hayden peake - harold weisbergjfk.hood.edu/collection/weisberg subject index... · by ernest...
TRANSCRIPT
/ •
;
The hot aspects (if they can be so called) of the new
Cold W
ar lie in an entirely different direction —
who's doing w
hat to whom
economically and financially:
riggin
g m
arkets, tran
sferring tech
nolo
gy, en
acting tariffs an
d b
oyco
tts. m
anipulating international money m
arkets, laundering money, tracking capital
flight, monitoring capital fom
iation, analyzing international hedging techniques, analyzing international finance trends and patterns, detecting the form
ation of m
onopolies and cartels, monitoring the flow
of strategic materials, pinpointing
tradeoffs and comprom
ises, detecting new alliances and the breakoff of old, and
the list can go on and on. In the new
Cold W
ar, intelligence takes the form of analyses and evaluations of
economic and financial threats and opportunities throughout the w
orld. This
includes the analysis of industrial and marketing capabilities and of financial and
monetary capabilities and vulnerabilities. W
ith this shift in emphasis the polarization of good guys-bad guys w
ill give w
ay to more or less, better or w
orse. The w
orld becomes m
ore mysterious as the
forces and influences at work becom
e more rem
ote. Interrelationships and interdependenices am
ong nations will becom
e more com
plicated. Political and
economic consequences of national strategies w
ill unfold slowly. C
ause-and-effect relationships w
ill become slow
ly visible but only over a period of time.
In the new C
old War, intelligence w
ill become ever m
olt indispensable and vital as the W
estern standard of living becomes m
ore vulnerable and more threatened.
Let us hope that the intelligence agencies and governm
ent depanmem
s of Western
democracies w
ill be up to their new assignm
ents.
F. Reese B
rown
SA
MU
EL
HA
LP
ER
N A
ND
H
AY
DE
N P
EA
KE
Did
An
gle
ton
J
ail N
ose
nk
o?
In his recent book, Am
erica's Secret War: The C
IA in a D
emocratic Society, L
och K
. Johnson discusses the problem of determ
ining whether defectors from
foreign intelligence services are genuine, a process called "establishing the defector's bona fides." A
s an example of the difficulties encountered, he cites the controversial case
of former K
GB
officer Yuri N
osenko, who defected to the C
IA in February 1964.
Nosenko professed to have handled L
ee Harvey O
swald's case for the K
GB
while
Ali
Osw
ald was in the S
oviet Union. T
he KG
B, he m
aintained, had not recruited O
swald and had no role in President John K
ennedy's death. These claim
s focused high level concern on N
osenko's debriefing, which produced a m
ixture of truth, lies, and contradictions that took years to explain. A
nd although eventually accepted officially, N
osenko's bona fides remain in dispute even today in the
minds of som
e of the CIA
officers involved,; Professor Johnson summ
arizes the
ililin
19
62
, wh
ile no
a trip
to G
enev
a, S
witzerla
nd
, Yu
ri No
senk
o, a
45
.ym
r-old
KG
B o
fficer, con
tacted
thu
s C
IA. C
laim
ing to
have w
ork
ed in
the K
GB
cou
nterin
telligen
ce directo
rate, H
om
an
offered
info
rmatissn
to
the C
IA fo
r som
e mon
ey w
hich
he n
eeded
qu
ickly
. In ex
chan
ge for th
e fun
ds an
d oth
er ind
ircernon
s, he
agreed
to serv
e the C
IA in
Mosco
w a
s an
agen
t-in-p
lace o
n th
e con
ditio
n co
nta
cts wou
ld ta
ke p
lace o
nly
o
utsid
e the S
ov
iet Un
ion
. No
senk
o retu
rned
to G
enev
a in
Feb
nia
ry 1
96
4 a
nd
told
the C
IA h
e wa
nted
to
defeci th
en a
nd
there. P
ermissio
n w
as q
uick
ly g
ran
ted a
fter he in
form
ed h
is CIA
case o
fficer tha
n h
e ha
d
perso
na
lly h
an
dled
Lee H
arv
ey O
swa
ld's ca
m in
the K
GB
. An
d, w
ha
t is mo
re, he ro
sined
tha
t the K
GB
-h
ad T
IM co
nta
cted O
swald
wh
en h
e d
ele
ted
to, o
r wh
ile he liv
ed in
, the &
ivies U
nio
n. N
osen
ko w
ou
ld '
main
tain later th
at this w
as true even
thou
gh O
swald
had
clearly stated b
e was a form
er U.S
. Marin
e radar
operator n
ear a U
-2 b
ase in
Ja
pa
n. T
his ex
ceptio
n to
KG
B p
olicy
wa
s exp
lain
ed b
y N
eseriko
wh
o sa
id th
e K
GB
view
ed O
swald
a
n a lo
on
y. N
ose
nk
o's c
hitin
ab
ou
t Osw
ald
, in th
e c
on
ten
t of th
e W
arren
C
om
missio
n in
vestig
atio
n o
f Pro
ficient K
enn
edy
's assa
ssina
tion
, ma
de it im
pern
ive th
at h
is bo
na
fides
be a
ssessed a
s qu
ickly
as p
ossib
le. If he w
as n
ot g
enu
ine, h
e cou
ld b
e return
ed io
the S
oviet U
nio
n. In
th
is even
t, his m
essag
e ab
ou
t Osw
ald
wo
uld
be ig
no
red, b
ut th
e imp
lican
on
s of S
ov
iet inv
olv
emen
t in
Bo
th Sam
uel Halpern and H
ayden Peake are form
er CIA
intelligence officers. Mr.
Peake is E
xecutive Director of the N
ational Intelligence Study Center and adjunct
professor at the Defense Intelligence C
ollege in Washington.
451
452
SAM
UE
L H
AL
PE
RN
AN
D H
AY
DE
N P
EA
KS
DID
AN
GL
ET
ON
JAIL
NO
SEN
KO
? 4
53
fi C
forces in play in the Nosenko debriefing as follow
s:
Though th
e FB
I counterin
telligen
ce officers accep
ted h
is (Nosen
ko's]
reliability
, James A
ng
leton
nev
er believ
ed in
him
. Th
e CIA
Ch
ief of
Counterintelligence felt sure that N
osenko was a plant w
hose pu
rp
ose
wa
s to
div
ert the m
ounting suspicion in the United S
tales that the US
SR
may have
been behind the assassination of President John F
. Kennedy. A
ngleton had N
osenko confined to a small building at a C
IA facility in southern V
irginia for 1,277 days in Spartan conditions, w
here, according to CIA
insiders, he was
interrogated relentlessly and treated in a shabby manner. (em
phasis added)2 •in
C j-VA1/4‘4 Nt...1
if A
s a source for the first portion oY the quote, w
hich pertains to Nosenko's bona
fides, Johnson cites his interviews w
ith James A
ngleton in 1975. He then says that
a "new
sletter, staffed b
y retired
CIA
han
ds, fin
ds A
ng
leton
's [KG
B p
lant)
hypothesis 'more likely' to be true." T
he newsletter anicle to w
hich Johnson refers, and w
hich he cites, is in the Foreign Intelligence L
iterary Scene (FIL
S). 3 T
he "retired CIA
hands" include the present authors. The subject of the article is a
1986 BB
C-T
V m
ovie about the Nosenko case. T
he qualifying words "m
ore likely," w
hich Johnson quotes, are extracted from the follow
ing sentence:
The story tells of the handling of a K
GB
defector who m
ight have been a key intelligence source but m
ore likely was a plant sent to deflect suspicion that
the Soviet Union m
ight have had something to do w
ith Lee H
arvey Osw
ald's assassination of President John F. K
ennedy. (emphasis added) 5
As is evident, the phrase "m
ore likely" was not a com
ment by F
ILS on the truth of
Angleton's hypothesis, but rather just a description of the story line. Johnson has
not led his readers astray, however, because had F
ILS or the "retired C
IA hands"
been asked whether they agreed w
ith Angleton that N
osenko was probably a plant,
the answer w
ould have been "yes." .4o otr.4
..a.rione, 0
40,4
4-;
tiltio 4(4
4.,111
the K
enn
edy a
ssassin
atio
n w
ou
ld b
e strength
ened
. If he
was w
hat h
e claim
ed, th
en th
e FB
I (an
d th
e W
arren
Co
mm
ission
) wo
uld
ha
ve co
rrob
ora
tion
tha
t Osw
ald
ha
d n
ot a
cted a
s a K
GB
ag
ent. In
the en
d
neith
er result o
ccurred
. Instea
d, a
lthou
gh
he h
eld stea
dfa
stly to
his cla
ims a
bou
t the K
GB
an
d O
swald
, P)
1/ V.4
14
1
Nosen
ko g
ave co
nflictin
g testim
on
y to
the C
IA (a
nd
even
tually
to C
on
gress) o
n no m
an
y critica
l po
ints, 1
F/40
.
