TALCOn PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORYCONSTRUCTIONJUERGEN H A B E R M A S

ABSTRACT

According to Professor Habermas, Parsons's later system para-digm is in conflict, to some extent, with his earlier action paradigm, asMenzies contended; but Parsons concealed the conflicts from himself,Habermas thinks, and retained his "cultural determinism" and "secretidealism." According to Habermas, Parsons lacked any adequate equiv-alent of the concept of a "life world" built up on the basis of inter-subjective communication. Parsons's unrealistic assumption of harmonybetween actors' orientations on the one hand and functional require-ments of systems on the other prevented him, according to Habermas,from seeing what Marx for example saw, namely that in modem society-the symbolic life worlds of actors suffer distortion because of their sub-ordination to the rationalizing tendencies of money and power. (Pro-fessor Habermas did not provide an abstract for this translation of hisaddress on Parsons, which he delivered to the German SociologicalAssociation in 1980. Readers are urged to regard this abstract as onlysuggestive and as inadequately reflecting a complex argument.—^Editor.)

Talcott Parsons died on the 8th of May last year [1979] in Munich.His death came a few days after a cedle)quium in Heidelberg (Schluchter,1980), given em the exxasion erf the reissuance erf his dex;toral degree. TheGerman Sociole>gical Association Council has asked me to talk abenit Parsons.It serves a discipline well to honor one erf its members who even while stillliving had attained the status of a classic.

No one of his contemporaries developed a theory of se>dety erf com-parable complexity. An intellectual autobiography, published by Parsons in1974 (Parsons, 1977:22ff), gives us a first impression erf the perseveranceand the cumulative results of efforts that this scientist devoted to the con-struction of eme theory over the course erf more than fifty years. With regardto its level of abstraction, its complexity, theoretical sce)pe, systematicity, andgroimeling in the literature of relevant branches erf research his publishedwork simply has no competitor to this time. Furthermore, no one else ame>tigthe prexiuctive theorists of sex:iety has conducted a continuing eiebate withthe classics erf our eiiscipline with equal intensity and persistence in eirderto build on received tradition. One need not share Parsons's (1937) con-viction that cemvergence among the great theoretical traditions itself consti-tutes prexrf of the validity of his own approach to building theewy. But his

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very ability to work through and incorporate the best traditions into his ownapproach remains eloquent testimony of the power of theories of societywhich are aimed at the establishment of one particular paradigm groundedin the collective everyday consciousness erf society itself. Throughout hislife. Parsons relied on the theoretical work of Durkheim, Weber, and Freudas one frame of reference that controlled his own efforts. But that meant notonly that he continuemsly distinguished his own approach from empiricism,it also amounted to maintaining his distance from Marx and Mead, from amaterialist as well as a pragmatic mode of theory construction inspired bythe critical tradition erf Kant and Hegel.' In addition, one fact remainsrather puzzling: the influence of Whitehead on the early work and rathervague references to Kant in the last writings (Parsons, 1978) aside,' thistheorist and ecumenical intellectual par excellence remained rather alexrf fromphilosophy. Nonetheless, any theoretical work in sociology today that failedto take account erf Talcott Parsons could not be taken seriously.

But we also face a danger about this man, one who became "a classiceven during his lifetime." I refer to the danger of a premature judgment,one that rejects Parsons before even coming to know his work, to say noth-ing erf comprehending it. Interest in Parsons's theory has declined since themiddle 1960s, both in the United States and in our country. His moreanthropologically oriented later writings have been pushed to the sidelineserf prerfessional effort due to an interest in phenomenological, ethnomethodev-logical, and critical approaches to research and theory building. Only fouryears ago the impressive twe)-volume Parsons Festschrift appeared (Loubseret al, 1976). But already at that time the inner circle of students who hadaccompanied the master to his speculations abenit the foundations of thehuman condition had shrunk to a sect. Merre recently we witness a returnof very serious interest in his work. Let us he)pe that this is more than justa reaction to his death.

If I understand the intentions of those who planned this cemventioncorrectly, the plenary sessions are to serve eme main purpose: to workagainst a widespread weariness with theory, to turn around jaded minds byrekindling interest in questions about the theory of society. That is why Ishould like to address one pre)blem in Parsons's theory, and one that displayswell the inner dynamics oi his theewetical development over time. That pr<^lem is the paradigm-tension between actiem theory and system theory in hiswork. The most important problem erf theory ce>nstruction for Parsons wasthe further development erf action thee>ry towards a conceptual systemmodeled on a thee>ry erf boundary-maintaining systems. He had alreadydevel(^d a ccmceptual scheme for the description of e)bject-oriented socialaction befe»'e he encountered the cybernetic mexiel in the later 1940s, amodel which invited a reformulation of social science functionalism. Incontrast to many system theorists of the younger generatimi, Parsems couldnever fall prey to tiie seduction of simply confusing the entities that consti-tute "action" or "society" with the application erf the system mcxlel to these

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 175

entities. Interesting, indeed, is the tension that remains between the twoparadigms to the later writing (Menzies, 1976). The more errthodea erf hisstudents simply deny the existence of a tension. The less orthodox seek toresolve it, either in "a forward direction," as it were, toward the developmentof an independent system functionalism, or "backward" by a recoupling erfthe theory to petitions of neevKantianism (Alexander, forthcenning). Tobegin with, permit me to explain why I regard this tensiem between the twoparadigms as highly instructive.

Parsons's basic question is the classic eme: How is sexiety as anordered set of related actions pe)ssible at all? The answer must be fenmdthrough coming to understand the problem erf the coordination erf actiems.What kind of mechanisms relate alter's actions to the>se of ego in such amanner that conflicts that might threaten the relatedness of their actions areeither avoided or at least sufficiently cemtrolled to maintain that relateelness?In general, we elistinguish two kinds of such mechanisms erf integratiem. Onekind, the mechanisms of social integratiem, are based on action orientations;another, the mechanisms erf system integration, operate with orientations toaction but achieve their effects through the consequences of actiem. In theformer case, action is integrated through conscienis mutuality in the actiemorientations of the parties concerned. In the latter case, action is integratedthrenigh a fimctional coupling of the consequences erf action to each e>ther,consequences that may remain latent or beyemd the conscious horizon ofthe actiem orientations of the acte rs involved. In short, Parsems postulatestwo kineis of integrative mechanisms. Sexial integration results from norma-tive consensus among the participants. System integratiem is based on thenon-normative regulatiem erf the action prexess that serves system mainte-nance. The orientatiem of the acting subject to values and norms is cemsti-tutive of the social-integrative production of order but not erf its system-integrative aspect.

The "invisible hand of the market" could serve as a mexld erf systemintegration. It was an anemymous mechanism prexiucing order. Our knowl-edge erf this integrative mechanism dates from the 18th century when pe^ticaleconomists made "the econemiy," an entity that had differentiated out olthe larger political order, the e>bject of scientific scrutiny. Since that timewe face a pre)blem imknown to natural law phile»e^hy and its doctrines.How are the two mechanisms erf the integratiem erf action related to eachother? What is the relatiemship between sex;ial integration, based as that iscm the cemsciousness erf acte>rs who share a commem "life-world" {Lebens-welt), and system integration, that other kind erf mechanism, denng its we rksilently, e>ver and above the conscieMis orientatiem erf the actors inverfved? Inhis phile)se)phy of law Hegel gave us one answer, eme that pexited an idealisttransformation of subjective to objective spirit Marx with his value theoryerf labor gave us ane>dter answer, one that tried to cemnee t the anemymenisself-regulating mechanisms of a market yielded by ecemomic analysis withthe results erf a historical sode^ogy dealing with "life-world" structured

17( QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

relations of actions em the part of historical actors of an individual or col-lective kind. By now both of these strategies to solve the problem have losttheir plausibility. In Parsons's opus, we are confronted with system theoryand action theory as disjointed members of a Hegel-Marx theoretical legacy.An older German sociolopcal tradition, one inspired by Dilthey, Husserl,and (through Max Weber) one directly connected to Southwest Germanneo-Kantianism (Habermas, 1970:7Iff.) provides a catalogue of basic con-cepts developed in action-theoretical perspective. But at the same time thefoundations of an economic theory were developed, which adopted a con-ception of an instrumental order from Hobbes and the Utilitarians. And thisperspective was elaborated further into a conception of a system regulatedby the monetary medium.

