handbook of risk theory volume 176 || the capability approach in risk analysis

39 The Capability Approach inRisk Analysis

S. Roeser, R

DOI 10.100

Colleen Murphy . Paolo GardoniTexas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981

Defining Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981

The Capability Approach and Gaging Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983

Current Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984

Use of the Capability Approach in Risk Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984

Risk Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984

Risk Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989

Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991

Use of Risk Theory in the Capability Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993

Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995

. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. Peterson (eds.),Handbook of Risk Theory,

7/978-94-007-1433-5_39, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

980 39 The Capability Approach in Risk Analysis

Abstract: The standard meaning of risk adopted by risk analysts from a broad range of fields

is that risk is the probability that a certain set of consequences will occur given a hazardous

scenario. Risk analysis is the process of determining the probability of occurrence and

consequences as well as evaluating the determined risks. Capability refers to the genuine

opportunity that an individual has to do and become things of value, such as being

educated and maintaining bodily integrity. Such doings and beings are called functionings.

A capability approach provides a distinct evaluative space for conceptualizing and judging

states of affairs on the basis of how the capabilities of individuals are affected. This chapter

examines the reciprocal contributions of a capability approach and risk theory. A capability

approach has been used to enrich risk theory in three ways. First, it has been argued that

the consequences component of risk should be conceptualized and assessed in terms of the

impact of a hazardous scenario on capabilities, instead of either resources or utility. Second,

instead of evaluating risks on the basis of either public or expert judgment, risks should be

judged acceptable or tolerable on the basis of whether certain threshold levels of capabilities

are maintained. Third, a capability approach provides a distinct alternative to a prominent

way of managing risks, cost-benefit analysis. Instead of comparing alternative policies on the

basis of their relative advantages and disadvantages, policies should be evaluated on the basis

of whether they address unacceptable or intolerable risks and on the basis of their likely

affectability. Likely affectability considers the dollar per unit change in the expected impact of

a hazardous scenario on capabilities. Risk theory has enriched the capability approach in two

ways. First, considering risk has highlighted an important dimension of capability, security,

not previously recognized. Second, attempts to operationalize a capability approach to risk

have led to the development of a novel way to assess capabilities, and not simply actual

functioning achievements.

Introduction

In this chapter we discuss a capability approach in risk analysis and discuss how risk analysis

has enriched theorizing about capabilities. The standard meaning of risk adopted by risk

analysts from a broad range of fields is that risk is the probability that a certain set of

consequences will occur given a hazardous scenario (Kaplan and Garrick 1981; Hansson

2007b). This definition is more specific than the broader definition of risk found in the

philosophical literature according to which risk is ‘‘a possible scenario in which adverse events

take place’’ (Hansson 2007b). Risk analysis is the process of determining the probability of

occurrence and consequences as well as evaluating the specified risks. There are three different

components of risk analysis: risk determination, risk evaluation, and risk management.

Capability refers to the genuine opportunity that an individual has to do and become things

of value, such as being educated and maintaining bodily integrity. The capability approach

provides a distinct evaluative space for conceptualizing and judging states of affairs on the basis

of how the capabilities of individuals are affected.

There are four sections in this chapter. The first defines capability and a capability approach

and discusses how capabilities are assessed. The second provides an overview of how the

capability approach has been applied to risk analysis as well as how ideas from risk analysis

have been used to deepen our understanding of capabilities. The third outlines two main areas

for further research in a capability approach to risk.

The Capability Approach in Risk Analysis 39 981

History

Defining Capability

There are many valuable states and activities, such as being adequately nourished, being

educated, and participating in the political life of a community, which a given individual

may or may not be in a position to achieve. In the capability approach pioneered by Amartya

Sen (1989, 1992, 1993, 1999a, b) and Martha Nussbaum (2000a, b, 2001) such states and

activities are called functionings. An individual enjoys a particular capability if he or she has

a genuine opportunity to achieve a specific valuable functioning. In practice, capabilities are

interdependent. An individual might have a genuine opportunity to have a rewarding career

and a large family, but not have an opportunity to achieve both at the same time.

An individual’s general capability captures this interconnectedness. An individual’s general

capability is a function of the various combinations or vectors of functionings that he or she

has a genuine opportunity to achieve (Sen 1992).

Two general factors influence the capability of an individual: what he or she has and what

he or she can do with what he or she has (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). The resources of an

individual provide information about what he or she has. Internal resources refer to the assets

an individual possesses, including skills, talents, and psychological well-being. External

resources encompass the other means available to him or her, including income, wealth, and

the support of family. For example, whether an individual has a genuine opportunity to be

educated depends on her mental resources and talents. However, it may also depend on

income, insofar as there is tuition or costs for lodging, meals, and books associated with

schooling; morever, schooling often reduces an individual’s ability to earn income in the

short term. Family support for education is also critical; families must be willing, for example,

to allow a child to attend school instead of working inside or outside of the home. The

resources of an individual are not the only factor that influences what genuine opportunities

are available to him or her. There are variations in what individuals can achieve with a given set

of resources (Sen 1993, 1999b). Equally salient for determining the genuine opportunities of an

individual is the social and material structure within which he or she acts. Customs and

traditions, laws, the physical infrastructure of a community, and language are all examples of

some of the dimensions of this social and material structure. It is this structure that influences

what an individual can do or become with the resources at his or her disposal. An individual

may have a set of talents and skills. However, whether an individual can become educated given

his or her talents and skills depends on the condition of the physical infrastructure (e.g.,

whether there are roads or paths through which he or she can access a school), social norms,

and laws (e.g., whether there are formal or informal restrictions on him or her attending

school). Such factors impact whether and how resources contribute to achieved functionings

(Robeyns 2005, p. 99).

An individual’s capability is morally significant because of its connection with individual

well-being. According to Sen (2009), well-being can refer to either the ‘‘promotion of an

individual’s well-being’’ or the promotion of an individual’s agency goals. Agency goals are

a broader category of goals, encompassing everything an individual has reason to pursue.

Some of the goals of an individual may include his or her ownwell-being, and so an increase in

well-being will be an increase in agency achievement. However, some agency goals may not be

connected to an individual’s well-being; indeed the achievement of some agency goals can


be at the expense of individual well-being. Using the freedom/achievement distinction,

an individual’s well-being might relate to well-being achievement or well-being freedom.

Keeping these distinctions in mind, Sen claims that capability, broadly understood as the

dimension of freedom concerned with substantive opportunities, can include both well-being

freedom and agency freedom. He argues that more capability often enhances well-being, when

well-being is defined in terms of agency. However, because that same agency freedom can be in

tension with, or indeed go against, individual well-being freedom depending on the goals

a particular agent has, capability may not always enhance well-being understood as well-being

freedom. Capabilities provide information about the opportunity individuals have (or lack)

to exercise their agency in shaping their lives.

