roles in responding to a
radiation emergency.
Reference levels should relate to the total residual
effective dose (the dose expected to be incurred by an
individual after protective action has been implemented)
estimated to be received both during the emergency
(acute) and, for members of the public, over the first
year following the emergency (annual).
Reference levels for members of the public should
include doses from the longer term exposure pathways of
ingestion, resuspension and external irradiation (from
deposited gamma-emitting radionuclides).
Regulation 21: Prior information to the public
Regulation 21(1-3)
(1) The local authority which has responsibility for
an area covered by an off-site emergency plan with a
detailed emergency planning zone must, in
cooperation with the operator, ensure that members
of the public are made aware of the relevant
information, and, where appropriate, are provided
with it.
(2) The local authority which has responsibility for
an area covered by an off-site emergency plan with
an outline emergency planning zone must, in
cooperation with the operator, ensure that members
of the public have access to the relevant information.
(3) The relevant information referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2) is—
(a) where the area is covered by a detailed
emergency planning zone only, the
information set out in Part 1 of Schedule 8
only;
(b) where the area is covered by an outline
planning zone and a detailed emergency
planning zone, the information set out in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of Schedule 8 in
addition to the information set out in Part 1
of Schedule 8;
(c) where the area is covered by an outline
planning zone only, the information set out
in Part 2 of Schedule 8.
Prior information should be supplied in an appropriate
manner and in an accessible format to members of the
public who are in the detailed emergency planning zone,
without their having to request it, so far as reasonably
practicable.
Prior information should be available in an appropriate
manner and in an accessible format to members of the
public in the outline planning zone. If members of the
public request such information they should be directed
to it or provided with access to a hard copy if requested.
Regulation 21(4)
(4) In preparing the information to be provided in
accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2), the local
authority must consult such persons who seem to that
local authority to be appropriate.
In preparing the prior information the local authority
should consult the operator, each local authority in the
detailed emergency planning zone and / or outline
planning zone and any authorities named in the prior
information, in addition to any other persons the local
authority considers appropriate.
Regulation 21(10)
(10) Where a report is made pursuant to regulation
The local authority should cooperate with the operator
to identify if any information should be excluded in the
7, the local authority must make that report available
to the public as soon as reasonably practicable after
it has been sent to the regulator under that
regulation (except that, with the approval of the
regulator, the local authority must not make
available any part or parts of such report for reasons
of industrial, commercial or personal confidentiality,
public security or national security).
publicly available consequences report.
The operator should inform the local authority of any
information which is to be withheld at the time of
submitting the consequences report to the local
authority. At the same time the operator should make a
written request to the regulator to withhold such
information.
Where the regulator gives approval to withhold
information the operator should provide the local
authority with a redacted report as soon as reasonably
practicable. The redacted report should be made
available to the public by the local authority as soon as is
reasonably practicable after receiving the redacted
report.
The local authority should ensure that publicly available
versions of the consequences report are updated when a
revised report is received in accordance with regulation
7(2)(b).
Regulation 24: Radiation protection adviser
Regulation 24(1-2)
(1) Every employer which carries out work with
ionising radiation must consult one or more suitable
radiation protection advisers about occupational and
public exposure to assist with that employer’s
preparations for responding to radiation emergency
situations.
(2) Where an employer consults a radiation
protection adviser pursuant to the requirements of
paragraph (1) (other than in respect of the
observance of that paragraph), the employer must
appoint that radiation protection adviser in writing
and must include in that appointment the scope of the
advice which the radiation protection adviser is
required to give as if the employer were an employer
under the 2017 Regulations.
To be suitable for the purposes of these Regulations, an
RPA will need to have the specific knowledge, experience
and competence required for giving advice on
occupational and public exposure to assist with the
employer’s preparations for responding to radiation
emergency situations for which the employer is making
the appointment.
Employers are required to consult an RPA where advice
about occupational and public exposure is necessary for
compliance with the Regulations. This should include:
(a) contingency planning;
(b) emergency procedures; and
(c) remedial actions.
Schedule 3: Assessment of consequences requirements
Schedule 3(7-8)
7. The assessment must identify any protective
action that may need to be taken for the range of
potential radiation emergencies.
8. The assessment must assess the consequences of
suitable and sufficient source terms by distance and
by exposure pathway, and the distances to which
protective action would be required based on the
United Kingdom Emergency Reference Levels,
published by Public Health England. [26]
Assumptions for the radiological consequence assessment
The consequence assessment performed in accordance
with Schedule 3 should identify the range of potential
consequences for:
a) the short-term (at least two days following the
start of the release or direct exposure); and
b) the long-term (in the twelve months following
the start of the release or direct exposure).
