heal, j. moore_s paradox. a wittgensteinian approach

8/14/2019 Heal, J. Moore_s Paradox. a Wittgensteinian Approach

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/heal-j-moores-paradox-a-wittgensteinian-approach 1/21

Mind Association

Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian ApproachAuthor(s): Jane HealSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 409 (Jan., 1994), pp. 5-24Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253955 .

Accessed: 30/10/2013 17:08

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to Mind.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 148.206.159.132 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 17:08:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mind

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253955?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253955?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mind

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup



Moore's Paradox:A WittgensteinianApproach

JANE HEAL

I

"I believe that it is raining but it isn't." It would be perfectly absurd, claimed

Moore,to saythisorits like. Butwhy?Afterall, it is clearlypossible thatI should

believe thatit is rainingwhen it is not, that others should realise and remarkon

the errorI make. Why should my doing so myself be somehow absurd?My aiminthispaper s to suggestthatWittgenstein'sapproach o this issue has

much to recommend t and thatseeing its attractionmight provide anentry point

to understandinghenatureof Wittgenstein's ater philosophy of mind. A proper

account of thatis clearly beyondthe scope of this paperand moreovercould not

be given without treatingthose issues of meaning and metaphysics which Witt-

gensteindiscusses in the early part of the Investigations,before he moves on to

reflecton psychological concepts. So my object is to consider some features of

the paradox n detail but only to gesturein the directionof the largertopics, in a

way that may at least make it seem worthwhileto look into themfurther.

The next section outlines the paradox slightly more fully and suggests two

conditions which a satisfactorysolution should meet. It sketches two possible

approaches o thematter, heWittgensteinian which at thispointwill not look at

all attractive)andthe more familiar one initiatedby Moore himself. ?111 xam-

ines this secondapproachn moredetail andsuggeststhatit cannotmeetthe two

conditions.?IVand?V considerthequestionof how theparadoxcouldbe treated

in the frameworkof a functionalisttheoryof belief. ?IV arguesthat on certain

particularversions of functionalismthe oddness of the Moorean utterancesdis-appears.We do not get an explanationof why they are absurd;ratherwe get a

view on which there is no absurdity o be explained. ?V suggeststhat this disap-

pearanceof the paradox s likely to be a feature of all versions of functionalism

andis, moreover,a serious defect in them. Theupshotof thisdiscussionis to put

us in a betterpositionto appreciate heattractions f theWittgensteinian trategy,

which is brieflyoutlinedin the final ?VI.

I Fora related approach ee Linville and Ring 1991. I have found much thoughtpro-

voking material n Gombay 1988. Pears 1991 is also helpful. Baldwin 1990 has much ofinterest,althoughI disagree with him for reasons sketched ater. Moore's discussions arefoundin Moore 1942, pp. 540-3 and 1944, p. 204. Wittgenstein'sremarksare scatteredatvariousplaces in his writings,but the centralmaterial s in 1953, pp. 190-2 and 1980, pp.90-6. I would like to thankD. H. Mellor, two anonymousreferees for Mind and the Editorof Mindforhelpfulcommentson earlierdraftsof this paper.

Mind, Vol. 103 . 409. January 1994 C)O,xfordUniversity Press 1994








6 Jane Heal

II

So what is Moore's paradox?An initial point to note is that there are really two

paradoxes,one having to do with sentences of the form "I believe thatp but notp" and the otherwithsentencesof the form "I don'tbelieve thatp butp". One of

Moore'sdiscussionsof theissue deals with the firstand the otherwith the second,

but it looks as if he did not notice that there might be a significant difference.

Wittgensteinalso makesno explicit differentiation.His actualdiscussionis how-

ever mainly centredon the first.2 shall endeavour o say something aboutboth.

Moore himself describes whatis paradoxical n termsof assertion.Whatis to

be explained s why it would be so strange o (attempt o) make some public and

informativestatementwith this sort of content.Why cannotI do so, given thatothers clearly can make such assertions(given appropriate hanges of pronouns

etc.) and that I can state such things of myself in the past or future?

However, this stress on assertion overlooks the fact that there is something

equally strangeabout the idea that someone realises the sentences to be true of

him or herself, i.e. makes the sort of judgment which they express, whether

overtlycommunicated o anotheror not.3Wehavejust the samereasonsas in the

case of assertion-that others can have the thoughtof me, thatI can thinkit of

myself in thepastor future-to supposethatit oughtto be possible.

This yields thefirstconditionon a solution,namely thatit mustbe of adequate

generalityto explainthe oddness of both thoughtandassertion.So any proposal

which calls essentially on featureswhich are found only in communicationand

have no relevantanaloguein thoughtwill not fit the bill.

A second condition s this: the solution mustidentifya contradiction, r some-

thing contradiction-like,n the Mooreanclaims. It will not do, for example, to

show thatthey are odd merelyin thatthey depict situationswhich we take to be

empiricallyextremely unlikely.The oddnessis conceptual: here is some kind of

tensionorincompatibilitybetweenthetwo partsof theclaims, and t is this whichneeds to be elucidated.

Let us now sketchbrieflythetwo possiblelines of approacho a solution.Con-

sider the firstparadox, namely "I believe thatp but not p". Here we have two

potentiallycontradictory lements, namely "p"and "notp". But the one is insu-

lated fromthe otherby theoperator"Ibelieve that".Wecouldthentryto generate

2The discussioninWittgenstein1953is quite explicitly,barringone passageon p. 192,about he firstparadoxandsincethis representshis mostconsideredstatementon thatmat-

ter we must give it considerableweight in attributing focus of interestto Wittgenstein.The kinds of cases considered n Wittgenstein 1980 rangemore widely andat pp. 93, 94and 96 we findwording which suggests that the second paradox s being dealt with. Buteven here, close attention o thecontent suggeststhat n some of the cases it is the firstpar-adox which concernshim.

3 The point is made by Linville andRingandby Baldwin.It is also emphasisedby So-rensenin an interestingdiscussion in his 1988 differing substantially n approachbothfrom the Wittgensteinian ne exploredhere and the Mooreanone. Sorensen's book con-tains muchuseful materialon earlierwritingon the paradoxes.








