hazardous material design strategies

7/29/2019 Hazardous Material Design Strategies

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DESIGN STRATEGIES WITHRESPECT TO HAZARDOUS

MATERIALS


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THE NATURE OF RISK ININDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf


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FATAL WORK INJURIES



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FATAL WORK INJURIES



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THE NATURE OF RISK ININDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

COMPARISON VALUES -DEATHS/100,000 WORKERS

IN 1912, 21 (18,000 - 21,000DEATHS)

IN 1992, 4.2 (TRIPLE THENUMBER OF WORKERS)


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SUMMARY OF MAJORINCIDENTS2,3

FLIXBOROUGH, ENGLAND (1974) -CYCLOHEXANE MANUFACTURING

AS A NYLON PRECURSOR4,5

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION KILLED 28 PEOPLE

CAUSE APPEARED TO BE DESIGNFOR TEMPORARY PIPING SYSTEM


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FLIXBOROUGH


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SUMMARY OF MAJORINCIDENTS

SEVESO, ITALY (1976) - DIOXIN6

TCP (2,4,5-TRICHLOROPHENOL)REACTOR EXPLODED RELEASINGTCDD, (2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO-p-DIOXIN

THIS MATERIAL WAS ACOMPONENT IN AGENT ORANGE


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SEVESO, ITALY (1976) - DIOXIN6

PLUME SPREAD OVER AN AREA THATCONTAINED OVER 100,000 PERSONS ANDIMPACTED OTHER MUNICIPALITIES WITH

A POPULATION OF 17000

PRIMARY IMPACT WAS FEAR OF LONG-TERM EFFECTS AND OVERCOMINGINITIAL TRAUMA

COULD BE THE SOURCE OF SARA TITLE

III REQUIREMENTS


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MEXICO CITY, MEXICO (1984) -LPG (LIQUID PETROLEUM GAS)

TERMINALA BLEVE (BOILING LIQUID

EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION) 7

650 DEATHS 6400 INJURIES

PLANT DAMAGE = $31.3 MILLION

S O O


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BHOPAL, INDIA (1984) - PESTICIDEMANUFACTURING8

UNEXPECTED CHEMICAL REACTION WHENWATER ENTERED AN MIC (METHYLISOCYANATE) STORAGE TANK

RELEASED ABOUT 40 TONS OF MATERIALOVER A 2 HOUR PERIOD

SPREAD OVER A LOCAL POPULATION OFABOUT 900,000

ESTIMATED 3800 DEAD AND 11,000 DISABLED

SUMMARY OF MAJOR


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BHOPAL, INDIA (1984) -PESTICIDE MANUFACTURING8

TRACED TO A NUMBER OFPOSSIBLE SOURCES9 FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SAFETY

SYSTEMS INADEQUATE DESIGN OF SAFETY

SYSTEMS

MIS-OPERATION OF THE FACILITY


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PASADENA, TEXAS (1989) -POLYETHYLENE MANUFACTURING

POLYETHYLENE REACTOR EXPLOSION KILLED 23 PEOPLE AND INJURED 130

TRACED TO EITHER A SEAL FAILURE ON

THE REACTOR AND/OR USE OFINEXPERIENCED MAINTENANCEPERSONNEL


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EXAMPLE OF INCIDENT

BHOPAL RELEASE

HOW IT OCCURRED

HOW IT WAS ANALYZED

RESULTING CHANGES

FUNDAMENTALS OF


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FUNDAMENTALS OFPROCESSES

THERMODYNAMICSCONSERVATION OF MASS AND ENERGY

MASS IS NEITHER CREATED OR DESTROYED

ENERGY IS NEITHER CREATED ORDESTROYED

PROCESSMASS IN - RAWMATERIALS

MASS OUT -PRODUCTS


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FUNDAMENTALS OFPROCESSES

THERMODYNAMICS

PROCESSES REQUIRE CHANGINGCONDITIONSSYSTEMS MOVETOWARDS A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

THE RATE DEPENDS ON THE

CHEMICAL AND MECHANICALPROPERTIES OF THE SYSTEM

WATER DOES NOT FLOW UPHILLWITHOUT A BOOST


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FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

