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ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n° 511208)

APPLIED MULTI-RISK MAPPING OF NATURAL HAZARDSFOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT

DELIVERABLE 5.1

Harmonised hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment methods informingmitigation strategies addressing land-use planning and management

Scira Menoni, Politecnico di Milano, Adriana Galderisi, Andrea Ceudech, Università diNapoli Federico II, Giuseppe Delmonaco*, Claudio Margottini*, Daniele Spizzichino, T6

s.c.

Milano, 30 June 2006* Scientific Advisor

Project funded by the European Community under the:

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS

ARMONIA - Applied multi Risk Mapping of Natural Hazards for Impact Assessment

Harmonised hazard, vulnerability and riskassessment methods informing mitigation

strategies addressing land-use planning andmanagement (Del. 5.1)

AimsDeliverable 5.1 is one of the two research outcomes of Work Package 5(WP5) of the ARMONIA project. The overall aim of WP5 was to produce aframework and decision support tool structure for risk-informed planning.The specific objectives were:

• to produce a framework and decision support tool structure that willhelp ensure that planning decisions are fully informed about themultiple risks affecting particular areas of land, the vulnerability ofdifferent land uses and populations (taking account of main socialfactors) and the options that are available to mitigate the risks;

• to provide input on the definition of harmonised vulnerabilityassessment, risk analysis and multi-risk for land-use planning andmanagement;

• to contribute to the central aim of the EU Strategic EnvironmentalAssessment (SEA) Directive (2001/42/EC) as this legislation andassociated guidance currently pays little attention to natural hazardconcerns.

OverviewThe main goal of Deliverable 5.1 was to illustrate the methodology toassess risk in ways useful to make sound and informed land-use planningand management decisions, at least with respect to existing natural risks inthe areas of concern.

The methodology is based on the work carried out previously within theARMONIA project by all the partners, but is also the result of large efforts tosolve some of the crucial problems and critical aspects that were discussedin the various meetings among the project’s partners. It was shown that itis necessary to strongly link the assessment phase to the identification ofprevention strategies that can be implemented into current planningpractices and therefore two previously separated deliverables have beenmerged into one.

This document also sketches the skeleton of the DSS that is proposed bythe ARMONIA project and will be illustrated in detail in Deliverable 5.2. Itwas deemed extremely important to support the development of the DSSwith an adequate conceptual structure and framework so as to include themost relevant aspects of risk assessment and prevention. In this regard,

ARMONIA - Applied multi Risk Mapping of Natural Hazards for Impact Assessment

vulnerability has a particularly important role, in defining the characteristicsthat make a specific place more or less resistant to a given natural stress.

The skeleton of the DSS also suggests ways to overcome difficulties arisingin multi-risk approaches, that need to integrate complex factors related tothe multiplicity of natural threats, the physical vulnerability of assets andobjects, the community coping capacity with respect to different hazards,some of which may be well enchained in the same event.

Key elements of discussionIn Deliverable 5.1 the following key elements are discussed:

- the identification and discussion of preventative actions that can betaken through land-use planning and management, divided andtabulated into the following categories:

o Hazardo Exposureo Vulnerabilityo Coping Capacityo Risk in terms of expected damage,

- the importance of scale and time factors in shaping the preventativemeasures that can be taken,

- recommendations on the hazard intensity scales which should beused for mapping for different forms of hazard at regional and localscales,

- different approaches to characterising vulnerability and categorisingexposed elements at regional and local scales,

- risk assessment and synthesis tables and maps with quantitative andqualitative methodologies evaluated (e.g. vulnerability curves anddamage matrix approaches),

- criteria for assessing the compatibility between land uses and risksincluding considerations of technical feasibility, affordability andacceptability in deciding on mitigation measures.

A skeleton structure for the DSS is also presented which was adapted andevolved as part of the development work in Del. 5.2.

If you would like to receive the complete deliverable, pleasedownload it from www.armoniaproject.net or contact:[email protected].

ARMONIA PROJECT

Contract n° 511208

WP5:Integration of harmonized risk maps with

spatial planning decision processes

Del. 5.1Harmonised hazard, vulnerability and riskassessment methods informing mitigation

strategies addressing land-use planning andmanagement

Project funded by the European Community under the:

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n° 511208) Deliverable 5.1

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Contract Number: 511208

Project Acronym: ARMONIA

Title:Applied multi Risk Mapping of Natural Hazards for Impact Assessment

Deliverable N°: 5.1

Due date: 30 June 2006

Delivery date: 30 September 2006

Short Description:The present Del 5.1 will first draw on the research in WP1 WP2 and finallyWP3 in order to synthesize all the previous contributions to define the fullrange of preventative and mitigation measures that may be implementedthrough land-use planning and related policy in order to enhance theprotection of citizens (e.g. prevention of new development, designation oflow density uses, building design etc.). The full range of measures willthen be related, through the development of a harmonised tool, reflectingthe categorisations of risk that emerge from the work in WP2-3 and todifferent categories of land-use (current or potential) exhibiting differentlevels of vulnerability. A framework will be illustrated, showing theskeleton of the DSS that has been developed accordingly and will beillustrated in Del 5.2. The skeleton consists in a complex path to befollowed by planners, involving the assessment of hazard and vulnerabilitymatrices that will be applied in the case study work in WP6. Such aframework has been designed so as to be flexible and adaptable to thelocal needs of different spatial planning authorities in different memberstates.

Partners owning: CR1 (T6), CR5 (UNINA), CR11 (POLIMI)

Partner contributed: CR1 (T6), CR5 (UNINA), CR11 (POLIMI)

Made available to: All project partners and EC

VersioningVersion Date Name, organization0.1 21.6.06 Scira Menoni, POLIMI0.2 31.07.06 Scira Menoni, POLIMI0.3 30.09.06 Scira Menoni, POLIMI

Quality check

Internal Reviewers:

1st Internal Reviewer: Fiona Tweed, IESR

2nd Internal Reviewer: Mark Fleischauer, UNIDO


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This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 License. To view a copy of this license,

visit : http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ or send a letterto Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco,

California, 94105, USA.


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Table of contents1 Introduction ................................................................6

1.1 Document purpose ..........................................................6

1.1.1 Structure of the introductory chapter ................................... 7

1.2 Preliminary remarks.........................................................7

1.3 Results from previous steps of the ARMONIA projectrelevant to the present document .....................................7

1.3.1 Critical aspects enlightened in the first work package (WP1) ... 81.3.2 Critical aspects enlightened in work package 2 (WP2) ............ 9

1.4 Proposed key factors to be implemented into the DSS........ 10

2 Methodological framework ........................................14

2.1 Types of preventative actions that can be taken in andthrough land-use planning and management .................... 14

2.1.1 Hazard oriented preventative measures...............................152.1.2 Exposure-oriented prevention measures..............................162.1.3 Vulnerability oriented prevention measures..........................172.1.4 Risk-oriented prevention measures.....................................19

2.2 Scale and time factors.................................................... 19

2.2.1 Scale factors....................................................................192.2.2 Time factors ....................................................................21

2.3 Illustration of the DSS skeleton....................................... 22

3 Hazard intensity scales..............................................26

3.1 Geohazards and Climate Change ..................................... 30

4 Vulnerability of exposed elements and systems ........31

4.1 Chapter’s objective and scope......................................... 31

4.2 Short background on vulnerability studies and proposedpath for the ARMONIA project......................................... 32

4.3 Exposed elements and systems....................................... 35

4.3.1 Exposed elements at regional scale.....................................354.3.2 Exposed elements at the local scale ....................................36

4.4 Exposure and vulnerability assessment at regional scale .... 36


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4.5 Exposure and vulnerability assessment at the local scale.... 38

4.5.1 Vulnerability matrices at local scale: organisation andstructure .........................................................................39

5 Risk assessment and synthesis tables and maps .......39

5.1 Vulnerability curves ....................................................... 39

5.2 Damage matrix approach ............................................... 41

6 Criteria to assess the compatibility of proposed land-uses and implementation control mechanisms ..........42

7 Document summary and conclusions.........................44

8 Bibliographical references.........................................46

Appendix: vulnerability matrices for the regional andthe local scale ...........................................................49

Regional scale ....................................................................... 50

Seismic risk .................................................................................50Floods .....................................................................................51Landslides ...................................................................................52Forest fire....................................................................................53Volcanic risk ................................................................................54Coping capacity ............................................................................55

Local scale ............................................................................ 56

Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: seismic.......................56Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: flood ..........................60Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: landslide.....................64Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: forest fires ..................67Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: volcanic lava ...............69Coping capacity - Vulnerability category: systemic; Hazard type: all....72


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1 Introduction1.1 Document purposeThe present document integrates the two previously proposed Del 5.1 andDel 5.2. The main reason for such merge results from the fact that it hasbeen recognized through extensive discussions, in collective and partialmeetings among the research groups, that it is rather difficult to separatethe phases of risk assessment and mitigation when their aim is to feedplanning decisions. Those two phases in fact interact in the sense that inorder to provide mitigation strategies tailored to the main components ofthe risk relation, the assessment of the latter must have been carried outin a coherent way.

A couple of definition choices must be clarified here, so as to make thefollowing document understandable also in the light of work package 4(WP4). As it can be seen in the glossary developed for the ARMONIAproject as well as for many other projects, organizations, agencies, thereare sometime diverging views with respect to terms like exposure,vulnerability and risk. In the present document, coherently with what hasbeen held in Work Package 3 (WP3), damage and losses are the units ofmeasure of risk, which is obtained from the convolution (that is thecombination of two probabilistic distributions) of hazard and vulnerability.Hazard refers to the characteristics of the natural phenomena potentiallystressing a given inhabited environment, while vulnerability refers to howprone is a system to be damaged once a hazard evolves into a real event.The vulnerability concept permits to qualify exposed systems (the lattermeaning whatever is exposed, menaced by a given hazard), distinguishingmore fragile (and therefore likely to be damaged) from more resistant.

In the present document the advantages of separating those factors (risk,hazard, vulnerability and exposure) will be illustrated showing differenttypes of preventative strategies that may be designed for each of them inthe realm of land-use planning and management. In particular, thedocument is organized as follows:

- first a general overview of the key concepts is provided (in theintroductory chapter 1);

- the methodological framework is illustrated in the second chapter;

- while the subsequent chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 specify the content ofthe different “boxes” that constitute the DSS; that is it is specifiedhow hazards (chapter 3), vulnerability (chapter 4), risk assessment(chapter 5) should be carried out to obtain results relevant toplanning according to the DSS structure.

- Finally some criteria to assess the compatibility of proposed land-uses are proposed (chapter 6) to be included as part of the DSS, inorder to provide planners with ideas about how to assess planningdecisions in the face of existing risks (or risks that will be augmentedor diminished by their decisions).


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1.1.1 Structure of the introductory chapterThe first chapter is organized as follows:

- Results from previous work packages that are relevant to thedevelopment of the DSS are summarized (1.2 to 1.3);

- Then the skeleton of the DSS is sketched by enlightening the mostimportant elements that characterizes it according to the results ofthe ARMONIA project research.

1.2 Preliminary remarksLewis in his book Development in disaster prone areas (1999, p. 30),quotes a report issued by UNESCO in 1977 regarding the touristdevelopment along the Fiji coastline: «nothing has been done todiscourage extensive tourist development close to the shore...Use ofshoreline sites is on the increase in the Fiji, putting investments, visitorsand Fijian people all at peril from rare but quite possible events». Basicallythis quotation is at the heart of the ARMONIA project, which has beenproposed to answer the question why so little of available knowledge inthe field of natural hazards has been incorporated into land-use planningpractices.

There may be several answers to this question. The path that has beenfollowed in the ARMONIA Project provided important state of the art withrespect to hazard assessment (WP2) and land-use planning in hazardousareas (WP1). Synthetically, what can be said as a conclusion of those firstphases of the project, is that on the one hand planners understand toolittle about risks, in the sense that they ignore many technicalcomponents that are central to well informed decisions. On the otherhand, though, perhaps specialists in various fields studying risks havefailed to produce results in a form that could be useful to planners.

The third work package (WP3) provided a synthesis of the Europeansituation in a larger international context. In particular, the work packageextensively analyzed the attempts that have been carried out until nowconcerning multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment, showing theirpotential as well as limitations. It also underlined the importance ofvulnerability assessment that are generally lacking or poorly integratedinto the multi-risk and multi-hazard approaches available today.

1.3 Results from previous steps of the ARMONIAproject relevant to the present document

In order to illustrate the continuation of the project and the methodologythat has been chosen to develop the Decision Support System (DSS) toenable planners make their decisions considering risk issues, it may beuseful to briefly summarize the present situation as resulting from theprevious steps of the ARMONIA project.


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1.3.1 Critical aspects enlightened in the first work package(WP1)

The WP1, providing a general perspective relative to the way planning inEurope tackles risk prevention and management, has enlighten somecriticalities as well as positive aspects that should be taken into account indesigning a DSS supporting planning decisions.

First, it must be recognized that European countries provide a ratherample spectrum of what is intended in terms of land-use and spatialplanning and management. In some countries (like Italy or Spain forexample), land-use planning is dealt with by professionals with anarchitectural/design background, which leads them to consider urbanplanning and design as part of a unique approach.

In other countries (like the UK for example), planners are educated also inlaw, sociological and political science schools, so that their vision ofplanning is much more oriented toward strategic programs of regional andurban development. To this difference, others must be added, the mostimportant of which derives from the variety of ways found in Europe tocope with land revenue and with the need to balance private propertyrights (related in particular to land property) and public needs and goods.

Furthermore it must be noticed that the planning system in Europe ischanging at this time, marking an important turning point between an“old” way of planning through comprehensive binding tools and a “new”way of planning, distinguishing between a “strategic developmentconcept” to the actualisation of a given plan in a specific area.

The differences that have been briefly underlined above, lead to theconclusion that any attempt to harmonise the methods of includingprevention into land-use planning decisions must be flexible enough so asto adapt to various kinds of political and land management systems. Inother words, the proposal must be a methodological one, guiding plannersthrough the steps that are deemed as most important to appreciate theimplication of existing hazards and vulnerabilities while decidingdevelopment or conservation policies and plans.

According to Bernardo Secchi (2000, p. 6), a well known Italian urbanplanner,

«urban planning is provided by the traces of a largeset of practices producing continuous and awaremodifications in territories’ and cities’ condition».

Secchi grants to non-professionals too the ability to modify consciouslycities and spaces.In other parts of the book, however, he attributes toprofessional planners the ability to systematize different visions aboutcities’ and settlements’ future, to foster into a designed, ordered,structured set of documents wishes of change, preservation andtransformation, obeying to the need of offering people adequate spaces tolive, work and move in. In the present document, therefore, the wordplanner will indicate the professionist deciding about land use preservationor transformation, about zoning and about the location of facilitiesrelevant for the public and for cities’ main activities. Most of theobservations made below will concern directly planners as intended here,


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unless explicitly expressed otherwise (addressing for example sectoralplanners).

The latter statement permits to underline another relevant issue that mustbe taken into account: in some regulatory systems, spatial and land-useplanning deal mainly with future development and the transformation ofpresently not urbanized areas into urban. In other systems, planners arein charge of defining future land-uses and location of strategic facilitiesand infrastructures in both urban and development areas. In countries likeItaly and Greece, for example, an important part of planners’ workaddresses ancient and historic centres, that societies ask to preserve as amatter of community identity and historical roots. Therefore, the DSS willhave to incorporate both aspects, with respect to future development aswell as to the preservation of urban areas and functions. The need todevelop vulnerability assessment tools become even more evident whenalready existing parts of the town must be considered.

With respect to the last important point to discuss, that is the relation thathave been traced between land-use planning practices, however intended,and risk prevention, it has been noticed that hazards are significantlytaken into account only in sectoral plans. As thoroughly discussed in WP1,sectoral plans address a limited number off themes and are prepared byagencies that are generally different from comprehensive land-useplanning offices. Reconstruction post-disaster plans, watershed plans,plans developed by specific agencies, like seismic prevention offices orcivil protection are an example of such sectoral plans. As demonstrated inWP1 those plans only actually address and integrate risk assessment andprevention, as it is their main goal.

On the other hand, instead, ordinary plans, the traditional“comprehensive” plans, addressing urban and regional development andconservation strategies, scarcely implement the results of hazards andrisk assessment studies. There are vague indications or references tobinding limitations on building and development that derive from this orthat sectoral plan, but there are few attempts to transform ordinary plansinto a tool addressing existing risks at all levels using the language andthe keys planners are familiar with in their work. There is a rather scarceintegration between the two groups of instruments, hazard and riskassessment on the one side and land-use plans on the other. The ratherhigh level of sophistication and precision of the first is rarely translatedinto similarly sophisticated land-use planning tools.

1.3.2 Critical aspects enlightened in work package 2 (WP2)With respect to WP2, it can be said that the majority of reports, whicheach related to a given natural hazard, show that most of the researchand tools developed until now address mainly the hazard factor, whileexposure and vulnerability analyses are still at a very pioneering andexperimental phase. The most remarkable exception is that of seismicrisk, as in this field there is a long tradition (almost thirty years) ofmethods aimed at assessing the vulnerability of buildings and to a minorextent that of other urban systems (like strategic facilities and lifelines)and at estimating the damage as the combination of hazard andvulnerability. The relation between damage (the unit of measure of risk),


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hazard intensity (expressed generally as an acceleration, the PGA) andvulnerability is expressed either through damage matrixes or throughvulnerability curves. In the majority of the other hazards, such a neatstep-by-step methodology is not available, in many cases not even forbuildings. This constitutes a rather important limitation to the project, asit cannot count on a vulnerability assessment method already agreedupon by the scientific community. Yet, vulnerability analyses have beenrecognized as crucial for planners, as most non-structural mitigationmeasures (or better measures that do not address the hazard, see forexample Burby, 1998) and which are the core of land-use planningactivity cannot rely on adequate vulnerability studies. This is the reasonwhy it was deemed important to incorporate within the present sectionand within the DSS development also an attempt to produce vulnerabilityparameters for all the risks considered in the ARMONIA project.