Since that time, the theory of sexriety is burdened with a certain compe-tition between the two paradigms. And both paradigms have their particularmethodological consequences. On the one hand, the action-theoretical para-digm is based on the intuitive social knowledge of the actors involved. Itpresents us with an internal perspective of a symbolically structured, and soinherently meaningful "life-world." The system-theoretical paradigm, on theother hand, presents us with an external perspective, one that seeks to com-prehend the counter-intuitive regularities of action prcxxsses productive oisocial order in their own ways. These methodole>gical orientations alsoprejudice the very questions ihe theorist raises abcnit his subject matter(Bernstein, 1976). Since Max Weber we have accustwned ourselves toUiink about pre>cesses of me)demization in terms erf the rationalization ofaction. But a theory of modem society loses immediately its normativeimplications and, indeed, any kind of relevance for the self-understanding oimodem men and wemien as soon as questions of the rationality of actionorientations and "life-worid" structures are transformed into, and therebysacrificed to, quite different questions, namely those regarding the self-steering capacity of rationalized action systems.

It is possible to regard the histe>ry of social theeny since Marx as aprocess of the bifurcation of two paradigms. These two, systems and "life-world," cannot be integrated any me«:e into a two-step conception of society.Instruments for critical normative reflection, as fe>r example the concept erfideology, Ie>se their power because we cannot devele>p a metatheoretical frameof reference of sufficient complexity within the lhnits erf one oi the nowdivided paradigms. And that is why it remains highly instructive for us tolearn how the two historical lines of theory development re-converge inParsons's work. Given the perspective just presented, I should like to tracePars(»is's theoretical development and {H-esent and defend three theses:

—Vint, the acticm-theoretical frame of reference is too namm to permitthe development of the concept "society" in action-theoretical perspec-tive; and that is why Paixms is forced to represent action rtlatlonsdirectly as systems d action and why he has to retocrf his theory of

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society from a primary reliance on the basic concepts of action to thoseof system theory.

—Second, in connection with his turning to system theory. Parsons had toreinterpret action theory, though not without reservations. The Par-sonian variant of system functionalism remained tied to a theory olculture emerging from the work of Durkheim, Freud, and, above all.Max Weber.

—^Third, the theory oi modem society that Parsons developed within thisframework suggests, in general outline, an image of harmony becauseit lacks the tools for plausible explanations of pathological patterns ofdevelopment.

In the following, I shall comment only briefly on the last two of thesetheses (see 4 and 5). My main effort is geared to establish the first thesis.In pursuit of this I shall (1) consider the action theoretical design of 1937and its particular problem of theory construction that forces one to recastthe theory; then (2) I shall comment on the significance of the patternvariables in the 1951 version of the theory; and this in turn will show (3)why Parsons had to abandon this second version of action theory in favorof system functionalism.

(1) In his first major work. The Structure of Social Action, Parsons(1937) developed the foundations of a normativist theory of action in adebate with empiricist traditions. He criticized the latter from two directions.On the one hand, he analyzed the concept means-end rational action inorder to show that the UtUitarians could not ground the actor's freedom ofchoice; and on the other, he concentrated on the concept of an instrumentalorder in order to demonstrate that the question of how social order is pos-sible at all could not be sdv&d with the use of empiricist presuppositions(Hobbes's problem of order). Focusing on the two central concepts, theunit act and the action system. Parsons showed how the two perspectivesturn into warring factions that both miss the boat: If you work mihrationalist and empiricist conceptions of action, you cannot account for theautonomy oi the actor; if you work with materialist OT idealist conceptionsof order, you cannot account for the legitimacy of an order based ultimatelyon the pursuit of interests. In light of these considerations Parsons devel*oped his concepts of voluntarist action (a) and normatively groundedorder (b).

(a) Following Weber, Parsons used the structure of the means'Cndrational act as a guide for the tmalysis of the concept action. He focusedon the general characteristics of the smallest possible unit act. This teleo-lo^cal model of action includes an actor who selects goals as "future states,"some state in the future towards which the actor strives. The "situaticm" ismade up of elements some of which the actor regards as under his control;others be regards as beyond his control. The former are means to the actOT;tile latter are conditions. The choice among alternative means rests oa cer-tain ground rules of action. The chdce among alternative goals that (ire pot

178 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THE<»tY

just contingent is possible by virtue e>f orientati(» to values and oorms.Both of these are treated by Parsems in terms of "normative standards."Thus Parsems analyzed the elementary unit act wiih the concept actionorientation, which he ascribed to an actor in a situation.

This action theoretical frame of reference has a number oi in^xntantimplicatie»s. The mexiel implies not only that an acteyr possesses certaincognitive abilities. It also implies that an actor can make normativelyoriented decisions (che>osing among alternatives). Further, the concept"situaticm" implies that means and cemditions can be meaningfully interpretednot only from the perspective erf the actor himself but also from the pointot view erf the e>bserver, who studies the actor. This excludes that kind tAe>bjectivism inherent iti behavioristic ex natural-science-inspired cemceptionserf action. Finally, the fact that actiem takes time is used by Parsems toassign to it two meanings. With respect to both, action is a process <rf goalattainment relative to normative standards. Seen from the perspective erfgoal attainment, action calls for the expenditure of effort, an expenditurerewarded by satisfactiem, intrinsic or extrinsic (the me)tivatioQaI dimensiem:instrumental/consummatory). Seen from the perspective erf ementation tonormative standards and their observance, action diminishes the gap betweenthe "is" and the "ought," between the realms of facticity and those of values,ot between the conditions erf a ^ven situation and the value and newm-structured orientatiems of the acte>r (the ontological elimensiem: conditions/nemos), ^parently, this last menticmed implicatiem, the idea that actioncalls tot the expenditure erf moral effort, derives fremi the "ve)iuntarism" ofthe actiem frame of reference. But Parsems cannert ex^dain this feature aslemg as he sticks to the analysis <rf the unit act.

(b) Let me turn now to the pre>blem of order. Parsems answered thequestiem how sexiety is pe>ssiUe at all with reference to the normative regu-lation erf interpersonal relations. Such normative integration demandsreverence fen: ttiat men'al authority upcm which the binding character erfcollectively shared norms for action rests. Critical here remained Durkheim'sdistinction between external, causal, and internal, moral constraint. As le-gards the actor, he has made that constraint so much a part e>f his per-semality that it no longer amfremts him as an external feyrce but guides himthrough his motives. Parsons endeavored to recast Kant's idea ci freedemias ohcditDce to self-impe)sed laws in sexiedogical format. CMtical in thatformulation are the symmetrical relatiems between the authority oS acknowl-edged norms that confront the actor and the self-directiem anchored in hispersonality, or the correspondence between the institutiemalizatiem and theintemallzatiem of values. This femnulatiem reveals the two-sided characterof the idea ot freedemi, a hetdom. ccmstituted in the persand acknowledge-ment of commitment to impersonal laws.

