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1. Cristobal v. Labrador

Facts: Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and was punished with imprisonment, together with accessory penalties. While in prison serving sentence, his civil liability was condoned by the complainants. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued to be a registered voter and was seated as mayor of the municipality of Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code was approved, disqualifying him from voting for having been convicted of a crime against property. In view of this provision, he applied to the President for absolute pardon. The President granted the petition, restoring Santos to his “full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.”

Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the Santos from the list of voters in their precinct in Malabon on the ground that the latter is disqualified. The trial court declared that the pardon extended in favor of Santos had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification created by the New Election Code.

It is the Cristobal's contention that the pardon granted by the President to Santos, did not restore the latter to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.

Issue: What is the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the President by the Constitution? Whether this power extends to Santos’ restoration of his power to vote.

Held: Yes. It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,” it is absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.”

The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

2. Torres v. Gonzales

Facts: Sometime before 1979 Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75

On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.

On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa which cases were then pending trial, on 26 June

POLI Set 8 – Article VII Sec 19-21

1985, petitioner had been convicted of the crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC, on 14 January 1986 the NBI, showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes. So the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.

The respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Issue: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. NOPE

Held: In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, the Court said the determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due

process. This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. Thus:

[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.

In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the Court reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:

Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.


2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on this matter.

It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

3. Monsanto v. Factoran

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. They were sentenced to imprisonment and to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.

Monsanto’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 and the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, Monsanto wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the


crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

The Ministry of Finance referred Monsanto’s letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. Said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held that Monsanto was not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.

Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. (NO)

Held: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Therefore, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.

The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power

from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, Monsanto may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Finally, Monsanto has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Monsanto’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

4. Llamas v. Orbos

Facts: Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship. Mariano Un


Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency Ocampo.

Sometime in 1989, Llamas, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed a verified complaint against Ocampo before the then DLG charging him with alleged violation Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, Llamas filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified complainant against Ocampo for the latter's alleged viloation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The complaint before the DLG, docketed as Administrative Case 10459, was subsequently tried, where both LLamas and Ocampo presented their respective evidence.

LLamas maintains that in his official capacity as Provincial Governor Tarlac, Ocampo entered into and executed a Loan Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by Ocampo himself as chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan Agreement was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the provisions of the LGC; that the said Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not provide for interest or for any type security and it did not provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control the safe disbursement of said loan); that a total amount of P20M was disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation; that the transactions constitute a fraudulent scheme to defraud the Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is wholly unconstitutional, illegal, a immoral.

On the other hand, it is the contention of Ocampo that "the funds were intended to generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered the best alternative as a matter of judgment."; that he resigned from the said Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion that he would influence it; that it is not true that the Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial Government because

the Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise; and that the Agreement is not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial Government and respondent governor did not and would not profit thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment.

After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a decision against Ocampo with suspension for 90 days. Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive suspension but a penalty of suspension. Ocampo moved for a reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but the same was denied. Aggrieved, he appealed the DLG decision to the Office of the President. On February 26, 1991, Executive Secretary Orbos issued a Resolution dismissing Ocampo’s appeal and affirming theDLG decision.

Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, Llamas, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order, Llamas had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991), Ocampo moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which Llamas filed an opposition. From the allegations of the Llamas in his petition, Ocampo accepted his suspension and turned over his office to Llamas.

To the surprise of Llamas, however, Ocampo on March 19, 1991, issued an "administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter signified his intention to "(continue, as I am bound to exercise my functions as governor and shall hold office at my residence," in the belief that "the pendency of my Motion for Reconsideration precludes the coming into finality as executory the DLG decision." And, as categorically stated in the petition, the reassumption ceremony by Ocampo was held on May 21, 1991.

Without ruling on Ocampo’s MR, Orbos issued a Resolution, in O.P. Case No. 4480, which reads: This refers to the petition of Gov. Ocampo III of Tarlac for executive clemency, interposed in connection with the decision of the Secretary of then DLG as affirmed in a Resolution of this Office suspending Ocampo from office for period of 90 days upon the finality of said decision.


By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to LLamas.

LLamas posits that the issuance by Orbos of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," basically on the ground the executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. LLamas also contends that since Ocampo refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by Orbos of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by Ocampo, Orbos failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Llamas further alleges that the executive clemency granted by Orbos was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy" because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by Ocampo.

Issues 1. WON the grant of executive clemency is a political question beyond judicial review. (NO)

2. WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. (YES)

Held: 1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, SC will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., is very enlightening: Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern

themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts. xxx xxx xxx What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitute delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not men" — words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document.

Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec.


1, Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view"

In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

2. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to constitutional limitations. SC held that it will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, SC held that it will not concern their selves with the reasons or motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial review.

Llamas’ main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

Llamas, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an administrative case," allegedly because the word "conviction" refers only to criminal cases. Llamas, however, describes in his very own words, Ocampo as one who has been "convicted in an administrative case". Thus, Llamas concedes that the word "conviction" may be used either in a criminal case or in an administrative case. In Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan,: For misfeasance or malfeasance ... any [elective

official] could ... be proceeded against administratively or ... criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established ...

