have pcc's undermind the operational independence of chief constables

Student ID Number: 0860915

1

Student ID Number: (7 digit number on student

card) 0860915

Programme of Study: Masters in Police Leadership and

Management

Cohort Number: 1B

Module Title & Code: Advanced Leadership and Strategic Management

Module Leader: Prof Keith Grint

Word count: (excluding title page,

bibliography and appendices) 3035

Date: 8th July 2013

Assignment Question

Answered:

(number and title)

Are PCC's likely to facilitate or undermine the Operational

Independence of Policing?

Is the author of this

assignment formally

registered as dyslexic with the University?

No

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submitted here has been

for accredited courses of

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This is to certify that the work I

external references and sources

identified within the contents. regulation concerning plagiarism and

No substantial part(s) of the work

submitted by me in other assessments

study, and I acknowledge that

appropriate reduction in the mark will be made.


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Introduction

The concept of the Operational Independence of Policing dates back to the

formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and helps ensure that the

British tradition for professional policing decisions rather than political

judgments are applied. The office of constable has a long history of

accountability to the law and that quasi-judicial independence has since

been a constant feature of British policing. ACPO argue that the

operational independence is a critical element in enabling them to deliver

a service to the public.

Until recently, responsibility for the delivery of all policing services was

shared between th ree di f ferent bodies. The power sharing

responsibilities were divided amongst the Home Secretary, Police

Authority (PA) and the Chief Constable (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009

cited in Rogers, 2013). This arrangement was referred to as the tri -

partite system established by the Police Act 1964. Under this system, the

Home Secretary was responsible for the overal l efficiency and

effectiveness of policing in England and Wales and was accountable

directly to parliament. The Chief Constable was responsible for all

operational policing decisions within the Force, controlling with autonomy

over any available resource (Rogers, 2013).


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There was also a belief that PAs often failed to hold Chief Constables to

account. It was believed that the lack of powers and autonomy held by

the authority combined to reinforce the position of the Chief Constable

while leaving the authority little option other than to submit to the

operational decisions of the Chief Constable. Reiner (2010) has stated

that PAs ‘play the piper but never name the tune’. Consequently, new

accountability measures have been being introduced that dramatically

alter the tri-partite system.

The Act of Parliament (Home Office, 2011) which introduced the role of a

Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) states the Commissioner will be

responsible for:

Holding the Chief Officer to account.

Identifying, engaging and representing local communities.

Setting the policing budgets.

Appointing the Chief Constable.

Dismissing the Chief Constable

On 15 November 2012 the electorate were invited to elect PCCs to take on

the key governance role previously undertaken by PAs. Whereas PAs were

comprised of a mix of local councilors and appointed independent members

the new PCCs are directly elected and exercise a role described by their chief

proponents at the Home Office (2011) as being “...to secure and maintain an

efficient and effective policing force through holding the Chief Constable to

account ...”.


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The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether the role of ' the PCC'

has facilitated or undermined the 'Operational Independence' of

Policing. For the purposes of this thesis I will conduct narrative review

collecting information, reading and making sense of a body of research

studies, including research relating to PCCs, PAs, Chief Constables and

Operational Independence. Due to the fact that there is limited academic

research in relation to PCCs, I have utilised quantitative and qualitative

research in the form of a semi structured survey sent out to every Chief

Constable and every PCC across 41 forces to ascertain their views on

the affects of the role of PCC on operational policing. There is very

little empirical research which explores the views or perceptions of ACPO

or the PCCs on the affect of the new role on operational independence.

Spano (2005) contends that qualitative and quantitative research has

advantages and disadvantages. Quantitative research is useful in that

it allows for the development of N data. Qualitative research raises

questions regarding authenticity which may be tainted by bias.

Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) warn that reviews based on a sample of

studies that are l imited in size or methodological rigor, the

conclusions drawn from the analysis are suspect. With a return of 18

Chief Constables and 15 PCCs, I would argue that my research is

statically significant. I will also explore previous academic research to

support or negate any findings. This research will not look at the wider

affects of the role of the PCC on strategic policing due to the word limits of

this essay.


