he...maj. gen. d. w. mcgowm hq, 50th .hnored divisim trenton, sew jersey e w hunu if the check is -...

HE MIGHTY ATOM.. . ATOMIC WEAPONS

IN LAND COMBAT -

By Cd. G. C. Rdnhordr und Lt. Cd. W. R. Klntnw

This new book explores the problem that today confronts all military men-and citizens. Hm will atomic weapons affect tactics and strategy? What is the meaning on the bat- dekld of this h o s t unknown, untried, mighty power? This is the first book to evaluate the new military weapon on tomorrow's battlefield.

The authors show how the atomic weapon challenges military leaders because it is a cod that demands new and exacting skills. Changes as radical as yesteryear's invention of gunpcrwder face the leaden of today's armies, who must know how to recognize potential atomic targets and must learn how to set up tbe correct missions to deal with tbe-w--

Dircussed far the first time are such important mpicsastbertomicweaponsand aidmtnesmgay,d€ensive and&fensive tauicswhen both &hme atomic weapons. p ( o ( b c e j y c l l w 9 1 m . d Ispeca. the n c v p a q M ? c t s d d K ~ pobkm. the IKW c a e i d y #c factor, t&*d indhdud and unit trrinir#. plus an lppndu widr a weakb d drggtimr. churr. and tables

. ~ w u d c h t ~ p R x a 8 e d ~ t k tuw add w. & & m a & h l m h a y ~d--clrWarrbartlu h D m d y b d w W h YI.) drdr Ilr - weapa dPr"P"* lml ru lnd lan . l *

Tht United Sturn

I

ARMOR The Mtzgaem of Mobik Warfwc

c o r n - To ...................................................... 2

m B ~ r m c m R o F s z u r . ..................... 4

m m ?AT.OPP .......................................................... IO

m w m - .......................................................... 16

( I M & ~ ~ S T A N C Z ............................................................. I)

R u t r m G -

b U c . L m L Yru. Jr.

sSc.LCE C..e

u U. E. C Drr. 4 J. I .Ib. W. - Iu. J. D. lcma

-RIAL ..................................................................... I

loooa~pl tam UD TAJIU ................................................. m

~ . I ~ o Q o I ~ ~ - - : A - - . . . I )

mrn.1)'- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n

m-n-

&w-L-lc.

m

L

. -

I I

HE MIOHTY ATOM. . ATOMIC WEAPONS

IN LAND COMBAT 6y Cd. G. C. Rdnhatdt and Lt. Cd. W. R. K h n r

- This new book explores the problem that today confronts all military men-and citizens. How will atomic weapons affect tactics and strategy? What is the meaning on the bat- tle6eld of this h o s t unknown, untried. mighty power? This’is the first book to evaluate the new military weapon on tomorrow’s battlefield.

The authors show how the atomic weapon challenges military leaders because it is a tool that demands new and exacting skills. Changes as radical as yesteryear‘s invention of gunpowder face the leaders of today’s armies, who must know how to recognize potential aunnic targets and must learn how to set up the correct missions to deal with

Discussed for &e first time are such important topics as the atomic weapons and airborne strategy, offensive and defensive tactics when both sides have atomic weapons, protective measures, medical aspects, the new aspects of the logistical problem, the new casualty rate factor. the demands of individual and unit training, plus an appendix with a wed& of definitions, charts, and tables.

- b a r e of the challenge presented by the new tool of war, the thoughtful military man and student will welcome this opportunity to study this carefully evaluated discussion of what the atomic weapon really means to the armed forces of today.

thesetargets.

$3.95

.

-Foreword by Lt. Cen. Manton S. Eddy, U. S. Army

W’atcb for the exclusive feature review . . . in the November-December issue of ARMOR.

Thc United skxtcs

ARMOR Tbc .Maga.(im of MobZZ~ Warj’re

CONIZNIS - To Tme PIms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

TEE A8UT-s mr CUII OF STAFF ........................................... 4

?ATOW ........ ........................................... *a

rar WAC0 DlsAsrE .............. .................................... 1s

maau.-CYur

b I*. c.L t m Jr.

SUM & 8umTmcs ........... : .................................................. so 4 W C L U U E. C.- CUc J. M. -.

L W. - M4. J. D. BIlrnr

WtOIut ...................................................................... s UcOaLpI CtTwll AND TIwul ................................................

m m u o o r L t . r b N L I ~ C O l L U T a m S ~ V I C X V I I C I C ~ : A C I ~ I I l ~ . . .

IPIO- C O M am ABM0.P) 13ylg ..................................... 84 Br Msj. E Dkr. Jr.

4 k C 4 6 r p E . Jr. BACSUOtXXD ?OR D.II.ILUI. PLLNWNC ........................

to? COYILIM) IN ms FAB EMT .............................................. 4a

AMUJCUJ -ART rOWCT ................................................. U 4 Drr C J . B a m u h d L E ilvr

R B I s N m ..................................................... 801 WOtTU) roc Do IT? ...................................................... y

FROM TO- PAC= .. .................................................. p

TOUB Ull.lTABT BcIlOOLlwG ................................................... II

Ammo. AsmclAmoR SEWS N o m ...........................................

R E boo= SB4XlON ............................................................. n

A m l v r n l & L r l p . r r t . e i r

Y

SlILWELL% MISSION ?O CEIXA ................................ - . ............. ST b m a . wwt.

KOREA 1950

LETTERS to the EDITOR

AhC0d.W b Sir:

I am e d a i n g a lctm fmo a unit I.lmmmAaofthe5orhArmaedDiVi- - N e r r J a s ~ y N . Q n n l G d Th lemer i d is ;.ul;rarive d the

d = d . i d - h b - is I amaware d the face that mlicrnlmra aremeligibleformemhership. I d

y m n t e t h e r w a r d s a n d d

the subscription desired. Further, I suggest, that the letter

might be published in .+FLMOR maga- z inc however, the writer, as be re- q u Q e d ~ d r a n a i n u y I I l y m a u

MAJ. GEN. D. W. McGowm Hq, 50th .hnored Divisim

Trenton, Sew Jersey

e w hunu if the check is - far

,Dear General McGfman: Since becoming a member of the

h o r ilsociaaoo, I have experi- eked a deep sense of admiration for the high degree or esprit de corps it fosters. I especially applaud its ef- foro to disseminate to the American Public, the taxpayers as well as the military man, the various rami6ca- tions of -%mor and mobile warfare. It incites interest in a v e q important

As a meaus of creating a greater interest in =Lmorwithin the 50th Ar- mared Di\;ision, I am respecdully requesting the General's permision to establish a w=ommanding General .Award" (or a similar tick) which shall CoIlSist of "Lksociace MesnbeT- ship" in the U. S. Armor Assoda- tion. Such award will be given, at the end of summer field training, to the outstanding noncommissioned of-

Segment Of OUT Mthd defense.

6cer in each major command CombatCommandA CinnbacCommandB CusnbatCimunandReserve EnginorrBanaion D i v i s i o n ~ e y DivisionTrains ReoonnaisJance Banalion Provisional Battalion

I am enclosin my persand check

to mer membership costs for the current year.

I pawnally would like to remain anonymous and have the award pre- senhedbytbeDividon. Themanna of sekction is of course the preroga- tive of the Commanding General.

in the amount f $38.00 (8 x $4.75;

The Navy is Mobik Minded Dear Sir:

After reading the introductory copy of pap ARMOR from cover to cover I wish to subscribe for it and am eaxhing a money order in the amount of eight dollars for a two pears subscrip tion.

Mthough I am a Navy man with ova taartp-he years service I am very much mtezesed in tank warfare and fed that your magazine is just the * t o L c d & me posted.

d Communication Tech- I am a

nictn,noaminaaivedurgmthe h e e n r l d e z d h Re+t-LNy a two-

VQU I ~ ~ a s a L i c u e m y l t during wald war I1 a d mpIfemd toFketRcravein1948,wasrecaUed in March 1951 and r e l a d again last Febnurp. 0 . W L E L ~ s Duadalt, hlaryland P u s o a d Mimay'Aid Dear sir:

Univusity, M d Air Fmr Base. ~ a n d a m a r q d a r ~ o f your nlagazk.

Rim to my pcvnt assignment I served as a United Ndons Xlilicq- obsaverin- '.whilestatioaed there I waked dapdy with xndon&m p a s o m e l p D d b e Q m e ~ t e d w i d l a Maj. dan Njonja A. WiprunLunmu of the Iodonesh Army. We cure- spond quite frrquently d he has re- ¶=-d Y W rmadac.

Please send me the particulars as I would like to subscribe and $end AR- MOR to chis Major as a gift.

LT. Cor. R. W. HALL hluarell Field, Alabama Mom NATO Arm- Dear Sir:

I am a constant of your b e whosehinoricalandcechnical tanks and mobility in ancient

and modan warfare I particuLrly a p preciatc.

On the front page of pour Jan-- Februarv 1953 h e I noted the in-

.

signia d five armored divisions to SHAPE.

At 3G31 of h l d - A p d 1953 &e you have printed &e pic- Nfes of six Vm0re.d division commanders. of these divisions and conlmandert, one is American, one &'French, three are B r i d and one is Bdgian.

I d l i k e m k p a u b t h u t h a c y m a e d f a c a a r e & ~ w SHAPE uodcr the H a d q u a a s .Ulied Forces Central Europe (HAFCE). However, SHAPE a b iuchmks Hed-

AuiaiFmaNanbandsaIdl (HAFNE a d RQFSE). WLrrrrrharrmaCdfaa

are ~HAFsE.buIsbaddIikel0 aaoaDcdmikaltheumacd

refwmCe to I* UmQCcd uniaeicba a%igna laarm; ; l r tcdarndaam- plcrioa fa NATO plrpa3a

I d p has - thrrt umaed divirioar esuippeaqirhPaaacl9nLchled these is a s q d to Saw and RWSE and irs name is -&eaz," in E+& "Run." in Italian s k g . "Gprooe. By the way, "R Gpuoe" is a nnmthly

of tbe aba two ymacd &+siom too. M a divish. whose name is

'-centaun," in En . "centaur." i5

third division called " P d del Friuli" (a 1 4 5 in the Venetian plain famous for a cavalry charge mde by War Italian I) horv is now regiments under compkcioa. during \Vorld These

two divisions will be asigned to S.-\TO and HAFSE in the near future. accurd- in3 to a statement made QLI 25th April this year by Lieutenant General Ennco htrini. IT.% Gmm?ader, .ulied k n d ForcesSourhemE fromhisV'uoar headquarum tu tbeTmo York Herald TtiburrC.

I hope the above d give you a fairlv accurate icture of what COLLQ~S I d + . .G for 8recc-e and Turkey :+e other two MI^- also repcsented m HAFSE) the fdlawing can be said:

Grcecehasthrrearmdregiments one for each of her n a a d armr corpr Presently tao are esuippsd &rh old British Gntaur tanks and the third one with 1124 light Amerioan tanks.

Turkev has now six annored bn on a reduced strength. which & come divisions equipped with American mataial.

Naples, Italy Capt.. Icalian . h p

c UDda HAFSL With PpeiCrrLr

paprissuedby thudivisiao, 00 behalf

m i e d ' f a s.A8?4 H.-\FSE: a

GIULXO \ IACRI

THE COVER This cover shot, fbrargh tbe courcq of the Rqmblic Aviation Corpontioa, depicts teamwork of tbc highest cplikr. Add to chis ream tbe &om of tbe tech- nicalandd ..* 'ebraercba,plus our sister semiqc--th Navy, Air and Marines. Funbcr, we annot overlook

feme efiorr. Mold them rogecher and it speUs-Vktory 00 r k *Id!

d.leci~iadustrybndriognpchisdc-

I I

ARMOR-S@O~I~W-OC~~H, 1953

RUSSIA c

IS RULED b?

Mede Fainsod

Hacinisdenibtdhaacbc peoples of Ck CSSR are ruiad, how the Sovier policial s)'sccm

d v work how &e

instruments of totditarian

Fa& Paw. the admin-

ismion. Ck seuer police. and

tht armed forces--uc organ-

ized, how * opcclu, and

the tensions and diswtisfac- uons chcv creare. Hac. &. the impact of Soviet rule 1s

brought down to earth, to the lives of the people in &e fac-

tories, in &e armv. and on the collrmve f m s .

$1.50

3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * c c c * * * * * * * c * * * c

THE ARMY'S

* * .L -

CHIEF : OF

* * * * * * * STAFF * * NEW * * GEN. MA- R -WAY

wed to the G e n d S@ carps where he SQVed as ArsisPnt Chief at S&, G3, d t h e Sixth Carpr Area, and inthatsamecapaciywithSecondArmy. Hegraduated from the Army War Gnegcii June 1937.

shalltoBndlonaspecialmiaian. Uponhisreturnhe

duty with the War Plans Division. In March 1942 he was assigned as Assiaaat Commander of the 823 Infantry Division. He assumed mmmand of the division and remained in commapd when it was designated the 82d A i r h e I)ivision. In Apd 1943 he took the division to North Afxica where he was rrspondble for planning and executing tbe 6rst largcscale a i r h e assault in the history of tbe Army-the attack on Sicily. For extraordi- nary hexoh during this action, he received the Dis- tinguished service ctoo. He led his division in its rapid amquest of the western half of that island, and from Sep- tember to November 1943, he led the 82d Airborne Division in the Italian campaign. In June 1944, he parachuted with kading elements of his division into Normandy where he played a major role in the invasion of Western France. Far this action he received th& Oak Leaf Clusta to the lXstin+ Senrice Cross In August 1944, he was appointed cammandm of the XVIII . % r h e Caps, in which capacity he directed operations in the Ardemes Campaign in Belgium, the crossing of the m e , the Ruht Packet, the crossing of the Elbe and the advance to junction with Russian forces on the Baltic on May 2,1945.

;\fter the cessation of hostilities in Europe, General Ridgwap retuned to the United States with his Corps

In Slay 1939 bc aoEampBpied George C. Mar-

was assigned to the war Depafinent General StaE for

A R M O R - ~ ~ W - O C ~ ~ W ~ 1953

for rsdepbpmeat to & Plcific, aad - h t o t k w i l i p p i p a i n ~ o f h i s d t o prepare fa its pa -. -. - * intbepoposcdinvasialof japan. ~n 0a0ba i ~ , was asigned to axmmmd the Meditannan lbata of Opartioos, and - ap pointed Dcplty Supleme Aniai rrmrmnk., Medita- mean. In J?nuuy 1%6, General Ridpay was assigned to rrprcvnt General of the Army Dwight D. Eiwnbowa an the Military st;rtf Committee, United Nations, a d subsequently, in addition to this duty, designated Senior

'p. In June 1948, he was

Theen months later, he became Deputy chief of S d

Upon the accidental death of Lieumuant General Wal- ton H. Walkr in I3ccember 1950. General Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth Army in Korea. Typical of his zeal toinfonnhissubordinaoesofvital issue% Gen- eral Ridgway SOOIL after he assumed command of the Eighth Army issued the following statement to his Inen:

he!ardfromrcvenlseurca,chieayfromthemember5

united states hkpk to the ha-* Defense Board, -g c- assigned as commands in chief. catibban Gmlmand.

forAdministra tion, united states Army.

"In my brief period of command duty here I have

of combat units, the suertiaas, 'Why are we here?

'Tbc answer to &e first question, 'Why are we here? is simple and conclusive. We are here because of the decisians of thtropaly constituted authorities of our rrspective pemments. As the commaader in Chief, United Nations cammapd, General of the Army DougIas MacArthur said publidy . . . This command intends to maintain a military position m Korea just as long as the statesmen of the United Nations decide we should do sa' The answex is simple because htrther comment is UUD- It is conclusive because the loyalty we give, and expect, precludes any slightest questioning of there orders.

T h e semmd question is of much greater si@- cance, and evey member of this command is entitled to a full and m e d answer. hline folbws: T o me the issues areclear. It is not a question of

this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is here, incidental. It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean allies whose fidelity and valor under the severest -of battle we recognize; though that M o m is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.

T h e real issues are whether or not the p e r of western civilization, as God has permitted it to h e r

munism, whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dig- nity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual right are saaed; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead US, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.

ar9 we fighting for?

in OUI OW b e l ~ e d lands, shall defy and ddeat Cam-

ARMOR-%@WJI~W-O~O~W, 1 9 s

h Apnl1951, General Ridgway was appo$Lbtd Cam- mander of the United Natians command in tbe Far East, comrmndainaef of tbc Far East &amnard and Supreme commander for the AUied Pawas in Japan.

Powers, Europe, with headquarrar at Puis, Fnoa, ..hich assignment he held until k was swvrn in 1s W d StatF of the Army 011 August 15,1953.

That General Matthew B. ELdgway is a soldier and a statesman, there is no doubt. His appreciaeion of the support remked by cidian

industry was exanpiified in a speech made in 1949 to

In hlay 1952, h was named supreme^, Allied

theElghthInfantrpDiv i s im.~:

"An namination CIf pur .%my Uill sbow that we aremaingmamiaprosessmMendingrDgah@rthe ~cswces of aur nation to produce the best Amy in the world.

W e are combiningthe best weapons that out technicians can develop, and which our great inrlueial know-haw can prod- with the k hadas and technicians that our people can k e l 0 p - d we are doing it within the kamework and according to the precepts of our American wa? d life. These in tbe principles that have produced the h e tradition of 'hlerican armiesn

On the same cuxskm he extqlled the v i m K s of the

5

.

other when he stated:

TO THE MEN A i D WOMEN OF THE ARMY sworn in asChie€ofStaE, United S t a t e s h y , I thought

i r ~ t o ~ ~ ~ t o t b e ~ g r o u p o f d i s i n ~

to them abne but ako to all OF you-both in and out of uniform-

"when the Pfesidemt his lan for re ap i z ing the Meme &Y:ipEC- L e law, be emphasized two essential o b j j t h e maintenance of democratic institutiams and the pnneaim of the integrity of the military profession.

"Ibe kst is clear. It nwzus, in my case, d e under the dim h-1 commaad of a distingrtished avilian of highest integrity, Sg- remy Stcocas, and through him under another great American patriot of highest character, Seaaary Wilson.

'Today, more than e m , our future dependson the moral stature of tbvse clothed with great authurity. We are very formnate to have these civiliancommanden.

"The President's d objective, while &wise clear to us, needs much continuing explanarion to many in our C;avaoment and ceztainly

The integrity of the military pofession is indkpemsable to an &- tive, &em military estab- and that in turn to the Nation's securitl;. 'The term i d , 'integrity of the milimy profession,' implies an m c e r Corps of such charaaer and competence as will provide the highest professional and spiritual leadershi , and a NonCommissioned O&er Corps indoctrinated and inspired 6 the O I k r Caps, whose precepts are its guides and whose standad it emulates

"It implies fearless, forthright exprrssion of honest objective professional milimy views.

'7t implies completely loyal execution of decisions, once announced by 'proper civilian authorities

"To attaiu this second ob@= will require a full recognition, a citilian authority, of the qualities of integrity, devotion to duty, and loyalty. and extensbn by the civilian commanders of a like loyalty to

"As a hmdamend institution in the development of our national Irr+ the United States Army has layed a proud historic role. It has produced leaders ULlsUrpaged in cgaracfer. competence, and courage- moral equally with physical.

'7 accept with pride and trust in Divine guidance, the challenge of continuing the senice of great disfinctim which my prrdecessor Gen- eral J- Lwton Collins has rendered. It shall be my constant purpose, within the scope of my responsibility and authority, to insure that the highest traditions of the United States Army are maintained in all their 6nest aspects that the Amy accoanplishes in full io assigned missions; and that the men and women who wear its uniform, and their de-

t and consideration from pendents, receive the full measure of their countrymen, which their high-priocip ed devotion and utter loyalty in both peace and war so fully merit" Today my admiration for you, the Amaican soldier, is greater than

ever. and I can 6nd no adequate words to express my own feelings of humble pride in sharing service of counpy with you.

You d l have my complete and unquali6ed support. I shall expect poun.

guess present at the ceralumy. In fact# however, I was spealring not

wbacpaparlmybea?tiansd. lllerrmvtswaethac:

to the Anmican people.

the military sen-ices.

T

MATT'HEW B. FUDGWAY General, united states Army chief of stas

1

These nest thee pages are remarks made b, Gerreral Ridgucr) ai his f i tst meetiug ui tb tk

Department of the Arm) Stdfl. two dais after be assrrnred o@u. -4lthorrgb u*e were dread, on

the press these remarks uere deemed of srr@ierit importcrricu to uithhold otber m a i d and

bririg tbem to the atteritiori of all .dssociation members mid others uho read tbese pages.

i r i order thut the) might guiri itisight irito the thnirphts o f our HYU Chief I . of Stad. .

N analyzing my thoughts for expsion at this meeting, I came to the conclusion that

the most important point. I believe the one uppermost in my mind was:

Recognition of the IimitIess oppr- tunity for IMposeful -.ice.

I believe every one. of yo-u sub rribes to the criterion that there is some p~upose beyond the powers of humans to &em for which we were put on this earth. For my part, I sub scribe to that fully, and I believe that the greatest purpose which we are permitted to see is to senz others. I believe it is no platitudc to say that never have the objectives of higher pcupmes been in greater need of service from men and wanen of high- principled integrity than the purposes for which the foundin fathers established this Nation. f believe that never has this Nation, and the cause of freedom of which it is today the preeminent leader, been in greater need of such service.

Each of us has been rendering, I am sure, the best service of which each is capable. You have been doing so as a closely integrated team, con- cemed with the whole range of global problems confronting our h y and our Military Establishment. 1 have likewise ken doing it, but in distant fields. However broad my responsi- bilities seemed and werr, I know they were but regional, compared to yours. Now we pin to share service tw

gether of the broadest sco

I want you to know of my profound respect for the vnice you have been rendering and to expms the eamest hope that together we can render st i l l better senrice.

