HAWKS, DOVES AND KENNEDYS Robert Kennedy and the Vietnam War

CONTENTS Introduction Chapter One Was Robert Kennedy Ever A Hawk? Chapter Two After The Fall Chapter Three Hawk, Dove or Chicken? Conclusion Sources Annex I people/organisations

Introduction How did Robert Kennedy’s position on the Vietnam War develop between the early stages of escalation during the Kennedy-administration and his own presidential campaign as peace-candidate in 1968? In this essay I intend to describe how Robert Kennedy emerged as a staunch critic of President Johnson’s Vietnam policy despite having been a key member of the administration that helped shape those policies. I will focus primarily on Kennedy’s developing view and how he made those known in cabinet meetings, speeches, debates, press-conferences, campaign-books and in private discussions with members of his staff. I originally intended to call this paper `How A Hawk Became A Dove’, but I felt it left no room for the possible outcome that perhaps Robert Kennedy had never been a hawk. Just as it ruled out any possibility that he never really became a dove. I therefore chose the title `Hawks, Doves, and Kennedys’, in part also because it’s impossible to understand Robert Kennedy without a clear picture of his brother’s Presidency For the sake of readability I have not always added the full title and function of each person mentioned or quoted in the main body of this essay. However I have included a list of people and their titles as Annex I. Xavier Baudet December 19th 2011

CHAPTER ONE WAS ROBERT KENNEDY EVER A HAWK? This question calls for some closer analysis of the earliest episode in which Robert Kennedy had the chance to influence Vietnam-policy: the administration of his brother, which began in January 1961. To which extent can President Kennedy’s policy be labeled as hawkish? And if it can be labeled as such, can Robert Kennedy’s contribution be viewed as hawkish, or did he perhaps have a restraining effect? As part of my answer I will describe the Kennedy administration’s approach of the conflict in Vietnam, particularly during the first major Vietnam- related crisis Kennedy faced and how this crisis affected the balance between doves and hawks. President Kennedy was determined not to `lose Vietnam’ like China had been `lost’ under President Truman. Particularly after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion and the construction of the Berlin Wall Kennedy felt that US credibility was at stake. Nonetheless he viewed the Bay of Pigs disaster as a major warning not to send in troops too easily, for instance in the case of Laos: “Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did, otherwise we’d be in Laos by now – and that would be a hundred times worse”, he told Ted Sorensen in September 1961 1 . As for Vietnam, Kennedy was reluctant to send full- fledged combat troops but instead expanded America’s military presence from 900 in 1960 to over 16000 in 1963. This presence consisted mainly of special forces, such as `Green Berets’ and other experts of Counterinsurgency, a strategy that both the President and his brother adhered to. Jack Newfield describes the `hawks’and `doves’ in The Kennedy administration as both being rather bellicose. The first group , the `military’group which included Walt Rostow, Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara favored bombing and sending ground troops, the second group, the `political’group included Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman, John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Kennedy. They believed a solution had to come from social and political reform in combination with `counterinsurgency’ tactics. Both groups aimed on `winning’ the war, they just disagreed on the tactics. It needs be said that members of both factions believed in Counterinsurgency, but the doves tended to place their bets more on programs aimed on winning the hearts and minds of the population, whereas the hawks cared more for covert action, for which the Green Berets were particularly trained. Robert Kennedy was a big fan of the Green Berets2. According to Newfield there was always a third group, which included George Ball and Chester Bowles. They believed America could not win a land war. Instead they suggested that America negotiated a settlement that included neutralization3. Kennedy supported this view, but only as an eventual solution. Not something for the immediate future. Although Bowles rapidly lost influence after leaking his initial reservations about the Bay of Pigs to the press, but George Ball continued to express his criticism and at one time 1 Sorensen, Theodore C, Kennedy (New York 1965) 644 2 Jones,Howard, Death Of A Generation. How the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam 2 Jones,Howard, Death Of A Generation. How the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War (Oxford 2003)26,27 and Newfield, Jack, Robert Kennedy A Memoir,( New York 1969/1988)113 3 Newfield, 113

