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Habermas, Goffman, and Communicative Action: Implications for Professional PracticeAuthor(s): James J. ChrissSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Aug., 1995), pp. 545-565Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096294 .

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HABERMAS, GOFFMAN, AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE*

James J. ChrissUniversity of Pennsylvania

In his Theoryof CommunicativeAction, Habermas(1984, 1987) argues that

because Goffman's dramaturgy emphasizes the goal-oriented or strategic

nature of actors' self-presentations, it fails to establish the conditions for

noncoerced or reasoned communication.After reviewing Habermas's nega-

tive reading of Goffman,I assess both Habermas's and Goffman'stheories

in the contextof professional practice and organizationalbehavior.I suggest

that certain programs in the social psychology of organizations, such as

Argyris and Schon's (1974) action research, share Habermas's one-sided

view of Goffman'sactor as an opportunistic, nsinceremanipulator.This mis-

reading of Goffmanresults rom a fundamental confusion over the ontology

and epistemology of "impression management." conclude that if Haber-

mas's theory of communicativeaction is to advancefurther, that is, if it is

ever to adequatelylinkwith the empiricalsocial world, it mustcome to more

concrete terms with the natureof thepresentedself.

)ver the past two decades researchers

in the social sciences and humanities

have been taking the "linguistic turn,"mean-

ing that they are turningtheir attentionto is-sues of the self and to theories of communi-

cative conduct or practice.Discussions of theprocesses or theories of the self are incom-

plete, however, if they are not formulated or

understood within a broader analyticalframework. Goffman's (e.g., 1959, 1971,

1974) dramaturgical theory of action, al-

though providing important perceptions and

descriptions of the vagaries of face-to-face

behavior, does not on its own offer much of

a sense of how these microprocesses arelinked to larger social structures.

On the other hand, TalcottParsons's (1951,

1978) architectonic social systems schemaprovides a blueprint, a mapping, or a grid forthe understanding,or at least the conceptual-ization of, whole social systems. Parsons at-

temptedto reduce the massive complexity ofsocial systems to a few crucial elements or

processes. This analytical gambit amountedto delineating four functional requisites ofsocial systems: adaptation, goal-attainment,

integration, and latent pattern-maintenance(AGIL). Then he argued, by sheer force of

reason (Parsons's notion of "analytical real-ism"), that there exists parallel functional

processes at all other levels of the social sys-tem.I

*Direct correspondenceto JamesJ. Chriss, De-

partment of Sociology, 3718 Locust Walk, Uni-

versity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,PA 19104-

6299. A much abridged version of this paperwas

presented on August 9 at the 1994 annual meet-

ing of the American Sociological Association in

Los Angeles, CA. I thank Hugh Willmott, David

Sciulli, John Forester, and Ivar Berg for provid-ing helpful comments on several earlier drafts. I

also thankthe ASR reviewers for theircomments.

Much of this paper is drawn from Chapter9 of

my Ph.D. dissertation (Chriss 1994a). For an

early cursory statement on the Habermas-

Goffman problem, see Chriss (1992). [The re-viewers acknowledged by the author are Chris

Argyris and Ben Agger. -ED.]

I For example, Parsons argued that the processof allocating roles in society was analogous to theinternalization, through socialization, of culturalnorms and values in the individual. As Parsons(1951) states, "The allocation of personnel be-tween roles in the social system and the social-

ization processes of the individual are clearly thesame processes viewed in different perspectives"

(p. 207). Both processes, then, have similar func-tional significances at their respective levels of

generality or specificity, namely that of integra-tion.

American Sociological Review, 1995, Vol. 60 (August:545-565) 545



546 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Although Parsons attempted to explain so-

cial microprocesses through his AGILschema, a majority of researchers have notemployed his blueprint in their analyses.

Parsons's schema is considered by many tobe bombastic, overly abstract, and not par-

ticularly amenable to empirical testing (butsee Lidz 1986). The sense that Parsons'sschema is detached from reality-from the

empirical social world-led to an avalanche

of criticisms beginning in the 1950s and ex-tending until his death in 1979 and even be-

yond (Dahrendorf 1958; Gouldner 1970;Mills 1959; Wrong 1961).

Much of this criticism of Parsons's pro-

gram was, of course, concentrated n the aca-demic left, or "radicalsociology," and espe-cially in Marxist or neo-Marxist thought. A

few observers have suggested, for example,thatParsons's (1937) "voluntaristic heory ofaction" is notable in that it includes almostno discussion of the works of Marx (Agger

1992; Gouldner 1970). Parsons's programthus offered, at least in the minds of some

left-leaning critics, a handy alternativeto the

Hegelian Marxism prevalentin Europe sincethe 1920s (Agger 1992:57).In sociology, the most successful wing of

Marxist thought and research has beenFrankfurt School critical theory (Kincheloe

and McLaren 1994). Horkheimer, Adorno,and Marcuse are some of the thinkers wholed the way toward establishing critical

theory and extending its influence in sociol-

ogy, largely throughthe successes of a num-ber of applied research programs (such as

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, andSanford's [1950] study of the authoritarianpersonality). In extending and updatingMarx's legacy, the goal of FrankfurtSchool

thinkers was to identify, uncover, and hope-fully ameliorate oppressive social structures

or circumstances. Whereas Marx had con-centratedprimarilyon the objective featuresof oppression, such as those connected with

political power andeconomics, the new criti-

cal theory called for a return to philosophy,and even to psychoanalysis, to thoroughlydiagnose the pathologies of modernculture.

This emphasis of critical theory continueduntil the early 1970s, when a new version of

critical theory-call it neo-critical theory-emerged, largely through the efforts ofHabermas. Habermas's (1971, 1975) pro-

gram carried forward some elements of theHorkheimer/Adorno version of criticaltheory. For example, he retained their criti-cal view of positivism and their goal of es-

tablishing a new theory of knowledge, whichwould, in dialectic fashion, take into accountthe social, historical, and cultural contextswithin which that knowledge is formulatedand accepted (i.e., the sociology of knowl-edge; see Dahl 1995).

But departing from the original FrankfurtSchool tradition, which was largely skepticalof the ability of established science to con-tribute to the good life, Habermasaimed torescue science and the Enlightenment-in-

spired force of reason through a search forthe foundations of knowledge (Bottomore1984). Habermas argued that if we are in-deed interested in identifying and eradicat-ing oppressive social structures,we must es-tablish a foundation or basis upon which wecan say, with some degree of certainty,whatis or is not a liberative or oppressive socialstructure.This understandingof social struc-ture can be forged only if critical theorists

turn their attention back to conceptualizingentiresocial systems, focusing once again oncertain crucial elements heretoforeneglectedin the social science literature.

This attention to systems theory ledHabermas inexorably to an analysis of theworks of Parsons. Habermas (1987) states,for example, that "no theory of society canbe takenseriously today if it does not at leastsituate itself with respect to Parsons" (p.199). This is not to say, of course, that

Habermaswas wholly enamoredof Parsons'stheory.HabermasarguesthatParsons's workdisplays a deep internal tension between theidealist tradition of social action and the

positivist tradition of social systems. In es-sence, Parsons's theory never successfullycoupled "system" to "lifeworld" (but seeMunch 1993).2 This is because Parsons was

2 Habermas (1984:82) argues that, for analyti-

cal reasons, we need to distinguish between"world" and "lifeworld," especially with regardto discussing the "rationalization of thelifeworld." As human beings we rely, often intaken-for-grantedfashion, on a cultural stock of

knowledge which, because it is alreadyintersubjectively shared, both forms the back-ground for communicative action and providesthe foundation for our routine social doings. The



HABERMAS, GOFFMAN, AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 547

generally inattentive to talk-to speech

theory or to linguistic analysis, more gener-

ally. Parsons chose insteadto attendto broad

conceptions of culture,as in the culture, per-

sonality, social system triad, and this focuskept his theory of social action suspended

within the system or functionalist side of the

analytical divide.On the otherhand, accordingto Habermas,

Goffman's dramaturgical theory, although

giving attention to social action or lifeworld

processes, is suspended in the idealist tradi-

tion, and therefore it was never in a position

to link adequately to systems theory. Goff-

man's mistake was that he never understood,

perhaps never realized, that talk itself couldcontain the potential for a universal founda-

tion for critical theory thatcould traversethe

lifeworld-systems divide. This foundationis,

as Habermas argues, the universal validityclaims inherentin all speech (to be discussed

more thoroughlybelow).3

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IN

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

Goffman's work stands on its own as a rep-

resentation of the lifeworld processes of so-

cial interaction and face-to-face behavior.If

we are ever to reconcile Parsons's systems

theory with Goffman's work on the micro-

processes of communication, it seems that

Habermas's theory of communicative action

may serve well, as it has assimilated crucial

aspects of Parsons's schema.

