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    Clark University

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    POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEregarded as inherently different from orsuperior to results arrived at by othermethods.The ideological foundation of the ethi-cal neutrality assumption can be demon-strated by a careful examination of theparadigmatic basis of enquiry through-out the history of science (both naturaland social) [7; 16; 27], as well as byexamining the history of the ethical neu-trality assumption itself [27; 40]. Theideological foundation can also be re-vealed by a consideration of those the-ories of meaning in which it is acceptedthat there cannot be an ethically neutrallanguage because meaning in languagecannot be divorced from the humanpractices through which specific mean-ings are learned and communicated [9;42]. It is not, however, the purpose ofthis paper to document the problems anddefects of the ethical neutrality assump-tion, critical though these are. I shall,rather, start from the position that scien-tific enquiry cannot proceed in an ethi-cally neutral manner, and seek to showhow the inability to sustain a positionof ethical neutrality inevitably impliessome sort of an ideological position inany attempt to examine something ascomplex as a population-resources sys-tem.Lack of ethical neutrality does not initself prove very much. It does serve, ofcourse, to get us beyond the rather triv-ial view that there is one version of someproblem that is scientific and a varietyof versions which are purely ideological.For example, the Malthusian termsoverpopulation and pressure of popu-lation on the means of subsistence areinherently no more or less scientific thanMarx's terms industrial reserve armyand relative surplus population, eventhough there is a predilection among un-sophisticated analysts to regard the for-mer phrases as adequately scientific andthe latter as purely ideological. Unfortu-nately, it is not very informative to averalso that all versions of a problem areideological, and it is downright mislead-

    regarded as inherently different from orsuperior to results arrived at by othermethods.The ideological foundation of the ethi-cal neutrality assumption can be demon-strated by a careful examination of theparadigmatic basis of enquiry through-out the history of science (both naturaland social) [7; 16; 27], as well as byexamining the history of the ethical neu-trality assumption itself [27; 40]. Theideological foundation can also be re-vealed by a consideration of those the-ories of meaning in which it is acceptedthat there cannot be an ethically neutrallanguage because meaning in languagecannot be divorced from the humanpractices through which specific mean-ings are learned and communicated [9;42]. It is not, however, the purpose ofthis paper to document the problems anddefects of the ethical neutrality assump-tion, critical though these are. I shall,rather, start from the position that scien-tific enquiry cannot proceed in an ethi-cally neutral manner, and seek to showhow the inability to sustain a positionof ethical neutrality inevitably impliessome sort of an ideological position inany attempt to examine something ascomplex as a population-resources sys-tem.Lack of ethical neutrality does not initself prove very much. It does serve, ofcourse, to get us beyond the rather triv-ial view that there is one version of someproblem that is scientific and a varietyof versions which are purely ideological.For example, the Malthusian termsoverpopulation and pressure of popu-lation on the means of subsistence areinherently no more or less scientific thanMarx's terms industrial reserve armyand relative surplus population, eventhough there is a predilection among un-sophisticated analysts to regard the for-mer phrases as adequately scientific andthe latter as purely ideological. Unfortu-nately, it is not very informative to averalso that all versions of a problem areideological, and it is downright mislead-

    regarded as inherently different from orsuperior to results arrived at by othermethods.The ideological foundation of the ethi-cal neutrality assumption can be demon-strated by a careful examination of theparadigmatic basis of enquiry through-out the history of science (both naturaland social) [7; 16; 27], as well as byexamining the history of the ethical neu-trality assumption itself [27; 40]. Theideological foundation can also be re-vealed by a consideration of those the-ories of meaning in which it is acceptedthat there cannot be an ethically neutrallanguage because meaning in languagecannot be divorced from the humanpractices through which specific mean-ings are learned and communicated [9;42]. It is not, however, the purpose ofthis paper to document the problems anddefects of the ethical neutrality assump-tion, critical though these are. I shall,rather, start from the position that scien-tific enquiry cannot proceed in an ethi-cally neutral manner, and seek to showhow the inability to sustain a positionof ethical neutrality inevitably impliessome sort of an ideological position inany attempt to examine something ascomplex as a population-resources sys-tem.Lack of ethical neutrality does not initself prove very much. It does serve, ofcourse, to get us beyond the rather triv-ial view that there is one version of someproblem that is scientific and a varietyof versions which are purely ideological.For example, the Malthusian termsoverpopulation and pressure of popu-lation on the means of subsistence areinherently no more or less scientific thanMarx's terms industrial reserve armyand relative surplus population, eventhough there is a predilection among un-sophisticated analysts to regard the for-mer phrases as adequately scientific andthe latter as purely ideological. Unfortu-nately, it is not very informative to averalso that all versions of a problem areideological, and it is downright mislead-

    ing to suggest that our views on thepopulation-resources problem dependmerely upon whether we are optimistsor pessimists, socialists or conservatives,determinists or possibilists, and the like.To contend the latter is not to give suffi-cient credit to that spirit of scientific en-deavor that seeks to establish truthwithout invoking subjective personalpreferences; to say that there is no suchthing as ethical neutrality is not to saythat we are reduced to mere personalopinion.We are, however, forced to concedethat scientific enquiry takes place in asocial setting, expresses social ideas, andconveys social meanings. If we care toprobe more deeply into these socialmeanings, we may observe that particu-lar kinds of scientific method express cer-tain kinds of ethical or ideological posi-tions. In something as controversial as thepopulation-resources debate an under-standing of this issue is crucial; yet it isall too frequently ignored. If, as I subse-quently hope to show, the dominantmethod of logical empiricism inevitablyproduces Malthusian or neo-Malthusianresults, then we can more easily under-stand how it is that scientists raised inthe tradition of logical empiricism have,when they have turned to the popula-tion-resources question, inevitably attrib-uted a certain veracity to the Malthusianand neo-Malthusian view. When theyhave found such a view distasteful suchscientists have rarely challenged it onscientific grounds; they have, rather,resorted to some version of subjectiveoptimism as a basis for refutation. Thiskind of refutation has not been helpful,of course, for it has perpetuated the illu-sion that science and ideology (under-stood as personal preference) are inde-pendent of each other when the realproblem lies in the ideology of scientificmethod itself.It is easiest to grapple with the con-nections between method, ideology, andsubstantive conclusions by examining theworks of Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx,

    ing to suggest that our views on thepopulation-resources problem dependmerely upon whether we are optimistsor pessimists, socialists or conservatives,determinists or possibilists, and the like.To contend the latter is not to give suffi-cient credit to that spirit of scientific en-deavor that seeks to establish truthwithout invoking subjective personalpreferences; to say that there is no suchthing as ethical neutrality is not to saythat we are reduced to mere personalopinion.We are, however, forced to concedethat scientific enquiry takes place in asocial setting, expresses social ideas, andconveys social meanings. If we care toprobe more deeply into these socialmeanings, we may observe that particu-lar kinds of scientific method express cer-tain kinds of ethical or ideological posi-tions. In something as controversial as thepopulation-resources debate an under-standing of this issue is crucial; yet it isall too frequently ignored. If, as I subse-quently hope to show, the dominantmethod of logical empiricism inevitablyproduces Malthusian or neo-Malthusianresults, then we can more easily under-stand how it is that scientists raised inthe tradition of logical empiricism have,when they have turned to the popula-tion-resources question, inevitably attrib-uted a certain veracity to the Malthusianand neo-Malthusian view. When theyhave found such a view distasteful suchscientists have rarely challenged it onscientific grounds; they have, rather,resorted to some version of subjectiveoptimism as a basis for refutation. Thiskind of refutation has not been helpful,of course, for it has perpetuated the illu-sion that science and ideology (under-stood as personal preference) are inde-pendent of each other when the realproblem lies in the ideology of scientificmethod itself.It is easiest to grapple with the con-nections between method, ideology, andsubstantive conclusions by examining theworks of Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx,

    ing to suggest that our views on thepopulation-resources problem dependmerely upon whether we are optimistsor pessimists, socialists or conservatives,determinists or possibilists, and the like.To contend the latter is not to give suffi-cient credit to that spirit of scientific en-deavor that seeks to establish truthwithout invoking subjective personalpreferences; to say that there is no suchthing as ethical neutrality is not to saythat we are reduced to mere personalopinion.We are, however, forced to concedethat scientific enquiry takes place in asocial setting, expresses social ideas, andconveys social meanings. If we care toprobe more deeply into these socialmeanings, we may observe that particu-lar kinds of scientific method express cer-tain kinds of ethical or ideological posi-tions. In something as controversial as thepopulation-resources debate an under-standing of this issue is crucial; yet it isall too frequently ignored. If, as I subse-quently hope to show, the dominantmethod of logical empiricism inevitablyproduces Malthusian or neo-Malthusianresults, then we can more easily under-stand how it is that scientists raised inthe tradition of logical empiricism have,when they have turned to the popula-tion-resources question, inevitably attrib-uted a certain veracity to the Malthusianand neo-Malthusian view. When theyhave found such a view distasteful suchscientists have rarely challenged it onscientific grounds; they have, rather,resorted to some version of subjectiveoptimism as a basis for refutation. Thiskind of refutation has not been helpful,of course, for it has perpetuated the illu-sion that science and ideology (under-stood as personal preference) are inde-pendent of each other when the realproblem lies in the ideology of scientificmethod itself.It is easiest to grapple with the con-nections between method, ideology, andsubstantive conclusions by examining theworks of Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx,

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    ECONOMICEOGRAPHYCONOMICEOGRAPHYCONOMICEOGRAPHYfor it is relatively easy to grasp the con-nections in these works and thereby todiscern some important and often ob-scured questions that lie at the heart ofany analysis of the population-resourcesrelation.