said: 'Within five years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again.' But Kennedy laughed and replied, 'Well, George, you're supposed to be one of the smartest guys in town, but you're crazier than hell. That will never happen.' 4 Still this quote only shows President Kennedy’s faith in America’s strength, it says little about his actual intentions. In fact President Kennedy ‘s position remains subject to debate to this day. The political reasons for this are clear: He is the one liberal that even conservatives regard as heroic. It is natural that they want him in their camp, just as the pacifists would like him in theirs. Conservative scholars like Michael Lint suggest that he, like so many ‘cold war liberals’ would have eventually jumped ship and become a Republican had he been alive to witness the Democratic party being taken over by pacifists and hippies5. On the other side of the political specter there are scholars like Arthur Schlesinger who view the Kennedy administration as fundamentally more cautious and less bellicose than the two subsequent governments. Not merely because most of the war took place after Kennedy’s death but because it would never have been fought the way it did, if it had escalated at all under JFK. Schlesinger dedicates chapter 31 of his book Robert Kennedy And His Times to explaining President Kennedy’s position and stresses his unwillingness to send in ground troops. He quotes several members of his administration 6 to whom Kennedy allegedly had promised to withdraw by the end of 1965. Pierre Salinger is quoted as saying that Kennedy called Vietnam a `swamp’7, a view supported by Roswell Gilpatrick8 to whom Kennedy had confessed that he felt that America had been ‘ sucked into Vietnam little by little ’. He concludes the chapter with a quote from Ho Chi Minh himself, suggesting that even he thought Kennedy would have ended the war quickly9. Yet Schlesinger concedes that Kennedy’s Vietnam-policy was `dual and contradictory’10 and he does not fail to mention his public statements about Vietnam such as the Walter Cronkite interview of September 1963 in which he clearly argued against withdrawal11 . Schlesinger explains this ambiguity by saying that Kennedy had to avoid being viewed as weak with an eye on the 1964 elections and the danger of ‘another red scare’12. He builds his case that Kennedy would eventually have pulled out with a quote from Charles Maechlin Jr who says that to both Kennedys Vietnam was part of a larger game, not a purpose in itself and that `as civilized, well-educated Americans they were totally devoid of the obsessive attitudes that characterized President Johnson under the influence of the

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Wildman_Ball 5 Lint, Michael, Vietnam The Necessary War, a reinterpretation of America’s most disastrous military conflict New York 1999, xiii 6 Schlesinger Arthur M, Jr, Robert Kennedy And His Times, 710 and 722 7 Idem,722 8 Idem,710 9 Idem 723 10 Idem 725 11 See Annex III 12 Idem 711

hardliners’13. He quotes hardliner William Bundy saying that Vietnam was really Johnson’s and not Kennedy’s war 14. However Schlesinger’s credibility is somewhat diminished as his desire to exonerate the Kennedys becomes too obvious: Schlesinger calls Robert Kennedy’s involvement `strictly limited’ just before he quotes from an interview Kennedy gave in 1964 in which he admits that withdrawal was never a serious option, just as going further in wasn’t. When asked if they would have sent in ground forces in case the South Vietnamese would not be able to defend themselves, he answered: `we’d face that when we came to it’15. An author's choice to quote someone's most self- incriminating remarks embedded in exonerating evidence is somewhat dubious. And even if the `we’d face that when we came to it’ remark is a sign of pragmatism rather than obsessive belligerence, it also suggests that Vietnam was not on the top of his agenda when perhaps it should have been. However it is true that very little suggests that Robert Kennedy played a pivotal role in shaping his brother’s Vietnam policy. The Diem-Crisis But it was Robert Kennedy who initiated the first National Security Council policy meetings after Cable 243 had made it clear in his words that `nobody knew what our policy was’. Cable 243 is one of the most controversial and indeed consequential events in the Vietnam War. On August 24 1963 four of Kennedy's advisors, George Ball, Mike Forrestal, Roger Hilsman and Averell Harriman, in the absence of their superiors authorized a telegram to be sent to ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon in which he was told to increase the pressure on South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and remind him of his disposability. Kennedy had authorized the cable believing it had the support of the CIA and the State Department, which in fact it didn't. This caused a huge conflict between the 'military' group and the 'political' group. Those who were primarily concerned with the hearts and minds, felt that Diem had become an embarrassment, or in George Ball's words 'an offense' to the US16. Years earlier Diem, a pro- US and anti-communist Catholic, had been introduced to President Eisenhower by some of the Catholic US politicians who now controlled America's foreign policy, including President Kennedy himself. However, once put in charge Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu proved totally unreliable. First of all, their military forces were less than effective in fighting the Vietcong 17. It appeared to many that their servicemen were more interested in lasting long enough to eventually get promoted than to protect the villages against Viet Cong raids. Secondly Diem's rule was extremely authoritarian, particularly against the Buddhists, of which of course there are quite a number in Vietnam. 13 Idem 729 14 Idem 727 15 Ibidem, 16 Jones, Howard, Death Of A Generation. How the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War 319 17 Lint,14 and Young Marilyn B, The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 (New York 1991) 90