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Before we can look at any affects on operational independence, we must first

look at the history and definition of what that means.

History and definition of Operational Independence

There is no single legislative definition – no one has ever written down

what ‘operational independence’ means but rather a convention that has

evolved over the years, with judges filling in the gaps left by parliament.

The most detailed explanation came in the 1962 Royal Commission on the

Police, which argued that Chief Constables should be given complete

immunity from political influence in decisions to apply the law in particular

cases. More widely the report argued that a Chief Constable should have

considerable room for discretion in areas such as the deployment of police

resources. This understanding of operational independence was later

widened by Lord Denning who in a 1968 judgement argued that a Chief

Constable ‘must take steps so to post his men that crimes may be

detected and that honest citizens may go about their affairs in peace...in

all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save the law itself’.

Denning’s judgement was highly controversial: while most people accept

that politicians should not be interfering in ‘quasi judicial’ matters, such as

whether to investigate particular crimes, or to arrest this person or that,

the judgement also implied that Chief Constables were not accountable

for wider decisions such as the policing priorities for their area.

(http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/email/rick-muir/2008/12/11/what-

do-we-mean-by-police-independence)

Reiner (2013) reminds us that Peel’s Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 was

http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/email/rick-muir/2008/12/11/what-do-we-mean-by-police-independence)

http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/email/rick-muir/2008/12/11/what-do-we-mean-by-police-independence)


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met with some hostility and a fear that policing might become an agency of

the government. Thus, Peel and the early Commissioners deliberately

insulated the service from direct central and local government control, to

prevent politicising policing.

Politicisation of Policing

The architects of the British policing model were Sir Robert Peel, a former

Prime Minister and Home Secretary; and Charles Rowan and Richard

Mayne, the first Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. Peel

established the Metropolitan Police Service for London in 1829; this is

largely recognized as the founding moment of modern British policing.

Peel, a politician was involved in the shaping of policing from the outset,

so why should Chief Constables be in fear of any political involvement

today?

Whilst there is no exact match for the PCC model, Chief Constables raised

concerns citing a variety of examples including; the UK policing political

scandals of the 1950s that led to the reforms of the 1960s, and various

models from the USA.

Sir Paul Stephenson, a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan

Police, argues that:

". . . There must be an appropriate space between policing

and politics to protect the principle of police operational

independence ... Just as the politician has no role in


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operational policing – I stress, ‘operational ’ – so the police have

no role in politics. The Police Service is not part of nor the

arm of any administration, of any government. (O’Neill, 2009)

A recurring critique of PCCs has been that their introduction risks

‘politicising’ the police (Liberty, 2010). This is usually meant in terms of

police resources being used instrumentally to further narrowly

formulated political interests which could erode police legitimacy. This, in

turn, raises questions about ‘what forms of political influence over

policing are appropriate’ (Newburn, 2012) and it is here that much of

the debate about the suitability of PCCs can be situated. More

fundamentally, the very idea of operational independence, sits firmly at

odds with the PCCs statutory responsibility to ensure that the police

force is efficient and effective.

Rogers (2013) argues that the PCC is a dominant political figure who

may in turn rely upon populist policies in order to retain their position

via the electorate. As Rogers et al (2013), point out, there is a

temptation for politicians to play to the gallery on matters of crime and

policing when holding the Chief Constable to account. This raises the

question of what exactly does 'accountability' of a Chief Constable mean.

Accountability

While independence (in the policing context) is alluded to in terms of

freedom from control or direction, there are some who use the term more

broadly to refer to freedom from requirements of accountability,


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direction or control.

Enshrined within the concept of police accountability is the need for the

powers awarded to the police to be balanced with a commitment to

ethics and human rights (Morgan, 1989; McLaughlin, 1989). The case for

such stronger public accountability, and for more effective democratic control

of policing, has been regularly highlighted over the years (Reiner, 1993;

Goldsmith, 2000; Leishman et al., 2000; McLaughlin, 2007; Loveday, 2009),

and particularly when things seem to have gone wrong – e.g., Brixton Riots

(Scarman, 1981), the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999), the

shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes (O’Driscoll, 2008), the death of Ian

Tomlinson in the G20 protests (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010) and most

recently in relation to the August 2011 riots in various UK towns and cities

(Birch and Allen, 2012).