    MALTHUSIt is sometimes forgotten that Malthuswrote his first Essay on the Principle ofPopulation in 1798 as a political tractagainst the utopian socialist-anarchismof Godwin and Condorcet and as anantidote to the hopes for social progressaroused by the French Revolution. In

    his introduction, however, Malthus laysdown certain principles of method whichought, he argues, to govern discourseconcerning such an ambitious subject asthe perfectibility of man:A writermay tell me that he thinks aman will ultimately become an ostrich.I cannot properly contradict him. Butbefore he can expect to bring any rea-sonable person over to his opinion, heought to show that the necks of man-kind have been gradually elongating,that the lips have grownharderand moreprominent, that the legs and feet aredaily altering their shape, and that thehair is beginning to change into stubs offeathers. And till the probability of sowonderful a conversioncan be shown, itis surely lost time and lost eloquence toexpatiateon the happinessof manin sucha state: to describe his powers, both ofrunning and flying, to paint him in aconditionwhere all narrow uxurieswouldbe contemned, where he would be em-ployed only in collecting the necessariesof life, and where, consequently, eachman'sshare of labour would be light, andhis portionof leisure ample [19, p. 70].The method which Malthus advocatesis empiricism. It is through the applica-tion of this empiricist method that thecompeting theories of the utopian social-ists, the proponents of liberal advance-ment and the rights of man, and the ad-vocates of the existing order of things

    can be tested against the realities of theworld. Yet, the first edition of the Essay

    for it is relatively easy to grasp the con-nections in these works and thereby todiscern some important and often ob-scured questions that lie at the heart ofany analysis of the population-resourcesrelation.MALTHUS

    It is sometimes forgotten that Malthuswrote his first Essay on the Principle ofPopulation in 1798 as a political tractagainst the utopian socialist-anarchismof Godwin and Condorcet and as anantidote to the hopes for social progressaroused by the French Revolution. Inhis introduction, however, Malthus laysdown certain principles of method whichought, he argues, to govern discourseconcerning such an ambitious subject asthe perfectibility of man:A writermay tell me that he thinks aman will ultimately become an ostrich.I cannot properly contradict him. Butbefore he can expect to bring any rea-sonable person over to his opinion, heought to show that the necks of man-kind have been gradually elongating,that the lips have grownharderand moreprominent, that the legs and feet aredaily altering their shape, and that thehair is beginning to change into stubs offeathers. And till the probability of sowonderful a conversioncan be shown, itis surely lost time and lost eloquence toexpatiateon the happinessof manin sucha state: to describe his powers, both ofrunning and flying, to paint him in aconditionwhere all narrow uxurieswouldbe contemned, where he would be em-

    ployed only in collecting the necessariesof life, and where, consequently, eachman'sshare of labour would be light, andhis portionof leisure ample [19, p. 70].The method which Malthus advocatesis empiricism. It is through the applica-tion of this empiricist method that thecompeting theories of the utopian social-ists, the proponents of liberal advance-ment and the rights of man, and the ad-vocates of the existing order of things

    can be tested against the realities of theworld. Yet, the first edition of the Essay

    for it is relatively easy to grasp the con-nections in these works and thereby todiscern some important and often ob-scured questions that lie at the heart ofany analysis of the population-resourcesrelation.MALTHUS

    It is sometimes forgotten that Malthuswrote his first Essay on the Principle ofPopulation in 1798 as a political tractagainst the utopian socialist-anarchismof Godwin and Condorcet and as anantidote to the hopes for social progressaroused by the French Revolution. Inhis introduction, however, Malthus laysdown certain principles of method whichought, he argues, to govern discourseconcerning such an ambitious subject asthe perfectibility of man:A writermay tell me that he thinks aman will ultimately become an ostrich.I cannot properly contradict him. Butbefore he can expect to bring any rea-sonable person over to his opinion, heought to show that the necks of man-kind have been gradually elongating,that the lips have grownharderand moreprominent, that the legs and feet aredaily altering their shape, and that thehair is beginning to change into stubs offeathers. And till the probability of sowonderful a conversioncan be shown, itis surely lost time and lost eloquence toexpatiateon the happinessof manin sucha state: to describe his powers, both ofrunning and flying, to paint him in aconditionwhere all narrow uxurieswouldbe contemned, where he would be em-

    ployed only in collecting the necessariesof life, and where, consequently, eachman'sshare of labour would be light, andhis portionof leisure ample [19, p. 70].The method which Malthus advocatesis empiricism. It is through the applica-tion of this empiricist method that thecompeting theories of the utopian social-ists, the proponents of liberal advance-ment and the rights of man, and the ad-vocates of the existing order of things

    can be tested against the realities of theworld. Yet, the first edition of the Essay

    is strongly colored by a priori deductionas well as by polemics and empiricism.Malthus sets up two postulates-thatfood is necessary to the existence of manand that the passion between the sexesis necessary and constant. He placesthese two postulates in the context ofcertain conditions; deduces certain con-sequences (including the famous lawthrough which population inevitablyplaces pressure on the means of subsist-ence); and then uses the empiricistmethod to verify his deductions. ThusMalthus arrives at a conception of meth-od which we may call logical empiri-cism. This method broadly assumesthat there are two kinds of truths whichwe may call logical truths (they arecorrect deductions from certain initialstatements) and empirical truths (theyare correct and verifiable factual state-ments which reflect observation and ex-periment). Logical truths may be relatedto empirical truths by uniting the twokinds of statements into a hypothetico-deductive system. If empirical observa-tion indicates that certain of the derivedstatements are factually true, then thisis taken to mean that the system of state-ments as a whole is true, and we thenhave a theory of, for example, thepopulation-resources relationship. Mal-thus constructs a crude version of sucha theory.Another feature of empiricism is wor-thy of note. Empiricism assumes thatobjects can be understood independentlyof observing subjects. Truth is thereforeassumed to lie in a world external to theobserver whose job is to record and faith-fully reflect the attributes of objects.This logical empiricism is a pragmaticversion of that scientific method whichgoes under the name of logical posi-tivism, and is founded in a particularand very strict view of language andmeaning.By the use of the logical empiricistmethod Malthus arrives at certain con-clusions supportive of those advanced bythe advocates of the existing order of

    is strongly colored by a priori deductionas well as by polemics and empiricism.Malthus sets up two postulates-thatfood is necessary to the existence of manand that the passion between the sexesis necessary and constant. He placesthese two postulates in the context ofcertain conditions; deduces certain con-sequences (including the famous lawthrough which population inevitablyplaces pressure on the means of subsist-ence); and then uses the empiricistmethod to verify his deductions. ThusMalthus arrives at a conception of meth-od which we may call logical empiri-cism. This method broadly assumesthat there are two kinds of truths whichwe may call logical truths (they arecorrect deductions from certain initialstatements) and empirical truths (theyare correct and verifiable factual state-ments which reflect observation and ex-periment). Logical truths may be relatedto empirical truths by uniting the twokinds of statements into a hypothetico-deductive system. If empirical observa-tion indicates that certain of the derivedstatements are factually true, then thisis taken to mean that the system of state-ments as a whole is true, and we thenhave a theory of, for example, thepopulation-resources relationship. Mal-thus constructs a crude version of sucha theory.Another feature of empiricism is wor-thy of note. Empiricism assumes thatobjects can be understood independentlyof observing subjects. Truth is thereforeassumed to lie in a world external to theobserver whose job is to record and faith-fully reflect the attributes of objects.This logical empiricism is a pragmaticversion of that scientific method whichgoes under the name of logical posi-tivism, and is founded in a particularand very strict view of language andmeaning.By the use of the logical empiricistmethod Malthus arrives at certain con-clusions supportive of those advanced bythe advocates of the existing order of

    is strongly colored by a priori deductionas well as by polemics and empiricism.Malthus sets up two postulates-thatfood is necessary to the existence of manand that the passion between the sexesis necessary and constant. He placesthese two postulates in the context ofcertain conditions; deduces certain con-sequences (including the famous lawthrough which population inevitablyplaces pressure on the means of subsist-ence); and then uses the empiricistmethod to verify his deductions. ThusMalthus arrives at a conception of meth-od which we may call logical empiri-cism. This method broadly assumesthat there are two kinds of truths whichwe may call logical truths (they arecorrect deductions from certain initialstatements) and empirical truths (theyare correct and verifiable factual state-ments which reflect observation and ex-periment). Logical truths may be relatedto empirical truths by uniting the twokinds of statements into a hypothetico-deductive system. If empirical observa-tion indicates that certain of the derivedstatements are factually true, then thisis taken to mean that the system of state-ments as a whole is true, and we thenhave a theory of, for example, thepopulation-resources relationship. Mal-thus constructs a crude version of sucha theory.Another feature of empiricism is wor-thy of note. Empiricism assumes thatobjects can be understood independentlyof observing subjects. Truth is thereforeassumed to lie in a world external to theobserver whose job is to record and faith-fully reflect the attributes of objects.This logical empiricism is a pragmaticversion of that scientific method whichgoes under the name of logical posi-tivism, and is founded in a particularand very strict view of language andmeaning.By the use of the logical empiricistmethod Malthus arrives at certain con-clusions supportive of those advanced bythe advocates of the existing order of