One of the things that went dreadfully wrong under Diem was the Strategic Hamlet Program. The idea behind this program was to separate the good from the bad and allow the good to grow accustomed to the benefits of modernization in order to foster a pro-capitalist rural class. In order to achieve this, villages (hamlets) with modern conveniences were to be built in strategic locations, each hamlet sufficiently fortified so as to keep the Viet Cong out. Eventually a whole network of hamlets would emerge and thus, pacified territory would expand, much like an oil blot. This program was developed by Roger Hilsman and endorsed by President Kennedy in february 1962 18. But Diem's soldiers never protected these hamlets sufficiently and so the VC could easily infiltrate them. Secondly the hamlets weren't in strategically relevant places, they were built wherever Diem's army happened to be. Thirdly, the building materials provided by the US military were not handed out to the villagers as intended but instead confiscated by Diem's men and the people were made to buy them19. Fourthly the villages were not separated from the VC but they were in effect separated from each other, since the roads between them weren't safe. And because the nearest market towns were so far away, their economic failures were guaranteed as well20. Most importantly however, since the Strategic Hamlet Program included the forced relocation of millions of Buddhists and this meant they had to leave their ancestors burial sites unattended as well. This caused great heartache among the Buddhists, which in the spring 1963 led to an outburst of protests culminating in the self-immolation of the monk Thich Quang Duc on June 11th 1963. Despite harsh criticism from the US, Diem proved unwilling to change his course and Madam Nhu even mocked the event as a 'barbecue' and offered free gasoline to each Buddhist willing to follow Duc’s example. To make things worse Nhu's forces raided the Buddhist pagodas on August 21, while the American Ambassador was away, which further annoyed the Kennedy-administration. Some of the doves in the Kennedy administration, those who were convinced that the war could never be won by military means alone but instead opted for tactics to win the hearts and minds of the people had by now grown increasingly uncomfortable with Diem. The Strategic Hamlet Program was a key element of the Counterinsurgency approach and it had by now obviously failed, not because it was a bad idea21 but because it was executed so poorly. It is no coincidence that one of the biggest supporters of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Roger Hilsman, was also behind Cable 243. The historical irony of this is clear: if the overthrow of Diem was the point of no return for an increased US military involvement , it was aided by those who placed the least trust in a military solution. Of course the significance of this episode and the

18 Latham, Michael E, Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam http://viet-studies.info/kinhte/Nation_Building_VN_TWQ.pdf and: Hilsman, Roger To Move a Nation, (New York, 1967), 427-438 19 Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1988), 309-310 20 Young, 82 21 It had worked in Malaya and the Philippines

opportunities missed because of it have been subject to debate throughout the years. Some would say that Diem's passing wouldn't necessarily have called for a greater military involvement, it might as well have caused the opposite and enabled Kennedy, had he lived long enough, to (as Nixon would later call it) 'Vietnamize' the war and eventually pull out. This is Arthur Schlesinger's view. It is important to realize that although Robert Kennedy had little to do with Cable 243 or the eventual overthrow of Diem, he was a huge proponent of political Counterinsurgency (winning the hearts and minds) as an alternative to traditional military intervention. But some of his strongest allies had put the administration in an awkward position. Not only for releasing Cable 243 half unwarranted, but also because with the Strategic Hamlet Program they had provided the Viet Cong with an effective vehicle for broadening their support in the South Vietnamese countryside. Even if its ultimate failure can not be blamed on the doves in Washington, it must have diminished their stature and influence22. This however did not keep Robert Kennedy from saying in the NSC-meeting of September 6 1963 that ‘if a communist take-over was eventually going to happen anyway, the US should leave immediately23’. This was a brave thing to do and a sign of his continued belief that the war could not be won with military means only. So he was clearly the dove here. According to Schlesinger his point was more or less dismissed24. But if that's the case, where was his brother, the President? It is possible that by this time President Kennedy felt more akin to the hawks in his administration, as two interviews he gave that week suggest25. In the following month President Kennedy sent Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam and their conclusions were far from optimistic. Diem could not be made to listen and had by now lost almost all support. Further more they also learned that the Strategic Hamlets Program was a failure26. On coming home they advised the President to announce ' the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of 1963 in connection with a program to train Vietnamese to replace Americans in all "essential functions" by 1965'27 And on October 5th 1963 Kennedy approved the measures but declined to formally announce the troop withdrawal and telegraphed to Lodge in Saigon: Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key 22 Years later it became known that the officer in charge of the program, Pham Ngoc Tho was in fact a communist infiltrator who deliberately disrupted the program. He was posthumously appointed a Colonel by Communist Vietnam. http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/essays/hamlets/0168.cfm 23 Newfield, 117 24 Schlesinger, 714 25 http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kentv.htm. 26 Jones 373-374 27 Elsberg Daniel `The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963’. Pentagon Papers. 201–276.

Vietnamese groups as to future intentions of United States. At same time, actions are designed to have at most slight impact on military or counterinsurgency effort against Viet Cong, at least in short term28. So Kennedy's withdrawal plan was not a sign of a serious intention to leave Vietnam, but a move in a political game of chess with the South Vietnamese leadership. By comparison: the Taylor McNamara Report appears to be serious about troop withdrawal. Conclusion The Kennedy-administration were neither hawkish nor dovish, it was pragmatic. Robert Kennedy's position concerning Vietnam during his brother's presidency cannot be regarded as hawkish either. His involvement was indeed 'strictly limited' as Schlesinger put it. But Robert Kennedy was a strong proponent of Counterinsurgency as an alternative to traditional warfare. However, a distinction can be made between the kind of Counterinsurgency that aims on winning the hearts and minds of the people, and the kind that involves covert action by special forces such as the Green Berets. The Strategic Hamlet Program was an example of the first and it failed bitterly, which may have contributed to the doves gradually losing influence, as perhaps did the unwarranted release of Cable 243. Yet Robert Kennedy suggested complete withdrawal during the Diem crisis. However, there were others in the administration, like George Ball, who were more dovish than Robert Kennedy. 28 Ellsberg, Daniel, 201–276.