So, while the intensity parameters that are exposed in section 3 resultfrom available expertise and may be considered a good representation ofthe present state-of-the-art, the vulnerability parameters have beenidentified and proposed looking in the more recent literature and the fewexamples available in the worldwide expertise, as will be discussed insection 4.

1.4 Proposed key factors to be implemented into theDSS

A rather large body of literature has been analysed to verify what kind ofdecision support systems were already available and in use in the field ofplanning in hazardous areas (see Task 5.2).

There is a vast literature on DSS, so one may choose articles and researchthat fits with his/her perspective (see for example Chen et al., 2001;Pearson and Shim, 1995; Witlox, 2005). However, there are somecommon elements that can be found in the vast majority of papers. Allagree, for example, that:

• first one should define what problem must be solved, or what set ofproblems must be addressed by the DSS;

• a second step is the definition of who should participate in the designof the DSS and its subsequent implementation and use. With respectto issues like planning, risk decision-making, situating of criticalfacilities or infrastructures, all agree that multi-dimensional, multi-actors, multi-criteria and interdisciplinary approaches are preferablebecause of the complex nature of the task, which is rather differentthan developing a DSS for a firm or a private company for marketingor design

More specifically to the kind of DSS that is under development in theARMONIA project, the review of existing tools in the field of risk and landuse planning, confirmed the results of the ARMONIA project’s investigationsummarized above: most of the available tools look at a risk at a time,are rather hazard oriented and rarely address vulnerability.

Analysis of the few multi-hazard/multi-risk methods discussed in WP3suggested that multi-hazard assessment is not the correct way to proceed


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in areas exposed to multiple threats. It is hard to find common units ofmeasures and after all such a multi-hazard “score” would not be of muchuse neither for emergency managers nor for urban and regional planners,as both must face specific problems provoked by hazards in a givencontext. The only exception concern events that may be interconnected ina unique chain.

Another way to tackle the question has therefore been then: to move froma multi-hazard to a multi-risk assessment. As physical vulnerability (andto a certain extent also coping capacity) may very between differenthazards, the idea to proceed with a multi-risk approach seems moreacceptable. But what does a multi-risk approach actually means? The firstattempts looked for unifying units of measures, for example estimatingeconomic damage or human losses resulting from the exposure tomultiple hazards. The notion of a unified unit of measure may soundappealing for scientists; nevertheless it is not equally decisive forplanners. What may be the practical use for the latter? Planners will stillneed to compare expected damage and secondary and indirectconsequences triggered by natural hazards t compare the expensesneeded to prevent this or that risk. Furthermore, they may be interestedin knowing if a preventative measure is addressing a variety of risks, if itaddresses only one, and even if it does not create some drawbacks, likecreating vulnerability or exacerbating other hazards.

An interesting point was made by Zerger (2002) regarding the beneficialcontribution of systems making explicit the levels of accuracy anduncertainties inherent in data and models used for risk assessment. Onepoint that is certainly crucial for any further attempt to better integrateplanning and risk assessment and mitigation derives from the need tofully appreciate uncertainty considerations and measures. Planners aregenerally reluctant to consider risk estimates expressed in probabilityterms when deciding for example a residential development. Especially inthe case of potentially rare but very harmful events, planners often endup taking the risk, as they do not fully understand the implications ofprobabilities.

The Zerger model was tested through interviews with civil protectionmanagers, in charge of deciding evacuation in case of imminent flooding;the conclusion of this test was not too encouraging for incorporatinguncertainty into the DSS, especially because managers prioritize on thebasis of vulnerability on the one hand (so that hospitals will be evacuatedfirst for example) and already consider a wide range of uncertainties onthe other. In this respect it may be useful to consider of the interestingreport by De Marchi et al., (1993) regarding the different categories ofuncertainties implied in risk assessment, ranging from legal to societal toepistemological. Nevertheless, Zerger ends his article noticing: «Riskmanagers working on policy formulation suggested the methodologywould be important for assessing mitigation strategies where a sensitivityanalysis is required. The uncertainty methodology is more appropriate forplanning, preparedness and assessing mitigation options, than for hazardevent response». As the duration of land-use planning decision is ingeneral much longer than that of any individual object built within anurban expansion or restoration project, the question of best locations and


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best options for conservation, development or redevelopment mustconsider time in terms of future generations, comparable to the “expectedfrequency” or “probability of occurrence” of some severe events.Uncertainty here refers not only to the actualization of the hazard, butalso to the development of vulnerable systems, which can be forecastedprobabilistically as well but on which societies (and planners) have a muchstronger possibility of action and interference. It cannot be neglectedhowever that planning and development activity may have a direct impacton some hazards as well, for example when hydraulic risk at a given riversection is considered or when slopes instability is aggravated by theconstruction of new roads or building(s). Even changing the trees speciesin a slope may worsen instability conditions, as not all species have thesame capacity to make soil more cohesive. This type of wrong changeshave occurred in the past (for example in the Sarno area in Italy beforethe tragically famous debris flows that killed a hundred people in May1998) when soil characteristics and potential hazards neglected tomaximise economic profits.

In general one may suggest that a DSS is a support tool for decision-making, in that it does not imply a unique, valid “response” (Delphi oracletype) but also a path, a methodology to be followed in order to get to afinal decision. In some instances (and we think that the ARMONIA projectis one such case) the path is more important than the final solution, asthere are several final solutions, with their positive and negative effects.In such a complex arena like planning it is not likely that those effectsmay be fully balanced and an optimal solution found. Most likely suchsolutions will occur outside the system. Therefore, the interest andusefulness of such system is the indication of a path to be followed, ofcrucial factors, criteria that should not be omitted in the discussion.

In planning, several types of data and parameters must be taken intoaccount, that are many times difficult to summarize satisfactorily into aunique value. As Davis and Hall (2003) put it:

«Evidence appears at very different levels ofgranularity and does not lend itself to beingcompressed into a single coherent format. Whilstthere may be a large volume of information relating toa decision, it is on the whole only of partial relevance,incomplete and sometimes conflicting.»

In planning it often occurs that available information is not provided in theform useful to support sound decisions; this is particularly true in the caseof risks, where many physical data can be provided but little has beenorganized in a systematic way regarding the response capabilities ofexposed systems. The two Authors mentioned above, propose than thefollowing strategy in designing a DSS:

« - to assemble evidence from diverse sources andrepresent it in a common and coherent model;

- to externalize expert judgements;

- to provide a commentary on sources and

implications of uncertainty in the evidence;


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- to facilitate dialogue between experts and otherdecision stakeholders»

Another element at stake while designing a DSS is how transparent thedecision process should be kept in the system. The definition of a clearstructure, a clear method to be followed, helps clarify the underlyingconcepts and criteria that the DSS designer thinks are important for thefinal decision.

In such a context, planners’ work is intimately linked to risk reduction (orcreation or increase) as «effective risk reduction is about learning how toachieve positive outcomes in situation where economic, social andenvironmental factors interact to create the context for appropriateactions» (EMA, 2002, p.18).

The approach taken by the ARMONIA project can be considered innovativein what follows: first it results from the integrated work of planners andspecialists in various natural hazards fields, second it looks at planners’activity from “inside”, respecting what planners actually do beforeprescribing this or that risk assessment and mitigation method.

The DSS should incorporate, as much as possible, the theoreticalachievements and the lessons learnt regarding the integration of planningand risk assessment, so as to avoid the kind of failure described byComfort (et al., 1999): «There is a widespread failure to recognize andaddress connections between changes in land-use, settlement policies,population distributions and the accompanying degradation of habitats onthe one hand and dramatically creased levels of hazard exposure andvulnerability on the other». Improvement in this field is not easy toachieve for the many reasons shortly discussed above. Therefore, the firststep requiring extensive thinking was developing a framework, a sort ofskeleton of the DSS, before producing an operational tool.

Such a framework provides a reference showing how the ARMONIA projectis locating itself in the wide and heterogeneous panorama of existingstudies on risk assessment.

The project also constitutes an attempt to bridge between fields ofexpertise that have been developed rather separately until now: betweenscientists investigating different phenomena, planners with differentbackground, between the two latter groups and social scientists. Planners,in their work, especially since when legitimating and participation havebecome central issues, have turned to social scientists to understandtrends, demands and needs.

No project aimed at reducing people’s vulnerability can succeed, nomatter how well conceived, without the people it is designed for (Wisneret al., 2004). In the case of planning, this is really a crucial point: somerisk prevention prescription or recommendations will affect local interests,the most relevant of which is related to the right to build on one’s land.Other restrictions on buildings height, shape, costs associated to buildingcodes are no less difficult to apply in the face of strong oppositions.

For those reasons, lessons learnt by social scientists, particularly thoseactually working with communities, can be particularly valuable.

Summarizing, the main objective of the designed DSS are:


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• to provide a basis for planning in an area subject to multiple risksrelated to natural hazards;

• to include exposure and vulnerability assessments;

• to help planners understand the implications of uncertainties andprobabilities in decisions concerning land-uses and location ofstrategic facilities.

2 Methodological frameworkThe methodological framework providing the basis for the DSS will bediscussed in three paragraphs. In the first, preventative actions that canbe taken by planners, or which planners may have an influence on, will besummarized. It will be shown what type of measures can be taken toreduce or mitigate the hazard, the physical and systemic vulnerabilities,and the risks resulting from the combination of hazard and vulnerability.

In the second paragraph spatio-temporal factors relevant to planning willbe examined, in terms of scale factors on one side and of “disasterphases” on the other.

Last, the skeleton of the DSS will be illustrated, in the attempt to showhow all the elements that have been deemed important sketching themethodological framework have been incorporated to guide planners intheir activity considering as an ordinary aspect among others hazard andrisk situations in the area to be planned.

2.1 Types of preventative actions that can be taken inand through land-use planning and management

The list of actions that follows is rather schematic and it is obvious thatreality is far less simple than described here. Nevertheless, it seemeduseful to schematise in this way so as to provide an immediate and easyto read picture of potentials and constraints of planners in the face ofnatural hazards.


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Table 1. Synthesis of mitigation measures that arerelevant to land-use planning and management

If the definition of risk as a combination of hazard and vulnerability ofexposed systems can be agreed upon, and if it is a common achievementthat risk can be measured in terms of expected damage (no matter howexpressed, if in monetary units or in indexes, etc.), one may ask on whatlevels and key parameters planning may act on.

Despite the fact that scientifically to have a unique, synthetic measurecomprising a complex reality-like risk may seem very powerful andelegant, one must consider that planning is a much “dirtier” activity,mixing together all types of considerations that are socially and physicallyrelevant in an area, despite the fact that the latter can be hardlycompared on a common unit scale. This leads to the appreciation of thefact that planners may act on several risk-related aspects (see Table 1):on the hazard component, on the exposure, on the vulnerability ofexposed systems as well as, to a certain extent, on the overall risk. Thefollowing paragraphs will be devoted to briefly expand on this statement.

2.1.1 Hazard oriented preventative measuresHazard analysis provides, as an output, relevant informationcharacterizing the kind of natural stress that may impact on a givenenvironment. It addresses the main factors permitting to describe andforecast the natural phenomenon accepting a given level of uncertainty.

Information regarding the hazard may lead to two types of measures: firstto address the hazard severity or probability in the attempt to reduce oneof them or both limiting the potential for the natural phenomena itself.Second, knowledge of existing hazards in a given area may constitute animportant information for planners, as will be discussed later.

risk factor addressed type of measure scale type of planning influence barriers

hazard structural measures local (may have an sectoral plans may include - structural measures mayinfluence at other structural measures induce false sense ofscales as well) - it would be better if plans safety

include such measures as - they imply a residual part of the features of the risk settlements

exposure - avoidance of hazardous regional and local direct in comprehensive plans - strong market pressure hotspots (though hotspots are as well as in detailed plans to develop some areas

provided at different (zoning prescriptions) especialy when the latterscales) are in nice/valuable locations

- relocation local (but it is worthy direct in comprehensive plans - many constraints to relocation:to prioritize at a regional as well as in detailed plans economic, administrative,scale) social

- reduce population as above direct in comprehensive plans - some constraints as above density as well as in detailed plans

vulnerability -buildings physical vulne- local (but can be prioritized in sectoral plans but can be - there is a certain cost to rability reduction regionally) included as a recommendation sustain (by the private sector)

- lifelines physical vulne- as above or requirement in compre- - cost to be payed by companies rability reduction hensive plans and the public sector- lifelines physical vulne- as above in sectoral pans but can be - cost to be payed by the public rability reduction included as a recommendation sector

in comprehensive plans-public facilities physical as above vulnerability reduction

coping capacity - increasing systems regional and local in sectoral plans mainly, may be - different sectors and companies redundancies introduced as a recommendation involved- reducing systems absolute regional and local in comprehensive plans - as above and requires many interdependency efforts (organisational and - improving people's wealth local indirect financial)- improving people's access local in comprehensive plans to services and resources- improving "risk culture" local indirect (as part of participatory

processes)

risk in terms of - insurance local and regional (national) indirect - it may constitute an incentive expected damage towards risky behaviours


– 16 –

Generally this type of measures is taken in sectoral plans, like for examplewatershed plans, while they may enter into comprehensive plans only inthe form of acquired information.

Structural measures are aimed at reducing the hazard potential: forinstance, levees and dams have been built to protect downstream oradjacent communities from floods; consolidation and drainage systemshave been developed to make slopes more stable, barriers have beenconstructed to deflect lava flows and protect settlements, etc. This type ofmeasure, though very efficacious in some instances, has its ownlimitations as well.

In some cases, like earthquakes or tsunami, there is not much one can doto reduce the severity or the potential of hazards and the only way is toprotect people, cities, villages and infrastructures from their direct andindirect impact.

Even when similar protections can be put in place, an important drawbackis the resulting overconfidence in their potential to actually protectexposed communities at whatever hazard severity level. Thisoverconfidence leads to risky behaviours, increasing the overallcommunity’s exposure and vulnerability to events that, though rare, arenot impossible and which are beyond the “acceptable level of risk”explicitly or implicitly set by any built defence system.

Another factor limiting the perspectives looking only at the hazardcomponent relates to the fact that many places are exposed to a varietyof hazards at a time. This is particularly true for some Southern Europeanregions, where a given territory may be seismic, volcanic, exposed tofloods and landslides or avalanches. In such cases exposure andvulnerability concerns become a priority, in terms of building a resilientterritory and society, as addressing all existing hazards in a given sitewould be unaffordable.

The second type of input hazard studies may provide planners isinformation regarding where natural threats are particularly relevant,what would be the total surface interested by an event and if there existspots with higher hazardous potential (as in the case of amplificationzones in seismic areas). This type of information may be used in twoways: in natural/rural areas, that have not been urbanized yet, to avoidfuture development; in already developed ones to recognise the mostcritical situations so as to take action with respect to whatever alreadyexists, reducing its exposure and/or vulnerability.

2.1.2 Exposure-oriented prevention measuresExposure analysis provide information regarding the number of people,the extension of settlements and value of goods threatened by a givenhazard. The most evident measure that can be taken on the grounds ofsuch information is relocation. Moving goods, infrastructures, people awayfrom dangerous sites can be an answer. Relocation decisions, similarly tothose aimed at avoiding future exposure in an area that has beenrecognised as hazardous, may occasionally conflict with the actualsituation faced on the ground: several places are exposed contemporarily


– 17 –

to a variety of hazards and it is not always easy to decide either not tobuild at all or to relocate large parts of existing settlements.

Nevertheless, it cannot be neglected that while avoiding future exposuredoes not imply disruption of already existing communities, relocationbrings much higher costs not only monetary but also (or particularly)social, psychological and political.

Relocation was decided in the past, for example in Latin America, wherecolonial governments moved cities they had funded years before, becausethey recognized the chosen site as particularly endangered by volcanicand other types of hazards (see in particular the cases of Santiago deGuatemala relocated in 1773 and partial relocation of San Salvador in1854).

Relocation has been proposed as an acceptable strategy in the USA afterthe 1993 Mississippi flood, when 15% of the total amount ofreconstruction funds was explicitly devoted to relocation. Examples areavailable also in Europe and particularly in Italy, where a national law(267/1998 issued after the dramatic debris flows killing a hundred peoplein the Sarno area in the Campania Region) calls for incentives to relocatedwellings and particularly industries exposed to critical hydro-geologicalhazards. Since then some regions have either adopted legislation toenforce voluntary relocation projects (Emilia Romagna and Valle d’Aosta)or have commissioned studies to establish criteria to help the regionalgovernment in promoting relocation programs (Lombardia, see Irer,2004).

Another measure may be labelled as “partial relocation”, in the attempt toreduce human pressure on a hazardous area, in other words reducingpopulation density. This was attempted in the Vesuvian area in Campania,where incentives were given particularly to renters to look for anapartment in other sites less exposed to volcanic threat.

In responding to the basic question of what type of prevention measurescan be foreseen upon exposure analyses, two main options are theanswer: avoidance of particularly hazardous sites for future developmentsand relocation for already built-up zones.