Conceptualizing and assessing individual well-being in terms of capabilities differs impor-

tantly from two common metrics for assessing well-being: resources and utility. Consider

resources, or evaluating well-being on the basis of the market commodities (e.g., income,

resources) or primary goods (e.g., wealth, income, social bases of self-respect) an individual

enjoys. Resources are one necessary condition for the well-being of individuals. As we saw

earlier, resources influence the capabilities of individuals. An increase in resources can also be

the consequence of certain functioning achievements. However, one problem with the

resource framework is that it mistakes means for ends. Resources are taken to be intrinsically

good, instead of instruments for the achievement of what is intrinsically good, namely,

capabilities. Typically, we care about income not for its own sake but because of what it

allows us to do and become. A second problem with the resource-based framework is that

it ignores interpersonal variability, or the different rates at which diverse individuals can

use resources to achieve a particular functioning. As David Crocker (2008, p. 114) writes,

‘‘Due to variations among individuals, the same commodity either may help some and harm

others or may promote the well-being of some a lot and of others only a little. Although food

intake normally will enhance human functioning, it will kill the person choking on a fish bone.

To function well, Milo the wrestler needs on the one hand, more food than the infant and

the disabled and, on the other hand, less food than a wrestler of a similar size but stricken

with parasites.’’

Another method for assessing individual well-being is in terms of utility. Welfare econom-

ics is the discipline devoted to the assessment of the goodness of states of affairs and policies in

terms of their impact on well-being. Well-being/advantage is usually defined in terms of utility.

Utility is defined as happiness, where happiness is often understood as desire fulfillment (Sen

2009). The utility approach avoids one weakness with the resource framework: it does not

fetishize goods but makes individuals the fundamental unit of concern (Crocker 2008).

However it has important limitations. First, happiness and desire fulfillment are necessary

but not sufficient for well-being. Individuals who are persistently deprived may adapt to their

circumstances to make life tolerable, learning to ‘‘take pleasure in small mercies’’ and refusing

to desire or hope for change in their circumstances. If we assess the well-being/advantage of

such individuals on the basis of their happiness alone, then we would fail to get an accurate

picture of their actual disadvantage. Conversely, ‘‘people may have well-being and even

opulence (be ‘well off ’) and yet be unhappy and frustrated; their unfulfilled desires may be

for rare Rioja wine and top-of-the-line Mercedes’’ (Crocker 2008). As these examples illustrate,

the informational basis of well-being/advantage in welfare economics is incomplete. It should

be broadened to include factors such as substantive opportunities, negative freedoms, and


human rights. Omitting this information prevents us from making important distinctions in

our judgments of the relative advantage of individuals who enjoy the same level of happiness,

but differ dramatically along these other dimensions. Omitting this information also leads to

distorted assessments.

The Capability Approach and Gaging Capabilities

The capability approach offers an evaluative space in terms of which judgments about states

of affairs should be made. For example, in a capability approach to development, ‘‘[T]he

purpose of development is to improve human lives by expanding the range of things that

a person can be and do, such as to be healthy and well nourished, to be knowledgeable, and to

participate in community life’’ (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2003). Societies are assessed as more

or less developed from this perspective, then, not on the basis of their wealth but rather on the

basis of the degree to which they ensure the ability of individuals to be healthy, knowledgeable,

and a participant in their community. The capability approach is used in a wide variety of

fields including social choice theory, welfare economics, development ethics and economics,

moral and political theory, disaster studies, and education (Robeyns 2006; Gardoni and

Murphy 2010).

To be able to use the approach to evaluate different states of affairs, it must be possible to

assess the capabilities of individuals. The earliest attempt to operationalize the capability

approach was in development economics. The United Nations and development agencies

now assess development on the basis of the functionings achievement of members of

a country. The Human Development Report (HDR), published annually since 1990, uses the

Human Development Index (HDI) to assess development. The HDI continues to provide

a prominent model for assessing functionings achievements in other fields. In the HDI, the

functionings used for assessing development include the ability to live a long and healthy life,

the opportunity to be knowledgeable, and the ability to have a decent standard of living.

Capabilities are not directly observable or quantifiable. In practice, indicators are used to try to

indirectly gage either actual functionings achievements and/or capability, the freedom to

achieve functionings (Raworth and Stewart 2003; United Nations Development Program

2007). Indicators are used to quantify each functioning. To illustrate, one indicator for the

ability to live a long and healthy life is life expectancy at birth. For the opportunity to be

knowledgeable the adult literacy rate is used. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is an

indicator selected for the ability to have a decent standard of living. The data collected for each

indicator is compared to a scale of minimum and maximum values (goalposts). In the case of

life expectancy, the average life expectancy rate for individuals in a given country is compared

to the minimum value of 25 years and the maximum value of 85 years (United Nations

Development Program 2000). This comparison, also called normalization or scaling, gives

some context and meaning for the specific life expectancy rate of a given country, providing

a picture of what the level of functioning achievement for that indicator is (Jahan 2003). The

goalposts represent reasonable minimum and maximum values based on an analysis of

historical data (Raworth and Stewart 2003). Finally the normalized or scaled values of the

individual indicators are combined in an unweighted average. No weights are typically used

because each functioning is taken to be equally important.


Current Research

In this section we first consider how the capability approach has been applied to risk analysis.

We then discuss two important ways in which the concept of capability has been enriched by

risk studies.

Use of the Capability Approach in Risk Theory

The study of risk is highly interdisciplinary. A diverse range of risks are the subject of

examination, including those associated to environmental, technological, man-made, and

natural hazards. This section describes the contributions that the Capability Approach has

made to risk analysis. We consider in particular the contributions to the three components of

risk analysis: risk determination, risk evaluation, and risk management.

Risk Determination

Risk determination refers to the quantification of the the probability of occurrence of a

particular hazard and its associated consequences. Our focus in this section is not on the

probability component of risk, for which there are a wide variety of methods of quantification

available. For a description of such approaches see Pate-Cornell (1996), Haimes (2004), and

Cullen and Small (2004). Rather, our interest is in how the consequence components of risk

are often characterized and assessed. The first contribution of the capability approach to

risk theory is in our understanding of how the consequences from hazardous scenarios

should be conceptualized and assessed. Below we first describe two common approaches to

conceptualizing and quantifying the consequence components of risk and their limitations.

We then discuss how the capability approach has been proposed as an alternative, and how

this approach avoids the limitations with existent approaches.