CHAPTER TWO AFTER THE FALL Robert Kennedy’s ability to shape US foreign policy was significantly reduced on November 22nd 1963. Because, to quote the George Ball Rule of Power, "Nothing propinks like propinquity": the more direct access one has to the President, the greater one’s power, regardless of one’s actual title29. When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, his younger brother was left with little more than his official title, United States Attorney General. Things might have been different if his relationship with the new president had been a better one, but Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy never got along. Still, both rivals realized they needed each other’s political support.

Robert Kennedy hoped for some time during 1964 that Johnson might offer him the Vice Presidential spot30. This depended in part on who the eventual Republican nominee was going to be. Was it going to be a liberal Republican like Rockefeller or (George) Romney, he might be needed to keep the North in Johnson’s column. Were the GOP to nominate a conservative Southerner, then Kennedy might actually hurt him in the South. But the Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater, the most conservative and least electable Republican available, and so Robert Kennedy wasn’t needed. Goldwater ran with the slogan ‘In your heart you know he’s right’ and Johnson answered with `In your guts, you know he’s nuts’ and won.

Another parody of Goldwater’s slogan was ‘In your heart you know he might’, which was a reference to the war in Vietnam. For Goldwater had once jokingly remarked that someone ought to `lob one (a nuclear bomb) into the men’s room of the Kremlin’. This, in combination with his remark "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue" left the impression that Goldwater was an extremist who would not hesitate to push the nuclear button.31 After a few gaffes from Goldwater it became easy to distort his record and spread the rumor that he was referring to nuclear war as a solution for Vietnam. Johnson’s famous Daisy add32 did the rest. Obviously Johnson had positioned himself as the dove versus the hawk Goldwater.

So, had any liberal Democrat wanted to disagree publicly with Johnson, Vietnam was not the topic. And as long as Kennedy was an option for the vice presidential spot it made no sense for him to criticize Johnson or outline his differences with the President33. At the Democratic National Convention Kennedy was welcomed with a 20 minute standing ovation, after which he delivered a eulogy of his brother, but even this didn’t persuade

29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Ball 30 Schlesinger, 657 31http://www.thefreelibrary.com/To+defeat+a+maverick%3a+the+Goldwater+candidacy+revisited%2c+1963-1964.-a020223410 32 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uO0R4k1tVMs&feature=related 33Could the interview RFK gave to John Bartlow Martin in April 1964 (Annex IV), in which he said that withdrawal had never been a serious option be viewed in this light as well?

Johnson to hire Kennedy. And so, as Kennedy felt he would only be useful until Johnson was officially elected34 he decided to step down as Attorney General and run for the Senate on behalf of New York so he would have a mandate of his own.

Three months before the Convention, on June 11th Kennedy had offered Johnson his services as ambassador to South Vietnam. In his letter to Johnson he called Vietnam `obviously the most important problem facing the US today’. Johnson declined, fearing someone might seek revenge for the murder of Diem35. It’s interesting why Kennedy applied for this job and the Vice Presidency at the same time. But since Goldwater had already defeated his main Republican rival Rockefeller it had become increasingly unlikely that Johnson would pick Kennedy as running mate. What is equally interesting is that he had a clear understanding of how big a problem Vietnam really was and since he asked to be sent there, probably did not expect Johnson to change the Kennedy-policies much.

Then, on August 2 1964 North Vietnamese ships allegedly fired at the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. Within days Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (officially Asia Resolution) granting the President permission to use conventional military force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war. Only two senators, Morse and Gruening, both Democrats, voted against it. Robert Kennedy was still a member of the cabinet, still hoping for some kind of promotion. And if he had any reservations at all. he didn’t make them known. In fact he remained almost silent about Vietnam until April 1965. Shortly after the first major anti-war demonstration in Washington36, Senator Kennedy went to the Whitehouse to ask Johnson for a bombing-pause. Johnson answered he would think about it, but the next day he sent a request for $700 million to Congress suggesting that Congress consider it `not a routine appropriations bill but a vote of confidence’37.

This angered Kennedy so much that he decided to speak out. May 6 1965 marks the first time Kennedy publicly (but politely) called for a different course in Vietnam. He called for honorable negotiations between the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese. He also criticized the government: ` I believe we have erred for some time in regarding Vietnam as purely a military problem when in its essential aspects it is also a political and diplomatic problem. I would wish for example that the request for appropriations today had made provisions for programs to better the lives of the people of South Vietnam’ 38 But Kennedy was careful enough to use the word `we’ instead of saying ‘President Johnson has erred for some time etc’. And he decided to vote for the subsidy, although a number of his colleagues had decided not to.

Then on July 9th he addressed students at the International Police Academy and said: `The essence of successful Counterinsurgency is not to kill, but to bring the insurgent back into national life’….`Air attacks by a government of its own villages are likely to be

34 Schlesinger, 631 35 Idem 728 36 April 17th 1965 37 Schlesinger729 38 Newfield, 120

far more dangerous and costly to the people then is the individual selective terrorism of an insurgent movement’. He had originally planned to add: ‘Victory in a revolutionary war is not won by escalation, but by de-escalation’. But he decided to hold his tongue. However, the press had already received the original version of the speech and by the end of the day, Kennedy’s dissent was official. Furthermore there had been so many quotes from President Kennedy in the speech that it was impossible to miss the obvious hint that the Johnson Administration was moving away from Counterinsurgency as Kennedy had intended it39.

