CaUBe No, 9931039

HARRY L, SOJILIS,P1aintitf,

HONORABLE LARRY STANPLIY

Defendant.

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IN THE COUNTY CRIMINAL

COURT NO, 6

HARRIS COUNTy, TEXAS

ORDER STRIKING JUDGE OF COURT NO, 6On this date Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Judge by

Constitutional Disqualification was presented in the above-captioned case. Plaintiff had not previously exercised the right toobject to a judge in this proceeding.

Therefore, the Judge Larry Standley, is hereby removed fromthis case,Signed:

Judge presidingApproved as to Form:

No. 993~O39

HARRY L. BOWLES, § IN THE COUNTY CRIMINALPlaintiff. §

§VS. § COURT NO. 6

§HONORABLE LARRY STANDLEY. §

Defendant. § HARRIS COUNTY. TEXAS

PLAINTIPP'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO STRIKE JUDGE ON CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .

I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE

II . PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE . .

III. CONSTITUTIONALLY DISQUALIFIED JUDGE

IV. DUTY TO RECUSE .

V. ABUSE OF DISCRETION

VI . ANY JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED

VII. JUDGE CAN NOT CONTEST DISQUALIFICATION

VIII.DISQUALIFlCATION CAN NOT BE WAIVED ..

IX. CERTIFIED DOCKET SHOWS VIOLATION OF LAW

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X. JUDGES' ACrIONS HAVE PERFECTED CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

HIMSELF

XI. JUDICIAL BIAS

SUMMARY

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCases ~Aetna Life Ins, Co, y, Layoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S,Ct. 1580,

1589 (1986) ".. .,..,. "" 5Buckholts I.S,O. v. Glaser, 632 S,W,2d 146. 148 (1982) 4

Cotulla State Bank y, Herron, 202 S.W, 797 (Civ.App. 1918) 4District Judges of Collin County v, Commissioners Court, 677

S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex,App,Pallas 1984) . . . . .. 2First City Bank y. Salinas, 754 S,W.2d 497, 498 (Tex,App,-

Corpus Christi 1988), ..... 3Frieburg y. Isbell, 25 S,W. 988 (Civ.App. 1894) 5Fry y. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18, 202 S.W.2d 218, 221 (1947) 2Henderson y, Lindley, 75 T. 188, 12 S.W, 979 (1890) , . 4J-IY Invest. y, oayid Lynn Machine. Inc" 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex,

App, Dallas 1990) ,...., . . . 2Jennings y. Garner, 721 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.App. 1986) 4Lee y. British-American Mortgage Co., 51 Civ,App. 272,

S.W. 320 (1909) , , ..115

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Marshall v. Jerrico. Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610,1613 (1980) .,.... ..,........ 5

Mcclenan V. State, 661 S.W,2d 108 (Tex.Crim.App, 1983) 5Mcyea y. Walker, 11 Civ.App. 46 (1895), 23 T. 104Nalle y. City of Austin, 85 Tex, 520, 22 S.W. 960 (1893)Newcome y. Light, 58 T. 141 (1882),.44 Am.Rep. 604

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seabrook y, First Nat.(Civ.App. 1915)

Bank of Port Lavaca, 171 S.W. 2474

Slaven V. Wheeler. 58 T. 23 (1882) 4Starnes y. Chapman. 793 S.W.2d 104 (Tex,App.-Dallas 1990) 3Stephenson y. Kirkham,

Antonio 1927)297 S.W, 265. 267 (Tex,Civ,App.-San

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Templeton y, Giddings, 12 S.W. 851 (Tex,1889)Templeton y, Giddings, 12 S.W, 851 (1890) , .

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Texaco. Inc. y, Pennzoil Co" 729 S,W.2d 768 (Tex,App,-Houston, 1st Dist. 1987) , 5

Wright y. Sherwood, 37 S,W, 468 (Civ,App. 1896)

Statutes

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1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies § 1,24 (rev.1981) ,.."..,." , . , , , , , ., 2

Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannons One (1) through Five (5) 1Government Code, Title 2, § 21,005 1Judicial Ethics Opinions 1Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Article 6252-9b 1Texas Constitution, Article V, § 11 (disqualification) 1

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HARRY L. BOWLES,Plaintiff,

VS.HONORABLE LARRY STANDLEY

Defendant

No. 9931039

§§§§§§§

IN COUNTY CRIMINAL

COURT NO. 6

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFF IS BRIEF IN SOPPORT OFMOTION TO STBIII JQDGI ON CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

TO 1HB HONORABLI JUDGH OF SAID COURT.

