hea stem 2014 understanding evolutionarily stable strategies: interactive games in the classroom...
TRANSCRIPT
HEA STEM 2014
Understanding evolutionarily stable strategies: interactive games in the classroom
Catherine Dennis
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy?
‘A strategy which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that
is initially rare.’
Pure ESS
One strategy adopted by all animals
Mixed ESS
Frequency dependent
Aim
John Maynard Smith (1973)
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Fight – win or be injured
Win
Retreat Negotiate peacefully
HAWK DOVE
HAWK
DOVE
Hawk Dove Game
Fight – win or be injured
Win
Retreat Negotiate peacefully
HAWK DOVE
HAWK
DOVE
Hawk Dove Game
Victory - Cost
2Victory
0Victory
2
HAWK DOVE
HAWK
DOVE
To play the game:
Victory = 50 points, Cost = -100 points
Victory = 50 points, Cost = 0
50 points 0 points
Hawk Dove Game
To play the game:
Victory = 50 points, Cost = -100 points
Victory = 50 points, Cost = 0
50 points 0 points
10 rounds
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
Hawk Dove Game
V - C2
V
0V2
HAWK DOVE
HAWK
DOVE
-25 50
0 25
Benefits
• Not entirely equation focussed• Play both strategies – one species!
• Evolutionary nature of the game emphasised• ACTIVE
Limitations
• Some students still fail to grasp concept
However…..
…..they remember game theory
….. all appear to be comfortable with the concept by Level 4
Further activities
• Spreadsheet exercises in ecology and evolution chapter 39: Evolutionary Stable Strategies http://www.uvm.edu/rsenr/vtcfwru/spreadsheets/ecologyevolution/ecology_evolution.htm
• Dennis, C. (2014) Teaching the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a non-computerised adaptation of Axelrod’s Tournament, Journal of Biological Education (in press)
• Extension exercise for Axelrod’s Tournament: http://www.christopherxjjensen.com/research/projects/online-cooperative-resource/easy-iterated-prisoners-dilemma/