It is also important to note that Ocampo's MR filed on March 1, 1991 was withdrawn in his petition for the grant of executive clemency, which fact rendered the Resolution dated February 26, 1991 affirming the DLG Decision.

Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," SC cannot sustain Llamas’ view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so SC must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following Llamas’ proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, SC do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. The SC’s considered viewis that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive clemency in administrative cases.

Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service."

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: "However, the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation." The Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove the amendment,


since it was in derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr. Natividad stated:

I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers in our society ....

The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers.

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.

Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Section I, Book III of which provides: SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. ... (emphasis supplied)

The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive


clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan program."

SC wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, SC refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

Noteworthy is the fact that on March 1, 1991, Ocampo filed a motion for reconsideration and the same may be regarded as implicitly resolved, not only because of its withdrawal but also because of the executive clemency which in effect reduced the penalty, conformably with the power of "control."

On Llamas’ argument that Ocampo’s MR has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment in O.P. Case No. 4480 (that is, there being no final judgment to speak of, the pardon granted was premature and of no effect, SC reiterate the doctrine that upon acceptance of a presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Thus, it was held that:

The commutation of the penalty is impressed with legal significance. That is an exercise of executive clemency embraced in the pardoning power. According to the Constitution: "The President may except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. "Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to this appeal."

Consequently, Ocampo’s acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the MR and renders the subject decision final, that of the period already served.

Finally, Llamas’ argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is unmeritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private,

though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that Llamas was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. Besides, Llamas’ claim that Ocampo has not begun serve sentence is belied by his very own factual allegations in his petition, more particularly that he served as Acting Governor of Tarlac effective from the date he took his Oath of Office on February 28, 1991 up to the time Ocampo reassumed the governorship of Tarlac on May 21, 1991. It is, therefore, error to say that Ocampo did not serve any portion of the 90-day suspension meted upon him.

SC failed to see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction committed by Ocampo.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the President did not act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 15, 1991 Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to Ocampo and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional (without prejudice to criminal proceedings which have been filed or may be filed against Ocampo), and (2) DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition for being unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.

Separate Opinions

Justice Cruz: Dissenting Opinion: I concur in the result and would s the challenged resolution of May 18, 1991, on the basis only of the President's control power. I think the discussion of the pardoning power is unnecessary and may even be misleading as the ponencia itself says that it was not by virtue thereof that the private respondent's penalty was reduced. The correct approach, if I may respectfully suggest it, is to uphold the resolution solely on strength of the President's power of "control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices" under Article VII, Sect 17, of the Constitution. SC have held in many cases that a Cabinet member is an alter ego of the President whose acts may be affirmed, modified reversed by the latter in his discretion. What happened in this case was that President Aquino saw fit to amend the decision rendered by the Secretary of Local Government on September 21, 1990, by reducing 90-day suspension imposed on Gov. Ocampo. The President had the authority to do this, and she could exercise it through Executive Secretary. His act, not having been "reprobated


disauthorized" by her, is presumed to be the act of the Preside herself. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom of that act, on its legality. I believe the act is legal but reserve judgment on its wisdom.

Justice Padilla: Dissenting Opinion: I vote to grant the petition which seeks to annul the 15 May 1991 resolution of the Office of the President, for the reason that the Executive Secretary, presumably acting on behalf of the President, had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in granting executive clemency to private respondent Ocampo by reducing the 90-day suspension imposed upon him to the period he had already served. The administrative sanction of suspension imposed upon private respondent does not affect the criminal complaint also filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The administrative finding of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, as affirmed by the Office of the President, that Ocampo had committed neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority while in office, was not by virtue of a criminal proceeding. Thus, it cannot be said that there was a criminal conviction of the Ocampo by final judgment. Nor can it be said that the disciplinary action suspending private respondent is an execution and/or enforcement of the criminal laws of the land. Therefore, the President's power to grant executive clemency is not applicable or even relevant in the case at bar. The President, in the Constitution, has been delegated the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons "after conviction by final judgment". This power cannot be stretched even by fiction or imagination to include the authority to grant similar reprieves, commutations or pardons over sanctions in administrative proceedings. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to annul the resolution of the Executive Secretary dated 15 May 1991, as having been issued clearly in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse or discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

5. Drilon v. Court of Appeals

Facts: In 1973, Paredes and Ganzon were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34, from which Paredes was acquitted and Ganzon was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. Gazon served the sentence until he was placed under house arrest on March 25, 1978.

Ganzon later on joined KBL in 1985 as campaign manager and was granted pardon by President Marcos on January 27, 1986. In 1988,

upon change in administration, Justice Secretary Ordoñez ordered preliminary investigation on Paredes and Ganzon on the same charge of double murder. They filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of acquittal and absolute pardon, respectively. However, their motion was denied.