EXAMPLE OF ETHANOL DISTILLATION


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FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCESSES

ENERGY/MATERIAL QUALITYCHANGES

ENERGY MAY BE ADDED OR REMOVED TO INITIATE A

SYSTEM CHANGE

WHEN ENERGY IS ADDED, IT FLOWS

THROUGH THE SYSTEM TO BE CONSERVED,BUT IT IS DEGRADED IN QUALITY


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ENERGY QUALITY CHANGES

EXAMPLE OF HYDROELECTRIC

POWER PLANT


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ENERGY QUALITY CHANGES

EXAMPLE OF HYDROELECTRICPOWER

WATER CHANGES ITS EQUILIBRIUMPOSITION WITH A RESULTANTCHANGE IN POTENTIAL ENERGY ANDPOWER PRODUCTION

WATER IN THE RIVER CANNOT BEUSED TO DRIVE THE TURBINEBECAUSE IT IS AT A LOWER

POTENTIAL ENERGY LEVEL


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MATERIAL QUALITY CHANGES

PURE CHEMICALS THAT AREDISPERSED IN WATER (SOLUBLE INWATER) CANNOT BE RETURNED TOTHEIR ORIGINAL PURITY WITHOUT

USING ENERGY DISTILLATION - ENERGY TO

VAPORIZE/CONDENSE

CRYSTALLIZATION - ENERGY TO

FREEZE/MELT

ADSORPTION OR ADSORPTION -ENERGY TO REGENERATE


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REACTIONS

RESULTS IN FORMATION OF NEWCHEMICAL SPECIES

ELEMENTS ARE CONSERVED, BUTNEW MOLECULES MAY BE FORMED

REACTIONS CAN BE SINGLE, INPARALLEL OR IN SERIES

MOLAR RELATIONSHIPS EXISTBETWEEN REACTANTS ANDPRODUCTS


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REACTIONS EXAMPLE OF METHANE COMBUSTION:

STOCHIOMETRIC REACTION

+ 2 + 2 4 44 4 16 + 64 44 + 32


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REACTIONS

REAL REACTIONS MAY NOT GO TOCOMPLETION

MAY REQUIRE AN EXCESS OF ONECOMPONENT TO COMPLETELY REACTTHE OTHER


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REACTIONS PARALLEL ETHANE COMBUSTION REACTIONS WITH 200%

EXCESS AIR AND INCOMPLETE COMBUSTION

C H O N CO H O N O

C H O N CO H O N O

ELEMENTAL BALANCES

C C C C

H H H H

O O O O O O O O

N N N N

MASS BALANCES

C H O N CO CO H O N

2 6 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 6 2 2 2 2 2

7 28 2 3 287

2

7 28 2 3 289

2

2 2 2 2

6 6 6 6

14 14 4 3 7 2 3 9

28 28 28 28

60 448 1568 88 56 108 1568 256

2 6 2 2 2 2

2 2O


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REACTIONS

MOST REACTIONS DO NOT GO TOCOMPLETION

COMBUSTION CAN HAVE PRIMARYPRODUCTS OF CO2, H2O AND N2

BYPRODUCTS CAN INCLUDE CO,UNBURNED HYDROCARBONS, NOx,

AND SO2 IN SMALLER QUANTITIES


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REACTIONS

OTHER TYPES OF OXIDATION-REDUCTION

REACTIONSCOMBINATIONMg O MgO

DECOMPOSITION

HgO Heat Hg O

DISPLACEMENT

Zn H SO ZnSO H

:

:

:

2 2

2 2

2

2

2 4 4 2


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REACTIONS

OTHER TYPES OF NON-REDOX

REACTIONS:COMBINATION TO FORM A BASE

Na O H O NaOH

COMBINATION TO FORM AN ACID

P O H O H POOXIDE COMBINATION TO FORM SALTS

CaO SiO CaSiO

NEUTRALIZATION

H PO Ca OH Ca PO H O

:

:

:

:

( ) ( )

2 2

2 2 3 4

2 2

3 4 2 3 4 2 2

2

5 3 2

2 3 6


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SEPARATION PROCESSES

PROCESSES TO SEPARATE

COMPONENTS, BEFORE OR AFTERREACTIONS

PROCESSES TO CONCENTRATE

COMPONENTS THE DRIVING FORCES FOR MOST OF

THESE PROCESSES ARE

CHEMICAL EQUILIBRIUM MECHANICAL

RATE DEPENDENT


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SEPARATION PROCESSES

PROCESS EFFICIENCY IS RELATED TOTHE DEVIATION REQUIRED FROM

AMBIENT CONDITIONS

THE MORE CHANGE REQUIRED, THELESS THE EFFICIENCY

THE LESS CHANGE REQUIRED, THE

HIGHER THE EFFICIENCY ALL HAVE POTENTIAL HAZARDS

ASSOCIATED WITH THEM


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TRANSPORT PROCESSES

USED TO MOVE MATERIAL BETWEENPROCESS OPERATIONS

PUMPS

TURBINES

CONVEYORS

GRAVITY PNEUMATIC


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STORAGE OPERATIONS

RAW MATERIALS

FINISHED GOODS

INTERMEDIATES OFF-SPEC MATERIALS


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CONTROL SYSTEMS

PROCESSES FOR NORMALOPERATION

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

BATCH OPERATIONS

START-UP


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CONTROL SYSTEMS

PROCESSES FOR NORMALOPERATION

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

BATCH OPERATIONS

START-UP

SHUTDOWN

PROCESS INTERRUPTION

ROUTINE SHUTDOWN

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN


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CONTROL SYSTEMS

SAFETY SYSTEMS

OUT-OF-RANGE CONDITIONS

INTERLOCKS BETWEEN UNITS


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INHERENTLY SAFE DESIGN10,11

TECHNIQUES THAT REDUCE THERISKS ASSOCIATED WITHOPERATIONS

EQUIPMENT FAILURE SHOULD NOTSERIOUSLY AFFECT SAFETY, OUTPUTOR EFFICIENCY


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MINIMIZATION OF THE INTENSITY

REDUCE QUANTITIES OF MATERIALSMAINTAINED IN INVENTORIES AND INTHE PROCESS

QUANTITIES IN INVENTORIES REDUCED CAPITAL COSTS

REDUCED MAINTENANCE

LESS MATERIAL TO PARTICIPATE IN AREACTION

HAZARDOUS REACTANT BE MANUFACTUREDON SITE FROM LESS HAZARDOUSPRECURSORS


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REACTORS

SMALLER REACTORS TYPICALLYHAVE LESS MATERIAL IN PROCESS

HAVE BETTER CONTROL OF HEATTRANSFER

AND CAN BE MORE EFFICIENT12

GENERAL FACTORS TO REDUCE


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GENERAL FACTORS TO REDUCEREACTOR RISKS13

OBJECTIVES METHODS

AVOID PRODUCTION OF

BYPRODUCTS - MINIMIZE

SIDE REACTIONS

PRODUCE PRODUCT OF HIGH PURITY AT HIGH

YIELD, GENERATING FEW OR NO

BY-PRODUCTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE

REMOVED THROUGH

DOWNSTREAM PURIFICATION STEPS

MINIMIZE REACTION TIMESAND RESIDENCE TIME AT

EXTREME CONDITIONS

USE REACTIONS WHICH OCCUR RAPIDLYWHEN THE MATERIALS COME INTO CONTACT,

REDUCING THE RESIDENCE TIME REQUIRED IN

THE REACTOR AND MAKING THE PROCESS

AMENABLE TO CONTINUOUS OPERATION

MAXIMIZE MASS

TRANSFER CONDITIONS

USE SINGLE PHASE REACTION SYSTEMS OF

LOW VISCOSITY, AVOIDING THE NEED TO

TRANSPORT REACTANTS ACROSS PHASE

BOUNDARIES AND FACILITATING THE RAPID

CONTACT OF REACTANTS

GENERAL FACTORS TO REDUCE


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GENERAL FACTORS TO REDUCEREACTOR RISKS13