8 Jane Heal

III

It is clear thatthe contents "p"or "notp" alone will not suffice to do the job of

generating hepropositions"I believe thatp" or "Ido not believe thatp". What-ever it is which supplies us with these claims, in such a way that they can be in

some kind of tension with the claims in the other halves of the Mooreanjudg-

ments, the propositionsby themselvescannot do it. Qua propositions hey carry

only whatever helogical implicationsare of "p"or"notp", whichdo notin gen-

eralinclude anythingabout people thinkingor notthinking. So, it seems, it must

be the occurrenceof some event (or state)which has the proposition"p"or "not

p" as content which brings with it the idea we need.

Manydiscussions, startingwithMoore's own, take the event in questionto bethatof my (apparently incerely)asserting hatp orthatnotp. This event does the

job by, somehow, implyingthatI do (or do not)believe thatp. A numberof dif-

ferent storiescould be told abouthow the new propositiongets broughtto our

attention.We could say that it was merely a matterof inductive generalisation:

those who assertthatp (ornotp) usually do believe thatp (ordo not believe that

p): hence the new propositionenters the scene in virtueof hearersmakingsuch

inductive inferences.This (very crudely) is Moore'sown approach.

Moresubtly,one could say that t is a matterof how thespeechact of assertion

works. Thus Baldwinwrites:

Theimplication[ofbelief ornon belief by assertion]must arisefromtheintention, constitutive of the speech act of assertion,of providingonesaudiencewith information hrough heirrecognitionthat this is ones in-tention. For since one cannot be understood as intending to informsomeone thatp unless one is believed by them to believe thatp, the in-tention to be thus understood ncludes the intention to be takento be-lieve what one asserts.(1990 p. 228)

Supposethatthis is correct.Then whenI say "Idon'tbelieve thatpbutp"it seemsthat, by the firstpartof my utteranceI intendto induce the belief thatI do not

believe thatp (becausethat is thecontent of thatbit of theassertion)while by the

secondpartI intendto inducebelief thatIbelieve thatp (in virtueof theprinciple

stated n the last sentenceof the quotation).So I intendto producecontradictory

beliefs. Thus it looks as if, by this sort of unpacking,we could reveal some con-

tradictionor contradiction-likephenomenon n the Mooreanclaim.

The above sort of storyworksbest for the second paradox. n order o account

for the oddness of the first Mooreanclaim (viz. "Ibelieve thatp but notp"), wehaveto go throughmore elaboratemanoeuvres.ThatI say "notp" somehowcar-

ries with it (in virtueof truthsaboutthe workingsof assertion,or whatever)the

idea thatI believe that notp. This is the firststep.But we can get from thatto the

idea thatI do notbelieve thatp only if we assume thatI am rationaland so do not

have contradictorybeliefs. So I, as a speaker,seem to be committedto inducing

the (quitecoherent)belief thatI havecontradictory eliefs. ButI will be commit-








Moore'sParadox: A Wittgensteinian pproach 9

ted further o inducingcontradictory eliefs in my hearer only if I assume thathe

or she will take me to be rationaland I intendhim or herto make the extrastep.4

It is worth noting that more work needs to be done to make these arguments

really cogent.5 For example, one difficultyis this.The original Griceanaccount,

which seems to be invoked, says that in assertingthat q I reveal to my audiencemy intention hat she believe that q andintend herto have thisknowledgeas her

reason for believing that q. It is true thatI cannot achieve my intended goal by

this route (in normalcircumstances)unlessmy audiencealso takes it thatI intend

her to have a true belief and thatI am myself well informedas to whetheror not

q. So, if all goes as planned,my audiencewill afterthe utterancebe in possession

of information romwhich she can inferthatI believe thatq. Butwe cannotwith-

out calling on furtherprinciples of epistemic logic and the logic of intention

derivefrom this thatI must intend my audience to believe thatI believe that q. Ifon the other handwe take the later Griceanaccount (on which when I assertthat

q I intendmy audience to believe thatI believe thatq) we run into other snags. I

shallnot pursue hese matters n detailsince it is notpartof my case thatthis gen-

eral line of explication of the absurdityof the Mooreanassertiondoes definitely

work, although t seems plausiblethat somethingof this general sort can be made

defensible. But if this is not so andthe sort of account sketched above ultimately

fails, because contradiction or some contradiction-like phenomenon can be

derived only by calling on further nvalid principles, then this strengthensthe

case for thinkingthatwe shouldlook elsewhere for a solution.6Let us however concede, for the sake of the argument, hat the above approach

can be developed persuasively and the act of utteringeither of the Mooreansen-

tences in an attempted incere assertioncan thus be shownto be bizarreand(in

one case at least) to involve anattempt o inducecontradictory eliefs. Theques-

tion remainsof whether hesereflectionssayall there s to be said.And the central

reason for thinkingthatthey do not is thatthey fail to meet the firstconditionon

a solution of the paradoxes. They tell us what would be odd aboutassertinga

Mooreanclaim but say nothing about why it mightbe odd to thinkit. If there isno public and communicatively intended utterance, hese strategies of solution

can get no grip.

But can they be extended? Can we find some interior analogue? Baldwin

(1990 pp. 229-32) arguesthatwe can. And he suggests further hatreflectionon

the parallelwill show us somethingof Wittgenstein'spurposes n discussingthe

paradoxwhich, as Baldwinremarks,clearly have little to do with Gricean deas

about the structure f acts of assertion.Baldwin holds that a rational hinkerwill

not consciously hold a Mooreanbelief "formuch the same reason that a rational

speakerwill not consciously assert a Moorean sentence".Clearlywhen I con-

4See Jones 1991 for some more reflectionson this and on how bringing n the concep-tion of assertionas conveying knowledge might strengthen he account.

5 I am grateful o the Editorandreferees of Mind for calling these points and their im-plications to my attention.

6 For further helpful discussion of the pitfalls of employing epistemic logic in at-temptedsolutionsof the paradoxessee Sorensen, pp. 19 ff.