Issues: W/N the Government may proceed criminally despite the verdict of Military Commission No. 34. (No)W/N Ganzon has completed service of his sentence. (Yes)W/N Ganzon has been pardoned. (Unnecessary to consider)

Held:

1. No. Nullity of the sentence can only be done upon showing of serious denial of Constitutional rights of the accused. Since neither Paredes and Ganzon nor the State allege Constitutional violation, a retrial or reinvestigation cannot be reordered.

2. Yes. Those tried by military commissions have the option to complete their sentence or be tried anew by civil courts. Ganzon obviously chose to serve his sentence fully, although it was converted to house arrest. Thus, he cannot be reinvestigated.

3. Unnecessary to consider. The pardon awarded to Ganzon is irrelevant upon acceptance that his sentence has been commuted or reduced by Marcos. The Constitution renders the commutation of Ganzon’s sentence final and unappealable and makes the absolute judgment unnecessary to consider.

6. USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer of the Philippines

Facts: This case concerns the Romulo-Synder Agreement, Usaffe Veterans (Filipino members of World War II, ex-members of the US Armed Forces in the Far East) prayed that the Agreement be annulled and payments there under be declared illegal and that the Philippine Republic be restrained from disbursing funds from the National Treasury in pursuance of the Agreement. The money, instead should be transferred to the Finance Service of the AFP for payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented.

Plaintiff forwarded 3 propositions: a) Funds to be ‘returned’ under the agreement were funds appropriated by the US Congress for the Phil. Army actually delivered to the Phil. Government and owned by said


Government b) US Secretary Snyder of Treasury ad no authority to retake the funds from the Philippine Government, c) Phil. Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called Agreement.

Plaintiffs attempt to block repayment because many alleged claims of veterans have not been processed and paid, having been fixed as the deadline for the presentation and/or payment of such claims. Plaintiff calculates that if the return is prevented and the money kept ere, it might manage to persuade the powers-that-be to extend the deadline anew. Hence, the two-pronged attack: No obligation to pay & The officers who promised to repay had no authority.

Issue: W/N the Romulo-Snyder Agreement

Held: The first ground is proven untenable. The first Congreesional Act of 1941 (Public Law 353) appropriated 269-million available for to the Philippine Government either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs. It is undeniable that upon a final rendition of accounts by the Philippine Government, a superabit resulted of at least 35 million dollars in favor of the US. Instead of returning such amount in one lump sum, our Executive Department arranged for its repayment in ten annual installments.

As to the second, no doubt President Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had power to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No. 213, amending Republic Act No. 16. The most important argument, hover rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by the Senate of the Philippines to make it binding on this Government.

The agreement is not a ‘treaty‘ as the term is used. It was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. However, it must be noted that a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international relations. In the point of view of international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.

Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) Agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or

without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into tin pursuance of acts of Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreement.

The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under these two classes for the Congress specifically authorized the President of the Philippine to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the US Government.

Even granting, that there was no legislative authorization, it is thereby maintained that the Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely ‘agreements relating to te settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens.’

7. Gonzales v. Hechanova

Facts: Respondent Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee. Petitioner, Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of a planters’ association, filed this prohibition with prelim injunction alleging that respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Respondents Hechanova allege that the Government has already entered into 2 contracts for the Purchase of Rice with Vietnam and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law and became binding effective upon the signing of representative parties; and that the contracts have already been consummated and the Government already paid the price of the rice.

Issues1) WON the contracts with Vietnam and Burma are valid2) WON petitioner has legal standing3) WON prohibition on rice importation applies to Government itself

Held:1) NO. The contracts are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President


may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws .

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts—the Court said Yes. Our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security — predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

2) YES, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest.

3) YES. Respondent Hechanova allege, that provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit because the importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the Philippines,” hence on behalf of the Government.

Further, the restrictions imposed in the Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Under the provision of the Commonwealth Act, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government.

-- SC held: Executive Secretary has no power to authorize the importation in question.

8. Vinuya v. Romulo

Facts: Petitioner s to file a claim against the Japanese officials responsible for the atrocities done during WWII, specifically against the comfort women stations. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issues: 1. W/N the officials acted in GADLEJ when they refused to espouse the claims of petitioner?


2. W/N the officials had the obligation to espouse the claims of petitioner before the International Court of Justice?

Held: 1. The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioner’s claim against Japan. The current issue involves a political question. In Tañada v. Cuenco, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." One category of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. Though not all cases involving foreign relations present political questions, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. Here, the Executive has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. Further, it cannot be argued that the Philippine government was not without authority to negotiate the treaty of Peace with Japan. Since the Treaty of Japan wipe out the underlying private claims of petitioner; thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law, petitioners thus cannot seek for reparation The Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

2. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims. In the international sphere, what is being asserted is the state’s rights and not the individual’s right. The only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf through the state’s exercise of diplomatic protection. The exercise of the state’s discretion is within the absolute discretion of the state. The ICJ held in Barcelona Traction that a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.Further, petitioner’s cannot insists that the State has the duty and an underlying obligation to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. Even if the acts are morally reprehensible, the Philippines has no obligation to prosecute international crimes since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability but seek monetary reparations from the State of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan.


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