Limitations with Common Frameworks to Risk Determination

Risk analysts and those who provide the inputs for a risk analysis, including engineers and

social scientists, have historically adopted a broad resource-based approach to the consequence

component of risk (Rowe 1980; Vose 2000; Bedford and Cooke 2001; Haimes 2004). In one

framework, the numbers of resources of various kinds that are lost, including structures,

money, time (in terms of delays in construction), and/or individuals are counted. Counting

the consequences of risks in this manner has a number of limitations. First, a concentration on

resources lost does not provide information about how the lives of individuals are affected. As

we noted in the discussion in the previous section, there are different rates at which a given

resource can generate an opportunity to achieve a valuable functioning. Thus, identifying the

number of structures damaged does not alone tell us what that loss means for the individuals in

the community affected. Losses of a given structure can have a greater or lesser impact

depending onwhether the structure is a hospital, an empty building, or an apartment complex,

for example. Second, defining consequences in terms of resources implicitly treats what are

important means to achieving well-being as ends in themselves. Third, risk analysts, engineers,

and social scientists increasingly recognize the need to consider consequences beyond those

traditionally taken into account in risk analysis. However, the resource framework does not

provide a principled way to demarcate what losses should count or are salient for purposes of


risk analysis. Indeed, consequences are often selected in practice on the basis of their ease

of quantification (Murphy and Gardoni 2006; Gardoni and Murphy 2009).

A second alternative framework evaluates consequences on the basis of the utility lost in

a given hazardous scenario. Utility is commonly determined by examining the preferences or

choices of individuals. An underlying assumption is that the satisfaction of preferences

increases welfare. Preferences or choices are assessed inmonetary terms. Thus, all consequences

of interest (e.g., the loss of a human life, harms to the environment) are converted into

a monetary figure. This figure is determined on the basis of individual ‘‘willingness to pay’’

(Sunstein 2005). That is, the cost associated with a risk is based on an examination of what

individuals would need to be paid to be willing to be exposed to a certain risks. These figures

are characteristically based on actual market activity. As Cass Sunstein (2005) describes it,

‘‘Suppose that people must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate risks of 1/10,000; suppose,

for example, that workers who face risks of that magnitude generally receive $600 in additional

wages each year. If so, the VSL [Value of a Statistical Life] would be said to be $6 million.’’

Contingent valuation surveys are used in cases where there is no market evidence on which to

make an assessment. For example, to assess the loss of a coral reef, individuals may be asked

what they are willing to pay to salvage coral reefs (Sunstein 2005; Hansson 2007a).

A number of objections have been raised to conceptualizing consequences in terms of

utility. Most fundamentally, assigning costs to certain consequences on the basis of market

choices and preferences does not accurately convey the costs of certain consequences,

either over- or under-estimating their significance. This is so for a number of reasons. First,

individuals may have misperceptions about or be indifferent toward risks they face. One

common case of misperception of risks is that rare, dramatic risks might be feared more

than ordinary risks. In the workplace, individuals may not be fully knowledgeable about

the occupational risks they face when accepting a position; when they do learn of certain

risks the costs to leave may be grave, including loss of seniority or pension if they seek

employment elsewhere (Anderson 1988). Environmental costs may not be a source of grave

concern, in part based on a failure to understand the significance of the environment to us.

As a result, the costs assigned may lead to a corresponding over- or under-valuation of

certain kinds of losses (Slovic 1987; May 2001; Murphy and Gardoni 2006).

Second, even when individuals have an accurate perception of the risks they face and are

not indifferent to their consequences, the willingness to pay amount may not capture the way

individuals value certain costs, such as the loss of their lives. Risks that are job-related may not

be voluntarily accepted, but rather chosen because they were the only form of employment

available (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). As Elizabeth Anderson (1988) writes, ‘‘Workers with

families commonly do not regard their choices about risks to their lives as acts of consumers

out to maximize their personal utilities. Rather, they see their choices as attempts to discharge

their responsibilities to their families. Bound by their responsibilities to others, they do not feel

free to risk their lives at will for pay, as they sometimes acknowledge having done in their youth.

But neither do they feel free to jeopardize their families’ means of livelihood and future

prospects by simply quitting their hazardous jobs and risking long-term unemployment.’’

Thus, choices to accept certain wages may not reflect an individual’s judgment about

the value of his/her life, but rather the judgment about how it is necessary to fulfill certain

responsibilities.

An additional limitation is that the utilitarian framework does not focus attention on what

should be of fundamental interest, namely, how the genuine opportunities of individuals will


change if certain hazards are realized. Instead of valuing and prioritizing the promotion of the

agency of individuals, the utilitarian framework treats the losses of human lives as a market

commodity. Furthermore, information about the monetary costs of consequences does not

translate into information about how the freedom of individuals to do and become things of

value will be restricted. That is, what are the implications of certain forms of environmental

damage for the lives of individuals? Concentrating onwhat individuals may be willing to pay to

avoid certain losses does not provide information about the ways in which the genuine

opportunities open to individuals may change should certain hazards be realized.

A Capability Approach to Risk Determination

In a capability approach, the consequences of hazardous scenarios are conceptualized and

assessed in terms of changes in capabilities. Risk is then defined as the probability that capabilities

will be reduced (Murphy and Gardoni 2006). Conceptualizing the consequences component of

risk from a capability approach overcomes the limitations with both the resource and utilitar-

ian framework. It focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on how a hazardous scenario

will affect the welfare of individuals within a community, insofar as consequences are defined

in terms of the change in the genuine opportunities of individuals to achieve valuable states

and activities. It thus avoids the mistake of focusing on commodities, which are instrumental

means but not valuable ends in themselves. Furthermore, the capability approach can account

for differences in interpersonal conversion rates in using resources to achieve valuable func-

tionings; the capability approach focuses directly on the freedom to achieve valuable function-

ings itself. The capability approach also does not define the consequences of hazards in terms of

what individuals would be willing to pay. It thus avoids the commodification of costs like the

loss of a human life and problems with the lack of information about, concern for, or ability to

avoid certain risks plaguing the utilitarian analysis. What individuals would be willing to

pay to avoid certain consequences plays no role in determining what the consequences of

a hazardous scenario might be. Instead, the impact of a hazard on the genuine opportunities

of individuals is the focal point of concern. The capability approach can account for the

broader indirect impact that a hazard might have, because built into the framework is

the recognition of the fact that both resources and the social and material structure of

a community profoundly affect the opportunities open to individuals. Concern with the

freedom of individuals to achieve valuable functionings invites questions about whether and

in what ways the resources of individuals or the social and material structure of a community

have changed. Finally, concentrating on capabilities, rather than achieved functionings, reflects

a respect for the commitment of liberal governments to ensure that a range of options of ways

of living are open to individuals, instead of promoting a particular way of living itself.