OBJECTIVES METHODS

USE MODERATE PROCESS

CONDITIONS

OPERATE AS CLOSELY TO AMBIENT

TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE AS POSSIBLE,

REDUCING THE POTENTIAL ENERGY FROM

ELEVATED TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN

THE REACTOR SYSTEM

CHOOSE LOWER ENERGY

REACTION SYSTEMS

USE REACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT HIGHLY

EXOTHERMIC

USE REACTIONS WHICH

ARE NOT HIGHLY

SENSITIVE TO OPERATING

CONDITIONS

REACTIONS WHICH ARE VERY TOLERANT OF

VARIATIONS IN RAW MATERIAL COMPOSITION,

CHANGES IN TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, AND

CONCENTRATION, AND THE PRESENCE OF

COMMON CONTAMINANTS SUCH AS WATER,

AIR, RUST, AND OIL.


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COMPARISON OF REACTORALTERNATIVES


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COMPARISON OF REACTORALTERNATIVES

CONTINUOUS REACTORS HAVE SMALLERINVENTORIES THAN BATCH REACTORS

TUBULAR REACTORS HAVE SMALLER

INVENTORIES THAN TANK REACTORS THIN FILM REACTORS HAVE SMALLER

INVENTORIES THAN TUBULAR REACTORS

GAS PHASE REACTORS HAVE LESSINVENTORY THAN LIQUID PHASE REACTOR


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SUBSTITUTION

USE OF SAFER NON-REACTIVECHEMICALS

MAY DECREASE EFFICIENCY

MAY ALSO DECREASE COSTS


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SUBSTITUTION

HEAT TRANSFER

FOR HIGH TEMPERATURE HEATTRANSFER USE WATER OR MOLTENSALTS IN PLACE OF HYDROCARBON-BASED HEAT TRANSFER FLUIDS14,15


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SUBSTITUTION

HEAT TRANSFER

FOR LOW TEMPERATURE HEATTRANSFER REPLACE OZONESCAVENGING FLUIDS (FREONS) WITH

ALTERNATES (N2, PROPANE,HYDROFLUOROCARBONS)16


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SUBSTITUTION

SOLVENT REPLACEMENT

USE WATER-BASED PAINT IN PLACE OFSOLVENT-BASED PAINTS

USE OF WATER-BASED SOLVENTS ORCO2 IN CHIP MANUFACTURINGPROCESSES17,18 (OFTEN WITH IMPROVEDPRODUCT PERFORMANCE)


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ATTENUATION

MODIFY CONDITIONS TO MINIMIZETHE IMPACT OF HAZARDOUSEVENTS19

ADDITION OF INERT COMPONENT TOSYSTEM CAN DILUTE THE POSSIBLEINTENSITY OF A REACTION

MODIFIED CATALYSTS CAN REDUCE THETEMPERATURES AND PRESSURESREQUIRED FOR THE REACTION20


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ATTENUATION

STORAGE OPTIONS

LIQUIFIED GASES STORED ATCRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES

STORED AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE USES SMALLER VOLUMES THAT GAS

STORAGE

TEMPERATURES ARE FREQUENTLY BELOW

IGNITION TEMPERATURES IN AIR


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ATTENUATION

STORAGE OPTIONS

MINIMIZE STORAGE BY ON-SITEPRODUCTION

HYDROGEN GENERATED BY ELECTROLYSISOR PARTIAL OXIDATION OF NATURAL GAS

CHLORINE GENERATION ON SITE


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ATTENUATION

STORAGE OPTIONS

STORAGE IN LESS NOXIOUS FORMS

CHLORINE FOR POOLS

GASEOUS STORAGE LIQUID STORAGE

SOLID FORM (Cyranuric Acid)