Plaintiff, Harry L. Bowles, submits this brief regarding his

objection to Judge Larry Standley on the basis of Texas

Constitution. Constitutional grounds for Recusal are found in

Texas Constitution, Article V, § 11 (disqualification), Texas

Revised Civil Statutes, Article 6252-9b, Government Code, Title 2,

§ 21.005; Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannons One (1) through Five

(5) I and the Judicial Ethics Opinions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action arises from underlying actions which include and

show the Trial Court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned

in this case because the Trial Court has a personal bias or

prejudice, concerning the subject matter of this suit, as

demonstrated in particularity in Plaintiff'S Motion to Recuse Trial

Judge.

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The Trial Court has personal knowledge of this case upon which

he has expressed opinions, and has violated Plaintiff's rights todue process, pursuant to plaintiff's Motion to Recuse Trial Judge.

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II .

As a matter of law, once Recusal motion is made against ajudge on constitutional basis, the judge has no discretion, butmust recuse himself immediately. If the judge deniesdisqualification of constitutional basis, he has abused hisdiscretion; and such denial may be reviewed. See J-IV Invest. v,David Lynn Machine. Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.App.Dallas 1990);District Judges of Collin County V. Commissioners Court, 677 S.W.2d743, 744 (Tex.App~Dallas 1984).

III.

The constitutional prohibition has long been held to make anyorder involving judicial discretion by a constitutionallydisqualified judge "absolutely void," "a nullity." Fry v. Tucker,146 Tex. 1B, 202 S.W.2d 218, 221 (1947); Templeton V. Giddings, 12S.W. 851 (Tex.1B89); Stephenson y, Kirkham, 297 S.W. 265, 267(Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1927). Accordingly, disregard of theconstitutional disqualification is error that can be raised at anypoint in the proceeding. Nalle y, City of Austin, 85 Tex. 520, 22S.W. 960 (1893); 1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

§ 1.24 (rev. 1981).

IV .. '

The legislature in 1977 added the new statutory provision fordisqualification that is in question here. Art. 200a § 6. Inadopting the amendment to article 200a the legislature providedthat the judge "has a duty" to recuse himself,

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V.Judge Larry Standley's error in failing to grant a continuance

to the hearing that is the subject of the Mandamus, even afterbeing advised of Mandamus to the Court of Appeals, demonstratespartiality to the State, and prejudice against Defendant Bowles(Plaintiff). therefore, not only has Judge Larry Standley forfeitedjurisdiction by Constitutional violation against a Defendant in aCriminal proceeding, plenary power also has expired, by virtue ofsaid loss. He erred and abused his discretion by ordering Plaintiffto trial despite pending Mandamus, in violation of the Due Processprotection of the Constitutions. He, therefore, could not actlegally from the moment Recusal was filed. See Tex.R.Civ.P.329(b); First City Bank v. Salinas, 754 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988).

VI.

It is an abuse of discretion and appealable error for JudgeStandley to issue or sign any orders after the Motion toRecuse/Strike was filed against him. In a similar instance JudgeRyan was ordered to vacate any order he signed in that causesubsequent to his May 13, 1988 Recusal. Judge Ryan was directed toremove himself from any further involvement in any of thoseproceedings.Dallas 1990).

See Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.App.-

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VII.

Judge Standley has been disqualified on constitutional grounds

and cannot enter even an agreed order or decree in this cause ofaction. Any judgment rendered by him must be reversed. Seabrooky. First Nat Bank of Port Lavaca, 171 S.W. 247 (Civ.App. 1915).

VIII .

Judge Standley can not contest his disqualification exceptunder oath. If he does contest the disqualification, it must be byproper testimony. Henderson v. Lindley, 75 T. 188, 12 S.W. 979(1890); Wright v. Sherwood, 37 S.W. 468 (Civ.App. 1896). Hisevidence must be given under oath. Slaven v. Wheeler, 58 T. 23(1882) .

IX.A judge should not try a case in which there is the least

ground for his disqualification. Cotulla State Bank v. Herron, 202S.W. 797 (CiV.App. 1918). The disqualification of a judge is amatter affecting the jurisdiction and power of the court to act,and cannot be waived. Lee v. British-American Mortgage Co., 51Civ.App. 272, 115 S.W. 320 (1909); Buckholts I,S.D. v. Glaser, 632S.W.2d 146, 148 (1982); Jennings y. Garner, 721 S.W.2d 445, 446(Tex.App. 1986).

X. 0.'.

The "Court Docket Sheet", is prima facia evidence on its' faceof violation of law. The court entered Orders "Exparte" withoutNotice to Plaintiff, in his role of Attorney Pro se and Attorney ofRecord, in his Motion for New Trial, and Motion opposing withdrawal

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of Counsel. The court violated Texas Rules of Court and the

Judicial Code of Ethics by lack of due process on Plaintiff.