Comprehensive planning is, in both cases, the best tool to be adopted,using zoning and deciding where a given settlement, or part ofsettlement, should be built again and in what manner.

2.1.3 Vulnerability oriented prevention measuresIf vulnerability is intended as a measure of susceptibility, fragility,weakness, it constitutes a qualification of exposed elements and systems;it permits differentiation between one exposed element and another onthe basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the elements at stake. It istherefore a rather powerful tool in the hands of planners, as it suggeststhe idea that risk may be increased or decreased in relation to the waycities, facilities, infrastructures are built; the policy is not only simply “yesor no”. Recommendations and prescriptions to improve the quality ofexposed elements and systems is a crucial point in addressing preventionthrough land-use planning and management.


– 18 –

Examining what has been proposed to-date in literature, two types ofvulnerability can be distinguished: physical vulnerability and systemic (orcoping capacity of a system).

Physical vulnerability describes how prone a given object is to beingdamaged when hit by a certain natural stressor (earthquake, avalanche orflood). The resistance capacity depends on the type of stress, butgenerally it refers much more to the concept of “good construction” andthe like. In some cases, like seismic risks, such rules have been codifiedlong ago and constitute the core of building codes or standards for bridgesand other type of facilities. This type of indication is generally betterincorporated into local detailed plans or local sectoral plans, like forexample in Italy the restoration plan (piano di recupero) or the restorationprogram (programma di recupero), a specific tool addressing interventionin historic centres.

Beyond physical vulnerability, though, other coping capacity factors mustbe considered, related to the settled environment on one side and to theexposed community and its institutions on the other.

Enhancing the coping capacity of an urban or regional system is not a taskthat can be left to planners only: the latter may often have only indirectinfluence on such factors, though it is important. In particular, by beingaware of interconnections among systems, of interdependence factors,planners may well decide best location for critical facilities as well asaddressing activity and transportation load in such a way to minimize thepotential for indirect and secondary effects, due to the interconnectionamong systems. Social factors, like age classes, presence of weak groups,accessibility to resources and strategic facilities are also factors on whichplanning, though indirectly, may have an influence on. This type ofmeasures is generally part of the strategic policy behind a comprehensiveplan or of a strategic framework in those countries and regions wheresuch a tool exists.

What land-use planners and managers can certainly do is to take intoaccount the potential for enchained effects, making natural events trigger,for example, technological accidents.

Vulnerability is clearly a concept that cannot be excluded once alreadyexisting urban areas are analyzed. In Europe, for example, this is true notonly for modern cities, but especially for the protection of monuments andhistoric centres, that deserve to be protected also against natural hazards,menacing the preservation of a cultural and historic patrimony whichrepresents a richness for the EU as a whole.

Nevertheless, the vulnerability concept is not only relevant for alreadybuilt up areas, but also for future settlements, in the sense that the lattermay be designed and built in more or less resilient fashion, depending notonly on location and siting considerations, but also on how they will belaid in a space and actually constructed. In France, for example, the Plande prévention des risques to be prepared for each municipality exposed tosome kind of risk (natural and technological) provides recommendationsand prescriptions concerning design, planning and even architecturaloptions to minimize the vulnerability of exposed elements, to be built oralready existing.


– 19 –

2.1.4 Risk-oriented prevention measuresWhile it is certainly clear that planners may act on one risk component ata time (that is on hazard, exposure and vulnerability factors), even whenconsidering all of them, it is worth mentioning that there are somemeasures that can be taken to address the expected damage per se. Thelatter are the so called risk transfer and risk sharing tools, that do notreduce the damage, but provide some ways to mitigate their impact onthe community, by finding strategies (particularly financial) to permitquick recovery and at reasonable costs.

The most “famous” of such tools is certainly insurance, a powerful risktransfer mechanism aimed at transferring to a third party (the insurer)part or all the risk by paying a premium and expecting compensationwhenever the feared event occurs. While this prevention measure cannotbe considered per se a land-use planning or management tool, it is ofrelevance to it, if premiums are set at differentiated levels to make themcorrespond to expected levels of damage and therefore require someaction to reduce those levels in order either to enter an insuranceprogram or to lessen the amount to be paid. An example of positiveintegration between insurance to natural hazards and land-use planning isprovided by the USA National Flood Insurance Programme (NFIP) run byFEMA. In this insurance model, private owners cannot insure their houseautonomously if their municipality or their county is not insured as well. Intheir turn, municipalities and counties can enter the insurance programonly if they agree to enforce mitigation measures, reducing the pressureon flooding areas, by relocating public facilities, excluding them fromfurther development and providing incentives to private owners torelocate from the most dangerous areas.

Although the balance of almost thirty years of such policy is not asfavourable as expected before the 1993 Mississippi flood, still it has beenrecognised that it had impact on buildings’ vulnerability, by forcingelevation above the flooding level.

2.2 Scale and time factors

2.2.1 Scale factorsBrenner (2001) addresses the importance of looking at the

«notion of a politics of scale [which] refers to theproduction, reconfiguration or contestation of particulardifferentiations, orderings and hierarchies amonggeographical scales. In this plural aspect, the word ‘of’connotes not only the production of differentiated spatialunits as such, but also, more generally, theirembeddedness and positionalities in relation to a multitudeof smaller or larger spatial units within a multitiered,hierarchically configured geographical scaffolding. […]Here, then, geographical scale is understood primarily as amodality of hierarchization and rehierarchization throughwhich processes of sociospatial differentiation unfold bothmaterially and discursively».


– 20 –

The concept of scale is very relevant in planning. It conveys a far broadermeaning than just a dimensional factor enlarging or stretching the detailat which a given object is looked or to which the Earth’s surface isreduced in a map.

The concept of scale incorporates at least three different aspects. The firstis closer to its “geometrical” interpretation: it refers to the fact that somefeatures while rather evident when looked at from a short distance, fadeaway on a larger scale, but also, vice-versa, some patterns that mayappear very clearly at a larger scale, loose their meaning whenfragmented in a number of zooms, decomposing the entire picture invarious pictures representing each a part of the area of concern.

The second interpretation leads to the recognition of substantially multi-scalar elements or processes or features, which may be well understoodonly crossing up and down the various scales. This is particularly true foreconomic forces shaping given environments. While the localization ofsome factories may appear purely occasional when considered locally, atlarger scale their relation to access ways, to other factories, facilities,markets, services may become much more evident. Secchi (2000) statesthat one of the main and most difficult task planners currently perform isthe constant verification of what they are doing at one scale with theconsequences or the influences of/on other related scales.

The third interpretation is a more political one, and refers to theadministrative, governmental level in charge of one scale or another. Inthis sense, scales are identified with administrative entities, such asregions (regional scale), counties, provinces, municipalities (local scale).

The cross comparison of planning systems in European countries carriedout in WP 1 by the ARMONIA project recognized two main administrativelevels that must be considered at the very least (see Fleischhauer et al.,2006, editing the first results of a EU funded project, ARMONIA.):

- local, where local refers to municipalities;

- regional.

Each administrative level is represented in a plan or even a set of plans,the validity of which is determined by physically drawn borders (as in thecase of watershed plans) or by political entities (as in the case ofprovincial or regional plans).

The concept of scale unifies planning, risk assessment and management,as natural events and their direct, as well as indirect and secondaryeffects, cross administrative borders and require the consideration ofsimultaneously different scales as Secchi (2000) suggests for planners’work.

According to Gunderson and Holling (2002, p.68), the concept of scale isequally important from an environmental/ecological point of view:«issues, problems, and opportunities are not just local; they can haveintegrated causes from processes at several scales. Some of those arelocal and are perceived locally. Some can originate half a world away,formed by geopolitical hemispheric policies, world trade, and climatechange». It is therefore crucial to «understand how these cross-scaleprocesses shape ecological and social dynamics».


– 21 –

Common to all those interpretations is the notion that larger scales notonly may show patterns and processes that are not recognizable locally,but also that they may convey significantly different meanings, as largerscales are not the simple sum of a number of “small scales”. The city isnot just the sum of buildings and roads, the province is not just the sumof cities and infrastructures, etc. At different levels, interactions amongsystems and subsystems vary in quantity and quality, emerge in differentways, shaped and shaping social, cultural, economic and territorialprocesses.

“Think globally and act locally” has become an environmental slogan; inthe case of the risks as those discussed here, the local scale is reallycrucial in avoiding larger disasters, that may involve regions far awayfrom the area directly hit by an extreme event or accident, and the effectsof which can last for longer than the few moments in which it hits. Actinglocal may mean sometimes avoiding extremely costly consequences forthe settled communities but also for much wider regions (not to mentionthe fact that those effects are often transboundary across nations).

As it can be seen in table 1, the different mitigation measures that can beproposed cannot be all implemented at whatever scale, while they mayachieve best results if adopted at the most convenient and appropriatescale, taking into account that many times coordination among regional,national and local is required. For example, physical vulnerabilityreduction measures must be taken locally, as they address specificfeatures of existing buildings and other structures, such as bridges,lifelines, etc. On the contrary, improving the coping capacity of a system,for example in terms of accessibility to critical facilities can be bestdecided at larger scale, looking at provinces or regions, so as to determinehow easily a given service can be reached by the most exposed andvulnerable areas.

Also structural measures addressing the hazard need to take intoconsideration the scale at which the phenomenon develops: landslides arerather local events, while floods will affect entire regions. Measures tocontrast them, therefore, must be local in the first case, designed at thewatershed scale in the second.

2.2.2 Time factorsPlans prepared for urban areas or regions have a twofold connection totime: on the one hand, once devoted to development, a site will keephosting some kind of human settlement for much longer time than anyindividual building or structure that will be built within it; on the otherhand, because of the difficulties in developing and approving such plans,especially now that participatory processes are almost the rule in EUcountries, their juridical validity will last for a rather long period ifcompared to the rapid onset of innovation and change characterizingtoday’s environment.

As for the destiny of areas that will be considered for development despitecritical levels of hazards, there are many lessons from the past thatshould be learned and emphasised to planners. This will be one goal of theDSS.


– 22 –

With respect to the second time related factor, a comment should bemade with respect the so called “disaster phases”. Although there hasbeen some concern with respect to the over-used use of such logicalscheme (see Neal, 1994), pre-event, impact, emergency andreconstruction phases can be considered of some use to planners,especially when the question of plans’ validity is considered. In fact, it hasbeen already recognized by some authors (see in particular Bolton et al,1986), that the possibility to actually enforce strict prevention rules varieswith respect to the timing of the taken decisions. Before an extremeevent, especially if rare, there is little concern about it: strict preventionwill be difficult to pursue; during emergency and reconstruction, on thecontrary, there will be a “window of opportunity” permitting braverdecisions to be made than at other times. It would be interesting to verifyto what extent such time consideration can be included in the DSS,leading to different assessment paths according to the time when adecision must be made. This way, the concern by some researchers (Neal,1994) regarding the need to prepare in advance for reconstruction or forenforcing relevant prevention measures will be addressed.

One high level manager interviewed by Neal (1997, p. 252) suggestedthat:

«recovery needs to start day one, or even prior to adisaster.[…] Why not have a recovery unit? They shoulddeal the long term recovery within hazard mitigation. Inany event that needs to be happening from day one».

2.3 Illustration of the DSS skeletonThe framework in figure 1 represents quite well the skeleton of the DSS asresulting from several discussions among partners and a number ofrevisions, reconsiderations and thought.

The object that must be tested is a plan, either local or regional, thatdefines land-uses and the location of strategic facilities andinfrastructures. Those choices are grouped under the definition “land-uses”, which correspond to exposed elements and system, either alreadyexisting or to be created by the plan. Exposed elements and land-uses willbe thoroughly described in chapter 4.

The distinction between urban and rural/natural areas was deemedimportant for planners, as those two conditions correspond to ratherdifferent juridical status that may be changed by plans. Furthermore, thetype of parameters to be considered, especially with respect to exposedelements and vulnerabilities, significantly changes between the two.

The second line of the framework addresses in the middle the type ofhazard considered in the ARMONIA project: seismic, floods, volcanic,landslides, forest fires, avalanches.

The hazard type is important not only because it guides towards differentvariables to evaluate the intrinsic characteristics of the naturalphenomena at stake, but also because it conduces to different types ofparameters related to physical vulnerability (see Wisner et al, 2004).Conditions that make a building vulnerable with respect to floods do not


– 23 –

necessarily coincide with those making it vulnerable to earthquakes orforest fires. Even though vulnerability is considered an intrinsic feature ofthe exposed system, to a certain extent it is dependent on the hazard, asfar as what constitutes a factor of resistance or weakness requires thatthe type of stress on the structure is well understood.

Figure 1. Skeleton of the DSS

The same can be said with respect to natural or rural areas: a wood forexample is vulnerable to lava flows in a different way than to avalanchesor floods. Putting on the same level hazard and vulnerability in theframework is a way of underlining the importance of considering both ascrucial elements in understanding the risk situation in a given site.

As for the hazard, four main macro-factors must be considered: hazardintensity or severity, frequency, location and the possibility of enchainedeffects. For many preventative strategies it is crucial to consider bothintensity and expected frequency, for example because many mitigationmeasures encounter different levels of social acceptability depending onone of the two factors. For example it has been extensively shown howpeople tend to buy insurance or accept relocation (see Kunreuther andRoth, 1998; Kunreuther, 2004, Irer, 2004) in case they have experiencedthe hazard repeatedly, while they are less inclined to take measures forevents with higher magnitude but a lower frequency which would beconsidered improbable.

Considering potential chains of natural phenomena is a first step towardsmulti-risk assessment: lava flows may generate lahars, forest fires mayconduce to debris flows, earthquakes may trigger landslides. In thisregard, it is important that planners are aware of the fact that events

land usesnatural/ rural urban

physical vulnerability- different types of agricoltural uses

- different types of soil uses

type of hazard- seismic (Se) - floods (Flo) - landslides (L)- volcanic (VO) - avalanches (A) -forest fires (F)

physical vulnerability- urban fabric - industrial/ commercial buildings- network infrastructures - strategic equipments

socio-economic coping capacity:- economic activities- age classes- trend of abandonment- recent disaster experience

urban coping capacity:- economic activities- network infrastructures- strategic equipmentssocial coping capcity:- age classes- handicapped

H. intensity

risk assessment (expected physical damage:

matrixes fragility curves

multirisk synthesis table:H, Vexp, R, CC, Na -tech

Chain Na-Na

land use preservation land use transformation

IncreasesHazard?

IncreasesVulnerability?

compatibility table and mapcriteria based on H,V,R, CC

land use acceptable

land use not acceptable

mitigation measures to reduce Hazard(s)

mitigation measures to reduce Vulnerability and Exposure

mitigation measures to increase coping capacity

reduces coping capacity?

future?as determined

in the plan

base

kno

wle

ge, c

ontin

uous

ass

essm

ent

regi

onal

or

loca

l pla

n

H.frequency H. location

land usesnatural/ rural urban

physical vulnerability- different types of agricoltural uses

- different types of soil uses

type of hazard- seismic (Se) - floods (Flo) - landslides (L)- volcanic (VO) - avalanches (A) -forest fires (F)

physical vulnerability- urban fabric - industrial/ commercial buildings- network infrastructures - strategic equipments

socio-economic coping capacity:- economic activities- age classes- trend of abandonment- recent disaster experience

urban coping capacity:- economic activities- network infrastructures- strategic equipmentssocial coping capcity:- age classes- handicapped

H. intensity

risk assessment (expected physical damage:

matrixes fragility curves

multirisk synthesis table:H, Vexp, R, CC, Na -tech

Chain Na-Na

land use preservation land use transformation

IncreasesHazard?

IncreasesVulnerability?

compatibility table and mapcriteria based on H,V,R, CC

land use acceptable

land use not acceptable

mitigation measures to reduce Hazard(s)

mitigation measures to reduce Vulnerability and Exposure

mitigation measures to increase coping capacity

reduces coping capacity?

future?as determined

in the plan

base

kno

wle

ge, c

ontin

uous

ass

essm

ent

regi

onal

or

loca

l pla

n

H.frequency H. location


– 24 –

have a certain degree of probability to be involved in the same disasterevent.

Physical vulnerabilities and hazard characteristics are the basic ingredientsof risk assessments, the latter to be measured in terms of expecteddamages and losses. For the majority of risks, vulnerability curves are notavailable, as vulnerability studies are still much behind hazard analyses asmentioned at the beginning of this report. In some cases, damagematrices have been developed, linking observed damage to a certain levelof hazard severity and to predetermined typologies of buildings orfacilities (corresponding to vulnerability categories). At the very least,those matrices can be just a qualitative comparison and subsequentmerging of hazard and vulnerability levels. An effort is being made withinthe ARMONIA project not only to collect risk assessment matrices andvulnerability curves developed in different fields of study, but also todevelop some new ones or at least to indicate what research path shouldbe followed to obtain more acceptable results than just the qualitativemerge mentioned above.

In the disaster literature an increasingly large number of researchers havebeen suggesting that the notion of physical vulnerability does not coverthe full range of aspects to be looked at while considering a complexurban or regional environment.

In this regard Weicheselgartner (in Veyret et al, 2004. p. 212) writes:

«Risks result from the interaction between natural andsocial forces. Damages are the results of three types offactors: nature with its extremes, people suffering thelatter and the built environment. [As in the case of naturalenvironments], social systems are complex and nonlinear: individuals as well as social groups arecontinuously evolving. Consequent changes influenceexposure and vulnerability. The built environment,infrastructures, public facilities are concerned as well bytemporal and spatial changes, in a way that may decreasethe coping capacity to natural hazards, worsening humanand economic losses in case of disaster. […] In order tomanage more satisfactorily risks and disasters, relationsbetween society and natural hazards must change».