DILUTED SOLID FORM (Cyranuric Acid WITH

INERT FILLER)

LIMITATION OF THE EFFECTS


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LIMITATION OF THE EFFECTS

OPERATE PROCESSES IN STAGES TO

AVOID PROCESS CONDITIONS THATCAN LEAD TO EVENTS MULTIPLE STAGES FOR OPERATIONS21

CHANGING THE SEQUENCE OF REACTIONS CANREDUCE HAZARDS

ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY STEPS TOSIMPLIFY THE PROCESS

SIMPLIFICATION


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SIMPLIFICATION

SIMPLIFIED CONTROL

INSTRUMENTATION EVERY CONTROL LOOP CAN FAIL

ELIMINATION OF THE NEED FOR A CONTROL

LOOP THROUGH EQUIPMENT DESIGN ANOTHER APPROACH IS TO MAKE CERTAIN

THAT CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION SENSORSARE SEPARATE FROM ALARMINSTRUMENTATION SENSORS

EXAMPLE OF USE OF SPECIAL


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EXAMPLE OF USE OF SPECIALMATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION

OXYGEN COMPRESSORS

EXAMPLE OF USE OF SPECIAL


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EXAMPLE OF USE OF SPECIALMATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION

IF THE COMPRESSOR ROTOR GOESOUT OF BALANCE, IT WILL RUB

AGAINST THE STATOR AND CAUSE AFIRE

FIRE EMITS INTENSE THERMAL RADIATION

COMPRESSOR IS EQUIPPED WITH VIBRATIONSENSORS

COMPRESSOR WAS INSTALLED IN A SEALED

HOUSING

PARTS THAT WOULD RUB FIRST WEREFABRICATED FROM SILVER, A METAL THAT WILLMELT BEFORE IT IGNITES

HAZARDOUS ANALYSIS InitiateHAZOPS PROCESS FLOWCHART


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HAZARDOUS ANALYSISSTUDIES

PROCESSESDEVELOPEDTO IDENTIFY

PROBLEMSINHERENT INPROCESS

DESIGNS.

Op. Manual Summary

Prepare

Revision ListCreate

Report

Complete

Frequency

Predict

SeverityEstimate

Risk

Define

Deviations

Examine

FactorsEngineering

Factors

Human

IntentDetermine

Parameters

Analyze

Process NodesDefine

DataCollect

Team

Assemble

StudyInitiate

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPS


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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A HAZOPSANALYSIS

INTENTS

DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS

HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

SAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF

CONTROL DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN

RELATED FACILITIES

CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING,

ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS

EVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING

ANALYSES ARE NOW


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ANALYSES ARE NOWREQUIRED FOR PROCESSES

SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITYRIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPADEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISKMANAGEMENT PROGRAM

OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119

HAZOP (HAZARD AND


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HAZOP - (HAZARD ANDOPERABILITY STUDY)

EXAMINES CONDITIONS ATDIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THEFACILITY

RESULTS IN A REPORT WITH LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESS

DEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDS

CLARIFICATION OF OPERATINGPROCEDURES

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR A


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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR AHAZOPS ANALYSIS

ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM - WHOHAVE NECESSARY PROCESSEXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE DESIGN ENGINEERS

OPERATORS

MATERIALS SPECIALISTS

EH&S SPECIALISTS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL



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COLLECT DATA DESIGN DRAWINGS

EQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND

SPECIFICATIONS MAINTENANCE INFORMATION

MSDS

DEFINE PROCESS NODES BREAK PROCESS INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSIS

LOCATE THESE ON A SET OF DRAWINGS



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ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACHNODE

PURPOSE OR INTENT PROCESS FUNCTIONS PROCESS VARIABLES HUMAN INTERACTION - HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO

THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.