10 Jane Heal

sciously make somejudgmentI do not puton some innerperformancewith the

intentionof convincingmyself of something.But the fact that the belief is con-

scious (where a "conscious"state is understoodas one accompaniedby aware-

ness of itself) will do some similar work, in making the fact of my belief do

double dutyas also a sortof claimthat t itself exists. So let us supposethatI con-sciously believe "Ibelieve thatp but not p". Now let us also take it thatholding

a conjunctivebelief (whetherconsciously or otherwise)implies belief (whether

consciously or otherwise) in each of the conjuncts.Then it follows thatI con-

sciouslybelieve thatI believe thatp andI consciouslybelieve thatnotp. So now,

because of this second belief and in virtue of the consciousness, I believe thatI

believe not p. So I (consciously) believe that I believe p and I believe that I

believe notp. If we are furtherallowedto takeit that any two beliefs (even if one

is conscious andtheothernot) yield a belief in the conjunctionof theircontents,

then I believe thatI believe p and thatI believe notp. So I believe thatI have a

contradictorybelief.

In the case of the second paradoxa suitablyadaptedchainof similarmanoeu-

vres (whichI shall not spell out in detail)can yield the conclusionthat I believe

of myself boththatI do notbelieve thatp and thatalso thatI do believe thatp. So

herewe get the outcome thatI actuallyhave a contradictorybelief aboutmyself

if I consciouslybelieve the second Mooreanclaim.

It is againimportant o note how muchworkis being done here by principles

of epistemiclogic. But let us waive this point.And let us grantalso whatBaldwin

claims, namelythatthe two resultantbeliefs canneitherof thembe heldby a con-

scious rational hinker.The interestingquestionis whatsignificancethis has.

Wittgensteinconcentrateson the firstparadox absurdityof self attribution f

particular rror).What the paradoxicalityof this shows, Baldwin claims, is that

an individualcannot hold apartherconceptionof the worldas it is andhercon-

ception of the world as she takes it to be. The subjectof belief cannotappear n

the worldas the subjectof belief. Baldwin (1990 p. 231) suggests that this is as

faras Wittgensteingoes explicitlyin his laterdiscussions butthatwhatis implicitin it is a Tractarian iew of the subject."Wittgenstein'sview is thatthe way to

come to termswithMoore's paradox s througha metaphysicalconceptionof the

subject.The reason thatthere aretruthsaboutme which I cannotbelieve is that

because these are truthsaboutme as a metaphysicalsubjectthey cannotappear

in my world."

I would like to suggest thatthis is not a mandatory eadingof the laterWitt-

gensteinon this topic. One reasonfor uneasinesswith it is thatpostulationof a

metaphysicalsubjectseems very likely to lead to solipsism andthus to a strongformof first/third ersonasymmetry n the meaningof psychologicalterms.But

there seem to be manyindications hatthese areviews thatWittgensteins strug-

gling against n his laterwritings.Otherpeoplearein theworld,as embodiedfal-

lible subjects,andso am I. Arguablythis"I"(theembodied,fallible, one among

many)is theonly sortof subjectorpersonthe laterWittgensteinwantsus to rec-

ognise. If this is rightthenhisproblem s to explainthephenomena-i.e. Moore's








Moore'sParadox:A Wittgensteinian pproach 11

paradoxes-in a way which precisely does not tempt us back to the Tractarian

non-worldly"limit"subject.

Anotherreason for worry is thatfurther houghtsuggests that we have not, in

the above reflectionson conscious belief, fully satisfied the second conditionon

a solutionfor the firstparadox;we have not yet found somethingcontradiction-like in the thought "Ibelieve thatp but not p". Let us remindourselvesagain of

exactly what absurdityor tension enters the scene in the would-be Moorean

thoughts.There is an importantasymmetryhere.In the case of the second para-

dox whatwe wouldhave withoutconsciousnessis a complex thoughtevent, the

occurrenceof thesecondelement of whichnecessarilyfalsifiesthe content of the

first. The additionof consciousness gives me the further hought"Ibelieve that

p". So I end upbelieving a contradictionabout my own psychological state.We

can certainlyagreewith Baldwinthat a rational hinkerwill not makethis judg-ment, since doing so is itself a manifestationof irrationality.The contradictori-

ness is right there in the judgment which is made. Thus as far as the second

paradoxgoes, this line of solutionseems satisfactory.

When we consider the firstparadox hingsareless clear.If I have the thought

"Ibelieve thatp butnot p" withoutconsciousnessthere exists a complexthought

event, thesecondelementin which can occur withoutfalsifyingthe contentof the

first, provided hat I have contradictory eliefs. AndI can have such beliefs. This

is what preventsus disentangling he firstparadoxwith the apparatuswe used for

the second. When consciousness is added,I come to be awarethatI believe not

p and so to be aware thatI have contradictorybeliefs. But having this thought

itself is not (in any obvious way) a manifestationof irrationality.The original

claim-believing thatp-is one itemand my recognisingthat t is false-my real-

ising thatI believe thatp butnotp-is another.Now all I amdoing, in the current

thirdjudgment, is, perfectly rationally and properly, recognising the conse-

quencesof these other states. Certainly cannotrecognisethe errorof a belief and

atthe sametime have it persistwithoutendingupwithcontradictory eliefs. And

so, we may say, this will not happento me unless I am irrational. am irrationalbecause my recognitionof the errorof a belief has failed to eradicate hat belief

in me. This is bad cognitive functioning n me. If this is how things are(andwe

haveno accountyet which shows thatit couldnotbe so withme) how couldit be

irrationalor contradictoryo recognisethatit is so? Onthis representation f the

structure f the thoughtsthe errorandits recognitionand theconsequentcontra-

dictorinessare all outside the contentof the conscious Moorean houghtI amnow

having.But intuitivelythis is extremelyunconvincing."Ibelieve thatp but not

p" (as a consciousthought) s in itself contradictory ndtension-ridden,n at leastas stronga way as "Ido not believe thatp butp". Someone who thinksit seems

to be thinkingcontradictorilyn thatvery judgment,not merelyto be committed

to recognisingdifficultyelsewhere.Ourproblem s to explainwhy it is absurd o

think"I believe thatp butnotp". But all we have succeededin doing is showing

thatif I were able to think it I would then be committedto recognisingthatmy

thoughtswerecontradictory.Wehave no explanationof whythis shouldbe some-








12 Jane Heal

thing absurdfor me to do, any more than we have an explanation for why it

shouldbe absurd o recognise the originalerror.

We might try saying that it is conceptually mpossibleto think thatp and that

not p consciously at the same time. The Mooreanclaim would inheritthis con-

ceptual absurdityprecisely because it seems to countenance such a possibility.