The short term consequence assessment should be used
to determine:
a) the distance at which relevant Emergency
Reference Levels (ERLs) would suggest that urgent
protective actions are required for persons off-site;
b) the recommended extent of the geographical
extent on which the local authority will determine
the detailed emergency planning zone; and
c) the effective dose to emergency workers for both
on-site and off-site for comparison against the
relevant reference level.
The long term consequence assessment should be used to
identify the effective dose to members of the public off-
site for comparison against the relevant reference level in
order to inform emergency planning.
Operator’s determination of recommended distances for
urgent protective action
Each suitable and sufficient source term identified under
the ACOP for Regulation 5 that lies within the “detailed
emergency planning required” region of the REPPIR
risk framework (Appendix 2, Table 3), supplemented by
any additional source terms identified for the sensitivity
study required by the ACOP for Regulation 5, should be
selected for analysis.
For each of these selected source terms the distance at
which the potential dose saving (averted dose) from all
relevant exposure pathways becomes equal to the lower
ERL following implementation of the relevant urgent
protective action (sheltering, and where appropriate,
evacuation and stable iodine) should be calculated. These
calculations should consider the most vulnerable
member of the public outside the premises.
The largest distance calculated for each urgent
protective action from all the selected source terms
should be considered for recommendation as a candidate
distance for that particular urgent protective action.
In order to inform local authority planning for the
implementation of urgent protective actions, the
operator should also evaluate the distances where the
upper ERLs may be applicable. Important factors such
as the timescales within which protective action should
be planned to be carried out should also be identified.
Operator’s recommendation for the minimum
geographical extent for the detailed emergency planning
zone
The largest of the distances recommended for the urgent
protective actions identified against the lower ERL
should be selected as the recommended distance for the
minimum geographical extent of the detailed emergency
planning zone.
Assessment of total residual effective doses for members
of the public
The assessment of the total residual effective doses for a
radiation emergency should consider effective doses to
members of the public from the boundaries of the
premises out to a distance which would correspond to 1
mSv effective dose in the first twelve months following an
emergency. Urgent protective actions, including food
restrictions at the levels corresponding to the EU
Maximum Permitted Levels in food currently applicable
to the UK, should be assumed to have been implemented.
Ingestion doses from domestic food production should be
based on the location of food production in the vicinity of
the individual.
Schedule 4: Particulars to be included in a consequences report
Schedule 4Parts 1-3
PART 1
Factual Information
1. The following factual information must be provided in
the operator’s consequences report—
(a) the name and address of the operator;
(b) the postal address of the premises where the
radioactive substance will be processed,
manufactured, used or stored, or where the
facilities for processing, manufacture, use or
storage exist;
(c) the date on which it is anticipated that the work
with ionising radiation will commence or, if it
has already commenced, a statement to that
effect.
PART 2
Recommendations
2. The operator must include the following
recommendations in the consequences report—
(a) the proposed minimum geographical extent, if
any; and
(b) the minimum distances to which urgent
protective action may need to be taken, marking
against each distance the timescale for
implementation of the relevant action.
3. Where a minimum geographical extent is
recommended under paragraph 2, the operator must
also include within the consequences report—
(a) the recommended urgent protective action to be
taken within that zone, if any, together with
timescales for the implementation of that action;
and
(b) details of the environmental pathways at risk, in
order to support the determination of food and
water restrictions in the event of a radiation
emergency.
Default outline planning zones
Where under Regulation 9(1)(a) the outline planning
zone is determined in accordance with Schedule 5, the
operator should set out in the consequence report
what is the appropriate distance for outline planning
in accordance with paragraph 2a of Schedule 4.
Where under Regulation 9(1)(a) the outline planning
zone is determined by the Secretary of State for
Defence, the operator should set out in the
consequence report what is the appropriate distance
for outline planning in accordance with paragraph 2a
of Schedule 4.
PART 3
Rationale
4. The operator must set out the rationale supporting
each recommendation made in the consequences report.
5. In particular, the operator must set out—
(a) the rationale for its recommendation on the
minimum distances for which urgent protective
action may need to be taken; and
(b) where the operator and local authority have
agreed that no off-site planning is required, and
therefore no emergency planning is
recommended, the rationale for that agreement.