I haveknowneachdyou for yean, some more intimately than others-but all with a sulkient hawledge of your conspicuously superior records to a p

the highest plane, and as r pin and you, Of

precise them fully. some of the things i shall my will

ARMOR-Wk--, 19.U

touch upon matters which. at this initial stage of our teamwork. I think are of &ient importance, either as basic principles w as hdicaticms of my working methods and line of thinking to bring to your attention.

In the first approach to any job. regardless of magnitude, my mind fol- lows a certain sequence of steps.

First, there is a misnun. Second, this mission breaks down

into certain functions to be performed. in order to accomplish the mission.

Third, there must be a sound. simple. positive. workable organiztion for the performance of these functions.

Fourth, men of the proper caliber must be selected and asdgned. each in his pmper place. to this orgrmi=lz- tion.

Fifth, the o r g a n i a as a team must then perfonn its functions and awmplish i o assigned mission, and

Finally, the execution or perfan- m e must have that vital esenaal at all times and at all stages of command sup-.

Sow. I have been here in Wash- ington for thirty days. Liale of that time has been available for me to go through this mend even less was available ore I r e linquished command to General

ture from France. This has been be-

by proper authority. I, thedore, am just starting to follow through this pattem of thinking, and it occurs to me that while, of course. I will receive the ma+ benetit, you, too, may perhaps glean an idea or two of value.

I shall not try, on this OcCasiQII, to State the Army's miaions in detailed

mind that however you word the Amy's miyion, tbere is but one hnal criterion by which to judge what the mission was and the manner of its

r and

G ~ ~ e ~ t h e r four h o w before depar-

cause of other assignments given me

term, but I do iA.isb to recall to your

performance. That criterion is syc- cess in bon&-succea and dl that it conmbutes in bade to tbe Sarion's m i l i e team.

The modern state a d in government. particularly our oun. i s about the most complex organhtion ya developed on earth. In the k u l a - tion of its poliaes and in their exe!cu- tion. the main fields. such as the political, economic. finaacia social. and military. are dependent. S o one Id can any longer be isolated and major decidons in it made without regard to one or more of the others.

Yet. and I think this is basic-at least it is in my way of thinking- the responsibility of the professional military man lies in the professional military field. His meniding responsibility is to give his honest, objective, professional military advice to t h e avilians hisGlmmanders. who

our Itisnothisrespon- Constiturion are sibility to decide whether the military means which he determines are the minimumervntiatoaocomplishthe

task ~ g n e d him mil l cost "z more tbeNationcanafford.He hasnotbeentrainedforthat. I t i s DOG I submit, within his field of responsibility. He must, of course, as evexy senior commapder is today, be aware of the major faccDrs m tbev other major fields He must recophe a s e v q senior commankrdoes today. the imperative necessity of mudmum emnomy and e86ciaKp in the uriliu- cion of Whatever mili'tary - his Gowrnwnt may make availabk to him. ThereisDoquestitmofthisany moze than there is an? guesrion of the loyalty of these seniar a86ms in carrpingarttbededrians aPOQUPCCd to tbem proper civilian authority.

Tbepoint 1wkbto&hrr,d I repeat it for empbzds is that the ProfeaKlnalmilirarpmanhaSthrrc pimaryrrsponsibilities:

First. to give his boa- fearks

Tbl'

I

If WT arc to havethk and witbaa it we do not baveao Army, we OIUU

&cacadreacrorrrsccian of theNa- tion's life, a fair shpt of thc bea thc Natioo pDduces in ch;uacm, in in- teIIeqandinculnm. Ifwedonot, f it is not mpresentarive of a QOII

section of Amaicl, i t d not, in the

Amaioan people which it must hrnn to accomplish its dtimati mhsion.

N a t , and dady rfta the O&es

iaprof&sionalcadreofcPsapason- neb inspirea bp the prrcept a€ the O&ccr Corps wbOICstdadsit emu- l a a s

hrrpepentedinaru+

long run, have &at suppar oc the

corpsistherrquitementfortbc Naacolamissioned<)$cnCaps,witb

k gentlemen, are &e - tiah with which leadcnhipcan - plish the seemingly i m e b k . Tbeoc are the essentials without Which ultimate nrcess is imporsibk. These are the elements to which I invite yam attention, k d which I fuggea we, allofUhLeepkforrwepcs,bowever numerous the dkactmm - ofour day to day concerns.

With these two instnunen& with which to work. an OScez and a Nan- ~ o g m ~ o f p a p r qualityandadequlrrrire,wecan then be contident that the and women of A m e r i c l - ~ ~ to us to train will receive the bat in professional, physica and spiritual education that it is possible to provide.

This bring me to the last of the mapr p e r a I i z a h which I wish to d e : that is, the 086Ca and En-

When we wexe young o&en, we served a long appreaticeship, during which our primary concern was the

the men under our cornmad We had. on the average, between fifteen and twenty yean to karn those lessons. They became ingrained. We r e c o p i d a respodb&ty twenm- four hours a day, wen days a week. for these men. We knew atkction for them in our hearts, and we knew their unfailing mponse to d leadership. Thep were American soldiers,

listed Man relatio&p.

m, t&h& a d wcltare- s iody , physically, and z

and there aren't any finer ones We must vas on to the vounpa

t]rd tkoi6ca fa hbmm. We have thso rrspopsirn~ k r e in Washing-

WitbourbabaotKceIs " T Z intbe W e e x i s t h a t i n t h e Pmggar for - pppaee. andthsuistoarcmain,evaluate and, to tbe limit of our abilities, to meet thrrquirarwnboftheannm?ndas in th field Who are chpgcd with the ~ t j r u l o f ~ m d c h r r . I S M expect that no mattcr bow en- + we bapmc in tbe multitude ofdpr#xdurrshaewermwmber thrc basic rkmmtr for which w e individually and dlecliveIy, are re- sponoiMc

Xhaveafewotha rsonwhich I wish to d~el l , 3 t e d for th modt part but deserving I think of

t to ]lour attention. If

have said this morning, of value to

shall hope you will make a note, and u s c ~ , We face a situation unparalleled in th history of our or any other QIULL~TY. We are in the presence of

of which we can perceive only the

The murecanfused we map tend to bxpmt, the mare imperative is it, thrrfac, that in our thinking we ltsep simple, basic principles and ob jectives betope our minds.

sepboftnrintran5ml 'tting to the Con- gress Reaganization Plan No. 6. since become law. In it he stressed d points, one of which was the necessity for the maintenance of democratic institutions. This point is iuustnted by the reiteration of a principle to which America has been unfaihgly dedicated: the principle of avilian control of the military. The command channels bv which

that control is to be exercised have beem made unminahbly clear. The c k e l goes from the Constitutional commander-inchief to the secretary of Defense and through him to the Service secretaries. In my own case,

I had not known him until last April, when he first visited mv command in

2W2ellb or anytlalng else I

you in the exacise of leadership by yaurowncboxnmethods,thenI

errdving sodal aad scientific forces

galeral&atthistiw.

one of these basic pdndples was jua ra~ndp stated by President Ei-

my commaader is secretary Stevens

of6cen the h;ow-how of handling ale- Eumpe. I want to say,'without reser- .herican sddier. W e have not taught the younger of6cers what to us became second nanuethe rrspanbbili-

vation, that the A m y has as its civilian commander as high-principled 3 man as the Nation can produce.

ARMOR-S.pt.cnb.r-O, 1953

In a sbat talk k ma& at &e Qulatico cantaawx he said -0 aneevecbadmorrmpct€ fx thc h y a m m ingmytlslrthmL I pTdgeandrig)ltfulpcivjkptotbe U t m a a r n

1 i m p a d t o ~ u D d a s s c r r - tary stcpcnr (Ls chief of SdF, arbd I feel sute you Shvc thr feeling with

NowIco&kto Mia,re- sponsibkmcmbaz t h i s s d t h e rrsponsibilitp f a p o ~ r in- t i o n d m t k ~ i n p c u r r - spctivc dividory t o t k end chat w teammkandtbemutaalrrspeaand u n d d g cnrid to teamwork be steadily shmgthawd and h a d - ened. Please remember, a this as in

everything else I have prrsented today,thatisarespm&Ltyoneach of us to C d ~ others. Actually, everything in life can be lxadated into some fann or aha of educ%tive process or, if you like, of training; and the requirements for training, and for kdaship, are just as active and jus as 7 in this great d as they are m any field command anywhere in the Army. It plays just as vital a part right hem as in the Seventh Army, the Eighth Army, or anywhere in the continental united states. Now a few points secondary in im-

portance to what I have already said but still worthwhile, because they rrprrsent some of my idiosyncraria as applied to the tasks we must work out together.

Loyalty. The necessity for this basic military essential is so clear that you scarcely ever hear it mentioned. Yet it is not automatic, and it is not always present-up, down, and lateral- ly in equal degree-= it must be This is not so much through design as through failure to cultivate it and to recophe its eternal imponance. It either does of does not exk& and

It is particularly vital today in this period whea we cannot see very far h a d the horiwm, and when the utteraaces aC senior Oecm. wh& made publicly or in private groups, assume everi.lQcasing -e.

me.

opu

* * *

SO- detamiMh difbcult

IShaUaq#rttheo8;cmofthiS StafF to present their own b e s t views, fearlessly, fonhdghtly, but ob Urn----, 19s

iectivelyinthe t d r h e i r o r o amc-astow bestscroath

d p l s a o r r r d r r i r a t o h d i s a "YesMm,"dtbe mostustko, is au Wbo hinLof elf inarvl of 5av- ire. I ~ P h o ~ U d ~ t h a t ~ e x p a c d h i s ~ alldhavinghepdthedrr;c;lmhis entire fuppm will then be put be- hindtkaDsutianoffbukricim rrgudlasof W h a t hisviewrhdbem. cliqwr I have not tbe slightat

knowledgeoftheadncace cliques within thb kadqurrterr pray thrr are sone, but I want to say in unegunoc?l tams that I win not tolerate arh vicious cknma if it is within my pmm to eliminlrr them.

c- -in&- is an M-t tcmpltian. If yield-

h y ' s O v a d intcrrar 7tC 'TbtmDst

of "f

ed to it can quickly become a via diff icul t tobat Inthecivilianfieid i t isof lesser impatanoc Inmili- tary organhations it is of vital im- portaoce.Ittendstocolrode,arbd awrosionpoducesfriction;uldfric- t i o n ~ h u u a n d e v e n ~ spoils any machine if uacarmud. I am not talking of honest ditkrences of opinion, leas of all at those times when issues are being debated. I am talking 06 the practice of vkious "crabbing" about the &ial &ON of proper authority.

B+g. It is of the highest importance. It is imposible to read the masses of paper which ,your con- science might dictate that you should read, and the only alternative is oral presentation. I expect only matters

providin basic information which I should %ave-to reach me. When they do, I want in general an oral

familiar with the major points on each side of every issue involved.

at any timc I€ unresolved issues are presented toome, the views of the principal advocates of alternative courses of action must likewise be presented. Where the matter involves execution by a principal subordinate command, I wans in advance W h pcaccica- Me, the views of the mmmpnder Who is to be charged wirb the mponsibili? for execution.

of major importance-generally speak- ing those requiring basic decisions or

presentation by an omcer thorwghlv

I want 110 c1 pste prrsartations

W L W

7 h Work Lopd. I think it is ex-

C e s i V e I t h i n t h n m n b e d c m b C r r d u t c d . 1 S h n S R ? k ~ f d l ~ 0 p m t i o a o f ~ s C l . e p r d the Under and .brkrat sscranicr But within ouf om ~CY~C~~CCS I think we can do much. by bata Qg.nit, tiaa-mm ot dle spam cluu tbe written w a d le% aacatim to tbc nriarn reroed fa alibi a d macdhcicntanddequaoc- Otlutborirptosu-

b g s an of than. in rapapiniaa.of subnmtial adraDcofepscotial im- paonrr.Tbac=mrwocbar,I doa'tprctendtolaartbt- p n 1 h a v e a h m k ; a n f m m ~ b e - faeIclaexpcatolaar~msncrs:

but with pau M help m .rhich I anmt, I am coal6dent me shall 6 d tbem....

I have rn me OLI whicb I want t o h t h i s k m e c r i n g . I a m p m faradhrconsdousofcbeprivilegeof shacingoapicc with ,you arbd in seek- ing '08aber to a>naibutc w U(m0n

intkdirhargcof&etrrnrmdous rrspmribilities with * tbc united

NawIhaveoaeredagoodmroy -. *

StahcsArmyiscbpged. Ihave the dccpea respect for what pou have &me,andwhatyouare&ing. Ihave ne major changes to make at this time. Ishallmakeaowatanptime witboat tbose maQ concerned having .the fullest oppormnitv to diruss rhem with me and to pirtk5p.t. in the proCeaofrearhingdgisiopr Ishall have in these matters but one criterion: the over-all good of the United States Army in the light of the coun-

ers give me apd rhn of the best judgment I am convinced I am capable that whatever of arncling. spec-

ters appear to some to lie ahead on doseor dinant boritonsaretbe \ision- ary imaginings of timid minds.

well lie ahead. But the strength of a peopk is found m its mQgjq its capabilities, acterandmoralpinciples. and above all in its It l l ink chu-

we have those in abundant measure I believe we were put on earth for

a high purpose. I believe tbe Amai- can people have a resemir d d and spiritual zpcngth amply dequae

future, in the capacity of its lea&-

ability of the Army to amtribute to

9

sel which )'OU and OUT kldcammarrd-

Decisions that will try t h e d may -

toful6llrhuplrpore. I am utterly ConMoV in Amaicli

ship to lllcct th ham% rad in tbe

thatkdeahipiafullat-

- W k e manenverability is linritrd and two forces desire to occnpy tbe

same tnrajn, a slugging matcb is b o d to ensue. Some of tbe kssons

karned wWe battling for HiU 812 me uwtb recording for fntawe we .

F R E P O WER PAY-OFF

by FIRST UEWENANT C U M C. M U N m

HIS is a story of tankers in battle. No sweeping envelop- ments or &.Lusting penetra-

tions mark this 6ght. Rather, it r e sembks a prolonged toeto-toe slug ging match whose prize was a few hundred yards of dirty, shell- mountaintop. Though it la&% spectacular aspects of a wide-open war maneuver, the battle which took place on Hill 812 desernes to be recorded.

If you look at Hill 812 from the air you see that it joins its two neighboring Eastem Korean heights to form a large, irr which points gene P y to the North- west. A long curving ridge on the u p per side connects the point of the a m h e a d , Hill 812, with the right tip of the base, Hill 755. A lower ridge connects 812 with Hill 770 which forms the left tip of the base. A third sharp ridge extends Northwest from Hill 812 and serves to connect the arrowhead to the enemy hILR domi- nated by a r l i a r rocky mound known as ‘1 e s Castle.”

RISl UaRINUn QIllt c mMor. 0 he- q w t contributor to ARMOR, 0nWnmd.d o tonk p(0n0n in Korw during 195051. ond is pes- en* en mum -. k k is o i b (0 u. C.n. 1. D. W h i i .

On the ground these positions are characterized by deep trenches honey- combed through tbe hills, log-roofed bunkers and tank firing slots carved from solid rock. A combination tank trail and supply route fills the draw below Hill 770 and then swerves Sonhwest to climb between the u p per and lower ridges to the crest of Hill 812. .At best this trail could han- dle four tanks abreast at a pobt 300 yards below the crest. Elsewhere it could support only one tank.

In May of 1953 the AlLR domi- nated bv these hills was occupied b\. a Republic of Korea division which was part of the X United States Corps The 140th Tank Battalion

Fondren was furnishing the tank sup port. The 140th had been supporting the ROKs since they had takn over in the 812 seaor, and for months the hill was condded to be one of the most likely taw for a Red a d In the latter pan of may every sign pointed to the probability that the enemy was preparing to move.

Captain D. (1 Dobenyk Company B was on line with its tanks in the 812 sector in late May, and 011 the crest of the hi itself there were three tanks under command of Lieutenant

commanded by 6 1 o w l william M.

J. F. Fiugerald-number 50 011 tbe left, and numbers 48 and 49 on the right with 49 dig& forward of 48. AI the tanks were tied in with wire and radio to each otber, to the tank company, to the ROKs on 4 e ground, and to the supporting ROK amlla). badon. The radio nets were given complete checks at intervals each day. Indications developed 011 the bt

of June that the Xonh Koreans were going to hit Hill 812 that night. By

on the hill had been alerted. Tbt S3 of the tank battaion pboned all positions at 2155 hours to confirm tbe need for a continued alert status. Tbe Reds cut loose at 2 0 0 barn.

ceded by one of the heaviest utilla).

years. The entire leagcb oftbe ROK Division MLR erupted with fire; Hill 8 1 2 d & m m b 1 0 , o o O d in the &st 24 hours. An e&ctive ene my counter-baturp fire fen in dl

were blanked with shells. Within ten minutes all wire corn-

municaticms to the tank and infan-

11

2100 houn the infanay and tankers

Thecommuniaattadrnasprc

andmortar t iclnstbeybad used along &% fmntintwo

friendly * positioDs and the tank company and batt?lian ws

apenonalmonnaissvKxoftknar- tow tank trail leading to 812 to de- t e r m i w t h e e x r m t o f t b e e n e m y pnetration and the feasibility of moy- ing this section up the trail in the dark. He collcludcd that the movt mmt would be e b l e utilizing illumination from Bare planes now over the area, d g h t rr&ction andartilleryill-shelkTbe enemy, from all indications, was in control of the high gmmd of 812 but had not yet loited his ad-

with the friendly infantry forced

jacent friendly posi?iol;lJ fmm the

sen mor.edourtogetberwith sergeant

vantagel?-moving "g Ownthetrai l

back along the upper and lower ridges. the Reds were in the dear to move down the trail and assault ad-

BarJ;s and rear. Taplug this hole and to give all possible help M Lieutenant Fitzgcrads tanks, Lieutenant Mad-

A.0 . Lind in tanks 31 and 33.- were on their way to the hill mid- night on tbe 6 ~ t of June. Tbe section moved without dif-

6culv until Raching the steep, final approach to the 6ring positions be bw the crest. There the platoon lead-

ed. moved to tank 33 and cocltinued the climb until k was in a t o a m r t h e a r r m m t a n L r ~ 2 Tank 31 pined him shmlp thae-

e i s d encountered difticultp I l e p tiating the terrain 3 I h diarclimt-

after. Tb run SEOtur d F q t p k r s t h x e ? c r e s R w a s ~ , b l l t ~ a n o o u i d ~ t b a t a c b t n n L w 4 f

ticm, an M-24, from the bptnlion rrcmrrpiaarre platam under conk rrrrmd of Maser Sageant W. R h4oachcod movcdout from thecorn- pany 8 to make its way up the hill to recwer wounded. As it beaded for tank number 50 on tbe left side of

tbcdispMed tank but the crew mem- bas were abk to escape through a desated communications mnch and maLC their ~ a ) 7 to ROK h- tberdowatheslop.

AtfirJtli htonthesccondofJuw but . Ma&n took advantage of a lull in enemy 6re and dimuxloted from his own tank to reconnoiter for- Wadonfoatodetamw * thesatus of tank 48 and 49. As he approached the rrarmort tank, number 48, he was brought under heavy small arms 6Ie from ewmy infanfry entrenhed on the high ground. Cut OE fmm his own tank, he made his way safely to I..ieut. Fitzgerald's command tank and climbed aboard. Finding the CICW in- tact but kaming that ROK medics had evacuated hat. Fitzgerald and his ckiver, he took command of the ssction, managed to establish radio Eommuhication with the company, and continued the fight. The tank, it dcvelopsd, bad thrown a track while maneuvering and was stranded in place, blocking tank 49 immediately ahead. A fire, fNnn an incendiary grenade, had disabled the engine of tank 50 and though it had been extin- guished 6 the fixed extinguishers. it was impossible for tbe driver to start the engine and it, too, could not be pulled back to within friendly lines.

Lieut. 3 l h radioed his own ranks, n u m h 31 and 33, to remain in position and cover the three tank on the hill. ROK infanapmen had not yet mounted a com~erattack so the tanks alone were holding the enemy at bay. Madvn was to remain in rhis compkb exposed and C u t d position with the suTvivors of the ~ a e w s f o r 3 6 h a u r s . D u r i n g thk time he expended all availabk

A R M O R - ~ - ~ , 1-

lmmunitiopdPZCOQOdQp~ cim of the aaanyi QIQQCS. in a&

dih aruntaotpckrHewasa "- T t o e R°K radio amtaa with tbe company and maintain it until a b a t o400 harn on tk thini a€ June when, because ofwenLaedbatteIi~dlttadiofadcd andfinallymsedtoapa?tc

Wben it besarne apparent that frieDdlp aoapr Would be unable to retake Hill 812 in cime to &ect tr- lief of the c u t 4 tmLm, captain Dobcagdecidedtomakeaground b h i s s u l m d h t b e fight s&rted, of the 812 area. Not

blockingtbenarrow ornthatank,

able to drive through spaadic mortar 6re toapaition ftom which becould

andtookitunder amostimwdtatehr

wishingmriskthe J - J b i a€

he moved aut in bir jeep prior to dawn on the second OrJune a d w a s

observe the eqage!d tapL and in- fantly. The enany spottsd tbe j u p

&antbe Tbt-rrtr-br- JulqKddFinthelnac aftumondtbescfmd~Jupand initial~ornarQcarroging.The enemy hurkd bc4vg mortar a d and- lay fire, urd as the N o d Koraurs emerged to battle the advancing ROK's the tanks poured their fire

casualties. Working forward, tbe ROKs moved onto the left pation of the hill before a costly Red counterattack forced tbem back to positions a proximatelv OB line with the tanks,

Inthecourseofthcounrmttack

of June, Lieut. Jacobs'tank threw a track on the sreep slope of the hill and the track bad beaned wedged between the hull and the bogies 90 as to make imposibk any on+ re peir. The risL of atmnpdng it was too

t under continuaus e n e q h e Y) ir vtain DobatoaQed a new see

into the treocbes lldktmg heat)-

?%ere they dug in and stood h.

andsubsequentoctionron t h e d

obgin a0 occuratc picouc of tbe situation, however, which supplemenred what he had been able to kom from the crews of tank 31 and 33.