But this move is unsatisfactory.t is acknowledgedon allhandsthatapersonmay

have contradictorybeliefs. How does the addition of consciousness guarantee

removalof our liability to sucherror?One maysay thatconsciousnessbringsthe

two beliefs together and hence makes it extremely likely that rationalitywill

operate n noticingtheclash and removingone orboth. But"extremely ikely"is

not "conceptually ertain".Wemay insist by fiat thatit is necessary,but it would

remainmysteriouswhy we shouldbe entitled to do so. Consciousnessis being

invoked as a deus ex machina, but the explanation we have of its nature (asinvolving second orderthought)does not show how it could have thepostulated

powers.If we admit that, howeverunlikely,it is neverthelessanempiricalpossi-

bility that a personshould(thoroughly rrationallyof course)believe p and notp

consciously at the same time, then we invite the responsethat if this happensto

someone then the right coherentthing for him to do is to acknowledge it in a

Moorean udgment.

The objectof this section was to examinethe secondstrategy or dealing with

the paradoxes,namelythatof expanding he"p"or "notp"into someclaim aboutmy beliefs andthusgeneratinga contradiction.The suggestionI wish to makeis

that it may work for the second paradoxbut is far from satisfactory n dealing

with the first,for thereasons ustoutlined.I also wished to suggestthat, although

Baldwinis quite rightin emphasisingthatthe contradictoriness f Moore'sfirst

paradoxical emark if andwhenwe do get it explained)connectsclosely withthe

impossibilityof prisingapart he conceptionof the worldandthe conceptionof

whatwe believe the world to be, talk of a metaphysicalconceptionof the subject

maynotbe either the laterWittgenstein's eactionorthebestreactionto thephe-

nomenon.

IV

Itis naturalatthispointto thinkthatwe mightget helpwith ourproblemby look-

ing more closely into the meaning of the word "believe".If we set out in more

detail what the state of belief is then perhaps he natureandsource of the Moo-reanodditywould becomeapparento us. Let us thereforeconsiderfunctionalism

and its implications or ourquestion.7 WhatI shallsuggestis that, arfrombeing

7 I have focused here on a functionalistaccount of belief becauseit is the most likelyto seem plausibleto a modem reader.But a line of argument imilar o the one aboutto bedeveloped could, I think,be produced f we had started nsteadwith a Humeanfeeling-based accountor a Cartesian nner act view.








Moore sParadox:A WittgensteinianApproach 13

helpedto track the source of the contradiction,what we find is thatthe oddness

of the Mooreanclaim seems to evaporate.

We startfrom what is common to all versions of functionalism,broadly con-

strued,namely this: to say thatsomeone believes thatp is to say roughly "He or

she is in a statewhich, togetherwith his or herdesires, will normallycause behav-

iourwhich satisfiesthosedesires only if p". This generalview is compatiblewith

a whole varietyof furtherdetailedviews, on how "normal" s to be captured,on

how desiresare to be identified,on whetherfurtherconditions on normalcausal

origins shouldbe imposed, etc. My aim is simply to gesturein the direction of

those accounts of belief which are offeredwhen, recoiling fromCartesian ntro-

spectionism, we insist that psychological notions have as their central role a

causal/explanatorytask vis-a-vis behaviour and we stress that psychological

states are attributed n the basis of observedpatternsanddispositionsin behav-iour.Let us summarise hese views by saying thattheyequatehavinga belief that

p withbeing in a state apt to cause behaviourappropriateo its beingthe case that

P.

It is very important o functionalism hat the meaningof "believe" s uniform

and is given by some suchaccountwhetherI attributebelief to myself or another.

The functionalistmay admitthatI do not observe my own patternsof behaviour

in order o see whatI believe. Perhaps,he will say,I have some internal,pre-con-

sciously operating,self-scanningdevice which deliversto me usually true udg-

mentsaboutmybeliefs. Thisoperates n a way whichenables me to short-cutany

need for self observation.All the same, the functionalistwill say, what I mean

when I say "Ibelieve..." is fully capturedby the mentionof causes of behaviour

etc. There s, andcouldbe, no morethanthis, namelythefacts abouttruthcondi-

tions and the descriptivemeaning of "believe",to be said aboutthe role of the

wordin the language.

Now considerthe following case. We are familiarwith the Mueller-Lyerllu-

sion where the visual appearanceof one item being longer thanthe other is not

dissipatedby thediscoverythat t is in realityequal oreven shorter.Supposesucha case to involve some objectsA andB, say sticksand not merelylines, andsup-

pose thatA looks, andcontinues to look, longerthanB, while the realityis that

B is very slightly longerthanA. Supposefurther hat,in my particular ase, it is

notonly visualimpressionswhichfail to fall intoline withincreased nformation,

but also a considerablepartof my bodily behaviour.For example, if I wantthe

longerof the two sticks then I findmy handreachingout towardsA rather han

B; if someone asksme to pointto the longer,I pointto A and so forth.

Is thisquiteabsurdandunimaginable? twould be rashto rule it out on a priorigrounds.Moreover, phenomenado exist which somewhat resemble what has

been describedandwhich give some hintof whatit mightbe like to experience

it.Forexample,whenwatchinga film takenfrom a rollercoasterpeopleswayand

clutch theirseats. Despite theirknowledge thatthey are not moving, the visual

inputcarries such vivid messages of plungingandswoopingthatthe appropriate

bodily behaviour s difficultto restrain.








14 Jane Heal

The account of belief sketchedabove mandatesus to say in such an extended

Mueller-Lyercase: "I believe that A is longer than B, but B is longer thanA".

That is, we can believe and assert of ourselves, with perfect-intelligibilityand

propriety,he Mooreansentence:There is some statein me (viz. the illusion with

its extended powers)which is causing me to behavein a way which will be suc-cessful in fulfillingmy desires only if A is longerthan B; but A is not longerthan

B, as I have realised and statedin the otherpartof my utterance.The question

which set us off broodingon the paradoxwas this: to say "I believe thatp" is just

to saythatthings area certainway with me, withoutcommitment o how it is with

the rest of the world;so why can I not discover that things arethat way with me

while also remarkinghat n the world outsidenotp? Whatwe havedone with the

thoughtexperiment s to fleshthis out witha particular ccount(the functionalist

one) of what hasto be the case with me whenI believe. And we have discovered

that whenbelief is so construed, he oddnessvanishes.