To assess the impact of a hazard, it is necessary to operationalize the capability approach to

risk. Initial efforts to operationalize the capability approach built on the framework are provided

by the HDI for development, which assesses achieved functionings (Gardoni and Murphy

2009). For the purposes of quantifying the consequences of risk, a Hazard Impact Index HII

was developed (Gardoni andMurphy 2009). TheHII is constructed in four steps. The first step

involves selecting the capabilities relevant for the kind of risk in question; that is, it is necessary

to identify which capabilities will provide an accurate picture of the impact of a hazard. Gardoni

and Murphy (2009) have argued for a set of criteria that any argument for the capabilities to be

used in risk analysis must satisfy. Briefly, a given capability is relevant for risk analysis insofar as it

reflects the underlying values and concerns with risk. To ensure that a capability risk analysis is


both comprehensive and, at the same time, practically possible to perform, theminimumnumber

of capabilities should be selected and the capabilities chosen should provide information not

available from given capabilities (e.g., because there is a correlation between the enjoyment of two

capabilities). Gardoni andMurphy also proposed a preliminary list of capabilities to be used in risk

analysis conducted with respect to natural hazards.

Indicators must then be chosen for the selected capabilities. In the context of risk,

appropriate indicators must be shown to track the impact on the capability of interest of

a hazardous scenario (Gardoni and Murphy 2010). Such indicators will allow risk analysts to

assess the impact of a hazardous scenario on capabilities, and so assess the consequence

component of risk. Following the model provided by the HDI indicators were taken to track

the change in the level of achievement of each associated functioning. Each indicator must be

converted into an index that ranges from 0 (minimum achievement) and 1 (maximum

achievement) through a process of scaling analogous to that used in the HDI. Finally, all

indices are combined through an averaging process to create an aggregate measure of achieve-

ment. It is also noted that in the context of risk analysis the values of the indicators cannot be

simply measured but need to be predicted since the subject of risk analysis is future events. The

HII gives a snapshot of the predicted well-being after a hazard. A comparison between the HII

and the actual well-being before a hazard (also measured using a capability approach) provides

a measure of the impact of the hazard.> Figure 39.1 illustrates this formulation of the HII. F1, F2,. . ., Fk on the left column are

the functionings under consideration. Each functioning can be achieve at different levels 1

through q. For example, functioning Fkmight be achieved at levels Fk1, Fk2,. . ., Fkq. As shown in> Fig. 39.1, an individual P(i) might achieve F1 at level F12, F2 at level F2q, and so on, up to Fk at

level Fk1. Each level of achieved functioning for individual P(i) is then converted into

a corresponding index, for a total of k indices: I1(i), I2

(i),. . . Ik(i). The same process is repeated

for all the considered individuals P(1),. . ., P(n). An average of the indices over all individuals is

then computed (Avg.[Ik(i)], i = 1,. . ., n) for each functioning. Finally the HII is computed by

combining all the averages.

One limitation with this construction of the HII is that it assesses the level of achievement

of functionings, not capabilities. For assessing the least advantaged in society and for assessing

the impact of a natural hazard (e.g., flood, earthquake, or hurricane) in the emergency phase

Converting achieved functionings into indices

Fk Fk2 Fkq

F2 F21 F22

F1 F11

P(i)P(i) P(n)

HIIP(1)

I(1)1 I(i)1 I(n)

1

I(1)2 I(i)2 I(n)

2

I(1)k I(i)k I(n)

k Avg. [I(i)k]

Avg. [I(i)2]

Avg. [I(i)1] i = 1,...,n

i = 1,...,n

i = 1,...,n

F1q

Fk1

F12

F2q

. Fig. 39.1

Illustration of the current formulation of theHII andHDI (Published previously as Fig. 1, inMurphy

and Gardoni 2010, with kind permission from Taylor & Francis Ltd., http://www.informaworld.

com)

http://www.informaworld.com



(the time that immediately follows a medium or large disaster) information about achieved

functionings may be sufficient for assessing capabilities. This is because we can typically assume

that the functionings frequently used in these contexts, which are basic functionings, will be

automatically chosen if individuals have the genuine opportunity to do so. Examples of basic

capabilities in Murphy and Gardoni’s (2010) sense include the capability to have adequate

shelter, avoid injuries, and be adequately nourished. Murphy and Gardoni’s use of the notion

‘basic capabilities’ departs from both Nussbaum and Sen. Nussbaum defines basic capabilities

as ‘‘the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for developing the more

advanced capabilities, and a ground of moral concern.’’ (2000b, p. 84). Sen defines basic

capabilities as capturing ‘‘the ability to satisfy certain crucially important functionings up to

certain minimally adequate levels.’’ (1993, p. 40). By contrast, we delimit basic capabilities in

terms of those functionings that, with rare exceptions, individuals will choose to achieve if they

have a genuine opportunity to do so. In the case of basic capabilities, the levels of achieved

functionings thus provide an accurate picture of the capabilities. For example, we can reasonably

assume that if some individuals in the emergency phase in the aftermath of a hazard are not

sheltered this is because they lack the capability to be so. However, when we gage the medium-

and long-term impacts of a hazard on capabilities, an assessment of functionings achievement is

typically an inaccurate proxy. This is because the medium- and long-term impacts of large

hazards, or the impact of smaller hazards, affect non-basic functionings (or basic capabilities in

amore subtlemanner) that we cannot safely assumewill be chosen given an opportunity to do so.

In addition, as discussed earlier, in practice only vectors of functionings are open to an

individual and choosing to achieve one functioning level might preclude the opportunity to

chose a certain level of a different functioning. That is, only certain combinations of function-

ings are open to an individual to achieve. However, the original formulation treated each

functioning in isolation and did not account for how different functionings might interact in

fact. (Murphy and Gardoni 2010). Furthermore, the original formulation assessed the average

impact on levels of functionings achievement across a population. However, an average impact

can mask important variations among a population. The same average may reflect a case

in which all individuals had roughly the same impact, or a case in which some individuals

were not impacted but a portion of the population was severely impacted. The variation in

impact may correlate with certain subgroups within a population, though it need not do so.

Finally, in evaluating the capability of an individual we need to consider two dimensions

captured by this approach: the quality of the possible vectors, and the extent of the freedom

that an individual has in choosing different vectors. In evaluating capability, we need to

capture both the quality of the options open to an individual as well as the quantity, or

range of vectors, he or she has a genuine opportunity to achieve. The quality of the possible

vectors provides information about the levels and kinds of functionings that can be achieved,

and, more generally, of the available opportunities. The range of vectors provides information

about the scope of freedom.