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    POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEthings, rejects the utopianism of God-win and Condorcet, and rebuffs thehopes for political change. The diminu-tion in polemics and the greater relianceon empiricism in the subsequent editionsof the Essay may in part be regarded asa consequence of Malthus' basic discov-ery that scientific method of a certainsort could accomplish, with much great-er credibility and power than straightpolemics, a definite social purpose. Theresort to empiricism was facilitated inturn by the growing body of informationconcerning the growth and condition ofthe world's population-a prime source,for example, was the work of the geog-rapher Alexander von Humboldt [10].Having shown that the power ofpopulation is indefinitely greater thanthe power of the earth to produce sub-sistence, and that it is a natural lawthat population will inevitably pressagainst the means of subsistence, Mal-thus then goes on to discuss the positiveand preventive checks through whichpopulation is kept in balance with themeans of subsistence. The subsequentevolution in Malthus' ideas on the sub-ject are too well-known to warrant repe-tition here. What is often forgotten, how-ever, is the class character with whichhe invests it. Glacken, for example, whotreats Malthus in the penultimate chap-ter of his monumental study, Traces onthe Rhodian Shore [5], ignores this as-pect to Malthus entirely.Malthus recognizes that misery hasto fall somewhere and maintains thatthe positive checks will necessarily bethe lot of the lower classes [19, p. 82].Malthus thereby explains the misery ofthe lower classes as the result of a natu-ral law which functions absolutely inde-pendent of all human regulation. Thedistress among the lowest classes has,therefore, to be interpreted as an evilso deeply seated that no human ingenu-ity can reach it [19, p. 101]. On thisbasis Malthus arrives, reluctantly, at aset of policy recommendations with re-spect to the poor laws. By providing wel-

    things, rejects the utopianism of God-win and Condorcet, and rebuffs thehopes for political change. The diminu-tion in polemics and the greater relianceon empiricism in the subsequent editionsof the Essay may in part be regarded asa consequence of Malthus' basic discov-ery that scientific method of a certainsort could accomplish, with much great-er credibility and power than straightpolemics, a definite social purpose. Theresort to empiricism was facilitated inturn by the growing body of informationconcerning the growth and condition ofthe world's population-a prime source,for example, was the work of the geog-rapher Alexander von Humboldt [10].Having shown that the power ofpopulation is indefinitely greater thanthe power of the earth to produce sub-sistence, and that it is a natural lawthat population will inevitably pressagainst the means of subsistence, Mal-thus then goes on to discuss the positiveand preventive checks through whichpopulation is kept in balance with themeans of subsistence. The subsequentevolution in Malthus' ideas on the sub-ject are too well-known to warrant repe-tition here. What is often forgotten, how-ever, is the class character with whichhe invests it. Glacken, for example, whotreats Malthus in the penultimate chap-ter of his monumental study, Traces onthe Rhodian Shore [5], ignores this as-pect to Malthus entirely.Malthus recognizes that misery hasto fall somewhere and maintains thatthe positive checks will necessarily bethe lot of the lower classes [19, p. 82].Malthus thereby explains the misery ofthe lower classes as the result of a natu-ral law which functions absolutely inde-pendent of all human regulation. Thedistress among the lowest classes has,therefore, to be interpreted as an evilso deeply seated that no human ingenu-ity can reach it [19, p. 101]. On thisbasis Malthus arrives, reluctantly, at aset of policy recommendations with re-spect to the poor laws. By providing wel-

    things, rejects the utopianism of God-win and Condorcet, and rebuffs thehopes for political change. The diminu-tion in polemics and the greater relianceon empiricism in the subsequent editionsof the Essay may in part be regarded asa consequence of Malthus' basic discov-ery that scientific method of a certainsort could accomplish, with much great-er credibility and power than straightpolemics, a definite social purpose. Theresort to empiricism was facilitated inturn by the growing body of informationconcerning the growth and condition ofthe world's population-a prime source,for example, was the work of the geog-rapher Alexander von Humboldt [10].Having shown that the power ofpopulation is indefinitely greater thanthe power of the earth to produce sub-sistence, and that it is a natural lawthat population will inevitably pressagainst the means of subsistence, Mal-thus then goes on to discuss the positiveand preventive checks through whichpopulation is kept in balance with themeans of subsistence. The subsequentevolution in Malthus' ideas on the sub-ject are too well-known to warrant repe-tition here. What is often forgotten, how-ever, is the class character with whichhe invests it. Glacken, for example, whotreats Malthus in the penultimate chap-ter of his monumental study, Traces onthe Rhodian Shore [5], ignores this as-pect to Malthus entirely.Malthus recognizes that misery hasto fall somewhere and maintains thatthe positive checks will necessarily bethe lot of the lower classes [19, p. 82].Malthus thereby explains the misery ofthe lower classes as the result of a natu-ral law which functions absolutely inde-pendent of all human regulation. Thedistress among the lowest classes has,therefore, to be interpreted as an evilso deeply seated that no human ingenu-ity can reach it [19, p. 101]. On thisbasis Malthus arrives, reluctantly, at aset of policy recommendations with re-spect to the poor laws. By providing wel-

    fare to the lowest classes in society, ag-gregate human misery is only increased;freeing the lowest classes in society frompositive checks only results in an expan-sion of their numbers, a gradual reduc-tion in the standards of living of allmembers of society, and a decline in theincentive to work on which the mobiliza-tion of labor through the wage systemdepends. He also argues that increasingsubsistence levels to a part of societythat cannot in general be considered asthe most valuable part diminishes theshares that would otherwise belong tomore industrious and worthy members,and thus forces more to become depen-dent [19, p. 97].From this Malthus draws a moral:

    Hard as it may appear in individualinstances,dependentpoverty ought to beheld disgraceful. Such a stimulus seemsto be absolutely necessaryto promotethehappinessof the great mass of mankind,and every general attempt to weakenthis stimulus, however benevolent itsapparentintention will always defeat itsown purpose ....I feel no doubt whatever that theparishlaws of England have contributedto raise the price of provisions and tolower the real price of labour.They havetherefore contributed to impoverishthatclass of people whose only possession istheir labour. It is also difficultto supposethat they have not powerfullycontributedto generatethat carelessnessand want offrugality observable among the poor, socontrary o the disposition o be remarkedamong petty tradesmen and small farm-ers. The labouring poor, to use a vulgarexpression,seem alwaysto live from handto mouth. Their present wants employtheir whole attention, and they seldomthink of the future.Even when they havean opportunity of saving, they seldomexercise it, but all that is beyond theirpresent necessities goes, generally speak-ing, to the ale-house. The poor laws ofEngland may therefore be said to di-minish both the power and the will tosave amongthe commonpeople, and thusto weaken one of the strongestincentivesto sobrietyand industry,and consequent-ly to happiness [19, p. 98].

    fare to the lowest classes in society, ag-gregate human misery is only increased;freeing the lowest classes in society frompositive checks only results in an expan-sion of their numbers, a gradual reduc-tion in the standards of living of allmembers of society, and a decline in theincentive to work on which the mobiliza-tion of labor through the wage systemdepends. He also argues that increasingsubsistence levels to a part of societythat cannot in general be considered asthe most valuable part diminishes theshares that would otherwise belong tomore industrious and worthy members,and thus forces more to become depen-dent [19, p. 97].From this Malthus draws a moral:

    Hard as it may appear in individualinstances,dependentpoverty ought to beheld disgraceful. Such a stimulus seemsto be absolutely necessaryto promotethehappinessof the great mass of mankind,and every general attempt to weakenthis stimulus, however benevolent itsapparentintention will always defeat itsown purpose ....I feel no doubt whatever that theparishlaws of England have contributedto raise the price of provisions and tolower the real price of labour.They havetherefore contributed to impoverishthatclass of people whose only possession istheir labour. It is also difficultto supposethat they have not powerfullycontributedto generatethat carelessnessand want offrugality observable among the poor, socontrary o the disposition o be remarkedamong petty tradesmen and small farm-ers. The labouring poor, to use a vulgarexpression,seem alwaysto live from handto mouth. Their present wants employtheir whole attention, and they seldomthink of the future.Even when they havean opportunity of saving, they seldomexercise it, but all that is beyond theirpresent necessities goes, generally speak-ing, to the ale-house. The poor laws ofEngland may therefore be said to di-minish both the power and the will tosave amongthe commonpeople, and thusto weaken one of the strongestincentivesto sobrietyand industry,and consequent-ly to happiness [19, p. 98].