tha
t the C
IA a
dv
ised th
e Wa
rren C
om
missio
n n
ot to
con
sider h
is story
, an
d they
did
no
t. A
iMA
.L1
In a
n a
ttemp
t to v
erify a
ll the in
form
atio
n N
osen
ko p
rovid
ed, h
is interro
gatio
n co
ntin
ued
for sev
eral
yea
rn a
fter the W
arren
Com
missio
n m
ad
e its report. A
nd
, alth
ou
gh
man
y o
f the im
porta
nt co
ntra
dictio
ns
were n
ever reso
lved
to th
e satisfa
ction
of a
ll invo
lved
, No
senk
o w
as ev
entu
ally
officia
lly a
ccepted
an
d
beca
me a
n A
merica
n citizen
. Fu
rther d
etails m
ay b
e fou
nd
in th
e sub
sequ
ent fo
otn
otes.
9loh
nso
n. L
och
K., 1
98
9, A
me
rica
's S
ec
ret W
ar: T
he
CIA
in a
De
mo
cra
tic S
oc
iety
, Oxfo
rd U
niv
ersity
FR
S!, N
ew Y
ork
, p. 3
4.
'FIL
S (F
ore
ign
Inte
lligen
ce L
itera
ry S
cen
e), N
ovem
ber-D
ecemb
er 1986, p
p. 1
0-1
1. T
he sn
ide, "
Yu
ri H
osea
°. KG
B"
is un
sign
ed.
4- Yu
ri Noten
ko, K
GB
." first sh
ow
n in
the U
nited
Sta
tes by H
BO
on
7 S
ept. 1
.986.
op
. cit., p.
INT
ER
NA
TIO
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
But, h
ad Jo
hnso
n ask
ed th
e "retired C
IA h
ands" ab
out th
e portio
n o
f his
comm
ent (in italics in the first quote above) alleging Angleton's responsibility for
hav
ing N
osen
ko co
nfin
ed an
d in
terrogated
, the resp
onse w
ould
hav
e been
, "w
rong, Professor Johnson, on both counts," notw
ithstanding the "CIA
insiders" to w
hom he refers. T
he question is, then, what is the evidence to support these
contrary positions, and who is right'?
SU
PP
OR
T F
OR
JO
HN
SO
N'S
VIE
W
Loch Johnson does not stand alone w
ith his charge that Angleton w
as responsible for N
osenko's incarceration. In his 1988 book, The S
py W
ho G
ot A
way: T
he
Inside Story of Edw
ard Lee H
oward, journalist D
avid Wise w
rote that Angleton
"held one Soviet defector, Y
uri Nosenko, locked up in solitary confinem
ent, and frequently drugged, for three and half years."6 D
eferring comm
ent for the mom
ent on drugging N
osenko, it is worth noting that W
ise gives no hint of the source of his charges; how
ever, the confinement part m
ay have come from
New
sweek
magazine. In
its 18 N
ovem
ber 1
98
5 issu
e, New
sweek w
rote in
an u
nsig
ned
insert:
"Co
nv
inced
that N
osen
ko
was a S
ov
iet plan
t sent to
deb
un
k G
olitsin
[sic], A
ngleton kept him in solitary confinem
ent for more than three years." (em
phasis adde d)7
Earlier, the R
euters news agency put out another version of the story w
hich was
carried In the Baltim
ore Sun: "Mr. A
ngleton ordered Mr. N
osenko to be locked up in a sm
all cell without a toothbrush or sufficient food for 3 and 112 years."8
Tw
o less specific versions of the charge were m
ade the same year. T
he first was
by Ernest V
olkman in his 1985 book, W
arriors Of T
he Night, w
here he noted that in his handling of the G
olitsyn case, "Angleton m
ade several errors of judgment.
On
e was th
e mistreatm
ent o
f No
senk
o...."9 T
he seco
nd co
mes fro
m P
hillip
K
nightley in his delicately titled 1986 book, Second Oldest P
rofession: The Spy
As B
ureaucrat. Patriot, F
antasist and Whore. W
riting of "Angleton and other
Golitsyn supporters," K
nightley says:
a CIA
faction set out to show that G
olitsyn was a genuine defector by trying
to force Nosenko to confess. H
e was confined for three and a half years,
'Wise, D
avid
, 1988. T
he S
py W
ho
Go
t Aw
ay: Th
e Insid
e Sto
ry of E
dw
ard L
ee Ho
ward
, Th
e CIA
Ag
ent W
ho
B
etrayed H
is Co
un
try's StC
rEC
I and
Escap
ed to
Mo
scow
, Ran
dom
Hou
se, New
York
, p. 1
6.
7“In
Fro
m th
e Co
ld, th
e intrig
ue H
as R
un
Both
East a
nd
West,"
in N
ewsw
eek, 18 N
ovem
ber 1
985, p
. 42.
Golitsy
n w
as a
KG
B o
fficer wh
o d
efected to
the C
IA six
mon
ths b
efore N
osen
ko. lie p
rovid
ed a
variety
of
info
rmatio
n, so
me o
f wh
ich p
rov
ed co
ntro
versia
l/it 1.4
,43
,45
WA
IN 4-m
tf
tavit 4'.4,--r"
- 'U
nsig
ned
, "D
efector R
eviv
es F
eat O
f Hig
h 'M
ole' a
l CIA
," in
Th
e B
alirw
ore
an
, 4 O
cto
ber 1
985, p
. rt.
19
A. R
euters cites A
dm
iral T
IMM
'S bo
ok
(sec belo
w) a
s the so
urce. T
he ch
arg
es rega
rdin
g th
e too
thb
rush
lgo
an
d fo
od
are ch
allen
ged
in th
e con
gressio
nal testim
on
y to
be d
iscussed
belo
w.
9V
olk
man
, Ern
est, 1985, W
arriors O
f Th
e Nig
ht: S
pies S
old
iers and
Am
erican in
telligen
ce, Morro
w, N
ew
Yo
rk, p
. 21
5.