One aspect is related to the capacity of «a system to experiencedisturbance and still maintain its ongoing functions and controls» to useGunderson and Holling’s words (2002). Although the two authors referredto natural ecosystems, their definition perfectly fit to the notion ofsystemic resilience or vulnerability (to be considered as complementaryand not opposite qualities) provided by other authors referring to manmade complex systems. Another meaning of vulnerability that must betaken into account refers to the possibility that a vulnerable technicaldevice or plant becomes a hazard in itself, producing the so called na-tech, that is technological accidents triggered by a natural origin event(like a gas explosion provoked by ground shaking or water contaminationas a consequence of floods reaching toxic depositories of dumps). The na-tech is another aspect of multi-risk, derived from the combination in the


– 25 –

same chain of natural and technological hazards, similarly to thepreviously mentioned chain of natural connected events.

The third aspect of vulnerability that must be taken into account refers toexposed communities, to their ability or inability to respond and face agiven threat, by adequate countermeasures and institutional as well asinformal structures. It was decided to define all those notions ofvulnerability in terms of coping capacity, to put the stress on the responsepotential of exposed systems and communities.

There is still a final interpretation of multi-risk which cannot be neglected,that is the possibility that a given site be threatened by several hazardsthat are not likely to be enchained in the same event (for exampleearthquakes and floods). There are several examples of Europeanmunicipalities exposed contemporarily to a variety of hazards, and thiscondition should be a cause of concern for planners.

It is therefore necessary to provide planners with a synthetic table andmap (when the latter can be produced) where all the main factors ofhazards, vulnerabilities and enchained events are shown and laid down forpossible comparisons and evaluations. Such a synthetic table is certainlyvery useful for those risks for which a satisfactory risk assessmentprocedure cannot be put in place according to the present state-of-the-art, but can be equally useful also in all the other cases. In fact plannerscannot ground their decision only upon risk estimates, they must be ableto see if and at what conditions they can influence hazard andvulnerability factors, both in terms of physical vulnerability andcommunities’ coping capacity. Planners in their everyday work are used toconfronting elements derived from rather different analytical procedures,to compare factors that would not be easily combined from a rigorouslyscientific point of view. Still, the same fact of having to weigh physicalfactors against social needs and demands make planners able to estimatea situation by viewing rather diverse elements in a unique table or map.

The synthesis table and/or map has been extensively used inenvironmental and ecological planning since the nineteen-sixties (see McHarg, 1969) and has entered into the tradition of some planning schools,especially those concerned with sustainable development. There is noreason why such a tool should not be used also for multi-risk evaluations.An advantage of this method is certainly the fact that there is no need forfinding an artificial and probably unacceptable solution from a scientificperspective to combine different hazards or different risks. Secondly itleaves open a large variety of possible alternative in choosing onepreventative measure or another.

Once a multiple risk assessment has been carried out for the presentsituation of the area for which the plan is being prepared, the questionabout potential future land-uses has to be asked. In the framework infigure 1 is clearly shown that the first part constitutes a base knowledgethat should be kept updated, while the second part addresses the future,the core of planning activities intended as a discipline of « continuous andaware modifications in territories’ and cities’ condition» (Secchi, 2000, p.6-7).


– 26 –

According to what has been discussed in the introduction regarding thevarious planning systems in Europe, two answers can be provided: onemay either preserve or transform present land-uses. It should be notedthat preservation of present land-uses is not necessarily a “good” option,as well as transformation is not necessarily bad. Those are choices thatmust be assessed against the present levels of hazard, vulnerability andcoping capacity in the case of preservation and against future hazard,vulnerability and coping capacity conditions that may be worsened orimproved through the selected land-use.

It should be just noted that in developing the parameters to assessvulnerability and particularly coping capacity, only those factors that canbe directly or indirectly influenced by land-use planning have beentackled, while others, referring for example to organizational factors incivil protection, have not been considered. In order to assess whether ornot and to what extent new land-uses will increase or decrease presentconditions of hazard, vulnerability and coping capacity, a re-evaluation ofthe whole framework should be followed. Last but not least, theconsequences of land-uses change or preservation on risk factors mustpass through a sort of compatibility assessment, to decide if they may beconsidered acceptable, unacceptable, or some measures should be put inplace to mitigate hazards and/or vulnerabilities and or improve copingcapacity. Compatibility assessment and guidelines toward mitigationmeasures require the decision or at least the illustration of some criteriaupon which judge whether or not a given land-use can be consideredacceptable or not. It is by no mean an automatic outcome of the“technical” analysis, thought the criteria that may be though of are to acertain extent dependent on the methodological path that has beencreated. It is not an automatic outcome because, for instance, it cannotbe taken for granted that a good decision is to invest all resources on themore critical cases or to solve the largest number of situations etc. Thefew available experiences in this domain (for example that illustrated byGranger et al, 1999 for the Australian case) clearly show that there exist avariety of possible options and combination of policies, depending onavailable budgets and on goals to be met according to more generalpolicies.

3 Hazard intensity scales1

As already described in Del. 3.1, paragraph 5.1.3 and section 6, intensityscales (expressed as e.g. intensity, severity, magnitude) for each singlehazard have to be defined as parametric scales and strictly correlated withpotential exposed elements and their vulnerability.

As general input for the development of the architectural design of theARMONIA DSS, intensity scales referred to all considered hazards has tobe defined for the different scales (Regional strategic, local general, localdetailed).

1 This section was written by CO1 (T6) as a further development of Del. 3.1.


– 27 –

At the regional scale it is possible, considering limits and constraints ofproduction of hazard maps, to adopt a simplified approach useful toproduce a set of single hazard maps that can be examined together in amulti-layered hazard map (not aggregating hazards) by simplyoverlapping the single hazard maps using a GIS environment.

This approach can be considered as appropriate also when no othervulnerability functions (empirical or theoretical) or damage matrices areavailable for risk analysis at local scales.

The table of intensity scales, expressed as parametric values grouped intothree qualitative classes, is shown below. This approach can be used whendetailed intensity parameters are not available in hazard maps, at anyscale of analysis.

Simplified approach for regional scale

INTENSITY SCALESNatural Hazard

Low Medium High Parameters

Flood <0.25 0.2 - 1.25 >1.25 Flood depth (m)

Forest Fire < 350 350-1750 >1750-3500 Predicted Fire-lineIntensity(*) (kW/m)

Forest Fire < 1.2 1.2-2.5 >2.5-3.5 Approximate FlameLength (m)

Volcanoes <5 5-10 >10

Intensity= VolcanicExplosive Index

log10(mass eruptionrate, kg/s) + 3

Landslide

(fast and slowmovements)

<5% 5 - 15% >15 %

percentage oflandslide surface(m2, Km2, …) Vsstable surface;

Seismic< 10 %g 10 - 30 %g >30 %g

Peak groundhorizontal

Acceleration (%g)

Table 2. Simplified approach for assessing intensitiesat the regional scale

The input parameters for defining intensity that can be adopted forvulnerability and risk analysis in ARMONIA DSS, at regional/strategic scale(> 1:50,000) and local scales (< 1:50,000) are reported in the followingtables (Tables 3; 4).


– 28 –

NaturalHazard Scales of hazards Parameters

Flood<10%

(< 1 in 10 ys)LOW

>10% - 1%(1 in 10 ys and 1 in 100 ys)

MEDIUM

<1%(> 1 in 100 ys)

HIGH

Annualprobability (%)of flood return

period(no intensityassigned)

Flood <0.25 0.25 - 1.25 >1.25

Flood depth(m)

(inundationlevel)

Flood 0 – 7 m

Flood depth(m)

(inundationlevel)

Forest Fire < 350 350-1750 >1750-3500 >3500

Predicted Fire-line Intensity

(kW/m)(Exceeding a

givenprobability)

Forest Fire < 1.2 1.2-2.5 >2.5-3.5 > 3.5ApproximateFlame Length

(m)

Pyro-cla-sticfall

<2,5 2,5-3 >3-10 10-30 >30Load on theground of fall

out (kPa)

Volcanicerup-tions Lava

flows < 3.3 10-3 > 2 Velocity, m/s

Landslide(fast and

slowmovements)

<5% 5-15% >15%

% of landslidearea (m2, Km2,

…) vs. totalarea

Seismicity ≤0,1 0,2-0,3 0,4-0,5 0,6-

0,70,8-

1,01,1-1,3

1,4-1,6

1,7-

2,0

2,1-

2,5

2,6-

3,0

3,1-

4,0

4,1-

6,0≥6,1

Peak groundacceleration(m/s2) in a

given returnperiod

Heavyrainfall

Rainfall mm

Extremerainfall in 1 -

24 h in a givenreturn period

Tsunamihazard

1 Very low hazardAreas that have

experienced tsunamis thatresulted mainly from

gravitational landslides(terrestrial landslides)

3 Medium hazardAreas in proximity of

tectonically active zones

5 Very high hazardAreas in proximity of

tectonically active zonesthat have already

experienced tsunami run-ups from earthquakes,

volcanoes and/orresulting (submarine)

landslides

Susceptibleareas (km2)of coastlinepotentiallyaffected

Table 3. Intensity measures at the regional scale


– 29 –

Parametricintensity values

at regionalstrategic

scalesNaturalHazard

Scales of hazards Parameters

Flood(dynamic flooding) <0.5 0.5 – 0.75 >0.75 – 1.00 >1.00 – 1.25 > 1.25

HR = d x (v + 0.5)Where:H R is the floodhazard rating;d is the depth offlooding in meters(m);v is the velocity off loodwaters inmeters per second(m/s).

Flood(static flooding) 0 – 7 m. Flood depth (m)

(inundation level)Flood

(bank erosion) < 0.5 m 0.5 – 2.0 m > 2.0 m Extent of lateralerosion (m)

Forest Fire< 350 350-1750 >1750-3500 >3500

Predicted Fire-lineIntensity (kW/m)

(Exceeding agiven probability)

Forest Fire < 1.2 1.2-2.5 >2.5-3.5 > 3.5 ApproximateFlame Length (m)

Pyroclasticfall <2,5 2,5-3 3 < and < 10 10-30 >30

Load on theground of fall out

(kPa)

Pyroclasticflows < 3 3 ≤ and ≤ 6 > 6

Magnitude(erupted

mass)/time (kg/s)

Vol-canicerup-tions

Lava flows < 3,3 * 10-3 3,3 * 10-3 ≤ and ≤ 2 > 2 Velocity (m/s)

< 500 500-5.000 >5,000 –50,000

>50,000 –250,000

>250,0001.000,000

>1,000,000–

5,000,000

>5,000,000

Volume (m3)Fell, 1994

Slide<

1mm/yr

0.06m/yr

>0.06m/yr –

1.5m/yr

>1.5m/yr–

1.5m/month

>1.5m/month -

1.5m/day

>1.5m/day -

0.3m/min

>0.3m/min - 3m/s > 3 m/s Velocity (Cruden &

Varnes, 1996)

Rock fall ≤5 6 < e < 30 30 < e < 300 > 300 Energy of impact(Kj)

Debrisand earth

flow-----------------

D<1m and v<1m/sMEDIUM

D>1m and v>1m/sHIGH

D= thickness ofdebris front (m)V= flow velocity(flood or debris

flow) (m/s)

Seismicity ≤0,1 0,2-0,3 0,4-0,5 0,6-0,7

0,8-

1,0

1,1-

1,3

1,4-

1,6

1,7-

2,0

2,1-

2,5

2,6-

3,0

3,1-

4,0

4,1-

6,0

>6,0

Peak groundacceleration,

modified from localresponse (m/s2) in

a given returnperiod

Heavy rainfall Rainfall mmExtreme rainfall in1 - 24 h in a given

return period

Snow avalanches 1 5 30 100 1000

Impact pressure(KPa)

(McClung andSchaerer, 1993)

Table 4. Intensity measures at the local scale

Other parameters that should be taken into account in the DSS, as theyare relevant to planning decisions, refer to hazard frequency and/orprobability and location. Frequency is important because planners maywish to know if the threat is likely to occur every year, provoking damagein the exposed areas or if it is rather rare. If the expected damage is verylarge, rare events should be also carefully addressed by planners, but isclear that there will barriers to the implementation of restrictions and


– 30 –

limitations for example to developers. People’s perception of hazardstends to fade since the last event: if the latter occurred decades ago theirawareness of the hazard will not be as high as for recent disasters.

Hazard location is not less important: though it is generally difficult toforecast what areas will be actually involved in a disaster, there are someclues in the hand of scientists to help them recognize where such eventsmay occur with greater probability. Location is a key factor to identifyexposed, and therefore vulnerable, communities. At the local scale,defining those areas where hazard intensity may be higher is even moreimportant as it permits differentiating within a given settlement or a city,promoting different preventive measures.

3.1 Geohazards and Climate ChangeOne aspect that cannot be neglected for a number of hazards relates toclimate change, which cannot be considered a hazard per se, as it isglobal in its scope, but may affect differently areas already exposed tohydrogeological hazards. Climate change will probably have an effect onall those hazards that are “meteorologically dependent” and to a certainextent this may prove true not only for floods, for which it is moreevident, but also for forest fires, landslides and avalanches. In particularwhat is at stake is the possibility to actually forecast future events trendson the basis of historical data, something which is at the very core of mostprobability and frequency analyses.

Climate change is likely to increase the flood risk in several parts ofEurope in the following areas:

- On the coast through rising sea-levels and storm-surge heights. A sea-level rise of 1 m has been predicted to occur for many parts of Europeby end of century under a high emissions scenario;

- Inland through increases in seasonal rainfall;

- Urban areas as a result of an increase in rainfall intensities. This willlead to a higher frequency of flooding from sewers and also urbanflash-floods.

The extent to which flooding increases is dependent on future emissions ofgreen house gases. It should be noted that the influence of the climate onfloods is not only induced via changes in the spatial distribution ofprecipitation, but also via temporal changes in the precipitation pattern,or, where snowmelt plays a role, via spatial and temporal changes intemperature.

Recent studies (EEA, 2005) have indicated that for many parts of northernand Eastern Europe (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Russia) the 1 in 100 year floodflows could increase by some 25% under a high emissions scenarios bythe year 2080. These studies have also indicated that for some southernparts of Europe flooding may become less frequent in future as a result ofdrier summers and less rainfall in the winter.

Concerning other meteorological-induced hazards, it is expected a generalincrease of droughts in southern and Eastern Europe, due to temperatureincrease, adversely affecting agriculture and the availability of fresh


– 31 –

waters. This may cause, consequently, a general increase in forest fires aswell as in soil erosion.

The expected decreasing of yearly precipitation amount coupled withincrease of rainfall extreme events (e.g. rainstorms) may promotetriggering of superficial landslides such as debris-flows and earth-flowswhereas deep landslides in clayey soils, whose trigger is generally relatedwith underground water levels, may decrease.

In addition, an increasing in soil erosion and forest fires due to climatechange effects may have an additional negative impact in landslidesusceptible areas.

It is also important to address spatial features of the hazard, in terms oftheir local or regional characterisation and to understand what can betheir spatial development after occurrence (see table 5).

Table 5. Spatial features of different hazards to beconsidered in the DSS

4 Vulnerability of exposed elements andsystems

4.1 Chapter’s objective and scopeThe goal of the fourth chapter is to explain how vulnerability of exposedsystems could be analyzed and assessed within the DSS. In other words itillustrates what parameters can be used in the boxes related to physicalvulnerability and coping capacity as described in the DSS skeleton. Asthere are very few examples already available in literature or pastexperiences, especially with respect to some risk, the chapter will

Natural hazardSpatial location of initial event

Spatial event development

Spatial development associated to probabilities Relevant scale

Possibility of enchained effects

Floodin a given river section

along the river and in other parts of the watershed

yes: to each area a Return Period is associated regional

water contamination; groundwater contamination

Forest Fire in forest areas

in forest areas and their immediate surroundings

from local to regional

effusive volcanos

distances from vents and craters; morphological corridors

yes: expected % of covering material

water contamination; forest fires

explosive volcanos at different distances

from craters

yes: expected % of covering material forest fires; lahars

Landslide instable slope

in the areas below the instable slope; in case of debris flows, along morphological corridors

experimental studies for some types of landslides local

Seismic epicenter

in an area around the epicenter at distances to be determined according to attenuation laws

yes: inter-occurrance period between same magnitude events local to regional landslides

Vocano regional


– 32 –

illustrate how parameters have been selected, identified and proposed inthe present state of the art context. This means that while someparameters can be traced in literature and even are largely agreed upon(as for example in the case of buildings vulnerability to seismic risk),many others have been found in pioneering work and even proposed forthe first time, at least at an international level, in the ARMONIA project.

The chapter is organized as follows:

- first some general comments related to the difficulties of findingvulnerability parameters for relevant urban and regional systems andfor all risks will be discussed (4.2);

- then exposed elements and systems will be illustrated for theregional level (4.3.1.) and for the local level (4.3.2.);

- finally vulnerability parameters for the regional (4.4.) and the localscale (4.5.) will be discussed. These last paragraphs must be read inconjunction with the appendix at chapter 8, in which all theparameters are extensively displayed and organized in a matrixshaped frame.

4.2 Short background on vulnerability studies andproposed path for the ARMONIA project.

Tools for recognizing and measuring vulnerabilities must be still developedfor most risks.

The first case of vulnerability assessment developed in analytical terms isin the domain of seismic risk and referred to buildings.