    fare to the lowest classes in society, ag-gregate human misery is only increased;freeing the lowest classes in society frompositive checks only results in an expan-sion of their numbers, a gradual reduc-tion in the standards of living of allmembers of society, and a decline in theincentive to work on which the mobiliza-tion of labor through the wage systemdepends. He also argues that increasingsubsistence levels to a part of societythat cannot in general be considered asthe most valuable part diminishes theshares that would otherwise belong tomore industrious and worthy members,and thus forces more to become depen-dent [19, p. 97].From this Malthus draws a moral:

    Hard as it may appear in individualinstances,dependentpoverty ought to beheld disgraceful. Such a stimulus seemsto be absolutely necessaryto promotethehappinessof the great mass of mankind,and every general attempt to weakenthis stimulus, however benevolent itsapparentintention will always defeat itsown purpose ....I feel no doubt whatever that theparishlaws of England have contributedto raise the price of provisions and tolower the real price of labour.They havetherefore contributed to impoverishthatclass of people whose only possession istheir labour. It is also difficultto supposethat they have not powerfullycontributedto generatethat carelessnessand want offrugality observable among the poor, socontrary o the disposition o be remarkedamong petty tradesmen and small farm-ers. The labouring poor, to use a vulgarexpression,seem alwaysto live from handto mouth. Their present wants employtheir whole attention, and they seldomthink of the future.Even when they havean opportunity of saving, they seldomexercise it, but all that is beyond theirpresent necessities goes, generally speak-ing, to the ale-house. The poor laws ofEngland may therefore be said to di-minish both the power and the will tosave amongthe commonpeople, and thusto weaken one of the strongestincentivesto sobrietyand industry,and consequent-ly to happiness [19, p. 98].

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    ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYThus, Malthus arrives at what we havenow come to know as the counter-intui-tive solution -namely, that the bestthing to do about misery and povertyis to do nothing for anything that is donewill only exacerbate the problem. Theonly valid policy with respect to the low-est classes in society is one of benignneglect. This policy is further supportedby a certain characterization of typicalbehaviors exhibited among the lowerclasses. Arguments such as these are stillwith us. They appear in the policy state-ments by Jay Forrester, Edward Ban-field, Patrick Moynihan and others. In

    fact, welfare policy in the United Statesat the present time is dominated by suchthinking.Malthus' approach to the lower classeshas, if it is to be judged correctly, to beset against his view of the roles of theother classes in society-principally thoseof the industrial and landed interests.These roles are discussed more analyti-cally in The Principles of Political Econ-omy. Here he recognizes that there is aproblem to be solved in accounting forthe accumulation of capital in society.The capitalist saves, invests in produc-tive activity, sells the product at a profit,ploughs the profit back in as new invest-ment, and commences the cycle of accu-mulation once more. There is a seriousdilemma here, for the capitalist has tosell the product to someone if a profitis to be achieved, and the capitalist issaving rather than consuming. If thecapitalist saves too much and the rateof capital accumulation increases toorapidly, then long before subsistenceproblems are encountered, the capitalistswill find expansion checked by the lackof effective demand for the increasedoutput. Consequently, both capital andpopulation may be at the same time, andfor a period of great length, redundant,compared to the effective demand forproduce [20, p. 402].Malthus placed great emphasis uponthe effective demand problem and soughtto convince his contemporary Ricardo

    Thus, Malthus arrives at what we havenow come to know as the counter-intui-tive solution -namely, that the bestthing to do about misery and povertyis to do nothing for anything that is donewill only exacerbate the problem. Theonly valid policy with respect to the low-est classes in society is one of benignneglect. This policy is further supportedby a certain characterization of typicalbehaviors exhibited among the lowerclasses. Arguments such as these are stillwith us. They appear in the policy state-ments by Jay Forrester, Edward Ban-field, Patrick Moynihan and others. Infact, welfare policy in the United Statesat the present time is dominated by suchthinking.Malthus' approach to the lower classeshas, if it is to be judged correctly, to beset against his view of the roles of theother classes in society-principally thoseof the industrial and landed interests.These roles are discussed more analyti-cally in The Principles of Political Econ-omy. Here he recognizes that there is aproblem to be solved in accounting forthe accumulation of capital in society.The capitalist saves, invests in produc-tive activity, sells the product at a profit,ploughs the profit back in as new invest-ment, and commences the cycle of accu-mulation once more. There is a seriousdilemma here, for the capitalist has tosell the product to someone if a profitis to be achieved, and the capitalist issaving rather than consuming. If thecapitalist saves too much and the rateof capital accumulation increases toorapidly, then long before subsistenceproblems are encountered, the capitalistswill find expansion checked by the lackof effective demand for the increasedoutput. Consequently, both capital andpopulation may be at the same time, andfor a period of great length, redundant,compared to the effective demand forproduce [20, p. 402].Malthus placed great emphasis uponthe effective demand problem and soughtto convince his contemporary Ricardo

    Thus, Malthus arrives at what we havenow come to know as the counter-intui-tive solution -namely, that the bestthing to do about misery and povertyis to do nothing for anything that is donewill only exacerbate the problem. Theonly valid policy with respect to the low-est classes in society is one of benignneglect. This policy is further supportedby a certain characterization of typicalbehaviors exhibited among the lowerclasses. Arguments such as these are stillwith us. They appear in the policy state-ments by Jay Forrester, Edward Ban-field, Patrick Moynihan and others. Infact, welfare policy in the United Statesat the present time is dominated by suchthinking.Malthus' approach to the lower classeshas, if it is to be judged correctly, to beset against his view of the roles of theother classes in society-principally thoseof the industrial and landed interests.These roles are discussed more analyti-cally in The Principles of Political Econ-omy. Here he recognizes that there is aproblem to be solved in accounting forthe accumulation of capital in society.The capitalist saves, invests in produc-tive activity, sells the product at a profit,ploughs the profit back in as new invest-ment, and commences the cycle of accu-mulation once more. There is a seriousdilemma here, for the capitalist has tosell the product to someone if a profitis to be achieved, and the capitalist issaving rather than consuming. If thecapitalist saves too much and the rateof capital accumulation increases toorapidly, then long before subsistenceproblems are encountered, the capitalistswill find expansion checked by the lackof effective demand for the increasedoutput. Consequently, both capital andpopulation may be at the same time, andfor a period of great length, redundant,compared to the effective demand forproduce [20, p. 402].Malthus placed great emphasis uponthe effective demand problem and soughtto convince his contemporary Ricardo

    that in practice: the actual check to pro-duction and population arises more fromwant of stimulant than want of powerto produce [14, p. 117]. Ricardo wasnot persuaded, and the idea of effectivedemand in relationship to capital accu-mulation and wage rates remained dor-mant until Keynes resurrected it in hisGeneral Theory of Employment, Interestand Money.Malthus' solution to the problem ofeffective demand is to rely upon theproper exercise of the power to consumeon the part of those unproductive classes-the landlords, state functionaries, etc.-who were outside of the production pro-cess. Malthus took pains to dissociatehimself from any direct apologetics forconspicuous consumption on the part ofthe landed gentry. He was merely say-ing that if the capitalist, who was notgiving in to what Adam Smith callsmankind's insatiable appetite for trin-kets and baubles, was to succeed in thetask of capital accumulation, then some-one, somewhere, had to generate aneffective demand:It is unquestionably true that wealthproduceswants; but it is a still more im-portant truth that wants produce wealth.Each cause acts and reacts upon theother, but the order, both of precedenceand importance, s with the wants whichstimulate industry. . . . The greatest ofall difficulties in converting uncivilizedand thinly peopled countries nto civilizedand populous ones, is to inspire themwith the wants best calculated to excitetheir exertions in the production ofwealth. One of the greatestbenefitswhichforeign commerce confers, and the rea-son why it has always appeared an al-most necessary ingredientin the progressof wealth, is its tendency to inspire newwants, to form new tastes, and to furnishfresh motives for industry.Even civilizedand improved countries cannot affordtolose any of these motives [20, p. 403].