Returning to the CP, Captain

two o&ms moved out for a further b which took them 6rst to a position sou& of Hill 812 and

looked the reverse dopt and positions on 812 and gave a vantage point from which they could obsapr movement on the crest with tbe bulk o€ the enemy utillerp 6re F*g south of Hill 812 It was ewident that the enemy was well dugm, having takcn over the former ROK bunkers,

working with the us advisors to the ROK units, CololDCl Fondren and Captain I)obmy phLlned a coup=- attack to retake 812 It involved ROK "Ifantry attacking along the uppes a n d l o w c r r i d g a w h i l e a n e w d section moved a h of the a&- ing elements abn the tank trail. The

and 33 on the firing positions and then support th 6naI assault on 812 at a range from 200~0 M o y d In addition,& l v l J u ~ g g n L s a n

wac prepOrai. Lieut L H. Jrobs was put in d o f the tank sdc- r i o n t o ~ t b e ~

Do* brided the'battalion can- mander W h o h p d a r m e ~ The

thn to OP Hill 7 0 . It a~er-

new section A ncplpce * 31

Hills 770 a J 7 5 5 , and the ytiliay

since all oc companp B s pnks had been committed, either on 812 or on

Hill 812 m event of further enany pmeaations. Lieut. R J. Kidwell re- poned to Captain Doheap's CP at

tenant from Company B, L#u. H. Fama,saidkLpcwoftbetzwxb which hiadvn bad used and h vd- rmheereddrenunandguidethe Qcwmm to safety. Permtdon was grnatcdzndFraoa-made his round aip, leding the men to f&dypoaolutromtheElnkin which tbey had been isolated for three days and nigh== At ouo bourson the fifth of J l k ,

-his unia on t heuppa r idg to pullback tobQcrpasitions and at tbcsvnetimerrqueaedtbeBaanlion commander to have his EapLson Hill SlZpUllbaclraadtie in with thenew &ink of the infantry although at the time the tanks Were in no immediate danger. U h the battle on Hill 812 developed 011 the first of June, Grin- plan? -4, commaodedbp captain Geo. S. Patton. had bem undergoing aaining at the Ukh Division tank naining area, situated 35 miles south of the tank battalion CP. As the action grew in intensic, Company A was alerted for posible commiaoent, and at 1425 hours on the second of June was ordered to move north to the axea of the tank battalion trains. Five minutes later the fist tank 4 the Ip and at #325 h- after -tiating two long, steep mauntain pBssest the cornpan? closed into the dehig ~ t e d area with all of its original tanks.

Captain Patton p t all of the third of June and the morningof the fouah preparing counterattack p k At noon on tbe fourth he received orders to move forward and rrliern h p a q - B. By evening the relief was complete, with two tankson Hill no, two on a hill sntth of 770, four on 755, and three in firing positions an line with the a d j d ROK front

tbe ROK Divirion comrmpdet or-

where they relieved Lieut Kidwelrs three tanks from campnnp C.

The night of the fauth and tk

f i d y quiet with only moderate m-

beat? artinerp and mortar pcepa-

daylight boun of the fifth rela-

caming.ptinerY. But at 2200 hours on the fifth the enemy strudt again. His attacks were pRaded .bp apotbcr

tion. The North Korean assault d

onethrustwas in two dlramms south along a 6nger leading to the ROK Nintb Company positions an tbe upper'ridge. The other was aimed

. .

atHi l l770lbngtkr id leadlng

werrmadebyeach.'IbeRedswere

011 that position. shortly after theat-

dawn from Hill 812 IniJ-

abk to come up to the edge of the nerrbes on Hill 770, and they made a s p e d &art to knack out the tanks

toon l eda on Hill 770, radioed Cap tain Panon that one tank bad ka, hit on the left of the bill.

On the embuled cmt, tank number 10 was in critical danger. The hit it had d v e d had wounded the gunna and bow gunner and had started a gasoline fire which could notbeextingusbcd. When it became

t that the fire was out of con- ar the tank commander, Sergeant Fderick Douglas, ordered the tank abandoned although it meant that the crew would have to leave the tank during an intense fire fight. After passing the word to leave, Sergeant Douglas got down in the turret and aided the wounded gunner to crawl through the hatch and get down onto the ground. Supporting the gunner with one arm, Douglas called to the crew crouched near the tank to follow him & the exposed position. M k he t down to a phce of relative safety t discovered that the bow gunner was not among those who had come down from the tank. Although enemy fire churned the ground on all sides, be ran to the tank of the platoon leader, crawled up and re-

Nichol informed Captain Patton by radio and stated he was going up to attempt to the missing man.

Dismounting and moving forward with Douglas, Lieut. Nichol reached the burning tank. Thinking the bow gunner might have tried to get out duough the escape Batch, Nichol crawled under the tank and inched hisway forward only to find the hatch searely in place. Cmwling out, he ordered Douglas toreturn to his crew and find cover. Then, ignoring enemy small arms fire which ricocheted off the tank, be hurled himself u over

down into the tank commander's hatch. Small arms ammunition inside

the h e iacffased in intensity. Un- able to enter the turret, Nichol crawled outside the tu- and looked into the open driver's hatch .but

trt Licut. B. B. Nkbol. ph-

porred what bad h a p e d . Lieut.

the engine cOmpartment and P ookd

the tank was beginning to explode as

c o d see no sip ofthe bow gunner.

FlamcS almost camp- maithe - m t T b e n , - k - in w1 view'oc enemy~tmops a%auh-

he leaped over to the dosed boar gun-

-4 fire was mginginride and t b e d

ing a sench las than 15 prds away,

ner's hatch a d wid his trench knife managed to pt)-' benmen the hatch and the hull and b cbc hatchopen.

arms ammunition was exploding with such fury that it was OhriaUJtbtman couldnothavesunived Knowingthat the 9Omm ammunition w-ould expbde at any minute, Sichol \add d the tank and sprinted down from the p sition just as thunderous explosioN r i d the doomed tank, shooting geysen of yellow Bame high into the air. Although the air was 6lled with exploding ammunitim and enem fire, Kichd safely made his way d to his own tank where, once within the turret, he radioed a full report to the Company CP.

Another report was being received by Captain Patton at the same time when the US d*r to the ROK sup porting artillery radioed that he believed the three tanks in the valley below Hill 812 had been cut otf when the enemy attack on the ROK Ninth Company on the uppa ridge had succeeded in overmnning the posi- tiom. The company commander had been in constant radio mntact with his platoon leader on the position, Lieut. G. P. Wright, and he was ca- tain the report was in a s . Not want- ing to pass on information which was in doubt, he radioed Wright to be particularly attentive to his rear area as the enemy had made paletdons i n k a r e a . Wright-. tedforthe transmission and rrp0rteBthemtire area was under extremely heavy fire from 122mm howitzero and luhnm mortars. Withdrawin ROK soldkrs were falling beck onto e6, position and digging in on his %anks.

The enemy failed BD follow up on his penetrations and move down the tank trail, and at daybreak on the sixth of June the tank positions were secure. A petration east of Hill 812 had been contained in the vicinity of the ROK Ninth Company, and Hill 770- s t i l l in friendIy baods. Heavy fighting contiaued throughout the day and night and into the morning of the seventh d June, but no signifigat changes in the line oc- curred.

ThepositioIlJ heldby Lieut Wright

bcbw. th crestof Hill 812 u.m TC. strictcdand a&xdedaarantlr iimit-

FondrenpcrmincdGptlio Put00 to

currence from the infantq who

a i 6 e J d s o f f i m ~ . ~

witbdnw, after having rrceked COKl-

the penerared lims hetween Hills -812 and 755 were now being pre pared. The Battalion commands, his operations &, and the Com y c~mmanti?r amivd at tbe ROK E- sionCPatO9K)boursandt9-1230 houn tbey were on their wa? beck to the front with the complete plan of anact. The attack was +ted to jump off at 1scO hours. so there was a min,imum of time in which to brief the t a n k on their role.

.it his CP, Captain Patton picked up one enlisted man and two &am to assist him in briefing hismews and preparing the tanks far the counterattack. Since the tanks on Hill 7 0

moved Plaas up for to a fill counteranack tbe gap. to restore

were fire? he to briefed support them the in attack the dear by area bv Bictedon hisforces.

radio. Those on Hill 755 were & saulting troaps, and Patton w a n d to

dividuaIIy and that all radios were in good working &. Travelrng in two jeeps, the party made i o way up the steep trail which climbed and thn sined behind the Hill 755 complex. Lieut. J. E. Morgan was to assist Pat- ton in penody going to each tank to OutIine the plan of attack and the tank sup rt role. LKUt R. H. Knight and &pod D. G. hlcDon- dd a radio F. were to check each tar& to mspect the radios.

The preparation b were already

ed their last radio check. As thev

lery shell hit a bank dirrctly to tbeir front hurling fragments into the jeep. Lieut Knight was seriously wounded and both McDonald and the driver received &abIing waunds while the jeepwasdemolished.

Nearby &e Company Commander, dmeganhg the intense enemy shell- ing$ moved fnrm rank to & direct- ing the CreWJ in pouring overwhelming 6Ie into the ewmy p o s i l i ~ OM

pbwmg into his jeep? dabaying one radio receiver but samebow missing

furnish the dose support to the as-

insure that each c r e ~ W ~ S briefed in-

being UnkaJhed by the time Lieut

mounted theii jeep an enemy altii-

Knight and Cpl. X f & d c~mplet-

eXphdhg mortar Shell sent fragments

both him and his driver. For five

baUstbeodrS*tbchke am tbc berk d tbr ROK iaFaq- mmwbodoggbdlpmorndfaamdto argagetkeaaqintbcaQcbabt had accupiai By 1900 baurs tk former m h'infb campan? pori- tionhdbeenrrapblrcdandtk ROKr folbwing though on tbcb a w r a s e s , ~ d o a m t b e 6 n g a which gave acms totbepdthn and ormpied a major autpst& k q to the newh. won berght Hill 812 was by this &e a w - * s w k r ~ to the enemy and canpleteh- &mi- nated by-friedy fue. The men of the 1- T d Bat-

talion had quitted tbcmsel\.es u-eU. Their stand paevenred a major breakthrough in tbe 812 sector and their desnuctive. accurate fire suppo~ enabled tbe ROC; infantq to seal IS a serious penetration of the hlLR Later intelligence revealed that a total of five enem? baaalions had participated in the sevenday assault and an esti- mated 1,166 casualties had been in-

-4mong the many teachings re- affirmed daring che engagement pa- hapsmne was Inoreevident than the value of maintaining Feliabk corn- m ~ n s W e t c k p b a w c o n o c t -wiped out durmg the k t m i a - Utes of the attack and rrmainrrl out a mapr portio0 of the timc in spite of efforts by wire linemen, radio CQII- munications mnained in- With tbeoneen#pt imof~maroorred tanks on the c r ~ r o f Hill 812, wkre repair or replacement was impasibk there was IIo inanrc of pro!ollgdd adio failure. Doubkberacfitsrrrued from this for on many occasks dux- ing the fight tk tank supplied tbe only link between ROK awps on the hill and the ROK Di- had- q- +besupply servicesofthe ladbat-

t a I i o p l t u r n e d i n m a ~ p a f o r m - an- Alrbough the enlire road net from four miles south of tbe tank battalion CP was unda connant fire fromewmyartillerpandmortarr mlck drivers brought tluuu& thousands of rounds of ammunition. buge quantitiaof gasoline and* sup

hem ism uadoubtsdly went urmcorded duringtk actioa but the errideocc b

Armatharpooedthatanyorrio anywhere k "tonkm' Coulrftl."

P k M a n p i n n a p c c s o c ~

overwhelming that once again

15

Tk &wemi& of *, 1953, uriu long be r d e d by t& citizens of

Wao, T-. Tbc enskg few days &ed #be militmy to t& bearts of tbae pple. T& A e rendered by t& Air Force, Army a d N.riarrd Gwcard, rdkviatcd a sitnution wbicb c d &we become mncb norvdisa#wm. If an ill urind EICII blow some god, it is believed tbat, irr*tocenentzs g PyMit rehatiom, tbose wbo participated kft wit& tbc feekg of a "hb well-dod' a d "we rea& k a w d something YKfiJ in the merit of a #&we ewtergency w k k in war or peace."

THE WAC0 DISASTER

by LT. cbl. WM. l. STARUS, JR.

mu Ironsider" Divkion: Organiwa rrscue fixce of approxi-

equipment and dump m r k suppan from your badoa; move to Wac0 as s ~ a n as possible te assist m rescue

dy1ooworkerswithtbenaxzsary

operatiolls be pmpared to stay three days.

stad chiefs regarding the details per-

Upon receipt of this directive, am- versaticms were held with all general

taining to their field. A warning order had been received #) minutes previous and the battalioncommander had alerted his battalion and sent for his stag. At 2230 hours a battalion staff- meeting was held and the necessafy orders finalized to --e the rescue force to Warn. "A" Company was desipated as the operational unit since its aainees were funher advanced (10 weeks) than the other units H&S Company was given the mission to furnish support and equip rnent. The force as organized was a heavily reinforced armored engineer company to operate under battalion direction. IP time for the first serial was set up

at 2330 hoks with the follow-up sup port serial at 2400 b. Fragmentary orders and instructiaas were received up until departure time Tegarding additional equipment, and division sup port. The battalion executive o&er was seat ahead of the convoy one half hour ~ contact tbe authorities in Waco, establish lipison, find a bivouac site, and recopnoitex the proposed operation.

At 233ohaun the f i r s serial de- parted, foUowed at 2400 hours by tbe support and heavy equiptne!nt d. In addition to the ntmaal tools and

neers the force was augmented by

moun craneganairarmpcsro~. an extra 6eld kitcbcn, an ordnance contact team. a ten t~ wrecker, a 2% ton truck-mounted bng range radio, 5 radio iecp mourrting tht A i i - GRC3, and five 2% tar q trucks loaded with CLSS I d 1II supplia

T h b a a a l i o o a e c u t i v e ~ m a tbebatt?lion-inMcGrrg or, a smdl town arside of Wro, with theinfarmahthat Ly)oIK pa- sonargnu d a b e i n

atywasmuch worzcthan M pcvi- ouslybeenrrparte&Hedvisedrr- porting to the Texas Highway Patrol

equipment carried by cambat engi-

2(=-y& m # y a d t n r L

W a C o i J b t t h e ~ ?Tin the

u p arrival, to rmxive a miss& M c e t h i s u n i t w a s ~ a n d opa?tiag.Thharnlimeacutivc badmade tsfurtheusI?d

on the outskirtsot cmvn, fur a bivouac site, which proved a mort wincbsice rincrakquale lmdallmgsd facilities existed fur both bivouac and s u p operatianr.

Tbebadoncommarrdaadacd tbeexecutivetotaketbetaskfaceto Bayla Stadium and to prepare for

The battalion cornmanderrrpatedtoCaplinSam Gardner of tbe Texas €+ghwav patrol and received a r r~uea to dear the entire len of Fim Street so that. debris h a s g to the aty dump could! be expedited. It was evident at that time that there was no overall plan for coping with the disaster but that various agencies were working where they thought best. Upon return to Baylor Stadium, or-

ders were iwed to half of the force to clear Fim Saeet, depamng in 30 minutes. A detail was dispatched to he1 on the R T. h i s building an B the remainder placed in resen-e. to relieve the working dctail at O600 houn. The administrative echelon set up the CP. opened the mess and established radio contact with Divi- sion.

The S3 and the Battalion Com- mander ptuceeded to the center of the city on a reconnainance wbere the terrible rene described hemofore w t t b e e y e T h e c e n t e r o t d w a s theDennisBuildin however,further

~ b k c k e d s a r r p d d a n g e K m which W- c~mplctcly ~ n -

rescue- A central Dkaster Hedqulivrs

was slowly fonning at th First Na- tional Bank Building, beaded by the

tbe Bo+= stadium, bcated

-movementofthe* noops into the aw.

reaJnnaiorvrc I$l;clfcd-

Mayor. Ralph WOM. Th headquarten was not etkctively opumoml and too few wereattemptingtodirect d too the many stultion. witbout It a was clear evident knowledge that

nodctlilcddirrctioPcaJdkex-

time yet, tbaefae it was ArrtGA to go to work w h r r v a the rsannais- svlccindicusdworkwasrrquirrd.

p e c t c d f r 0 m t h i s ~ ~ f o r s o m c

17

stoppsd the life d the city for some drys. Thdicactrrpointedout the

;-7 7 * 2 withsucha

ian authorities In spite of tbe fact civil defense is mainly a dvilian

reqmnsitdity, the military must be

An lrmared division in a theater of operations is oftcn found in reserve

mandex's Sunday Punch. An atomic bomb attack on a city within the

ity might well 6nd the armored

-available un instant call to cope with

i J s

PRparrdtoadviseandaSsia

waitkrg to deliver the Corps Cam-

corpst or Army's area of responsibil-

division as the O n l y source of troops

up certain faca which win be ex-

n e Eomparisoll of this disaster and the desauction that might be

uemely valuable in other aDergepcies ofasimilarnatuR

wrought a an atomic bomb b too v a i d to be d h k d h+. Tbe

pmbbly a small scale replica of th deanrtiontobeexpectedfroman a& bomb over an a * aty. casuatier of course, were much bWeT and w he5 were present to addaothedcstnrnon ' . However, even this small version praaicanp

endRsultoftheWac0 ? Omadowas

rhe disasta. From a military point of view an

atomic-bomkd, large city in the rear of the front lines could seriously hamprthefi htingeEort. Tomen- tion a few of t!e important considera- tionc-vita lines of communications pass through such cities, storage and manufacturing facilities exist ready ma&, mtrol of civil populace in the surrounding area is usually seated in the cityrand ic and epidemic would result if G p were not forth-

To help the commander reduce this threat to his rear, an Area Dam-

and, as taught at the Command and General sc?fF Cow, is sound and woxkabk for a situation such as has been &picred. Engineer units, due to their equipment and training, are

coming.

age Control system hasbeen devis4

suited to*arh apentioaJ;

*eng ineaequipomt~open- e ally milimy unit with suit-

tors atmched can do a creditable pb. The military unit which it is

planned to utilize for such work should be so c o n s t i d that 24 hour a &y opaatians are possibk. This

bv- unitsbouldbe- municationr and xmintenance s o ~ ~ n a ~f a hi* ablon t l d ! organic to it if the operation is some disraace from the borne station. More thvl the normal pcoPosdon of NccYs and * to enlisted men is required due to the nature of the work encountered.

The type d engineer equipment found in an argineer battalion is adequate, such as bulldazers cranes, dump truc4 bucket loaders, etc. However, the quantty taken should be limited only by availability of

cranes are espec-luable and practically any number could have been used. Dump trucks are re q u i d in p"fion to the loading equipment to haul debris away to some temporary dump. Engineer hand tools mch as shovels, picks, wrecking baa, saws. etc., are required in large numbers to equip the labor force. Aaxiliary lighting equipment is of the utmost importance since w l l v all available avilian generaton will be used supplying emergency power for vital city in- stallations, and night work can be

openton and q u i t. clamshell extremely hazardous without adequate Good lighting. communications within the

city and to the base station are vital.

tactical unit in the Army, are excel- lent for this type of work. Augmea- tarion of the number required would alIow some Badbility and would at the same time be available for assist- ing any vital civilian organization &at is witbout the proper type of communicatians.

A needed adjunct to the normal

The radios, organic t9 amoa any

military canmunications not dften

found in a trtical unit is a public

actual work site it is practically man- &to?. if work is to progmss safely and &&ely. and if the volunteer ch5lL.m workers are to be given in-

by the use of a public address ~-stcm has increased his range of amunand and direction of work many eimcs

principles ofpiorreconnairsance and phnning. sound mganizatj0i.1 of a job. timely maintenance of liwn a d equ@ment,goodcammunifationsand close liaison with a d j j t units are

addrrasystenL h c o n t r d o f t b e

- telligeat direaion. Th casmamb,

As a final observation, the

as essential a3 this typed opaafion as to any otber d t a r p operation.

u p o n ~ m t h i s l e s r s p e c t a c u l a r

In this atomic world where we live. success in battle might wdl hinge

fietl of Area Damage Control. As the 16th Armored Lngrneer

Battalion liwd up their vehicles to return to Fort Hood on Fxjday 15 May, there was hardlp a man among the approximately 200 d k e n and enlisted men who had pdcipated Who didn't breathe a prayer of thanks- giving that it a-as not his borne town or his h e d ones who had been \-is- ited h- this most terrible of storms

ako that man was Tbereaht im now able to am~pete with nature in destructivefurpbroughthometoall the horror of atomic W& and tbc nax!sity of planningand preparation in the event that nrh a Qtastrophe should ever OVcItak the wdd.

19

&g -T/O & E 17-32A, wha&, 1953) is the basis for Organization of the group headquarters. This little Department of the . b y publication sett upasuength in &en and men

garrircm situation, where anrhrrl units are conveniently close, and

onaainingandadminisna tive inspec- ti- rather than field operations.