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
AN
D C
OU
NT
ER
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
V
OL
UM
E 3, N
UM
BE
R 4
in;
of
Ts ca el
tic
at
Y tt
nL
int
en
C
(
hit
tic e
s
PC
:ie
454
SAMUEL H
AL
PE
RN
AN
D H
AY
DE
N P
EA
KE
sometim
es in conditions as bad as those in any Soviet gulag....N
osenko was
subjected to hostile imenogation.... 10 M
i J
4/11
,4•o
al4
, ' 10
0..tr td
it.411414 17
Knig
htie
y cites D
avid
Martin
's Wild
ern
ess o
f Mirro
rs as h
is sou
rce, b
ut M
artin
neith
er m
ake
s com
pariso
ns w
ith th
e g
ula
g n
or im
plie
s any A
ngle
ton in
volve
ment in
Nose
nko
's inte
rrogatio
n o
r dete
ntio
n. 11
The o
ne b
ook th
at u
nequiv
ocally
and a
uth
orita
tively
supports
Johnson's
positio
n is S
ecre
cy and D
em
ocra
cy: The C
IA in
Tra
nsitio
n, b
y form
er D
irecto
r of
Centra
l Inte
lligence
(DC
I) Adm
iral S
tansfie
ld T
urn
er. "It a
ppeare
d to
Angle
ton th
at
the S
ovie
ts mig
ht h
ave
sent N
ose
nko
to p
lant a
story th
at w
ould
abso
lve th
em
of
an
y com
plicity w
ith O
swa
ld in
the
Ke
nn
ed
y assa
ssina
tion
," says T
urn
er. A
fter
Angle
ton b
ala
nce
d th
e p
ros a
nd co
ns.,"h
e d
ecid
ed th
at N
ose
nko
was a
double
ag
en
t, an
d se
t ou
t to fo
rce h
im to
con
fess." W
he
n N
ose
nko
pro
ved
"tou
gh
an
d
ob
stina
te" a
nd
wo
uld
no
t give
in to
no
rma
l inte
rrog
atio
n:
Angleton's counterintelligence team
set out to break the man psyC
hologically. A
sma
ll priso
n w
as b
uilt, e
xpre
ssly for h
im, o
n a
secre
t base
near
Washington. H
e was kept there in solitary confinem
ent for three and a half years. O
stensibly this was to isolate him
so that the interrogation would be
more effective. In fact, on only 292 of his 1277 days in that prison w
as he questioned at all....D
uring the entire period he was adm
inistered one or more
of four drugs on seventeen occasions. 17
Late
r in th
e b
ook T
urn
er re
turn
s to th
e th
em
e, w
riting, "W
e've
alre
ady se
en o
ne
insta
nce
of A
ngle
ton's e
xcessive
zeal in
his tre
atm
ent o
f the S
ovie
t defe
ctor
No
sen
ko....I still fe
el d
ee
ply a
sha
me
d th
at o
ur g
ove
rnm
en
t trea
ted
an
y hu
ma
n
be
ing
the
wa
y CIA
let A
ng
leto
n tre
at N
ose
nko
." An
d still la
ter, "T
he
last th
ing
I
wa
nte
d w
as m
ore
An
gle
ton
s inca
rcera
ting
mo
re N
ose
nko
s...." 13 No
on
e w
ill
accu
se A
dm
iral T
urn
er o
f wafflin
g h
is po
sition
. An
d, e
ven th
ou
gh
he
ga
ve n
o
source
s, consid
erin
g h
is form
er o
ffice, re
aders a
nd sch
ola
rs would
seem
justifie
d
in a
ccep
ting
his co
nclu
sions a
s the la
st word
. But n
ot e
veryo
ne d
id.
SU
PP
OR
T M
R A
N A
LT
ER
NA
TIV
E V
IEW
The m
ost re
cent in
dic
atio
n o
f an o
pposin
g v
iew
is fo
und in
the 1
989 b
ook.
Dece
ptio
n: T
he In
visible
War B
etw
een th
e K
GB
and th
e C
IA, b
y Edw
ard
Jay
'eKn
igh
tley. P
hillip
, 1986, S
eco
nd
Old
en
Pro
fessio
n: T
he S
py
its B
ure
au
cra
t, Po
rriot, F
an
tas
ia a
nd
Wh
ore
, An
dre D
eutsch
, Lo
nd
on
, p. 3
10
.
"M
an
ias, D
av
id, 1
98
0, W
ildern
ess o
f Mirro
rs, H
arp
er & R
ow
, New
York
, pp
. 155-1
77.
'Tu
mor, S
tan
sfield
, 1985, S
ecre
cy a
nd
Dem
ocra
cy: T
he C
IA in
Tra
nsitio
n,
Hou
gh
ton
Mifflin
Co.,
B05100, p
p. 4
3-4
6. F
or th
e CIA
's officia
l respon
se to a
Con
gressio
nal q
uestio
n co
ncern
ing d
rugs g
iven
to N
osen
ka. see ref. 3
7.
"Ib
id. p
p. 7
1, 1
41
.
DO
AN
GL
ET
ON
JAIL
NO
SEN
K07
455
Ep
stein
. In a
discu
ssion
of w
ha
t the
CIA
sho
uld
ha
ve d
on
e o
nce
it ha
d re
aso
n to
doubt Nosenko's bona fides, E
pstein states:
Be
cau
se o
f all th
is da
ma
ge
tha
t No
sen
ko co
uld
do
, Mu
rph
y [Ch
ief o
f the
S
oviet Russia D
ivision (SR
D), C
IA] recom
mended that preparations should
be made to im
prison him to prevent him
from redefecting....A
t some point,
Nose
nko
would
have
to b
e co
nfro
nte
d a
nd b
roke
n th
rough a
pro
cess o
f "hostile interrogation." B
agley knew that this inevitable confrontation w
as strongly opposed by A
ngleton, who w
anted to keep playing Nosenko and his
KG
B co
ntro
llers like
a fish
on a
line. B
ut w
hile
Angle
ton m
ight h
ave
inexhaustible patience. M
urphy wanted results."
Many o
f these
poin
ts about A
ngle
ton's ro
le w
ere
not n
ew
to E
pste
in's tre
atm
ent o
f
the N
ose
nko
case
. He h
ad m
entio
ned th
em
in h
is 1978 b
ook o
n th
e su
bje
ct,
Le
ge
nd
: Th
e S
ecre
t Wo
rld o
f Le
e H
arve
y Osw
ald
, the
first to e
xam
ine
the
case
in
pu
blic
." Ep
ste
in's
firm p
ositio
n in
Dece
ptio
n re
su
lted
from
inte
rvie
ws w
ith
Angle
ton, D
avid
Murp
hy. "P
ete
r Bagle
y," Raym
ond R
occa
(then C
hie
f/Rese
arch
and A
naly
sis
Div
isio
n, C
I Sta
ff), and R
ichard
Helm
s. T
he in
terv
iew
s w
ere
au
gm
en
ted
by tw
o a
dd
ition
al so
urce
s: testim
on
y from
the
19
78
He
arin
gs o
f the
Ho
use
Se
lect C
om
mitte
e o
n A
ssassin
atio
ns (H
SC
A),16 a
bo
ut w
hich
mo
re w
ill be
said
belo
w, a
nd
New
sweek.
Wh
en
Ep
stein
rea
d th
e q
uo
te in
New
sweek m
entio
ned e
arlie
r, he w
rote
the
edito
r givin
g h
im a
n a
ltern
ate
view
, which
is quote
d h
ere
in fu
ll:
In its co
ver sto
ry on Y
urch
enko
(Natio
nal A
ffairs, 1
8 N
ov.), N
ewsw
eek
suggests that James A
ngleton, the CIA
's form
er co
unte
rinte
lligence
chie
f,
was responsible for the incarceration of another K
GB
defector, Yuri N
osenko. S
pecifically, it asserts that "Angleton kept him
in solitary confinement for
more than three years." A
lthough this charge has been made by no less an
authority than former C
IA D
irector Stansfield T
urner, it is completely untrue.