What Durkheim designated as the matal authenity erf an enxler, MaxWeber refened to as its legitimacy. But legitimate orders not emly r^re-sent vahies; they also int^rate values with positioa-related interests. Paisons

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conceives of normatively guided action as a process of the implementationof values under conditions of a factud nature; in any legitimate order valuesare already selectively related to extant position-related interests.

Now in retrospect, it would appear inviting to relate the concept olacticm, on the one hand, and that of order, on the other, in ccHnplementaryfashion to each other. A concept normative consensual mutuality could haveserved as a bridge between the concept value-oriented rational umt act andthat of an order constituted of values integrated with position-related inter-ests. Then Parsons's binary interpretations erf yes/no responses among theinteraction partners, which involve value consensus and the acknowledge-ment of norms, would have become the focal point (A analysis. Instead oiconcentrating on the means-goals structure of the unit act, primary attentionwould have been given to language-contingent consensus formation as thatmechanism which coordinates or makes mentally compatible the goals of aplurality ol actors, thereby making social interacticm possible in the firstplace. However, Parsons did not take this route of analysis. While he didwage a valiant war against the empiricist traditions. Parsons also remamedtheir prisoner. The individualist pdnt of departure (working off the imitact) in a theory dt action explicitly oriented to the teledogic^ character oi.action gave the whde a highly individualist cast. Parsons did ccmceive ofgoal-oriented action as constrained by value standards and their correspcmd-ing value orientation. But in the last analysis the single unit act of an iso-lated actor remains the critical building block. I should like to comment alittie more on this, his first critical decision for theory construction, in lightof the alternative just mentioned.

Proceeding from the monadic actor, Pars(»is sought the conceptualbridge connecting the imit act with the relations between acts in a fashionthat thought of elementary interaction as con^posed of two acton and theiroriginally independentiy constructed imit acts. The single action-cmentaticmremains the point of departure for the analysis of interaction. That singleaction-orientation is the result of contingent decisions between alternatives.Relevant value orientations express the fact that correqxmding preferencesfor values related to one of the given alternatives already exist Now, sincethe regulative power of cultural values does not alter the contingency ofdecisions, any interaction entered into by any two actors is characterized by"double contingency" (Parsons, 1951a:36). This double contingency i^aysa role in theory construction. It produces a proUem, and one with the si2eoi a functional in^rative. Double contingency means that effort must beexpended to create order. This is so because dout^ conting^Ky is a manelementary building block in the logical constructimi of interacti(» than arethe action-coordinating elements ot order. Analytically, value standards aretreated as a property of the unit act in the sense of an actor who is subjec-tively committed to observe them. Consequentiy, in interaction value stan-dards need to be made con^tiUe in an intersubjectivdy understood way.

180 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

This way of approaching the problem contrasts sharply with the conceptof vahies as already intersubjectively shared culture. And it is the contrastbetween the two approaches that produces our problem for theory construc-tion here. How can Parsons connect his monadic unit act with the concepterf shared and intersubjectively understoexl culture, which he borrowed fromDurkheim? Had Parsons put ihost interpretation efforts of his two inter-acting actors that make the construction of consensus possible at the coreof his concept of serial action, the pre)blem may well have lent itself to anadequate solution. After all, language-contingent prex:esses of arriving atsome understanding do require—and with the force of conceptual necessity—some intersubjectively shared traditions, above all else conmionly sharedvalue-commitments. The context to which any text pewnts can then servein the mexiel as the that that creates ordet. The problem of order thatresults from the postulate of a denibly contingent relation between two actorsboth of whom are capable of decision making [with respect to selecting goalsand means (translator)] could then be solved in this model via orientationsto the bindingness of norms that in turn are designed in terms of intersub-jective validity.

Yes/no responses to the imposition of nemnative claims on actors donot originate from some contingent freedom e>f choice. They have theirorigin in the moral-practical convictions e>f the actors involved. At leastimplicitly, such responses are based on the compelling power of soundreason [having gexxl reasems to agree or elisagree (translator)]. However,if one first treats action-oriented decisions as an emergent of the privatearbitrariness of isolated actors, as Parsons did, then one deprives oneself ofa mechanism that cenild explain the emergence ot a system of action out ofunit acts.' It is this embarrassment that sheds some light on the rearrange-ments of action theory, as evident in the two 1951 publications. The SocialSystem, and Toward a General Theory of Action.

(2) During this time, the early middle perie>d e>f his work. Parsons nolonger confined himself to conceiving erf the unit act in terms of cemceptsdescribing the orientations of a s i n ^ actor in his situation. Instead, heattempted to treat the concept action ementation as a joint interactive prod-uct of culture, society, and personality (Parsons, 195la:3-23; 1951b:53-109). He prex;eeded to analyze the concept action orientation fremi aperspective that asked what these three could contribute to the pre>ductionof a concrete actiem. As a result, the acten' becomes an agency, an agencypropelled by me>tivational forces and controlled by values at the same time.The personality system participates in actiem orientations bringing to bearthe forice of me>tives; the se>cial system participates in action orientatiemsbringing into play normative orientatiems.

In the interim Parsons had been influenced by Freud's theory of per-sonality and Malinowski's cultural anthre^logy. These also altered histheoretical perspectives. Under their influence Parsons began to constructhis theory with the concept culture. Patterns of value-orientations now

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTTRUCTION 181

became that part of culture of direct relevance for the constituents of actionsystems. These value patterns make up the raw material. InsUtutionalizationtransforms this material into legitimate role expectations, and intemalizationtransforms it into personal motives or character-formed dispositions to act.In this fashion Parsons conceptualized the two action systems [personalityand society (translator)] as mutually complementary channels through whichcultural values become transformed into motivated action.

This procedure alone raises an interesting question: How can one Iitikup these three concepts of order—culture, social, and personality system—with the concept action, a concept from which in turn these three could notbe developed? It is important to realize that the three orders culture, society,and personality were first introduced simply as "systems" in a quite unspe-cific sense of that term. Without that realization one catmot adequatelygrasp the problem for theory construction inherent in the question justraised. Parsons's work under consideration here is still one where he stuckto the notion that the action frame of reference made it possible to viewsociety as a whole as made up of ordered sets of related tinit acts.

Thus, permit me once again to use the concept "action oriented to amutual understanding" as a contrast to the unit act. We can use here aconcept current in phenomenological and hermeneutic schoc^s of thought.I refer to the conceptualization of society as a "life-world" (Lebenswelt) /We can use this concept in complementary fashion to another, namely iheconcept oi communicative action. Proceeding along this path, we can cometo conceive of culture, society, and personality as resources for action-coordinated processes that produce understandings. After all, the certaintiesof the "life-world" do not have only the status of taken-for-granted contextpresuppositions. The competence of societalized individuals and the sdi-darity of groups integrated by values and norms constitute that very contextof the "life-world" in a fashion quite similar to received cultural traditionsthat one knows without noticing that one knows them. The concept "life-world" has two strategically important advantages. On the one hand, it isa promising tocA to answer the question oi the determinants of action oriea-tations. If we analyze the formal properties of the accomplishments of inter-pretation on the part of actors who orient their actiotis toward each other bymeans of communicative action, it should be possible to show how ctilturidtraditions, institutional orders, and the competencies c^ personalities bringabout commtmicative integration and stabilization of action systems in theform of diffuse taken-for-granted understandings of their "life-world." Onthe other hand, the notion that the symbolic structures of the "life-worldf'are only reproduced through communicative action is also a useful totd. Itcan serve us as a guide for a probably fniitftil analysis of the relations fre-tween culture, society, and personality. If we find out just how the samemechanism of accomplishing understandings is used in different ways in thereproduction of culture, in social integration, and in socialization, the natureof the interdependencies between the three components of the "life-world"should become clear to us.