Any further discussions of Goffman, Par-

sons, Habermas,andtheirinterrelationat thishigh level of theoretical abstraction runs the

risk of disintegrating into confusion, into

something even less than a patchwork ofideas. Thus, I move now toward a concrete

area of concern to facilitate this discussionof communicative action: professional prac-tices, such as planning, consulting, and

evaluation.I choose the substantive area of profes-

sional practice because I have worked as a

consultant(mainly in business and education)and evaluator (in program planning andevaluationwith philanthropicorganizations),

andof courseI did much of this workthroughobserving talk in formal (business or organi-zational) settings. For example, consultants,planners, or evaluators may be hired by a

business to observe the natureof interactionstaking place between personnel across vari-

ous organizationalhierarchies (Stein 1994).Organizations hiring consultants to do

such work areconcerned, of course, with the

bottom line-improving organizationalcom-

munication, performance, or perhaps evenmorale.4 Sociologists familiar with Haber-

mas's or Goffman's works may well recog-

nize this particularorganizationalproblemasone of "systematicallydistortedcommunica-

tion" (Habermas1987). The goal of the con-

sultant in such a case is to recommend ac-

tions for improving the organization's com-

"lifeworld" is an unthematized realm that, suf-

fused as it is with shared cultural knowledge, al-

lows us to refer thematically to something that

actually exists in the objective world. For an ex-

tended critique of Habermas's formulation of

lifeworld, see Rosenthal (1992).3 Habermas's theory of communicative action

can be thought of as a meso theory providing

links from the macro or systems analytical realm

to the micro or lifeworld analyticalrealm.House,

Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt's (1995) mesotheory of organizational behavior, although not

drawing from Habermas per se, nevertheless

shares some affinities with Habermas's program,

such as their criticism of prevailing general psy-

chological theories in the field of organizational

behavior (OB), which tend to be context-free and

rarely take into account macro or structuralvari-

ables.

4With respect to morale, an organization may

hire a consultant if there is a widespread organi-

zational perception that employee morale is lowor that managers are not effective in motivatingin their employees a sense of organizational

pride, loyalty, or teamwork. The literature on

problems and issues of this sort falls somewhat

outside the bounds of sociology per se, residing

instead in literature on organizations and espe-

cially management. The practice of compelling

employees to demonstrate loyalty to a particular

set of organizational values has received a scath-

ing critiquefrom Willmott (1993), who states:

Especiallyin cases where insecure, fashion-con-scious management strives to 'modernize' itspractices,aided and abettedby consultantswhoprey uponmanagers'vulnerability,a paradoxicalconsequence of culture-strengthening pro-grammesis a furtherdegradationand distortionof communicationas employees instrumentallyadapt heirbehaviour o conformwith the relevantcorporate ode. (P. 536)




municative practices (Felts 1992; Hakel

1994).A few professional planning consultants,

such as Forester (1989, 1992) and Schroyer

(1973), have made explicit connections be-tween their day-to-day consulting work and

Habermas'stheory of communicative action.

Other scholars, such as Sciulli (1992a) andFrankford (1994), are actively working on

programs that attemptto implementor assess

Habermas's ideas within the context of pro-

fessional or business practices. For the most

part, however, the theory of communicative

action remains distant from practice. Frank-ford (1994) and others have suggested that

although critical theory's majorgoal has al-ways been to link theoryto practice,attempts

such as Habermas's to facilitate such links

have not been successful. Just as with

Parsons'sAGIL schema, Habermashas faced

the difficulty of making his abstract theory

relevantto the empirical social world.

The guiding idea of my paperis that Goff-

man's observations on face-to-face interac-

tion, and especially his taxonomy of verbal

presentationsof self, may be just the sort ofempirically-grounded research to provide

links from theory to practice. I return in the

next section to the case of business consult-

ing, specifically Argyris and Schon's (1974)

programof "actionresearch." illustratethat

Habermas'stheory of communicative actionis relevant even in those cases where the

practitionersthemselves may be unaware of

such theory-practicelinks.5Thus, I illustrate

the potential applicability of Habermas's

theory within business and professional set-tings where consultants are paid to observeorganizationalactors' social and verbal inter-

action.I address a final issue, however, beforecontinuing. One could very well argue thatmy attemptto analyze Habermas, Goffman,and issues of communicative action withinthe context of organizations is fatally flawed

because, by their very nature, formal organi-zations and other administrativeentities arebased, not on communicative rationality, buton purposive and instrumental rationality.Cooke (1994), for example, notes that "the

administrativesystem does indeed representa mechanism of action coordination externalto the lifeworld" (p. 20).

Habermas (1987) admits that even withinformalorganizationsa numberof routine in-teractions between organizational membersare connected via the mechanism of mutualunderstanding-that is, on some crucial lev-els communicative action is assured or atleast made possible between these organiza-

tional actors.As Habermas(1987) continues,

Members f organizationsctcommunicativelyonly with reservation. They know they canhave recourse o formalregulations,not onlyin exceptionalbut in routine ases; there s nonecessity or achievingconsensusby commu-nicative means. . . . Innerorganizationalrela-tions constitutedvia membershipdo not re-place communicative action, but they dodisempowerts validitybasis so as to providethe legitimatepossibilityof redefiningat will

spheresof action oriented to mutual under-standing into action situations stripped oflifeworld contexts and no longerdirected toachieving onsensus. Pp.3 10-11)

Although I am sympathetic to criticisms

that, following Cooke (1994) and Habermas

(1984, 1987), point out the instrumental,pos-sibly even coercive natureof organizations,I

argue that there are equally pernicious im-

pediments to engaging in noncoerced or rea-

soned communicative interaction within theboundaries of the lifeworld itself. Granted,actorsmay very well be ethically neutralized

by the formal-legal constitution of action

systems typical of organizations-thisamounting to a distortion of lifeworld pro-cesses via the incursion of systems impera-tives. Nevertheless, there always exists the

5 Until 1985, Argyris and his associates(Argyris, Putnam, and Smith 1985) made no ex-

plicit mention of the relevance of Habermas and

critical theory to their own work, such as in the

following quote:

Action science is not alone in advocating thatcommunitiesof inquirybe enacted in communi-ties of practice.This formulationalso seems ap-propriate o criticaltheoryas articulatedby theo-ristsof the Frankfurt chool. Habermas peaksofcreating conditions that approximatethe 'ideal

speech situation,'which would allow humanbe-

ings to come to a rationalconsensus abouthow toconduct their affairs. To our knowledge, however,

Habermas has not devoted his energies to creat-

ing such conditions in the real world. (P. 35; ital-

ics added)

For an interesting discussion that comparesand

contrasts Habermas's critical theory with action

research, see Ledoux (1981).




possibility that certain forms of action, suchas strategic action, although emanatingfromthe lifeworld itself, are nevertheless parasitic

on communicative action, therebyhampering

actors' ability to reach understanding.6With this caveat in mind, let us turn nowto a discussion of Argyris's action research.

ARGYRIS, SCHON, AND ACTION

RESEARCH

For several decades Argyris, Schon, and

other researchershave been involved in what

is variably described as "action research,""action inquiry,"or "action science," a pro-

gram for integratingthought and action, es-pecially in the context of professional prac-tice (Argyris 1993a, 1993b; Argyris et al.