In our groping for background on "armored cavalry group" operations .we have come across one report in- dicating that during World War 11, the sodled "tank groups" which

provided training supervision and control of tvlL bilttllions until the time of ammitment to action, at which time the grou headquarters relin- quisbed contmfof the battalions and was i d employed thereafter largely in the role of an armor StafF rection at

When? the emphabs, 50 far as the p u p headquarters is c o m is

were PreaeceSJon of our type unit,

cocps Q -Y hedqua- If this is historically correct, it is .

no doubt deed in the statement of mission and capabilities as given in

quarten is stated ar. "command, control, and "1;""" of one or more sepvlbetan batPLansasslgnedtoa corps a 6eld army."

Amon the listed capabilities which

a. Canmad, aontrol. a d super- v i S i o n i n a * n b a t & a n d cask fonr comparable to a com- b a t r n m m l l u l f a k p r i o d r .

b cammpd, control, and super- v i s i o n o f ~ v m o r r d equipment (flame-throwing, mine-exploding. and floated tanks, etc.) which may be as-

e & corps or field a m y

T/O & E 17-32 Hm. the misd~n d an vmorcd m p had-

follow, & Inore S@cmt are:

. - - CopaOtioD of iulnodav*

k d q u a r m when rqaired.

AIMoI---odokr, 1953

Tbcidcizedpa&msofitenrsa l a d b a b m % ~ t a o & t b c monyspcciicquaaiarrstbatabcm IIyiUg to visdize epcttv what is in- tcadcdIrtherdcdthistypebad- qunraa* F o r e J l a m p 4 r h u i r ~ t by -cammoDd.. . in & . . . fa sJKlrtpiodr")ola6ddapaiencc

tbaipd. and the bquirmrart fa

SPfF rcctionr, CLC, plus tbe require

kdrurcoan cslimakd3to 5 &ys asthreYaa?Mebumpriodd wt?ined annbat oprations f a this

so far rritb tbe lim;alparmwl au-

244~umdayopartimndndione4

mcnt for local sccu&y at all times.

type headquarters, as resentlv

the 19th do if required cooperate for a longeccontinuouspaiodi Impmvise, OE course, and this covers a multitude of sins, all juJti6ed in the vrvice of our country.

What is meant by "wkn reqirired," in item c, above? When and under what conditions A d d the headquarters furnish personne and equipment to operate an armor section of corps or army headpuarters? Un+

19th has been of limited asistance to ~rps 'staf f with which we are

d a t e d , without detriment to the command rerpansibilities it has in connection with the presently attached tank and armQed infantry battalions. Under combat conditions, it seems clear that the group headquarters could with relative ease assume command responsibilitp for an armored task force in active options or it could furnish an annor section of a higher h e a d q m but it could hardly do both simultaneously unless additional persumel and some additional equipment were provided.

be divorced. Be that as it may, the 19th bds

itself on duty in Gexmany, with tbe Sloth, 333d and 141s Tank B a d - ions, and the 373d tbmorrd Infantry Battalion, attached. All of these units have bad and will amtinue m d v e

ingmla ,a t tachedto the antry

manned and equippad. vr% t would

F present MWCOmbet conditions. the

Ideally, these two f t l m h n s should

good training arpaience in su JO*-

regiments d'divisions stationed in -Y-

The 19th Armored cavalry Group

aaining maneuvers#

inalwtimtothenol- =and week-out cyde of

6eld amcins, m, is pd+ W k -

4 4 4

The Headquarters and Headquar-

Group is 0rg;mmed under T 0 & E

ferent in suuctum f m n th Had- quaxters and service Company of a Tank Battalion. We do not have the

a HeadquPtas. Headquarters and

nance, anrun- supply, and

ten company of an Armored cavalry

17-32V w / c h U l ~ It b qui0 dif-

men 0s equipment to warrant bdng

service company. This company is organized to furnish main*

-t

timely valuable in & cmcfpc~c# - mul- facilities exis- ready atarinrilvnatunz mdc, cnmtrol of civil populace in the ThC awparison of thb disasm slnouDdingucaisuarallyseatedin

andthe . thatmightbe thecity.and and epidemic

To help the commander reduce

&aucriontobeexpectedfroman a g e c € m a O l S y a e m h a s b e e n ~ ~

w l w & b s - is too w d d t ifE were not forth

endrcsultoftheWacu ?? ornacbwas r-alid to be disnisd h e . The coming.

pmkhly a small rak replica of the this threat to his rear, an Area Dam-

arOmic bomb over an Americvl citp. and, as taught at the Command and Casualties. of course. were much General Staff Cow, is sound and lower and no 6res were present to workable for a situation such as has addtothedearucbo n. However, been d e p i i . Engineer units, due even this small version practically to their equipment and training, are

- . . .

cnrem+ b r d n r r , rlthua xk +tc lighting.

(;ood communiatims uithin tk city and to &e bow srachn arc sital. The radius, aganic to ahaon tactical unit in ck .%xu?-. are d-

tanon of &e number q u i d w'ould allow some Bacibilicy d d at the same time be available for assist- ing any vital civilian organizaciqn that is without the pmper type of communicatiolrr

A needed adjunct to the normal

lent for this ')'pc of wort ;\ugInen-

military communications not often

f a d UI A Urd d 6 1 plbbF & ~yc.3. F a coard of rLr

*. if rut is to pmsrror de)? and dcccivc&. and if tk d u a u ~ r c n i h w.cxtm arc to be given in- vUigPnt direaioo. Tbc ammaan&. by the use & a public d r e s s e- has incrravd his range of rommand and direction of work a t a q times .G a final o h - a d o n . tbe mil-

planning. sound organizadon af a

&uipmmt. good rommunications and close liaison with adjacent units are as essential to this npe OC operation

In this atornic world where we live. sum& &battle might well hinge upon in this less Spectacular field of .kea Damage Control. .G the 16th .+mod Engineer

Battalion lined up their vehicles m return to Fbrt Hood on Friday 15 \fay. there was ha+ a man among the appro~mtely 200 O&XTS and enlisted men who had participated who didn't breathe a prayer of thank- giring that it was not his borne town or his loved ones who had been visited by this most terrible of s t o m The realization also that man was now able to corn with MNE in

the horror of atomic warfare and the necessity of planning and preparation in the event that sucb a catastrophe s h o d ever cn-ertake ihe w d d .

19

aKcual wort shc i is pmJcdb llllb

principksof prior recauuistaace d

icb. timely maintenance of men and

as to any ocher militar\. opelation.

'

destructive fury r mght borne to all

Y

Sum & Substance

plopment considered most appropriate.

1953) is the basis for otganbation of the p u p headquarters. This little Department of the Army publication sets upa strength in &en and men

T ‘0 & E 17-32, with tbanges (in- dudkg T/’O & E 17-32A. March,

garrison atuation, where attached units are conveniently close, and where th emphasis, so far as the group headquarters is concerned, is on mining and administrative inspec- tions, rather than field operations. - In our groping for background on “armored cavalry group” operations we have come acfoss one repon in- dicating that during World War 11, the d e d “tank groups” which were predecesors of our tvp unit, provided training supervision and con trol of tank battalions until the time of commitment to action, at which time the grou headquarten relin- quished mntmrof the battalions and was itself emplayed thereafter largely in the role of an armor sa section at corps or army headquarters.

If this is historically correct, it is no doubt dected in the statement of mission and capabilities as given in Ti0 & E 17-32 Here, the mission of an armored cavalry group headquarters is stated as, “command, control, and s u r a of one or more separate tan battalions assigned to a

a. Camand, control. and supervision in Combat of an armored task force comparable to a corn- b a t c o m m a n d f o f ~ ~ .

b. cammaad, control, and super- ~ o f ~ a r m o d equipment (flame-throwing, mine-exploding, and floated tanks, er~.) which may be ar - sgned. -

copatioa of armoredcavalIy section of corps or field army hedquarters when rt?q&?.d.

The illlirird pat ias of items a and b, above, sugpt two of tbe manyspedfrquatioatb?tarixin trying to vinulizc d y what is in- teoded as the rde of chir type hd- puut”. Faapmpk,wh?tnmant bv “d.. . in ambat. . .fa sl;arpenods”?ourwerpriarc Y) far with the limited penomel authorized, and the 9-t fa 2 4 h o u ~ y open- of rad10 nets, staff: sefxion% etc., plus the qu i re - ment for bal security at all tim‘es leads us to an rctimltrof 3 to 5 da?~ as the reasonable maximum periodof utstained combat opations far this type headquarters, as resentlv manned and equipped &t would the 19th do if required to operate for a longer continuous perk& Impwix, of couxse, and this covm a multitude of sins, all justi6ed in the service of our country.

What is meant by “when required,” in item E, above? When and under what conditions should the headquarters furnish personne and equipment to operate armor section of corps or anny headquarten? Under present noncombat conditions the 19thhas been of limited assistance to &e C“PJ UafF with which we are associated, witbout serious detriment to &e command resparsibilities it has in connection with the presmdy attached tank and annored infanay battalions. Under combat conditims, it seems clear that the p u p headqua- ten.could with relative ease assume command responsibility for an a- mored task force in active operations or it could furnish an armor section of a higher headquarters but it could hardly do both s i m d ~ ~ u d y unless additional personnel and ylme additional equipment were pmided. Ideally, these two fpncdons should be dived. Be that as it may, the 19th finds

itself on duty in Germany, with the 510th. 322d, and 141s Tank Battal- ions, and the 37M Armored Infana). Banalion, a d d . AU of thest units have had and will continue to receive good aaining experience in su port-

regimenu and divisions stationed in -Y. The 19th Armored Cavalrp Group

headquarters, in addition to the normal week-in and weekat cyde of training inspecclonr, ces& maneuven,

rp

ing des, attached to the inantry P

field e., k wak-

4 4 4

The Headquarten and Headquar- ters Cornpan)- of an Arnmed Ca\-e Group is organired under T 0 & E 17-325 w;changes. It is quite different in spucture from the Head- quarters and Service Company of a Tank Battalion. We do not have the men oc equipment to warrant being a Headquarters, Headquanm and Senice Company. This Campany is organized to furnish maintenance, communicationS supply, and

1 f

4 4 4

m a d docs not mix in any way with the- . diolrrarkrlbot-

Armored Division HeadqumasThe CIOup Headquarters has no DAC to which it may send itspenannel ~bc- tian or the personnel & of its anacbed banalions but must, with the limited facilities at hand, and normally over long distances control and

in day+ operations in the field. The S1 in the Armored Cavatry

Gmup must become FHnililr with the inner workngs of the Cocps nag since the Group commandet is normally theCorpsAnaoro&cer. TheSlmua

mander not only in his command ca- pacit)- but also in those proMems which result from his being a member of the Gorp Staff.

Adrrrrmstrative channels fa the Ar- mored Cavalry Group in the 6eM are normdy from Group to Caps to . h v . U%en the Group is anached to a Division the Division tbed becomes the 6rst channel for moa 6ekl repom and p m t s a sa@ level

taliaar’Thepdealdirrctlpwilhthe

supervise the many reporp required

be prepared to assia he Group com-

. .

which is more easily reached by the Group Staff and with which more pasonaltansrtioasmnbemade.

and daachmenrs to and from the Group in the field, it is not possible for the Group S1 00 become too in- \-oh-ed in Battalion a b i n h r a lion. Coasequently the relarionship between the s1 and the attached Battal- ions w a rary with the! pasodicy of th commander and the s i r u a h at hand.

C m . Jm M. W

Bgause of frequent arrlEhmrnts

T k w a c r o f t k c ~ g s l t p c d irr Evropcdawing W d War 11 with tkc4thCmwbyGrowp. Hrrccciocd abmtyirldcormnisdor,andwus d the Distinguished !kn?ice cross 4 silver stor d i l c servillg asaSeumdLhtmant in the Hiirt- gen Fore. He is pramtt;V OZdH as S4 of the 19th Arnaed Cad? Group.

The Armored Cavalry Group am- manda is arsiaed in supply functions by the supply and evacuatim penon- ne1 of the d. This condsts of an 9, a supply sergeant, and a Food Service Warrant mcer with two enlisted asdstantt. The Group supply section acts in an advisory capacity. coordinating supply, maintenance and eyacuatlocl functionsbetween higher beadquarters and armored cavalry grwpe--

Succersful operat‘on of the group _is dependent upon adequate and time- Ip supply. Because of the high consumption rate, emphasis is placd on the resupply of fuel and lubricants, ammunition, and spare parts. These musf be provided in a steady stream if armored cavaly is to roll, shoot, and communicate.

ganization and fadlitate attachment and release, subordinate unit supply requests are not consolidated by the Group 3. He is not an operator in the supply chain, nor does he have the logistical means to receive or issue supplies to the battalions. All b a d ion reports are normally channeled direct to division and army instab tiom, with information copies being retained by the Grou 9.

The armored cav& group headquarters contains the necessar). command and stag personnel for command and control of a tactical grouping of combined arms. It i s completely mu- bile, with all personnel and equip ment habitually mounted or trans- ported in organic wheeled vehicles Each battalion normally anached is organized for independent administrative operation, and is capable of sup

itself with resupply of fuel,

water for organic and attached elc

Field and combat trains are retained under the control of each battalion and include operating personnel to

In ad- to retain kibil i? of OC-

Fg ubricants, ammunition, rations, and

mentp.

perfam the fuactions of supply, main- M M O I - k p c . c n k r - O t 1953

tenance, and e\*acuatioo. The battalion combat trains d l y coasist of the major elements OC the battalion maintenance platoon and the battalion medical detachment. and those ammunition and fuel and lubricant ve- hides of the banalion supply platoon required for the immediate support of combat operations.

The battalion field a a i n s consist of those vehicles not required for the immediate support of combat operations, and generally include kitchen, ration, water, and equipment and admnmracivetrucks Narmallythey will include fuel and lubricant trucks and ammunition trucks not required in the battalion combat trains A small part of the battalion maintenance platoon, such as 2% ton truck and a small part of the battalion medid detachment, such as & W COD ambu- lance, may be left with the battalion field trains

. .

division, - =P&;g$$; w -& ag&;PFJY& stallatiopr

the p1p ctercasetbereisaum&krable

u o d a c a r p J e o n ~ ~ t b e ~ i s reQl liedfrom~innalboons ‘ I n

d;hmcc ~OI the ~ ~ ~ p p l y vehicles to ~ ~ ~ a s g r e a t a s l 1 o o m i l & In rbe tbatcr of o m -

rions the day-mday supply operations are far from routine, and there is vigorous oompet ih ammg the fop notch units seeliing the bea lopstic ~ T b i s g m u p € w s b e c n f o r t u -

operational, altbaugb even now, six

Mte eaougb to 0- wb tbis )rrat the equipment necessay to kcow

months afm activrion, some major items of +pwa have not been ARMOR---OC~&M, t9U

+ + + The uriterofthe following 4

in the Ewopcrnr Theater of Opere t M l s durirrg M‘orld M’m 11 with the 74lst Tank Banalion. Prior to his presenj ussignmen: as Comaunicu- t h s otficor of the 19th Armored Card9 Gnmp he sen-ed with the 2d Annored Cad? Reginrent.

When I reported for duty as communications o&er of the 19th Ar- mored Cavalry Group shortly after it was activated, I was disma+ to learn that the gmup with a combat cam- mand type of mission was authorized a communications section of O+ seventeen enlisted men and was to be equipped with juzt eight FXl radios

series) and three X R 506 radios. :in fan% e seuteen-man mrnmuni- caaons section is broken down as fd- lows:

1 -communications chief

%-Hiremen 2 4 d e r k r 2-motor messengers 2-armored utility d i c l e drivers I-radio mechanic The 6rst several months of training

were spent mostly in the garrison. and I concentrated on 2-Fhour-aday radio operation for the CW operators, and on-the-pb training ftx rhe wirewn. wbo were W d y armored cavally CrewmenandUnsLilled~. As aaining # and the

p u p participated m 6eld exefcises and speaal operations, it became a p parrntchatmarrCWndioapaaarrs waen&andthatthewirepman- nel opere not fully employed in the field. Hmce,ste!psweretakeatoPain thewircwnasCWndiooperaoors sothat t b q d a u g m e n t theTO&E cwradioopaatorr’Ihisaainingis

saiesintbegrou i n w s h o r t

arrange for voice radio contact w i t h te armored field anaery bat- zz a separate armored infan-

banalion, an annored cavalv reconnaissance battalion. and units OF tbe 2d Armored Division. .Ail these

4-cw radio operaton

‘ “ F T -: 0fhaviagFM dhPthewadtr oso€tharmored

exisene I have Cded 011 to

units are equippad aitb tbc umorrd wrirsof n1 raliias md +ctbcgratp is equipped w i t h the infanq raia of F31 radios DO voice ;FM> am- municationscan beesublisbed. The p u p has requeped on ENL three A\ IRQl F?rl ndios ~umorrd P ria: to be mounted in b4 UIP pudis for ranmunications w-irh units that have the armored series ofrdios. Tbe group presently has three heat? tank hadions aarhed aad as rhsc units have the infanu)- series of Fhl radios and as qlements of the p u p &ten work uith units of the US infan- d i v i s h ~ it is mandatory that the

infantry and armored series of FSl radios The requirement of b - i n g both

voice and CW communicuians at air

ing field operations presented a communications problem that could not be met with the group’s SCR 506 radios This problem was solved the corps signal banalion suurting

The group has requested five SCR 3 9 radios on LNL and a pemnnel augmentation of CM‘ radio operam to operate these r d i o s in order fo have positive mmmunicarions mer extended diPances to both higher and h e r headquarters ip future traininy and field operations. One or two of these SCR 399 radios wouId operate in the hlgherbeadquanm radio nets and one would operate as SCS of the group‘s cu’ command radio net. The two rsmaiaingsaswarld be kep: as p p reserve and would be used as rhe facdcal sitnatho dictates. For example. if one of the groups sub

p p be equipped with borb rbe

d;ctancaofwthzn 1OOmiksd~-

.

with YHF team^ .I\ - &EP0r SCR 399 radio teams.

t

o€ map. training arcs% stboo1 quotas, etc, for tbe separate batdions feu WithiptbepuNiewOfthalrrdy busy corps G3 section. Now, with the activation of the 19th Armored Cav- alry Group, the corpr has gained not only an a r m o e e d aaE section but as0 the advantage d dealing with but ope armored sub unit insteadof four. This hap circumstanoeforthecorpssCar hasL every bit as foxtunate tk the battalions themselves, inasmush as it has removed some of the burdem from their sa&. We battalions may w w take out problems to the relatively small group headquarters where, being much closer to the group commander or wff o&er concerned. receive much more in the way of individual attention than heretofore.

From the standpoint of phns our robkms are vastly simplified. Initial- & our naf fs were required to spend

long hours gleaning From the volumi- nous corps phns the bits that &eaed the banalions Sow that goup headquarters has assumed this function and passes to the battalions only the information pertinent to their plans and operations the battalion opera- tiom officer can devote the majority

The p u p with its attached units can be utilized very much like a com- bet command, can act as a sub head-

units temporanly attached, or can provide the c a n d element under which to weld as5ault or reserve task force units. S a d ? , we banalions

of his time to norm?l training.

quarters for corps in controlling corps

v e c y d p e t n t b e ~ . ' I h group with its three berrvy tank bet- plioarandmevmacd infantry bat- rahmamrtinuera cforceand

miadm. but we like best to visualize ouncloa as a powerful neiking force held initially in reseme and used for the "Sunday punch" which so often

municltion* The pcesent T,O & E for aur separate tank banalions calk for radios on the infanay band while the T/O & E of our a r m d infantry battalion provides radios on the armor band, as is also the case with the units of the 2d Armored Division. This problem renders our getting together on the air a little d i h l t in combined training and Eertainly presents a potential hazard in battle whenever unitsonrheanws band work with or are attached to thase which are not. Our present, admittedly interim, solution is maximum utilization of CW common to all our units as well as depepdence upon the common " B set with irs very.limited range. Our recommended solution is the issue of enough armor sets to each battalion that the key sets within the unit may

though this problem is far from whippal, with what we have, we of the 19th Armored Cavalry Group are prepared to give a good account of ourselves as we are whether we are fighting as a group or as detached units.

canrquititrdEwe IP"" onanpassigned

be switcbed when necessary. A-

e d i t o r i a l

A Potential Team

R E C O I L L E S S G U N S A N D T A N K S

bY MCHARO M.

Tbr pros a d cons of recoilless guns bave been basbed over many times since tbey Pst made

tbck marrasce on tbe battkpld emly in World War 11. In fact tbe Rnssians wed tbem

that, one has onlv to recall the statement made shonlp before the kxean e o n by the then seactary of the h y to show how far some of these views went: d. . . tank warfare as we have lmown it will soon be obsolete"!

The causes of this are not far to seek RecoiIIesgunshavebeendc- vehped largely to increase the organic 6re power of the infantry; to pvide infantry units with more powerful. yet handier, weapcms than those whichehephithempoaased. Tht they have accomplished. They have inaeased the h e power of the infan- trp and its ability to engage several cppaoftargersinc1udingymored~ hidaTheEefaclscanhpdlvbeq9es- timed. But tbe conclusions which harcbecndnwnhpmthemarevery quariopable.

krOlwa9,mdlmbm First, there is the "devastating"-

to quote a senior ordnance &- performanceofrscoillessguns. It is ''devastating" indeed, compared with carlie types of infantry weapons. But, as far as the target &ect is concerned, it is no more so than the performance of field artillery and tank guns, which havebeenmuseforsometime. Un- fonunately this fact is often forgotten and quite enoneous conclusions are drawn as to the on-target &ect of recoilleJs weapons.