Appendix 2 Risk Framework
Regulations 4 & 5 Appendix 2 ACOP Figure 1: Impact
Table
Appendix 2 ACOP Figure 2: Likelihood
Table
Appendix 2 ACOP Figure 3: Risk
Framework
Page 1 of 4
Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/37
Meeting Date: 11 September 2019 Meeting type: Open
Type of Paper: For Discussion/Decision FOI Exemptions (if applicable):
CM9 Reference: 2019/253413
HSE Board – Openness, Transparency and Engagement
Teresa Quinn
FOR DISCUSSION/DECISION
The Board is invited to :
Note the outcome of the light touch review of the Board’s approach to
openness, transparency and engagement in paras 5-7;
Consider its approach compared to other regulators (see para 10); and
Consider, in the light of the issues raised in para 9, whether it agrees the
recommendation that the current structure/programme for open HSE Board
meetings combined with a themed stakeholder event should continue.
KEY INFORMATION
1. In 2016, in response to concerns raised about the transparency of HSE and Board business, the Board reviewed its approach to openness and transparency and agreed proposals for enhancing transparency and increasing direct stakeholder engagement. Those proposals involved the Board continuing to host four open Board meetings a year, including one in a devolved nation, one in London and two others in the regions and a themed stakeholder event at each. The Board also agreed to visit local HSE offices to learn more about the work of the teams and visit a local business.
2. In June 2018, the Board considered a review of its approach to openness and transparency (HSE/18/25), including feedback from stakeholders and HSE colleagues involved in facilitating the stakeholder events. At that time, it agreed to continue its approach but to review again in 12-18 months.
3. Since June 2018, some changes have been made following feedback from the Board. These include:
a) Replacing stakeholder engagement events with less formal, but still strategically important, discussions over a light business lunch.
b) Adopting a presumption of openness in the revised Board Operating Framework1.
c) Providing more time for Board members to visit local offices, meeting and hearing from HSE’s people; and
d) Abandoning visits to local business as Board members have the opportunity to visit with HSE inspectors on an annual basis.
1 Para 5, Annex to the Board Operating Framework
Page 2 of 4
4. In light of the changes made since June 2018, we have carried out a light touch review of the Board’s approach to openness and transparency by: reviewing feedback from stakeholders; discussing with HSE colleagues the effectiveness of stakeholder events and visits to local offices from their perspectives; and looking at seven other regulators’ approaches to openness and transparency.
5. Stakeholder Engagement
a) Evidence from the surveys indicate an increased level of engagement with stakeholders, though the extent of this varied dependent on sector. There has been reasonably consistent success in securing attendance of senior influencers (Chairs/Chief Executives) but more can be done to provide greater notice of events to encourage attendance at the right level.
b) Very positive feedback from the HSE theme/topic lead on the impact of bringing stakeholders together (resourced and facilitated by the Secretariat and others – demonstrating a cross-HSE corporate effort). This has started a discussion which otherwise may not have taken place or would have taken months to reach those stakeholders individually. “The event was a catalyst – accelerating action and engagement with HSE”.
c) The earlier events provided officials with a rich blend of HGBWW commitments and other ideas to take forward. Whilst the number of responses to the post-event survey to stakeholders was relatively small, the large majority indicated that they found the events of interest, with increased awareness of HSE and its Board and issues faced by industry/sector etc. Immediate feedback on the day was equally positive.
d) HSE leads were less clear on whether the event had raised the Board’s awareness of issues and influenced the Board’s decision-making and strategic thinking. Some felt that follow-up briefing might be helpful.
6. Office visits
a) In all cases, the local office found the Board visit a very positive and engaging experience, fulfilling several objectives, such as providing a development opportunity for those involved, though some would welcome the opportunity to learn more from the Board about its role. In one case, the visit had a very positive impact on engagement within the office, raising awareness of the role of colleagues from other divisions.
b) Colleagues also commented that Board members appeared to have a greater understanding of the work of the local offices and issues they faced. Visits from individual Board members were also welcomed.