Angleton did not order the arrest, incarceration, or hostile interrogation of
Nosenko. N
or did he, or his counterintelligence staff, ever have jurisdiction over the N
osenko case, which w
as the exclusive responsibility of the CIA
's S
ovie
t Russia
Divisio
n. A
s is unam
big
uously se
t forth
in co
ngre
ssional
testim
ony, th
e ch
ief o
f that d
ivision. D
avid
Murp
hy, m
ade th
e d
ecisio
n to
Ed
ward
Ja
y, 1
989,
Decep
tion
: Th
e In
vis
ible
War B
etw
een
the K
GB
an
d th
e C
IA, S
imon
&
Sch
uste
r, N
ew
Yo
rk
, pp
. 60
-61
. Th
e S
ov
iet R
ussia
Div
ision
(SR
D) la
ter b
eca
me th
e S
ov
iet B
loc
Div
ision
(SO
D). T
he n
am
e -B
ag
ley"
used
in th
is qu
ote refers to
a P
eter Ba
gley
iden
tified ea
rlier by
Ep
stein (f/s
ee
/Aim
s. p
. 46) a
s Nosen
ko's ca
se officer, g
ivin
g fo
rmer D
CI R
ichard
Helm
s as th
e sou
rce.
Rob
in W
ink
s, 1987, C
loa
k a
nd
Do
wn
: Sc
ho
lars
in the S
eare
l W
ar, 1
9.1
9-1
961., M
orro
w, N
ew Y
ork
.
p. 4
20, a
lso u
ses th
e n
am
e P
ete
r B
agle
y. g
ivin
g A
ngle
ton
as h
is sou
rce. F
or c
on
sisten
cy, "
Pete
r
Bagley
" is u
sed h
erein.
"pE
rte2in60.-15.1126wia
rd la
y, 1
978, L
eg
en
d: T
he S
ecre
t Wo
rld o
f Lee H
arv
ey O
sw
ald
, McG
raw
-Hill, N
ew Y
ork
,
"In
ve
stig
atio
n o
f the
A
SJ4S
Tilk
lii0A
of P
res
ide
nt J
oh
n F
. Ke
nn
ed
y,
Hea
ring
s befo
re the H
ou
se Select
Co
mm
ittee on
Assa
ssinatio
ns. 9
5th
Con
gress. 2
d sessio
n, W
ash
ingto
n, D
.C., G
PO
, 1979.
INT
ER
NA
TIO
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERNTELLIGENCE VOLUME 3, NUMBER 4
•
45
6
SAM
UE
L H
AL
PE
RN
AN
D H
AY
DE
N P
EA
KE
134D
AN
GL
ET
ON
JAIL
NO
SEN
K07
457
imprison N
osenko without consulting A
ngleton. Murphy's m
ain concern was
that Nosenko, if not physically restrained, w
ould stage a redefection back to
the Soviet Union as part of "a m
assive propaganda assault on the CIA
.' He
pointed out the uses the KG
B m
ight make of a "redefected C
IA agent" in his
original mem
orandum requesting authority to put N
osenko in escapeproof
quarters.17
Alth
ough E
pstein
did
not p
rovid
e chapter and verse citations from the
congressional testimony to w
hich he referred, New
sweek apparently did its ow
n
checking. In any case, the editor's reply to Epstein w
as printed just under his letter
and reads as follows: "N
ewsw
eek regrets the error," Had N
ewsw
eek been able to
find a single authoritative source to contradict Epstein, it is unlikely that either the
letter or the admission of error w
ould have ever been printed.
Other authors, w
riting before Epstein, had m
ade similar though less detailed
comm
ents. Gordon B
rook-Shepherd, in his recent book, The Storm B
irds: Soviet
Post-W
ar Defectors, provided a footnote to his discussion of N
osenko that states:
It needs recording that some of A
ngleton's colleagues have maintained that he
had absolutely no part in the decision, made later in 1964. to intensify the
'hostile interrogation' and transfer Nosenko to a specially constructed 'bank
vault' for this purpose.ts
Just a year earlier, Robin W
inks, in his Cloak and G
own: Scholars in the Secret
War, 1939-1961, took an even stronger position. "A
ngleton," Winks w
rites, "was
not responsible for Nosenko's incarceration and hostile interrogation, and he
learned of it only after it had begun." Then, in a som
ewhat startling com
ment,
Winks adds, "B
oth Angleton and R
occa are said to have protested that hostile
techniques should not be used in peacetime in the U
nited States." L
ater Winks
notes that David M
urphy "made the decision to handle N
osenko first through
hostile interrogation and then through the Office of Security...." U
nfortunately,
Winks does not supply a source for these statem
ents.° Still other authors have provided pieces of the puzzle regarding N
osenko's
confinement and interrogation. D
avid Martin, in his book W
ilderness of Mirrors,
noted that Helm
s, David M
urphy, and CIA
General C
ounsel Law
rence Houston
were th
e on
es wh
o w
ent to
the D
epu
ty A
ttorn
ey G
eneral, N
icho
las deB
.
Katzenbach, to determ
ine what actions could be taken to assure continued control
°L
ette
r from
Ed
ward
lay
Ep
stein, to
New
sweek, p
rinted
un
der th
e tide, "
Th
e Nosen
ko C
ase,"
23 D
ecemb
er
198
5, p
. 12
. Ep
stein h
ad
ma
de th
e sam
e poin
ts in g
reater d
etail in
an
Octo
ber 1
985 C
om
me
nta
ry
magazin
e article, W
ho K
illed T
he C
IA7"
(pp
. 54-5
5).
"B
rook
•Sh
eph
erd, G
ord
on
, 1989, T
he S
torm
Bird
s: S
ovie
t Po
st-W
ar D
efe
cto
rs, W
eiden
feld &
Nico
lson
,
Ncw
York
, p. 2
32.
"W
ink
s, op
. cit., pp
. 417, 4
20. W
ink
s is inco
rrect ab
ou
t Mu
rph
y m
ak
ing th
e decisio
n to
han
dle N
osen
ko
thro
ugh
the O
ffice of S
ecurity
. Th
is decisio
n w
as m
ad
e by D
CI R
ichard
Helm
s. See th
e testimon
y o
f
Rich
ard
Helm
s in H
earin
gs o
f the H
ou
se Select C
om
mittee O
n A
ssassin
atio
ns (H
SC
A). S
eptem
ber 1
978,
VO
L IV
, p.2
8. T
he co
mm
ent =
gird
ing M
urp
hy a
nd
hostile u
nerro
gatio
n is d
ealt w
ith b
elow
.
1NT
ER
NA
TK
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
of Nosenko. M
artin makes no m
ention of a role for Angleton in the decision,"
Thom
as Powers notes, in his The M
an Who K
ept The Secrets, that N
osenko was
still the subject of dispute in the agency, even after being "held in virtual solitary
confinement for years w
hile counterintelligence interrogators from the Soviet
Russia D
ivision and the Office of Security pored over every detail of his account of
himself." (em
phasis added)2I On the point of responsibility, H
enry Hurt w
rote in
his book, SHA
DR
IN : T
he Spy Who N
ever Cam
e Back, that "D
avid Murphy,
Chief of the Soviet D
ivision. which had custody of N
osenko during the period in j...."22 N
one of question [N
osenico's incarceration these authors provided specific
sources for their statements.