But to avoid the potential pitfalls such as the risks of undue politicisation and

undermining the operational command of Chief Constables, it seems clear

that there also need to be effective “checks and balances” in the

governance framework and in the system of accountability. This point was

recognized by the coalition government and reflected not only in the

scrutiny role of the new Police and Crime Panels but also in a protocol,

setting out the principles governing the relationships between chief

Constables and PCCs (Home Office, 2011).

As a “one-to-one” relationship, more than anything, the PCC model seems to

reflect the traditional “principal-agent” accountability model (Hughes, 2003)

where one party – “the agent” (the Chief Constable) – is held to account by


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another – “the principal” (the PCC) for the execution of certain stipulated tasks

or responsibilities.

The debate around police accountability centres on the proposition that

accountability needs to be more effective but how that is achieved is

open to debate (Mawby & Wright, 2005). One view is that accountability

to local communities is the key (Home Office, 2008), another view

promotes political accountability along political party lines as the way

forward (Freeman & Webster, 2006). A third view proposes local and

national oversight (Gove, 2005). So how can accountability and

operational independence be achieved, or is there an alternative?

Operational Independence versus Operational Responsibility

Lord Denning's statement of the doctrine of police independence in

Blackburn has effectively become the 'locus classicus' on the subject in

common law countries around the world, as well as in England itself, thus

seemingly ensuring continued disagreement and confusion about the

scope, application and implications of it.

Denning was strongly criticised by Labour Party spokesman Jack Straw

et al ( Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Spencer, 1985; Lustgarten, 1986)

as giving Chief Constables too much power, for which they were not


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democratically accountable. The Minister seemed to be against including

a statutory definition of operational independence in the Bill to introduce

Police and Crime Commissioners. He said that Chief Constables held a

view that "we should not attempt to define operational independence in

the legislation" and that a definition could be "problematic".

The Patten inquiry noted "overwhelming advice" that it would be "difficult

if not impossible to define the full scope of a police officer's duties". It

favoured rejecting the concept of "operational independence" and

replacing it with the notion of "operational responsibility", to remove all

doubt that Chief Constables should be held to account on operational

matters.

Patten’s criticisms of operational independence clearly influenced

a later Home Office (2003) consultation paper, which addressed

police accountability as part of its remit and proposed formally

adopting ‘operational responsibi l i ty’ in place of ‘operational

independence’.

As a result of the consultation process the Home Office (2004)

produced Building Communities, Beating Crime. In an appendix on the

triparti te relationship there are no references to the terms

‘ independent ’ or ‘independence’ in the section on the Chief

Off icer’s role — there are, however, six references to ei ther

‘responsible’ or ‘responsibility’ in seven short paragraphs.

I would argue that policing is an inherently political activity. Wherever the


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autonomy level sits, whatever the level of accountability, the impact of

policing on shaping social order makes it politically irresistible. The effect

of law enforcement activity on gaining votes in parliament makes the

joining of politics and policing not only inextricably but also inevitable.

Newburn (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/17/tension-

police-politicians/) argues that we cannot keep politics out of the police,

and should not seek to. The vagueness of the distinction between

matters that are ‘operational’ and those that are questions of ‘policy’ has

meant that the ‘principle’ has been used by senior officers and others as

a means of attempting to resist political influence much more generally.

There should be operational freedom, but also accountability. It is in

this sense that ‘operational independence’ is so obviously a misnomer.

The Independent Commission into the future of policing in Northern

Ireland set up after the Good Friday agreement, chaired by Chris

Patten, made precisely this point in 1999:

"In a democratic society, all public officials must be fully

accountable and a Chief of Police cannot be an exception.