1985; Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989; Schon

1983; Torbert 1991; Whyte 1991). Thosewho work as evaluators, planners, consult-

ants, psychiatrists, lawyers, architects, case-

workers, and so forth, spend years receiving

formal and rigorous training in a variety of

diagnostic techniques that give them effica-

cious means for assessing and interveningintheir world.

Argyris and Schon (1974) provide the fol-

lowing account of the logic underlying theirown action program:

All humanbeings-not only professional rac-titioners-need to becomecompetentn takingactionandsimultaneouslyeflectingon the ac-tion to learn rom t. Thefollowingpages pro-vide a conceptual rameworkor this taskbyanalyzing he theoriesof action hatdetermine

all deliberate umanbehavior,how thesetheo-ries of actionare formed,how they come tochange,andin what senses they maybe con-sideredadequate rinadequate.P.4)

In the authors'assessment, then, all delibera-

tive action, whether conducted by profes-

sionals in a work setting or by laypersons in

the course of their everyday lives, is based

upon some theory of action or conduct, how-

ever tacit or unthematizedthis theory may be

in the minds of actors. The authors suggestthat one of the primary goals of their pro-

gram is to help identify what they call "theo-

ries-in-use," that is, the actual assumptions,

knowledge, orientations, and strategies

undergirdingand informing the actual socialpractices of individuals in given situations.As Argyris and Schon (1974) state, "Theo-

ries-in-use are means for getting what wewant. They specify strategies for resolvingconflicts, making a living, closing a deal, or-ganizing a neighborhood-indeed, for everykind of intended consequence" (p. 15).

Argyris and Schon are careful to distin-guish theories-in-use from mere "espousedtheories," the latter being those theories ofaction to which actors or organizations givewritten or spoken allegiance. The idea is thatwe cannot be certain of deriving a person's

theories-in-use simply by asking why he orshe did X or Y under condition Z; a personmay not even be aware of incompatibilitiesbetween their espoused theories and theo-

ries-in-use. Likewise, an organization mayhave a written code of directives or a formalmanifestpertainingto organizationalgoals or

purpose: yet their overtly stated position-the organization's "espoused theory"-maynot align with actual organizational prac-

tices.7Argyris and Schon's (1974) research

points to a particularmodel thataccounts for

persons' typical theories-in-use, which theyrefer to as "Model I."This model designates(1) a group of governing variables, or the

goals research study participants strove toachieve; (2) action strategies, these being the

actual strategies participants adopted; (3)consequences for the behavioral world; and

(4) consequences for learning.

6 As we shall see later, Habermas argues that

dramaturgicalaction is parasitic on communica-

tive action as well.

7 Argyris and Schon, citing Scott (1969), illus-trate the incompatibility between espoused theo-ries and theories-in-use among workers in an

agency for the blind. The organization's official

position, as represented n written documents and

employee testimony (its espoused theory), holdsthat "the blind are potentially independent, that

agencies for the blind function to help the blindrealize that potential. The theories-in-use, how-

ever, assume that the blind are basically depen-dent on the agencies, that it is a function of the

agencies to sustain the dependence through con-tinuing service, and that the function of a blind

person is to adapt to life in an agency setting"(Argyris and Schon 1974:8). Note also that this

idea parallels Goffman's discussions of virtual

versus actual identity (1963b) and total institu-

tions (1961a).




Particularly important are the conse-quences for the behavioral world resultingfrom the various action strategies employedby research study participants and the gov-

erning variables underlying these strategies.For example, if an actor's primary orienta-tion to the world is to define goals and try toachieve them (the famous ends-meansschema), then a typical action strategy wouldbe to design and manage the environment

unilaterally (e.g., by being persuasive or byappealing to larger goals). When actors findthemselves in such situations or perceivesituations in such a light, the consequencesfor the behavioral world are such that actors

are seen by others as defensive (e.g., havingto defend a particularline of action or pro-vide rationale), as inconsistent (e.g., in caseswhere the chosen means don't appear toalign well with desired or stated ends), ascompetitive, controlling, manipulative, or

any numberof other negative consequences.The implications of Model I, according to

Argyris and Schon (1974), is that, otherthings being equal, behavior is typically de-

fensive and ultimately dysfunctional. Thisdefensiveness is passed on across genera-tions, as children are socialized into or learnModel I behavior from their parents, peers,and significant others insofar as the behav-ioral worlds of the family, school, and else-where conform to the assumptionsof ModelI (Argyris and Schon 1974:82). As Argyrisand Schon (1974) state,

Adults programmed with these [Model I] val-

ues tend to create humanrelationshipsthatem-phasize competitiveness, withholding helpfrom others, conformity, covert antagonism,and mistrust while deemphasizing cooperation,helping others, individuality, and trust. (P. 83)

The authors then make an assertion thathas grave implications for my work on Goff-

man, Habermas, and communicative action:Because these dysfunctional Model I values

are embedded in our cultureandremain there

as unseen or unthematized aspects of dailylife, they are "confirmed"by societal mem-bers and act as real, authentic, natural,or in-

evitable guidelines for directing groups orindividuals in their dealings with one an-

other. Hence, "Interpersonaldiplomacy, be-

ing civilized, withholding feelings, and sup-pressing anger and hurt are but a few com-

mon examples of what individuals are taughtto do to help maintain harmony in interper-sonal relationships" (Argyris and Schon1974:83).

Argyris and Schon argue that the tools ofinterpersonaldiplomacy-things like defer-ence and demeanor, politeness, embarrass-ment, norms of etiquette, face work, reme-dial and supportive interchanges, accountsand apologies, tolerance, access rituals, androle distance (Goffman 1953, 1959, 1961b,1963a, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1981)-ac-tually support Model I, thereby sustainingandperpetuating he dysfunctionalbehaviorsassociated with it. In fact, from the perspec-

tive of Argyris and Schon, Goffman's life-long work was dedicated to unearthing,de-scribing, and systematizing humanity's de-structivebut "natural"Model I behavior.8

What this implies, then, is that Goffman'sdescription of the interaction order, and thevast array of interpersonalrituals containedtherein, amounts to documenting the wayspersons go about the business of living andcoping in a world of "pseudo-authenticity."

Model I generates and regenerates a state ofpseudo-authenticity, especially insofar aspersons tend to minimize negative feelingsand their expression.

As we have seen, then, the governing vari-ables of Model I consist of competitive, win/

8 argue (Chriss forthcoming) that the behav-iors that Argyris and Schon describe as self-seal-ing, defensive, andultimatelydestructiveactuallyembody the negational self. The negational selfis a self by default in that most public declara-tions of self amount to specifying what the self isnot. This can be accomplished through role dis-tancing or through self-effacement and modestyabout the self. Through these behaviors personsattempt to demonstrate the ideals of a well-de-meaned individual. Habermas (1984), too, sideswith Argyris and Schon in emphasizing truth-tell-

ing as part and parcelto reasonedcommunication,thereby tending to cast politeness and other eti-quette norms into the realm of the irrationalsince

they can work to mask persons' truthful assess-ments of a situation. Kingwell (1993:392) warns,however, that any reconstructionof rational pre-suppositions in communication, such as embod-ied in Habermas's theory of communicative ac-tion, would have to include those propositionsas-sociated with politeness, especially as specifiedby Grice (1975) and Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1967,1963a, 1971).




lose, rational, and diplomatic behaviors that

are "self-sealing."9 These are examples ofwhatHabermas 1984, 1987) would call "sys-

tematically distorted communication." For

most large-scale organizations, distortedcommunication is a day-to-day, operationalreality. As Forester(1989) explains,

Whethern thepublicorprivate ector,organi-zationsarenotegalitarian topias;differencesof status,powerandauthority,nformationndexpertise, nterestsand desiresabound.Thoserealities-includingthe incompetentmanager,the arrogantsection head, the misinformedstaff analyst, he fight betweendeveloperandregulator-cannotbe wishedaway.(P. 8)

It is no great revelation that much of the

dysfunctional Model I behavior with which

Argyris and Schon are concerned is ex-

pressed or expressible in talk. Likewise, it isno surprise that the corrective measures

which they propound-as specified in their

"Model II" programof theories-in-use-aretargeted at organizational communication

and face-to-face behavior.