A survey form based technique first developed in the US, was extensivelyused and enforced in Italy (as in other European countries) where animportant built patrimony exists and should be preserved for culturalreasons.

The basic idea behind this method is to survey several buildings that wereaffected by earthquakes using particular forms to classify severalparameters (like structural typology, main layout features, maintenanceconditions) related to damage and to correlate them to the sameparameters observed before the event to test buildings vulnerabilities. Atype of score method can be therefore used to judge how good a buildingis in responding to earthquakes.

The result of such an analysis provides a coefficient, the vulnerabilitycoefficient, that can be put in an equation describing the hazard to obtainthe expected damage to buildings; or an earthquake of a given magnitudein a given location can be chosen as a deterministic input to produce ascenario.

This approach can applied either to single buildings, by surveyingextensively all the buildings in a given settlement (which, of course ispossible only with small villages), or to large areas, by combiningstatistical and sampling techniques.


– 33 –

In order to widen the scope of vulnerability assessment, clearly what isneeded is to take into account also other objects apart from buildings,other systems as well as the relationship between objects and systems.

A further effort is therefore required in the attempt to:

• identify parameters as indicators of vulnerable situations;

• look for units of measure to be able to survey and assign values (inqualitative, semi-qualitative or quantitative way);

• provide an assessment to be used as the input in damage assessmentor scenarios.

In order to implement this type of studies and this research, however, achange of perspective becomes inevitable, in the sense that the disastershould not anymore be considered as the result of the event (earthquake,flood or other) but as the moment when vulnerable patterns and factorsbecome apparent, while the event (the physical event) is the triggeringmechanism which discloses and reveals weaknesses of a givenenvironment (Hewitt, 1997). The latter to be considered as the interactionof physical, natural, social, economic, cultural systems.

For the vulnerability is already there, just looking for a triggering factor tobecome evident to everybody.

How can this enhance preventive strategies?

By showing that the question is not only hazard-related, but refers to theway vulnerabilities pile up in a society and in a geographical system.

As Comfort et al. pointed out (1999, p. 39):

«There is a widespread failure to recognize and address connectionsbetween changes in land-use, settlement policies, population distributionand the accompanying degradation of habitats on the one hand anddramatically increased levels of hazard exposure and vulnerability on theother».

In the attempt to extend the method developed to assess buildingsvulnerability to other urban systems, some problems have beenencountered:

a. The first problem challenge arises when one tries to shift from theanalysis of a house to the analysis of lifelines, roads, because the first arepoint-location while the second are linear. In such cases the spatialdimension prevails.

b. The second limit regards those facilities like hospitals, fire departments,for which the type of use and internal function is the priority. In this case,standards valid for houses are not efficient and do not permit to analyzewhat is really important, that is:

• the capacity to function and provide service even though a certaindegree of physical damage did occur;

• the capacity to function depends on many other facilities, like lifelines,access roads, etc.


– 34 –

Those limits lead to the conclusion that it is useless to reduce thevulnerability assessment to a coefficient when dealing with cities and withcomplex systems.

Another relevant obstacle in any attempt to include vulnerabilityassessment in multi-hazard approaches derives from the fact that whileseismic risk assessment has been developing vulnerability parameters forat least the last twenty years, only pioneering studies are available forother risks, like landslides, floods, volcanic threat, etc. In all these casesthere is a lack of even elementary parameters to judge the capability ofbuildings and structures to resist the specific threat.

What can be suggested in the context of the ARMONIA project is topropose some parameters that make sense according to pioneeringstudies, literature, past events loss estimation and frame a first grid to beimproved and tested with other scientists and stakeholders both duringthe application phase and in future research. Furthermore, themethodological steps needed to make the research advance should beproposed as well to guide future attempts. This process is rather similar tothe one illustrated by Mc Laren (1996) referring to the experience ofEnvironment Canada in its project in the search of sustainabilityindicators. If the word “sustainability” is changed to “risk prevention” littlereally changes in terms of the general validity of the following statements.

«Sustainability should be able to distinguish between localand non local sources of risk, and between local and nonlocal environmental effects». «The search for coreindicators is a search for certain fundamental indicatorsthat are of concern to all communities, regardless ofdifferences in their situational context r their sustainabilitygoals».

Environment Canada has proposed an iterative approach, during which atan early stage indicators are chosen internally, by scientists, according tothe following criteria:

«- scientific validity;- representativeness;- responsiveness;- data accuracy and availability».

In a second step, external comments are welcome and other criteria areintroduced such as:

«- relevance to sustainability goals;- comparability;- relationship to the thresholds/targets;- ease of understanding».


– 35 –

4.3 Exposed elements and systems

4.3.1 Exposed elements at regional scaleThe identification of exposed elements and the definition of parametersand procedures for vulnerability assessment have been carried outaccording to the final objective of WP5. The latter is aimed at providing adecision support system for achieving land-use planning processes fullyinformed about the risks affecting particular areas, the vulnerability ofdifferent land-uses and populations (taking account of social factors suchas age, gender and disability) and the options that are available tomitigate the risks. The decision support system has to be implementedwithin a GIS environment.

Thus, first of all exposed elements have been articulated into threecategories, representative of the different types of spatial elements whichcan be handled by the GIS.

Then, the identification of exposed elements has been carried out withrespect to the results of WP2 (exposed elements for each consideredcategory of hazard). Common exposed elements at regional scale for eachtype of spatial element can be synthesized as follows:

Areal exposed elements include population and the main land-usesarticulated with respect to Corine land-use map categories whichrepresent a common reference for all European countries. In detail, at aregional scale the main environmental resources (including natural andanthropogenic ones) have been considered: urban fabrics, natural areas,agricultural areas.

Type of spatial element Exposed Element

Areas Population

Areas - Urban fabric Buildings

Areas - Natural and agriculturalareas

Arable land and heterogeneous areas

ForestPermanent crops

Lines Road networksOther network services

Points Commercial areasMonuments

Industrial centres (includinghazardous installations)Transport nodes (airports, railwaystations, harbours, etc.)Emergency services (hospitals, firebrigades, etc.)

Table 6. Categories and spatial features of exposedelements


– 36 –

Lines include road networks and all the network services, which representrelevant exposed elements in case of hazardous events: urbancommunities are highly reliant on the so-called lifelines such as watersupply, sewerage, power supply, etc. These elements are not included inCorine land cover map.

Points include elements which can be represented as punctual elements ata regional scale, even though they sometimes have wide surfaces. Indetail, they are the main relevant economic activities (industrial andcommercial areas), the main historical assets and the strategic facilities incase of hazardous events, such as emergency equipments and transportnodes.

4.3.2 Exposed elements at the local scaleExposed elements categories do not change at the local level; whatchanges is the way they are considered and analyzed, that is with a muchgreater level of detail. The census unit is still the smallest unit one mayconsider to attach data related to population as well as buildingcharacteristics.

It should be mentioned that in some circumstances, local administrationsmay be willing to initiate data surveys more detailed than those availablenationally. In those cases, vulnerability analyses may prove more efficientand also more reliable.

4.4 Exposure and vulnerability assessment at regionalscale

Exposure of each element has been evaluated with respect to type,quantity (number or surface) and relevance (hierarchical level) ofelements that may be subject to a hazardous event.

Vulnerability is a multi-dimensional concept which represents thepredisposition of exposed elements (people, buildings, infrastructures,activities, etc.) to be damaged in case of hazardous event.

Hence, the concept of vulnerability expresses the capacity of a system toface an hazardous event, with respect to the main possible damages thatsuch an event could determine: direct damages, such as instantaneousphysical damages and consequent human sufferings and indirect damages(human sufferings, economic losses, etc.) due to incapacity of a system toface the event (e.g. inadequacy of road network which obstructs therescue team access).

With respect to this, we defined (see Annex 1):

- physical vulnerability, taking into account building vulnerability to eachhazard;

- vulnerability of population, taking into account people with reducedmobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency;

- coping capacity, taking into account the resources (in terms of quantityand hierarchical level of emergency equipments, such as hospitals, firebrigades, etc.; infrastructure and road network; accessibility from the


– 37 –

external territory) enabling each municipality to face adverseconsequences of an hazardous event.

Medd and Marvin (2005) for example, talking about the recent UKexperience, say that

«building resilience has become a challenge of spatial managementrequiring situating strategies for building resilience within the context ofmore complex understanding of spatial interdependencies» (p. 46)

It has to be highlighted that physical vulnerability assessment has beencarried out only with respect to parameters and procedures alreadyavailable in international literature. In some cases, just exposure has beenconsidered at regional scale.

To determine what concerns vulnerability assessment of areas, data haveto be collected and elaborated with regard to census units and aggregatedwith respect to each land-use within a municipality (fig. 1).

Then, parameters and indexes are provided for the physical vulnerabilityassessment of buildings and for population vulnerability assessment withrespect to each hazard.

With regard to lines and points, at regional scale only the location ofdifferent typology of lines and points is required. Then, for the elementslocated in hazard prone areas cards for physical vulnerability assessmentwill be provided. At present, these cards are available only for seismichazards and for some typologies of lines and points (see Annex 1).

These cards can be filled out at regional scale or detailed analyses to becarried out at local scale can be required.

Figure 2. Data computing and aggregation layers forareal spatial elements at regional scale

Finally, the last set of parameters concerns the coping capacityassessment at regional scale.

These parameters are aimed at evaluating the services (in terms ofstrategic equipments such as hospitals, fire brigades, etc. and in terms ofroad networks) of different regional areas (municipalities) for facing theemergency phase due to an hazardous event and the accessibility formexternal areas to each municipality.

The lack of an aggregate index of vulnerability for areas, points and linesis due to the choice of providing land-use planners with disaggregated


– 38 –

information related to the vulnerability of each exposed elements assupport for the definition of mitigation measures.

4.5 Exposure and vulnerability assessment at thelocal scale

Vulnerability assessment at the local scale should be in general morespecific and more accurate than regionally. While in the latter case what islooked for is a prioritarization strategy and the need to address some risk“hotspots” (see Van der Veen, 2005), locally it is important to differentiateas much as possible different localities within the settlement or the urbanarea.

Such a differentiation may help recognise built areas or social groups thatare more likely to suffer from damage in case of an extreme event.

Regarding physical vulnerability it is important to address the followingsystems and elements:

- buildings; this can be dealt with either using an extensive survey or,more likely, through sampling techniques, recognising first classes ofbuildings with the same characteristics and then extending thevulnerability assessment from each sample to the entire class. This hasbeen done, for example, in the case of seismic risk;

- public facilities, that will require, apart from a physical vulnerabilityassessment also the evaluation of their systemic vulnerability (orcoping capacity);

- productive buildings and areas;

- lifelines

With respect to coping capacity, apart from assessment related to criticalfacilities and infrastructures, some population data must be considered aswell, related to a variety of concerns, which can be better gathered locallyrather than regionally, and may count on ad hoc studies and surveys.

The problem in dealing with such surveys is that one tends toautomatically associate vulnerability with some notion of poverty andmarginality. While this is certainly true in many cases, it should not be theexclusive way of dealing with social coping capacity. As demonstrated bya number of other studies (Granger et al., 1999; Wisner et al, 2004),there are some other parameters to be considered, for example theexistence of good information regarding risks and hazards, theaccessibility to protection and self protection resources, to strategicfacilities in case of an emergency, past experience providing insight onwhat may occur. With respect to planning activities, inter-institutionalcooperation and coordination is certainly a key point in assuring thatrelevant information regarding hazards and vulnerabilities will beconsidered whenever a decision with spatial and territorial relevance willbe made.


– 39 –

4.5.1 Vulnerability matrices at local scale: organisation andstructure

In the tables presented in the annex to this report, a vulnerabilityassessment table has been developed for each hazard, both at theregional and the local scale.

As far as the local scale is concerned, tables have been organised asfollows: to each land use exposed systems have been associated in thefirst column. In the second vulnerability parameters are identified, basedon expert proposal or on available literature, which is reported in the sixthcolumn. In the fourth column the main force or pressure against which thesystem must defend itself are identified. In the fifth column, anexplanation of the parameter is provided. In the last two columns thefollowing aspects are referred to: it is asked whether or not the vulnerableobject or system may become a hazard in its turn (e.g. hospitals keepingradioactive materials or hazardous facilities) and what should be the pathof future research so as to get to more satisfactory parameters than thosethat are proposed in this work for some risks.

Two vulnerability parameters levels are proposed in the coping capacitymatrix, to distinguish between a situation where a given area is vulnerablebecause of the lack of some facility or service (e.g. hospital) and theintrinsic vulnerability of the latter.

5 Risk assessment and synthesis tables andmaps

In this chapter the box in the DSS named “risk assessment” will bediscussed. In particular it will be shown what type of methods areavailable to-date to carry out damage estimation derived from thecombination of hazard and physical vulnerability.

Two main methods have been developed until today to carry out suchassessment, as indicated in WP2: vulnerability curves (5.1) and damagematrices (5.2). Illustration of the two methods will be discussed usingexamples taken from seismic risk assessment. Then some examples thatare available in other natural hazards fields will be described. Finally amethodological path that should be followed by future research will bediscussed briefly.

5.1 Vulnerability curvesIn the seismic risk assessment method that has been described in WP2,risk is first measured in terms of damage index, by considering as avariable function the hazard (expressed in PGA with given periods ofreturn in given sites) and the vulnerability as a coefficient. The latter isobtained through more or less detailed surveys carried out on buildings,either with a direct survey or through sampling techniques. Vulnerabilitycurves expressed in figure 3, show how at the same level of accelerationin a give site, a vulnerable building may be completely destroyed (theupper curve) or suffer just minor damage (the first curve below).


– 40 –

Figure 3. Vulnerability curves developed by Petrini etal., 1998

When statistical techniques are applied to a large number of buildings,vulnerability is evaluated according to a small number of simplifiedparameters, that may be easily fed by census data. In this case thevulnerability is not a coefficient but a statistical curve, which will enter aswell as the hazard into the final convolution.

Once damage indexes are obtained, it is easy to extend them to allbuildings pertaining to the same vulnerability class.

Vulnerability curves are preferable for the following reason:

- they make explicit the relationship between hazard, vulnerability anddamage;

- correlation between damage and vulnerability is evaluated upon largedatabase including a large number of cases surveyed afterearthquakes.

The same method could be applied to some other elements, such asbridges, but in general it is difficult to extend to complex systems.

There are no vulnerability curves available in literature for no othernatural or technological hazard.

What could be done to get to a condition where vulnerability curves maybe developed, the following steps should be followed:

- simulations to study some stress factors on given elements of buildings(looking for the type of stress that floods, avalanches, different kindsof landslide, etc. may have in terms of pressures, accelerations andforces applied to buildings). This kind of simulation can be donecoupling computer techniques and real experiments in laboratories, asit has been done in the field of seismic risk;

- damages on different components of buildings and structures shouldbe accurately surveyed after events, as it has been done in the case of


– 41 –

earthquakes, so that Italy for example may count on thousands ofsurveyed buildings, with a large majority of masonry buildings and asmaller percentage of concrete;

- while carrying out the steps mentioned in the previous points, firstvulnerability curves may be proposed and further adjusted whenevernew information and better knowledge become available.

5.2 Damage matrix approachDamage matrices-express in a matrix the combination of hazard levelsand vulnerability. Each xyj element corresponds to the damage provokedby the y hazard level on the object classified in vulnerability class j (seeBernardini, 2000; Cosenza and Manfredi, 2000).

Damage matrixes are also constructed using statistical data, but.,differently from the vulnerability curves approach, the correlation amongfactors and the all procedure results a bit less transparent. The matrixpermits to a certain extent to overshadow the uncertainties involved inassociating the expected damage to given levels of vulnerability andhazard.

Furthermore, while vulnerability curves derive from accurate analysis ofelements that make a given object more or less susceptible to damage,the matrix approach generally relies upon a very rough description ofbuilding or structure typology, including very few parameters.

This is the reason why the matrix approach has been attempted for otherrisks than seismic, for which, as already largely discussed, vulnerabilityassessment are far behind and do not allow for rigorous identification offactors determining the structural response to a given type of stress.

Table 7. Example of seismic damage matrix forbuildings

A sub-category of damage matrixes is a qualitative one, in which each xyjderives from a qualitative comparison between assessed hazard andvulnerability levels expressed both in terms of scores.

Examples of this type of matrixes proposed for natural risks other thanseismic have been proposed for example for landslides.

PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA PGA

0,1 g 0,2 g 0,3 g 0,4 g 0,5 g 0,6 g 0,7 g 0,8 g 0,9 g 1 g

RC1 RC2

RC3

RC1

RC2

RC3

RC1

RC2

RC3

Masonry builing with bricks well cemented; good connection between walls; heavy badly connected roof

3-4 floors

Masonry building with well cemented bricks, good connection between walls and roof

3-4 floors

Building type N. of floors Rupture condition

Stone building with iregular blocks, without connections among walls

1-2 floors


– 42 –

Table 8. Method developed by Pergalani and Petriniwithin a Regional project, here the matrix related toslide type (other matrices available for rock falls anddebris flows)

6 Criteria to assess the compatibility ofproposed land-uses and implementationcontrol mechanisms

This chapter is aimed at describing the last set of boxes in the DSSstructure, those responding to the question: how compatible is theproposed land-use and management in the face of existing hazards,vulnerabilities and risks. Furthermore in such a compatibility boxconsiderations regarding social and systems’ coping capacity can beincluded to achieve a more complete representations of elements at stake.