Hereis another ase. I embarkupona certaincourse of action,enteringa com-

petitiveexamination or a job, exhibitingmany signs of cheerfulness andconfi-

dence; I am jaunty and smiling; I say "I'm going to win this one";I make no

arrangementsor alternative obs. At the same time I do other things which are

appropriate reparationsorthetreatment f a personwho hasreceiveda horrible

andunexpected(let me stressthat)shock. Forexample,I collect herbsandbrew

a potion,thepeculiarand sole virtueof whichis to console for the frightfulpangs

associatedwith unanticipatedmisfortune.It is clear from whenI brew the liquid

and where I stow it thatI am the intended recipientand that the day it is to be

takenis the day of the announcementof the examinationresult.I am awareof

whatI amdoingand say "Ibelieve thatI am going to fail and more,I believe that

I believe falsely thatI shall succeed. But of courseI shall succeed "

The case makesessentiallythe samepointas the extendedMueller-Lyer.Both

seem to licence the straightforwardmakingof the Mooreanclaim. The second

case, however, shows additionally hatwe can also licence on the basis of non-

linguisticbehaviourascriptionof thebelief "I believe falsely thatp".What shouldwe concludefrom thesecases? One move wouldbe to take them

at their face value and, acceptingfunctionalism, o say thatthey show that there

is no paradox; here s reallyno oddnessin Mooreanclaims,henceno problem n

explainingwhy there shouldbe oddness;we havebeen led intothe mistaken dea

thatthere was some oddness simply by lack of imaginationandby the rareness

of thecases;Mooreanclaims arenotconceptuallyquasi-contradictoryutmerely

extremely unlikelyto be true.

A way of avoidingthis somewhatunwelcomeandimplausiblecollapse of ourwhole problemwould be to say that there are faults in the so far rathervague

functionaliststorywe have been telling. It is clear,it mightbe said, thatnot all

my behaviour, n the extendedMueller-Lyer,s appropriateo A's being longer

thanB. Afterall, I intentionallyproduce, n thesecondpartof theutterance,a ver-

bal accountof how thingsare. This actionis under he control of some otherrep-

resentation of the world than the one which is directingthe movement of my








Moore'sParadox:A WittgensteinianApproach 15

limbs. Similar remarksare clearly appropriaten the examinationcase. Perhaps

we should so formulateour functionalistaccountthat a belief can be attributed

only if all behaviour s unifiedunderthecontrol of one representation?

But this is clearly too stronga demand.People do have contradictorybeliefs,

andeachof such a pairwill manifest tself in a differentareaof behaviour. n gen-

eral when we become awareof such contradictionsafter reflectionone belief or

the otheror bothdisappear.What is undoubtedlyunusualaboutthe cases imag-

ined is that the personhas contradictorybeliefs, andknows it, but that bothper-

sist-one controllingone partof behaviour,e.g. limb movement,and the other

some differentpart,e.g. vocalisation.This is doubtlessall very unfortunate or

the personwho is its subjectand (in some sense) irrational.But to acknowledge

that it is regrettableand irrational s very differentfrom supposingthat it could

not happen or could not be quite straightforwardlydescribedif it did happen.Nothingin thefunctionaliststory seems to entitleus to rule out thepersistenceof

contradictorybeliefs in the imaginedcases, even when the subject is awareof

them as contradictory. o we seem driven back to the conjecture hat the whole

idea of a paradoxwas a mistake.Is this acceptable?

In setting up these cases I have helpedmyself to the whole normalbackground

of humanlife, behaviour and speech. I have helped myself to the idea thatthe

Mooreanutterance s a whole (if made sincerely)expressesa belief which I have,

andconsequentlythatits second partexpresses my belief thatnotp.It is

clearlypresupposed n setting up the paradox hat the "I"spokenof in the explicit self

description s the same as thepersonwhose belief is expressed n the utteranceas

a whole and that the "belief' explicitly spoken of is the same as the belief

expressed, viz. belief in the ordinary sense. (If "I" meant "this rabbit"and

"believe thatp"meant"eats grass"of coursethere wouldbe no paradox.) n toy-

ing with the idea that there is really no paradoxwe have assumedthese presup-

positions to be fulfilled-namely thatthe "I"spokenof and the "I"who speaks

are the same and thatthe functional account of belief is the one and only one,

which capturesnot only the sense of the explicit self descriptionbut also whatcould be saidof me about my relationto the whole propositionexpressedby the

Mooreansentence.

Are these assumptionsright?Onefact to note is thatit is extremelynatural o

fall into some kindof contrastiveemphasisand/orverbalelaborationn reporting

the imaginedcases. For example one might well be temptedto say "Thisbody

believes thatp butnotp" or (bringingout the fact that the secondpartexpresses

a belief) "Thisbodybelieves thatp butI believe that notp".Another ormulation

mightalso seem apt:"Ibelieve in a bodily way thatp but notp" or "I believe ina bodily way thatp, butI reallybelieve thatnotp". The impulseto producethis

kindof contrastivedescription uggeststhattheremaybe somethingwrongin the

assumptions hatthe sense of belief and/or hepostulated ubjectof belief areuni-

form.The impulsebehindthe reformulationss to allow me to distancemyself

fromtheexplicitly ascribedbelief, eitherby assigningit to anothersubjectorby

denyingthatit is full belief. But if it is rightto do either of these thingsthen we








16 Jane Heal

will be wrongto thinkthatwe have discoveredthenon-existenceof theparadox.

If the subjectof belief or the sense of "believe" arenot the same, we may find

when we bringtheminto line againthatthe paradoxhasreappeared.

Which of the two moves, if either, s likely to be the moredefensible?Distin-

guishingbetween"me"and"thisbody"is plausibleat the level of sense ormode

of presentationbut highly controversialat the level of reference.It would seem

rashto embarkon a defence of dualism.The alternative,distinguishingkindsof

belief, has no such obvious drawbacks and does seem to provide a way of

expressingsomethingwhichneeds saying,namelythatmy relationsto theprop-

osition thatp andto the propositionthat not p are importantlydifferentin the

imaginedcase. For example,as faras conversationand furtherpersonal nterac-

tion with me is concerned(debatingwhatis really the case, makingplansfor the

future,sharingajoke, being outragedat my flippancy,blamingme, encouragingme, condolingwithme, etc.) you will treatme as one who believes notp; it is on

the basis of this that all your moves will be premised.This is partof what we

understandn graspingthatnormalhumanlife is proceedingas the background

to the strangeevents. The regrettable act thatin certainrespectsI carryon as if

I believed thatp, i.e. thatmy limbs fromtime to time execute variousmanoeu-

vres, is somethingthatyou andI will planto changeor circumvent.