    Effective demand, located in the un-productive classes of society and stimu-lated by need creation and foreign trade,was an important and vital force in stim-

    that in practice: the actual check to pro-duction and population arises more fromwant of stimulant than want of powerto produce [14, p. 117]. Ricardo wasnot persuaded, and the idea of effectivedemand in relationship to capital accu-mulation and wage rates remained dor-mant until Keynes resurrected it in hisGeneral Theory of Employment, Interestand Money.Malthus' solution to the problem ofeffective demand is to rely upon theproper exercise of the power to consumeon the part of those unproductive classes-the landlords, state functionaries, etc.-who were outside of the production pro-cess. Malthus took pains to dissociatehimself from any direct apologetics forconspicuous consumption on the part ofthe landed gentry. He was merely say-ing that if the capitalist, who was notgiving in to what Adam Smith callsmankind's insatiable appetite for trin-kets and baubles, was to succeed in thetask of capital accumulation, then some-one, somewhere, had to generate aneffective demand:It is unquestionably true that wealthproduceswants; but it is a still more im-portant truth that wants produce wealth.Each cause acts and reacts upon theother, but the order, both of precedenceand importance, s with the wants whichstimulate industry. . . . The greatest ofall difficulties in converting uncivilizedand thinly peopled countries nto civilizedand populous ones, is to inspire themwith the wants best calculated to excitetheir exertions in the production ofwealth. One of the greatestbenefitswhichforeign commerce confers, and the rea-son why it has always appeared an al-most necessary ingredientin the progressof wealth, is its tendency to inspire newwants, to form new tastes, and to furnishfresh motives for industry.Even civilizedand improved countries cannot affordtolose any of these motives [20, p. 403].

    Effective demand, located in the un-productive classes of society and stimu-lated by need creation and foreign trade,was an important and vital force in stim-

    that in practice: the actual check to pro-duction and population arises more fromwant of stimulant than want of powerto produce [14, p. 117]. Ricardo wasnot persuaded, and the idea of effectivedemand in relationship to capital accu-mulation and wage rates remained dor-mant until Keynes resurrected it in hisGeneral Theory of Employment, Interestand Money.Malthus' solution to the problem ofeffective demand is to rely upon theproper exercise of the power to consumeon the part of those unproductive classes-the landlords, state functionaries, etc.-who were outside of the production pro-cess. Malthus took pains to dissociatehimself from any direct apologetics forconspicuous consumption on the part ofthe landed gentry. He was merely say-ing that if the capitalist, who was notgiving in to what Adam Smith callsmankind's insatiable appetite for trin-kets and baubles, was to succeed in thetask of capital accumulation, then some-one, somewhere, had to generate aneffective demand:It is unquestionably true that wealthproduceswants; but it is a still more im-portant truth that wants produce wealth.Each cause acts and reacts upon theother, but the order, both of precedenceand importance, s with the wants whichstimulate industry. . . . The greatest ofall difficulties in converting uncivilizedand thinly peopled countries nto civilizedand populous ones, is to inspire themwith the wants best calculated to excitetheir exertions in the production ofwealth. One of the greatestbenefitswhichforeign commerce confers, and the rea-son why it has always appeared an al-most necessary ingredientin the progressof wealth, is its tendency to inspire newwants, to form new tastes, and to furnishfresh motives for industry.Even civilizedand improved countries cannot affordtolose any of these motives [20, p. 403].

    Effective demand, located in the un-productive classes of society and stimu-lated by need creation and foreign trade,was an important and vital force in stim-

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    POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEulating both the accumulation of capitaland the expansion of employment. Labormight be unemployed, consequently,simply because of the failure of the up-per classes to consume. This theory ofeffective demand does not sit easily withthe theory of population. For one thing,it appears contradictory to assert via thetheory of population that the power toconsume be withheld from the lowestclasses in society while asserting, throughthe theory of effective demand, that theupper classes should consume as muchas possible. Malthus attempts to resolvethis contradiction by arguing that theupper classes do not increase their num-bers according to the principle of popu-lation-they consume conspicuously andregulate their numbers by prudent habitsgenerated out of a fear of a decline intheir station in life. The lowest classesimprudently breed. The law of popula-tion is consequently disaggregated intoone law for the poor and another law forthe rich. But Malthus also has to explainwhy an effective demand cannot be gen-erated by an increasing power to con-sume on the part of the laboring classes.Such a possibility Malthus quickly dis-misses as illogical for: no one will everemploy capital merely for the sake ofthe demand occasioned by those whowork for him [20, p. 404].He adds that the only case in whichthis could occur would be if the laborersproduce an excess of value above whatthey consume. He dismisses this possi-bility entirely. But even Ricardo, in an-notating this passage, asks quite simplywhy not? and writes out a simple caseto prove his point [36, p. 429]. And, ofcourse, it is this idea, which Malthusrejects out of hand, that forms the foun-dation of Marx's theory of surplus value,out of which the Marxist theory of rela-tive surplus population stems.Internal to Malthus' own work there isa central contradiction. On the one hand,the natural law of population asserts adoctrine of inevitable misery for the massof mankind, while the theory of effective

    ulating both the accumulation of capitaland the expansion of employment. Labormight be unemployed, consequently,simply because of the failure of the up-per classes to consume. This theory ofeffective demand does not sit easily withthe theory of population. For one thing,it appears contradictory to assert via thetheory of population that the power toconsume be withheld from the lowestclasses in society while asserting, throughthe theory of effective demand, that theupper classes should consume as muchas possible. Malthus attempts to resolvethis contradiction by arguing that theupper classes do not increase their num-bers according to the principle of popu-lation-they consume conspicuously andregulate their numbers by prudent habitsgenerated out of a fear of a decline intheir station in life. The lowest classesimprudently breed. The law of popula-tion is consequently disaggregated intoone law for the poor and another law forthe rich. But Malthus also has to explainwhy an effective demand cannot be gen-erated by an increasing power to con-sume on the part of the laboring classes.Such a possibility Malthus quickly dis-misses as illogical for: no one will everemploy capital merely for the sake ofthe demand occasioned by those whowork for him [20, p. 404].He adds that the only case in whichthis could occur would be if the laborersproduce an excess of value above whatthey consume. He dismisses this possi-bility entirely. But even Ricardo, in an-notating this passage, asks quite simplywhy not? and writes out a simple caseto prove his point [36, p. 429]. And, ofcourse, it is this idea, which Malthusrejects out of hand, that forms the foun-dation of Marx's theory of surplus value,out of which the Marxist theory of rela-tive surplus population stems.Internal to Malthus' own work there isa central contradiction. On the one hand,the natural law of population asserts adoctrine of inevitable misery for the massof mankind, while the theory of effective

    ulating both the accumulation of capitaland the expansion of employment. Labormight be unemployed, consequently,simply because of the failure of the up-per classes to consume. This theory ofeffective demand does not sit easily withthe theory of population. For one thing,it appears contradictory to assert via thetheory of population that the power toconsume be withheld from the lowestclasses in society while asserting, throughthe theory of effective demand, that theupper classes should consume as muchas possible. Malthus attempts to resolvethis contradiction by arguing that theupper classes do not increase their num-bers according to the principle of popu-lation-they consume conspicuously andregulate their numbers by prudent habitsgenerated out of a fear of a decline intheir station in life. The lowest classesimprudently breed. The law of popula-tion is consequently disaggregated intoone law for the poor and another law forthe rich. But Malthus also has to explainwhy an effective demand cannot be gen-erated by an increasing power to con-sume on the part of the laboring classes.Such a possibility Malthus quickly dis-misses as illogical for: no one will everemploy capital merely for the sake ofthe demand occasioned by those whowork for him [20, p. 404].He adds that the only case in whichthis could occur would be if the laborersproduce an excess of value above whatthey consume. He dismisses this possi-bility entirely. But even Ricardo, in an-notating this passage, asks quite simplywhy not? and writes out a simple caseto prove his point [36, p. 429]. And, ofcourse, it is this idea, which Malthusrejects out of hand, that forms the foun-dation of Marx's theory of surplus value,out of which the Marxist theory of rela-tive surplus population stems.Internal to Malthus' own work there isa central contradiction. On the one hand,the natural law of population asserts adoctrine of inevitable misery for the massof mankind, while the theory of effective

    demand points to social controls to theemployment of both capital and labor.Zinke suggests that Malthus did not needto reconcile these conflicting positions,for the principle of population appliesin the long run, while the theory of effec-tive demand is an explanation for shortrun cyclical swings [43]. Malthus doesnot appear to have thought this wayabout it. In the Summary View of thePrinciple of Population, published in1830, Malthus attempts to reconcile thesedivergent views. Here he admits thatthe laws of private property, which arethe grand stimulants to production, dothemselves so limit it as always to makethe actual produce of the earth fall veryconsiderably short of the power of pro-duction [19, p. 245].He then goes on to point out that un-der a system of private property theonly effectual demand for produce mustcome from the owners of property, andthat the control of effective demand sointervenes with respect to the principleof population that it prevents the visita-tion of misery on all sectors of mankindand secures to a portion of society theleisure necessary for the progress of thearts and sciences -a phenomena thatconfers on society a most signal bene-fit. Claims for social reform, and par-ticularly any challenges to the principleof private property, are misplaced. Todo away with a society based on com-petitive individualism regulated throughthe institutions of private property is topermit the principle of population tooperate unchecked-an eventuality thatwill plunge all of mankind into a stateof misery. The laws of private property,insofar as they have restricted the oppor-tunities for the laboring classes, haveartificially checked the operation of theprinciple of population and thereby re-duced the aggregate misery of mankind.Malthus thus reconciles the principle ofpopulation with the theory of effectivedemand:

    It makes little difference in the actualrate of increase of population, or the

    demand points to social controls to theemployment of both capital and labor.Zinke suggests that Malthus did not needto reconcile these conflicting positions,for the principle of population appliesin the long run, while the theory of effec-tive demand is an explanation for shortrun cyclical swings [43]. Malthus doesnot appear to have thought this wayabout it. In the Summary View of thePrinciple of Population, published in1830, Malthus attempts to reconcile thesedivergent views. Here he admits thatthe laws of private property, which arethe grand stimulants to production, dothemselves so limit it as always to makethe actual produce of the earth fall veryconsiderably short of the power of pro-duction [19, p. 245].He then goes on to point out that un-der a system of private property theonly effectual demand for produce mustcome from the owners of property, andthat the control of effective demand sointervenes with respect to the principleof population that it prevents the visita-tion of misery on all sectors of mankindand secures to a portion of society theleisure necessary for the progress of thearts and sciences -a phenomena thatconfers on society a most signal bene-fit. Claims for social reform, and par-ticularly any challenges to the principleof private property, are misplaced. Todo away with a society based on com-petitive individualism regulated throughthe institutions of private property is topermit the principle of population tooperate unchecked-an eventuality thatwill plunge all of mankind into a stateof misery. The laws of private property,insofar as they have restricted the oppor-tunities for the laboring classes, haveartificially checked the operation of theprinciple of population and thereby re-duced the aggregate misery of mankind.Malthus thus reconciles the principle ofpopulation with the theory of effectivedemand:

    It makes little difference in the actualrate of increase of population, or the

    demand points to social controls to theemployment of both capital and labor.Zinke suggests that Malthus did not needto reconcile these conflicting positions,for the principle of population appliesin the long run, while the theory of effec-tive demand is an explanation for shortrun cyclical swings [43]. Malthus doesnot appear to have thought this wayabout it. In the Summary View of thePrinciple of Population, published in1830, Malthus attempts to reconcile thesedivergent views. Here he admits thatthe laws of private property, which arethe grand stimulants to production, dothemselves so limit it as always to makethe actual produce of the earth fall veryconsiderably short of the power of pro-duction [19, p. 245].He then goes on to point out that un-der a system of private property theonly effectual demand for produce mustcome from the owners of property, andthat the control of effective demand sointervenes with respect to the principleof population that it prevents the visita-tion of misery on all sectors of mankindand secures to a portion of society theleisure necessary for the progress of thearts and sciences -a phenomena thatconfers on society a most signal bene-fit. Claims for social reform, and par-ticularly any challenges to the principleof private property, are misplaced. Todo away with a society based on com-petitive individualism regulated throughthe institutions of private property is topermit the principle of population tooperate unchecked-an eventuality thatwill plunge all of mankind into a stateof misery. The laws of private property,insofar as they have restricted the oppor-tunities for the laboring classes, haveartificially checked the operation of theprinciple of population and thereby re-duced the aggregate misery of mankind.Malthus thus reconciles the principle ofpopulation with the theory of effectivedemand:

    It makes little difference in the actualrate of increase of population, or the

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    ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYnecessary existence of checks to it,whether the state of demand and supplywhich occasionsan insufficiencyof wagesto the whole of the labouring classes beproducedprematurelyby a bad structureof society, and an unfavourabledistribu-tion of wealth, or necessarilyby the com-parative exhaustion of the soil. The la-bourer feels the difficulty in the samedegree and it must have nearly the sameresults, from whatever cause it arises[19, p. 247].Malthus was, in principle, a defenderof private property arrangements, and itis this ideology that underlies his formu-lation of the principle of population aswell as the theory of effective demand.Private property arrangements inevitablymean an uneven distribution of income,wealth, and the means of production insociety. Malthus accepts some such dis-tributional arrangement and accepts itsclass character. Specific distributionalarrangement may be judged good or bad,but there was no way in which a ration-al society could be ordered which didnot incorporate necessary class distinc-

    tions. Malthus bolstered his argumentswith analysis and materials blended to-gether, particularly with respect to thetheory of population, by appeal to amethod of logical empiricism. In his writ-ings on political economy, however, Mal-thus frequently made use of a methodmore characteristic of Ricardo. In partthe contradictory character of much ofMalthus' writings on population andeffective demand stems from the disjunc-tion of method used to examine the twophenomena. At this point, therefore, wemust turn to that method of investigationmost clearly exhibited in the cleanlyspelled-out analytics of Ricardo.

    RICARDORicardo accepted Malthus' principleof population without any reservationsand, it must be added, quite uncritically.But the population principle plays a

    quite different role and is also treatedaccording to a quite different methodol-

    necessary existence of checks to it,whether the state of demand and supplywhich occasionsan insufficiencyof wagesto the whole of the labouring classes beproducedprematurelyby a bad structureof society, and an unfavourabledistribu-tion of wealth, or necessarilyby the com-parative exhaustion of the soil. The la-bourer feels the difficulty in the samedegree and it must have nearly the sameresults, from whatever cause it arises[19, p. 247].Malthus was, in principle, a defenderof private property arrangements, and itis this ideology that underlies his formu-lation of the principle of population aswell as the theory of effective demand.Private property arrangements inevitablymean an uneven distribution of income,wealth, and the means of production insociety. Malthus accepts some such dis-tributional arrangement and accepts itsclass character. Specific distributionalarrangement may be judged good or bad,but there was no way in which a ration-al society could be ordered which didnot incorporate necessary class distinc-

    tions. Malthus bolstered his argumentswith analysis and materials blended to-gether, particularly with respect to thetheory of population, by appeal to amethod of logical empiricism. In his writ-ings on political economy, however, Mal-thus frequently made use of a methodmore characteristic of Ricardo. In partthe contradictory character of much ofMalthus' writings on population andeffective demand stems from the disjunc-tion of method used to examine the twophenomena. At this point, therefore, wemust turn to that method of investigationmost clearly exhibited in the cleanlyspelled-out analytics of Ricardo.

    RICARDORicardo accepted Malthus' principleof population without any reservationsand, it must be added, quite uncritically.But the population principle plays a

    quite different role and is also treatedaccording to a quite different methodol-

    necessary existence of checks to it,whether the state of demand and supplywhich occasionsan insufficiencyof wagesto the whole of the labouring classes beproducedprematurelyby a bad structureof society, and an unfavourabledistribu-tion of wealth, or necessarilyby the com-parative exhaustion of the soil. The la-bourer feels the difficulty in the samedegree and it must have nearly the sameresults, from whatever cause it arises[19, p. 247].Malthus was, in principle, a defenderof private property arrangements, and itis this ideology that underlies his formu-lation of the principle of population aswell as the theory of effective demand.Private property arrangements inevitablymean an uneven distribution of income,wealth, and the means of production insociety. Malthus accepts some such dis-tributional arrangement and accepts itsclass character. Specific distributionalarrangement may be judged good or bad,but there was no way in which a ration-al society could be ordered which didnot incorporate necessary class distinc-

    tions. Malthus bolstered his argumentswith analysis and materials blended to-gether, particularly with respect to thetheory of population, by appeal to amethod of logical empiricism. In his writ-ings on political economy, however, Mal-thus frequently made use of a methodmore characteristic of Ricardo. In partthe contradictory character of much ofMalthus' writings on population andeffective demand stems from the disjunc-tion of method used to examine the twophenomena. At this point, therefore, wemust turn to that method of investigationmost clearly exhibited in the cleanlyspelled-out analytics of Ricardo.