Semdy, there is the more general question d annor-piercing weapons and the validity of the argument that tanL are rendered obsolete because their armor can be peaanted. Such an argument, if it were true, would mQIl that tanks have hitherto been invulllaable-wu of course, thy

ARMa--b--, 1953

never were. So, om dmt m Ibw, tbe argument is fake. hiorawa, armor protection is rrot tk C&'S d y or even chief attribute, though, uw foramaately, there are sti l l many who are unda that illusiam. Thus w h t h r the armor can be m t e d or m, the question of the tank becoming outdated does not rally arise. It is the thinking ambing such im ance to aRlylr procsction w h i c K hopelessly outdated.

#..dk- Confused thinking must not, how-

ever, be albwed to obsrurr the d value of recoilless weapons, any more than their limitation. It makes it all the more important to examine them carehrlly; to attempt a close ad ob jective VJIllySis of tk chancanstrs of Tccoilless sibilities in They have alredy a fairly wide background of devdopmnf which deseMs some attention, and which is also intaesting in illustrating the progrm ma& in this field since the firngunswereinooducsd.

. .

-D...bgud The6rstorm?nrrooilleaguns

waepmducedforairbxnetroaps where their light weight and e z ~ e of dropping by parachute fined thm well. They were 6xs used, a-ri- ately enough, during the German attack on Crete, in May 1941, the first

bien carried out a b exclusivel~ large rak operation ewr to have

The 6rst type to be produced was airborne forces.

a short 75mm gun, mounted on a light wbeeled carriage. Lib all rub squent rrcoilkss weapom'it bal?nced the recoil forccs bI; alloffing a portion

the rear thmugh a nuzzle, these s a p ing gases acting in much the same wag as the caurter-propsale d the &vis gun. This nazzk assembly re plrcd the am~entional k h k k

with a phstic h which disinu-

of the propellant gasa to empe to

aadtbeamidgccycswerepo\ided

p t e d firiag but which WZI mf- 6ciently robat to allow an initial prrprure built up fa sbot popllion.

After the 7 . h LG.40 prooed itself in the hands of tbe Geman

~

against tbe Fimss drrring tbr Winter War of 1939-1940. For a bistory of tbcir k k g r d and some sound conclnsions based on analytical s t d e s a P"Kt0J of tbis ortick i s in order.

The first succedd application of

priwnts begun as early as 1937. Some attempts at producing IccoillesJ weapons had been d e earlier, nota- bly with the Davis gun of World war I, which was m a n u f d in the United States and mounted on a few large British airplanes. This fired projectiles in 0 . 'te directions with the same p r o s was tbe actual projectile and e other a counterweight by meaps of which recoil forces Were belanced.

The Russians appear to have &ne some early work also: a spechmn was captured by the Finns during the "winter War" of 19391940. but recoilless guns do not appear to have been used latex on the Eastern Front againsttheGerm?nr

Ecoilkss gury as chey are known today, was in Germany, when? ex-

d"$: One

airborne it was issued and used succe&i= mountain noapsand infanmy units. It was found par- cicularly useful by tbe units opating in Finlaod, where it could be carried to positions where it was impossible to take heavier types of weapons More than one type of 75mm gun

was actually built and it was followed closely by 105mm models, which were also originally intended for airborne troops but which were used by others as well. Both types, the 75mm and the 105mm. were in service in some numbers by 1943 and were en-

Other types were also under development, fairly high priority being given to this until the middle of 1944. By 1945 the range of &Is stretched fmm a 55- automatic aircraft cannon to a 28omm coast de-

countered by Allied troops in Italy.

57 and 75mm ri&s WCIC Born an mthemaintheatemofopnt iarr In Europe tbev were anpbpsd =- cfdull,. m th 6nal densitle in Germanylad.liketbefirsc;crmm TecoilleQ guns w a e d iniollly by parachuteooopsoftk 17thAirbane Division. Alittlelatertbegsbowed equallpweu in the P a c k mvmgtbt fighting on Okinawa.

s i world war IIrrcoilkrsriea have, of coury, become s&Ddard equipamt. panlp as a repbrrmmt of conventional EuppoR aad antitank p:thrrc57mmri&stoeaChin- fantry company and four 75mm ri8cs to each infanq batralion. Tbae is hardly any need to add that more re ant ly tbey have dmpnnrwd tbeir value as infanmy weapoas in Kaa and have been s u p p k m w d by a t h i r d a n d s t i l l l v g e r ~ t h e

27

t

i

W'orld W a r 11. t h q rovided their

light infantry bowiaert So were the Japanese with their ultra-light 7Omm banalion howitzers.

It is within this trend that much of the general development of recoilless gunsf& a trend which they d e r - aced considerably. -- The advantages of light weight and

of the resultant mobility of the piece have to be paid for, however. The

When a round isM only a small *on of the gases does workon the projectile: the restescape to the rear.

&e gun its d e s s characteristics but it is also rrsponsible for the hge

infantry regiments and Ka nalions with

price is powder consumption.

The latter is rrsponsihk for giving

and moce bulky ammunition, through transfort. and storage problems, right back to the cost of manufacture and the question of raw materials. The price paid for the lightness of the piece with teference to the ammunition problem is, therefore, quite high. It limits severely the scope of recoilless guns and makes it unlikely that

application to such roles where a high muzzle velocity and hence a high chamber pressure are not required. - Infantry guns, of course, fall into the latter category. A relatively low m u p h vekdtp is adequate for sup part p n s 6ring high explasive shells. But, important as the development of

tbep will supersede convent id guns ingcneraluse.Italsorestrictstheir

infin- ~ U D S and the COD-

uibrrtion madc to this by ramille!s

guasyc,theimpoctplyTa€tbeLaa

w b o r c p m o t p n e a p t i o n d i d n o t

wads, tbe ckw+amlt a€ tlu shaped charge

JlkmV.l--

would bave been far less were it not foraaahadcvebpmcnt. A h

depard upon its vdaitp-in ocher

amtt which produced a pjecti t

Thedtvdopmartaftbesbaped,a

badtanumberdycr r Butitspnc- tical application only began in the middk of World W r 11: among tbe

- earliest projectiles incorporating this feature were some German field artillery shells and the British Xo. 68 d e grenade. The most efkaive and s+ar, however, was its use in the o r i e a l U. S. bazooka, the 2.36 in., first used during the Allied land- ings in French North Africa in 1942 The bazooka is in itself a recoilless

weapon, though it is more properly classified with r o c k launchexs than with what are usually termed'recoilless guns Anyway, its ladt of recad and light weight cotnbmed with the

projectile -ded the infantry with a highly E v e short-rulge antitank W a p .

Assuchrbebazookademonanted againstGam?nt?nkiUthe

?=&l French campaigns A

perfarmaace of the shaped charge

ARMOR--h--, 1953

tanks there and then. In fact, the menace of the shaped charge projectile was considered EO be such that Hider and his advisers began to doubt further value of tank as early as 1942 Allied leaders and expens took much thesameviewinmahad * yafterthe war and, unlike the others, haye been slow in revising their 6rst and unduly pessimistic impmsions.

i

be cllled "baisd cznied artilkry." But

wborc ammunition is proporcioaately

that no bnga applies to the 105mmm model which weighsvrme 365 I b d

havia. It thus becanes neceJsarv to mount

the gun on a towed cadage, or, to achieve maximum eflectiveness, to mount it directlyon a suitable vehicle -in other w d s , to make it into a self-propelled gun. As the size of the gun iacrases, an-

other problem, associared with recoilless equipment becomes of iaaeasin

PIOpelled mounting: the problem of beck blast.

TacticaLly the latter is the greatest

It is potentially lethal for some d k tamr behind the weapon and thus considerable care must be OLn in posiricnins a gun, 50 as not to en-

crew. It makes the gun unsuitable for firing in confined spaces and makes

as it often does, clouds of SmOLe and dust behind the weapon, which dis- clavs io position immediately at

importance and as0 qgests self

&whack of all recoilks equipment

danger friendly troops of the gun

coOceolment diffilt by tlmwing up,

*h Thrc are serious prohlemr But

taelp can. at least, be reduced by mountingthegunonavehide:even thelightcaMaawillminimirr& danger to t h e m . and the ability to change positions rapidly will partly alleviate the problem of concealment.

At tbe same time, vehick mounting will amderably ease the problem

fa * allbut thelightat models

hider Further, it takes little imagina- tion m see such a vehicle turning rapidIy mto a tank or, at least, a "tank desmyer." A fast, light vehicle of. say, somewben between 5 and 15 mns, which would exploit the lightness a€ the r d e s s weapon and at the same time minimitr the latter's

Rmmvr Gun Tamk? But such a light, recoilles~ gun

armed,vmoredvehiclehasalready

It has been propod on various oc- cadau by U. S., French a d &a- dianarmoral faerat6Cena.s a means * g round some of the dif-

taes of size, weight and cost of

suggested as the besic tank of the fu- NIC, a light and highly mobile tank

moving swarms and revive the tempo

wbeckr it would prove quite as e&crioc as has been suggested or

vmed with more conventional high vebciry guns must remain a matter of conjcctun But whether it will or nos d a type has undoubted and more immaliate possibilities. In fa the Germans were already

working on such a vehicle when World War 11 ended. Having con-

and tank applications they were de- &ping a 1 5 h m recoilkss gun version mo&red on that light, turretless

38 chassis. Cmdderable hopes were placed on it as a "tank destroyer," or, mafc accuratdy, a v e hide of the li t Panzerjagu class,

of the war and which combined the roles of o&I1Jive action againsf hostile azma and direct support of the in-

For tbae roles the charaaeristla

ofvnmunitian handling. 'fhacarethusrevd good reasons

o f ~ ~ o 1 1 I c l f - p m p c l l a i v c

sbaccomkrgs

been *ted h m anorher quarter.

-present day tank It has even been

which would g~ into action in swift-

of g c o d warhrr.

moresothanotbatppsofranL

s i d d types of sclf-p@ed

which was evoved ? towards the end

fantly. - of tk recoiuess gun were pmicular- ly suited: the low velocity, shaped charge projectile provided good antitank performpace at up to medium ranges and the large caliber assured g o o d h i g h e x p ~ r & a . ' I h a e

s b o u l d k m u k e d a

ended WaetheGennanswmabk m build mocc thrrrooear nu0 experi- wntalmnklr.

-Alrrmrdhw The advantagesof an? such vehicle

areworthconridaingagain.

of the rypes dpo' and the ab

which imposes H) suesses on the v e hide. But the'disadvantages of the d a s g u n u r l l S 0 t b a c : t h e ~ blast, and its danger to friendly mops, and tbeammunition, as- and heavy as chat of any heavy. high velodty gun.

bere ref ore, h;ving accepted a kbt armored vehicle as the best way of using d e s s guns. or assumed he desirability of a light recoilless gun armed tad, one may well cany the analysis one step farther and enquire whether there is some otha way of projecting large caliber, low velocity projectiles h m such a vehicle-for is this not the basic pblem?

The weight of ammunition could be reduced and back blast e l h i n d byusingaconventional .Gunsof 1osoreven15ommcan 6re!dfrom a vehicle of about 10 tons, or even less. But the gun would be d a - ably heavia and the force of d on the vehicle considerable. The pr~- jectileJ too wadd have to be much more robust and this would rcducc their explasive content and hence ef- fectivpsess.

A way round some of the di&dties of the conventional p, yet without

Thp arc due to the comb&

aaccofrrcoil, ? hencealightgun

r

incurriogthe disadvlntlgesof there- coilless gun, was discopaed b -- man enginees towards the end of WorId War XI So far the new type of p has been referred as a %igh and low p"urr gun," but it could equally we& and much more brie$, be called a "throttled gun."

TbotuadQIln

this gun is that the fmnt of the o a t n d g e - i s d o r e d b y a d e latc (in pnctice a plate with plain he), and by a suitable choice of

proiectile can be kept lower than in

t very briefly, the main feature of

arc?sthepezureantbebaseofthe

the c h a m b e r - h tbe "hisb and baprrsam"deSignali0n.

‘T- I

Britain‘s latest combat aod general se.nke vehicles-some just og the sesm k - w a e sboan to military expem of the European Defense cammuaity, at arbmrncrnnnn held at the “proving gmund“ of the Jfinisny of Supply’s Fightiq Vehicles Research Establishment near Chobham. Surrey.

The vehicles put through their p a s m hilly country, ranged from motor- cyda to a huge Kkoa tractor. towing a 6o.ton tank t r a n s p ~ ~ ~ ~ , complete with Centurion tank, some of which were driven round the difiirult dos~ munay h i t , negotiating sharp b t d and right angle turns at high speeds, d climbing gndKnts as steep as one UI three.

One of the vehicles which stole &e limelight was the new sh-wheeled armarrd personnel carrier, known a b the 5araccn,” which was s ~ e n in puhlb- for the first time. It is to be issued to motor battalions of British a d divisi~ns. Powered by a Rolls Royce enplne, it has a top speed of 45 miles per hour, and weighs ten tons. It c m any a complete d o n of infan-. and is armored against small arms hre md shell splinters. It mounts a .30 caliber machine gun and a Bren gun. .\n outstinding feature of the vehicle

NEW BRITISH VEHICLES FOR COMIAT ANDb GENERAL SERVICE

is that it can even bedriven minus a wbeel or two if the front u-k& M not hit. The military e*pms w m also hi@ i n d in a new liaison smut car which seats a ERW of t h re and is capable d high speeds over rough country.-British Information Senices

I f W0 sbovld come, we, t& peopk of tbe Umted States, witb o w "Knolu-botu," sbonld not try to meet k d a with e+ k & s . We s h d employ o w ep'pmet# more s W f d y .

'THE ARMORED CORPS AND

ARMORED ARMY

- by MAJOR HAROLO H. DYKE, 1R.

sldllful ure of wf modan weapons including helxupcers and atomic artillery. The present rho01 doctrine contemplates the organization of army cop, within Field Annics, in which the ratio of armored divisions to infantry divisions is a h one to

the frittering away of armored

tomaLethemaximumuseoftbe

k i b i l i ~ , and 6repower inherent in

three. such employment results in

smngth in *penny pedretr." It fails

m c - of mobility,

annor.

ccos in Wald War Il by arh kad- as a€ armor as Geneds Patton, walker, Hannan, Eddy, aadcritten- bagcr, but the blunders OE Hider a d the exhausrim of the Geman

armies played a major part in that SUCC~SS In the War Between the

success by the South and later the North. Infantry, attacking in

waves behind an overwhelming ar- dleq berrage, achieved a degree of

ever, neither the outmoded a m on the one hand nor the o u d e d technique on the other could reasonably be expected to produce any decisive feSUIt in favor o€ the user today.

Thinking leaders, both military and civil, see the futility of anem t-

sort of combat at which the latter are manifestly supexior, i.e., "meet bordes with equal hordes." The most skillful use which M be made of OUT superior equipment is to employ it in

states, horx cavalry was used with

succss duMg W d d War I; how-

ingtodefeatEasternmasseswith t! e

34

i .

To employ ow Armor in greater mass tban ever before, we nust remgauizt it in greezer masses. Tbir entails tbe formation of Atmmed Corps and Atlnotcd Armies ylcdcl i t s own leaders.

highly trained formations pos5es&

tactical, firepower and shack action. maximum mobility, bah strategic an I!

Such formations would be used in the early phases of a war in Europe to conduct a vigorous mobile defense on a large scale while the Western .Ulies gather their strength. Later, on the offensive, these units would

into the enemy's rear and against his centers of control and supply.

h r is the obvious arm around

mor alone has the requisite characteristics of mobility, firepower, and shock action. Armor, supported by tactical air and atomic artillery, sup plied by helicopter, and with airborne forces under its command, would be the ideal combinatitm in the performance of the mksions outlined above.

h r must be employed in great-

has ever attempted More. In orda to obtain mas, it must be organited into larger formations than ever before, and under its own leaBerr The smallest fighting unit into which it should be b the corps; the

armored armies in a d a to perform the strategic p e n d o n s once the West has gone over to the otTensive.

Thisdoesnot redudetheuseof the tank units Jtbc infanny divi- dons, corps tank and annored cavalry units, and the few armored divisions neceSSary to add p"er to the infantry corps. Armor ~ ~ I S C continue to give its support to infanty along with the artilkxy and air. but the armored concept must be completely d i d fromtheTypeCorps TheArmorrd Caps and Annored Army are thin apart and must be considered in d- tion to the present Type Corps and Type Field Army. Only the annored corps and armored army can give the commander the sort of formations he

perform deep strategic p e n e t r a h

which to build these formations. AI-

ermasjthan the united stares Army

corpscould erbeconfinedinto

will need to Crgaxlize the highly trained. highly mobile forces which alone are capable of idiccing defeat onthemassesoftheEast. .

. - The unit upon which the organi-

zation of the armored corpr would be based is of course, the .Gmaed Division. The vmorrd division con- ta ins all &e essential ekmmts for the surressful Prformance of the armor mission; bowever, in order for it to exploit to the fullen its powerful potential for Oeensive combat, i a present ocganiration quires same modifications. As it is presently organized the armored division contains too many non-tial, noa-fightiag elements which reduce its mobility by making it dbound and so increase its vulnerability to air and ground anad;. In addition, the majority of the vehicles in the division

cmsunmf"~ abil- ivof do ."r t?nLThisrequiresthat the the division base its movanents ~ o t upon itsmosrmobikvehidebutupon vehiclcs with ks manewaing ability. Inordertoovmamethesehand- icaps.sevd changes in the division's organization must be accomplished.

All the ekments of the division which are IKH ablutely necesaq to carry out the fighting mission

dxy units, ban4 replacement com-

Information u&er, the special sav.

sbould be eliminltcd Bath a d lam-

pany, The Adjutant General, The Judge Advocate C e n d the Public

ices A, and others that make up the division rear shod be organitad and trained to operate in the Annp area, completely cut from the di-

should pi" the division onlv wbm it is in a rest area, wben it is in r e m e for an a m b l e time, or at any ocher time when tbeir rrvace will not A k r n t b Ividon*s mobility or tacnipre its vulnerabilitp.

visionforlangpenodsoftime. ?hcp

I

Tbir does not precc'rdc nse of tanks in s v of tbe ZHfautty Di&m but it does divorce tbs m e d Carps c-ept M t b c Type Corps concept, to obtain tbe reqwed Amor Mass.

tbe W e River. Such a .cordon de- feme would ru&r the same fate as the Austrian cordon in Italy during Xapolam's first campaign in that

only becauseof the weakness inherent in this type of &feme but also be- - there pbably would not be enough divisions available Eor the job.

A rqbile defense based upon the

Available infantry divisions shuuld beaganizedintoaseriesof"hedge- h w " along the obstacle to be de- fended. The 'hedgehogs" need not be mutually supporting but must be strong enough in weapons-and sup pEes to withstand the heaviest attack for several days Behind this gigantic o u v line the maximum number of armored corps should be held in reserve. .+s the enemy attack in any armv area threatening a penetration of the line of "hedgehogs- or the de- smcaon of one of them. the armored corps should be launched in a powerful counter-attack, limited in objective but designed to cut a& and destroy the threat. Because of its ma- neuverability. Bexibilicy and lack of dependence on the existing road net. the armored corps could move quickly to counter a threat in any part of the arm? area, destroy the enemy, and return to its reserve position in mini- mum time and with little confusion.

M'hen the ;Ulies move mer to the &ensi\~. the strategy of attack must not be based on a continuous pres- s u r e e d against the enemv all along the front driving him back on his prepared positions and on his re- serves as was the SH-EF strat- in Europe m the last war. Rather the strategy of the indirect approach, as advocated by B. H. Liddell Hart uti- lizingdeeppenetratinmtheenemy rear to seize his centers of control and supply should be employed. In this situation the armored corp organized into an annored armv would cow

country. ~ w u u i d r e s u l t n o <

a r m o r r d corp'should be adopted.

into iS own. Able to maneuver CTOSS- country, able to drive ahead without fear fur its Bank or rear, resupplied by air when n-, the armored army could drive deep into the enemy's rear seiziug his nerve centers

strategy was advocated by Guderian and & German armor leaden in the early s a p of the German cam- peign'in Russia. The &eaivenes of the amoral army in such Opera- tion could be increased a hundred- fold by placing under its control one or more airborne divisions. In this - way the indifta approach would be acmm lished from two directions,

sky on a critical center, well in the enemy's rear, while the armored army, slashing through a gap made by atomic artilley, moved swiftly on the ground for a linkup. h r and airborne would form an unbeatahle combination.

and pamlyzing his operations. such

the air L e troops dropping from the

Victor) for the Western Allies. in the event of another major war, lies in using the most modem weapons in the hands of highly trained, highly mobile troops employing maximum firepower and flertibility against a larger and inherently slower enemy. Anmr, wirh its characteristics of mobilitp, kibility. firepower and shock &ion. is the logical arm for the cask. Organized into armored corps and armies to obtain the necessary armor may it can perform the initial defensive task by conducting a ~ ~ ~ I X O U S mobile defense, and. when the ofknsive stage is reached, it can encompass the final defeat of the enea~y by a deep stab into his vitals The armored corps and the armored army can be and should be relied upon to fad611 the requ' Irement, as stated by Dr. Bush. for skillful use a€ the modern weapons which science w i l l give it. .