Argyris and Schon (1974) suggest thatModel II's governing variables are an im-

provement over Model I's because they are

not self-sealing, but instead tend to permitmore effective testing of interactants' as-

sumptions and greater learning about one's

effectiveness as a communicatorand/or nter-

preter. For example, the primary governing

variable of Model II, namely maximizing

valid information, means that an actor pro-vides others with directly observable data so

that others may make valid attributionsaboutthe actor (Argyris and Schon 1974:86). The

organizational consultant's job, then, is to

show organizational actors how to make the

transitionfrom Model I-self-sealing behav-

ior-to Model II-open and honest behavior

based on maximizing valid information,

maximizing free and informed choices, and

maximizing internal commitments to deci-

sions made. Argyris and Schon spell out in

some detail the steps that instructors typi-

cally take in helping participants actuallylearn Model II behavior(see 1974:110-136).

The differences between Habermas andGoffman is thus illuminated by the analysis

of the work of consultants, especially thosewho are considered experts in the observa-tion of face-to-face interactionin a variety ofsettings-often organizationalones.

The empirical context thus established, Inow return o Habermas's theory itself. In an

attempt to describe and clarify the methodsof reasoning employed by Habermas in hisTheory of Communicative Action (1984,1987), Baldamus (1992:100) provided a ci-tation analysis of that work.Not surprisingly,

Baldamusfound that of the 220 authorscitedby Habermas,the top 5 were (by total num-ber of citations) Parsons (180), Weber(140),Durkheim (76), Mead (75), and Marx (69).Much further down the list, cited only 4times, is Goffman. I evaluate Habermas'sbrief treatmentof Goffman and suggest theways in which Goffman's theory might helpconnect Habermas'sovertly analytical theoryof communicative action to the empirical so-

cial world.

HABERMAS ON THE CONCEPTS OF

TELEOLOGICAL, NORMATIVE,DRAMATURGICAL, AND

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

Habermas (1984) defines "communicativeaction" as "the interaction of at least two

subjects capable of speech and action whoestablish interpersonalrelations (whether by

verbal or by extra-verbalmeans)" (p. 86).10

9"Self-sealing" behavioris behavior thatcloses

off public testing of the assumptions of one's or

other's theories-in-use, therebyreducing learning

and hence freezing actors in static and potentiallydestructive worlds. An example of the self-seal-

ing process is as follows. Actor A believes that

actor B is defensive: If A cannot test this belief

and if A acts according to his hunch, B probablywonders why A is behaving in this way. There-

fore B acts cautiously. A senses B's caution and

may interpretit as evidence that B is indeed de-

fensive. A believes that if he were to reveal his

feeling that B is defensive, his relationship with

B would become less manageable. A's reluctance

to confront B means that B in turn need not con-

front the incongruity between B's espousedtheory and his theory-in-use. But also as a result,A's behavior is incongruentwith his values. Thenorms supporting ncongruity and minimizing ex-

pression of negative feelings are reinforced,

thereby exacerbating A's negative or uncertainfeelings about B (Argyris and Schon 1974:77).

10This obviously excludes so-called "self-talk." Goffman (1978, 1981) deals with specific




Obviously, language is itself prominent inHabermas's model-it is the mediumthrough which individuals interpret eachother's plans of action while negotiatingdefi-

nitions of the situation. Ideally these nego-tiations, if they are to lead at all to a final(even if only provisional) definition of thesituation, must first and foremost define con-sensus among the participants.

This process of achieving understanding

through language is for Habermas the defin-ing problem in the theory of communicative

action. As Habermas (1984) explains, "Theconcept of reaching an understanding sug-gests a rationally motivated agreement

among participantsthat is measured againstcriticizable validity claims" (p. 75). Haber-mas's theory of communicative action, then,attemptsto treatrationalityfrom a universal-istic perspective.Thatis, in attemptingto de-lineate the normative foundations of a criti-cal theory, Habermassuggests that these es-sential concrete normsare implicit in the va-lidity claims of all speech.

Habermas then expands this provisional

concept of communicativerationalityby ana-lyzing the ontological assumptions of ratio-

nality embedded in a variety of social-scien-tific theories of action. Habermas(1984:85)suggests that this "profusionof action con-

cepts" can be reducedin essence "tofour ba-

sic, analytically distinguishable concepts" ortheoretical traditions:(1) teleological action,

(2) normatively regulatedaction, (3) drama-

turgical action, and (4) his own communica-tive action.

Habermas evaluates the worthinessandso-phistication of the four theoretical perspec-tives on action with respect to how each sat-

isfies the criteria of a three-world model.

Habermas's (1984:95) three analyticalworlds correspond to the three ways social

actors relate to the everyday world, namely,objectively, socially, and subjectively. Thisthreefold relation of communicative actors to

their world identifies different forms or di-

mensions of understandingthat members ofa society gain as a result of their interactionwith others as well as through other routinesocial practices. Habermas argues that the

four theoretical perspectives on action varyin the extent to which each is able to illumi-nate these relations. He lists these theories inrankorder:Teleological action is at the weakend of the explanatory spectrum, and pro-gressing to the most efficacious of the theo-ries, Habermas's own communicative actiontheory is at the strong end.

Teleological Action

Since teleological concepts of action-suchas those of utilitarianism,behaviorism,or ra-tional-choice theory-emphasize primarilythe strategic or goal-orientedcalculations ac-tors employ in pursuing courses of action,Habermassuggests that this concept can onlyaccount for one world, namely the objectiveworld. As the actor is engaged in a decisioncalculus that takes into account the elementsof his or her action options in relation to the

constraints and exigencies of the objectiveworld, the intendedeffect in the world or theresults of his or her strivings will in the endbe judged a success or failure according tocriteria of truth and efficacy (Habermas1984:87). The implications of teleologicaltheory is that action, as realized throughthecognitive processes of a knowing subject, isrepresented only as a relation between theactor and a world. At the level of its onto-logical presuppositions, then, teleologicalaction operates from a highly demarcated,and for Habermas's purposes, insufficientone-world concept.

Normatively Regulated Action

Whereas teleological action operates from alimited one-world perspective, normativelyregulated action (such as Parsons) presup-poses relations between an actor and two

worlds (Habermas1984:88). Actors depictedin the normatively regulated concept of ac-tion are endowed with a "motivationalcom-

plex" in addition to teleology's lower-level"cognitive complex."The motivational com-

plex makes norm-conformativebehaviorpos-sible in that actorsjudge whether or not theactions of themselves or anotheractor are in

forms of self-talk, such as imprecations and

curses (e.g., "ouch ," "damn ,""jeez ," "oops ").Habermas (1979) chastises Goffman, however,for lumping together identity-threatening acts,which are authentic emotional-expressive in-

stances of self-talk, with spill cries, such as thosementioned above, which are more impulsive and

not overtly calculated as face-saving devices.




accord with existing norms (Habermas1984:89). Beyond providing judgments ofthe extent to which actions are successful or

unsuccessful in relation to the objective

world, the normatively regulated modelof

action also provides for judgments of an ac-

tor in his or her relation to the social world,

insofar as the actor is able to comply with

(or is unable or chooses not to meet) the nor-

mative expectations of the membersof his or

her social group. This is a two-world model

because, as Habermas (1984) explains, the

concept of norm-conformative action "pre-

supposes that the agent can distinguish the

factual [objective] from the normative ele-

ments of an action situation, that is, condi-tions and means from values" (p. 90).