Criteria to decide compatibility of given land-uses with respect to riskfactors should be considered in a broader spatial-temporal context. Onone side, it should be checked whether a given land-use will not create ortransfer risk to another area or site: for this reason an evaluation acrossscales should be carried out to exclude that a solution which may seemsound locally will not provoke substantial risk increase to other parts ofthe community. Similarly, decisions that may prove efficient at a largerscale, may prove prejudicial locally, imposing burden to a number oflocalities, for which at least compensation (if considered sociallyacceptable) must be guaranteed.

Another important factor to be considered is related to the phase of thenatural feared event with respect to which decisions are made. As alreadymentioned in the aftermath of an event it is easier to make acceptablechoices that would not pass in “ordinary circumstances” such as, forexample relocation from the most dangerous areas.

It is rather hard to find in literature criteria to compare and select riskprevention decisions in general terms not to mention related to land-useplanning. The most commonly used criteria is cost benefit analysis, tobalance costs of mitigation against costs that will be sustained once adisaster occurs. While apparently simple, cost benefit analysis is fraught

Type of landslide: slide

HAZARD depth > 1m depth > 1m depth > 1mDisplacement < 30 cm Displacement > 30 cm Displacement > 4 m

BUILDINGS VULNERABILITY

Position: above or below the landslide no damage no damage no damageIn the area potentially covered: noType of foundation: piles

Position: above, on or below the landslide partial damage collapseIn the area potentially covered: yesType of foundation: piles

Position: above, on or below the landslide partial damage partial damage collapseIn the area potentially covered: yesType of foundation: concrete bed


– 43 –

with problems deriving from the difficulties to translate into monetaryterms social discomfort, victims as well as benefits associated withpreventative actions. There is a large literature especially in the field ofenvironmental economics focusing on the several limits of cost benefitanalysis. Mechler (2003) identifies those limits with respect to risksituations, showing that benefits associated with prevention are strictlycorrelated to the discount rate applied to future damages, expected as aconsequence of some natural hazard, especially when the latter isconsidered rare.

While according to common sense, it may be simple to prioritize on thebasis of the highest level of risk or on the basis of some rough cost-benefit estimation, in the attempt to maximize return of investment, oneshould be reminded of the multi-dimensional and articulate way ofthinking which characterizes planners’ activity. As the Cairns exampleshow (see Granger et al, 1999), communities may prioritize on the groundof different considerations, related to the number of people who willbenefit from a given action, to the affordability of associated costs, etc. Toa certain extent, communities may also decide to take some risks, ifcompensated accordingly as it occurs in the case of nuclear waste disposalor similar – Not In My back Yard (NIMBY) and Locally Unwanted Land Uses(LULUs).

There are a couple of concerns that are deemed particularly relevant tothe final objective to be achieved by the ARMONIA project. First it isimportant that whatever criteria are chosen to assess the compatibility ofgiven land-uses and mitigation efforts associated with them, they will bemade explicit and transparent to final users. One may not exclude othercriteria from those proposed in the project will be considered by publicadministrations using the DSS; what is considered important is that anycriteria will be described and made explicit. It is, after all, a governanceissue, that should be adapted to the cultural, social and institutionalcontext within which criteria are applied.

Table 9. Framework to assess the compatibilitybetween land-uses and risks

low H, V, R, high Coping capacity acceptable

transform transformation implies mitigation measures to be alternative exist compare mitigation costs withland uses increase in evaluated according to the costs associated to the

H following set of criteria: selection of an alternativeV * technically feasibleR * affordable no alternative acceptable as far as mitigationor reduces Coping Capacity * leverage effect exist measures are taken

* effectiveness: - multirisk or single risk not acceptable* socially acceptable referring to: - to residual risk and - equity concerns

low H, V, R, high Coping capacity acceptablepreserve land uses existing high levels of: mitigation measures to be preservation acceptable as far

H evaluated according to the as mitigation measures are takenV following set of criteria:R * technically feasible preservation is not acceptablelow Coping Capacity * affordable but mitigation is not affordable:

* leverage effect at least necessry to prepare a* effectiveness: plan ready when windows of - multirisk or single risk opportunity will open (after a * socially acceptable referring to: severe event for example) - to residual risk and - equity concerns


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Three sets of criteria are suggested hereto assess the compatibilitybetween land-uses and risks:

− Technical feasibility: some mitigation measures simply may not beapplied to a given hazard or to a given area.

− Affordability: in this context affordability refers more to availableresources than to cost/benefit concerns. It is a matter of howresources are distributed among a number of concurrent needs, evenwhen assessment is restricted to risk prevention.

− Leverage has been proposed by Foster (1980) among other criteria toassess alternative mitigation criteria in general terms. Considering“leverage” as a criteria, Foster addresses the question: «will theapplication of the strategy lead to further risk reducing actions byothers»? This may be the case with what Bolton et al (1986) proposedwith respect to the attracting effect of public investment in facilitiesand infrastructures. If the latter are built in safer areas they will attractthere also private investment (residential as well as productive).

− Another important criteria refers to the number of risks (in case ofareas subject to multiple risks) that are addressed by the proposedmeasure. This is generally true for actions aimed at improving thecoping capacity of a given system: many times increasing community’sand systems’ resilience is effective with respect to a rather amplerange of hazards, natural as well as man made.

− Social acceptability: feasibility and affordability must be evaluated alsothrough the lens of society. On the one hand there is a matter ofacceptability: society accepts de facto some levels of risk, though thequestion is if it is always aware of this. On the other, there is a matterof equity, between those who take the risk and those who benefit fromit as well as between those who pay for mitigation (not necessarily interms of money, but perhaps discomfort or need to abandon theirhouse, activity, etc.) and those who will benefit from it.

As it can be seen in table 7, no decision can be made automatically, butrequires some level of evaluation and balance different needs one againstthe other.

Finally, to complete the methodological path, it would be necessary toconsider some control step, according to which, after a given period haspassed since the approval of the plan, tests and assessment are made toverify if and at what extent mitigation measures have been put in placeand how effective they have been in reducing one of the risk componentor all of them.

7 Document summary and conclusionsThe main goal of the present document was to illustrate the methodologyto assess risk in ways useful to make sound and informed land-useplanning and management decisions, at least with respect to existingnatural risks in the areas of concern.

The methodology is based on the work carried out previously within theARMONIA project by all the partners, but is also the result of large efforts


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to solve some of the crucial problems and critical aspects that werediscussed in the various meetings among the project’s partners. It wasshown that it is necessary to strongly link the assessment phase to theidentification of prevention strategies that can be implemented intocurrent planning practices and therefore two previously separateddeliverables have been merged into one.

This document sketches also the skeleton of the DSS that is proposed bythe ARMONIA project and will be illustrated in detail in Del. 5.2. It wasdeemed extremely important to support the development of the DSS withan adequate conceptual structure and framework so as to include themost relevant aspects of risk assessment and prevention. In this regard,vulnerability has a particularly important role, in defining thecharacteristics that make a specific place more or less resistant to a givennatural stress.

The skeleton of the DSS also suggests ways to overcome difficultiesarising in multi-risk approaches, that need to integrate complex factorsrelated to the multiplicity of natural threats, the physical vulnerability ofassets and objects, the community coping capacity with respect todifferent hazards, some of which may be well enchained in the sameevent.


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8 Bibliographical referencesAndronico D., L. Lodato, Effusive activity at Mount Etna Volcano (Italy)during the 20th Century; a contribution to volcanic Hazard assessment, in“Natural Hazards”, vol. 36, 2005, pp. 407-443.

Bernardini A.(ed.), La vulnerabilità degli edifici: valutazione a sclanazionale della vulnerabilità degli edifici ordinari, CNR-Gruppo Nazionaleper la Difesa dai Terremoti - Roma, 2000, 175 pp. + CD-ROM allegato

Bolton P., Heikkala S., Green M.M., May P., Land-use planning forearthquake hazard mitigation: a handbook for planners, SpecialPublication n.14. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University ofColorado, Boulder, Colorado, 1986.

Brenner N., The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalarstructuration, in “Progress in Human Geography”, vol. 25: n. 4, 2001.

Burby R. (ed.) Cooperating with nature. Confronting natural hazards withland-use planning for sustainable communities, Joseph Henry Press,Washington D.C., 1998.

Chester D., Degg M., Duncan A., J. Guest, The increasing exposure ofcities to the effects of volcanic eruptions: a global survey, in“Environmental Hazards”, vol. 2, 2001, pp. 89-103

Comfort L., Wisner B., Cutter S., Pulwarty R., Hewitt K., Oliver-Smith A.,Wiener J., Fordham M., Peacock W., Krimgold F., Reframing disasterpolicy: the global evolution of vulnerable communities, in “EnvironmentalHazards”, vol. 1: 1999; pp. 39-44.

Cosenza E., G. Manfredi (eds.), Indici e misure di danno nellaprogettazione sismica, CNR-Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dai Terremoti- Roma, 2000, 125 pp.

Cruden D., D. Varnes, Landslide types and processes, in Turner A.K., R.Schuster (eds.), “Landslides. Investigation and mitigation”, NationalAcademy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996.

Davis J., J. Hall, A software-supported process for assembling evidenceand handling uncertainty in decision-making, in “Decision SupportSystems”, vol. 35, 2003, pp. 415-433.

De Marchi B.,S. Funtowicz and J. Ravetz, The management of uncertaintyin the communication of major hazards, Joint Research Centre at Ispra,EUR 15268, 1993.

EEA (2005). EEA Briefing 1/2005 - Climate change and river flooding inEurope. Briefing No 1/2005, Copenhagen, 2005.

EEA (2004). Impacts of Europe’s changing climate. An indicator-basedassessment. EEA Report 2/2004. Copenhagen, 2004)

EMA (Emergency Management Australia), Planning safer communities.Land-use planning for natural hazards, PenUtlimate, Canberra, AU, 2002.

Fleischhauer M, Greiving S., Wanczura S., Natural hazards and spatialplanning in Europe, Dortmunder Vertrieb für Bau- und Planungsliteratur,2006.


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Foster H. D., Disaster Planning. The preservation of Life and Property,Springer-Verlag, New York, 1980.

Granger K, T. Jones, M. Leiba, G. Scott, Community risk in Cairns. Amultihazard risk assessment, AGSO, Australia, 1999.

Gunderson and Holling, Panarchy. Understanding transformation in humanand natural systems, Island Press, 2002.

K. Hewitt, Regions of risk. A geographical introduction to disasters,Longman, Singapore, 1997.

Chen K., R. Blong, C. Jacobson, MCE-RISK: integrating multicriteriaevaluation and GIS for risk decision-making in natural hazards, in“Environmental Modelling & Software”, vol. 16, 2001, 387-397.

King D., Uses and limitations of socioeconomic indicators of communityvulnerability to natural hazards: data and disasters in Northern Australia,in “Natural Hazards” vol. 24: 2001.

Kunreuther H., Neglecting Disaster: Why Don’t People Insure AgainstLarge Losses?, in “The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty”, vol. 28, n.1, 2004

Kunreuther H., Roth R. J. (cur.), Paying the price: the status and role ofinsurance against natural disasters in the United States, Joseph HenryPress, USA, 1998.

IreR (Istituto Regionale di Rocerca della Regione Lombardia) project(Code IReR 2003A016): Socio-economic factors to be considered inrelocation projects from areas subject to high levels of hydrogeologicalrisk, internal report, 2004.

Jurado-Chichay Z., G. Walker, The intensity and magnitude of theMangaone subgroup plinian eruptions from Okataina Volcanic Centre, NewZealand, in “Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, vol. 111,2001, pp. 219-237.

Lewis J., Development in disaster-prone places, Studies of vulnerability,Intermediate technology Publications, UK, 1999.

Lirer L, L. Vitelli, Volcanic risk assessment and mapping in the Vesuvianarea using GIS, in “Natural Hazards”, vol. 17, 1998, pp. 1-15.

Maclaren, V.W. (with the assistance of S. Labatt, J. McKay, and M. Van deVegte), Developing indicators of urban sustainability: a focus on theCanadian experience. Prepared for the State of the EnvironmentDirectorate, Environment Canada; Canada Mortgage and HousingCorporation; and Intergovernmental Committee on Urban and RegionalResearch (ICURR). Toronto: ICURR Press, 1996.

Mc Harg I., Design with nature, Natural History Press, Garden City, NewYork, 1969.

Mechler R., Natural disaster risk and cost benefit analysis, in Kreimer A.,Arnold M., Carlin A., eds. “Building safer cities. The future of disasterrisk”, The World Bank Management Facility, Washington D.D., 2003.

Medd W., S. Marvin, From the politics of urgency to the governance ofpreparedness: a research agenda on urban vulnerability, in “Journal ofContingencies and Crisis Management”, vol. 13:2, June 2005, pp. 44-49.


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Neal D., Reconsidering the phases of disaster, in "International Journal ofMass Emergencies and Disasters", vol. 15:2, 1997, pp. 239-264.

Pearson J.M., J.P. Shim, An empirical investigation into DSS structuresand environments, in “Decision Support Systems”, vol. 13, 1995, pp. 141-158.

Secchi B., Prima lezione di urbanistica. Laterza, Bari, 2000.

Todini E., An operational decision support system for flood risk mapping,forecasting and management, in “Urban Water”, vol. 1, 1999, pp. 131-143

Turner et al., A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainabilityscience, in “PNAS”, July 8, 2003(www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1231335100)

Van der Veen, C. Logtmeijer, Economic hotspots: visualizing vulnerabilityto flooding, in “Natural Hazards”, vol. 36, 2005.

Veyret Y., Garry G., Meschinet de Richemond N., eds., Risques naturels etaménagement en Europe, Armand Colin, Paris, 2004.

Witlox F., Expert systems in land-use planning: an overview, in “ExpertSystems with Applications”, vol. 29, 2005, pp. 437-445.

Wisner B., Blaikie P., Cannon T., Davis I., At risk. Natural hazards,people’s vulnerability and disasters, Second edition, Routledge, 2004.

Zerger A., Examining GIS decision utility for natural hazard risk modelling,in “Environmental Modelling&Software”, vol. 17:2002, pp. 287-294.


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Appendix: vulnerability matrices for the regionaland the local scale

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Seismic riskSpatial element Land-use Exposed element Exposure Vulnerability Parameters and indexes Synthetic index Explanation Bibliographical source

Areas All Population Population density : Pe = ab/Sa

People vulnerability index: Pvi = [(Pop(<5) + Pop(>65)) / Poptot]*100 normalized to a value variable between 0 and 1

ab = Residents; Sa = Surface of the area (ha); Pop(<5) = people under 5 years of age; Pop(>65)= people over 65 years of age

SPv = (Pe*Pvi) ranked into 4 classes People with reduced mobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency.

Granger K., Jones T., Leiba M., Scott G. (1999) “Community Risk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard Risk Assessment”, Commonwealth of Australia.

Areas Urban fabric Buildings Building consistency: Bn

Building vulnerability: Bvi = (Bmr + Bar + Bhr + Bmar+Bct). Normalized between 0 and 1

Bn = number of buildings; Bmr = (number of masonry buildings/Bn)*100 ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Bar = [(BnA*6)+(BnB*5)+(BnC*4)+(BnD*3)+(BnE*2)+(BnF*1)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class. Where BnY = number of buildings of the class Y and Y = Class of building age ranked in 6 classes (A,B,C,D,E,F). A = buildings before the 1919, B = 1919 – 1945, C = 1946 – 1960, D = 1961 – 1971, E = 1972 – 1981, F = after the 1981 .Bhr = [(BnG*2)+(BnH*3)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Where BnW = number of buildings of the class W andW = Class of building height ranked in 2 classes (G up to two floors, H over two floors).Bmar = [(BmI*2)+(BmL*3)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.BmI = Number of buildings of the class Z.Z = Class of building maintenance (I = High and L = low), determined with respect to the presence of waterworks, sanitary fittings, heating system, etc.Bct = [(Bcti*2)+(Bcta*2)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Bcti = number of isolated buildings.Bcta = number of aggregated buildings.

SBv = (Bn*Bvi) ranked into 4 classes Building vulnerability depends on many structural features. At regional scale it is possible to use statistical data to assess building vulnerability to seismic event, taking into account construction typology (masonry buildings), building age, building height, building maintenance and type of aggregation (isolated or aggregated building). All the classes of indicators are defined basing on the features of Italian building stock and on the Italian statistical data provided by ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics).

Meroni F., Petrini V., Zonno G. (2000), “Distribuzione nazionale della vulnerabilità media comunale”, in Bernardini A. (eds), La vulnerabilità degli edifici: valutazione a scala nazionale della vulnerabilità sismica degli edifici ordinari, CNR – GNDT, Roma.

Arable and heterogeneous areas

Permanent crops

Forest

Road network Re = (Wi * Li) ranked into 4 classes

Li = length of road of typology “i”; Wi = weight (1, 2, 3) of the classes of road network typology, assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels (highway, national, regional)

Other network infrastructures Ne = (Hi * Lj) ranked into 4 classes

Lj = length of network of typology “j” (water pipes; power lines, etc.); Hi = weight (1, 2) of the classes of network typology, assigned basing on 2 hierarchical levels (main and secondary elements )

Emergency equipments Typology and location Typology: (civil protection units, hospitals, etc.)Infrastructures Typology and location Typology: (airports, railway areas, harbours, etc.)Monuments Typology and location Typology: (isolated monuments, archaeological sites, monumental

districts, etc.)Commercial areas Typology and location Typology (type of goods)Industrial areas Typology and location Typology (type of production)Hazardous installations Typology and location Typology (type of production, level of hazardness)

C(Y): score with reference to the class of Y, giving 1 point for the lower class and 4 points for the top class.