A final com
ment, here, notes a significant om
ission during a discussion of the
Nosenko case by L
eonard V. M
cCoy, form
er Deputy C
hief/CI staff (after
Angleton left). W
riting in the CIR
A N
ewsletter,23 M
cCoy leaves absolutely no
doubt that he is convinced of Nosenko's bona fides. H
e then takes vigorous and
lengthy exception with those w
ho do not share the "official" agency point of view;
especially Angleton, the only one identified by true nam
e, and Nosenko's case
• officer, w
hom he calls "S
teve Daly."24 S
ays McC
oy, jGolitsyn'sj "outlandish
▪
theories and fanatic beliefs" were the problem
, not Nosenko, "the m
ost valuable
defector from the K
GB
...whose hum
an rights were blatantly violated by the C
IA."
Where M
cCoy sees errors, he points them
out along with the offender and then
gives his version of what w
as wrong. H
ad McC
oy thought or known that
Angleton had been the one behind the incarceration and hostile interrogation, or
had any connection with it, he w
ould, it seems probable. have m
ade the point loud
and clear. Indeed, in the only allusion he makes to the subject of specific
responsibility, McC
oy writes of "the team
working under 'D
aley's' dogmatic
direction to prepare the case against Nosenko."25
AN
INT
ER
IM D
EC
ISION
Forced to m
ake a judgment on the basis of the argum
ents presented so far, the
"Angleton is responsible" position m
ight well get the nod, depending on how
'Na
ive, D
av
id, 1
98
0, o
p. cit., p
. 16
2. T
he v
isit to K
atzen
ba
ch w
as d
ocu
men
ted in
a m
emo
ran
du
m fo
r
record
by C
IA G
enera
l Cou
nsel L
aw
rence H
ou
ston
, a co
py o
f wh
ich is rep
rod
uced
in H
SC
A, H
ean
ngs,
Vo
l. IV, p
. 26. T
his m
emo n
otes th
at th
ey w
ere info
rmed
that th
e agen
cy "
cou
ld ta
ke a
ny a
ction
necessa
ry to
carry
ou
t the term
s of th
e paro
le."
•
l 'Pow
ers, Th
om
as, 1
979, T
he M
an
Wh
o K
ep
t Th
e S
ecre
ts R
ich
ard
Nelm
s a
nd
the C
IA, A
lfred A
. Kn
op
f.
New
York
, p. 3
4. In
a co
nversa
tion
with
au
thor N
ike o
n 4
Au
gu
st 1989, P
ow
ers said
that A
ngleto
n's
nam
e nev
er cam
e up
in co
nn
ection
with
the d
ecision
to in
carcera
te an
d su
bm
it No
senk
o to
ho
stile
inte
rrogatio
n. '
"H
un
, Hen
ry, 19111.311AD
RIN
.- Th
e Sp
y Wh
o N
ewer C
om
e Rack, R
ead
er's Dig
est Press, N
ew Y
ork
, p. 2
78
.
aA
qu
arterly
pu
bb
ealio
n o
f the C
entra
l Intellig
ence R
etirees Asso
ciatio
n (C
IRA
).
3AM
cCoy id
entifies N
osen
ko
's case o
fficer as "
Stev
e Da
ly"
beca
use th
is is the p
seud
on
ym
used
in th
e TV
movie cited
in ref. 4
. Th
e reference is to
the sa
me p
erson
referred to
herein
as 'P
eter Bagley
" (see ref. 1
4).
crCIR
A N
ew
sle
tter, V
ol. X
II, No
. 3, F
all 1
98
7, p
p. 1
7-2
2.
INT
BISG
EN
CE
AN
D C
DU
NT
ER
INT
EU
-IGE
NC
E
VO
LU
ME
3, NU
MB
ER
4
460
SAM
UE
L H
AL
PE
RN
AN
D H
AY
DE
N P
EA
KE
D
ID A
NG
LE
TO
N JA
IL N
OSE
NK
O?
461
Murp
hy w
as a
sked b
y the C
om
mitte
e co
unse
l, "What d
ivision o
r unit o
f the
Centra
l Inte
lligence
Agency h
ad p
rimary re
sponsib
ility for N
ose
nko
?" H
e
answ
ere
d, T
he S
ovie
t Russia
Divisio
n." A
fter a
few
questio
ns a
bout d
ate
s,
counse
l retu
rned to
the re
sponsib
ility issue a
nd h
ad a
noth
er e
xchange w
ith
Murp
hy:
Counsel: A
s Chief of the S
oviet Russia D
ivision, did you have primary
responsibility for what happened to N
osenko? And w
hen I say happened.
where he w
as kept, what he w
as asked?
Murphy answ
ered: I was responsible for the case.
Counsel responded: "O
K."
Murphy then added: A
lthough the case was handled by one of the groups
within the division.
Counsel: B
ut they report to you?
Murp
hy: Y
es.36
Murp
hy w
ent o
n to
testify th
at th
e d
ecisio
n a
s to w
ho w
ould
questio
n N
ose
nko
was also m
ade in his division, and that no "truth drugs" were given to him
. Helm
s
later stated that the question of sodium pentothal did com
e up. but he said "no" to
its use.37 E
arly in
his te
stimony, H
elm
s was a
sked b
y HS
CA
Chairm
an L
ouis S
toke
s,
(D., O
hio
) "what u
nit w
ithin
the C
IA h
ad th
e p
rimary re
sponsib
ility for h
andlin
g
Mr. N
ose
nko
in 1
964?" H
e re
plie
d th
at "th
e O
ffice o
f Secu
rity was g
iven
responsibility for his housekeeping, his care, his feeding, his guarding, and that
the S
ovie
t Blo
c divisio
n h
ad th
e re
sponsib
ility for h
is inte
rrogatio
n." M
r. Helm
s
added th
at S
B d
ivision h
ad o
pera
tional (in
carce
ratio
n a
nd in
terro
gatio
n)
responsibility until 1967 when it w
as transferred to the Office of S
ecurity. 38
Then C
hairman S
tokes asked: "Whose decision w
as it, Mr. H
elms, to place him
in solitary confinement?" H
elms replied:
I think it was a decision arrived at by those involved in the case —
well it
was a kind of a decision jointly arrived at, 1 am
sure, on the recomm
endations
of the individuals who w
ere going to do the interragating....This is probably
not the kind of a decision an individual makes all by him
self....[ assume it
went to the D
irector for his approval....1 was a party to the decision, 1 am
sure of that....lt would not have been m
y final decision to make.39
'61-IS
CA
, Hea
rings, V
ol. X
II. p. 5
31.
"Ib
id., M
urp
hy testim
on
y, p
. 535; H
elms testim
on
y, IIS
CA
, Hea
rings, V
ol. IV
, pp
. 316-1
17. S
ee also
:
HS
CA
. Hea
rings, V
ol. X
D, p
. 541, w
hich
lists the six
dru
gs a
dm
inistered
to N
osen
ko fro
m J
an
uary
1964
to 1
968, a
ll of w
hich
arc th
erap
eutic m
edicin
es.
"IIS
CA
, Hea
rings, V
ol. IV
, p. 2
8.
p. 1
03.