B A C K G R 0 tJ N.D for deliberate planning

* * *

OR thrives cm "Deliberate Planning" aad "Violent Ex- r ecution." But deliberate

planning requires adequate and time Iy information on which to base the plans. Throughout all of our training in Armor, we have been taught cer-

ment, such as terrain, weather mdi- tions, obstacles, soil tdkability, and enemy antitank means. These are planning factors at dl levels and in varying degrees from the Tank Com- mander to the Field &my Gmunand- a. HOW-, tbe methods of obtaining the information and using it will

with the rize d the unit. Nor-

tain factors & e C t i n g . d employ-

mally, we can d e r these facton under the general heading of tank terrain and aaft;cabil'ty studies for the larger units. The information can best be used in the "deliberate phn- ing" phase by the l ~ c e of a tank m- rain and trafkability map.

h i o a m d m 8 Q p I o I sourceS of obtaining tenain and

trafficability info- include personal reconnaissance, patrok, engineer road repom. momahance units, reconnaissance by ligbt aircraft, d l

photographs, civilian line cmsers, in- terrogation of PWs, artillcxy surveys, and ~arious combinations of all these. T d T.ncdn m d T- -- .% this information is received from

the various sounxs, it must be col- lated and recorded in a place and manner to make up-to-date information readily available to the planners.

uation map a&ds the best means. This map is best maintained by the d m O t corps Or .h). headquarters and by the G(S:2 in divisions. regiments, combat commandr, and battalions. It should be maintained as Current as the situation permi.=. .u1 changes in tdkability resultmg from fluctuating weather conditions (rain, snow, freeza, thaws, etc.) must be recordedcm the map as soon as received. A map clerk can maintain the map similarly to G2 or G3 situation maps. '411 information is then funneled through this one clerk who posts the information, source, date. time and other information of importance as quickly as it is received.

WamdmtObO-

-1 tank terrain and aafficabilit). dt-

Information that should be re-

catepries: Terrain and tra&ability conditions that a h tank maneuver,

corded on the map falls into two

and detailed informatiorr of a *spa"

Tke information, as rccoTdcd here, is bused u p Korean -and

tions In the that frnt a h c a w tank we cruswmmp 6ndcoDdc

maneuver and that demnune . t b e maximum size of the tank unit that

nature.

does not d? Crpply ulorlduidc.

can be deployed in an). partiah cer- raincompamwnt. CrosKPun~ma neu\rr is afTefted by natural and areificial obstacles soil conditions. meather conditions and the widthof the v a l k or the width of the area betweenobnacks I n b i t i s n o r - mall! tbe valley widths that restrict the size of the rank units that can be d e p w wberas in aher geographical areas it d be the widths between marshes 01 whatever tbemaiaokmmmln - iodigenousto thatareahappentobe. Haarepa,tbe poblemof- . - ganddesignu- ing the maximum size unit that can be deployed exists. The map and any

. a o v a l a p s m a d e b

formula that was used as the basis f a annpuption. The fmnula used inKoreabyIxcapswasborcdm cheprinciplethutbcrmxiimund p k t o a n k p l a p m e n t i s ~ ~ f a m r - tionwithceruinspecibcintaP?kbe tweentank.Ibactae,plyesllep

was denrrmDsd - bydividingtbcrrrr-

?z2?z"deintkkgmd&

capacitp in tams of numbas of tanks

37

coaditionratchas& tcmpQprybB

guicbzllddimpyvMemamtoin passaduetoiceorsnowcanditians shouldbeindicad Insbort,allin- fam?tiontbatirofpl?pningvlhre both a! thecapsand Army kvd md at rbe&ghtiug kvel &odd bepbaed.

--el- In d e r to be of Val% this in-

fonnatim must be available to planners at the higher headquarten as wJ1 as the opaatitnd tank units. Atbough much of the information is vduable only OD the d a s in their

regardkss of its scak, in arcas where d emp-t is maicted, has to

coming ~ n u a l and artificial obstacles in the path o f a tank attack must be made and obstacles eliminated in rear of our defensive lines to facilitate tank

dicates that due to the pdydrologg of the average soldier and 086Ca in de siring to have the maximum amaunt of information about his enemy, any information digeminad through G2 ~lreceivesgre!aterdiaibutian, discussion and individual attention thanifdistributedthroughaseparate channeL For that reasam, c&cab&ty informatianwillgettomoreofthe potarrialusasifiraKdasanvrnex to c 2 Paiodic Inoenigare Repartt (PIR) and as an inrLLpvc to the G2 estimate in opemiod plans and or- darthanbyothamca.KThein- foxmation is best di%emiMted in tbe form of over-tinted maps with th spotinfamationovapriDtedinbbtt If the information K isual as actnu- plLtlonofrrpara,bcatedbVgd coordi~tes, rrpuiring it to be re- ploacd before it can b e d theap

(bpttalionaadctnu- F Y ) WIU not use it to.the derind ~ X ~ Q L L The map, when it

immcdiatefront,anytankopaation,

be carefully planned. Plans for over-

c o ~ t ~ n a c k s . K m experience in-

map into a smaller. more usable map, pmided the scale is ah0 p b graphed down with the map. The Repmentative haction of the result-

since the 1,ooOmeter grid system ing map is datively unimparpnt,

.ALo,thennlllerthe map, the easier it is to haodk in a

tankturretaU-tonbntctIikewk tbc~sizefadl iuradisaihtion. --- -

Thekgendsbowrthemarginaldata that sbould be iDclUW in additim to the graphical sclleon each repro- duced terrain and t&cab% map. Although cmain colors are indicated in the figure, any cola scheme that isexplainedin the legendcan be used pTovided it is sutsciently spea6c to be undanood easily. --

Kaepn experieace indicates th?t, pamcularly in areas of r e s t l i d tank anpbyment, tarain and tra86cabilitp studies are invaluable for operational phapip . Although many examples are avafable to illustrate this point., there are two Which illustrate most P a 8 factors.

On 26 April 1951, the Chinese -communist Foms broke through the IX Corps front northwest of Chun- chon. Previous terrain and tdica- bility studies had shown the valley qmtan northeast and wrthwst of K a p g to be capable of supporting two complete tank companies. G2 re parq pior to 26 April, indicated a pooiMe enemy densive &wn the Kapymg axis, Gmsequently, the

Kapyon on24Apriltobackupthat

Tank Badion, was oent to Kapyong to join this unit, dosing on 25 April. 0116Cm from this company and the IXcorpSAn#Kcdsectianmadea "verification" mmmahmx of the Dnin while &e company was en route toxlpyong. Pa6sible routes of cmnotntcrk, objectives, assembly iUt?a!%aadlttrLparitiOnsW4%errCan- noiaacd. As a result af this prior -and planning, the tank company, although operating against p a t odds, matmially a s s i d the 27th Bcigad~ in holding Kapymg. The 27th Brigade and CO A, 72d

Resave, 27th Britirh Common- wealth Bri* had been moved to - J theline.companyA,72d

Tank Battah,withdrewonlyan Ix corpa'ordet after units OD their aank had been penetn#d, making their pasition untenable. Both the tank unit and the 27th Brigade received Diainguished Unit Citations for this action.ThCBrigadecommandalata

90' asked tbnt this company remain munatly as his "brigde tank unlt."

1

LEGEND

In addition to courage ana good leadenhip prior informahan * ofthebade ama was instnunend inthissuccea. In planning for a tank raidin Sep

tember 1951 JOuth of K-g a- rangements were & t~ alternate the use of M4 and M46 tanks, based

on depth width of the of attack munrnin and continua-

using M4A3J3 tanb to Qlck through

ing the MWs thmugh behind &e

to concentrate all availabk tank pow-

ARMOI--kp)mb~-Odokr, 1953

E== tion of the attack was planned by

enemy fnmt lines initially, having

M4A3WS inm tbe valleys in or&

eronthe6nalobjeaiocs

engineers widen kppaerondrcad-

- It cannot k averrmpharized that

&ent for sa- +g.

mind prior to making opemood

studies cannot degena;uc into mere

addition, engines nudies d areas of O p e r a t i o n that have ba%l made yean

they are f p e d y rcunteonly as to

mereroadandaailipformaaan isnot

The actual am-counay maneuver capacity of each area must be deter-

plans r3lso. terrain and t d k a b i l i ~

map studies, but must r e k t accurate andup-mdatetarainamditianr In

mustbecarrMy

whetha thae ~UUD~~~ILS a ~al-

40

The Top Command

in the Far East

Sincethissp+wasLapub lished in the *March-Apd, 1952 issue of ARMOR, many ChangeshaveraLm~aUd f u r r h e r c h a Q g e s w i u ~ b t - edly OCNT. eoen s this is writ- cel. Tbecmeo€phncimpor- taLlce and mo5t dramatic. of cause, was the ces6atioll ofbos- tiline chat is, the end a€ the sbooting war. U'e. lilwise, see an entire&- new arrap of

here on this page last year is

faces IC P a fact that not one kev commandet who appeared

currentlr in that critical area. Once agm. as stated in the luly-hpst 1953 issue of .AR- iiOR h is a tribute to the wealth of 'Dp COmmaDd per- some4 a-ailable to the United StatesarmedfolcCsInaddi- tion 10 the personnel h- prted bmca AFCMOR recog- xllz€3 and pq-s mbute to the mnnibutions made by its sister sen= m arms hoa-erm.space does Mu permit the mentioning of all h wbo --ere SD de- Sen-ing. Y~tbesbooringstage has napped. but we must not forgex the tital importance of tbe m h t Y) recently has rrqruAd deulp of OUT blood d aeas~re.-Tm &.

I FABEASTANDWARMY- I 1 THEDMSK))IS- I

31.j. Gem. chtb. L DJa. Jr. CG. Ut4 Id- MrLir

PARTONE

The Revolution: American Military Policy Emerges from the

Crucible of Waf by C. 1. BEWARDO, Ph9. and EUGENE H. BACON, PhD.

During tbls paid largely because d their isolated +cion from E m pcdn turmoil aod inmgue, they had come to enjoy a larger and ever- incleadngmeasureof litidliberty by initiating laws w X limiting the power of the y a l governors, by control of provincial finance, and by appointing administrative o&txrs de- spice the contention that this ap- pointive power resided in the go-- nan alone.

These extra-legal privlkges went unchallenged while England can- tended with Louis XIV for control of the continens and after the Peace of U d t , in 1715, this ''dutarp neg- lea" Was permitted to go unchected by Engtancrs ministm who bad grown to view with a measure of suspicion any scheme for taxing the co- xor were hey checked in 17%. when England made a determined &on to displace the French in North America. To attempt it at this time would have been folly since M support of the t\merican cole

dispaLeabh to British victory. Keenfy aware of the fortuimus im-

plicatiolls of thest ConMgeaCies the COW assemblies bst Iittk oftheir iniciatmc for prping further Q)IIc&

sions from P a r h t . Throughout

nias w a ~ XIOC only derirabk, but in-

the course of the F d and Indian

War, they displayed a greater eagex- ness to curtail British authority than to come to grips with the French

. and their Indian allies, with the re sult that they streagthened their claim to exclusive control of the purv strings. WhSn thqr granted money, ths. prrscribea the p q = for which it was to be spent; and often interfed in the command of military fomr and removed d c e r s considered incompetent.' . In taking advantage of the critical position of England hard-pressed by w a r i n € America, and India.

thCmwnofitspowm Allwere lumhmus in giving only the bprat lcciavrr for the war effan; and even tbe modt loyal of the colonies refused to subadinace their own interests to tboseoftheKing. corn d w i t h this unity of obiectives, E thirteen

layed a p'ovindal iro

Pariiulwt, rccpced by Bf?!njamin FrankWto pin the colouies in a military rmion in 175% Unmindful evena€threpeatedthr raoof~ mion fnw Padiamalt# the assemblies radned firm in their resolves to refrain fian such a union.

t h e 2 assemblies diSpoJscSJed

latioa w a defeated the plan of

&bI faut m m )TeaK Of o(- perimencation with this mahod of banting the war, William Pia saw

the wkddm of bring& to an end his Government's &- . t i on to persuade the lgislatws to sbbulder their share of the.- of the

promised rcimburvmrnt for their

and few saings. they threw eco~lomy to the winds in equipping and sup plying troopr The humiliation of stooping to her'cobnks was a high price to pay for aid; bu added to this, Great Britain was saddled with a pc m e n d w public debt h g h t about by tbe most expensive war English- men had ever waged. In contrast. the colonies emerged with a com- paratively low debt, and greatly en- hanced prestige in local selfgovern- ment These were no small considera-

struggle. Inrtad, the colonies were

expendiwcr, and with no restraints

tions in the detenninatian of George

the aushing debt. England's experiences in the Seven

Years' War clearly indicated the need for a change in colonia policy. The stubborn refusal of the colonies to work together for the benefit of the mother country might prove fatal in another conflia. From the purely selfish viewpoint of protecting the Empire, the King's ministers could no longer disregard the need for a revitalization of the ties that bound the mlonies. Few could denv the

111 to tax his s u b j j to help defray

-

wisdom of this decision, but fewer stil l were willing to accept the Brit- ish formula for bringing about a more perfect union. Having partaken of the Fruits ~F'unlimited selfgovern- ment for almost a century, Americans were prone to guard jealously against any encroachment u p their political and economic indeprndence by means of taxation.

Disregarding the serious con* quences that were sure to follow in the train of economic coercion. Par- liament undertook to set in motion the series of incidents that would

revolt. It should have been lead to ai Or ent to the King's advisers and to George hinself, that what England had been smble to bring about in 1756, she could no l o n p accomplish after the threat of French aggressiveness in America had been eliminated in 1763. While the danger from that quarter remained. .hericani were forced to seek the protection of the British Annv and Navy. But now this was past, and with it had dipped any hope the

British may have enlcRziryd )a knitting the c o h i a into a sdid

British statesmanrhip az that time

generations of its leadm on the stage of power politics. 'Ih Americvl Revolution was kindled by the fate ful decision of Parliament to eaforce

CIOWtl. .Wan objection to taxation was

aired primarily because of a universal feeling that it was a scheme to en- hance the ec0M)ZILic well-being of British merchants at their expense. and secondly hecause the m o ~ thus collected would k used to maintain and subsist large.Englhh armies in North .+meria. Each succeeding revenue law, beginning with the Sugar Act of 17H was met with increased opposition until the &Dod gates of public indignation were finally thrown open by the h n Tea Partv. This outbreak was pre- cipitated by the notorious Towns- duties of 1767,< and paved the way for the Intolerable Acts of 1774.s which drew the curtain on the first phase of the bloody melodrama that was destined to last eight years.

Below the surface of this c o n e veny, .-cans began to lay the groundwork for a uni6ed Art to dispute the authority of Parliament to tax them without their permission. By 1768. a nonimportation agreement was consummated among the Sew England colonies Sew York. and Penns).lvania; and OM vear later, their southem neighbon joined the concert. Americans clothed in home- spun began to give evidence of a M-

tional consciousness.

the p a m e ir. opposition to the Par- liamentav policy, c o ~ p l d with But- ish inability to rearah t- assured the final brealr. The ditficulties encountered bp Parliament in fonnu- lating and executing .4merican poli- cies were vastly i d a the problew created by time and space. a factor which led Edmund Burke

. s were finding to remark: "Amencan that they had a great resource in the incapacity of the mother -try.* Well aware of their own strength and the utter klplesmss of the crown to execute the laws, .baeri- cans could h a d y be restrained even by their own local gavernments. It

union. unfahuuctlp for the crown.

faikd to display the taknts d future

the financial prerogatives of the

The uncompronlishg temper of

was only a mum d time until tbc attcm o n t & p m d B r i u i a m k

E H b a s l m w * f t x c e In 1773. when &e British esmb

lisbcd a cavt of Inquiry m R i d e Island to in%TzaigaCe the l lesmdm of the Gasp.: the V i House of Burgasa oaundsd tbe tmin of rebellion b. prOpOSing that clmlmit-

Samuel .klauts met the akb by or-

L will was bound to be chl-

b a l l a s e m Of -YE?== m.hcricatorcsin bc *d all fonns of oppenioa. In Boston.

ganizing a similar committee designed to mer Sew England aitb a M- uvrk of res' = = P y d & middle colonies quickly 11 into the

the\- had faikd to bring about m 1756 the Britisb finaUv achieved br:

can ~ c h o k y ~ - . ) With tbe denruc- tion of the tea in Boston, the intricate and currrbemme wheels of this ma- chi- were set into high gear. d the British attempt to bring the cul- prio to justice mcrely rcdcated the &ectiveness of tbese committm. The closing of the Port of'Bosroh

June 1 . 1 7 4 . was an experi- ment to determine bow far the ocher cobnies u.ould go in @ing succot to a sister cobny. The Govrrnmrnt of G e o r F III had not bng to wait for *. the the answer. in this

evolved. in an etrort to unite tbe colonies for a cornman d e f r n ~ . to call a Continental Can- and while the qwstion of ultimate ~011-

d over this body r a n a i d dubious at the oupe~' the British mme to furnish the solution by tbe of the coerciw ;\Cts during the summer of 1 7 4 . The arbiaarinesr of these laws was su&cient ointmrnt to sah- all the petty jeabtsk e g among the ditkrent patriotic ek-

+he immediace*ofthese .b sachusetts was to produce which an swept outburn all autbori? in >(as-

before it. and the Boaoa Commit- tee's call to arms quickly a d the countq- against Britisb m. ;zt

this ~idencc of OpprrSsiOO uith p a t

Act as a c W e n g to religious l i b - tiesinAmcrica. allpamatonce,obsnndGeaazl TbeMslrcspadin

43

panernofunitedopporicion. w h a t

neglecting to undersp;ld the .&-

colonists rallied to frzrz the beleagued city. Plans were qua+

men&

the same time. patriot leaders utilioed

&ect by interpreting the Queber

with calbus &ectjveness. There was liak lcft for th d British farce but to WitMraW to Boaon for a much & "kathr."

whcn lmws of this engagement reached the southem c o b and the westan frcmticr rettlewny the cau%e of Amuica suddenly cryrtal- lizedintoanationalausade. AU tlrnc (the Toris ex- cepted) m tbe opinion that British tyranny in any form could no longer be bohnted this side of the Atlantic; andaltbarghthemenbeyondtbe Hudron River felt bale compunction for sending their d t i a immerlbtely to the aid of Boaon, &ere was no dearth o€ spirit. Arms were quickly cdleaed, outgoing ships were seized, and men organid for the fight.

The mifwss in which an a m y was garhered around the Bay aty was due chi+ to the efforts of Mas- srhusetts some weeks before Lex- ington, her leaders had taken neps

largel la gees of^. culnpd with these, British troops wae few ard aidely s c a d on the eve of the wu; and while England could cbeck ;\mericans with a naval su- pcrioriF, sbe could be cbedrmated k the tremendous facilities in the h;llds of the patriots for buldmg andmanningships." Ifanthiswere not emugh to impress the British w i t h the futility of attempting armed coedon, eveq problem of logsncs, recruiting, and even of strategy that plagued the American commander- inchief had to be multiplied (in the British col~mn) by the distaoce ~epa- rating the two continents. Britons proved to be poor students of simple arithmetic.

nm0tMmhhcadaq Tbe decision of Tbamas Gage, the

British General, in Boston, to cap ture the military stores at Concord gave rise to a s p o n ~ u ~ w Can to lLms implemented by djspauh ridas throughout New England and to New York rpreading the Wwsd the

who drew up on Lenngton Green

linkofmilitarp line,buttheg

tbe terrain upan Which they cbadc to

axled# they had proved their point

coming of the British. IIbe men

011 April 19, 1775 in answer to this summons were farmerr who lmew

d i d b h o W t o 23ethe-d

6 g 4 a d when the bbodsbcd had

permit the &bliap and subsisth~ - to-invite the neighboring New Eng- land cdonies to join in a proposed Army of Observation; and when GI& struck, cbaden delegates were aheady aut on their missions. As early as December, 1774, M e Island,actinginaccordwith the Mas- sachusetts proposal, had made p n p - rations to mrganize her small militia force by.amending the old laws to dLtribute public arms and cannon (seized fmm Fort George at New- port), and for the dispatch of her militia tothe aid of any of the sister colonies Later in the same month. New Hampshue a h seized her share of guns and cannon from Fort Wil- liam and hlay at Portsmouth, and made preparations to qualify her militia for an ordeal. In Connecti- cut, the miritia was both well- equipped and welluained and stood ready to march to the defense of the

Rempizbg the necessity for ef- fiaent organization and coordination, Massachusetts assumed responsibility far the forces g a t h h g around Bos-

to cammad.- On April 23. the pm- virrdal legislature proposed the rais-

.pay State.'*

ton and selected the general &Is

ing of an amy of 30,000 men to be pzlnqJdy drawn fnrm these forces. of tbk taa, they &ped them-

be rrauicedh the Ot6ercoloniesl '

chusfta committee of safety &ered

sehres aquoca of 13,600, the rest to

To epcourage recruiting, the htassa-

ARM--- ' -0dokr.1953

-

tbe r ! of capcaul to any

camp, and higher grades in h i l a r propodons while this ne8v Army

who refused to enlist, began to make

the minutemen, who had been part

man who cauld bring 56 men into

was slowly being reauittd to senre for eight months, the men who had held the lines since April 19, and

their way back home. In this manner

of the militia system for over a hundred yean, faded out of the picture. giving place to the militia and the continental army.1a

By the middle of May, the ho - for enthusiastic enlisrmem of Jz - sands of men failed to materialize, and the h k h u v t t r Pmvincial As- semblv began to graw a rehensive in &face t~ the A responsibility they had so suddenly inher- ited. The appeal to a otrcnger power to carry foiward the burdens of or- qanizing and supporting this army

Fhth Bay State leaders. d t i o d v f e a r - ful that a powerful military might

to bear the cause of America alone, and finally admitting the need for a more energetic conduct of militar). affiin, the Masachusetts Con- gress, on May 16, appealed to the Second Continental Congress, assem- bled in Philadelphia since the 10th.