182 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACnON THEORY

Since Parsons neglected the mechanism of accomplishing understandingsin the architecture of his action theory, he had to seek an equivalent iotthe cemcept "life-world" on the basis of different premises. Following upon his first decision in theory construction, which gave primacy of place tothe actor's value-oriented decision to choose among action alternatives, hehad to develop cemceptual tools that could elucidate how action orientationsemerge from the interrelations between culture, society, and personality. Andit is for this purpose that he introduced the so-called "pattern variables ofvalue orientation" (Parsons, 1951a:58ff.; 1951b:78). With that Parsonsmade a second important decision for theory construction. Cultural valuesfunction as templates for the choice between actioa orientatiems. They de-termine the orientations of an actor in that they prescribe preferences with-out touching on the contingency of the decision. Parsons claimed that fiveproblems must be faced in any action situation. And he claimed that anyactor is inevitably confronted with these problems in a manner that compelshim to cope with them by making a binary, schematized, general, andabstract choice between alternatives. In a certain sense, then. Parsonsascribed some transcendental "power" to the pattern variables. Any actionorientation should be conceived as the resultant of simultaneous decisionsbetween exactiy five general and inevitable alternatives. You will not dis-cover even a trace of deduction from more general principles in this enter-prise. The catalogue of problems and the corresponding table of alternativesderives a certain evidence instead from the Gemeinschajt-Gesellschaft con-trast intre>duced by Toennies. The pattern variables are posited on dimen-sions of the processes of the rationalizatiem of society upon which an oldersociole>gy conceptualized the transition from traditional to modem societies.Parsons (1977:41ff.) himself draws our attention to i t

At any rate, use of the pattem-variaUes is suppe>sed to help us examinehow any kind of cultural values structure the actor's freedom of choicethrough a priori determined possible combinations of fundamental decisions.Further, the preference pattems described in terms erf the pattem variablesserve as the structural common core that connects the action orientation ne>tonly with a received cultural tradition but also with society and personality.For example, the complex of instrumental activism illustrates the point.Parsons (1938) observed this complex on the part erf American businessmenand i^ysidans. It is a value complex based on fundamental decisions foraffective neutrality, universalism, achievement orientation, and a specificce>gnitive style that works for or transcends different subject matters. Thecomplex is present on three levels simultaneously. One finds it in struc-turaUy analogous motives for action, occupatiemal roles, and cultural values.But such a description hardly solves the problem at hand; we still do notknew herw to aHiceive of the relationships between culture, society, andpersonality.

If pattem variables describe a structural core common to all three[of action, viz. culture, society, and personality (translator)],

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 183

then they cannot serve at the same time to exi^ain specific differences inthe ways in which personality, society, and culture affect acticm orientations.A very general notion that contingent decisions are regulated by preferencesdoes not by itself give us perspectives from which to examine the differen-tiation of the motivational base of action, its commitment to norms, and itsorientation to cultural values. We can use the pattern variables to identifythe area oi overlap or mutual interpenetration of the three systems. But thevery metaphor here gains meaning for theory construction only after <me hasdiscovered one's failure of developing a concept society that is adequatelycompatible with a concept of action as value-regulated teleological action.And returning to my first thesis, let me state: Parsons's concept of actiondoes not yield a concept oi society.

What is missing is a concept analogous to the mechanism of acc(Hn-plishing understandings. Parsons's actor sits there in his free space ofdecision-making regulated by preference patterns. But he does not respondto the latitude for choice left him with the achievement of interpretations.The model does not permit initiatives that we could study in order to dis-cover how the various resources oi the "life-world"—such as achievedcompetencies, shared and respected norms, and received cultural knowl-edge—are brought tc^ether to form a reservoir that the participants in inter-action use to build up shared action orientations. Without the conceptualbridge of a "life-world" centered in communicative action culture, society,and personality simply fall apart. And it is precisely for this reas<»i thatParsons proceeded to postulate that these three orders are systems in theirown right, and systems that affect each other in unmediated fashion bypartial interpenetration. In other words. Parsons abandoned trying to explainin action-theoretical terms the notion that cultural values enter society andpersonality via institutionalization and intemalization, respectively. Insteada model of mutually interpenetrating but analytically separate systems gainsa central position on his theoretical stage.

(3) Giving greater precision to the concept system, a term used hithertorather loosely, constituted Parsons's third important decision in theory con-struction. Until the early 19S0s the term system did not denote much morethan some ordered set of elements with a tendency to preserve what structureit had. In his contribution to The General Theory of Action he introducedthe first and hardly noticeable revisions in his structural functionaiism. Hebegan to characterize action systems with the basic conceptual tools atgeneral systems theory. Special importance is given to the idea that systemshave to secure their existence under conditions of a variable and over-complex envircMiment which they only partially control. In system func-tionaiism the ccmcepts "functicm" and "structure" can no longer be handledon the same level. The functional imperatives of a boundary-maintainingsystem have to be managed with structure and process. Under certain coo-diticMis structure and process may serve as functional equivalents for eachother (Parsons, 1970:35).

184 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

To begin with, this more strict conceptualization of the term systemis applied only to sex;iety and personality. In contrast, the curiously free-floating "system" of transferable cultural meanings forms a coherent entityonly in the widest i>ossible sense of the term "grammatical." At best, thisis a "system" in terms of the structuralism of a Saussure or L6vi-Strauss.When Parsons referred to "the structure" of a value system, what he had inmind was the order erf the internal relations among its meaning components.But he did not have in mind that order manifest in external relations, as forexample functional relations between the empirical components of an actionsystem identifiable in time and space (Parsons, 1951b: 176).

This twe>-fold meaning of the term system characterized Paisons'sambivalent way of connecting Weber's concept of value implementation orvalue realization with the concept of a boundary-maintaining system adoptedfrom cybernetics. The special place of culture vis-a-vis the empirical actionsystems made it possible for Parsons to introduce the neevKantian dualismof values and facts into his system functionalism. This value-theoreticalbarrier separates Parsons's from Luhmann's system functionalism. An extantsystem is always defined by a set of cultural values, manifest in the institu-tional orders of sexiety, or in the motivational bases of personality. Sincesuch values come from the cultural system and, to fe>rmulate it sharply, sincethe latter belongs to a sphere other than the struggle for survival, such valuesgenerate some identity-defining power that counteracts the highest systemimperative: to abandon any particular kind of arrangement in the serviceof survival.

This is evident in the two basic problems that se>cieties and personalitieshave to solve once they are conceived as culturally structured boundary-maintaining systems. On the eme hand, they have to manage the functiemalimperatives that arise from limitations in their environment. On the e>therhand, they have to integrate and maintain their identity-conferring patternsthat result from the institutionalization and intemalization of values. Par-sons deals with the two tasks separately. An action system has to maintainits identity or integrity of meaning in two directions, externally and intemal-ly. The analogous functions are identified in terms erf "allocation" and"integratiem" (Parsems, 1951a:114ff.; 1951b: 108ff.). Allocation refers toaelaptatiem and goal-attainment functioning and hence to the creation, me>bi-lizatiem, distribution, and effective use erf scarce resenirces. In this cemnec-tion Parsons emphasized over and over again the restrictions ot time, ofspace, erf nature, and erf the organic basis erf human nature. Solving suchalle)cation |»e>blenis serves the "functional integratiem" erf the action systemin the widest sense, a matter that Parsems (1951b:107ff.) carefully distin-guished from "se>cial integration." Sexnal integration refers to functions thatmaintain and integrate the cultural values built into the action system. Thistype of integration is ne>t to be measured in terms ot functional imperativesresulting from the relations between system and enviremment, but rather interms erf the demands for consistency that are a function of the internal rela-

TALCOIT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF TBEORY CONSTRUCTION lSS

tions of a cultural value system. In their role as boundary-maintainingsystems, society and personality have to cope with imperatives that resultfrom system-environment relations. But at the same time, and in their n^eas culturally structured action systems, society and personality are also ex-posed to consistency demands resulting from their dependency on institu-tionalized and internalized value patterns of unique cultural configurations.