INT
ER
NA
TIO
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
The R
ockefeller Com
mission R
eport of 1975 had comm
ented on this point stating
that N
osenko's
confin
em
ent "w
as a
ppro
ved b
y th
e D
irecto
r of C
entra
l
Inte
lligence
."40 w
ent C
learly, if it w
e to
the D
irecto
r, it was n
ot m
ade b
y Jam
es
An gleton. T
he Congressional testim
ony on responsibility for the Nosenko case is also
supported by the documentary evidence. A
17 February 1964 m
emorandum
from
the Chief, S
R D
ivision, to then DD
P H
elms, sum
marizes alternative courses of
action for handling Nosenko in light of the doubts about him
. Recom
mended to
Helm
s was a
n in
itial d
ebrie
fing p
erio
d in
an a
tmosp
here
of tru
st, "rath
er th
an
moving into an im
mediate show
down and hostile interrogation." H
elms approved
this recomm
endation the same day (subject to an oral m
odification), giving SR
Divisio
n th
e authority to proceed. E
xcept for the notation that a copy of the mem
o
was sent to the C
hief/CI. A
ngleton was not m
entioned.'"
It is true that the Cl S
taff eventually assumed a m
ore direct role in the Nosenko
case, but not until October 1967 w
hen the hostile interrogation was stopped and the
Office of S
ecurity assumed case responsibility from
the SB
Division. T
he Cl S
taff
role
invo
lved su
bm
itting "q
uestio
ns to
be u
sed fo
r contin
ued e
licitatio
n fro
m
Nosenk. o" during questioning by the O
ffice of Security.42
SO
ME
FIR
ST
- HA
ND
CO
MM
EN
TS
The te
stimony a
nd d
ocu
menta
tion m
entio
ned a
bove
indica
tes: (I) th
at th
e
resp
onsib
ility for th
e N
ose
nko
case
fell to
SB
divisio
n, n
ot th
e C
I Sta
ff and
Angleton. and (2) that the recom
mendation co
nce
rnin
g his incarceration and hostile
inte
rrogatio
n w
as m
ade b
y office
rs oth
er th
an A
ngle
ton. B
ut th
ere
may still b
e
some w
ho will argue that A
ngleton exercised a sinister, all-powerful, behind the
scenes role in the drama, to achieve these ends. A
nd, since no one in the hearings
eve
n a
sked, th
ere
is no d
irect co
ngre
ssional te
stimony o
n w
heth
er it w
as
°R
ep
ort to
the P
resid
en
t by s
he C
om
mis
sio
n o
n C
IA A
ctiv
ities w
ithin
Th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s
(Rock
efeller
Rep
ort), lu
ne 1
975, p
. 12. T
his rep
ort a
lso sta
ted th
at "
ITth
e CIA
main
tain
ed th
e lon
g co
nfin
emen
t
beca
use o
f dou
bts a
bou
t the b
een fid
es of th
e defecto
r INosen
kor A
l the tim
e the d
erision
was m
ad
e it
was a
nticip
ated
the in
terrogatio
n w
ou
ld ta
ke h
orn
two w
eeks to
two m
on
ths a
t most. F
m m
ore d
etails see
IISC
A, V
ol. X
n, pp
599-6
01.
41Mem
orand
um
For: D
DP
, Su
bject; N
osen
ko
: Cu
rren
t Sla
w a
nd
Imm
ed
iale
Pla
ns, d
ated 17 F
ebru
ary 1964.
from
Ch
ief, SR
Div
ision
, 4 p
ages, ro
uted
thro
ugh
Ch
ief, Office o
f Secu
rity, co
pies to
Ch
ief/C1 a
nd
AD
DP
. in IIS
CA
Hea
rings, V
ol. IV
, pp
. 116-9
0. T
his m
emo clea
rly in
dica
tes that A
ngleto
n w
as a
ware th
at
hostile in
terrogatio
n w
as u
nd
er con
sidera
tion
in F
ebru
ary
1964. N
on
e of th
e docu
men
ts availa
ble,
how
ever, d
isclose w
heth
er he o
pp
osed
, con
curred
, or lo
ok
an
y a
ction
at a
ll on
this p
oin
t. A n
ose a
n th
e
mem
o b
y M
r. Nelm
s ind
icates th
em is a
n "
ora
l con
ditio
n"
bu
t does n
ot sp
ecify w
hat is in
volv
ed.
uH
SC
A, H
earin
gs, V
ol., X
II, pp
. 544-5
45. M
emora
nd
um
For: D
CI, S
ub
ject: Prep
ara
tion
s for th
e
Reh
ab
ilitatio
n a
nd
Resettlem
ent o
f Yu
ri Nosen
ko. d
ated
24 M
arch
1969, p
ara
gra
ph
4, p
age 1
of 5
an
d
Step
5, p
age 5
; ap
pro
ved
by D
CI (H
elms) 2
Ap
ril 1969. ro
uted
thro
ugh
an
d in
itialed
by th
e Gen
eral
Cou
nsel. D
D/P
, D/S
ecurity
. Cited
in H
SC
A, H
earin
gs, V
ol. IV
, pp
. 80-1
35. T
his m
emo a
lso m
entio
ned
that th
e Office o
f Secu
rity a
nd
the D
DiP
wou
ld co
ord
inate w
ith th
e Cl S
taff, b
ut n
o o
pera
tion
al
respon
sibilities w
ere assig
ned
the S
taff.
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
AN
D C
OU
NT
ER
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
V
OL
UM
E 3, N
UM
BE
R 4
462
SAM
UE
L H
AL
PER
N A
ND
11AV
OE
N PE
AK
E
DID
AN
GL
ET
ON
JAIL
NO
SEN
KO
? 463
Angle
ton's d
esire
that N
ose
nko
be in
carce
rate
d a
nd q
uestio
ned a
s he w
as, o
r
whether he had e
ver w
orked toward that end.
There are, how
ever, comm
ents available from tw
o of those directly involved
who have not been quoted by nam
e elsewhere or published w
ritten accounts on
these issues. Both w
orked for Angleton; R
aymond G
. Rocca w
as his deputy, and
New
ton S. (S
cotty) Miler, his C
hief of Operations.
When asked by the authors, did A
ngleton jail Nosenko, R
occa replied: "It is my
clear re
colle
ction th
at Jim
Angle
ton w
as a
lways o
ppose
d in
prin
ciple
to th
e
confinement and hostile interrogation of Y
ury [sic) Nosenko and had no part in the
decision to do so." Rocca w
ent on to explain that he and Angleton w
ere informed
of the decision, prior to its implem
entation, during a meeting in N
ew Y
ork, which
he recalls clearly because he had not anticipated that topic. Be then added som
e
details about their reaction and the others present.
I was, in fact, present w
hen Jim A
ngleton learned from D
ave Murphy that the
Director of C
IA, on the recom
mendation of M
r. Murphy and his staff, had
authorized that course of action forthwith. Jim
Angleton, D
ave Murphy and 1,
among others, w
ere in New
York C
ity at the time for a day-long planning
discussion dealing with a totally unrelated m
atter. These conversations took
pla
ce in
the
5th
Ave
nu
e H
ote
l (24
5th
Ave
nu
e). N
ew
Yo
rk City. Jim
Angleton's reaction: "It w
as a mistake." I rem
ember those w
ords because
agreed with them
. As far as I know
from m
y contacts with JA
until his death,
he never changed that opinion.°
Scotty M
iler was assigned to the C
I Staff in O
ctober 1964 while N
osenko was
still being interrogated in a safehouse in the Washington aria. O
ne of Miler's first
assignments, given hint by A
ngleton personally, was to "review
and monitor the
Nosenko case," w
hich he continued to do, among other things, until his retirem
ent
in Decem
ber 1974. Recalling the initial briefing A
ngleton gave him on the case
progress until that time (O
ctober 1964), Miler said:
Angleton m
ade it clear he had had no role in the decision to confine Nosenko.