Let us then use "believe" n the clearunderstandinghatwearespeakingof a

particular elation o a proposition,namelythe one whichI have when I "really"

believe it. Now supposeI say "I believe notp-as ourconversations,plansetc.

rightlyassume-but in factp"?The paradoxhas reappeared, ince this utterance

is extremelyodd, as is equally the idea thatI shouldmakethis judgmentabout

myself. All the old flavourof contradictorinesss detectable.

Whatwe foundearlierwas thatwe had a worryingdisappearance f the para-

dox on ouroriginalfunctionalistaccountof belief. We first consideredavoiding

this by reformulating unctionalismto rule out contradictorybeliefs andfound

that unsatisfactory.Can we now explain the reappearanceof the paradoxby

pointingto somefurthermodifiedandenriched unctionalistaccountof belief?If

so, we can preservebothfunctionalismandourintuition hatthe paradox s cen-

tral to the natureof belief. This would seem to be rathera satisfactoryoutcome.

So perhapswe should try somethinglike this, as an elucidationof the sense of

"believe" I have been gesturing at with this talk of conversation and normal

human ife: "A believes thatp" means"Abehaves, includingbehaviour n delib-

erationandvocalisation, n a way whichwill be desire-fulfilling f andonly if p".

(Makingthis move might also satisfy the impulse to insist that what has gone

wrongso faris thatwe have not consideredspecificallyconsciousbelief. On theaccount suggested earlier,conscious belief is belief accompaniedby belief in

itself.And this latterwill on thecurrentapproach onsistin dispositionsto behav-

iour appropriateo the first evel belief, e.g. amongotherthingsin explicitdelib-

erativeandvocal behaviour.)

This formulationdoes not provide the stable resting place we might hope.

Instead t invites the imaginationof furtherbizarrecases. Suppose,for example,









that underthe influence of certain drugs or tirednessthe extendedMueller-Lyer

case extends itself even further, o thatI find not merelymy bodily behaviourbut

also some chainsof images and representation nd somevocalisationstaking off

underthe control of the belief that A is longer than B. In other words, I find that

I cannot stop ideas of what would be the case if A werelonger thanB coming intomy mind and when they get there they exert the same controlover bodily behav-

iour as the originalerroneousbelief; and I findmyself utteringout these new con-

clusions, even though, in some sense, I wish to repudiate hem. I still, however,

have enoughcontrol of my voice, when I try,to say "I believe thatA is longer

thanB but B is longer thanA".

It is clear that if this happensto me I am in even worse case than when my

limbs alone are carryingon bizarrely.But, to reiterate he earlierpoint, to remark

that somethingwouldbe a grave misfortune o a personis quite a different hing

from supposingthatit cannot happen or be recognisedand describedby him or

her. On the current hypothesis about the meaning of "believe" an entirely

straightforwardorm of wordsis instantlyavailable,to be usedquite literallyand

unparadoxically,o describemy unfortunate tate,viz. "I believe thatp but not

p". So we have again mislaid the strange natureof the Mooreanclaim and the

revised functionaliststory does not, after all, quite capture hat apparent ense of

"believe"we meant to gesture at when we talked of normalhuman ife and con-

versation.

V

Whatconclusions shouldwe drawfromthediscussion of the last section?I wish

now to suggest that there are general reasons for thinking that any functionalist

approachmust runintothe sametroublesas the versionswe have examined and

so must fail to account orthe idea thatthere s somethingcontradictory bout he

Mooreanclaim. I shall furtherurgethatthis is a seriousproblemfor functional-

ism.

The firstpointto note is that functionalism s formulatedwithina (naturaland

attractive)metaphysicalview. On this view the world contains a varietyof phe-

nomenawhich people may come acrossandof which they may form some con-

ception (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, p. 190). Among these are states of themselves,

includingbeliefs. They come acrossthese eitherby introspection althoughthis

idea would morenaturallygo with a HumeanorCartesianview than with a func-

tionalist one) or in seeking to explain, in proto scientific folk-psychology, thebehaviourof themselves and those around hem. The linguisticbehaviourof the

word "believe" is to be explained by unpackingthe truthconditions of claims

aboutbeliefs; these in turn are explained by pointingto the conception people

have of thephenomenon heyhave come across,aconceptionwhichwill moreor

less accurately capturethe natureof the pre-existing phenomenon. (Lurking

behind this commonsensical-seeming account are furtherpictures e.g. of the








Moore'sParadox: A WittgensteinianApproach 19

not say straightforwardly I believe thatp"-as the functionaliststory demands.

What is true of this version of functionalismwill (I suggest) be true of any other

version which fails to deliver a contradiction n the Moorean utterance, or the

following reason. If there is no contradictionthen the subject may coherently

acknowledge the supposed belief thatp while at the same time affirming hatinreality not p. And if the subject does thus affirmthat not p (while coherently

acknowledgingalso the going on of the supposedfunctionalistbelief thatp) we

will surely want to say that this affirmation s what expresses his or her "real"

belief and hence that whateverwas capturedby the functionalist tory is not (con-

traryto hypothesis) realbelief. In summary, f functionalismdoes not deliver a

contradictionwe can have the subject acknowledgingthe supposed "belief' but

also disowningit. And then the functionaliststory has not captured he ordinary

sense of "believe".My challenge to the functionalist,in brief, is to show howwhat happened o the definitionsproposed n ?IV could be avoided by any other

proposed definition which satisfies the functionalist overall demands. Putting

these thoughts ogether n sequencewe havethis:a deepseatedmetaphysicalpic-

ture motivatesfunctionalism;butfunctionalismcannotdeliver thecontradiction;

in failing to deliver a contradiction t undermines ts claim to capture he normal

sense of "believe".