A simple diagram may help in describing the two-fold relations ofaction systems to environment and culture. Let us use arrows to denotethe complexity differential which characterizes all system environment rela-tions. And let us use a broken line to identify the internal relations thatconstitute structural similarities. Then we have:

^^ Culture^^

Social System

Environment

Personality System

Environment

This picture reveals a weakness of the scheme. The schema suffers from afusion of basic concepts, and one that lacks clarity. The concepts come fromdifferent paradigms. The cultural system occupies the space, as it were, ofa missing concept. The missing one is the concept of "life-world." Andbecause culture serves as a substitute here, it has to have this dubious posi-tion of an entity supraordirtate to the action system but at the same timealso composing its internal environment, one that ncMietheless lacks aU theempirical character of the environment of a system. How is one to ascribeto culture actual efficacy in its impact on acticm systems when such culturetranscends in certain ways those very action systems without serving as theirenvironment? Parsons's intention is quite clear. The identity of a givenaction system is supposed to be tied to the value sphere via the Iatter's ownorganization, and in such a manner that the system can resist the pressuresto adapt to an overly complex environment through its own imperatives.Culture should be manifest in making demands that call for obedience tostandards other than the criteria of successful adaptation to the system'senvironment. "A cultural system does not 'function,' except as part of aconcrete action system, it just is" (Parsons, 19Sla:17). But what internalbarriers against some change in values, a value change indttced by changpin system-environment relations, could Parsons identify?

Presumably, the pattern variables simply serve dassificatory purposes.They enable us to conceive of cultures as variant ccnnbinations of a finitenumber of decision patterns. Presumably, the pattern variables do notdescribe a structure that restricts change ol such decision patterns in terauof a developmental logic. If both my presumptions are correct, then Parsonslacks the theoretical tools to explain the resistance of distinctive or uniqdcculture patterns to functional imperatives. Parsons has no equivalent for the

IK QinssmoNS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

concept "life-world," which provides the contextual background for commu-nicative action. If it were otherwise, the sphere of the integrity demands thatParsons located in a transcendence oi free-floating cultural contents wouldhave been treated, from the onset, in terms of empirical, time and space-bound, and identifiable relations between unit acts.

Only with the just indicated alternative strategy for ccmcept formationcould one avoid the paradigm confusion that the second version of Parsons'stheory, one developed during the early 1950s, falls prey to. A "life-world"with its material substructure is exposed to chance vadaticms in its condi-tions. From its perspective, though, such chance variations appear more asbarriers to the realization of action projects than as restrictions on its self-steering capacity. The substructure has to be maintained with the use ofscarce resources through socially organized work. This is the task for whichParsons chose the catchword allocation problems. Insofar as the net effectsof collective action satisfy the imperative (^ maintaining the material sub-structure, we have a situation that permits the functional stabilization ofaction rdations. It is a functional stabilization by virtue ot feedback con-cerning the consequences erf action. That is what Parscms meant by "func-tional" in contrast to "social" integration.

This is a consideration we can still afford to make within the paradigmot the "life-world." But it also suggests an alteration of the perspective inwhich that paradigm has been used. We should regard the "life-world" asan objectivating system. With respect to material reproducticm, the processesol exchange between life-world and its environment are alone critical, notthe symbc^c structures of the life-world itself. The maintenance (tf the mate-rial substructure depends entirely on the former. Looking at these in analogyto "metabolic i»'ocesses" (Marx), it seems advisable to reify the life-worldas a boundary-maintaining system. Then functional relations become rele-vant for its treatment, a matter for which intuitive knowledge about life-world contexts is not an adequate substitute. The imperatives of survivalreqiiire a functional integration <A the life-world. That kind of integraticmoperates across the symbdic structure of the life-world and that is why itcannot be comprehended frcnn the perspective of a participant. Compre-hending that integration requires a contra-intuitive analysis and is to be donefrom the perspective ol an observer who objectifies the life-world. Socialintegration is a part oi the symbolic reproducticm (^ the lif&-world, involvingnot only the reproduction of memberships and sdidarities, but also that ofcultural traditions and socialization process. Let us concq>tualize functicxialintegraticMi, in contrast, as referring to the material rej^oduction of the life-worid, and treat it as system maintenance.

Study df each of these problems calls for the adopticm of distinctivemethodolopcal orientations and the use of different ccmcepts. One cannotstudy functional integration frcnn the internal perspective cl the life-wcwld.Functional integration beccMnes accessible to the eyes of an observer onlywhen the life-wcHid has been reified and only when he takes an objectivat-

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 1V7

ing stance toward it as a boundary-maintaining system. la this procedurethe system model does not just serve as a conventional tod. The latentfunctions of action require analysis with a concept of system integration thattranscends the integration of action orientations attributable to communi-cative action.

The basis of Parsons's action theory is too narrow to develop therequired concept, which has to link up system and life-world in a two-stepmethoddogical procedure. The perspective of action theory does not allowone to develop the required concept of society. That is why ParscMis pro-ceeded to represent the relations between acticms directly as systems withoutrealizing the change in perspective which produces the concept action systemthrough the methodological reification of the life-world in the first place.Parsons did proceed from the primacy of action theory. But he did notfollow through its implications consistently enough. That is why the metho-dological significance of the basic system-theoretical concepts retnainedhidden.

Parsons removed the difficulties arising from his dualist conception bysimply removing the special status of culture; and that gave primacy ot placeto the basic ccmcepts of system theory. This remains also the only occasionwhere he admitted a revision important for the overall design of his theory.Hitherto he had reserved for culture a sort of extramundane position as asphere of values and legitimacy standards. But then he placed culture cmthe same level of empirical action systems where society and personality hadcome to rest. And these three systems, supplemented by a fourth, theorganism or behavioral system, are set subordinate to a general action systemonly now gaining postulation in its own right. The general action system isthe reification of the action frame c^ reference.

But this procedure did not, < course, permit assimilating the relationbetween actw and action situation to that of acticm system and environment;an action system does not act, it functions. The relations between the alreadyanalyzed components of action orientations are constitutive of the actionsystem. An action system consists of the relations between values, n(»ms,goals, and resources. Luhmann (1980:8) made the point when asserting:"Action is a system by virtue of its internal analytical structure." The pro-cedure also determines the four system references. The action system iscomposed of subsystems specialized for the production and maintenance ofone of the compcments of action: culture for values, society tot nonns, per-sonality for goals, and behaviwal system for means or resources. Actors asacting subjects disappear in this conceptualization. The actors are nowabstract units, units to which one ascribes dedsimis and the effects of action.However put, actors stand for aspects of an organism capable of learning,of the motivaticMial econcMny of personality, erf roles and memberships insocial systems, and of the acticm determining cultural traditicMis.