Goffman 's Dramaturgical Model of Action

Habermas then discusses the concept of

dramaturgical action. Like normativelyregu-

lated action, dramaturgicalaction provides atwo-world model, the two worlds comprising

the objective andsubjective dimensions of an

actor's relation to the world.Goffman's actor''works the system for the enhancement of

self' through self-presentation and impres-

sion management.This idea is, for Habermas,strongly reminiscent of the kind of goal-

orientedness characteristic of teleological(strategic)action. As Habermas 1984) states,

"The dramaturgicalqualities of action are in

a certain way parasitic; they rest on a struc-

ture of goal-directed action" (p. 90).In addition to the objective world, drama-

turgical action depicts a subjective world;actors involved in self-presentation must

form a "visible public" with regardto their

audience.For the theorist,then, this model of

action opens up a subjective world of actorsmaking "stagedpresentations"beforea group

of others. In other words, we peer inside the

"black box" of the subjective workings lurk-

ing behind and animating an actor's overt

behavior.As Habermas (1984) explains, the

concept of dramaturgicalaction suggests that"the actor is oriented to his own subjectiveworld in the presence of his public" (p. 93).

Important to note here is that unlike the

concept of normatively regulated action,

Habermas argues that dramaturgicalaction

does not allow for understandingor explain-ing the social world. In fact, he suggests that

all three of the aforementioned action con-cepts aredeficient with respect to at least oneof the three worlds.

Although each of the concepts (teleologi-

cal, normatively regulated, and dramaturgi-cal action) presupposes the importance oflanguage in explaining an actor's relation tothe world, Habermassuggests that only com-municative action incorporateslanguage as amedium for reasoned or noncoerced action-a medium throughwhich actors can actuallygain understandingand consensus as mem-bers of a societal community. As Habermas

(1984) explains,

Onlythe communicativemodelof action pre-supposesanguageas a mediumof uncurtailedcommunication hereby peakers ndhearers,out of the context of their preinterpretedlifeworld, efersimultaneouslyo things n theobjective,social, andsubjectiveworlds n or-derto negotiate ommondefinitions f thesitu-ation.(P. 95)

It is my position that Habermas's diagno-sis of the deficiencies of teleological, norma-tively regulated,and dramaturgicalconcepts

of action in explicating certaindimensions ofhis three-world model is for the most partsound. However, I explore further Haber-

mas's judgment that dramaturgical actionfails to adequately specify actors' relationsto the social world. I believe, in fact, thatHabermas'stheory of communicative action

may be fruitfully recast throughthe prism ofGoffman's (1974) frame analysis, especiallywith reference to "The Frame Analysis ofTalk" (Goffman 1974, chap. 13:496-559).11

Before moving on, however, I first review

II Because HabermaspublishedCommunicativeAction in 1981 (translatedfromGermanin 1984),it is perhaps the case that he had not yet readGoffman's Frame Analysis, which was first pub-lished in 1974 (and translated into German in

1980). Habermasnever cites FrameAnalysis, andit is hard to imagine that he would have come to

the same conclusions regarding the inadequaciesof dramaturgicalactionfor his own theoryof com-

municative action had he been familiar with itsmajorarguments.However, Habermas(1979) wasfamiliar with a paper of Goffman's-"Response

Cries"(Goffman 1978)-which later appearedin

an edited volume on human ethology (vonCranach, Foppa, Lepenies, and Ploog 1979) and

then was included in Goffman's Forms of Talk(1981). However, Goffman does not refer to ormention Frame Analysis anywhere in that paper.




Habermas'sdiscussion of validity claims and

the rationality assumptions underlyingcom-

municative action.

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, RATION-ALITY, AND VALIDITY CLAIMS

To reiterate,Habermas s concerned first and

foremost with an analytical program that,

through the generative assumptions of uni-

versalizableethics (norms)and social actors'

capacity for moral reasoning and rationality

(Benhabib 1992:24), attempts to delineate

criteria for and the possibility for nonco-

erced, or communicative, action. The prob-

lem of rationality is thus reintroduced inHabermasinsofar as the conditions for such

a communicatively achieved, reasonable

consensus among actors must be grounded

in the possibility of actors' communicativerationality,this being "thecompetency to ar-

gue and the imperative of responsibility

[throughlanguage]" (Hinkle 1992:317; alsosee Hayim 1992).

Habermas's attempt to designate criteria

for noncoerced, or communicative, actionhinges on the explication of three validity

claims that represent the binding force of

communicative acts. A speaker raises all ofthe following validity claims with his or her

utterances,as every speech act could be con-

tested on the following grounds:

(1) Hearer can contest the normative right-

ness of the utterance(social world).

(2) Hearer can contest the subjective truth-

fulness of the utterance (subjectiveworld).

(3) Hearer can deny that certain existential

presuppositionsobtain (objective world).

Habermas (1984) offers the following ex-

ample to illustrate these validity claims:

A seminarstudentunderstandshe followingrequestbyaprofessor: Pleasebringme aglassof water."P. 306)

As this is not a simple imperative or sheerexpression of will, but a speech act carried

out in an "attitude oriented to understand-

ing,"the student may contest its validity with

the following responses:

(1) No. You can't treatme like one of youremployees contestinghenormativeight-nessof the utterance].

(2) No. You really only want to put me in abadlightin frontof the otherseminarpar-ticipants[contesting he subjectivetruth-fulnessof theutterance].

(3) No.Thenext water ap s so far awaythatIcouldn'tget backbefore heend of the ses-sion[denying hat he appropriatebjectiveconditionsobtain]. (Habermas1984:306;comments n brackets ddedby author)

The student is, in the first case, contestingthe action of the professor; in the second,contesting that the professor means what hesays; in the third, denying the truth of propo-sitions the professor has presupposed in thegiven situation. This holds, according to

Habermas, for all speech acts oriented toreachingunderstanding.

Habermasattemptsto somehow find a wayto institute the binding normative (moral)conditions obtaining in the "ideal speechsituation" across the entire societal commu-nity. He admits that this is, at present, a

purely utopiangoal, as he is unable to locateinstances of communicative action at the in-stitutional level within modern, Western so-

ciety (see Sciulli 1989, 1992a, 1992b). It is,first andforemost, the problemof modernity,what Habermasrefers to as the shearing offof system from the lifeworld.'2 But unlikemany critics of modernity, Habermasis un-willing to reject the project of Enlighten-

ment, which he construes as the quest for therational foundations of a critical sociology.

This quest is, I believe, worthwhile and im-

portant, and hence my concern is to helpreach this goal by attemptingto link Haber-

mas's analytical theory of communicativeaction to the empirical social world. In a

somewhat more critical vein, I suggest that

Habermas must take more seriously Goff-

12 In attemptingto complete the project of mo-

dernity, Habermas knows full well the sorts of

social pathologies that must be addressed to de-

fend modernity against recent postmodern(meta)critiques(especially those of Lyotard, Fou-

cault and Baudrillard). Habermas's "shearing offof the lifeworld" equates to a concern with the

deleterious effects of instrumentalrationality on

the everyday social world (lifeworld). The ongo-ing rationalization of society has caused a split

between system and lifeworld. This implies twoforms of societal integration: (1) The lifeworld is

integratedby communicative action, whereby ac-

tors work to achieve consensus through language;




man's (1959, 1981, 1983a, 1983b) insights

into the forms of talk that occur in the gen-

eral context of human communicationforged

through simple co-presence (i.e., the "inter-

action order").