For this reason,Murphy andGardoni (2010) proposed amethod for determining vectors of

capabilities of an individual. The fundamental idea is that functioning achievements of other

people says something about the choices that are genuinely open to an individual in the same

group. Knowing that other individuals have chosen to realize a certain opportunity is an

indication that such opportunity actually exists and allows us to distinguish between

a situation where an individual chooses not to actually take advantage of an opportunity

versus a situation in which such an opportunity does not exist. This method also accounts for

Fkq

P(i)

C(i)HII (1) HII (i) HII (n)

Converting achieved functionings into indices

I(1)k I(i)k I(n)

k

I(1)2 I(i)2 I(n)

2

I(1)1 I(i)1 I(n)

1

P(1) P(i) P(n)

Avg. [HII (i)]

Basic functionings

Non-basic functionings

St. Dev. [HII (i)]

i = 1,...,n

i = 1,...,n

F11F12

V(n)V(i)V(1)

F2iF2q

Fk1

F1q

F21

Fk1

F1

F2

Fk

. Fig. 39.2

Illustration of the new formulation of the HII (Published previously as Fig. 2, in Murphy and

Gardoni 2010, with kind permission from Taylor & Francis Ltd., http://www.informaworld.com)


vectors, rather than isolated functionings, by computing the impact of a hazard at the

individual level and then determining the achieved functionings across individuals.> Figure 39.2 illustrates the formulation proposed by Murphy and Gardoni (2010). An

individual P(i) can only choose among a set of vectors of achieved functionings, V(1),. . ., V(n).

For example, P(i) can chose V(i) which means choosing F12, F2q,. . ., Fk1. After transforming the

achieved functionings into indices, we need to compute the HII(i) (or the HDI(i) if this

approached is applied to human development) for individual P(i) and only then determine

the statistics (average and standard deviation) of the HII(i) across all individuals, indicated in> Fig. 39.2 as Avg.[HII(i)] and St. Dev.[HII(i)], respectively. In this formulation, Avg.[HII(i)]

tells us about the quality of the possible options, while the St. Dev.[HII(i)] captures the extent of

freedom.

Risk Evaluation

As its name implies, risk evaluation is the process of assessing the information provided

through a risk determination. Of particular interest is whether a risk is acceptable or not.

Below we survey two common methods for judging the acceptability of risks and their

corresponding limitations. A third approach, cost-benefit analysis, is considered in the next

section on risk management. We then present the capability approach to acceptable risk.

Limitations with Common Frameworks to Risk Evaluation

One approach to determining the acceptability of a risk is to consider whether the public finds

a given risk acceptable (Hunter and Fewtrell 2001). Underlying this approach is a commitment

to democratic governance, where democracy is taken to imply a form of majority rule.

In a democracy, policies and decisions are justified insofar as they express the will of the

people. However, there are two important limitations with using public judgment as the basis

for determining the acceptability of risks. First, as noted earlier, the public often has limited,

and sometimes inaccurate, knowledge about risks; thus judgments will not be based on correct

assessments. Furthermore, the public may be indifferent about risks they face. All of these

factors undermine the confidence we can have in the assessments of the acceptability of a given



risk the public may make. Second, the public judgment standard for acceptable risk mistakenly

equates democracy with majority rule. However, it is widely acknowledged by liberal demo-

cratic theorists that individual rights are at the core of democracy and constrain what the

majority may want to do. Furthermore, democratic processes should not take preferences or

views of citizens as a given, but rather aim to help develop an informed citizenry. Thus,

democracy does not require that the initial, often uninformed, preferences of citizens be the

basis for evaluating risks a community faces.

An alternative approach is to leave judgments about the acceptability of risks to experts.

Professional risk analysts have the most complete information about the character of risks and

the knowledge to understand how to interpret the results from a risk analysis. Often risk

analysts use as the basis for their judgments their past experience, the standards of their

profession, or the preferences and desires of their client (Fischhoff et al. 1981). However, in

practice experts may be biased in their evaluation of the acceptability of risks, failing to take

into consideration aspects of risk that matter to the general public or how risks impact society

as a whole, as opposed to their client in particular. Finally, the criteria experts use to judge a risk

as acceptable are frequently implicit, making it difficult to scrutinize or evaluate the justifi-

ability of a particular decision.

A Capability Approach to Risk Evaluation

In addition to providing an alternative characterization of the consequences of a hazardous

scenario, the capability approach provides resources for a novel way of conceptualizing the

criteria in terms of which a risk should be judged acceptable. Motivating this approach is the

key claim that justice requires that individuals enjoy a certain threshold level of capability

(Nussbaum 2000b). Judgments about the acceptability of a risk, then, should take into account

whether or not individuals will continue to enjoy threshold levels of capabilities in the

aftermath of a hazard (Murphy and Gardoni 2008).

There are two thresholds that are relevant in this context. The first is the acceptable

threshold. This threshold specifies what minimum level of capabilities it is acceptable for

individuals to enjoy over any period of time; this is the level below which capabilities should

not fall ideally. In the aftermath of a hazard, especially the immediate aftermath, it may not be

practically possible for all individuals to enjoy the acceptable level of capabilities. A framework

for risk evaluation should recognize this possibility, while at the same time setting limits on

what is permissible even in the immediate aftermath of a hazard. This is where the second

threshold comes in. The tolerability threshold is lower than the acceptable threshold. It

specifies what level of capabilities is tolerable in the immediate aftermath of a hazard, provided

this lower level is temporary, reversible, and does not fall below a lower tolerable limit. The

tolerability threshold reflects the moral necessity of avoiding permanent damage to the well-

being of individuals (Murphy and Gardoni 2008).

To account for the role of public deliberation, Nussbaum (2000b) and Sen (2009) rightly

note, is an important component of the capability approach. In a capability approach to

acceptable risk (Murphy and Gardoni 2008), the precise specification of the acceptable and

tolerable threshold can be the product of internal democratic processes. The goal of such public

processes is to articulate standards that establish realistically ambitious levels of acceptable and

tolerable capabilities, given a society’s actual conditions. Because we are dealing with risks, in

which the precise consequences of a hazard are unknown, the specification of the thresholds of

acceptable risk must also take into account probability. That is, in addition to specifying the


level of capabilities judged acceptable, the acceptable threshold must also specify the proba-

bility that capabilities will not fall below the acceptable threshold whichmust beminimally met

for a risk to be judged acceptable. The same consideration is true of the tolerability threshold.

In risk evaluation, then, we assess the probability that the level of capabilities across

a population is below the thresholds of acceptable and tolerable risk. To take into consideration

questions of justice in the distribution of risks, a process of disaggregation may be used.

This involves determining the probability distribution (as a measure of the likelihood) of the

capabilities of subgroups within a population. The probability that the level of capabilities for

various subgroups is below the thresholds of acceptable and tolerable risk may then be assessed.

The capability approach to acceptable risk avoids the limitations with relying either only on

public judgment or on expert judgment. It finds a central role for the public to play in shaping

the criteria of acceptable risk in setting the thresholds of acceptability. At the same time,

judgments about the acceptability of particular risks can be done by experts, whose evaluation

will be shaped by the standards the public sets.