    RICARDORicardo accepted Malthus' principleof population without any reservationsand, it must be added, quite uncritically.But the population principle plays a

    quite different role and is also treatedaccording to a quite different methodol-

    ogy in Ricardo's work. Ricardo's methodwas to abstract a few basic elements andrelationships out of a complex reality andto analyze and manipulate these ideal-ized elements and relationships in orderto discern the structure of the systemunder consideration. In this manner Ri-cardo built an abstract model of eco-nomic allocation through the marketmechanism-a working model of capital-ist society-that had little need for anempirical base. The function of such amodel was to provide a tool for analysiswhich would both explain and predictchange. Ricardo was not an empiricist inthe sense that Malthus was in the Essayon Population, and he used facts spar-ingly, largely by way of illustrationrather than with the intent to verify the-ory. The success and legitimacy of sucha method depends, of course, entirelyupon the reasonableness of the abstrac-tions made. It is important to look, there-fore, at the nature of the abstractionsand idealizations built into Ricardo'smodel in order to understand both hissubstantive conclusions and his treatmentof the population-resources problem.At the heart of Ricardo's system wefind a basic assumption concerning thenature of economic rationality: eco-nomic man is the model of rationalityto which all human beings ought to as-pire. Ricardo was, consequently, a nor-mative rather than an empirical (posi-tive) thinker. More deeply buried inRicardo's work, however, is a doctrineof social harmony achieved through eco-nomically rational behavior in the mar-ket place. This doctrine of social har-mony is frequently found in the politicaleconomy of the period, and its appear-ance in Ricardo's work is not uncon-nected with the use of an analytic,model-building methodology. A set ofelements and relationships linked into alogical structure is bound to be internal-ly consistent and to be internally har-monious. The model also generates equil-ibrium-type solutions to problems whenit is subjected to manipulation and anal-

    ogy in Ricardo's work. Ricardo's methodwas to abstract a few basic elements andrelationships out of a complex reality andto analyze and manipulate these ideal-ized elements and relationships in orderto discern the structure of the systemunder consideration. In this manner Ri-cardo built an abstract model of eco-nomic allocation through the marketmechanism-a working model of capital-ist society-that had little need for anempirical base. The function of such amodel was to provide a tool for analysiswhich would both explain and predictchange. Ricardo was not an empiricist inthe sense that Malthus was in the Essayon Population, and he used facts spar-ingly, largely by way of illustrationrather than with the intent to verify the-ory. The success and legitimacy of sucha method depends, of course, entirelyupon the reasonableness of the abstrac-tions made. It is important to look, there-fore, at the nature of the abstractionsand idealizations built into Ricardo'smodel in order to understand both hissubstantive conclusions and his treatmentof the population-resources problem.At the heart of Ricardo's system wefind a basic assumption concerning thenature of economic rationality: eco-nomic man is the model of rationalityto which all human beings ought to as-pire. Ricardo was, consequently, a nor-mative rather than an empirical (posi-tive) thinker. More deeply buried inRicardo's work, however, is a doctrineof social harmony achieved through eco-nomically rational behavior in the mar-ket place. This doctrine of social har-mony is frequently found in the politicaleconomy of the period, and its appear-ance in Ricardo's work is not uncon-nected with the use of an analytic,model-building methodology. A set ofelements and relationships linked into alogical structure is bound to be internal-ly consistent and to be internally har-monious. The model also generates equil-ibrium-type solutions to problems whenit is subjected to manipulation and anal-

    ogy in Ricardo's work. Ricardo's methodwas to abstract a few basic elements andrelationships out of a complex reality andto analyze and manipulate these ideal-ized elements and relationships in orderto discern the structure of the systemunder consideration. In this manner Ri-cardo built an abstract model of eco-nomic allocation through the marketmechanism-a working model of capital-ist society-that had little need for anempirical base. The function of such amodel was to provide a tool for analysiswhich would both explain and predictchange. Ricardo was not an empiricist inthe sense that Malthus was in the Essayon Population, and he used facts spar-ingly, largely by way of illustrationrather than with the intent to verify the-ory. The success and legitimacy of sucha method depends, of course, entirelyupon the reasonableness of the abstrac-tions made. It is important to look, there-fore, at the nature of the abstractionsand idealizations built into Ricardo'smodel in order to understand both hissubstantive conclusions and his treatmentof the population-resources problem.At the heart of Ricardo's system wefind a basic assumption concerning thenature of economic rationality: eco-nomic man is the model of rationalityto which all human beings ought to as-pire. Ricardo was, consequently, a nor-mative rather than an empirical (posi-tive) thinker. More deeply buried inRicardo's work, however, is a doctrineof social harmony achieved through eco-nomically rational behavior in the mar-ket place. This doctrine of social har-mony is frequently found in the politicaleconomy of the period, and its appear-ance in Ricardo's work is not uncon-nected with the use of an analytic,model-building methodology. A set ofelements and relationships linked into alogical structure is bound to be internal-ly consistent and to be internally har-monious. The model also generates equil-ibrium-type solutions to problems whenit is subjected to manipulation and anal-

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    POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEOPULATION, RESOURCES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCEysis. It is with respect to the social har-mony concept that Ricardo's work con-trasts most markedly with that of Mal-thus and Marx. The latter's work is ex-pressive of the theme of class conflictthroughout, whereas in Malthus' workthe sense of class conflict is confusedwith social harmony (particularly in ThePrinciples of Political Economy) as Mal-thus seeks to combine results arrived atby means of logical empiricism withthose arrived at by means of an abstractmodel of the economy. Class conflict canscarcely be found in the harmoniousanalytics of Ricardo's market system, al-though the analytical results are usedfor class purposes, namely, the defeat ofthe landed interest and the subservienceof wage labor to the interests of theindustrial entrepreneur.Under these conditions it is surprisingto find that Ricardo so easily acceptedMalthus' principle of population. In part,the simplicity of Malthus' deductive ar-gument must have appealed to him, butthere is a much more significant reasonfor Ricardo's wholehearted endorsementof the principle. Only by means of itcould Ricardo keep his system harmoni-ous and in equilibrium. The analyticproblem for Ricardo was to explain theequilibrium wage rate. Wages, he ar-gued, were basically determined by twofactors: scarcity and the costs of subsist-ence. In Ricardo's system labor was re-garded abstractly as a commodity likeany other, and a growing demand for itought to elicit a supply so that wageswould, in the long-run, tend to the levelof a natural wage set by the costs ofsubsistence. The mechanism that Ricar-do appropriated from Malthus to achievethe balance between the supply and de-mand for labor was, of course, the prin-ciple of population, through which thelaboring population would automaticallyincrease their numbers:

    When, however,by the encouragementwhich high wages give to the increase ofpopulation, the number of labourers isincreased,wages again fall to their natur-

    ysis. It is with respect to the social har-mony concept that Ricardo's work con-trasts most markedly with that of Mal-thus and Marx. The latter's work is ex-pressive of the theme of class conflictthroughout, whereas in Malthus' workthe sense of class conflict is confusedwith social harmony (particularly in ThePrinciples of Political Economy) as Mal-thus seeks to combine results arrived atby means of logical empiricism withthose arrived at by means of an abstractmodel of the economy. Class conflict canscarcely be found in the harmoniousanalytics of Ricardo's market system, al-though the analytical results are usedfor class purposes, namely, the defeat ofthe landed interest and the subservienceof wage labor to the interests of theindustrial entrepreneur.Under these conditions it is surprisingto find that Ricardo so easily acceptedMalthus' principle of population. In part,the simplicity of Malthus' deductive ar-gument must have appealed to him, butthere is a much more significant reasonfor Ricardo's wholehearted endorsementof the principle. Only by means of itcould Ricardo keep his system harmoni-ous and in equilibrium. The analyticproblem for Ricardo was to explain theequilibrium wage rate. Wages, he ar-gued, were basically determined by twofactors: scarcity and the costs of subsist-ence. In Ricardo's system labor was re-garded abstractly as a commodity likeany other, and a growing demand for itought to elicit a supply so that wageswould, in the long-run, tend to the levelof a natural wage set by the costs ofsubsistence. The mechanism that Ricar-do appropriated from Malthus to achievethe balance between the supply and de-mand for labor was, of course, the prin-ciple of population, through which thelaboring population would automaticallyincrease their numbers:

    When, however,by the encouragementwhich high wages give to the increase ofpopulation, the number of labourers isincreased,wages again fall to their natur-

    ysis. It is with respect to the social har-mony concept that Ricardo's work con-trasts most markedly with that of Mal-thus and Marx. The latter's work is ex-pressive of the theme of class conflictthroughout, whereas in Malthus' workthe sense of class conflict is confusedwith social harmony (particularly in ThePrinciples of Political Economy) as Mal-thus seeks to combine results arrived atby means of logical empiricism withthose arrived at by means of an abstractmodel of the economy. Class conflict canscarcely be found in the harmoniousanalytics of Ricardo's market system, al-though the analytical results are usedfor class purposes, namely, the defeat ofthe landed interest and the subservienceof wage labor to the interests of theindustrial entrepreneur.Under these conditions it is surprisingto find that Ricardo so easily acceptedMalthus' principle of population. In part,the simplicity of Malthus' deductive ar-gument must have appealed to him, butthere is a much more significant reasonfor Ricardo's wholehearted endorsementof the principle. Only by means of itcould Ricardo keep his system harmoni-ous and in equilibrium. The analyticproblem for Ricardo was to explain theequilibrium wage rate. Wages, he ar-gued, were basically determined by twofactors: scarcity and the costs of subsist-ence. In Ricardo's system labor was re-garded abstractly as a commodity likeany other, and a growing demand for itought to elicit a supply so that wageswould, in the long-run, tend to the levelof a natural wage set by the costs ofsubsistence. The mechanism that Ricar-do appropriated from Malthus to achievethe balance between the supply and de-mand for labor was, of course, the prin-ciple of population, through which thelaboring population would automaticallyincrease their numbers:

    When, however,by the encouragementwhich high wages give to the increase ofpopulation, the number of labourers isincreased,wages again fall to their natur-

    al price, and indeed from a re-actionsometimesfall below it [35, p. 94].In the short run and under favorable

    circumstances, the rate of accumulationof capital could exceed that of the powerof population to reproduce, and duringsuch periods wages would be well abovetheir natural price [35, p. 98]. But suchperiods are bound to be short-lived. Also,when a population presses against themeans of subsistence, the only remediesare either a reduction of people or amore rapid accumulation of capital.Consequently, the laws determiningwages and the happiness of far thegreatest part of every community weredependent upon a balanced relationshipbetween the supply of labor, via theprinciple of population, and the accumu-lation of capital. Population, Ricardoargued, regulates itself by the fundswhich are to employ it, and thereforealways increases or diminishes with theincrease or diminution of capital [35,p. 78]. Even Malthus, however, objectedto this use of his population principle,observing that it took at least sixteenyears to produce a laborer, and that thepopulation principle was far more thanjust an equilibriating mechanism [20,pp. 319-20].Ricardo accepted that:the pernicious tendency of the poorlaws is no longer a mystery since it hasbeen fully developed by the able handof Mr. Malthus and every friend of thepoormust adamantlywish for their aboli-tion [35, p. 106].