BRINGING GOFFMAN BACK IN

Habermas'sconcern with the problem of cur-

tailed communication,and of communication

more generally, is sharedby Goffman. Thatis, like Habermas, Goffman spent his entire

career investigating communicativeaction or

conduct, but from an empirical or ethno-graphic perspective, not an overtly analytical

one. In his dissertation, "CommunicationConduct in an Island Community,"Goffman(1953) explains, "As the study progressed,

conversational interactioncame to be seen as

one species of social order"(p. 1).And later,citing Parsons (1951) and Barnard (1947),

Goffman lays out the fundamental assump-

tion underlying his sociological model of

communication: "I assume that conversa-

tional interaction between concrete persons

who are in each other's immediate presenceis a species of social order and can be stud-

ied by applying the model of social order to

it" (p. 33).Whereas Habermas's rationality assump-

tions are explicitly stated as three validity

claims, the assumption of rationalityis onlyimplicit in Goffman, as Parsons and others

had already worked out sophisticated sche-

mata to explain the place of rationalityin so-

cial order, or rather,in the "constitution"of

social actors operatingwithin the social sys-tem. The closest Goffman ever comes to di-

rectly dealing with the rationality problemis

through his theory of normal appearances

(see Goffman 1971). That is, per the drama-

turgical theory of action, social actorslearn-first through socialization and then

through imitation and experience-the tacit

cultural codes signaling an actor's proper de-meanor while in the presence of others.

Goffman's actor can thus modify presenta-tions of self appropriately to "fit" any par-ticular interaction episode so as to signal to

those present that he or she is a reasoned or"rational"actor (i.e., that he or she is a rati-fied participant in the social proceedings,that he or she belongs there, that he or she isnot "crazy"or deranged, that he or she is nota threat).An actor's minimum requirements

for maintainingnormalappearances throughthe display of his or her verbal and/or non-verbal actions means that no undue alarm issignaled to others present.

Goffman and Habermas part company onthe epistemological assumptions embeddedwithin each of their theories that pertain toeach theorist's ability to conceptualize whatis going on in the minds of social actors; call

it the problem of Verstehen,or phenomeno-

logical "intersubjectivity," r more generally,subjective understanding. Habermas, in

viewing dramaturgical action, operates ex-

plicitly with a "black box" concept of action(to be discussed more fully below). Goffmanhowever rejects this position in his own theo-ries. For Goffman, Habermas's view of com-munication is overly rationalistic. To under-

stand this divergence, we turn to Goffman'sFrame Analysis (1974), specifically his dis-

cussion of the "FrameAnalysis of Talk."

Goffman's Frame Analysis of Talk

The one thing that makes the idea of com-

municative action possible is that, using lan-

guage, disparate actors can reach consensus

on issues at hand. Goffman's idea of linguis-tic competence is close to Habermas's: Indi-viduals in the presence of otherspossess cul-

tural competence in that they are generally

able to avoid misunderstandings n their ev-eryday communication. (Notice though, for

example, the "cute mistakes" that children

are allowed in theirspeech; they are assumedto lack a fully developed communicative

competence. ) Goffman discusses conversa-

tion-the traditionalview of which "assumesan easy exchange of speaker-hearer role

(2) at the systems level, functional integrationin-

tertwines action with theirconsequences. The lat-

ter form of integration is guided by the

"objectivating attitude," the former by the

"performative attitude." Because abstract and

generalized criteriaare encompassed in many fac-ets of life (e.g., legal norms,economic action, thenorm of cognitive rationality), the "system" may

be seen as operating with a life of its own, withlittle or no reference to the actual activity of par-

ticipants of the lifeworld. This system domination

occurs through the ongoing rationalization (or

what Habermas calls the "colonization") of the

lifeworld.




[wherebyparticipantsare] engaged in a con-

summatorymoment" (Goffman 1974:498)-merely as a foil. Habermas shares this tradi-

tional, hyperrational view of conversation,

and as a consequence tends to gloss over theactual social context of talk, which, I would

suggest, Goffman has successfully incorpo-

rated. In other words, Habermasneeds Gof-

fman's fuller communication paradigm to

flesh out his own theory of communicative

action.From Goffman's perspective, all utter-

ances, whetherformal or informal, regulative,

expressive, constative,directive, commissive,

or declarative-are first and foremost an-

chored in the surrounding world.'3 As he(Goffman 1974:500) states, "utterancestake

up a place in the world";they are, following

Durkheim,"social facts." Utterances produce

reactions or orientations of actors, thereby

contributingto the productionof an ongoing

social world. Most importantfrom the per-

spective of dramaturgy, talk is always a

project imbued with "structuredsuspense"

(Goffman 1974:506).

Suspense in talk implies that "we spendmost of our time not engaged in giving infor-

mation but in giving shows" (Goffman 1974:

508). The implications for Habermas's

project are staggering. Habermas'stheory is

driven by an information paradigm.That is,

social life is more or less a continuous battle

over the status, the validity, the appropriate-

ness, the truthfulness,of knowledgeclaims-

the problem of information exchange and

transfer drives Habermas's theory. But for

Goffman, talk constitutes not only bald state-

ments of fact; talk is also about recounting,about "story-telling."Much of talk consists

of replayings in which a storytellermaintains

the listeners' suspense. This suspense pro-vides frames for the organizationof talk.

The purely informational perspective

(Habermas) leads, in Goffman's view, to an

unacceptablyutilitarianview of talk or com-

munication. The "rational recounting" of

facts between participants in communicationimplies the black-box model of interactants

(Goffman 1974:51 1). Furthermore, ontinuesGoffman, "this utilitarianlike approach to

speech ill equips us for what individuals ac-tually do during speaking" (p. 512). The

black-box model of information exchange is

a simplification because in actuality the "in-sides of the actor's head are exposed in ways

other than through voluntary statements or

involuntary eakage" (p. 514). Going beyondthe black-box model, Goffman (1974:515)gives examples of nonutilitariantalk such as

"collusive communication,"whereby one can"conceal speech behind speech" by convey-

ing information via sarcasm, irony, innu-endo, or simple fun. Habermasdeals some-what inadequatelywith the collusive frame,

and would tend to write it off as strategic ac-

tion, which, in any case, would not meet hisstandards or communicative action.

Goffman (1974) suggests that the "tradi-

tional model of the actor whose facial fea-turesare his evidential boundary does not fit

the facts but instead somehow overration-

alizes man"(p. 515). However, notice thatanactor may guide his or her behavior to fit the

black-box model-to align with normative

strictures of the perceived moral universe:In

Goffman's (1974) words, "he has guided his

conduct so as to ensure this fit, sustaining a

human natureto fit the frame" (p. 516). This

is Goffman's "normal appearances,"which

Habermasmistakes for first-level rationalac-

tion. Goffman illustrates the complexity, theframe-within-a-frame possibilities, of rea-

soned communication.Additionally, Habermas says very little

about what Goffman refers to as the "ritual

frame of talk."This is when listener providesto speakeran intermittentstream of support-ive gestures: "uh-huhs,""yeahs,"nods of the

head, sustaining eye contact so as to signal

interest in the talk, and so forth. This ritual

frame reflects the accommodating patternof

face-to-face interaction. The speaker, of

course, also plays a role in accommodation,as the "life of talk consists principally of re-

living," or replaying, sustained by suspense

(Goffman 1974:547). In other words, naked

performative utterances, such as a bridge

player's bid of "threeclubs," are only a mi-

nuscule element of the frame of talk. What is

important,especially if we are to link Haber-

13 As Collins and Makowsky (1993:268) note,

Habermas attaches one particulartype of speech

act, namely expressives, to Goffman's dramatur-

gical theory of action in that for Habermas, ac-

tors represent (or can misrepresent)their subjec-

tive states or inner selves to others through dra-

matic presentation.




mas's theory to the empirical social world, is

that in talk a person always frames him- orherself from view. An important quote from

Goffman (1974) illustrates this point:

To say thathe [the speaker] ssumesa roleandpresentshimselfthrought is alreadya biasinthe directionof wholeness and authenticity.Whathe doesis topresent one-man how.Heanimates.P. 547)

This animationis the speaker's agency, his

or her "doing of the moment." There oftenare, as Habermashas rightly noted, truefeel-

ings and attitudes expressed in talk, and in-

ner states can be documented (the famous

black-box). "But,"as Goffman (1974) sug-gests, "these displays arenot some privilegedaccess to the biological innards of the

speaker,for they areproperlyto be attributed

to a figure animated, not the animator"(p.547). This is Goffman's (1983b) notion of

"loose coupling," the difference between the

mythic and the performance text-or theslippages that occur between social structure

and individual human acts.