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HAZOPS ANALYSIS

ESTIMATE SEVERITYRANKING IMPACT

CATASTROPHIC FATALITY(S), MAJOR EQUIPMENT LOSSES (>$5M), DOWNTIME > 1

MONTH, LONG-TERM PUBLIC HEALTH & SAFETY ISSUE

HIGH LOST TIME INJURY, EQUIPMENT LOSSES > $100K, DOWNTIME>1

WEEK, OFF-SITE RESPONSE REQUIRED

MODERATE REPORTABLE INJURY, EQUIPMENT LOSSES > $10k, DOWNTIME>1

DAY, EMISSION REPORT

LOW EQUIPMENT LOSSES > $1000, DOWNTIME < 1 DAY

NONE NO EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL LOSSES & NO DOWNTIME



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HAZOPS ANALYSIS

PREDICT FREQUENCY OF EVENT

RANKING FREQUENCY

HIGH PROBABILITY 1/6 MONTH

HIGH 1/YEAR

MODERATE 1/2YEAR

LOW 1/5YEAR

NONE 1/PROCESS LIFETIME

HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN)


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HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN)STUDY

STARTS WITH THE SAMEINFORMATION AND TEAM AS THEHAZOPS STUDY

EXAMINES THE RESULT OFFAILURE OF EQUIPMENT OR

CONTROLS INDIVIDUAL - SINGLE JEOPARDY

MULTIPLE - DOUBLE JEOPARDY

HAZARDSGENERIC FAULT TREE FOR HAZAN - DOUBLE JEOPARY


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HAZARDSANALYSIS

(HAZAN)STUDY

CAN BEORGANIZEDWITH FAULTTREE (FTA)

FAILS

CONTROL

SUCCEEDS

CONTROL

DOES NOT OCCUR

EVENT

FAILS

CONTROL

SUCCEEDS

CONTROL

OCCURS

EVENT

FAILS

CONTROL

FAILSCONTROL

SUCCEEDS

CONTROL

DOES NOT OCCUR

EVENT

FAILS

CONTROL

SUCCEEDS

CONTROL

OCCURS

EVENT

SUCCEEDS

CONTROL

OCCURS

EVENT

PRIMARYEVENT

CONTROLLERRESPONSE

SECONDARY EVENT CONTROLLERRESPONSE

HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN)


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( )STUDY

FAULT TREE SYMBOLS

FAULT TREES USE PROGRAMMING SYMBOLS FOREACH TYPE OF JUNCTION

BASIC EVENT -FAILURE THAT ISTHE START POINT

FOR THE ANALYSIS

BASICEVENT

CONTRIBUTINGEVENT - CAN OCCUR

IN PARALLEL TO THEBASIC EVENT ANDCONTRIBUTE TO THE

OVERALL IMPACT.CONTR.

EVENT

OR GATE -OUTLETCONDITION

RESULTS IF ONE OFTHE INLETCONDITIONS EXIST.

OR

INTERMEDIATEEVENT -EVENT

THAT RESULTSFROM PREVIOUSEVENTS IN THETREE.

INTER.EVENT

AND GATE -OUTLETCONDITION

RESULTS ALL OFTHE INLETCONDITIONSEXIST.

TYPICAL FAULT TREESYMBOLOGY -ALSOREFERRED TO ASALTERNATE DIGITALLOGIC, ADL

FAULT TREE EXAMPLE - NO PAPER FOR


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BREAKFAST

PRIMARY SOURCES OF


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CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

HUMAN ERROR MISLABELING

TRIP FAILURES

STATIC ELECTRICITY WRONG MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION

FAULTY OPERATING PROCEDURES

UNEXPECTED REVERSE FLOW COMPUTER CONTROL PROBLEMS

IGNORANCE

hazardous material design strategies

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