Points

Lines

Areas Natural and agricultural areas

Regione Lombardia (2001), Vulnerabilità sismica delle infrastrutture a rete in una zona campione della Regione Lombardia, Regione Lombardia - CNR, Milano.

SEn = C(Re)+C(Ne) Normalized and ranked in 4 classes.

At regional scale exposure of points can be evaluated and physical vulnerability assessment can be worked out for facilities in critical areas through specific cards.

At regional scale exposure of lines can be evaluated and physical vulnerability assessment can be worked out for critical lines through specific cards.

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FloodsSpatial element Land-use Exposed element Exposure Vulnerability Parameters and indexes Synthetic index Explanation Bibliographical source




FPv = (Pe*Pvi) ranked into 4 classes People with reduced mobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency.


Areas Urban fabric Buildings Building consistency: Bn Building vulnerability: Bvi = (Bmr + Bhr). Normalized between 0 and 1

Bn = number of buildings Bmr = (number of masonry buildings/Bn)*100 ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Bhr = [(BnG*2)+(BnH*3)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class. Where BnW = number of buildings of the class W and W = Class of building height ranked in 2 classes (G up to two floors, H over two floors).

FBv = (Bn*Bvi) ranked into 4 classes This vulnerability index takes into account only type of building tecniques (masonry or not) and the height of the building which are the main features reported in literature useful to assess the flood vulnerability of buildings to regional scale.



Exposed surface: Al ranked into 4 classes

Al = surface of arable land and heterogeneous areas (ha) ranked into 4 classes

Permanent crops Exposed surface: Apc ranked into 4 classes

Apc = Surface of permanent crops (ha)

Forest

Road network FEn = (Wi * Li) Li = length of road of typology “i”; Wi = weight (1, 2, 3) of the classes of road network typology, assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels (highway, national, regional)

FEn ranked into 4 classes At regional scale exposure of lines can be evaluated.


Other network infrastructuresEmergency equipments Typology and location Typology: (civil protection units, hospitals, etc.)

Infrastructures Typology and location Typology: (airports, railway areas, harbours, etc.)Monuments Typology and location Typology: (isolated monuments, archaeological sites,

monumental districts, etc.)Commercial areas Typology and location Typology (type of goods)

Industrial areas Typology and location Typology (type of production)Hazardous installations Typology and location Typology (type of production, level of hazardness)

C(Y): score with reference to the class of Y, giving 1 point for the lower class and 4 points for the top class.

Points

FEa = [C(Al)+C(Apc)] ranked into 4 classes


Lines

At regional scale exposure of natural and agricultural areas can be evaluated.

Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee, Science for floodplain management into the 21st century; Washington DC, June 1994

At regional scale exposure of points can be evaluated.

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Landslides

Spatial element Land-use Exposed element Exposure Vulnerability Parameters and indexes Synthetic index Explanation Bibliographical source




LPv = (Pe*Pvi) ranked into 4 classes People with reduced mobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency.



Building vulnerability: Bvi = (Bmr + Bhr). Normalized between 0 and 1

Bn = number of buildings Bmr = (number of masonry buildings/Bn)*100 ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Bhr = [(BnG*2)+(BnH*3)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class.Where BnW = number of buildings of the class W and W = Class of building height ranked in 2 classes (G up to two floors, H over two floors).

LBv = (Bn*Bvi) ranked into 4 classes Vulnerability to landslide depends on many structural features of the building which can be summarized at regional scale taking into account the construction type (impact of the landslide) and the height of the building.

Arable and heterogeneous areasPermanent crops

Forest



Other network infrastructures

Ne = (Hi * Lj) ranked into 4 classes


Emergency equipments

Typology and location Typology: (civil protection units, hospitals, etc.)

Infrastructures Typology and location Typology: (airports, railway areas, harbours, etc.)Monuments Typology and location Typology: (isolated monuments, archaeological sites,

monumental districts, etc.)Commercial areas Typology and location Typology (type of goods)Industrial areas Typology and location Typology (type of production)Hazardous installations

Typology and location Typology (type of production, level of hazardness)

Notes:C(Y): score with reference to the class of Y, giving 1 point for the lower class and 4 points for the top class.


Lines

Points At regional scale exposure of points can be evaluated.

At regional scale exposure of lines can be evaluated.

LEn = C(Re)+C(Ne) Normalized and ranked in 4 classes.

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Forest fire





FFPv = (Pe*Pvi) ranked into 4 classes People with reduced mobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency.


Areas Urban fabric Buildings

Arable and heterogeneous areasPermanent crops

Forest FEa = (Fa*Fp) Fa = surface of forest (ha); Fp = score of class percentage of forest in protected areas, based on 4 classes (0-25% Fp =1; 25% - 50% Fp = 2; 50% - 75% Fp = 3; 75% 100% Fp = 4)

FEa = ranked into 4 classes The index takes into account the exposure of forest surface and the percentage of forest included in protected areas.

Road networkOther network infrastructuresEmergency equipmentsInfrastructuresMonumentsCommercial areasIndustrial areasHazardous installations

Lines


Points

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Volcanic risk


Areas All Population (1) Population density : Pe = ab/Sa



VAPv = (Pe*Pvi) ranked into 4 classes People with reduced mobility/escaping capabilities in case of emergency.



Building vulnerability: Bvi = (Bmr+Bar). Normalized between 0 and 1

Bn = number of buildings; Bmr = (number of masonry buildings/Bn)*100 ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class; Bar = [(BnA*3)+(BnB*2)+(BnC*1)]/Bn ranked into 4 classes with a score of 1 point for minimum class and 4 for the top class. Where BnY = number of buildings of the class Y and Y = Class of building age ranked in 3 classes (A,B,C). A = buildings before the 1945, B = 1946 - 1981, C = after the 1981 .

VABv = (Bn*Bvi) ranked into 4 classes Building vulnerability depends on roof typology and resistance and on other structural features. At regional scale it is possible to use statistical data to assess building vulnerability, taking into account the construction typology (masonry buildings) and building age.

Spence R. J., Kelman I., Baxter P. J., Zuccaro G., Petrazzuoli S. (2005), "Residential building and occupant vulnerability to tephra fall", Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 5, 477-494.


Exposed surface: Al ranked into 4 classes

Al = surface of arable land and heterogeneous areas (ha) ranked into 4 classes

Permanent crops Exposed surface: Apc ranked into 4 classes

Apc = Surface of permanent crops (ha)

Forest Exposed surface: Fe = (Fa*Fp) ranked into 4 classes

Fa = surface of forest (ha); Fp = score of class percentage of forest in protected areas, based on 4 classes (0-25% Fp =1; 25% - 50% Fp = 2; 50% - 75% Fp = 3; 75% 100% Fp = 4)



Other network infrastructures

Ne = (Hi * Lj) ranked into 4 classes


Emergency equipments Typology and location Typology: (civil protection units, hospitals, etc.)

Infrastructures Typology and location Typology: (airports, railway areas, harbours, etc.)Monuments Typology and location Typology: (isolated monuments, archaeological sites, monumental

districts, etc.)Commercial areas Typology and location Typology (type of goods)Industrial areas Typology and location Typology (type of production)Hazardous installations Typology and location Typology (type of production, level of hazardness)

Notes:(1) In case of lava flows, population exposure should not be considered, because evacuation is possible in the light of low lava flow velocity, see in bibliography Lirer and Vitelli (1998).(2) C(Y): score with reference to the class of Y, giving 1 point for the lower class and 4 points for the top class.

At regional scale exposure of lines can be evaluated.

Natural and agricultural areas

At regional scale exposure of points can be evaluated.

VAEn = C(Re)+C(Ne) Normalized and ranked in 4 classes.

Vesuvius' National Emergency Plan; Cronin S. J., Neall V. E. (2001), “Holocene volcanic geology, volcanic hazard, and risk on Taveuni, Fiji”, New Zealand Journal of Geology & Geophysics, 2001, Vol 44: 417-437.

Volcanic risk map for santa Maria Guatemala.

Areas

Lines

Points

At regional scale exposure of natural and agricultural areas can be evaluated.

VAEa = [C(Al)+C(Apc)+C(Fe)] ranked into 4 classes

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Coping capacity

Spatial element Considered element Parameters and indexes Index of measure Explanation Bibliographical source

Strategic facilities equipment

Ei = number of emergency equipments of typology “i”; Wi = weight (1, 2, 3) of the 3 classes of emergency equipments typology (local, urban, regional), assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels

Emergency equipment index: Iem = (_i Wi * Ei) /Sa ranked into 4 classes

It is related to the quantity and to the hierarchical level of emergency equipments (hospitals, fire brigades, etc.) of each municipality, with reference to the total surface of the considered municipality.

Infrastructures and road networks equipment

Inf = (_i Wi * INFi) /Sa; INFi = area of infrastructures of typology “i”; Wi = weight (1, 2, 3) of the 3 classes of infrastructure typology (local, urban, regional), assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels. Ip = (_i Wj * Rj) /Sa ranked into 4 classes; Rj = length of roads of typology “j”; Wj = weight (1, 2, 3) of the 3 classes of road typology (highway, national, regional), assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels.

Infrastructure ad road network index If = (Inf+Ip) ranked into 4 classes

This index is referred to the quantity and hierarchical level of infrastructure and road network of each municipality, with reference to the surface of the considered municipality.

Accessibility Ai = number of accesses of typology “i”; Wi = weight (1, 2, 3) of the 3 classes of access typology (highway, national and provincial roads), assigned basing on 3 hierarchical levels.

Accessibility index: Ia = (_i Wi * Ai) /Sa ranked into 4 classes

It is related to the accessibility from the external territory to each municipality, taking into account the number and the hierarchical level of the main accesses with reference to the surface of the municipality

Municipality Regione Lombardia (2001), Vulnerabilità sismica delle infrastrutture a rete in una zona campione della Regione Lombardia, Regione Lombardia - CNR, Milano; Granger K., Jones T., Leiba M., Scott G. (1999) “Community Risk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard Risk Assessment”, Commonwealth of Australia.

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Local scale

Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: seismic

Exposedelements/systems

Exposure index Vulnerability indicator Physical factorthreateningexposedsystems

Explanation Bibliographical source Can it increasealso thehazard level?

Path to get anacceptablemeasure

Population Density % Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over 65;Handicapped people

Falling objectsmoved by groundshaking;collapsingbuildings andstructures

People who will havemore problems intheirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “Community Riskin Cairns. A Multi-hazardRisk Assessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia. Lewis J.,Development indisaster-prone places,Studies of vulnerability,Intermediate technologyPublications, UK, 1999.

Land

use

Urb

an fa

bric

Residential buildings Number of buildings in a seismicarea; or % of residential buildingin the seismic area (differentiatedaccording to amplification zones)

Specific features (seethe GNDT frameworkwith the 11 parametersto assess thevulnerability of ordinarybuildings to seismicrisk). At the local scalevulnerability survey canbe carried out building-by-building or usingsampling techniques.

Ground shaking,horizontalacceleration

Those parametershave beenextensively explainedin literature and usednot only in Italy but ina number ofinternational (and EUfunded) projects

D. Benedetti, V. Petrini,On seismic vulnerabilityof masonry buildings:proposal of anevaluation procedure, in"L'Industria delleCostruzioni", n. 18,1984.

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Historic centres Building blocks; internalaccessibility; strategic facilitiesinside the historic centre

Experimental work hasbeen carried out toassess the vulnerabilityof historic centre toseismic risk


Parameters to assessthe vulnerability ofbuilding blocks havebeen set to assesshow interconnectedstructural systemrespond to seismicwaves with respect toindividual buildings

Menoni S., ed., Lasalvaguardia dei valoristorici, paesistici eambientali nelle zonesismiche italiane.Proposte per unmanuale, Gangemi,Roma, 2006.

Monuments andarchaeological sites

Monuments distinguishingbetween churches, theatres,libraries, museums, etc.

Work has been carriedout since the Friuliearthquake to produceparameters assessingvulnerability to seismicrisk of some of sometypes of monumentslisted in the previous box


Parameters to assessthe vulnerability ofmonuments likechurches, take intoconsideration theextreme variability ofshapes, materialsand the fact theyhave been built overcenturies

Menoni S., ed., Lasalvaguardia dei valoristorici, paesistici eambientali nelle zonesismiche italiane.Proposte per unmanuale, Gangemi,Roma, 2006.Lagomarsino S.,Brencich A., BussolinoF., Moretti A., PagniniL.C., Podestà S., Unanuova metodologia per ilrilievo del danno allechiese: primeconsiderazioni suimeccanismi attivati dalsisma, in “IngegneriaSismica”, Patron editore,Bologna, vol 3., 1997.

Hazardous installations Number; intrinsic hazardousnessin terms oftoxicity/inflammability/explosivepotential of stored materials

Designed according toantiseismic codes?

Ground shaking,horizontalacceleration;falling objectsdue to groundshaking

Hazardousinstallations inseismic areasgenerally need tofollow stricterrequirements withrespect to ordinarybuildings.

Hazardousinstallations area hazard perse, may beimplied in na-tech: fires,explosion, toxicrelease

There are somecasesdocuments inthe more recentearthquakes (inparticular Izmit,1999) regardinginduceddamage tohazardousinstallations dueto seismicwaves.

Indu

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Ordinary productiveareas

Built surface and location As for buildings As above As for buildings

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Commercial areas Built surface and location As for buildings As above As for buildings

Cultivated areas

Forest

Permanent crops

Nat

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and

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Population Number and consistency ofsettlements

% Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over 65;Handicapped people;people living in remotehouses

People who will havemore problems intheirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs;people who will notbe reached easilybecause of theirbeing isolated andremoved from mainaccess ways

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “Community Riskin Cairns. A Multi-hazardRisk Assessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia. Lewis J.,Development indisaster-prone places,Studies of vulnerability,Intermediate technologyPublications, UK, 1999.

Net

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Road network andrailways

Type and hierarchy of network Vulnerability of key parts(bridges) andvulnerability to potentialinduced landslides (seelandslides)

Ground shaking Bridges vulnerabilityto seismic risk hasbeen studied andparameters havebeen proposed

Menoni S. , M.P. Boni,F. Pergalani, V. Petrini,Lifelines earthquakevulnerabilityassessment: a systemicapproach, in “SoilDynamics andEarthquakeEngineering”, vol. 22/9-12, Elsevier Science,The Netherlands, pp.1201-1210. 48. BoniM.P., S. Menoni, F.Pergalani, V. Petrini,Developing completeevent scenarios startingfrom lifelines damageassessment, in“Proceedings of the 12thEuropean Conferenceon EarthquakeEngineering”, ElsevierScience, TheNetherlands, Paperreference 513, pp. 1-10.

Records frompast eventsshould beanalyzed tostudy differentcases

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Ports and airportsfacilities

Location with respect tolandslides

As for buildings (?) Ground shaking Records fromknown eventsshould bestudied

Other networks Length and number of segmentsmenaced by landslide; presenceand position of vital plants(purification; pumping;pressure/voltage cabins);hierarchy

Position with respect tolandslides (on/below);intrinsic resistance todifferent types oflandslides

Ground shaking,in terms ofacceleration andvelocity

Some pipes like gasconducts mayprovoke fires

In the Sarno case themain gas conduct hasbeen shut down to avoidinduced effects

Records frompast events andinterviews withmanagingcompaniesshould becarried out toidentify themost crucialparameters

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm

ent

Emergency equipment(civil protection units;hospitals; areas forcollecting people, etc.)

Location with respect tolandslides; hierarchy

Ground shaking Records frompast eventsshould beanalyzed; futureevents shouldbe studiedaccordingly byscientists

Oth

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Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: flood


Exposure index Vulnerabilityindicator

Physical factorthreateningexposed systems

Explanation Bibliographicalsource

Can it increase alsothe hazard level?

Path to get anacceptable measure

Population Density % Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over65; Handicappedpeople

Depth and velocityof water; floodduration

People who will havemore problems in theirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “CommunityRisk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard RiskAssessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia.

Residential buildings Built surface Ground floor type;foundation type andlength; resistance tolateral loads; usedmaterial; number offloors; goods storedin ground floors

Depth, velocity andwater volume;contaminatedwaters

The use of ground floorhas been until now themain parameter tojudge the damageabilityin case of floods

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “CommunityRisk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard RiskAssessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia. Burby R.,ed., Cooperating withnature. Confrontingnatural hazards withland use planning forsustainablecommunities, JosephHenry Press,Washington D.C.,1998.

The built surface canincrease flood level byreducing drainageareas

Computer simulationscould be used to studythe relationshipbetween: materialsand damage;resistance to lateralloads. Statisticalcorrelations may beused to check therelationship betweennumber offloors/damage; use offirst floors/damage

Historic centres % Buildings includedin historic centres

As above+maintenance;sensitivity tocorrosive waters;wall paintings in firstfloors

Depth, velocity andwater volume;contaminatedwaters

Corrosive contaminantsin flooding waters havebeen recognised asmain causes of damagein Piemonte 1994 flood

Land

use

Urb

an fa

bric


% Monuments orarchaeological sitesin flooding zones

As above Depth, velocity andwater volume;contaminatedwaters

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Hazardousinstallations

Number; intrinsichazardousness interms of toxicity ofstored materials

Available flooddefence systems(pumps;containment; walls);machinery andstorage "easy or notto move")

Depth, velocity andwater volume

Installations in floodingareas may protectthemselves by anumber of means.Parameters derivedfrom real cases of 2000and 2002 floods inLombardia and 1994Piemonte

Hazardousinstallations are ahazard per se, maybe implied in na-tech:contamination andeven fires (on water)

Reports on damage inhazardous installationsduring floods shouldbe analyzed to test theproposed parametersand find new ones.