7. Other regulators’ approaches
a) The approach to publishing agendas, papers and minutes varies widely. Six publish minutes, which range from comprehensive (with redactions) to abridged or meeting summaries. Five publish agendas and only two publish papers.
b) Five out of seven hold all or part of their meetings in public. Only one holds all of its meetings in public (four a year) and three always have an open session at every meeting. Two film Board meetings to upload and//or live-stream. One films the whole meeting using a contractor at a cost of £20k, the other only the open session of the meeting (90 minutes). Three invite questions on papers either in advance or at the end of the
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meeting. These questions are normally answered by an Executive member.
c) The number of Board meetings per year varied from four to ten. The regulators who are more open have less Board meetings a year or hold most meetings in their headquarters.
d) Although most Boards do some stakeholder engagement, such as hosting stakeholder dinners annually or holding stakeholder conferences, it is fairly limited compared to the HSE Board’s approach. One reports individual Board member engagement activities at its Board meetings and records these in the minutes.
8. The HSE Board holds four open meetings a year. It publishes all open Board agendas, minutes and papers on HSE’s website a week in advance of the open Board meeting. Observers can register to attend open meetings and stakeholders are invited to stay to observe. Since adopting the current approach the Board has held four stakeholder events and open meetings in the devolved nations (Wrexham, Aberdeen, Cardiff and Glasgow) and seven in the English regions (Bootle, three in London (including September’s), Nottingham, Newcastle and Bristol).
9. Based on the above analysis, it is recommended that the current structure/ programme for open HSE Board meetings combined with a themed stakeholder event should continue. However, the Board is invited to consider its overall approach compared to other regulators.
10. Board members’ views are also welcome on the following issues which have arisen either at Board meetings or from feedback:
a) Light open meeting agendas – as dates for Board meetings are set over a year in advance, agendas are difficult to predict and so some open meetings have not contained decision making papers. One option when this happens is to cancel the open meeting, but this may attract criticism from stakeholders. Alternatively, the Board can go ahead with the meeting but accept that it may be a light one, which may include an update presentation. This will require closer working with colleagues to ensure such presentations are succinct and adds value.
b) Cost of hosting open meeting and stakeholder events and resource needed to prepare for stakeholder events/visit – although the feedback from colleagues has been positive, local colleagues and topic leads have flagged the potential ongoing resourcing impact of holding such events and visits. The Board is also invited to note the comparison costs and benefits in paras 12 & 13 below.
c) HSE topic lead feedback – see para 5(d) above.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS/OPPORTUNITIES
11. The Board is committed to conducting as much of its business as possible in an open and transparent environment subject to relevant Freedom of Information Act exemptions. This provides the Board with an opportunity to demonstrate the strong governance processes in place and put strategic/regulatory decisions and information in the public domain to inform and raise awareness of stakeholders and give public assurance on the Board’s effectiveness.
12. The introduction of stakeholder events has significantly increased the number of observers at Board meetings (on average 30 – 50, depending on size of
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venue), reinforcing the value of this opportunity. Any reduction in openness and transparency poses a potential reputational risk to the Board, in addition to the missed opportunity to share important decisions and information.
13. Average costs comparison – Closed vs Open Board meetings
Average cost for open Board meeting and stakeholder engagement event/lunch
£6428
Average cost for closed meetings in Bootle £2050
14. Whilst there is an additional cost for holding stakeholder engagement events, there is evidence that stakeholders, and those in HSE who lead on the topics/themes for the Board’s stakeholder events, have found them to be of value, both in terms of the opportunity to mutually engage but also in the impact of the discussions at the events and outputs/outcomes. Examples include: greater engagement in Wales leading to a partnership group on health and a conference to be held in October; improved engagement and collaboration from hard to reach bodies; securing buy-in to initiatives from, and reinvigorating industry groups with, influential stakeholders; and industry taking ownership of developing new guidance on issues raised at an event, with HSE support.
IMPACT ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS/REGIONS
15. Subject to any other recommendation, the Board’s established practice of alternately meeting annually in Wales and Scotland will continue.
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION CONSIDERATIONS
16. The Board continues to value the contributions from constituents represented under the tripartite constitution of the HSE Board. The stakeholder events reinforce the Board’s collective understanding of issues faced by, and views of, those constituents. Officials are also raising awareness of equality, diversity and inclusion issues in Board papers to ensure that these are taken into account in Board decision-making.
HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS
17. The need for communication messages, including amendments to the HSE website, will be developed if necessary following the Board’s decision on the way forward.
CLEARED BY David Murray
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Health and Safety Executive Board HSE/19/38
Meeting Date: 11 September 2019 Meeting type: Open
Type of Paper: For Information and Discussion
FOI Exemptions (if applicable):
CM9 Reference: 2019/251732
Review of the impact of the Sentencing Guideline
Tracey Anderson, Legal Adviser to HSE
FOR INFORMATION/DISCUSSION
The Board requested a paper on the Sentencing Council’s Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food Safety and Hygiene Offences Definitive Guideline and its impact on the sentencing of H&S offences.