Risk Management

Communities and individuals want to knowwhat risks they face, and tomake judgments about

whether such risks are acceptable, in part so that they can effectively manage risks. The

information provided by risk determination and risk evaluation provides a foundation for

ensuring that policies about risk are formulated in a well-informedmanner. Such policies must

take into account the limited resources available to governments and agencies as well as the

other competing priorities that governments must address. Risk management strategies pro-

vide a framework for aiding policy makers, who are generally not experts in risk analysis, in

deciding which risks should be prioritized formitigation action andwhichmitigation strategies

should be taken. Below we first discuss one prominent risk management framework, cost-

benefit analysis and its limitations.We then consider a capability approach to riskmanagement.

Limitations with Common Frameworks to Risk Management

A common method of evaluating and managing risks is cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA is

a broadly utilitarian approach in which two or more options for public policy decision making

are compared on the basis of their respective advantages and disadvantages. The advantages

and disadvantages are defined in terms of the consequences. All consequences (which may

include economic costs, risks of death, environmental harm) are assigned a numerical, typically

monetary, value. The monetary value is assessed based on the preferences of individuals, where

such preferences are measured based on the amount of money an individual would be willing

to pay to avoid certain risks or the amount of money he or she would agree to be paid to be

exposed to certain risks. Market information or valuation surveys provide the basis for

monetary figures. After quantifying the relative advantages and disadvantages, advantages

are weighed against the disadvantages numerically. The option with the greatest net benefit

(taking into account benefits minus costs) is then selected (Sunstein 2005; Hansson 2007a).

There are two strengths of CBA, which explains in part why it is favored by policy makers.

First, it provides a straightforward decision-making strategy for determining which risks to

address and in what way to address them. Second, it takes as a priority the efficient allocation of

scarce resources.


However, CBA has also been the subject of a number of criticisms, which parallel those

raised to a utility approach to risk determination. To briefly review, first, as noted earlier, many

critics of cost-benefit analysis object to allowing the market to establish a distribution of risks

on the basis of what individuals are willing to pay or be paid. For critics, this does not recognize

and cannot guarantee the obligations that both employers and communities have to guard

against exposing employees or individuals to certain kinds of risks. Second, relying on market

mechanisms to quantify risks is problematic because it assumes that individuals have full

knowledge about the risks they face when they determine what they would be willing to be paid

to be exposed to certain risks and that they base their decision on their assessment of how they

value what will be put at risk, such as their lives. However, neither assumption is warranted in

practice. As noted above, individuals are often not fully knowledgeable about the risks they

face. Furthermore, choices about risk exposure are often a function of factors, such as limited

income or employment opportunities, that do not reflect how individuals value certain goods.

Third, CBA fails to sufficiently recognize that the protection of life is not simply a question to

which a certain cost should be assigned, but reflects a principle or ideal to which societies

should be committed. Relatedly, it is problematic to assess a monetary value to the loss of

human life or a monetary value to other noneconomic goods. Fourth, there are important

issues of fairness and equality in the distribution of risks which the CBA cannot take into

account, given its emphasis on the aggregate costs and benefits (Asveld and Roeser 2009, esp.

the chapters by Hansson, Cranor, and MacLean).

A Capability Approach to Risk Management

In a Capability Approach to risk management, the overarching aim is to protect and promote

individuals’ capabilities (Murphy and Gardoni 2007). Given this aim, the first step in evalu-

ating which risks to address is to determine whether a given risk is acceptable or tolerable.

Priority should be given to risks judged intolerable, followed by a consideration of risks judged

unacceptable.

When evaluating a range of policy options to address and mitigate unacceptable or

intolerable risks, policy makers should determine which policies are viable options. Viable

options should be reasonably anticipated to bring the predicted level of capabilities above

the tolerable or acceptable thresholds, respectively. This can be achieved by reducing the

probability of occurrence of a given hazard and/or its expected impact. Because resources

are limited and risk management is not the only objective to pursue, choices among

viable options need to bemade. In a Capability Approach, we select from among viable options

on the basis of the likely affectability of relative policies. That is, from among policies

considered, we can select a policy to pursue based on the expected dollar per unit change

in the impact of a hazard. Monetary quantification can be used as a measure of the cost of

a given policy; its effectiveness is then conceptualized in terms of the increase or decrease in

capability levels.

The capability approach to risk management avoids some of the main criticisms leveled

against CBA. In a capability approach the thresholds that set the criteria for acceptable and

tolerable risk reflect the judgment that justice requires that individuals not be exposed to

certain kinds of risks and that society has an obligation to ensure that individuals are protected

from such risks. Because the quantification of the impact of risks and of mitigation strategies is

defined and assessed in terms of capabilities, the Capability Approach does not involve

quantifying the value of a human life or commodifying diverse kinds of goods. At the same


time, assessing policies on the basis of their likely affectability ensures that consideration is

given to the fact that resources are scarce and that it is important to ensure that public resources

are used in an efficient manner.

Use of Risk Theory in the Capability Approach

The concept of risk has been used to enrich our understanding of capability. In their work on

assessing advantage and disadvantage from a capability approach, philosophers JonathanWolff

and Avner de-Shalit (2007) have argued that it is important to consider the security of any

functioning achievement when assessing the capability of an individual. An individual has

a genuine opportunity to achieve a given functioning only if that achievement is one that can

be sustained; it is not an achievement that is at undue risk. A functioning achievement is at

undue risk, in their view, insofar as its achievement is temporarily and involuntarily put in

jeopardy by the pursuit of other functionings achievement. In other words, a functioning

achievement is insecure when an individual is ‘‘forced to take risks that in one way or another

are bigger than others are being exposed to or take’’ (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). To illustrate,

the achievement of being sheltered may be insecure and at risk insofar as an individual has an

uncertain income stream stemming from irregular employment that results in unstable ability

to pay rent. Alternately, an individual may be forced to constantly put her bodily integrity

at risk, insofar as the only available sources of employment are dangerous occupations

(Wolff and de-Shalit 2007).

The inclusion of the idea of secure functionings achievement is becoming widely accepted

and adopted in capability analyses. Capability is now understood to represent the genuine

opportunity an individual has to achieve a particular functioning in a secure manner. Thus,

concern with the functionings achievements being put at risk in an involuntary or dispropor-

tionate manner is a central issue. Wolff and de-Shalit suggest statistical information

can provide some insight into the security of functionings achievement. In their view, we

can assess the security of functionings achievement by looking at trends over time for specified

subgroups. In their words, (2007, pp. 116–117),

" The fact that I have a job today says nothing about whether it is a day’s casual work or a sinecure

for life. However, taking a wider view and looking at the individual’s social circumstances or

context immediately provides more information. Indeed, statistics will provide much of what we

need. Imagine that among certain groups – perhaps the young, recent immigrants, or the low

paid – there is a high degree of mobility in employment or housing, with those moving jobs or

homes also experiencing periods of unemployment or homelessness. This, then, gives a prima

facie reason to believe these functionings are not achieved securely by people within these

groups. . . In general, then, although individual functioning is not an indicator for the degree of

security, statistics often can be.