Goffman (1974) makes this extremelyim-portant point: "Everyday life, which is real

enough in itself, often seems to be a lami-

nated adumbrationof a patternor model thatis itself a typification of quite uncertain

realm status" (p. 562). This is what Garfinkel

(1967) and others havedescribedas the "per-

ceived moral universe,"the normative view

of the world that individual actors carry

aroundin their heads, or what Durkheimre-

fers to as the "collective conscience." From

Goffman's perspective, everyday activityprovides an original againstwhich copies canbe struck.

Attempting to Reconcile Goffman and

Habermas

As we have seen, Habermas'sgoal is to out-

line a research programfor a universalprag-

matics that identifies and reconstructs the

universal conditions of possible understand-ing between actors. This goal, of course,turned Habermas's attention toward the

realm of "practicaldiscourse,"and to specifythe criteria or conditions for possible nonco-

erced action, this practicaldiscourse must be

aimed at "understanding" rather than at

"success."

For Habermas then, "success" is an overlystrategic orientation that often overrides themore crucial goal of "understanding" n ac-tion or communication. What Goffman's ob-

servations on talk help us see, however, isthat Habermas's distinction between "suc-cess" and "understanding"n talk is an over-specification of a process thatmay be imper-vious, at least at this time, to the sort of ana-lytical fine-tuning Habermas seeks. Granted,

persons often "put on shows" in talk, theymay attempt to deceive, and there are oftencalculated shifts in the alignment of speak-ers and hearers (what Goffman calls shifts in"footing") as the context of the talk dictates

(Goffman 1981:127). But much of this seem-ingly "strategic"action is not necessarily ori-ented to success, that is, a speaker's instru-

mental attempt to achieve some goal at theexpense of his or her audience (see Rawls1987:143-44). In fact speakers do indeed at-tempt to achieve understanding throughtalk-Habermas's communicative action-and they utilize the props, mechanisms, andprocesses that Habermas erroneously con-

demns as evidence of a speaker'sstrategic orcoercive intent.14

Much of the content of talk is, as Goffman

shows, suffused with the very humanattemptto illustrate to others through speaker's talkthe presence of a stable, concerted self (seemy discussion of the "negationalself' [Chrissforthcoming]). In other words, everyday life

is guided by fictive or romanticized ideals

(norms) about the way life ought to be con-ducted. We learn to comportourselves to ren-

der our activities as agreeable to others, andto show through our presentations that wehavea consistent, stablepersonato which our

identity is connected. As Goffman (1974)

suggests, "Indeed, in countless ways and

ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes

14 Collins and Makowsky (1993) make muchthe same point, suggesting that Habermasseems

to view Goffman's theory as concerned primarily

with the ways that actors express or conceal sub-jective states before a group of others. But, as Iargue here, this view of Goffman is overly nar-row. Rather, "The self may be a 'sacred object'

to which we give ritual respect, but by the sametoken it is also a modern myth which actually

fluctuates with the footings one takes in different

levels of social interaction"(Collins and Makow-

sky 1993:270; also Chriss 1993).




into itself the understandings we have of it"(p. 563).

It is no wonder, then, that Goffman dedi-cated so much of his professional energies to

mapping out where, how, and to what extent"real" life becomes theatrics or even down-right deception. In effect, Habermas's ana-lytical program attempts to pick up fromGoffman's (and before him, Bateson's[1972]) starting point by suggesting thatthere is a way to make such a distinction, thisbeing the distinction between authentic (non-coerced) and inauthentic(coerced or staged)communication.

The problem of communicative action, un-

derstood in this way, leads us to consider thefollowing from Goffman (1974):

Life maynotbe an imitationof art,but ordi-naryconduct, n a sense, is an imitation f theproprieties, gestureat the exemplary orms,and the primalrealizationof these ideals be-longs more o make-believe han o reality. P.562)

Persons in talk, according to Goffman, al-ways walk a tightropealong thereality/make-

believe continuum, not because there is nec-essarily some devious or underhanded easonfor doing so, but because of the inherentlytenuous and shifting positions speakers oc-cupy while talking. Goffman's (1981:147)idea of "embedding"suggests just this; thatas speakers we represent ourselves throughthe personal pronoun "I."As speakerswe area figure in a statement,a protagonistin a dra-matic event told (or retold).

When we refer to ourselves in talk, we

necessarily speak of someone who inhabitsthe world that is spoken about, not necessar-ily the world of current talk. It is first and

foremost a knowledge claim, but not in theway Habermas would designate. That is, thereferencing of self in talk throughuse of the

personal pronoun allows for a tremendous

flexibility of presentation(s)of self before anaudience (Bell 1984). In effect, we each have

at our disposal a wide arrayof naturallyoc-

curring dramatic personae from which todraw in normal everyday speech, and this isnot alarming.15

But in modern industrial societies, bur-geoning populations and increased levels ofanonymity are a feature of everyday interac-tion. In this environment,the increased flex-

ibility and decreased accountability of self-presentations may indeed contribute to therise of a whole new range of framing de-bates, such as the imbroglios which haveeruptedrecently over abortion,speech codes,or even sexual harassment. This particularline of investigation cannot be pursued fur-ther here because it would take us too farafield (butsee Chriss 1994b; Horowitz 1993;Wiley 1994). I emphasize, however, thatconceptualizations of the self, and especially

the question of the sincerity of the presentedself (see Tseelon 1992a), are central issuesin the theory of communicative action.

ISSUES OF ORGANIZATIONS ANDPROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

In summarizing my thoughts on Habermas,Goffman,andcommunicativeaction, I returnnow to issues of organizations and profes-

sional practice-consulting, management,evaluation,and planning.One of the areas inwhich sociologists can claim a degree ofcompetence is social interaction, or morespecifically, face-to-face behavior. For ex-ample, studentsor disciples of Goffman maychoose to follow his lead regarding the ob-servation and understandingof face-to-faceinteraction in naturalistic settings. For re-searchers so inclined, the dramaturgicaltheory of action provides a general frame-

work for describing, analyzing, assessing, orexplicating concrete instances of such talk inany number of settings, be it a party,an of-fice meeting, a therapygroup session, a ser-vice transaction, a chess match, a war-gamersconvention, or what have you.

Several years ago I spent the summer

workingfor a largephilanthropic oundation.I was hired to conduct a meta-evaluation ofthe foundation's evaluation research unit.

Because the foundationprided itself on hav-ing a "flat" organizational hierarchy,I gen-erally had free access to all departmentaland

managementmeetings as well as to key or-ganizationalactors, such as the executive di-rector and the heads of the various depart-ments (these being religion, culture, educa-tion, policy analysis, international affairs,

15 For example, "hedges" and "qualifiers," inthe form of performative modal verbs (e.g., I"wish," "think," "could," "hope," etc.) introducedistance between a speaker's figure and itsavowal (Goffman 1981:148).




communications, and evaluation). Through

both formal and informal discussions withemployees of the foundation, it became ap-parent to many of them that Goffman's work

was central to my own understandingand in-terpretationof social behavior.Within two weeks of my arrival,I sensed a

growing uneasiness, and even suspicion,among many at the foundation.Much of this

had to do, I believe, with Goffman's reputa-

tion for turningajaundiced eye towardorga-nizations, and organizational actors more

generally, as evidenced by his infamous

expose of "total institutions"reported n Asy-lums (1961a). What I suggest is thatmany in

organizations or organizationalstudies seemto have a one-sided or incomplete view of

Goffman's theory-one that views him as

overtly concernedwith exposing the darkun-

derbelly or the "crawlspaces" of organiza-tions.16

Ingram (1986) perhaps best typifies thisparticularsentiment;he suggests that the no-tion of organizational "underlife"was firstproposed by Goffman (1961a). According to

Ingram's reading of Goffman, the underlifeof an organization is composed of organiza-tional members who, while maintaining a

level of organizational identification and ap-pearing to fulfill organizationalroles, engagein behaviors that violate organizational ex-

pectations and yield unauthorized rewards.The crawlspace of an organization, then, is

the structureof arrangements hat supportor

even promote underlife existence.