No public official can be said to be “independent”. Indeed,

given the extraordinary powers conferred on the police, it is

essential that their exercise is subject to the closest and

most effective scrutiny possible. The arguments involved in

support of “operational independence” – that it minimises

the risk of political influence and that it properly imposes on

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/17/tension-police-politicians/)

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/17/tension-police-politicians/)


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the Chief Constable the burden of taking decisions on

matters about which only he or she has all the facts and

expertise needed – are powerful arguments, but they

suppor t a case not for “ independence” but for

“responsibility”.

Furthermore, as the Patten report argued, there may be a clear tension if

Chief Constables invoke independence as a way of avoiding full scrutiny.

Similar arguments are being played out today in Police Scotland,

which has retained the tripartite system. Chief Constable, Stephen

House:

"We cannot support a position where the Scottish PA may

seek to give direction to the Chief Constable in relation to any

matter relating to operational policing as this would

fundamentally erode police operational independence with all

the dangers that this brings to a democratic society. It is

absolutely essential that the Scottish PA does not enable

politicisation of the police, as may be the case in England and

Wales through the election of PCCs."

So what research is there to support or dispute these views.

Previous research

The role of PCC has only been in place for 6 months and as such there is

limited recent academic research to rely upon. The creation of PAs


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was to ensure on behalf of the public that their police forces are

‘efficient and effective’, but research shows that Chief Officers have

always resisted the very concept of a loss of operational independence.

This is evidenced in responses to a survey by Caless and Tong in 2013.

From 2008 to 2010, they interviewed 85 ACPO Officers, and obtained

completed questionnaires from another nine. This total of 94 partici-

pants represents 43% of all Chief Officers (there are 218 in total), and

is the first major research study of Chief Officers in England and Wales

since Reiner’s in 1991.

Interviewee 72: " I ’ve no problem at all with oversight: it ’s

a necessary and healthy part of democracy at work, but the

PA has long exceeded its democratic remit and now sees

itself as some sort of ‘OffCop’,

Some Chief Officers argued that the oversight by PAs had become an

excuse to impinge on or influence the ‘operational independence’ of the

police. Something which appears to be re-occurring in arguments

today:

Interviewee 60: "I have a hands-off relationship at the

moment. They tried to interfere with my operational

decision-making, so I froze them out for a while"

Caless and Tong argue that this kind of stubborn defensiveness is often


14

a ‘default’ position for some Chief Officers.

Former Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, Kit Malthouse,

believed that Chief Officers were not kept in check by PAs and that as

a consequence, their power had grown out of control:

". . . they are incredibly powerful individuals. Each one

controls a standing army, they have extreme powers to

incarcerate you and me and to use force against us when

they see fit."

Malthouse expressed a common belief (Mawby & Wright, 2005;

Williams, 2003) that Chief Constables, and by extension Chief

Officers in general, operate unaccountably.

Caless and Tong's research also identified that Chief Officers views on

any challenge to their authority or operational independence was not

isolated to PAs (See chart below).


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Caless and Tong postulate that Chief Officers themselves seem unaware

of the impression they give about PAs, HMIC, and the Home Office and

I would argue there appears to be no change in attitude in relation to

the new role of PCC.

Sir Hugh Orde on behalf of ACPOS outlined the position of Chief Officers:

"...In our view there remains much to be resolved...Ultimately

it is not for police chiefs to determine how they should be held

to account, but there is a need for absolute clarity in the

relationship between Chief Constable and PCC."

Sir Hugh Orde sites the Peelian traditions of British policing arguing a need

for a clear commitment to maintaining operational independence. Sir

Hughes comments about ambiguity are reflected by a significant number

of respondents in my research.

My research

My research survey posed 10 questions (see below results) relating to

operational independence including a free text question.


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Conclusion

In conclusion, my research shows that there is a disparity in opinion

between Chief Officers and PCCs in relation to how the new role of PCC

is perceived to be affecting the operational independence of policing. The

response from Chief Officers seems to suggest that the role of PCC

has/or may undermined operational independence with a number of

exceptions, whilst PCCs appear to believe that the system is working

well, with operational independence being facilitated and maintained.

The role of PCC seems to be no different to the tripartite system that

went before it, in that Chief Constables fear an erosion of their ability to


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police without political interference, which from my research is certainly

nothing new and is inevitable.


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