Despite some minor skirmishes with the press,40 he kept silent about Vietnam for the rest of 1965. Privately Kennedy had hailed Johnson for supporting the Christmas bombing-halt that McNamara had proposed. Johnson thanked him for his `warm letter’ and said he felt `prayerfully alone’. But just four days later he resumed the bombing. And again as in May, Kennedy felt personally betrayed and radicalized yet a little more. On January 31st 1966 he told the Senate: ‘If we regard bombing as the answer in Vietnam we are headed straight for disaster’, and he proceeded to explain that in the past, bombing had never driven a rural economy to its knees, let alone a guerilla army41’.

Around this time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by Senator Fulbright, opened public hearings on the war in Vietnam. Kennedy felt that the tone of these hearings, particularly the interrogation of Dean Rusk was too scholarly. And more importantly it struck him that no one asked the questions he deemed vital. No one offered a clue as how to negotiate a peace and it seemed that nobody dared to suggest a role for the National Liberation Front, either at the negotiating table or in a transition government. Meanwhile Johnson interrupted the television broadcast of these hearings with the announcement that he was spending the weekend discussing a settlement with South Vietnamese leader Ky. And so Kennedy decided to pull a Johnson of his own and call a press conference that same weekend to announce what is considered his break with the administration.

On February 19 1966 Robert Kennedy explained to a handful of journalists that he envisioned a `share of power and responsibility for the Viet Cong’ but that withdrawal was ‘impossible for this country’. He also said that `a negotiated settlement means that each side must concede matters that are important in order to preserve positions that are essential’. After the press-conference he went on holiday but had to fly back the same day to deal with the media attention. Since he was already the 21st senator to announce his dissent he hadn’t expected much of a fuss, but clearly the press took more notice of this particular senator. Vice president Hubert Humphrey compared his vision with putting an ‘arsonist in the fire brigade’ and `a fox in the chicken coop’42 and henceforth this Kennedy-statement has been known as the fox in chicken coop speech. Kennedy was roasted to the extent that even some old friends who by now had become political foes came out to help him.

39 Schlesinger 731, Newfield 122 40 like for instance the remark that he would donate blood to the North Vietnamese and that it was fine to burn one’s draft card. 41 Schlesinger 735 42 Joseph W. Alsop Oral History Interview - RFK #2, 6/22/1971, 25

General Maxwell Taylor defended Kennedy’s new position as `very, very close to what I consider my own’43. White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers said there was no real disagreement with Johnson unless Kennedy had proposed such a coalition before elections were held. However, McGeorge Bundy’s comment that `no Democrat can successfully ride thát tiger’ was a rather mean reference to President Kennedy’s Inaugural Speech: ‘Remember that those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside44’.This had been a warning against the sort of coalition government that had sucked Czechoslovakya into the Warsaw Pact. But eventually Kennedy accepted such a coalition as a solution for Laos. Robert Kennedy thought it was mean that Bundy used his dead brother against him45.

Many called him an opportunist who merely used the Peace Movement as a steppingstone for his own eventual White House bid. But in fact in early 1966 a Gallup poll showed that a majority of 59% felt the war was not a mistake46. It must be said that Kennedy became a critic of the Vietnam War before it became fashionable. But until now, each time he tried to say something about the war it was ill conceived. And this time he even found himself at the mercy of hawks like Maxwell Taylor. And Kennedy became increasingly convinced that his dissent was always going to be viewed in the light of his personal rift with Johnson and never taken for genuine47.

So again Kennedy had to keep quiet about Vietnam and so he devoted the rest of the year helping in the various (re-)election campaigns. During the summer he went to South Africa and became one of the first western politicians to speak out against Apartheid. But meanwhile at home the war began to affect Lyndon Johnson’s real passion,48 the Great Society, as the first cutbacks to some of the programs were announced in the fall. And after a summer of hippies burning draft cards and pop stars claiming to be `Bigger than Christ49’ the first signs of Liberal disintegration became visible: On election day the Republicans won 47 House seats and two future right-wing leaders, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush rose to prominence that day50.

Although Kennedy felt that whatever he said publicly about Vietnam would only cause Johnson to do the opposite51 he also realized he couldn’t cop out altogether . For instance in October 1966 I.F. Stone wrote an article named While Others Dodge The Draft, Bobby Dodges The War52. And so Kennedy set out to negotiate a peace himself. He went to France in January 1967, spoke with Etienne Manac’h, Director of (French) Far East affairs and John Dean, Vietnam expert of the American Embassy in Paris. Here Kennedy

43 Like Whitehouse Press Secretary Bill Moyers and most notably General Maxwell Taylor, Newfield 125 44 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBYr1s9ZX3E 45 Newfield, 126 46 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_to_the_US_involvement_in_the_Vietnam_War#1966 47 Newfield, 122 48` I knew from the start if I left a woman I really loved -- the Great Society -- in order to fight that bitch of a war in Vietnam then I would lose everything at home. My hopes my dreams’. Lyndon B. Johnson 49 Beatle John Lennon caused considerable controversy with that statement, particularly in the South. 50 The 1966 elections are often considered a foreshadow of the New Conservatism that struck America in the last decades of the 20th century http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/busch/06/1966.html 51 Newfield, 128 52 Stone I.F. The Best Of I.F. Stone, 281

was told that Hanoi asked for no more than a bombing pause in return for negotiations, which was significantly less than what Hanoi had demanded thus far53. Dean then sent a cable to the State department which was leaked to Newsweek.