The thrustof the arguments to suggest thatthe source of the muddlewe find

ourselvesin is themetaphysicalpicturewhich dictates theshapeof the function-alist account.The next section pursuesthatthought.Otheroptionsare available

at this point.I do not claim to have conclusive proofthatno version of function-

alism can reveal the Mooreanclaim as contradictory.Nor have we proofthat we

must retain the idea of the contradictoriness.The considerationsurged on both

these issues were suggestive rather han fully cogent. Hence two optionsat least

are to look to furtherversionsof functionalismor to thedefensibilityof abandon-

ing the paradoxes.A thirdquitedifferentpossibilitywould be to suggest that we

should look to theepistemology of belief to finda solution.Ithasbeen suggested

(following Wittgenstein) hatusuallywhen a personself-ascribes the belief that

p he or she does so on groundswhich arethesame as his orhergrounds orjudg-

ing thatp. Thus if I am asked "Do you believe that p?" I do not think about

myself. Rather ask"p?"Andif the answer s "yes"thenI say "Ibelieve thatp".

If this is the standard outeto self ascriptionsof belief thenperhapssome contra-

dictory characterappearsin "I believe thatp but not p" when said in circum-

stances where the presumption is of the normal epistemology.8 (I shall not

examinethe detailsof what contradictionwouldemergeorexactly how.) Onthis

scenario it is not the metaphysics behind functionalism nor yet its particularaccount of the meaningof "believe"which leadsto ourinabilityto elucidatethe

paradoxbut ratherour blindnessaboutthedistinctiveepistemologyof "believe".

Investigationof thisproposalwouldrequiremorespacethanwe have here. So

I simplynote it andturn o ask how things mightgo if we did not like the look of

8 I am grateful o one of the refereesfor drawing his possibilityto my attention.








20 Jane Heal

any of these options and chose instead to question functionalismand its frame-

work.

VI

What alternativecould there be to using the word"believe" as a label for some

phenomenon,some internalstate of people, which people come across in them-

selves or others?A possible answer is thatit is a phenomenonwhichcomes into

existence togetherwithcertainpracticesof ascribing t. The full phenomenonof

belief, the kind of belief which peoplehave, only exists when creatures ike our-

selves engagein practicesof belief ascription-where thosepracticesdo not have

the shape which the metaphysical pictureunderlyingfunctionalism demands.

Someonebeingtrained o use theword "believe" n his or her first anguage s not

simply being taughtto connectthe word with a pre-existingsomethingof which

he or she is aware;rathersuch a learner s being educated into being a believer.

Let me tryto make this less schematic by outliningwhatI suggest to be a Witt-

gensteinian accountof belief ascription,togetherwith how it accounts for the

contradictoriness f Mooreanclaims.

The proposalmaybe put like this. Wehave a practicewith the word "believe"

which combines a number of features. The first, (A), is that beliefs are often

attributedo peopleon the basis of observedpatterns n behaviour.So the sort of

thirdpersonalcriteriawhich the functionalistemphasisesare ndeed connectedto

the concept. It is no mistake to think that they are. But thereis much more to be

saidthanthis.A second feature, B), is thata person earning he language s also

trained o say "Ibelieve thatp" sometimes as a substitute or the plainassertion

"p".This training,of its very nature,makes the trainedperson'sutteranceof "I

believe thatp" very often occur withouthis or hercheckingany criteria.In par-

ticular the trainedperson does not check up on his or herbehaviour.If any evi-dence is looked at it is evidence as to whetherp. But often,of course,if a person

has alreadysettled thatp then he or she does not check anythingbefore saying

"p"andin these cases he or she would likewise not check anythingbeforesaying

"I believe thatp".9

If we stopped at this point and considered only (B) we would have an

extremelydirectsolutionto Moore'sproblem."Ibelieve thatp" is merely (as far

as (B) alonegoes) analternativeway of saying "p".So of courseone who says "I

believe thatp butnotp" contradictshim or herself.In effect what has been said9 Herethe practicewhich is the basis for the distinctive epistemology alludedto atthe

end of the last section appears,but placed as an element in an overall accountof a non-functionalistcharacter.There is clearly a parallelbetween what is suggested here about"believe"and Wittgenstein'sviews abouthow "It hurts"or "I am in pain"areintroducedas replacements or non-linguisticpainbehaviour. t seems highly probable hat t wasthepossibilityof linkingMoore'sparadoxwith these strandsof his thoughtwhich aroused heenthusiasmWittgensteinexpressesin his 1944 letterto Moore, quoted n Gombay,p. 192.








22 Jane Heal

access to an independent tatebutbecausewhen I come to thinkthatIbelieve that

p thenI do, in virtue of that very thought,believe thatp. It is however important

to remember hat, as with any performative, ertainbackground onditions must

be present which render he claim "happy", n Austin's terms.'0Thus we do not

give the subjectcarte blanche to pronounceon his or her beliefs, even when tired,deranged,understress, underthe influence of drugs etc.

If we are prepared o make this radical move, then we can hang on to some-

thing like the simple solution of the paradox.SupposeI say sincerely"Ibelieve

thatp"andtherebyexpress my belief thatIbelieve thatp.Thisbelief, namely that

I believe thatp, itself constitutes n me a belief thatp. So my utterance"Ibelieve

thatp" also expresses belief thatp. In doing this it is, from one perspective, ust

an alternative orm of assertion thatp. So if I now add "but notp" then I have

contradictedmyself.Thus we have in "Ibelieve thatp" an utterancewhich is, at one andthe same

time, a memberof two different classes. On the one hand it is a self description

of me as a believerandas such it has all thepossibilitiesof grammaticalransfor-

mation, entry into inference and possibility of incompatibilitywith behavioural

evidence whichthat involves. Onthe other handit is an expression of belief that

p, an alternativeway of voicing out what could also be voiced out as "p".When

we sense the contradictionn theMooreanutterancewe hear"I believe thatp" in

this secondrole. When we become puzzled aboutwhy the utterance s contradic-torywe hearit in the first role."

The remarksof the last paragraph ear on the oddness of the overt Moorean

assertion.Butwhat of the Moorean hought?Clearlya closely analogoussolution

canbe offered.As we have alreadystressed,what is central o theproposal s not

thatthe utterance"Ibelieve thatp" constitutesbelief but that ts sinceritydoes so.