KEY INFORMATION
Background
1. The Definitive Guideline in Health and Safety sentencing was introduced in February 2016. Prior to this the judiciary and a broad range of stakeholders were concerned about the low levels of fines imposed for breaches of health and safety law and whether there was a real impact on offenders, particularly on large businesses. This was expressed clearly by the Court of Appeal as long ago as 1998 when the court made clear that fines should reflect the means of the offender as well as the gravity of the offence.
2. The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 increased the sentencing powers of the Magistrates’ Court to £20,000 for many health and safety offences. By March 2015, this cap was removed under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which allowed for unlimited fines to be imposed in the Magistrates’ Courts for most health and safety breaches.
3. The Definitive Guideline replaced a more limited guideline introduced in 2010 which applied to corporate manslaughter offences and health and safety offences causing death only. This guideline contained information on factors likely to affect the seriousness of offending along with some general information on appropriate fine levels.
4. HSE contributed to the development of the Guideline by providing the Sentencing Council with information about the number and types of offences prosecuted and its experience on issues relating to sentencing.
Application
5. The Guideline is based on the culpability of the offender, the risk of harm created by the offence, the likelihood of harm arising from the breach and the actual harm caused. Separate sentencing tables are provided for different organisation sizes determined by annual turnover. The Guideline for individuals is the same in terms of the culpability and harm levels but contains just one sentencing table to be used for all adult offenders. It was therefore anticipated that more serious offences committed by larger organisations would result in higher fines.
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6. Whether dealing with a company or an individual, the Guideline requires the court to first assess the culpability of the offender on a scale from low to very high. This is based upon an exhaustive list of criteria (see Annex 1). This is often a contentious issue between parties, and the result can make a significant difference to the penalty imposed.
7. Once culpability has been established, the court must determine the level of harm risked, together with the likelihood of that harm arising. Applying the criteria set out in the table in Annex 2, will result in a Harm Category being established, to which an uplift can be applied if several workers/people were exposed to the harm, or the offence was a significant cause of actual harm as opposed to harm risked.
8. The court will then consider the financial position of the offender, in the case of a company looking first at turnover to establish its size. This will provide the court with a sentencing range (see Annex 3). Further factors can then be considered to establish the appropriate sentence, including any additional aggravating and mitigating factors (see Annex 4). Finally, and if there was a guilty plea, the court will apply “credit for guilty plea” of up to 1/3 reduction of sentence.
Cases
9. Several key cases have helped shape the landscape of health and safety law further since the imposition of the Guideline. Interpretation of the concept of “likelihood of harm arising” was explored in the cases of R v Tata Steel UK Limited in June 2017 and R v Diamond Box Limited in November of the same year. The conclusion of those cases was that an accident-free period did not necessarily mean that the likelihood of the risk eventuating was not high.
10. In Tata Steel, an employee injured their hand in an unguarded machine. There had been a similar incident previously. The court assessed likelihood of harm as “high”. On appeal the Court of Appeal reduced the fine £1.9m to £1.5m on the basis that the previous incident was 15 years earlier so likelihood should have been assessed as medium.
11. However, in Diamond Box an employee was injured when he was pulled into a machine during routine maintenance. The company appealed the £400,000 fine saying that the fact that there had not been an accident in previous years meant that the likelihood could not be described as high. The Court of Appeal held that a substantial period without an accident may be a factor but did not mean that the likelihood of harm was not high. It all depends on the circumstances of the case. Tata was an unusual case.
12. A table of notable fines from 2017/2018 is at Annex 5.
Impact Assessment
13. Earlier this year, the Sentencing Council produced an impact assessment to consider the way in which sentencing had been affected by the Guideline. In brief, the assessment ascertained the following:
More cases are being sentenced in the Crown Court – this is perhaps surprising given the introduction of unlimited fines in the lower courts only a year prior to the implementation of the Guideline;
There has been an increase in fine levels for larger organisations – the median fine for a large/very large company has risen from £25,000 pre-Guideline to £370,800 post-Guideline;
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There has been an increase (albeit to a lesser degree) in fines for smaller organisations – median fines for medium organisations have increased from £20,000 to £100,000 whilst fines imposed on micro/small companies have more than doubled from £20,100 to £45,200- See Annex 6.