XI.Judge Larry Standley has been properly disqualified on

Constitutional basis. If Judge Standley acts in this cause after

being disqualified, without jurisdiction, he is responsible as any

other trespasser and has no immunity. McVea v, Walker, 11 Civ.App.

46 (1895), 23 T, 104; Newcome y. Light, 58 T. 141 (1882), 44

Am.Rep. 604; Templeton y. Giddings, 12 S.W. 851 (1890); Frieburg v.

Isbell, 25 S.W. 988 (Civ.App. 1894).

XII.The U.S. Constitution guarantees a person to an impartial and

disinterested tribunal in criminal cases. If judicial bias or

prejudice deprives a party of a fair trial, the bias or prejudice

creates a due process problem under the U.S. and Texas

Constitutions. Marshall y. Jerrico. Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100

S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d

768 (Tex.App. -Houston, 1st Diet. 1987); McClenan v, State, 661

S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Aetna Life Ins. Co. y. Lavoie, 475

U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1589 (1986),

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SUMMARY

Plaintiff would show the Court that Judge Larry Standley hasbeen recused on constitutional basis. From time of his Recusal,

df'any~his orders and actions in this cause are void and null, andconstitute a valid cause of action against said judge by Plaintiffherein, as Plaintiff has perfected a valid cause of action inMandamus.

Plaintiff requests, as in his Motion, that Judge LarryStandley recuse himself permanently from this instant cause; andthat he so advise the Administrative Law Judge.

Respectfully submitted,

owes, Sui Juris306 B' Hollow LaneHouston, Texas 77042(713) 784-8966

ATTORNEY OF RECORD, and acting asATTORNEY PRO SE

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HARRY L. BOWLIS,

Plaintitf,

v.HONORABLE LARRY STANDLEY,

nefendant.

No. 9931039

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IN COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT

NO. Ii

HARRIS COUNTY, T!XAS

MOTION POB MANDATORY CONSTITUTIONAL DISOUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

TO THE HONORABLE COURT;COMES NOW Harry L. Bowles, Plaintiff, making a Motion to

Strike Judge Larry Standley, and for cause would show the Court as

follows:

Plaintiff Harry L. Bowles, filed Motion for New Trial and

Motion Opposing Counsel Motion to Withdraw. Plaintiff then served

and/or filed for service, Witness Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces

Tecum. Hearing was held on December 7, 1999, on Prosecutors Motion

to Quash Subpoenas. Plaintiff avers he is not subject to rules of

court dictating time deadline for Motion to Recuse, as Plaintiff

specifically does not file under Texas Statutory law, but under

Constitutional law. Plaintiff states that this Disqualification is

not filed for purposes of delay, but to insure fairness and

impartiality of tribunal.

As a Constitutional Disqualification, Recusal may be made at

any time during the Proceeding. See attached ·PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN

SupPORT OF MOTION TO STRIXE JUDGE ON CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS.·

Plaintiff Disqualifies the Trial judge under the following

provisions of Constitutions and Rules of Court subject to Recusal:

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1. The Court I s impartiality might reasonably be questioned inthis case.

2. The Court has a personal bias or prejudice concerning thesubject matter of this suit.

3. The Court has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary factsconcerning this suit.

CONSTITOTIONAL GROUNDSPlaintiff sets forth each of the above grounds for

Disqualification in particularity to show Due Process Violations.I.

IMPIJl.TIALITY

Plaintiff filed Motion for New Trial citing mandatory groundsfor New Trial. Plaintiff served witness subpoenas and SubpoenaDuces Tecum. The State intervened by filing "Motion to Quash" allSubpoenas. The State cited no authority granting the State a rightto interfere with a Defendants Constitutional right in a CriminalProceeding, to call witness and evidence. Plaintiff challenged theState at the hearing of December 7, 1999, to show Authority to fileany Motion on behalf of a Defendants witness. The trial judgeignored Defendant in a show of partiality to the State. AlthoughPlaintiff announced before the hearing, that he was appearing as"Attorney Pro se", the trial judge refused to recognize the statu6of counsel, instead treating Plaintfff as a "Ward of the Court", bynot enforcing Plaintiff I s right to challenge the Prosecutor infiling Motions on behalf of Defense witnesses. This was an act ofgross partiality to the State, in direct violation of the Due