If our concept of belief does indeed work like this then the same dual character

to be found in the utterance"Ibelieve thatp" will also be found in the thought

with thatcontent.When we contemplatesomeone having this thoughtwe take

him or her to have a representationwhich is at the sametime aboutthe self and

10 See Austin 1962for the classic accountof performative tterances.The proposal ustoutlined here has somethingin common with that suggested by C. Wright n some recentpapers and ascribedby him to Wittgenstein.But it differs from Wright's n continuingtogive a centralrole to behavioural riteria.On Wright'sview the treatment f psychologicalstates is parallelto a familiartreatmentof secondaryqualities, namely (to put it crudely)thatthey lie in the eye of the beholder. n my view this does not accuratelyrepresentWitt-genstein's approach.

IILet me brieflycontrast his accountof thematterwith the bestthat we would be able

to come up with if we were to take the authoritativeness f self attributions f belief asepistemological. Herewe allow in traditional tyle infallible access to one's own mentalstates, which are neverthelessconceived of as distinct from the states of knowledge towhich they give rise.On this story one who sincerelyasserts"I believe thatp" will indeedbelieve thatp. If we add the other partof the Mooreanclaim,also sincere,we clearlyhavea person who believes p and also believes not p. So contradictorybeliefs are implicit inthis story,butthe utterancetself is not directlyexpressive of a contradiction.Thusthisac-count loses the contradictionagain. Moreover, t landsus with the problemof explaininghow there can be this sort of infallible knowledge of anything.









aboutthe world.It is both a belief that he or she believes thatp and a belief that

p. One andthe samestateenters nto two sets of inferential,evidenceresponsive,

etc. relations.We have the troublesomesense thatthe Mooreanthoughtis both

coherentand incoherentas we concentratenow on one and now on anotherof the

patterns n which its first elementsits.

Functionalism s not entirelywrong. The thirdpersonalbehaviouralcriteria

which it stresses are genuinelypartof the notion of belief.'2 But, to put things

metaphorically,t capturesonly one dimensionof a notion which has a type of

complexityordepthnotenvisagedwithinthe metaphysicaland linguisticpicture

of which functionalism s a part.The real shapeof the concept is one in which

criterionlessfirst personascriptionandbehaviourallybasedthird personascrip-

tion areinseparably inked.

Even in the hypothesisthe pattern s not whatyou think.Whenyou say"SupposeI believe" you are presupposingthe whole grammarof theword"tobelieve",the ordinaryuse, of whichyou aremaster.(Wittgen-stein 1980, p. 192)

So in ascribingbelief to anotherone may make the ascriptionon the basis of

behaviourbut will take for granted he ability of the subjectto make criterion-

less self ascription.In self-ascribing criterionlessly one will take for granted

appropriate ehaviour.If psychological notions did not have this complexityof

shape then our normalhumaninteractionswith each other would be impossi-ble.

We arestrongly nclined to say thatone utterance "I believe thatp"-cannot

be univocal and also combine the two roles of which I have spoken. Relatedly

we shall protestthata supposedlydescriptiveconceptdefined by thejoint pres-

ence of features (A), (B) and (C) is misbegotten and impossible. There will

perhapsbe pressure o divide usage up intoa properdescriptiveelement(behav-

ioural criteriaagain) and something else (i.e. the aberrant irst person present

tense use) which is given an expressiveor speech act account.But what entitles

us to do this or necessitates it? Can't we have concepts of whatevershape we

like, governedby whateverpatternsof ascriptionrules we like, if they do good

work for us? Clearlywe could not set up the practiceI have just sketched,and

operate the notion of "belief' which it defines, unless various contingencies

obtained,most strikinglythatpeople's sincere criterionlessself ascriptionsdo,

almost invariably,passthe test of acceptabilityby behaviouralcriteria.Theprac-

tice with the word"believe" s erectedon a substructure f facts aboutoursocial

nature,abilityto respondto certaintraining,brainworkingsand so forth.But is

this any criticism of the concept or proof that it does not have the nature

sketched?To answerthisquestionwouldinvolve tacklinglargeissues to do with

12 I wouldlike to suggestherethatwhat we meanby "behaviour" eedsclose scrutinyandthatthe rangeof "behaviour"we recogniseand the kinds of descriptionsof it we are

willingto offermaybe different or creatureswho canhave the full personalkindof belief

sketchedhere and ones which cannot.Thus it is possible that the firstand thirdpersonalarewoven together n furtherways thanthose indicatedhere.








24 JaneHeal

concepts, meaning, truth and fact and would take us beyond the remit of this

paper.13

St. John'sCollege JANE HEALUniversityof CambridgeCambridgeCB2 I TPUK

13 For some discussionof why willingness to introduceconsiderationsabout the pre-suppositionsof conceptsandto talk of the "languagegames" hey are linked with neednotundermine deas of truthand realism, see Heal 1989 especially Ch. 8.

REFERENCES

Austin, J. L. 1962: How to do Things with Words. Oxford:Oxford University

Press.

Baldwin,T. 1990: G. E. Moore. London and New York: Routledge.

Gombay, A. 1988: "Some Paradoxesof Counterprivacy".Philosophy, 63, pp.

191-210.

Heal, B. J. 1989: Fact and Meaning. Oxford:Basil Blackwell.

Jones, 0. R. 1991: "Moore's Paradox,Assertionand Knowledge".Analysis,51,

pp. 183-6.

Linville, K. andRing, M. 1991: "Moore's ParadoxRevisited".Synthese, 87, pp.

295-309.

Moore,G. E. 1942: "Replyto my Critics" n P. Schilpped. ThePhilosophy of G.

E. Moore. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

1944 "Russell's Theory of Descriptions" n P. Schilpp ed. ThePhilosophyofBertrandRussell. La Salle, Illinois:OpenCourt.

Pears,D. 1991: "Wittgenstein'sAccount of Rule Following".Synthese, 87, pp.

273-83.

Sorensen,R. 1988: Blindspots. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein,L. 1953: Philosophical Investigations.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.

1980: Remarkson the Philosophyof Psychology, Vol I. Oxford:Basil Black-

well.

Wright,C. 1989 "Wittgenstein'sLaterPhilosophyof Mind".Journalof Philos-

ophy, 86, pp. 622-34.

1989 "Wittgenstein'sRule-followingConsiderations nd the CentralProject

of Theoretical Linguistics" in A. George ed. Reflections on Chomsky.

Oxford:Basil Blackwell, pp. 233-64.

heal, j. moore_s paradox. a wittgensteinian approach

Documents