Built surface andlocation with respectto flooding areas

Available flooddefence systems(pumps;containment; walls);machinery andstorage "easy or notto move")


As above Productive areas canreduce drainagesurface; restrict riverbed; provokecontamination (to aminor extent thanhazardousinstallations)

Reports on damage inhazardous installationsduring floods shouldbe analyzed to test theproposed parametersand find new ones.

Indu

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Commercial areas Built surface andlocation with respectto flooding areas

Available flooddefence systems(pumps;containment; walls);


As above Large commercialsurface can reducedrainage surface andreduce river beds

Reports on damage tocommercial facilitiesshould be analyzed

Cultivated areas Extension in floodingzones; value/mq

Resistance ofcultivated goods towater; diversificationof goods

Depth, velocity andwater volume;contaminatedwaters; floodduration

Some fruits/vegetablesare more or lessvulnerable than othersto water; biodiversityand multiple cultivationincrease resistance andalso improve waterdrainage solidcapabilities

Interagency FloodplainManagement ReviewCommittee, Sciencefor floodplainmanagement into the21st century;Washington DC, June1994

Insurance companiesrecords regardingfloods repayment tofarmers should beanalyzed

Forest Extension in zonesclose to the river bed

Resistance of treesand trees "health"

Falling trees carriedby flooding watersmay create natural“dikes"

Nat

ural

and

agr

icul

tura

l are

as

Permanent crops Extension in floodingzones; value/mq

Resistance ofdifferent crops towater; diversificationof cultivated goods

Depth, velocity andwater volume;contaminatedwaters; floodduration

Some crops are moreor less vulnerable thanothers to water;biodiversity and multiplecultivation increaseresistance and alsoimprove water drainagesolid capabilities

Interagency FloodplainManagement ReviewCommittee, Sciencefor floodplainmanagement into the21st century;Washington DC, June1994

Insurance companiesrecords regardingfloods repayment tofarmers should beanalyzed

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Population Number andconsistency ofsettlements

% Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over65; Handicappedpeople; people livingin remote houses

People who will havemore problems in theirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs;people who will not bereached easily becauseof their being isolatedand removed from mainaccess ways

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “CommunityRisk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard RiskAssessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia. Lewis J.,Development indisaster-prone places,Studies of vulnerability,IntermediatetechnologyPublications, UK,1999.


Length in floodingzones; presence ofcrucial facilities(traffic controlsystems; barrageshierarchy

Bridges robustnessand height; height inflooding zones


Records from pastevents should beanalyzed to studycorrelations betweenheight and otherparameters anddamage


Location with respectto flooding zones

Facilities to defendfrom floods(pumping,containment, etc.);use of first floors;location of crucialmachinery


The Nice airport wasflooded in 1999 forexample

Records from knownevents should bestudied especially inports, that may havebeen inundated moreoften

Net

wor

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frast

ruct

ures

Other networks Length in floodingzones; presence ofvital plants(purification;pumping;pressure/voltagecabins); hierarchy

Intrinsic resistance towater; conditions ofconducts (water andsewerage) in termsof %ofobsolete/leakingpipes)

Depth, velocity andwater volume;watercontamination forwater conducts

Some pipes like gasconducts may provokefires even in thepresence of water!!Drinking water can becontaminated bysewerage or by pollutedflooding waters

Records from pastevents and interviewswith managingcompanies should becarried out to identifythe most crucialparameters

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm

ent Emergency equipment

(civil protection units;hospitals; areas forcollecting people, etc.

Location with respectto flooding zones;hierarchy

Intrinsic vulnerabilityof buildings toflooding water (seeabove); for areaslocation and height

Depth, velocity andwater volume;watercontamination forwater conducts;flood duration

There are reports fromrecent floods in Italywith firemen stations;emergency units inhospitals flooded

Records from pastevents should beanalyzed; futureevents should bestudied accordingly byscientists

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t Public facilities Location with respectto flooding zones;hierarchy; number ofexposed people

Intrinsic vulnerabilityof buildings toflooding water (seeabove); possibility forpeople toescape/recover intemporary safezones

Depth, velocity andwater volume;watercontamination forwater conducts;flood duration

As above

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Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: landslide



Physical factorthreateningexposedsystems


Can it increasealso the hazardlevel?

Path to get anacceptable measure

Population Density % Children(defined accordingto census data); %people over 65;Handicappedpeople

Falling rocks;mass of materialcovering peoplesin their houses orcars

People who will havemore problems intheirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “CommunityRisk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard RiskAssessment”,Commonwealth ofAustralia.

Residential buildings %, Number and volume inmenaced areas

Depending on thelandslide type.Position withrespect to landslide(more vulnerableon and below);materials; depth offoundations;number ofopenings in thedirection of thelandslide; buildingtypology

Falling rocks;mass of materialcovering houses

Depending on thelandslide type thereare some buildingsfeatures that havebeen recognised asimportant to judgetheir ability to resist tothe landslide

Maquaire, proposal;Pergalani and Petrini,proposal (in QuaterInterreg research); lookfor Sarno database

Buildings oninstable slopesmay increase theinstability byadding extra-weight

Computer simulationscould be used tostudy the relationshipbetween: materialsand damage;openings in thedirection of landslidesand damage;foundations anddamage;

Historic centres % Buildings included in historiccentres menaced by landslides

As above As above

Urb

an fa

bric


% Monuments or archaeologicalsites in areas menaced bylandslides

As above As above

Land

use

Indu

stria

l/com

mer

cial

act

iviti

es Hazardous installations Number; intrinsichazardousness in terms oftoxicity/inflammability/explosivepotential of stored materials

Available defences(possible?)

As above Hazardousinstallations are ahazard per se, maybe implied in na-tech: fires,explosion, toxicrelease

Reports on damagein hazardousinstallations inlandslide areasshould be studied

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Built surface and location withrespect to landslides

As for buildings As above As for buildings As above

Commercial areas Built surface and location withrespect to landslides

As for buildings As above As for buildings As above

Cultivated areas Extension in zones menaced bylandslides; value/mq

As above Insurance companiesrecords regardinglandslides repaymentto farmers should beanalyzed

Forest Extension in instable slopes With respect tosome landslidetype roots can bemore or lessimportant for solidcohesiveness

As above The Sarno caseindicated somefeatures that makesome type of treesbetter than other

Certain types oftrees do not addcohesiveness tothe soil andconstitute an extra-weight

Permanent crops As for cultivated areas As above As for cultivated areas

Nat

ural

and

agr

icul

tura

l are

as


% Children(defined accordingto census data); %people over 65;Handicappedpeople; peopleliving in remotehouses

As above People who will havemore problems intheirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs;people who will notbe reached easilybecause of theirbeing isolated andremoved from mainaccess ways

Granger K., Jones T.,Leiba M., Scott G.(1999) “CommunityRisk in Cairns. A Multi-hazard Risk Assess-ment”, Commonwealthof Australia. Lewis J.,Development indisaster-prone places,Studies of vulnerability,Intermediate technologyPublications, UK, 1999.

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Length in flooding zones;presence of crucial facilities(traffic control systems;barrages hierarchy

Position withrespect tolandslides(on/below);

As above A network belowlandslide may becleared, dependingon the quantity ofmaterial; a networkon the landslide maybe broken needing tobe completelyrestored

Menoni S., M.P. Boni, F.Pergalani, V. Petrini,Lifelines earthquakevulnerability assessment:a systemic approach, in“Soil Dynamics andEarthquake Enginee-ring”, vol. 22/9-12,Elsevier Science, TheNether-lands, pp. 1201-1210. 48. Boni M.P., S.Menoni, F. Pergalani, V.Petrini, Developingcomplete event scena-rios starting from lifelinesdamage assessment, in“Proceedings of the 12thEuropean Conference onEarthquake Enginee-ring”, Elsevier Science,The Netherlands, Paperreference 513, pp. 1-10.

Records from pastevents should beanalyzed to studydifferent cases


Location with respect tolandslides

As for buildings (?) As above Records from knownevents should bestudied

Net

wor

k in

fras

truc

ture

s

Other networks Length and number ofsegments menaced bylandslide; presence and positionof vital plants (purification;pumping; pressure/voltagecabins); hierarchy

Position withrespect tolandslides(on/below); intrinsicresistance todifferent types oflandslides

As above Some pipes like gasconducts mayprovoke fires

In the Sarno case themain gas conduct hasbeen shut down toavoid induced effects

Records from pastevents and interviewswith managingcompanies should becarried out to identifythe most crucialparameters

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm


(civil protection units;hospitals; areas forcollecting people, etc.

Location with respect tolandslides; hierarchy

Like buildings As above Records from pastevents should beanalyzed; futureevents should bestudied accordinglyby scientists

Oth

ereq

uipm

ent Public facilities As above; concentration of

peopleAs above As above As above

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Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: forest fires



Physical factorthreateningexposedsystems


Can it increasealso the hazardlevel?


Population Density % Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over65; Handicappedpeople

Smoke; level ofradiation


Residential buildings Number of buildings in a forestarea or very close to; or % ofresidential building in forestareas or in the close vicinity

Radiation level


Radiation level

Urb

an fa

bric



Radiation level


Number; intrinsic hazardousnessin terms oftoxicity/inflammability/explosivepotential of stored materials

Radiation level;smoke

Hazardous installationsmay provoke a muchlarger accident in adomino like effect

Yes, by bothextending the fireand especiallyreleasing toxicsubstances


Built surface and location As for buildings As above As for buildings

Indu

stria

l/com

mer

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act

iviti

es

Commercial areas Built surface and location As for buildings As above As for buildings Cultivated areas Extension and type Fire Forest

Land

use

agric

ultu

ral

Permanent crops

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% Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over65; Handicappedpeople; people living inremote houses

Radiation level;smoke

People who will havemore problems in theirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs;people who will not bereached easily becauseof their being isolated andremoved from mainaccess ways


Type and hierarchy of network;location with respect to forests

Vulnerability of keyparts (bridges) and ofrails

Fire Records frompast eventsshould beanalyzed to studydifferent cases


Location with respect to forests As for buildings (?) Fire and smoke Records fromknown eventsshould be studied

Net

wor

k in

fras

truc

ture

s

Other networks Length and number of segmentsin or close to forest areas;presence and position of vitalplants (purification; pumping;pressure/voltage cabins);hierarchy

Position with respect toforests (inside/closeto); intrinsic resistanceto radiation levels

Ground shaking,in terms ofacceleration andvelocity

Some pipes like gasconducts may provokefires

Records frompast events andinterviews withmanagingcompaniesshould be carriedout to identify themost crucialparameters

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm

ent

Emergencyequipment (civilprotection units;hospitals; areas forcollecting people,etc.)

Location with respect to forests;hierarchy

Position with respect toforests (inside/closeto); intrinsic resistanceto radiation levels;possibility to isolatefrom smoke

Radiation level,smoke

Records frompast eventsshould beanalyzed; futureevents should bestudiedaccordingly byscientists

Oth

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ent Public facilities As above; concentration of

peopleAs above Radiation level,

smoke As above

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Vulnerability category: physical; Hazard type: volcanic lava


Exposure index Vulnerability indicator Physical factorthreateningexposedsystems

Explanation Bibliographical source Can it increasealso thehazard level?


Population Density % Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over 65;Handicapped people

Heat; fallingtephra; smoke


No

General shape of settlementswith respect to lava flows

Position with respect tolava main corridors;presence/lack of naturalor built protection

Lava pressure;heat

Settlements shouldnot be built along lavapotential corridors

No

Distance from areas exposedto pyroclastic falls

Areas directly exposedto heavy materials fallingare certainly morevulnerable than those ata certain distance wherelighter material willdeposit

Falling material,missile type

Spence R. J. Et al.(2005), "Residentialbuilding and occupantvulnerability to tephrafall", Natural Hazardsand Earth SystemSciences, 5, 477-494.

Urban morphology

General shape of settlementswith respect to pyroclasticflows

Location with respect topyroclastic flowsclassified by maxmaterial load in a 500years eruption scenario;presence/lack of naturalor built protection

Load onstructures; heat

Settlements shouldnot be built in thevicinity of potentialcraters and should beprotected by naturalmorphology (hills)

No The path that hasbeen followedcorrectly startsfrom recentreported eruptionsin the attempt tofind recurrentvulnerablepatterns

Type of buildings exposed tolava flows

Lava pressure;heat

Land

use

Urb

an fa

bric

Residential buildings

Type of buildings exposed topyroclastic falls

Roof characteristics(angle, span, vulnerableif >5mt; load resistance(low vuln. Resistance<26kPa; high vuln. R <2,5 kPa; average 2,5kPa <= R < 3 kPa)

Load onstructures

Load on structuresmay cause collapse,especially of roofs

Spence R. J. et al.(2005), "Residentialbuilding and occupantvulnerability to tephrafall", Natural Hazardsand Earth SystemSciences, 5, 477-494.

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Type of buildings exposed topyroclastic flows

Presence of openings(ventilation andwindows) and theirfeatures (possibility toboard them effectively)

Heat Heat entering intobuildings in the formof ashes may ignitedwhatever inside, needto close openings

Baxter P. et al, Theimpacts of pyroclasticsurges on buildings atthe eruption of theSoufrière Hills volcano,Montserrat, in "Bull.Volocanology", vol. 67,2005. Zuccaro G., D.Ianniello, Interaction ofpyroclastic flows withbuilding structures in anurban settlement: a fluid-dynamic simulationimpact model, in "Jour.of Volcanology andGeothermal Science",vol. 133, 2004.

No The path that hasbeen followedcorrectly startsfrom recentreported eruptionsin the attempt todefine vulnerabilityparameters anddamage matrices


As for buildings; easyaccess for evacuation

As above No



As above No


Number; intrinsichazardousness in terms oftoxicity/inflammability/explosivepotential of stored materials

As for buildings Load onstructuresprovokingcollapses; heatigniting alreadyhighlyinflammablesubstances

Hazardousinstallations mayprovoke a much largeraccident in a dominolike effect

Yes, by bothextending thefire andespeciallyreleasing toxicsubstances


Built surface and location As for buildings As for buildings

Indu

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ities

Commercial areas Built surface and location As for buildings As for buildings Cultivated areas Extension and type Forest

agric

ultu

ral

Permanent crops

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% Children (definedaccording to censusdata); % people over 65;Handicapped people;people living in remotehouses

People who will havemore problems in theirmobility/escapingcapabilities once anemergency occurs;people who will not bereached easilybecause of their beingisolated and removedfrom main accessways


Type and hierarchy of network;location with respect to forests

Vulnerability of key parts(bridges) and of rails


Location with respect to forests As for buildings

Net

wor

k in

fras

truc

ture

s

Other networks Length and number ofsegments in or close topresence and position of vitalplants (purification; pumping;pressure/voltage cabins);hierarchy

Some pipes like gasconducts may provokefires

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm


(civil protection units;hospitals; areas forcollecting people, etc.)

Location; specific features asfor buildings

As for buildings andlocation with respect tolava or tephra flows

Oth

er e

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men

t Public facilities As above; concentration ofpeople

As above

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Coping capacity - Vulnerability category: systemic; Hazard type: all

Exposed elements/systems First level vulnerabilityindicator

Second levelvulnerabilityindicator

Explanation Bibliographical source Path to get an acceptablemeasure

Population Residential buildings External and internal

accessibility; distancefrom recovery areasand buildings

Historic centres As above Urb

an fa

bric

Monuments and archaeologicalsites

Hazardous installations External and internalaccessibility;dependency onexternal lifelines

Ordinary productive areas Uniqueness/transferability ofproduction;

External and internalaccessibility;dependency onexternal lifelines

Van der Veen, C. Logtmeijer,Economic hotspots: visualizingvulnerability to flooding, in“Natural Hazards”, vol. 36, 2005.

Indu

stria

l/com

mer

cial

activ

ities

Commercial areas Uniqueness/transferability ofprovision

External and internalaccessibility;dependency onexternal lifelines

Cultivated areas Forest Permanent crops

Land

use

Nat

ural

and

agric

ultu

ral

area

s

Population

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Road network and railways Existence and redundancy Dependency onexternal lifelines(communication andelectricity)

Menoni S. , M.P. Boni, F.Pergalani, V. Petrini, Lifelinesearthquake vulnerabilityassessment: a systemicapproach, in “Soil Dynamics andEarthquake Engineering”, vol.22/9-12, Elsevier Science, TheNetherlands, pp. 1201-1210. 48.Boni M.P., S. Menoni, F.Pergalani, V. Petrini, Developingcomplete event scenariosstarting from lifelines damageassessment, in “Proceedings ofthe 12th European Conferenceon Earthquake Engineering”,Elsevier Science, TheNetherlands, Paper reference513, pp. 1-10.

Ports and airports facilities External and internalaccessibility;dependency onexternal lifelines

Net

wor

k in

fras

truc

ture

s

Other networks Existence and redundancy Interdependency andaccessibility

Some pipes like gasconducts mayprovoke fires

See as for road network andrailways

Stra

tegi

ceq

uipm

ent Emergency equipment (civil

protection units; hospitals;areas for collecting people, etc.

Existence and redundancy External and internalaccessibility;dependency onexternal lifelines

See as for road network andrailways

Oth

ereq

uipm

ent Public facilities As above As above See as for road network and

railways

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