He opposed the hostile interrogation approach —
he told me defectors should
43 1
Mr. R
occa
is not certa
in o
f the d
ate o
f the m
eeting. 1
1 th
e DC
I au
thoriza
tion
men
tion
ed w
as th
e decisio
n
to reso
rt to th
e ho
stile interro
ga
tion
wh
ich b
ega
n o
n 4
Ap
ril 19
64
in th
e Wa
shin
gto
n a
rea (H
SC
A, V
ol.
Ft. 5
44
). the m
eeting m
ust h
ave o
ccurred
befo
re then
. On
the o
ther h
an
d, if th
e decisio
n m
entio
ned
con
cerned
the m
ovem
ent to
an
d co
ntin
ued
interro
gatio
n o
f Nosen
ko in
a sp
ecially
con
structed
facility
ou
tside th
e Wash
ingto
n a
rea, th
e meetin
g co
uld
ha
ve ta
ken
pla
ce in la
te 196
4 o
r early
19
65
, allo
win
g
time fo
r con
structio
n. N
osen
lois m
ovem
ent to
the la
tter facility
was in
Octo
ber 1
965. In
either ca
m,
since A
ng
leton
kn
ew th
at h
ostile in
terrog
atio
n w
ar a
n a
lternativ
e (see ref. 41), o
nly
the D
CI d
ecision
to
do
is wo
uld
ha
ve b
een n
ew in
form
atio
n. A
t the tim
e of N
osen
ko
's inca
rceratio
n, M
r. Ro
cca w
as
An
gleto
n's C
hief o
f the R
esearch
sod
An
aly
sis Div
ision
. flis com
men
ts qu
oted
here w
ere ma
de in
discu
ssion
with
the a
uth
ors a
nd
in a
mem
o to
the a
uth
ors d
ated
28 A
ugu
st 1989, sig
ned
by M
r. Roc..
Mr. R
occa
also
con
firmed
th
at h
e had
nev
er been
ask
ed b
y J
oh
n H
art, o
r an
y o
ther in
vestig
ato
r on
the
Nosen
ko ca
se, ab
ou
t an
y ru
le of th
e CI S
taff,
INT
ER
NA
TIO
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
be interrogated on the basis of their own inform
ation and not confronted
hostilely. He said he did not expect the hostile interrogation to w
ork but that
given the fait accompli situation I w
as to review N
osenko's information
available to the CI S
taff and submit questions to the S
R/S
B for possible use
with N
osesiko.44
Finally, contrary to A
dmiral T
urner's charge that Angleton's counterintelligence
team
set o
ut to
bre
ak th
e m
an p
sycholo
gica
lly," Mile
r note
d th
at "n
o C
I Sta
ff
personnel ever interrogated or interviewed N
osenko from 1964 to 1975."45
TH
E W
EIG
HT
OF
EV
IDE
NC
E '
After 15 years under C
IA control, during w
hich he repeatedly gave contradictory
statements in interview
s by agency officers and in testimony to the C
ongress, Yuri
Nosenko w
as "resettled on the economy in A
pril 1969.'46
Ten years later, the F
BI
informed the H
SC
A that, "O
n May 11. 1977 the C
IA and the F
BI concurred that
Nosenko w
as a bona fide defector, based upon an assessment of the totality of
information furnished by him
." Neither the F
BI nor the C
IA has provided a public
exp
lanatio
n a
s to w
hy th
is decisio
n w
as m
ade e
ight ye
ars a
fter N
ose
nko
was
rese
ttled. M
ore
ove
r, no d
eta
ils were
pro
vided to
indica
te h
ow
Nose
nko
's
contradictions were resolved, if they w
ere. And, throughout this period, despite
subsequent claims to the contrary, the only m
ention of James A
ngleton and his CI
Staff in connection w
ith Nosenko, had to do w
ith the questions to be asked during
"L
ike R
occa
, Miler sta
tes An
gleto
n "
had
no p
an
in th
e decisio
n"
' to co
nfin
e Nosen
ko a
nd
in fa
ct op
posed
the a
pp
roach
. "P
eter Bagley
," o
n th
e oth
er han
d. reca
lls thin
gs a
little differen
tly. B
agley
say
s, "I
remem
ber n
o o
pp
ositio
n (a
s op
posed
to reserv
atio
ns, w
hich
we a
ll fell) prio
r to th
e inca
rceratio
n fro
m
an
y o
f the p
an
icipan
it in sh
e decisio
n w
hich
, as
Dick
Helm
s testified, w
as o
ak
en jo
intly
'by th
ose
involv
ed in
the ca
se' — in
clud
ing A
ngleto
n."
[Letter to
the a
uth
ors fro
m "
Peter B
agley
," d
ated
19
Octo
ber 1
989.1
T
he d
ocu
men
tary
evid
ence a
vaila
ble d
ots n
ot in
dica
te an
y a
dvoca
cy o
f hostile in
terrogatio
n b
y
An
gleton.
Lik
ewise. th
ere is no in
dica
tion
that A
ngleto
n to
ok
an
y fo
rmal a
ction
ou
tside th
e CI S
taff to
op
po
se ho
stile interro
ga
tion
, wh
ich in
bu
reau
cratic term
s can
be in
terpreted
as p
assiv
e go
pp
on
Mo
t
respo
nsib
ility), p
rincip
les no
twith
stan
din
g.
Miler w
ent o
n to
poin
t ou
t that a
fter Nosen
ko w
as relea
sed fro
m co
nfin
emen
t an
d th
e Office o
f
Secu
rity to
ok
ov
er the ca
se, it started
to a
pp
ly th
e ap
pro
ach
An
gleto
n h
ad
orig
ina
lly reco
mm
end
ed, w
ha
t
he ca
lled elicita
tion
, usin
g sein
e qu
estion
s from
the C
l Sta
ff. Bu
t by th
en, N
ovem
ber 1
967, th
e pressu
re
to reso
lve th
e case w
as In
tense, th
e qu
estion
ing
wa
s con
den
sed, n
on
e of th
e CI S
taff q
uestio
ns w
ere ask
ed
du
ring
No
senk
it's fina
l po
lyg
rap
h ex
am
ina
tion
, an
d th
e pro
cess of elicita
tion
wa
s nev
er com
pleted
.
IPh
on
e con
versa
tion
s with
Miler, a
nd
letter to th
e au
thors fro
m N
ewto
n S
. Miler. d
ined
18 A
ugu
st 1989.1
°Ro
cca so
d M
au
con
versa
tion
s with
the a
uth
ors. J
uly
an
d A
ug
ust 1
98
9.
"H
SC
A, H
earin
gs, V
ol.
p. 5
76, 5
82, 5
87. T
he co
ntra
dictio
ns v
aried
from
claim
s ab
ou
t his ra
nk
(he
Said
at v
ario
us tim
es he w
as a
majo
r an
d lieu
tenan
t colo
nel a
nd
ad
mitted
even
tually
he w
as so
lidly
a
cap
tain
), to d
escriptio
ns a
bo
ut th
e size an
d n
atu
re of O
swa
ld's K
GB
file an
d h
is ina
bility
to d
escribe
ad
equ
ately
KG
B o
rgan
traiiim
al elem
ents to
wh
ich h
e said
he h
ad
been
assig
ned
. Th
e resettlemen
t deta
ils
are g
iven
In a
Mem
ora
nd
um
For: D
irector o
f Cen
tral In
telligen
ce, sign
ed b
y th
e Directo
r of th
e Office o
f
Secu
rity, dated
5 Octob
er 1972, and
repro
du
ced in
IISC
A, H
earin
gs, V
ol. IV
, pp
. 92
-94
.