There is a second contribution that risk theory makes to the capability approach.

The method developed to assess capabilities in the context of risk analysis (Murphy and

Gardoni 2010) and illustrated in > Fig. 39.2 can also be applied to assess capabilities in its

original context of development economics and in other applications. As noted above, initial

efforts to operationalize the capability approach built on the model provided by the HDI for

development, which concentrated on assessing achieved functionings. Furthermore, the


original formulation treated each functioning achievement in isolation, while in practice an

individual P(i) can only choose among a set of vectors of achieved functionings.

Further Research

There are two main areas of further research for a capability approach to risk analysis that we

concentrate on in this section. The first centers on the issues to address to operationalize the

capability approach to risk. The second centers on the place of a concern with capabilities in an

overall perspective on risk evaluation and management.

The capability approach developed by Sen is deliberately underspecified. Sen (1992, 1993)

refrains from identifying the capabilities that should be used in any given evaluative exercise for

two reasons. Thefirst is that the capabilities that should be consideredwill always be to some extent

evaluative exercise specific; that is, the capabilities of interest when considering development are

not necessarily the capabilities of interest when assessing risk. The second reflects Sen’s commit-

ment to identifying valuable capabilities via democratic procedures, and in particular democratic

deliberation. These two commitments of Sen’s give rise to a series of theoretical questions for

a capability approach to risk. First, there is the issue of how evaluative exercise specific the selection

of capabilities should be. For example, should the capabilities selected vary according to the kind of

risk being assessed? The work done to date developing a capability approach to risk has been

conducted in the context of the risks posed by natural hazards. Are the capabilities relevant for

technological risks, for example, the same as those relevant for natural hazards? On what basis do

we answer this question? Second, if Sen is correct about the role of public deliberation, in the

context of risk there is a need to incorporate a place for public deliberation in the selection or

evaluation of capabilities and a method for such deliberation to become possible.

Making the capability approach operationalizable also requires further research into

a cluster of questions surrounding the quantification of consequences. Indicators must fulfill

at least two criteria (Gardoni and Murphy 2010). They must be representative of a given

capability and be intuitively plausible. The latter criterion is required to facilitate the adoption

and successful application of a capability approach in public policy discussion and decision

making about risk. Indicators in the context of risk are designed to track changes in capabil-

ities, so that we can understand the impact of a given hazardous scenario on a community.

One question concerns which indicators will be both representative of a capability and provide

information about the change in capabilities due to a hazard.

Another issue is that, unlike many current applications of the capability approach, indica-

tors in the context of risk must be predicted. With risks we are always dealing with future

possible states, not analyzing existing states as is the case with many current applications of the

capability approach. The basis on which an accurate and credible prediction of changes in

capabilities can be made must be determined and, in particular, whether current methods for

quantifying risks can be used for this purpose or whether novel methods for predictionmust be

developed. One method (Gardoni andMurphy 2010; Murphy and Gardoni 2010) is to forecast

the impact of future hazards by first assessing the impact of past disasters using available data.

The impacts of past disasters can then be used to estimate the likelihood of each potential

outcome ofHII for a given hazard type,H, of magnitude,M. Mathematically, such likelihood is

expressed as the conditional Probability Density Function (PDF), P HII H ;Mjð Þ, of HII forgivenH andM. Using the Total Probability Rule (Ang and Tang 2007), we can then estimate the


probability of future societal impacts accounting for their likelihood of occurrence integrating

out H and M, as

P HIIð Þ ¼Z

P HII H ;Mjð ÞP H ;Mð ÞdHdM

where P H ;Mð Þ is the joint PDF of H ;Mð Þ, which can be estimated for typical natural hazards

based on for example meteorological or seismological considerations for hurricanes and

earthquakes, respectively.

Further research is also required to determine whether, and to what extent, indicators for

selected capabilities must be either time-dependent or risk-dependent. With respect to time-

dependence, the issue is whether in trying to understand the long-term versus immediate

impact of a hazard the indicators must change.

The second general topic for further research concerns the place of capabilities within

a comprehensive framework of risk evaluation and risk management. One specific question for

further research is the place of a consideration of capabilities among the additional, diverse

moral considerations that a judgment of the acceptability of a risk must take into account.

The capability approach to risk developed to date provides an account of how the capabilities

dimension of risk should be evaluated, which reflects the fact that capabilities are constitutive

dimensions of individual well-being and that justice requires a minimum level of capabilities

be guaranteed for all individuals. However, the consequences of a hazardous scenario are not

the only factor that is relevant for risk evaluation purposes. It is well-established that the public

is concerned about and distinguishes among risks on the basis of the source of a risk, that is,

how a risk was brought about or created (Wolff 2006; Murphy and Gardoni 2011). The public

distinguishes among risks on the basis of whether they were created through negligence,

recklessness, and non-culpable behavior. Risks are also evaluated differently depending on

whether they were voluntarily taken or not. The distribution of benefits associated with taking

risks and the potential harm that may be realized should a hazardous scenario occur is morally

salient (Fischhoff et al. 1981; Slovic 2000; Asveld and Roeser 2009). One question for further

research then is: when evaluating a risk, onwhat basis should we weigh or take into consideration

the expected impact of a given risk on capabilities relative to the other moral factors that matter?

A second question centers on the broader implications of a capability approach for issues in risk

management. That is, if we conceptualize risks from a capability perspective, how should that

inform the principles that should guide the creation and regulation of risk? Consider techno-

logical risks. Should, for example, new technologies be permitted only insofar as it can be shown

that such technologies will enhance human capabilities? Should the design of technologies be

guided by a concern for capabilities? There are a number of authors working on extending the

capability approach to areas like design ethics (Oosterlaken 2009), information technology

(Johnstone 2007; Wresch 2007; Zheng 2007; Coeckelbergh 2010b) and AI technology in health

care (Coeckelbergh 2010a). Another question is whether it is necessary to adopt a capability

approach to design or to technology insofar as one adopts a capability approach to risk.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the reciprocal contributions of a capability approach

and risk theory. A capability approach can enrich risk theory in three ways: (1) The conse-

quences component of risk can be conceptualized and assessed in terms of the impact of


a hazardous scenario on capabilities; (2) Judgments of the acceptability of risks can be made on

the basis of whether certain threshold levels of capabilities aremaintained; (3) The primary aim

of risk management can be to protect and promote individuals’ capabilities, by prioritizing

unacceptable or intolerable risks and by selecting policy options on the basis of expected dollar

per unit change in the impact on capabilities. On the other hand, risk theory has enriched the

capability approach by (1) drawing attention to an important dimension of capability, namely

security; and (2) providing resources for developing a novel way to assess capabilities instead of

functioning. Further work is needed to make the capability approach to risk theory operatio-

nalizable and to clarify the place of a concern for capabilities in an overall perspective on risk

evaluation and management.