And Johnson was furious, because he believed Kennedy was blackmailing him into negotiations with the North Vietnamese. But in fact Kennedy, whose French was mediocre at best, had hardly understood what had been discussed at the meeting! Johnson projected that the war would be over by summer and vowed to destroy Kennedy, Fulbright, etc. `You’ll be dead politically in six months’54 . How ironic that both men completely misunderstood the significance of the situation. Kennedy wasn’t even aware of what might have been his finest hour, a moment where the gap between his ambition and idealism could be bridged. And Johnson – if Hanoi was sincere- might have ended the war that was becoming eponymous with his name. But he could only interpret the possible peace feeler as a sign of Hanoi’s imminent collapse.

After heavy pressure from Rostow and others Kennedy was forced to publicly deny he had brought any feelers, even though he wasn’t sure. And of course he was slaughtered by the press, including his close friend Joseph Alsop, who argued that Kennedy’s mission had been illegal under the Logan Act that forbids citizens to engage in foreign policy activities55 . However, several international statesmen including Russian Prime Minister Kosygin and his British counterpart Wilson believed that for a brief instance peace had been at hand. The affair was a miserable PR disaster for Kennedy. And perhaps this time deservedly so. For if Kennedy had really missed the significance of a matter this big, than it was true that people like him only prolonged the war.

After this Kennedy was willing to burn some bridges: On March 2nd he acknowledged in a much anticipated speech that he had been involved in many of the decisions that brought the US into Vietnam and that it had been a mistake. This was a remarkable thing to do especially since he exaggerated his influence. But the context made a lie a grand gesture, since he was in fact apologizing for it. He then proceeded to describe some of the horrors inflicted by American bombing and made a moral appeal to stop them and use the pause to test Hanoi’s sincerity. And he suggested that UN soldiers should gradually replace American forces. And as before he said that `we should work toward a final settlement which allows all major political elements in South Vietnam to participate in the leadership and shape their future direction as a people’. `No one is going to defeat us or slaughter our troops or destroy our prestige because we dare take initiatives for peace56’

Meanwhile Johnson tried to knock the speech off the air by announcing the pregnancy of his daughter.Right after the speech Dean Rusk and General Westmoreland said that Kennedy’s suggestions had either already been tried unsuccessfully or were otherwise unviable. Again the speech was seen as a despicable attempt by Kennedy to unseat 53http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19670106&id=McgtAAAAIBAJ&sjid=GZwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=5868,2442265 54 Schlesinger 767, 768; Newfield 130, 131 55 http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/RFKOH/Alsop,%20Joseph%20W/RFKOH-JWA-02/RFKOH-JWA-02-TR.pdf 27 56 Olsen, Gregory A.,’ Landmarks Speeches on the Vietnam War, 73-93

Johnson for the 1968 nomination, an assumption that did not make much sense given the fact that at the time only 32% of those polled by Gallup believed the war was a mistake57.Six weeks later Westmoreland addressed Congress himself and gave a very optimistic assessment of the war effort that was interrupted seventeen times by applause58. Conclusion Between 1963 and 1968 Robert Kennedy emerged as a staunch critic of the Johnson administration. Many times it was suggested that Kennedy only differed with Johnson out of political rivalry and that he only used the peace movement as a stepping stone for a White House bid. However, closer analysis shows that his views changed rather little between 1963 and 1967. What did change was the increasing emotionality of the speeches as it became obvious that Vietnam was becoming such a divisive issue in American Society. As for the extent to which the political rift between Johnson and himself played a role in Kennedy’s development it can be said that Kennedy grew more vocal in his dissent each time Johnson snubbed him. However, these snubs always followed perfectly moderate requests by Kennedy, but for once: When Kennedy had allegedly leaked to the press that he had received a peace feeler from Hanoi he did meddle with US foreign policy – and subsequently screwed up because he didn’t realize the significance. However, Johnson’s response was equally unwise.

57 www.shmoop.com/vietnam/facts.html 58http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Westmoreland