This appeal was prompted more b. the fear that hlassachusetts could ex- ert little control over a force recruited from other colonies than by a desire to surrender authority to some national body empowered to do the will of thirteen united colonies. In this narrow outlook, the Bay Colony willingly accepted what was considered a Iesser evil rather than gamble on the e v e n d t y of a military force which owed obedience to no other authority than the individual colony each component represented. Haunted by this peay provincialism, they appealed to the Continental Congress for advice; and, since this army was for the general defense of all the colonies, "we -suggest vour taking the regulation and general direction of it. . . .nu

Three days later, May 19, the Con- gress assumed full rrsponsibility and General Artanas Ward was commis- sioned to command under this new i* . Ontb t sameday , the txm&sb&g of entire regiments was but because cc A R M o a - ~ b r - o c I o b U , 1953

COUldIw,lOngerbe

Ovashadow the C h d 8UthoriT, RlUC- tant

ccui* was sbw t+ were under aragth, and the 30.m man armp TemaiLyd d y a future quandtp. ;\leanwhile, moa of the m m l in the field were wending their way boa^. Since the British were not fighting there was no immediate danger, bence no need for them to longer absent themsclves fmm the banhaow. Funhermore, the fields were in need of attention. This condition gave rhe to many

apprehendonson the panof the lead- ea who were not slow torr?lhe that, despite an apparent ~~ over tbe British, thy had no axmy. Around Boston swarmed an u n o r p i d and undisciplined force, its regiments in-

thecoreofare+force. Thewceding

ful. Tbemilitiahadtobesentback home to be& out a@ and again as the need arose; and the minute men as a body disappead princi-

ing." Tborc who remained did so on a voluntary basis, it being ditKcult

istered as militiamen in the various

leasure of those colonies. These

an army from the militia together with all the problems of recruiting

George Washington when he ar- rived on the rene on July 2. But in addition to this he assumed the command of a body of mops that had shattered the legend of the ms-inci- bilty of British regulas

W - m C a E l l X d amdDkplayB&ewb&uld

a- Among'& 6rst acts to engage the

attention of the secoad Contiwntal Congress assem~bled in Philadelphia was the selection of a commamh- in-chief for the armies to be integrated with the hetempeous force collected before the City of Boston.

ony to selfgovernme!ns the 6-

vestedinaPrrrident. Asthevisible

began to act with the authority of

committeaof~colonies. OnJupe

C0mpkte and companies varying in size, but herr, &cy were SUTC, was

out proces was deliberate and pain-

pally becausethephadnolegalstand-

to enlist men who already were reg-

colonies witbout incurring the di5-

pegal obstacles in the path of enlisting

and supplies were in!lerited by

After affirming tbe right of each COI-

s i o d Bovemmplt y d t h e united Glonles Wlth leadmhip

head of pvemmens the chgress

law enforced by the revolutionary

15, Gal& U'lshurgrm w% rrlrrtrrl as Gmmadcr -ihchictoftheuma l u g d p b a u r s c o f t k ~ k

' h d m d e ~ p o a J o b n A d Y l r r 1 ~ 8 .deleg?tctotbefirnCantiaal&l6n- grrss in 1774.x

Ihuthiswasa&ppycbaicetbe episodcsdthewubardeg~ testimm).. TbatitltMttocbcair- dan of those who ma& tbc rdbc- tion, the judicious use of tbc poaa thrun into his hands to uphold d insure Americln libatits is rulk;cnt aidence. - n e ruprrmrp of civil authority is the rich heritage Wab- ington bl%pa&d his m, and f u n u c g e a e n t i o n s o f ~ b a a r Were to emulate this QpzIlpIc witb a l l t h e w i s d a n d t b e . who h-ed and died for =But in spite of these rmnifesraticw of sin- cere h o t i o n to duty, the kcion continued 10 grow in the minds d monAmenc?as . that a strong military ocganizadoa consip~ted a danger to libmy,andtbea+-nfguardagains . such a threat & to rmder such an entip. impot!l?nt. even if this exposing the!md\-a to the WIcp of powerful neighbors.

This fear of the militan- was sharply emphasized by the Britkh insistence on quartaing large bodies O f t r o O p s i n A m e r i G a n d t i e r ~ t b t outbreak of the Wac and, whih Nea England patriots seized u p such a vivid example of nlann). as choice ropaganda, the e k t s u p th pub

Ec mind lingered on long atier the war had ended. Congress, in giving expression to tbe will of the States, insisted upon civil control of the milimyatalltimes. Thiswasmade cleax on October 14, 1774, when the

nouncedthatstudingarmiesa-ithin the colonies "in times of peace without the corKent of that c o h y in Which such an army is Irep, isagaimt the law."' This was rc&me!d in Jm, 1776, when a Board of War comprising six ci\ilianss' was or- garuzedbycongrrss,~rcsmphk sized one manth lam in the Viqhia Bill of Rights the declvltron - that "standing vmies in time of POQ

liberty; ad tbat in all cases the military should be under spid subadi-

poWes.-= These probmam ' o f civil Wererrligiarslpun-

Firn Conti~mtal Congrrss an-

should be avoided as dangaous to

M h t4 apd govaaed bp, the Ckd

--he Crmn\l.ulrr;n-

45

fidcnce in thpmvlvrc over the out- come of the bo* the pamiocs gave free rein to their earhusiasm. AI

of dscipline soon disappeared %e they waited for the British to givebettleoncemore. Addedtothis was the confilsioa attending the a p pearaace of haeasing numbers of miputanen and militia from the u p Coun- and the searaajt towns of the sew England colonies who came under the independent orders of

Washington thoseprovincial fina lP-zs y amved on - the rene some three weeks later. what his mined eves saw was not a mili- t a ~ encampment but rather an un- disciplmed mob cespecting no other authority than the of6cers whom they had elected. and who in turn were restrained in their prerogatives by the electors. In the face of such an unmilitary situation. the Virginia fanner assumed formal command of

wing at h h u r y , Mapr General charlcs Lee in QIcDm?od of the left. and Major Gnrral Istael Putnam in the center. By this Washington eliminated the separate groupings of men, while the mops of each colony were beld togethet as much as p sibk. In the matter of commissions for kld however, he was all<naed little d isaet iq and as he was unable to reward &n for meritorious conduct, congressional appoin- often proved more em- barrassing than welcome to him. There was little denying that Con- gres was going to control this army as much as was possible.

Altbough Congress recognired the e t y for assuming conml, they failed to make the A m y a rmanent organization. This ovenig g. t was the result of a general feeling that the war would not be of long duration, and that a reconciliation m-th Great Britain could be e d hourlv: the Arm). on the third of- July.

On the following day, a general order was issued to the armv which

and by tbe fear that 4 annv of lo&

at once ph~ed evep-thing'upon a new basis and put an end to the di- vided coamand that existed in camp:

The Continental Congress having now taken all the Troops of the several Colonies, which have been raised. or which may be hereafter raised for the s u p p a and defence of the Liberties of .he* into their pay and service, they are now the Troops of the United Prorkces of Sonh .+meria; and it is hoped that alI Distinctions of Colonies w d l be laid aside, so that one and the same spirit may ani- mate the whole, and the only Con- test be. who shall render, on this great and trying ocrzasion. the most essential service to the Great and common cause in which we are all engaged.s

This meant a complete reorganization of the armed forces in the face of an enemy who might attack at any m-t-a dangemus undertaking even under the most favorabIe cir- cumnances-but here. with little dk- apline. order. or even government among the troops. it was su idal . But it had to be done regardless of the hazard.

Washington at once proceeded to organize the h v into three grand divisions with Major General A r e mas ward commapdlll g the rigbt

term volunteers might be t & f o d into a standing army which could destroy its progenitorsw These reasons were of Nfticient moment to limit enlistments to the end of the year.

Such an open display of prejudice agaiast the amy was not lost to the sight of Washington, who, hopeful that ideairm and patriotism would d i c e to induce men to the call of arms, acquiesced in the Congressional policy of short enlistments and op position to bounties. But. finding himself in the precarious position of seeing his army melt away as the terms of the men expired on Decem- ber 31, 1775, the Commander-inchief began to search for means other than patriotism as an inducement to keep the men in the ranks. However, the soldiers would serve

accordin to the letter of their con- tract J no more: when their time was up they would

was the system

perid unless Congress extended the term of service. But Congress was in no position to reckon with reality: their power limited by the will of the States, they could do little more than legjslate by molves which did not c a q the authority of law: while the fluctuating charaaer of the American Army became a 6xed principle. De

ARM~-SO@O~W-- , 1953

spite the earnest appeals of Washtng ton urgingtbe men torcmain at their posrs, eacb expiratiue period wouM witness whole re&+nt.s going back how.

With a bosrile amny just a few miles h t # WaSbingtDn looked upon the first of b ominw ep!- sodesonthelastdayoftheyear. I f n bad not been for the New England militia and the few mumants of the minutnnen who bartened hto 91 the depleted ranks, he would have been left vimrally abne and his disillusionment was not diminished by the sight of the irregular levies who, for the most part, were una^- customed to the rigors of camp life in the face of an enemy. This tran- sitional penod. fmm one army to another, gave Washington his most

q% mrmeaq and as each mc- "edmg year came to an end his apprehensions were compounded over and ova again. .G one authority describes it: %-ations at war hare oftm changed ge!neraIs in midrneam but it remained for the .hericam to change amlie%"'1

Sor did the chagrin of tbe commanding general end here. There was also the problem of supply which. because of the a h of prope~ organization, d d not on&- become progressively worse, but often oper- ated to leave whole units without the bare necessities while others were pm-ided with an abundance." Tbe limited of der D IS IQ~- dered acute by the E of proper organization, and at critical moments the army often was forced to with-

hold its fixe for fear of - u u of a m m e . - coupled with rbcr w1s the sensith-e queaim of cum- ~ g l a a t e d ~ c o n g m s € o r t b c

fa i ledtopraluceada ' 11 e&ct alnongtbose mcnofabiliq whowere passed OVCI. Tbcv md many other probkms contin+- pl?gucd Wash ingum, d u W theeBecth-cnessofthe Amy. and dictated the pdicr to be followed in the pmsecution of the war. In this pdkanumt rbac aas Link advantage in pmparing plans. the exemtkm of which would be serious&- handicappal b. the operation of an!- number of these de fi- Srrateig. then. was dc pendent upon the many \icissi& which visited U'ashington from every direction. b\- land and by sea."

newi regiments-an ksue which DCI'CI

P

I NEWS NOTES k-1

F - M - D l w Colonel Hen- T. Cherry, Jr.. 1935 graduate of the Jfilitaq- AcademF. and a 1952 council member of the US Armor Aseoeiation. died at Brooke hrm~ Hospital on the 19th of August. -As a tank battalion commander in the 10th Armored Dirision during World War 11. Cd. C h e q received the Distinguished Sen-ice Cross for estraordi- n a F heroism in addition to the Silver Star with two clusters.

d funha approval of F ' r d e n c

=&nerd J. H. collia, Com- m a n d i n g ~ o f T h A r m a c d C e n m. hr Qmmepccd plannmg for the CQcmOQies a d other preparations.

military &cus M d civil- %lUry ians will Y invited to participate in the stamp ceremonies honocing General Palton.

Bzrcd on the expezience of Fort BW Centennial Anniversary Stamp isaK d 19.18. the Fon f f i x Poa O h

6nrdaycrbttssmttoit orcancella- tim. T d commemorative sales in all probability will e d one million -F

TQlL R0lp.w in the design of militaq *!2 been as dramatic and startling

may well have over 9 t h a u d

g at the convention of the u informatian ha^ been received m'm.

b?: He?dquaners The .+mod Center. Fp Annored Divisim Arrnriltion recently, Kella dcckred chat tank are Fort box. Kentucky, that Postmym - summerfie field daig- of mae value in modan warfare than

Fan fa first clip * of theg have ken the past. the Gmeral George S. P a m , Jr. com- memarative stamp and har set the first day dace as Nnelnber 11th. General standamnic expladoarbma than an?' P~UUI'S birthdav.

Th idea for. a canmcmontive Pat- ton stamp was originated by the World Wars Tank Cups Association. which has its ekes in Indianapolis, Indiana. Congrersman William G. Bray of In- diana presented the q u e s t to the Poa- master General who approved it. and it

ma dw dterz are poinrins a t b t a with.

o tba weapons system. In addition. he said. tanks can m e in quickly to exploit atom-bombed areas with relative immunity horn any rodiolcri~6ty.h~ may remain.

"In the early days of World War 11. we learned the value of ranks in modern warfare. And fur all the talk of push-

TOP COMAAND CHANGES

Major General Bruce Sa- gruder, United States Amy? Retired, died at Orlando Air Force Base. Florida on 23 July 1953 at the age of 70. En- l i ing (LB a Private in the Ftegdar Army, he roee through therankstothegradeof 31a- jor General. Canmhioned aa a Second Lieutemnt of Infan- try m 1907, General Magmder w- rrerignen to the Philip pineu Following a tour on the Mexican Border he n- turned to the Philippines The O m e d ' s bext atsign- nient was to h c e during World War L dr Executive Odieer of the Intelligence Seetion of the Headquarters of the h e r i c a n Expedition- ary Forcea, he received the Dishgui&ed Service Medal. Retarning Surkide he nerved on the War Department Gen- end Stad: in the mi ta ry In- telligenee Division Graduat- ing from the I b t r y Sehool in1923hewasamignedasan Instructor at Fort k i n g in the Department of Tatiea In 1926 General Magruder was ordered to the Command and General Stafll SchooL Completing hm course as a Distinguished Graduate he .CIS w e d in the OSce of the Chief of Infantry. In 1931 he was assigned as PMS&l' at North C a r o h State College. He was transferred to Fort Meade where he commanded the 66th In- fantry Regiment, a light Tank

signment at the Infantry Sehool he commanded the

gade. H b nest atsignmat was as the 5mt CG of our F h Armored Division.

mta Sulmequmt to an as-

W-O~ M d Bri-

General Jonrthan X Wain- wright, United S t u a Army, Retimidied at Brooke Army Hapita& Fort Sun Houston, Texas OLI 2 September 1933

funeral wrvieer 8t Ft. Sam Honrtog, the body - down to wadhgto& D. C. for in- terment at Arlington Na- tional Cemetev, w h m he wan buried five feet from his father's grave-Major Robert Wainrright. TheGaleml'r body l8y in rtrtc in the T m

- t h e first tribute of its kind since tbc barkl of tbe Cn- known Soldier of World War L in 1921. Graduate of West Point in th? eLr of 1906,

Serving in dl ranks and at various porte of the &dryT he eommmded the Third Cardry Begbent at Fort Myer when he mxiwxl hb 6mit star. He waa transferred to the eamMnd of the Firrt Cavalry Brigade at Fort

ly to the Philippine Islamia It mu here that General Wainwright pnwinepcc u gained tbe Commmd- nafiond

er of J1 US Fona in the Philippineq mcce€?d* oen- eral U r t h u r . For &e mOnthr,hi.bdagueredffona held out against the Jap Brrt tam for rhieh he lweivecl the CUH, md himaelf kame a p- of war. For hia he-

regidor, it may be aid--to borrow a Churehillh phrue -"Xever did 10 mmy (the TS. people) awe 10 much to Oae nmu in &or Mcrt days of the war."

8t the .gC Of 70. f O d

pbp 8t tbc craketerp

Gelled musxmed w.inrright in the wu c8rJrg. con- . .

Clrrrt, T q md =mat-

m e 8t - md Cor-

49

L

FROM THESE PAGES

Tbe s a d of a sctics of articks from Career Management Diuision Wended to rtll~wer vari-

ow queries concernkg assignments-scbool opportmities-op4n;ngs for special assignmmts - a d diverse p e s t k wbicb o@ws assigned to tbe combat arms otherwise migbt bave.

YOUR &lILITAR Y SCHOOLING ,

.%ti.+-, after a ?ear of troop duty

service, will attend the battery otticer cou~se of approximately 28 weeks' duration. Upon graduation thy will be assigned to a different len- unit from the one in ~ 7 % thew

mand and General Statr Coll

of the Amy's education ladder is the Army War College. Since the authorized enrollment for the 1953-54

artil- -.course is unly 200 ofken, it can be

. and before reaching four years of Above that college and at T t e top

&.ed their initial tour of troop aut>;. .Urn several yean of troop duty

and before accumulating twelve pears of m i c e every Regular . h y &, and an annual quota of Resenre 06- cers, wil l attend the regular advanced courss of their arm or service. AU other Restme &cen on extended active dun-. and a percentage of Re- sm-e Component &ers not an active duty. will attend the associate advanced courses & the advanced courses &cers receive insaucrion pecukar to their arm or service intended to fit them for duaes above the company or battery level. In addition. they receive genedid instruction to prepare them for d assignments on higher levels.

Following the advanced COUM of the branch schook, oa~er education becomes competitive. The first school where anendance is on a selective basis is the Command and General staff college, whieh con- ducts a Regular Courv annually for RegukrAnnyo&enandtwo&sm ciate Courses each year for Resenre Component &en. Each branch of the A m y receives an annual quota b a d on mobilization Irquirrments. in proportion to itiauthorid szrength and prescribed mission. B a d on c u m t student quotas approximately 50% of all Regular Amp oMcers will, &proximately Mtcen weeks m length.

R e d a x .b~ ~ECEXS a d selected. at the apprqkate t& in their Ca- in the reersbese ld toat tendtheCam- E.= diccn comrmssomed . .

readily seen that attendance is on a highly selective basis. Graduation from the Army War College repre- sents completion of the Amy's f o n d education requirement for the assump tion of high-level positions in the

fense, and those which the Army

other governmental agencies. Paralleling the Army's educational

system 'are the joint colleges: the Armed Forces Staff College, Indus- trial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. These colleges are under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are at- tended by o9icexs of all &. Due to th limited quotas available to the h y , ancndvlce has been confined to Regular Army oi5cers. In addition to the colleges prwi-

OUJly mentjoMd the Depertment of the accepts invitations annually for its c&ers to attend colleges of the Navy, Marine Corps and Force as well as colleges of foreign ~tionr Quotas are limited and at-

Anny and the Deperrment of De-

might be called upon to 6l1 with

tendnnce is by competitive selection. Each d the foreign colleges is considered as being on a comparable level with one of our own colleges, and graduates are given the same consideration in selection for further schooling as mduates from the coc- reqnmding United States college.

tending invitations are listed below The fareign college!s presently ex-

"getber with the amparable level

Notionnl War College or Army M'ar Cdlcge b e l

British he Defence College Canadian A atlOnal Defence College French h l e Superieure de G u m

Armed Forces Stoff College Lepel United Kingdom'Joint Services S&

Command d ' G d Statf College Lepcl

.\ustralian Staff CoPege

united states all*.

college

Indian Defence Savices Statr Col-

ltalian Army War College Pakistan StaE Calli e

level, of increas' importance is graduate level r h z i n g in the physical and social sciences under the . b y civil schooling program. A subsequeq article will cover this program in detail.

In view of the number of inquiries received by the Career blanagernent Division, it might be well to discus what is meant by competitive selection. AU&cesofabranch.inthe zone of consideratpn established b. the prerequisites far attendance at a college. are considered ann tirively within each branch. In OZ to select, from the large-numk of & c m in the zone of consideration, a limited number to 6Il the quota of a particular college, it is necessary that all &en in the zone of consideration be arranged m order of merit according to their existing d. Many facton are cmployed in devel- oping such a list. Thae include

bat duty; experkm on school sta& and faculties; previous military education; civilian coolponenu and as- signmenp; duty with military missions as military attach& and duty with joint sta& or ocher services;

nary actions; efkkncy ratings; and age ahd years of #vice.

It is ncognid that the question uppermoa in the nindsof those who aspire to attending various schools concerns the medmds of actual selection. Detailed explanations would be

all 086Cm in the eligible sroups are scnatinid by mature and unbiased

b e

Other schooling, a % ve the branch

-d and staff experience; am-

p'omotion~, demociolrJ, and discipli-

e d y dscult. The records of

ARMOR----, 1953

OglCeTs. The qua-ns of each aIeChecLeddOa wort shm Gear weight is given to cuamand experience and demonsnad leadenhip. The broad p~rern of an Obrer's a- perience is considered and th degree to which o&en have met'demands that wollld seem to index this future potential are evaluated with care. . h d of cour~e the -S a d d - ficienq index for the past five years of sen-ice. as determined from et%- cienq reports. carries great weiqht -but this is not the sole deciding factor. The m e t M can be summed up as careful. unbiased selection based upon best available information. weighing c a r e f e the qual&- cations and imeresrs of the individual &r and the requirements of the . h y . .UI &cers can take comfort from the fact that political pressure has no weight whatsoever. The Career .\lanagement Division is always interes-d in receiving infonna-

I IN THE NEXT ISSUE: I ROTATION

tion as to the merits of different A- cers and when recOmmendations are submitted by. senior &n they are of course evaluated with care. How- ever, the 6nnd decision is based upon the &cer's overall qualifications and his future value to the service.

It is not neresSarJI that an ocfica submit an application for attendance at one of the service colleges. OMcers are considered by their arm or service automatically from the time they become eligible until they pass aut of the zone of consideration. >lorea.er. selection is without regard to geographical location or assignment. However, + desiring to a d Air, Navy or Foreign colleges in preference to an Army collese, should indicate such a desire on their annual preference cards.