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Process rights of witnesses and evidence, guaranteed to a Defendantin a criminal proceeding. See "Support Brief", U.S. Supreme Courtin Aetna Life Ins. y, Lavoie, and Marshall v, Jerrico. and TexasCourt of Criminal Appeals, in McClenan Y, State. Additional DueProcess violation is in the Courts refusal to grant a continuanceto Plaintiff, on learning that Plaintiff was filing a Manaamusaction against the Court. Refusal of a trial continuance, pendingresult of Mandamus is a gross abuse of discretion showing immensepartiality to the State in an adjudicatory proceeding. Inaddition, the Trial judge admonished Plaintiff on at least two (2)instances, to "get a lawyer to do his appeal." This was overtbias, as Plaintiff was set for an Evidentiary hearing for The 17thday of December. The comments were made on the 7th of December,indicating that the Trial judge, had already decided the outcome ofthe Evidentiary hearing, by advising Plaintiff to "get a lawyer forhis Appeal." The trial judge fortified the bias, by denying thePlaintiff the right to subpoena witnesses, in trying to manipulatethe outcome of the Evidentiary hearing. Perhaps the most egregiousact of partiality was in court admission, of holding two (2)Exparte hearings or communications for benefit of Plaintiff'sformer counsel. The first was heard without notice to Plaintiff,to sign an order dismissing Plaintiff's counsel, without notice toPlaintiff. The second was held E3cParte on December 7, withoutnotice to Plaintiff by former counsel, by quashing a subpoena.

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II.PBRSONAL BIAS OR PRBJUDICE

The Court has demonstrated a personal bias and prejudice bothtowards Plaintiff. and in the subject matter of the case. Thecourt directed the Plaintiff to sit outside the Bar, while awaitingturn for trial. The Prosecutor was accorded stature as the Courtslawyer. and the Plaintiff while in capacity of Attorney Pro se andAttorney of Record, was refused legal standing as an "attorney", byrefusing Plaintiff the same treatment as the Courts personalProsecutor. This was an act designed to demean Plaintiff instature and to abridge his Sovereign right to "Open Courts" and"right to redress" as Constitutionally guaranteed, This was anovert act of bias and prejudice, demonstrated toward both Plaintiffand the subject matter. The court further demeaned Plaintiff byasking in open court if Plaintiff could "read or write". This wasan act done to embarrass Plaintiff and to demonstrate to Plaintiff.his standing as a 'W;lrdof the Court." In the eyes of the trialjudge The ward of the court status was enforced during the December7th hearing, when the Prosecutor made gross misstatements of fact,and the trial judge denied Plaintiff his right to respond to thefactual errors in the Prosecutors statement. This was an open biasand prejudice toward Plaintiff.

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PERSONAL XNOWLBDGB OP EVIDBNTIARY PACTS

The trial judge "is disqualified because of personal knowledgeof evidentiary facts'- Plaintiff, as part of his Motion for New

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Trial, submitted a portion of the "Exculpatory Evidence", in thepossession of the Prosecutor. By denying witness subpoena for theProsecutor in his role of "Investigator", the trial judge preventsPlaintiff from examining the Prosecutor on the witness stand at thehearing of December 17. With knowledge of exculpatory evidence,and preventing examination, the trial judge verifies his personalknowledge of the facts of the case, in order to prevent the factsin testimony. Plaintiff has accused the Prosecutor of perjury ina legal proceeding, and is entitled to examine on a witness stand.By denying Subpoena, the trial judge has acknowledged personalinterest in the case, and of the facts, by denying right to examinethe Prosecutor on the stand.

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dl The Judge also has a Legislative duty to recuse.e) The judge cannot act legally from moment of Recusal.f) Any order issued after filing will be vacated.g) Any judgement issued by the judge will be reversed.h) The trial judge can only contest a disqualification under oath

and on a witness stand.il The disqualification can not be waived.j) Orders after disqualification, lift judical immunity.

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DUTYThe personal interest or bias of the judge of the court will

deprive Plaintiff of a fair trial in violation of the due processclause of the Texas and the United States constitutions, and inviolation of Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b because the judge of the court has apersonal extra judicial bias or prejudice against Plaintiff. JudgeStandley is mandated to issue no further orders, conduct nohearings, and to forward this Disqualification to theAdministrative law judge for reassignment to another court.

Respectfully submitted, this1999 by:

/6721, day, of December,

306 Big Hollow Lane, Houston, 77042713-784-8966

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CERTIPICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this /C,17I1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoingu.s. mail to all interested parties

day of December,was forwarded by

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CIRTIFICATI OP CONPIBENCE

I hereby certify that I have not contacted State Prosecutor,Randall Ayers, but feel sure he will oppose it.

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VlRIFICATION

STATE OP TIXAS

COUNTY OP HAIUUS

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BIPORB MI, the undersigned authority, personally appearedHarry L. Bowles, who by me being duly sworn on his oath, deposedand said he has personal knowledge of the information in thepreceding documents, and that every statement of fact is true andcorrect within his personal knowledge.

SWORN TOon this thewhich witness

Bowles

~SUBSrRIBED BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority~~ day of December, 1999, to certifymy hand and official seal.

Notary.

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