CHAPTER THREE HAWK, DOVE OR CHICKEN? Throughout the year 1967 a New York Student Union leader Allard K. Lowenstein had coined with the idea of launching a Dump Johnson movement59. But even as the war was beginning to lose popularity, nobody expected the Johnson administration to be in such dire straits in 1968 that someone else could seize the nomination. However, since Robert Kennedy’s dissent on Vietnam policy and personal disliking of Johnson was well known it was only logical that Lowenstein vetted Kennedy. But however sympathetic Kennedy may have been to the idea, he never believed for a second that he could win. And most of his friends warned him that the Democratic Party would never forgive him if such an obvious display of internal division would lead to a Nixon Presidency. Kennedy was well aware that not everybody trusted him. Then eventually the Dump Johnson movement started to vet other candidates. Senator George McGovern was interested but he was also up for reelection. Another option was Senator Eugene McCarthy, who had been on Fulbright’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And on November 30th 1967 McCarthy declared his candidacy. But Kennedy was convinced that the party establishment would never replace Johnson even though he had lost some support of late. Still he didn’t want to endorse either one of them. Yet, after McCarthy announced, Johnson began to speak of the `Kennedy-McCarthy-movement60’, possibly out of paranoia, possibly teasing Kennedy into running so he’d divide the opposition. Then finally on January 30th 1968 Kennedy announced he was definitely not going to run. Just one day later came the event that changed everything: For months the Administration had been talking about significant progress and imminent victory, but now, seemingly out of the blue, the NLF started the largest operation by either side up to that point in the war. Although they eventually did not manage to hang on to any of their military gains, they won a major public relations victory. Whatever was left of Johnson’s credibility was now shattered. But it was McCarthy and not Kennedy who profited rom Tet, since he had decided not to run, just 12 hours too soon. “HAWK, DOVE OR CHICKEN?”61 read one of the protesting signs that greeted Kennedy as he visited a campus one day. Obviously Kennedy had miscalculated badly. In 1971 Roberta Greene interviewed conservative columnist and Kennedy friend Joseph Alsop about his friendship with Robert Kennedy. Among other things they discussed Kennedy’s decision to run in 1968. According to Alsop there was a personal feud between the Kennedys and Senator Eugene McCarthy that dated back to the Democratic National Convention of 1960 where McCarthy continued to lobby against John Kennedy even the nomination. He continued to spread `filthy lies’ about JFK on more than one

59 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dump_Johnson_movement 60 Newfield, 198 61 Idem, 199

occasion. McCarthy allegedly hated the Kennedys and often engaged in petty, personal games to disrupt Kennedy plans. When McCarthy proved so successful in the New Hampshire Primary in ’68 Kennedy’s personal dislike of McCarthy convinced him that he should run62. This view is supported by John Kennedy’s Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon who says that Kennedy considered McCarthy `totally inadequate as a national leader’ and held him in even lower esteem than he did President Johnson and that he needed to be stopped. Dillon described himself as having a restraining influence on Robert Kennedy and he suggests that Kennedy’s position right after the Tet Offensive was the `extreme peace position’ whereas Dillon himself opted for Vietnamization of the war. He believes Kennedy would never have run if it hadn’t been for McCarthy’s success in New Hampshire63. It is tempting to flirt with the possibility that Robert Kennedy took a more extreme position as candidate after Tet because it was the position held by a successful personal foe and someone Robert Kennedy considered a serious threat to Democratic hegemony in the national elections. It is not uncommon for a candidate to take a more extreme position during the primary season when they have to sway the party base, while they move to the center as the national elections draw closer and they have to convince the general public. Kennedy had been suspected of opportunism on more and McCarthy himself complained that Kennedy had let him do the dirty work of having to start the campaign against Johnson, only to join the race after Johnson's vulnerability had been proved. But the truth is that Kennedy’s position did not change much after Tet or McCarthy’s strong showing in New Hampshire. In his 1968 campaign book To Seek A Newer World –published after Tet- Kennedy included a chapter on Vietnam that he said he had written in the fall of 1967 with but minor adjustments. And ‘Vietnamization’, although he didn’t coin that phrase, was at the core of his proposed solution of the crisis. In fact it needs be said that Kennedy’s position had altered remarkably little since his first criticism of the war three years earlier. However, Kennedy's political shrewdness did show: In the televised debate of June 1st 1968 in which McCarthy suggested he would support a South Vietnamese coalition government that included the communists. Kennedy used that opportunity to position himself as tougher on communism than his opponent. But his public break with the Johnson administration in February 1966 had started with the `fox in the chicken coop’ speech in which he expressed his belief that any negotiations would fail unless the US accepted a role in the political process for the NLF. And in his book he even went so far as to say the US had to accept the `principle of Viet Cong participation in any interim 62 http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/RFKOH/Alsop,%20Joseph%20W/RFKOH-JWA-02/RFKOH-JWA-02-TR.pdf 36-37 63http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/RFKOH/Dillon,%20C.%20Douglas/RFKOH-CDD-01/RFKOH-CDD-01-TR.pdf 43

government structure, albeit under international supervision64’ Although it was undoubtedly Vietnam that sparked it off, both the McCarthy and The Kennedy candidacy, it did not determine the outcome. When Lyndon Johnson announced his resignation on March 30th, the two remaining candidates agreed basically about the war. Kennedy won the California Primary, possibly because of his relatively tough stance on Communism in the California debate and because he vowed not to move whole contingents of Blacks into Orange County65. Instead he would give companies who invested in the inner cities a tax break. Right after the murder of Martin Luther King on April 4th there had been riots all over America, but not in Indiana where Kennedy had been. It is fair to say that Kennedy won because he addressed the worries of what Nixon later called the Silent Majority. Pete Hamill, whose passionate letter to Kennedy finally convinced him to run, believes that McCarthy’s support was limited to a small elite of university students, the `Kropotkins with creditcards’66 whereas Kennedy had the support of a strange blend of blue collar workers, intellectuals and ethnic minorities, previously known as the Roosevelt coalition. Still, nor Vietnam, nor any of these other explanations determined the final outcome, for on June 4th 1968 a young Jordanian living in the United States shot and killed Robert Kennedy because of his support for… Israel.