The Courts have made changes to their sentencing of individuals – use of fines has decreased though the average amount has risen from £3,000 to £5,000. Other types of sentences including suspended prison sentences have become more common.
The impact on HSE
14. Sentence hearings are now often more protracted, as dutyholders (often via senior counsel) engage in complex arguments as to the assessment of culpability and harm after they have entered guilty pleas. This has taken up more Inspector resources than before and has resulted in an increased number of requests for legal assistance for what might previously have been considered a simple guilty plea and sentence hearing that could be presented by an Inspector. There has also been an increase in the use of expert evidence in sentencing hearings.
15. In HSE v Timberline DIY Limited (September 2018) the facts of the case were relatively straightforward; an employee of the company had sustained an injury to his hand following contact with an unguarded machine. The prosecution was brought by an HSE Inspector in the Magistrates’ Court without legal representation initially but following several issues raised by the defence, Legal Adviser’s Office was instructed. The company entered a guilty plea but raised various issues as to the circumstances of the case and how that should impact on the application of the Sentencing Guideline. As a result, the District Judge held an impromptu “Newton Hearing” (that being a hearing to determine the factual basis upon which a defendant should be sentenced) and called the Managing Director to give evidence. The matter was then further adjourned for the hearing of more evidence, and again thereafter for sentence, meaning that there was total of four hearings for a matter which had been expected to resolve at the first hearing.
16. HSE v Premier Hank Dyers (November 2018) was a case which pre-dated the implementation of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, meaning that despite the application of the Sentencing Guideline, the Magistrates’ Court was restricted to a fine of £20,000. Following a guilty plea, the matter was adjourned to be sentenced at the Crown Court where the Sentencing Guideline was applied. However, given the limited means of the defendant company, a fine of £12,000 was imposed – an amount which could, in fact, have been imposed by the lower courts.
Next steps
17. The Sentencing Council has considered the impact assessment, particularly the unanticipated findings in relation to the fines imposed on smaller organisations and individuals and has indicated that it intends to investigate the operation of the Guideline further in due course. At that stage it will consider if any revision is necessary. HSE will be able to contribute to the consultation.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS/OPPORTUNITIES
18. Whilst financial penalties have increased, this money is paid to the Consolidated Fund rather than to HSE. HSE does not benefit from higher fines.
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19. Protracted sentencing exercises are now a frequent part of our prosecution work, partly because of the implementation of the Guideline. This will affect the costs incurred by HSE and ultimately claimed from the dutyholder on successful application following a conviction. Costs awarded are subject to the means of the offender to pay so we do not recover all our costs in prosecuting.
IMPACT ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS/REGIONS
20. The Guideline specifically applies to England and Wales. Though several cases have seen reference to the document in Scotland, it is persuasive only and the courts are not bound to apply it.
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION CONSIDERATIONS
21. The Guideline was implemented to create consistency, and there are no issues in this regard.
22. The only group excluded from application of the Guideline are individuals who have not yet attained the age of 18. Whilst possible, it would be very unusual for HSE to consider a prosecution against an individual in this category
HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS
23. The Guideline and all referenced documentation regarding the impact assessment are freely available on the internet.
CLEARED BY
Tracey Anderson
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Annex 1
Assessing culpability for organisations
Assessing culpability for individuals
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Annex 2 Assessing harm
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Annex 3
Example sentencing range
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Annex 4
Aggravating and mitigating features
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Annex 5
Notable Cases 2017/2018
Defendant Turnover Fine Comments
Iceland £2.7b £2.5m Contractor fell 3m to his death from a work platform. No barriers or trip
hazards.
Warburtons £526m £1.9m Injured worker trapped arm in conveyor belt. Company had two previous
convictions.
South West Water £1.4b £1.8m Lone worker drowned in filtration tank. Previous warnings had been given.
Tata Steel £4.2b £1.5m 2016 case where the fine was reduced on appeal from £1.99m. Two hand injuries from unguarded machines.
Martin Baker £216m £1.1m Red arrows pilot killed by faulty ejector seat. Previous warnings of risk.
Aldi £7.7b £1m Foot injuries from electric pallet truck. Inadequate training given by company.
Laing O’Rourke £1.1b £0.8m Worker crushed to death. Correct certificates were not in place for the
plant in use.
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Annex 6 Median fine amounts imposed on organisations prosecuted by the Health & Safety Executive, 16 months pre-guideline compared with 16 months post-guideline