(4) If my first thesis, the one I developed here at some length, iscorrect, thm it is not possible to understand how Parsons himself and his

18S QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

orthcxlox students can deny a change from action to system theory and assertan unbroken continuity in theoretical development and the history of theopus. My second thesis asserts that the appearance of such continuity whicheffectively hides the change is attributable to a very characteristic reservationunder which Parsons developed his system theory of society. The four-function schema, a model for inter-system exchanges, the theory of the mediaof interchange, and the move toward the anthropolo^cal level of systemformation (Human Condition), all this is evidence of one line of theorybuilding in the form of system construction conducted with utter consistencysince the Working Papers (Parsons, 1953), and so over the course of aquarter century. But this ccmstruction of a theoretical system is synchronizedwith a reinterpretation and assimilation of action theory on the one side, andthe ever more abstract and consequently ever more hidden preservation ofneo-Kantian intentions on the other. Within the constraints c^ a systemparadigm Parsons still could not let go of a conception of action systems asincorporations of cultural value patterns, a ccmception he had learned fromthe history of social theory. My second thesis requires technical evidence inits own right, of course. But I shall have to confine myself to four examples(a-<l); and these are examples on the basis of which one could prove thataction theory has been fundamentally reinterpreted.

(a) As already shown, during his early middle period Parsons describedthe functions of action systems with reference to two sets of imperatives.One concerned the relations between system and environment; the other therelations to culture. The tasks of functional integration were analyzed interms <rf allocation problems. They involve the provisioning, the mobiliza-tion, and the goal-effective application c^ resources. On the other hand, thetasks of "social integration" invcdve the maintenance of the structure of valuepatterns. While the former covers the material reproduction of the life-world, the latter covers the reproduction of its symbolic structures. In lightof the history of theory this was a plausible two-fold classification of basicproblems. But the four-function view, the famous AGIL-schema took itsplace from 1953 on (Parsons, 1953). The allocative functions were dif-ferentiated into those of adaptation and those of goal-attainment, while thenew pattern-maintenance function covered both cultural reproduction andsocialization. What is of primary interest in our present context, however,is the simultaneously accomplished reduction of what was before a criticallyimportant distinction, the distinction between functional and social integra-tion. Both simply become the new "integrative functicm." And this coveredup the stitch-line that connected the action and system paradigms in his work.

(b) Until 1953 it was quite sufficient for Parsons to illustrate the basicfunctions with the model of a functionally differentiated societal system. Theeconomy served the function of adaptation; the polity the function of goal-attainment; the legally organized community served the integration funcdcm;and the cultural subsystem served the culture-transmissicm and socializationfuncticms. But this proved no longer sufficient once the AOIL-schema was

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCnON 189

posited as applicable to any subsystem. Now a more general foundatiem otthe idea of system function had to be found, one that wemld be independentof the previous conception of society, which had been informed by actiontheory. Parsons took account of this by starting the analysis below the levelof action systems. He focused attention on the process of system formationand the more general problems of maintenance that any living system facesunder the constraints of time and space. And so, the internal/external axisyields the boundary-maintenance preAlem of system and enviromnent. Thetempewal axis, present/future, in turn yields the problem of relating meansto ends. And tihe combination of the two problems yields the desired fourfunctions. Since these have been uproe>ted enit of their action-theoreticalfenindations and apply to any living system of whatever kinel, the analyticalcompements of actiem in turn have to be made deducible from sdving systemprobletns (Parsons, 1970:30ff.).

(c) And indeed Parsons decided to a]le)cate the analytical componentsof action—^values, norms, goals, and resources—to one of the basic functionseach. This decision erf theory construction made the reinterpretation of thehitherto central pattern variables inevitable. Parsons (1960) accomplishedthat revision in the course erf his debate with Dubin. These abstract dedsiemalternatives had been introduced in order to explain how cultural valueicould be reduced to a finite number of preference patterns from a universalperspective. After Parsons abandoned the perspective of action theory, thepattern variables Ie>st this particular meaning. Now the question was nolemger eme of the cultural determination of actiem orientations. Now thequestion was how the actor's decisions cenild be derived directly from systemformation processes. If one was to carry along the pattern variables at all,they could now serve at best as lenses prismatically breaking system problemsand so eiisplaying how actions appear in the light of system dynamics. Par-sons simply eliminated one of the five pairs of basic alternatives facing theactor. He then uncoupled the pattern variables from the value orientations(rf acting subjects and used the remaining two times four variables in orderto describe the four basic functions in terms of pretty arbitrary combinationsof decisiem alematives. But this effort never attained much significance forhis thee>retical development.

(d) An even more teUing example erf the mixing in of residues ot analready abandemed paraeligm can be found in the theory erf the media ofcemununication appearing in the 1960s. Leaning em cemceptualizations innee>-classic ecemomic theory. Parsons and Smeker developed the cemceptmeeiium of interchange. Money, for example, transfers ne)t emly infemnatlonwithin the economy, it also facilitates exchange processes between the ecem-emiy and the e>ther subsystems. In certain situadems and in certain respectsmoney substitutes for a context-dqwnelent everyday language as a mechanismfor the cex>rdination of acticm. Inserfar as interaction can be based on sucha medium, a means-end, ratiemal, success-emented manifnilatiem of general-ized values retraces that communicative everyday practice which C(»iMnes a

190 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

higih level of interpretation and its attendant risks of dissensus with verylimited rcxnn for maneuvering. Money is not a specialized language; it isinstead a cost-saving substitute for special fimctions of language, one thatmakes action orientations independent of a life-world context of sharedcultural knowledge, norms acknowledged as binding, and accessible motives.This uncoupling requires a recoupling of the medium to the life-world. Thusthe circulation of mcmey requires the institutions of civil law, like the lawof property and contract. With certain reservations one can also conceiveof power as a medium. And so conceived, one may view it as playing a rolein the pditical system which is analogous to the rde of money in the eco-nomic one. However, as soon as Parsons yielded to his compulsi(»i fortheory construction here and proceeded to invent other media, such asinfluence for the integrative and commitments for the cultural subsystems, he"had to liquidate," as it were, the very core of his action-theoretical legacyfor the sake of system theory (Habermas, 1980). From the perspective ofaction theory, the influence c an expert and the binding power of a moralauthority are nonmanipulable goods which can function only as long as onerefrains from subjecting them to strate^c uses. As scx>n as one redefinesthem as media, however, they become objects of an objectivating orienta-tion; and then they have to be treated just like some deposit of money orpower. The concept medium "levels" a distinction between mechanismsthat is critical in action-theoretical perspective. The distinction distinguishesmechanisms that substitute for consensus accomplished with language andneutralize the life-world context on the one hand, from those forms of gen-eralized communication, on the other, that specialize and simplify consensusformation with respect to truth or correctness criteria but otherwise still relycm life-world contexts.

(e) The last example refers to the assimilation of the concept "legiti-mating force of cultural values" to the control function of the ought-functionsin self-steering systems. This example can also serve as a first illustration oftendencies in Parsons's work that counteract the liquidation of action-theoretical traces in the later writings. Even here ParscMis tries to save thesubstance of the neo-Kantian dualism of values and factidty, of values andinterests. The differential between the sphere of values and norms to whichone appeals and the realm of the factual conditions of life became signifi-cantly reduced when culture was degraded to cme sub-system next to others.Pars(H)s translated the logical tension between the "is" and the "ought" intoa cybernetic analogy in order to minimize this consequence. He equatedcultural values with the critical values (d some guidance mechanism; and heproceeded to treat the organic bases of action systems as a source of energy.And then he imposed a hierarchy of organization on the behavicH'al system,personality, scxnety, and culture in such a way that the lower oat is alwayssuperior in energy to the higher one, while any higher cme is always thesupedcH' in information and steering capacity to the lower. This linear ar-rangement ot the four subsystems in form of a contrcd hierarchy preserves

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 191

the pewition of a sovereign for the cultural subsystem. It is a sovereign erfsteering, one simultaneously dependent on the erther subsystems for energysupplies (Parsons, 1961:352ff.).