    Like Malthus he argues that:The principle of gravitation is notmore certain than the tendency of suchlaws to change wealth and power intomisery and weakness; to call away theexertions of labour from every object,exceptthat of providingmeresubsistence;to confoundall intellectualdistinction;tobusy the mind in supplying the body'swants; until at last all classes should beinfected with the plague of universalpoverty [35, p. 108].

    al price, and indeed from a re-actionsometimesfall below it [35, p. 94].In the short run and under favorable

    circumstances, the rate of accumulationof capital could exceed that of the powerof population to reproduce, and duringsuch periods wages would be well abovetheir natural price [35, p. 98]. But suchperiods are bound to be short-lived. Also,when a population presses against themeans of subsistence, the only remediesare either a reduction of people or amore rapid accumulation of capital.Consequently, the laws determiningwages and the happiness of far thegreatest part of every community weredependent upon a balanced relationshipbetween the supply of labor, via theprinciple of population, and the accumu-lation of capital. Population, Ricardoargued, regulates itself by the fundswhich are to employ it, and thereforealways increases or diminishes with theincrease or diminution of capital [35,p. 78]. Even Malthus, however, objectedto this use of his population principle,observing that it took at least sixteenyears to produce a laborer, and that thepopulation principle was far more thanjust an equilibriating mechanism [20,pp. 319-20].Ricardo accepted that:the pernicious tendency of the poorlaws is no longer a mystery since it hasbeen fully developed by the able handof Mr. Malthus and every friend of thepoormust adamantlywish for their aboli-tion [35, p. 106].

    Like Malthus he argues that:The principle of gravitation is notmore certain than the tendency of suchlaws to change wealth and power intomisery and weakness; to call away theexertions of labour from every object,exceptthat of providingmeresubsistence;to confoundall intellectualdistinction;tobusy the mind in supplying the body'swants; until at last all classes should beinfected with the plague of universalpoverty [35, p. 108].

    al price, and indeed from a re-actionsometimesfall below it [35, p. 94].In the short run and under favorable

    circumstances, the rate of accumulationof capital could exceed that of the powerof population to reproduce, and duringsuch periods wages would be well abovetheir natural price [35, p. 98]. But suchperiods are bound to be short-lived. Also,when a population presses against themeans of subsistence, the only remediesare either a reduction of people or amore rapid accumulation of capital.Consequently, the laws determiningwages and the happiness of far thegreatest part of every community weredependent upon a balanced relationshipbetween the supply of labor, via theprinciple of population, and the accumu-lation of capital. Population, Ricardoargued, regulates itself by the fundswhich are to employ it, and thereforealways increases or diminishes with theincrease or diminution of capital [35,p. 78]. Even Malthus, however, objectedto this use of his population principle,observing that it took at least sixteenyears to produce a laborer, and that thepopulation principle was far more thanjust an equilibriating mechanism [20,pp. 319-20].Ricardo accepted that:the pernicious tendency of the poorlaws is no longer a mystery since it hasbeen fully developed by the able handof Mr. Malthus and every friend of thepoormust adamantlywish for their aboli-tion [35, p. 106].

    Like Malthus he argues that:The principle of gravitation is notmore certain than the tendency of suchlaws to change wealth and power intomisery and weakness; to call away theexertions of labour from every object,exceptthat of providingmeresubsistence;to confoundall intellectualdistinction;tobusy the mind in supplying the body'swants; until at last all classes should beinfected with the plague of universalpoverty [35, p. 108].

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    ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYCONOMIC GEOGRAPHYFurther, he warns that:

    if we should attain the stationarystate,from which I trust we are yet far dis-tant, then the perniciousnature of theselaws become more manifest and alarming[35, p. 109].Ricardo's evocation here of an ultimate

    stationary state is of interest. The analy-tic model-building methodology that heemployed naturally suggests, as we haveseen, harmony and equilibrium, and itis understandable that Ricardo shouldinfer from his model that there must in-evitably be some kind of equilibrium orstationary state. (J. S. Mill came to thesame sort of conclusion using a similarmethodological framework [28, pp. 752-7].) Ricardo is here arguing also that un-der such an equilibrium condition, inwhich the demand and supply of laborare equated and the prospects for furthercapital accumulation eliminated, therewould appear to be a choice betweenconditions of universal poverty (every-body receiving a mere subsistence wage)or conditions in which rational thoughtand civilization itself could survive, atleast among an elite. Ricardo is also sug-gesting that social welfare provision willbecome particularly pernicious in non-growth situations. Again, this argumentis still with us and we will return to itlater.Ricardo found Malthus' argumentswith respect to effective demand quiteastonishing however, and commentedthat: A body of unproductive labourersare just as necessary and useful with aview to future production as a fire whichshould consume in the manufacturer'swarehouse, the goods which those un-productive labourers would otherwiseconsume [36, p. 421].Ricardo would have no truck withMalthus' defense of the landed interestand it is clear from his remarks andpolicies with respect to the corn laws,rent, and the like, that Ricardo's sym-pathies lie entirely with the industrialentrepreneur who alone, in Ricardo's

    Further, he warns that:if we should attain the stationarystate,from which I trust we are yet far dis-tant, then the perniciousnature of theselaws become more manifest and alarming[35, p. 109].Ricardo's evocation here of an ultimate

    stationary state is of interest. The analy-tic model-building methodology that heemployed naturally suggests, as we haveseen, harmony and equilibrium, and itis understandable that Ricardo shouldinfer from his model that there must in-evitably be some kind of equilibrium orstationary state. (J. S. Mill came to thesame sort of conclusion using a similarmethodological framework [28, pp. 752-7].) Ricardo is here arguing also that un-der such an equilibrium condition, inwhich the demand and supply of laborare equated and the prospects for furthercapital accumulation eliminated, therewould appear to be a choice betweenconditions of universal poverty (every-body receiving a mere subsistence wage)or conditions in which rational thoughtand civilization itself could survive, atleast among an elite. Ricardo is also sug-gesting that social welfare provision willbecome particularly pernicious in non-growth situations. Again, this argumentis still with us and we will return to itlater.Ricardo found Malthus' argumentswith respect to effective demand quiteastonishing however, and commentedthat: A body of unproductive labourersare just as necessary and useful with aview to future production as a fire whichshould consume in the manufacturer'swarehouse, the goods which those un-productive labourers would otherwiseconsume [36, p. 421].Ricardo would have no truck withMalthus' defense of the landed interestand it is clear from his remarks andpolicies with respect to the corn laws,rent, and the like, that Ricardo's sym-pathies lie entirely with the industrialentrepreneur who alone, in Ricardo's

    Further, he warns that:if we should attain the stationarystate,from which I trust we are yet far dis-tant, then the perniciousnature of theselaws become more manifest and alarming[35, p. 109].Ricardo's evocation here of an ultimate

    stationary state is of interest. The analy-tic model-building methodology that heemployed naturally suggests, as we haveseen, harmony and equilibrium, and itis understandable that Ricardo shouldinfer from his model that there must in-evitably be some kind of equilibrium orstationary state. (J. S. Mill came to thesame sort of conclusion using a similarmethodological framework [28, pp. 752-7].) Ricardo is here arguing also that un-der such an equilibrium condition, inwhich the demand and supply of laborare equated and the prospects for furthercapital accumulation eliminated, therewould appear to be a choice betweenconditions of universal poverty (every-body receiving a mere subsistence wage)or conditions in which rational thoughtand civilization itself could survive, atleast among an elite. Ricardo is also sug-gesting that social welfare provision willbecome particularly pernicious in non-growth situations. Again, this argumentis still with us and we will return to itlater.Ricardo found Malthus' argumentswith respect to effective demand quiteastonishing however, and commentedthat: A body of unproductive labourersare just as necessary and useful with aview to future production as a fire whichshould consume in the manufacturer'swarehouse, the goods which those