Eligibility prerequisites for the Army and joint collega map be found in SR 3502G1, SR 350-195-1, and DA Pamphkt B21. Prerequisites for the Air. Nary. and Foreign col-

hgcs arc si& to . h v couega d - d k u 5

maybecoaadaed X f a a senice college although tbq do not meet all the pcrequisivs for that Col- 1.g.. w'hcae\-er. in the opinion of th career .\lanageqKnt &lacbes, ILL officer is O u d g and places hi& competiti\olp in all o h respecrs. a waiver is ccnddered f a the prereq- uisite in which he is lacking. Thus even ef€ort is made to selecr tbose OEfrerS most qualitied who greaten potend value to t senice. Due LO dw limited qwtar a rela-

tively few &cers will attend the hi h

p0in:ed OUL hmvver. that schooling is tentialkaders only one means .Ginthepan,anum- of de\-eloping p

developed from thow who map n3t attend a senjce college but d~, through on-the-job training and a di- versity of career broadening assignments subsequent to scbo31 eligibiliv. indicate by acrual performance of dut)- a pocentiali~ for high level corn- mand and aaff positions

T h i s l a s t f a c e t o c c u e a d e v e ~ mentdescn.cs emptudsItisan

r level sen-ice colleges. It must %e

ber of outnanding leaders will k

ObviOuJ fact call o&ccrs cannot scpect to attend our top militarg schools and it is # mident that some of thcse selected will not necer- sarily prove to be .OUT ablen o&en

fications are n3t susceptible to such accurate mduation and as a rrrult the next emergenq uil] find many higher o&ers schooling, u-bo were who not may selected make th i r for

wav in= the select group of general

of war. The relatiuelp recent past is complete ofthisaatawnt Sot all of t h e c n - o f k w b haddininguisheddandthead- vanxe o€ high military schooh during World War I1 met the requirements for wartime general & -IC, ~ h i k others without w h nai6- ing rose to some of the very highea positions of respomibfity. One of these otkers wh3 were not selected for higher schooling is General James .C Van Flsn His distinguished record of battle leadmhip and aril ad- minisbation s h a d be a comfort, in-

for spiration, and guiding in&noce many who now feel a sense of frustra- tion for not having been selected to receive more advanced rchoding.

u

in dme of -gar?.. H- q d -

&who guide our Armies io time

I l-

ARMOR ASSOCIATION NOTES

p u M a j j General George w.

cauncilA4dhry Boards are:

Red, Jr. in Europe. At present the members of the

&-I-=- Mapr General L. L. Doan, 2d Ar-

Brigadier General Hamilton H.

cabnel Charles E. Brown, 19th

cabael Raymond W. Curtis, 14th

mored Di%ision

Howze, 2d iLmored Division

Armored C a v e Group

Armored cavalry Regiment

m o d &%* Reglment

mored cavalry l3egmKnt

colonel Harold C. h v a l , 6th AI-

colonel William E. EcUis, 2d Ar-

Fa?-- Lieutenant General Bruce C.

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau,

Major General Gordon B. RogaJ.

Clarke. I Corps

7th Infantry Di%ision

ThokmwlM..(ingOf*o u n i k d ~ A n n e r A s . . d . - Hacl,will k h.ld cd FdKnOX, Kentucky, loto in January, 1954. Gonoral Mstthow B. Ridswoy,ch&f of s t d , united Stator Army, has boon in- rH.da8c(wgcm,dhon# and PrinW rP.akm.

I I

MAAG, Korea

donald, MAAG, Formasa BC~- c;eneral John C. Mac-

Brigadin General William J. Brad-

Lieutenant C0)onel hben B. Mc- ley, 1st cavalry Division

-pLariaeIkdAlmlndw.dhrg Tt;e next meeting of th Executive

coundl wil l be held on October 2, in Washingtm, D. C., at which time plans will be made far the annual meeting to be bekl at Fort Knox

Rae, 89th Tad Battalion

RESOLUTION WHEREAS the modern ground army is a carefully balanced force of many combat arnis and technical SerViceJ, and WHEREAS cooperation and teamwork amon8 the many combat arms and technical seryices form the basis for be&eld success, and WHERMS for many years the pmfessional military associations of the respective combat arms and technical senrices have through the pro- motion of branch understanding, contributed substantially to the ef- fectiveness of the army team, and WHEREAS there exists no professional military association with peri- odical in which all members of the combat arms and technical services map meet on a common ground XOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the United States Armor dhociaaon propose considemtion of the formation of an Army- wide military association to operate in the general area ourside of existing branch anociations with membership to be open to all military perscmnel, icqective of branch, rank, or exising alUation, and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the posed association be or-

supplement them h e a d and thus contribute to funher unification within the Am?, and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that tbe prqmsed association be in

ing t h e d Army view and dedicated to the interests of our collll-

ganized. not to replace any of the existing L associations but to

additian toandxpvate framthegbrpoch associations, -t-

op's defbse!.

ARMOR--~W-O~O~W, 1953

THE Bostklkn I - I BOOK

,

Stilwell's Mission to China STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA. By Charlos F. Ro- momn d Riley knd.rlawl.

Rodowadby THEODORE 1. WHITE

This c o m p d a l t has ken following the United States Army at hame, in Asia, andin Europe fur some f h e n years-a petial bngenougb to have inused him against any surprise at its muitifarbus activity. certaialp, no demonstration of its courage should startle him.

Rarely, however. have I o h d

by the United States Anny than that of pubhshmg, as one of its o&cial histories, a book d e d S t i l d s Mis-

and Riley Sundaland. This book is much more than the

usual anny treatise on a theater, a campaign ar a mission. It is more than a gewrosls and bngowrdue rribute to a great soldier. It is an honest, baffhanded clnminlrim of the most explosive subject of Amaican foreign policy-our relations with

of the China and the Gemdsmo Chinese armies, Chiang Raishek. In

an act of greater bravery p a f o d

sion to China by Charles Romanus

. .

i c

not ro enterrain, or to curry favor, but simply to illuminate the chief prob lem tbe United States Army faces in the fume. The best dehition of this problem is +My that of Gen- eral =Ufred 5l. Gruenk. S-XEUR at SH=\PE. who declared ofThad one &!- 'there are only two kinds of rvars- lndia~ wan and coalition wars. .+I1 wars d the future are coalition was and m-e have to learn how to fight them" In learning how to seek .+Ilia in coalition, hold them. and

-

fight &ectively by their side, we have, by now. solved the problem of coalition in Europe by such enormous snuctures as SHVE and NATO. \Ye haw not yet solved the problem in Asia. . b d any soldier whose career brings him to decision and action in the Orient might well begin his search for a solution with a study of the Romanus-Sunderland work.

The s t o ~ of StiZweII's Jfission to Chi=. though heavily detailed and b e n d with complex scholarly

preckbn, is, essentially, a simple one. It is the story of how the United States sent Joseph Stilwell to shake alive the vast, pulpy mass of Chinese soldiery under Chiang K'aiAek, -to improve its combat &ency." Strate- gically, Stilwell's mission was to create a supply system a~oss India in order tom pananetkctiveChiaesearmy whi J might win back the continental land mass the Japanese oocupied, and provide a platform on the China coast for sea and airborne assault on the Japanese homeland.

and demanded by the *ZEZLmcs begin their story not on that day in February, 1942 when Joseph Stilwd left Washing- ton for Asia, but early in 1 9 M when the United States first began to seek the revitalization of the Chinese armies as a counterweight to Japan in the Orient .

Far a year and a half before Stilwell -set out for China on his grand mission, long before Pearl Harbor. the United States had been wrestling with the problem of equipping and training the Chinese armies. All the elements of the problem that were Iater to pla e Stilwell and cause American po&s to boil were already presemt. There was the simple, technical Chinese ignorance of modem war-their insistence for example, on American delivery of tanks which could not posribly traverse the light bridges of China and Burma. There was the irrational element of face, the refusal of the Chinese to accept stand- ard American des which they des-

d y needed because they would Enface? if they did not get the new Gacands of which the U. S. A m y was critically Jbon itself. There was the discovery of the great graft system, then fioucisbg about the Burma Fbad, China's lifeline, clogged with private cargo. protiteering, aud of- ticid racketeering and red tape. There was, finally, the Bair of the Chinese nati& for Washington intrigue. and their discovery that the A m y of the United States could be circum- vented in political maneuver in the White House, the Congress and the press

By January of 1942, when the United States was already in the war. the situation in Asia had become so grave that drastic measures were needed. Jointly, secrrtary of the

Army, Henry L Scimum, and Chief of S& Gearge c. M.nhau decided that .the war in the Orient was so critical as to warrant the sander of General Joseph Stilwell (already as- signedtopeparrd.commandthe North Afiiian invasifm) to be chief of S d to chiang kaisbdr and chief of all u. s. rtwd Forces in China-BUrnu-India. Hk misdon W?S to pull +er'the war &on on the

maidad, of, as his blunt d m y

and grab command and in give 'em the works"

The main namative of the Roman- us-Sunderlaud book falls thereafter, into three nahual sections.

Fint, is the aOCOUIlt of the B h campaign of 1942 a d the evolution of strategy in theyear and a half that

uable for the light it throws on Stil- well's qualities as a tactician and field soldier, superb qualities doomed to be wasted as was so much other talent in the swamplands of Asian politics.

Next comes the chronicle of Stil- well's & to wrestle his reluctant coaliaon parmen-tbe British and the Chinese-into ofknsive action.

Here, in this section, rhe authors, with access to all the army's dacu- ments, 0th a picture of Chinese Na- tionalist life and mQ1Js which is all the more devastating fa the dry and wooden exactitude with which it is set &wn. To make a Chinese A m y out of the sick and hungry peasant CollsQiPts that chirng &end him after endless delays, Stilwell found himself plunged deep in Chinese politics. He found, for example, that General Lo C&@g (one of Chiang's favorites) sent to command the new Chinese A m y being pained and equipped by Americans in India wanted 4H).OOo silver rupees (air soldiers' payroll) paid in a lump nrm to him each month. "the customam procedure," as the authors drily point out, "which p e r m i d large amounts to stay in the mamanden' @as."

records "get variol& facckms cogettm

followed. This aCOOUlt is &eay Val-

When S d d insisted that the 270,-

q u i d in ~01dier~"pay) bt paid directly to the soldiea themselves, La Was infuriated and bd toberelievd andmurnedtochina AU down the l i n ~ StihRdl's sub

ordinates f d thmJeloes caught in the same racketeering system, a ann-

OoOrupees(all thatwasacmallyrc-

- i ____-_ - - - - - - -

pound of cupidity and China's endless p o y ~ . Scoresaff-hm- ous, some grim XWK tragic-are fitted into a mosaic picture ofthe Chinese war e&n. Chinese o t k n tried t3 shake down civilian contracms working on .4merica11 projg.fs. On weral

supplied trucks drained the brake- fiuid to sell in the black market. On some American building pjects in

WOIIS truck dri \*a OIY .-\merican-

for e\.- one driven in. .-\merim of- ficers attempted to w h the C h i n e modern artillery fire merbods at an a r t i l k training centcr. found the pack-animal in e p o o ~ rooditioa. say the h y rqnm on the sinration -The chinac are very reluctant to grate tbcir animals for fear of kaing both animak and -1- dim through desenh."

-

To one who, like this correspond- china it was necesary to cOunt the nailsissuedtocarpenten and account

ent. sen.4 in the war area at the-time. some of the facts fint published

*- The authm record, though with leser detail, stilwcll's problems with the British and the tedium, ioatia, and red tape of the Indian colonial rpstem that dogged his apply lines and paralyzed his pcparations fa at- d It should be notal, to the au- tbors'crrdit, that all thsc faas arc set down cold in this book, witbout malice or bittanus, as much in pity as in dcvotian to the taJk of inform- ing America.

The last and mort dramatic section of the book concerns inelf with the & W a s b a t c g p k w a r U scihaell and his nominal rubordinate GwalclairechermaultThiscon- Biacenteredonthefami l ia r~be twem the adt.ouuaof air- and ground forces chmnault claimed that his hemic handful of planes, banded in the China Air Task Force,

dose enough to Japan's vitals to huh Further, he claimed that, given enough supplp, his Task Force could

were the only rimaiom s&iking force

=crippleJq== pk with &&e %- as t o x t k Japanese Em* tofollaI#ut Stilwellinsistedthatd Chmnldt's raidas-bascd in Epst China-everbegantohuntheJapn- nese serioyrly the J a m would re- act in a massive land campaign to

of the amt, and that the Chinese ground forces were incapable of stop ping such a push. The hub o€ the snuggle revohftd about the Hump's limited 4 i r - T allocations. Both Chennault and Stdwell required the Jamc supplies for their stntegy-the limited air hauled over the Hump. If z t equipment and training supplies were appartioned to rrgilhnnize the Chinese d e s , not QIougb would be left to fuel and arm

hand, if su6ci-t quantities were a p portional to give Chennault his chance, notenough would be left to suppat the Chinese ground foms against the Japanese attack the planes

Thit vgument was commas knowl- dge in &e GB-I theata at the time and was honestly, if heatedly, de-

Both the C h d t and Wwen theses could be wt;Lioed by valid argument What was unknown then and is here revealed for the 6rst time are the full details& the method by which Chen- nault won his victory over Stilwell. With the support at the Chinese

wipeout all theairbass within range

chaurault's plana. on the otha

would prwoke.

b a d by dedicated Inen.

gnemment against Wwell. and with f r i d i n Wash-

i n p , the aid dzzF ult, by 1943, had Come into dim comrnrmicotion with the White How. Indeed, by early 1943, President Roorvclt had invited chennault to mice and communiclte

Stilwell, but Mars and Stimsm as well. In such a situation, Stilwell's aec t ive command d his own theata was impassible and, at this point, in the fall of 1943 the authors end their history of Stilwell's misdan.

able, that the authors should have chosen this penod to bring StilweKs Mssion to China to a dose. Th dramatic eyents that followed in 1944 in China are so intricately involved in contemporary politics that not for many years will we be able to re- tiew them dispgssianady. Great success was to follow in 1944 as Stilwell forged the crack Chinese d e s which drove the Japanese out of northern Burma and +, as we have learned since to our sorrow, how well the Chinese can fight when efficiently led. Great disaster was to follow, too, as Cbennault's planes stepped up their nids on Japanese shipping and provoked the e v e Japanese EastChina campaign which coa us all our coastal bases as Stilwell had predicted. And, hall?, personal tragedy was to cap Stilwell's mission when, in October 1944, he was relieved of command and sent home

with him directly, p$=%-oalp

It is regmtable, but mderaand-

because of his prophetic co~~lusioa

der communkt and Russian kder- ship in the future unlas the U. S. immediately forced chung to reform

ledaship more able to w e AUied ends. Au these hinorlc events d 1944

ofthisbook. B u t t h i r b d g r o u d and sources am so clearly detailed and illuminated in the Romanus-sundaland work that no saious d e n t of the Far h e m war or politia aiu in the future, be able to hold an opinion without having read StilweUs Missia to China. The United States Army's Historical Section is to be con- gratulated for its conmbution to learning.

There is no moral or conclusion at the end of this volume, for history when it is best written lets e v ~ reader make his own judgment The lay d e r will probably end this book with the inescapable lesson that wan and coalitions are not matters of militar). technique alone. He will learn that the greatest milita~ talents can come to naught unless they are sup ported wise and &tire political leadership. He will learn that no soldier, however brilliant and d w c , can sued unless great cirilian statesmanship offers him reciprocal widom and loyalq-. The lessons of history should never

that chiaa would ul-y fall ULI-

OrrepLcedhimwithabaChinew

are excluded by the arbarp ending

be forgotten.

STONEWALL JACKSON

and the American civil

cd G. F. R. Hadusom

86.00

CEIUN6 A thrilling histnrp of Amaican aviation from tbe d a ~ oi tbe Wright brothers' expefimmts to the modem age of slpsooics. n e wri- cur- :Is% Lindbagh, krturt, and ail the otber great pi- in aviation ace shown as leaders in the viaorp of the human spirit over che forces of PW.

M NEGRO IN THE

-4 historp of the put taken by Negroes in the War. as soldiers, spies, ourses, home-front

defenders, pmpgaodists, k d workers for the Underground R2ilroad.

bykdolnin- $5.00

h

The REDEEMERS World War II left thousands of J- homeless and lort in Europe bfany of thi world's leaders did their best to help thae luckless EP.'s-Eisen- h e r , Ben Gurion, and Gencd Clay amoag

b a n d &e Jear themselves never gave up dxir auanpts to win their way back to n o d life.

-

b y b - $4.50

The TERROR The inside stoq of Saviet rule in GenrHnp, writ-

ally hostile to the regime. It is ao inside account of the Soviet Army aad bure?uuacg and Soviet life in genrrrl, as it must appear to countless young and intelligent R~asshs , who mzn?ged to keep out of major trouble, who ace trying to M d their careers, and wbo arc makh8 the machine work.

ten by critical foreign OLxcrVers vho were basi-

0ECISH)N FOR WAR, 1917

A well-documented presentation of two incidents,

the zimwmun Telegram and the sinlting of the

h o n k and the part they played in America's

decision to enter World War I.

STEMMING THE TIDE

Churchill's 50 best speeches during the first two

after his recapture of the post of Prime Min- ister. Io uniform binding with previous collec-

. ' ciotu.

The UNDECLARED WAR

A diplonkic ?ad political k o r y of the period between September, 1940, when Japan joined the Axis, and Par1 Harbor, analyzing the strategies and operations d our country as well as thoK of the enany e ti on^.

by William L longer aEvueitGlearon $10.00 -

VICTORY RODE THE RAILS Here is the little-known story of the strategic position of the railroads in the Civil War. Relvalu- ates the strength of both sides, the importance of communications, and reveals the many ways in which the n i l rads were valuable weapons.

QUEST FOR A NORTHERN

AIR ROUTE !:

A personal a c m t of Captain F o M apdtions to locate military bases along the "Crystd. air mute across the Arctic to Europe.

by Alexander Forbes $4.00

CONCRESS and the CONSTITUTION

In answer to tbe nttd for popular informulon about our government. Colonel M i l k has F'C- p r e d this study of the Cnrted Suta governmen:

m question and answer form.

by call Miller $3.00

HITLER'S SECRET

OfTered n a as a conversatiod deL&t but as a

rtvelation of Hider's mind and pmm.ahg-table monologs delivered in the ad7 foma and cover-

ing a variety of topics.

byAdotfHitkr $6-

The GREAT PEACE The author, who travelled through Red China as

an Indian joumaht, giva an authentic, 6rst-hand account of conditions there. I n t m i w s with hi@ 0 6 4 s and with people tbcmsclves as well as Mr. Hutheesing's own impressions give a valuable por-

trait of a land now c l o d to westeraers.

by Rap Hutheesing $3*

BOOK

' $6000

FIGHTING INDIAN WARRIORS

$5.00

Orr q s t d kll is brdu#-did pr la# us laow you moved?

I

8 I - I

0 I d o s e $ ... ; ...... 0 Bill me. (Subscribers only.)

0 Billunitfuad.

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

PaMisbcd on Augwst 5th

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR I1

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 19414942

by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell

In this ]at& voIum(l of the series cntitkd "The US. h\. in \\'odd \l*ar 11" the authors trace the gradual

Awakening of the militar). plann~rs to the danger of the American involvemcnt in a world war. and their efforts

?UBLISIEB W L I M E S IN T I E ARMY SERIES The Army G d Fo-

The Organization of Ground Combat Troopt The P+oewwment a d T m h g of (;road Conkt

Ttoopr The War in the Pri5c

Okinawa: The Laat Battle Guada&uml: Tha Firrt Of.y 've The Approach to the Phdtppnu

The European Theater of Opcrrrtion~ The Lawaim Campaign Cnm-Channef Attack

Tbe War Department' Chief of Stag: Pyewar Plana and Prcparatiolu Warkin ton Cosaniurd Port:

The 8perotbsu DirLion The Technical Sedces

Tronaportation R e 4 b i l i t i a . Cotps: Orgalrizatioii. and Operatima

Pietorial Bacord The War Against G e m n v and I ta ly :

Ycditrrrancar a d Adjacent Area8 The War Auoirut Gcrrnarv:

Europe and Adjacent Areas The War Again& Japan

The Middle East Theater. The Peraian Comedm and Aid to Ruasia

Three Battles: Arnadlc. A1taz:o. a d Schmidt

StilrelP. Miuiol to China

-_ (Speckl Smd?)

Tbe C h i i - B ~ m - I n d i . Tbcrrtcr

to shape plans and build and deploy an .h); to meet

the threat. The show clearly how the basis of war

strateg was laid with the British in the p a r period. and how and why it \vas decided to "beat Germany

first" while pursuing the strategx defensive against Japan. The principal steps taken from the autumn of

1938. when planning of&m first took.mto serious ac-

Cmunt the possibili? that the United States might

becmme involved in a world-wide coalition war. to the agreement early in 1942 eventually to CTOSS the Eng-

lish Channel and the decision to invade Sorth Africa.

arc rclatcd in &tail. The 382 pages of this work

dcx-ribe the planners' hopes. frustrations and fears.

their struggles to keep plans realistic despite the myiad unknowns and uncertainties of war. and amid

the often divergent aims and interests of the sen-ices.

the President and the .We.

382 PP- 83-25

Order from Book Deputmtnt.

r-

In today's h&y mechanized army, with its new weapons, greater firepower and mobility,

and an ever inpasing tempo of modem warfare, you as a member of the team, regardless of

branch, need a current working knowledge of Armor.

The alert young professionals who form the core of this army have found that ARMOR supplies them witb continuous uptodate technical information to supplement their back-

ground in this highly specialized field of mobile warfare.

,%MOR, the only journal of the m i l i t q art and sciencc devoted to thc coverage of mo-

bile warfare. depicts above the covers of the first four issues of this year, and in typical fashion

tells the story of modem warfare in the self-propelled field.

Pacing the Wd for the Regular, Reservist and Guardsman, ARMOR has provided its

readers with issw-by-issue proof that an investment of a little over a penny a day is a bargain

in support of pour military career as well as your Association.

he...maj. gen. d. w. mcgowm hq, 50th .hnored divisim trenton, sew jersey e w hunu if the check is -...

Documents