This idea is subjected to an additional step erf hierarchization, onepertaining to an order amemg the basic functions. And this step guaranteesin a priori fashion that the functionally specialized subsystems cannot impacton each e>ther in arbitrary fashion but only in the LIGA-direction ot acultural determinism. This remains a prejuelice une>btnisively built into thetechnique of cross-tabulation. The latent meaning of this formalism consistsin two things. On the one hand, eme reinterprets the validity erf symbolicorder in an empirical eiirection; and on the other, eme immunizes valuechange from materialist assumptions."

The cemstruction of the cultural system itself tells us how the techniqueof cross-tabulation secured the secret idealism inherent in Parsonian systemfunctionalism. To begin with. Parsons followed Weber's trilejgy of cognitive,moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive types erf sytnbolic structures. Thefourth, constitutive symbolism, in fact denotes relipon. And this despite thefact that modem science and technology, law and morals, as well as anautonomems art have all been differentiated ewt from religienis-metaphysicaltraditions and now e>ccupy a petition neither structurally nor historically emthe same level as such traditiems. The formalism of cross-tabulatiem revealsits secret at last completely in Parsons's "late philose)phy." There we findthe general action system subordinated to a reified trancendentalism in theform of the "telic system" (Parsons, 1978). And this versiem reveals theclue to something that Parsons had already smuggled into the contred hier-archy of his theory of sexiiety. At the lewer pe)le erf the contred hierarchythe actiem system has to maintain its bewndary vis-a-vis a natural and emrpirical environment; at the upper pole, it faces a nonempirical environmentof a supernatural kind. For the latter. Parsons selected the expressiem"ultimate reality" from the early thedogy erf Tlllich.

(5) According to my analysis, Parsons's theory of society emerges fromthe ambiguous assimilatiem erf action theory to system theory. His work hasthe character erf a theoretical compromise between two competing para-digmatic cemceptualizations. The compromise covers up their conflicts; butit does not resolve them. If this assertion is correct, it shemld be possible toprove this compremiise formation systematically in the subtheories thatParsems devele>ped with this framework. As a brief illustratiem, let me usehis theory erf modernity (Parsems, 1971), one to which my third and lastthesis abewt his work refers.

Had Parsons adopted a system-theoretical framewenk without anyreservations, he could have analyzed modem societies simply from the per-spective of increased complexity in their ejrganization. Then the fe>Ilowingbird's-eye view ot mexiemity wenild hold: there is a continual "differen-tiating cHit" erf subsystems. Each is relatively indepradent of the others.All femn enviremments to each other. All engage in media-regulated ex-

192 QUESnONS ABOUT ACnON THEORY

changes with each other and in a manner that yields zones of mutual inter-penetration. Roughly, that kind of image emerges from Luhmann's evolu-ticmary theory, which definitively abandons the neo-Kantian idea ol valueimplementation, which deserts tiie heaven oi cultural values, loosens thecorset of the four-function schema, and so lends more dynamics to a theoryof modernity than Parsons did. This theory does not foreclose any possi-bilities. At any rate, Luhmann aims only at historical explanaticm whereParsons aspires to theoretical prediction. The point is illustrated by thedevelopment of modem societies through exactiy three revolutions. If youproceed in Parscmian fashion, you start the analysis with the integrative sub-system. Then only three revolutions are possible. The industrial, the demo-cratic, and, finally, the educational each appear as structural-differentiationproducts of the societal ccnnmunity into the economic, the political, and thecultural subsystems (Parsons, 1971:101; Parsons and Platt, 1974[intro-duction]).*

Granted, differentiation is only one of four evdutionary mechanisms.The other three invdve a gain in adaptive capacities, inclusion or generali-zation of rights to membership, and the generalization cA values (Parsons,1966). A deductive determination of just what is to be understood bygrowth in complexity of organization and steering capacity of this kind alsoproduces advantages for Parsons that cannot be found in a stricter yet lessspecified system functionalism. Inclusion and value generalization have beenascribed to those functions by means oi which the ccmcept value-implemen-tation, the institutionalization of values, has been both preserved and trans-formed. That is why Parsons was able to translate and transmute theexternally observed growth in system complexity into the self-understandingof the members of such societies within the internal ccmtext of their life-world. Thus Parsons could synthesize growth ol system autonomy withincreased autonomy ot moral-practical reason. Increased inclusion and valuegeneralizaticm lend themselves to interpretation as steps toward a greaterrealization of ideals of justice from a perspective of ethical universalism(Parsons and Platt, 1974).

Similar results emerge from an internal perspective of the differentiationprocess, once you focus on the analytical level of the general action system.Modernity signals a greater differentiation ol society from culture on the onehand, and from personality on the other. And both have c(MisiderabIe phe-nomenological validity, a matter characterized by ParscMis (1978:233ff.)with such catch-words as "secularizaticn" and the emergence c^ "institutirai-alized individualism."

One may conclude therefore that the very compromise between his neo-Kantianism and his system functionalism made it possible for Pars(»is toconstruct his functional theory of modernity in continuity with Max Weber'sabiding concern with the ccHirse of Occidental rationalism. Parsons couldafford to conceive of societal modernization not cMily in terms ol systemraticmalization but also in terms of the rationalizaticm of action. But one

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 193

must also note that his work lacks an action-theoretically derived conceptof sexiiety. And that is why Parsons cannot describe the rationalization ofthe life-world, on the one hand, and the growth of complexity erf actionsystems, on the other, as separate—though of course interacting—^but fre-quentiy also confiicting prewesses. With respect to modem sexiiety. Parsonscan link up new levels erf system eiifferentiation and their correspondinggrowth in system autonomy with self-understaneling of modem culture. Buthe can do so only by means of catchwords like secularization, institu-tionalized individu^ism, instrumental activism, and the like. Thus he caninterpret continuing system development in line with Weber's ideas as theenhanced institutionalization of value, norm, and means-end rational actionorientations.'

Parsons elid not resolve the paradigm cemipetition in his work throughdevelopment erf a two-step concept of society, one which could relate life-world and system to each erther. All he did was to tone down the compe-tition by fusing the conflicting meanings of the two sets of basic concepts.And this compromise prevented his full comprehension of a fundamentalalteration that characterizes modem societies. The symbolic structures erf themexiem life-world are certainly highly rationalized. But the life-worldremains as dependent on social integration as it always was. Yet the life-world has not only been separated from the economic and pditical sub-systems, eiifferentiated out via media as they are, the life-world has alsobeen subordinated to the imperatives of these subsystems. Basing his obser-vation on the emerging industrial proletariat, Marx showed us what hidesbehind the categories wage labor and monetized labor power. It means noless than a profound transformation erf a hitherto sex:ially integrated life-world and its subjugation to the imperatives erf a legally and formally or-ganized ecemomic system steered witii a medium of exchange values. Andthat system can stabilize itself through functiemal interrelations, and, with ahidden hand and in silence, steer itself right through all actiem euientations.Texlay, the operation erf the media erf money and organizational power e)radministrative decision provides us with further realms erf action that haveattained a systemic life of their own. And they also absorb and deform thoserealms of life that depend for their very existence em the integratiem ot valuesand norms through the cemimunicative accemiplishment erf understandings,and remain therefore forms of life that canne>t be retooled tor system inte-gration without pathole)gical side effects.