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
AN
OC
OU
NT
ER
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
V
OL
UM
E 3, N
UM
BE
R 4
464
SAJA
UE
L H
AL
PER
N A
ND
HA
YD
EN
PEA
KE
Nosenko's interrogations. For these reasons at least, the N
osenko case in general, and his bona fides in particular, rem
ain controversial 47 B
ut, concerning the responsibility for Nosenko's incarceration and hostile
interrogation, the congressional testimony, N
ewsw
eek's admission of error, and
the firsthand accounts of Rocca and M
iler, support the conclusion that neither Jam
es Angleton nor his C
I Staff were responsible.
The rem
aining unanswered question is the obvious contradiction betw
een this conclusion and A
dmiral T
urner's version of the events; both cannot be correct. Perhaps T
urner had information that has never been revealed publicly. B
ut if this be the case, the public testim
ony of many w
itnesses would then be incorrect
because the specific question of responsibility for the operation did arise, was
answered, and excluded A
ngleton. The alternative is that A
dmiral T
urner got it w
rong, and the facts indicate that is what happened.
17L
euer o
f Fed
eral B
urea
u o
f Investig
atio
n to
the H
SC
A, d
ated
8 J
an
uary
1979, rep
rod
uced
in H
SC
A,
Hea
rings, V
ol. X
II, p. 5
68. U
nfo
rtun
ately
, the C
IA reco
rds m
ad
e pu
blic d
o n
ot d
iscuss th
e I I May 1
977
da
te, bu
t they
do
gin
gen
con
tinu
ed o
rga
nita
non
al co
nfu
sion
on
the b
on
e fides q
uestio
n. D
epu
ty D
CI,
VA
DM
Ru
fus T
ay
lor, su
bm
itted h
is stud
y o
f the ca
se with
a 4
Octo
ber 1
96
8 m
emo
ran
du
m to
the D
irector
in w
hich
he stated, "
I conclu
de that N
osenko sh
ould be accepted as a bon
a fide defector" H
u ju
dgm
ent
ag
reed w
ith th
e Office o
f Secu
rity.
In th
e sam
e vein
, in a
n a
ttach
men
t to a
I Sep
temb
er 1978 letter iv
the IIS
CA
from
the C
FA
CO
MIC
% for
the C
om
mittee, S
cott D
. Breck
enrid
ge, it w
as sta
ted th
at, "
Follow
ing acceptan
ce of biasenkoi bon
a fides in
late 1
968. M
r. Helm
appro
ved a
n a
rran
gem
ent w
inch
resulted
to N
asen
kes em
plo
ymen
t." S
ee: IIS
CA
, Hea
rings, V
ol. IV
, p, 4
6, 4
9, 1
30; see a
lso IIS
CA
, Ilean
ngs, V
ol. X
II, pp
. 546, 5
52, 5
53. 5
56.
Bu
t a su
bseq
uen
t mem
o in
dica
ted th
e bon
a fid
es were still in
dou
bt o
fficially
. A 2
4 M
arch
1969
Mem
ora
nd
um
to th
e Directo
r discu
sses ha
nd
ling
No
senk
o a
nd
wh
at to
do
"W
hen
we
lea a
t favorably reso
lved d
isagreem
ent w
ithin
the A
gen
cy as to
his b
on
a ru
les." It g
oes o
n to
no
te tha
t "the p
rob
lem
of N
osenko's bon
a fides and h
is rehabilitation
and resettlem
ent can
be considered separately."
See: IIS
CA
, H
earin
gs, V
ol. IV
, p. 4
5. M
r. Helm
s testified th
at if N
osen
ko
's "b
on
a fid
es were esta
blish
ed in
19
68
, 1
have n
o reco
llection
of th
is havin
g h
ap
pen
ed."
Th
is is un
dersta
nd
ab
le if the d
ecision
was n
ot m
ad
e un
til 1
97
7 a
s the F
R1 m
emo
ma
les. Mo
reov
er, Helm
s testified h
e cou
ld n
ot a
ccou
nt fo
r the sta
temen
t in th
e 1
Sep
temb
er letter that N
osen
kcia
bon
a fid
es had
been
accep
ted in
1968. (S
ee: Hea
rings, V
ol. IV
, pp
. 62-
63.) T
he id
ea th
at so
me in
the C
IA th
ou
gh
t that N
usen
ko h
ad
been
form
ally
"giv
en"
his b
on
e fides in
196
8 m
ay ha
ve co
me in
pa
n F
rom
VA
DM
Ta
ylo
r's 19
68
mem
o.
No
ne o
f the p
ub
lic docu
men
ts ind
icatin
g th
at N
osen
ko
's bo
na fid
es were a
ccepted
dea
l with
the
specific fu
nd
am
enta
l op
erau
on
al m
aso
ns th
at ra
ised th
e do
ub
ts 111 th
e first pla
ce. For a
mo
re deta
iled
acco
un
t of th
ese reaso
ns see IIS
CA
, Hca
nn
gs, V
ol. X
II. pp
. 573-6
44.
INT
ER
NA
TIO
NA
L JO
UR
NA
L O
F
JER
EM
Y R
. T. LEW
IS
Freed
om
of In
form
atio
n:
Develo
pm
en
ts in th
e
Un
ited
Kin
gd
om
While num
erous changes have occurred in official secrecy and Freedom
of Inform
ation in Britain during the last few
years, structural and cultural factors cause continuing difficulties for the B
ritish Freedom of inform
ation movem
ent. T
raditionally. government authority descended from
the Crow
n rather than rising from
the people in a revolution; that authority was reinforced by deference to
the national security establishment during W
orld War 11. G
enerations of young people up to and including that of the early 1960s w
ere brought up with parental
stories of being bombed nightly w
hile doing homew
ork under the stairs. "Careless
talk costs lives" was the slogan for keeping things "hush hush." B
ritain came very
close to being invaded by the Nazis; sim
ulations and war gam
es after the event have confirm
ed that southern England w
ould have been lost, and the fight for survival continued by underground guerrilla forces. W
hile the Royal A
ir Force (R
AF
) was principally responsible for stopping G
erman invasion plans,
counterintelligence subsequently played a major role in turning around the w
ar by cracking the G
erman and Japanese ciphers. K
nowledge of that effort had to be
guarded (some have w
ritten) even at the expense of permitting the bom
bing attack on C
oventry, which cost 40,000 lives.' S
ince 1974, the government has
authorized publication of these codebreaking successes to offset scandals occurring
'Nig
el West, in
his b
oo
k reex
am
inin
g in
telligen
ce my
ths o
f Wo
rld W
ar II, a
rgu
es tha
t Co
ven
try w
as n
ot
in fa
ct delib
erately
sacrificed
to p
rotect th
e fact th
at th
e cod
es had
been
bro
ken
. His su
ggestio
n is th
at
figh
ter aircra
ft were n
ot su
ccessfully
vecto
red o
nto
the G
elman
bom
ber strea
m b
y R
AF
sign
als
intercep
tion
SW
IMS
mo
nito
ring
Germ
an
pa
thfin
din
g b
eam
s.
Dr. Je
rem
y Le
wis is a
n a
ssistan
t pro
fesso
r, De
pa
rtme
nt o
f Po
litical S
cien
ce,
Leh
man
Co
lleg
e/C
UN
Y, N
ew
Yo
rk.
465
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
AND
CO
UN
TE
RIN
TE
LL
IGE
NC
E
VO
LU
ME
3, NU
MB
ER
4