Acknowledgment

This research was supported primarily by the Science, Technology, and Society Program of the

National Science Foundation Grant (STS 0926025). Opinions and findings presented are those

of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor.

References

Anderson E (1988) Values, risks, and market norms.

Philos Public Aff 17(1):54–65

Ang AH-S, Tang WH (2007) Probability concepts in

engineering: emphasis on applications to civil and

environmental engineering. Wiley, New York

Asveld L, Roeser S (2009) The ethics of technological risk.

Earthscan, London

Bedford T, Cooke R (2001) Probabilistic risk analysis:

foundations and methods. Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge

Coeckelbergh M (2010a) Health care, capabilities, and AI

assistive technologies. Ethical Theory Moral Pract

13:181–190

CoeckelberghM (2010b) Human development or human

enhancement? A methodological reflection on

capabilities and the evaluation of information tech-

nologies. Ethics Inf Technol. doi:10.1007/s10676-

010-9231-9

Crocker D (2008) The ethics of human development.

Cambridge University Press, New York

Cullen A, Small MJ (2004) Uncertain risk management

choices in risk analysis and society. In: McDaniels T,

Small MJ (eds) Risk analysis and society: an inter-

disciplinary characterization of the field. Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, pp 163–212

Fischhoff B, Lichtenstein S, Slovic P, Derby SL, Keeney RL

(1981) Acceptable risk. Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge

Fukuda-Parr S, Kumar AKS (eds) (2003) Readings in

humandevelopment.OxfordUniversity Press,Oxford

Gardoni P, Murphy C (2009) A capabilities-based

approach tomeasuring the societal impacts of natural

and man-made hazards. Nat Hazard Rev 10(2):23–37

Gardoni P, Murphy C (2010) Gauging the societal

impacts of natural disasters using a capabilities

based approach. Disasters J Disaster Stud Policy

Manag 34(3):619–636

Haimes YY (2004) Risk modeling, assessment, and man-

agement, Systems Engineering and Management.

Wiley, Hoboken

Hansson SO (2007a) Philosophical problems in cost-

benefit analysis. Econ Philos 23:163–183

Hansson SO (2007b) Risk. Stanford encyclopedia of philos

ophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/. Accessed

23 March 2010

Hunter PR, Fewtrell L (2001) Acceptable risk. In: Fewtrell

L, Bartram J (eds) Water quality: guidelines, stan-

dards, and health. IWA, London, pp 207–227

Jahan S (2003) Evolution of the human development

index. In: Fukuda-Parr S, Shiva Kumar AK (eds)

Readings in human Development. Oxford Univer-

sity Press, Oxford, pp 128–139

Johnstone J (2007) Technology as empowerment: a

capability approach to computer ethics. Ethics Inf

Technol 9:73–87

Kaplan S, Garrick BJ (1981) On the quantitative defini-

tion of risk. Risk Anal 1:11–27

May P (2001) Organizational and societal consequences

for performance-based earthquake engineering.

PEER 2001/04, Pacific Earthquake Engineering

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/


Research Center, College of Engineering, University

of California–Berkeley, Berkeley

Murphy C, Gardoni P (2006) The role of society in

engineering risk analysis: a capabilities based

approach. Risk Anal 26(4):1085–1095

Murphy C, Gardoni P (2007) Determining public policy

and resource allocation priorities for mitigating nat-

ural hazards: a capabilities-based approach. Sci Eng

Ethics 13(4):489–504

Murphy C, Gardoni P (2008) The acceptability and the

tolerability of risks: a capabilities-based approach.

Sci Eng Ethics 14(1):77–92

Murphy C, Gardoni P (2010) Assessing capability instead

of achieved functionings in risk analysis. J Risk Res

13(2):137–147

Murphy C, Gardoni P (2011) Evaluating the source of the

risks associated with natural events. Res Publica

17(2):125–140

Nussbaum M (2000a) Aristotle, politics, and human

capabilities: a response to Antony, Arneson,

Charlesworth, and Mulgan. Ethics 111(1):102–140

Nussbaum M (2000b) Woman and human development:

the capabilities approach. Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge

Nussbaum M (2001) Adaptive preferences and women’s

options. Econ Philos 17:67–88

Oosterlaken I (2009) Design for development: a capabil-

ity approach. Des Issues 25(4):91–102

Pate-Cornell ME (1996) Uncertainties in risk analysis: six

levels of treatment. Reliability Eng Sys Safety

54:95–111

Raworth K, Stewart D (2003) Critiques of the human

development index: a review. In: Fukuda-Parr S,

Shiva Kumar AK (eds) Readings in human

development. Oxford University Press, Oxford,

pp 140–152

Robeyns I (2005) The capability approach: a theoretical

survey. J Hum Dev 6(1):93–114

Robeyns I (2006) The capability approach in practice.

J Polit Philos 14(3):351–376

Rowe WD (1980) Risk assessment: theoretical

approaches and methodological problems. In:

Conrad J (ed) Society, technology, and risk assess-

ment. Academic, New York, pp 3–29

Sen A (1989) Development as capabilities expansion.

J Dev Plan 19:41–58

Sen A (1992) Inequality reexamined. Harvard University

Press, Cambridge

Sen A (1993) Capability and well-being. In: Nussbaum

M, Sen A (eds) The quality of life. Clarendon,

Oxford, pp 30–53

Sen A (1999a) Commodities and capabilities. Oxford

University Press, Oxford

Sen A (1999b) Development as freedom. Anchor Books,

New York

Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Belknap Press of Har-

vard University Press, Cambridge

Slovic P (1987) Perception of risk. Science 236:280–285

Slovic P (2000) The perception of risk. Earthscan,

London

Sunstein C (2005) Cost-benefit analysis and the environ-

ment. Ethics 115:251–285

UNDP (United Nations Development Program)

(2000) Human development report 2000. Oxford

University Press, New York

UNDP (United Nations Development Program)

(2007) Human development report 2007. Oxford

University Press, New York

Vose D (2000) Risk analysis: a quantitative guide. Wiley,

New York

Wolff J (2006) Risk, fear, blame, shame and the regulation

of public safety. Econ Philos 22:409–427

Wolff J, de-Shalit A (2007) Disadvantage. Oxford Univer-

sity Press, Oxford

Wresch W (2007) 500 million missing web sites:

Amartya Sen’s capability approach and measures

of technological deprivation in developing coun-

tries. In: Rooksby E, Weckert J (eds) Information

technology and social justice. Information Science,

Hershey

Zheng Y (2007) Exploring the value of the capability

approach for E-development. Paper presented at the

9th international conference on social implications of

computers in developing countries, Sao Paulo

handbook of risk theory volume 176 || the capability approach in risk analysis

Documents