The theenies of Durkheim and Weber were still sensitive to the kindsof pathedogies that Marx had analyzed with his paradigmatic case (rfalienated labor. But Parsexis cemceived erf the rationalization erf the life-world and the growth erf system complexity in the same basic conceptualterms to such an extent that he tiiily could not discem the dialectic (rf thecosts of modernization, costs that arise from the growth of system complexity,for the intemal structure of the life-world. At best he could cope with sudiceMts in terms erf certain malfunctiems, like patterns erf monetaiy inflation

194 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY

or deflation. The rather metaphorical use, after all, of this over-generalizedconcept "media of commimication" aside, such media dynamics pertain onlyto contingent disequilibria c^ intersystem exchange prcx^esses. Media dy-namics can hardly explain the kind of pathologies that Marx, Durkheim,and Max Weber were concerned with. These have to do with deformationsthat result from the dominance of forms of eccmomic and administrativerationality over areas of life that because c^ their communicative internalstructures simply cannot be rationalized in terms of such standards.

Parsonian functionalists appreciate this defect. That is why R. C. Baum(1976) endeavored to relate the just mentioned pathcdo^es to a certainunderdevelopment in the operation ot media. He proceeded from the asser-tion that even highly economically developed societies have not yet developedall four media to a sufficient degree of institutionalization to actually accom-plish the regulation of product and factor exchanges across six markets pre-scribed by the interchange paradigm. Only one of these media, namelymoney, has been sufficiently institutionalized to serve as an adequate measureof account and a store oi value. And because of the unequal developmentof the media to date, there are tendencies to use the best developed andtherefore most manipulable for problems of steering regardless of theirfunctional nature. For exan^le, the destruction of an urban environmentas a consequence of unchecked capitalist economic growth or the over-bureaucratization oi the system of higher educaticm could be explained CMithe basis of the "misuse" of the media money and power. Such misuse inturn can be related to a fal^ perception on the part of participants in decisionmaking who believe erroneously that any kind c^ rational steering is possibleonly with a calculated disposal of money and power. According to Baum,media theory can be used as a critic;al instrument, leading to reform. Misper-ceptions can be identified. One may call for a more careful use of the mostdeveloped media available, and engage in a kind of consciousness raisingthat alerts those concerned that influence and value-commitments need moredevelopment in order to catch up with money.

But such an argument is possible only if one is prepared to assign directnormative significance to well defined equilibria. That is why others showlittle hesitation in trying to recover the normative core of action theory frc»nthe bondage of system functionalism. If I understand correctly, that is R.MUnch's (1980b) intention in introducing "interpenetration" as a nonna-tively structured idea for the measurement of the pathc^ogies d modernity.'Miinch derives the idea from the philosc^ical content of the theory thatParsons built into the hierarchy of coDtrcd vdiile also making it invisible inthat procedure. The very hierarchization of the four functions and theircorresponding subsystems made sense only with the premise that actionsystems im^dement or realize values under empirical C(MiditiCHis. Processesof value implementation can be normatively understcx)d frcMn the perspectivecl the participants: Values ought to be imidemented. And that can onlybe accomplished to the extent that the ordering and CMientation achievements

TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCnON 19S

of culture fit in seamlessly with the conditional limitations and resources ofnature (MUnch, 1978).•

Whoever starts on this kind of road should not hesitate to take Mponhimself the task c^ constructing a theory of value imjdementation or valuerealization. It remains highly doubtful that the normative im^^caticHis ofsuch an endeavor could be compatible with the character of Parsons's theory.Let us not forget either that the philosophical tools once used for such anendeavor by Lask or Rickert, for example, are quite outmoded today.

NOTES

1. Parsons (1^68) found an unproblematicAl rriationship between symbolic inter-actionism and bis own tbeoretical potrition only in 1968. lii contrast, be reviitted Durk-beim repeatedly (Parsons, 1967, 1973).

2. References d so global a nature to Kant's Critiques baldly jnstify qieaking ofa "Kantian core" in Parsons's work as does MUncb (1979).

3. I sball not try bere to justify the point with conceptualizations of learningtheory. Tbe so<alled sanctions paradigm can explain at best bow non-noimativeorientation expectations are conditionally related to eacb other.

4. Parsons, in contnut, remained aloof from tbe phenomenological concept 1if»-world" (Schutz, 1978).

5. Cf. also MUncb (1980a) on the technique of cross-tabulation.6. Sometimes Parsons seems to conceive of these three revolutions also as proc-

esses through which each one at tbe subsystems differentiated from all remaining sub-systems. So, if one classifies the three named revolutions functionally as belonging totbe economic, tbe p<rfitical, and the cultural subsystems, one could expect one addi-tional revolution for tbe integrative subsystem. Possibly, Parsons (1974) bad tbe"exiHessive rev<dution" in mind.

7. Tbrougb his aflirmative conception of secularization Parsons's views on tbedevelopment of moral consciousness in modernity are different from Weber's and lessskeptical (Parsons, 1978:240 ff).

8. MUnch (1980b) distinguishes mutually balanced "interpenetration" from patho-logical instances of adaptation (dominance of tbe energizing over tbe steering s u b ^tems), the reverie, "over-constraint" (dominance of the steering over the energizkgsubsystems), and mutual isolation.

9. Tbe desirability of justifying nonnative axkmata becomes very apparent inMflnch (1978).

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196 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACnON THEORY

MQnch, R. 1979. T . Parsons und die Theorie des Handelns, I," Soziale Welt, 30,4:385-409.

Mtlnch, R. 1980a. T . Parsons und die Theorie des Handelns, n," Soziale Welt, 31,1:3-47.

Mtinch, R. 1980b. "tJber Parsons zu Weber," Zeitschrtft fUr Soziologle 9, l:18fF.Parsons, T. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. (New York, 1949 edition).Parsons, T. 1938. "The Professions and Social Structure," pp. 34ff., in Parsons, T.,

Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied. Glencoe, 111.Parsons, T. 1951a. The Social System. Glencoe, Ol.Parsons, T. 1951b. "Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action," pp.

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Parsrau, T. 1953. Working Papers in the Theory of Action. New York.Parsons, T. 1960. "Tattem Variables Revisited: A Response to R. Dubin," pp. 192fiF.

(cf. also Appendix, pp. 521ff.) in Parsons, T., Sociological Theory and ModernSociety. New York (1967).

Parsons, T. 1961. "An Outline of the Social System," pp. 30-79, in Parsons, T. et al.(eds.). Theories of Society. New York.

Parsons, T. 1966. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. EngiewoodCliffs, NJ.

Parsons, T. 1967. "Durkbeim's Contribution to the Theory of Integration of SocialSystems," pp. 3flf., in Parsons, T., Sociological Theory and Modern Society. NewYork.

Parsons, T. 1968. "Social Interaction," pp. 429-441, in Sills, D. L. (ed.). InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 7.

Parsons, T. 1970. "Some Problems of General Theory," pp. 27-68, in McKinney,J. C. & E. A. Tiryakian (eds.). Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Develop-ments. New York.

Parsons, T. 1971. The System of Modern Societies. Engiewood Qiffs, N.J.Parsons, T. 1973. "DurUieim on Religion Revisited: Another Look at The Elemen-

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Parsons, T. 1974. "Religion in Postindustrial America," pp. 320£f., in Parsons, T.,Action Theory and the Human Condition. New York (1978).

Parsons, T. 1977. Social Systems and the Evolution of Action. New York.Parsons, T. 1978. "A Paradigm of the Human Condition," pp. 352ff., in Parsons, T.,

Action Theory and the Human Condition. New Yotk.Parsons T. and G. M. Platt 1974. The American University. Cambridge, Mass.Schlucbter, W. (Hrsg.). 1980. Verhalten, Handeln und System. Frankfurt/M.Scbutz, A. 1978. The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz

and Talcott Parsons. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.