64 Kennedy, Robert F, To Seek A Newer World, (New York 1967) 212 65 http://sixties-l.blogspot.com/2008/06/bobby-kennedy-myth.html 66 Pete Hamill in: Eppridge, Bill, Bobby Kennedy In The Sixties (New York 2008)

CONCLUSION From the early days of his brother’s Presidency until his final days as a senator running for President Robert Kennedy opposed complete withdrawal from Vietnam as much as he opposed escalation. He believed the war could be won with a mix of political and military tactics called Counterinsurgency. Right from the beginning until the very end he had spoken of a military conflict and this `other war’, a war for the hearts and minds of the people. There were times when Robert Kennedy kept quiet for tactical reasons, but there would always be times when he spoke his mind, regardless of the polls or consequences. Was it Robert Kennedy’s personal dislike of President Johnson that caused him to dissent? No, Johnson’s handling of the war was fundamentally different than his. Johnson escalated. Kennedy kept loyal to his original position. What did change between 1963 and 1968 was the drama, the emotionality of Kennedy’s statements about the war, but this is reflected in the way Vietnam came to dominate public debate during that time. Was Robert Kennedy `a hawk or a dove’? He was certainly never a hawk. But since he never supported unilateral withdrawal, he cannot be considered a true dove either. Perhaps he was simply an ambitious politician who felt an irresistible urge to put his unique intellectual and empathic qualities to use to solve a problem he knew he could.

SOURCES Primary sources: Campaign material: Kennedy, Robert, To Seek A Newer World (1967) JFK Library online sources (RFK Papers): Joseph Alsop Oral History Collection (nr 2 and 3) (1971) C. Douglas Dillon Oral History Collection (1972) Speeches: The Fox In The Chicken Coop Speech (1966) On Vietnam (1967) Various On Line Sources Literature: Clarke, Thurston, The last Campaign, Robert F. Kennedy and 82 days that inspired America (New York 2009) Ellsberg, Daniel, The Pentagon Papers (New York 1971) Eppridge, Bill, Bobby Kennedy In the Sixties, (New York 2008) Hilsman, Roger To Move a Nation, (New York, 1967) Hunt, Michael H., A Vietnam War Reader (North Casrolina 2010) Jones, Howard, Death Of A Generation. How the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War (Oxford 2003) Latham,Michael E, `Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam’ in: This World Quarterly Vol 27 No 1 2006 Lind, Michael, Vietnam The Necessary war A reinterpretation of America’s most disastrous conflict, (New York 1999) Newfield, Jack, RFK: A Memoir (New York 1969) Olsen, Gregory A.,’ Landmarks Speeches on the Vietnam War (Texas 2010) Palermo, Joseph A., In his own right: the political odyssey of Senator Robert F. Kennedy (New York 2001)

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston 1978) Sheehan, Neil, A Bright Shining Lie : John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York 1988) Sorensen Theodore C, Kennedy (New York 1965) Young, Marilyn The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 (New York 1991)

ANNEX I People/Organisations Alsop, Joseph, conservative columnist, friend of the Kennedys Ball, George, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs ’61-’66) Bowles, Chester, predecessor of Ball, and ambassador to India Bundy, McGeorge, National Security advisor (1961-1966) Bundy, William, several positions in JFK and LBJ administrations Dean, John Vietnam expert in American Embassy France Diem Ngo Dinh, South Vietnamese dictator 1955-1963 Dillon,C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury Gilpatrick, Roswell, Deputy Secretary of Defense (1961-64) Forrestal, Michael, assistant to McGeorge Bundy Hamill, Pete. Journalist, Robert Kennedy friend Harriman, Averell, Undersecretary for the Far East and Ambassador-at-large Humphrey, Hubert, Vice President under Johnson (‘64-‘69) Ky, Nguyen Cao, General and President of South Vietnam (1965-67) Lowenstein, Allard K., activist, Kennedy ánd McCarthy-supporter Maechlin Charles Jr, Counterinsurgency expert in the State Department Martin, John Bartlow , Speechwriter, envoy and Kennedy confidant Manac’h, Etienne, Far East Advisor to President De Gaulle of France Mansfield, Mike, Senate Majority Leader (1961-77) McCarthy, Eugene, Democratic Candidate for President in 1968, Kennedy foe McNamara, Robert, Secretary of Defense 1961-1968 NLF, National Liberation Front South Vietnamese Guerillas NSC, National Security Council Nhu, Madame, South Vietnamese First Lady, wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu Nhu, Ngo Dinh, South Vietnamese Junta member 1955-1963, brother of Diem Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson Sorensen, Theodore C, Special Council to Kennedy and Johnson Salinger, Pierre, President Kennedy’s Press Officer Taylor, Maxwell, general, and Ambassador to Vietnam Westmoreland, William, General, US commander in Vietnam