Confronted with this rather negative as-

sessment of Goffman at the foundation, orrather, confronted with the abiding conten-

tion that Goffman has little to offer in the

way of explicating organizational behavior,

my next step was to determine what litera-ture or traditions of thought guided the day-

to-day theories-in-use of these professional

practitioners, especially the evaluators andconsultants at the foundation with whom Ihad regularcontact.17

As we saw in an earlier section, a sizable

portion of the research traditionguiding or-ganizational evaluators and consultants isrepresented by Argyris's (1993a, 1993b;Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989) and Schon's(1983) "action research."This traditionis inturn derived from Lewin's (1943, 1951) re-search on small groups, and it is importantto note here the major aims of Lewin'sproject. As a (psychological) social psy-chologist, Lewin was attempting to establishin systematic fashion the links between an

individual's behavior and attitudes and cer-tain characteristicsof groups; he devoted at-tention to the spatial andtemporalcharacter-istics determininggroup stability or change.Lewin's work was originally formulatedwithin the context of problems communitiestypically face with regardto attitudechange,loyalty, and in-group/out-grouprelations.

Whatemerges, then, from this brief reviewof Lewin's program is the realization that

Lewin was not satisfied merely to documentor describe the vagaries of face-to-face be-havior or group life; his primary goal was tounderstand and establish the conditions un-der which attitudechange could be affectedor facilitated. As Back (1981) explains,

Thekindof group hatemerges rom[Lewin' ]model s one thathasmeaningor the membersandthat s especiallyeffectivein producing rpreventing ttitude hange n its members.The

16 There may also exist within organizations

high levels of skepticism toward intellectuals or

academicians in general, regardlessof their theo-retical or philosophical orientation, especially

those who are not well known to members of theorganization. Kanter's (1977) fieldwork appears

to confirm this atmosphereof anti-intellectualism

in formal organizations: "Emphasis was placed

on getting along, 'keeping your nose clean,' and

on having a smooth interpersonalstyle. Introspec-

tion was out. Intellectuals were suspect" (p. 41).

17 I am not implying here that Ingram's own

assessment of Goffman is negative. Ingram sim-ply points out that Goffman's work in Asylumswas important and influential primarily becauseit documented the ways persons cope in the faceof the stringent demands of a coercive organiza-tional or social structure. An underlife then be-

comes a survival tactic, a way of shoring up or

saving identities under siege. But academics orconsultants who go into organizations with the

intent of observing organizational behavior andwho are known to be sympathetic to Goffman's

approach may be seen by organizational actors as

carryingwith them an implicit assumptionof the

coercive nature of organizations. This, then, ex-plains the source of suspicion and negative as-sessments of the research observer (and of

Goffman) by organizations or their representa-tives.




model thus examines the conditions under

which members change andbegin to exhibit at-

titudes and beliefs similar to the group, or to

act in a similar way.... Lewin's interest was

in investigating conditions that could produce

attitudeand habit changes. (Pp. 330-3 1)

This instrumentalist, therapeutic impulse

of Lewin's work was carried over into the

traditionof organizationalbehavior (OB), in

which the aim of research is to help organi-

zations influence change, presumablyfor the

better. Argyris's action research (1993a,

1993b) is one such program in the applied

social psychology of organizations.'8

Argyris and Schon (1974) tend to view

Goffman's characterizationof social actors(especially his position on impression man-

agement and the presentationof self) as a fair

approximationof the naturallyoccurringbut

ultimatelydestructivetendenciestowardself-

sealing, defensive, and insincere behavior.

This naturally occurring Model I behavior

could, according to action research,be over-

come through a program that heightens or-

ganizational actors' self-realizations-that

is, a program that brings actors' espousedtheories more into line with their actualtheo-

ries-in-use. And throughthis change of atti-

tudes or behaviors, organizational learning

could therebybe advanced.

Habermas's program is also based on an

ameliorativeplan, namely the effortto assure

reasoned or noncoerced communication in

the face of multiple organizationalstructures

supportinginequality and differential power

that serve to cut off the possibility of con-

sensus or intersubjective understanding

through fair discussion or argumentation.But unlike Lewin's programor the program

of action research, Habermas does not see

Goffman's dramaturgical heory of action as

representing some fundamental, albeit

flawed, description of the human condition

that could somehow be overcome through a

critical programof attitudechange or self-re-

alization. This is because Goffman's drama-

turgy cannot assure intersubjective under-standing between actors because, in

Habermas'sview, it has no way of providing

access to the social (normative) world, one

of Habermas's three key analytical worlds

(the othersbeing the objective and subjective

worlds). In other words, communicative ac-

tion can be realized only if social actors havefree and undistortedaccess to the three va-

lidity claims of propositional truth, norma-

tive rightness, and subjective truthfulness.

CONCLUSION

How has Habermas's ameliorative program

of communicativeaction been received in the

literatureon organizations and professions,

and how does it compare to the reception of

Goffman's work? It is safe to say thatHabermas's work, and critical theory more

generally, has been much more influential

and more seriously discussed in these fields

than has Goffman's work.19A good exampleof this is Holmes's (1992) paper, entitled

"TheDramaof Nursing."In the recent litera-

ture on organizations and the professions,much has been made of conceiving of pro-

fessions as a form of aesthetic praxis, the

goal being to provide a more stable analyti-cal foundation for the concept "profession"

through the identification and linking of

these so-called performativepractices to the

concept itself. Holmes's (1992) contrast be-

tween Goffmanand critical theory is instruc-

tive for our discussion:

In contrastto Goffman's dramaturgy,whichstresses he artificeof socialrelationsandsug-gests a cynicalview of human nteractions,

critical heoryof dramatic raxis ntroducesnormativedimensionin which performancemaybecome elf-realizing ndemancipatorysit aspiresto the statusof aestheticpractice.Conceived n suchterms,nursingpracticebe-comes a powerful form of self-expressionwhich has the potential o become liberatingforthenurseandthepatient. P.941)

Holmes's insistence that critical theory

adds a normative dimension to the under-

standing of actors' performances points tothe same failings of the dramaturgicalmodel

identified earlier by Habermas, namely that

Goffman's theory of action cannot explain

18Lewin's work was also influential in the de-

velopment of the organizational development

(OD) model of attitude or behavior change (see

Aguinis 1993; Marshak 1993).

19See for example Burrell's (1994) overview

of Habermas's contribution to organizational

analysis.




why actors would ever engage, or choose toengage, in norm-conformativebehavior.20

Again, it should be pointed out that thisincongruity between critical theory and

Goffman's theory on the issue of actors' ac-cess to the validity claim that assures, or atleast makes possible, appropriate social re-lations and normative rightness, evolvesfrom a disagreement over the ontology of

self-presentation and impression manage-ment. I have already discussed at somelength Goffman's position and my own de-fense of him on this issue, and the reasonsfor this disagreement should now be clear.In the final analysis, the contention between

Habermas and Goffman comes down to afundamentalquestion: Is the presentedself asincere self? As I suggested in my attemptto reconcile the views of Goffman and

Habermas (pp. 13-14), Tseelon (1992a,

1992b) goes a long way toward answeringthis question.21 Tseelon (1992a) argues thatthe tradition known as impression manage-ment (IM) (see Arkin 1980; Schlenker 1980;

Tedeschi 1981; Tedeschi and Melburg1984), although rooted in Goffman's (1959)seminal work on the presentation of self,has veered away from Goffman's originalintent in a number of crucial ways. Most im-portant, whereas Goffman's idea of"frontstage" and "backstage" attemptedmerely to illustrate how selves can be parti-tioned in terms of self-presentations beforea variety of audiences, IM's interpretationof this partitioning is that individuals pos-

sess distinctively "true"private selves anddistinctively "false" public selves. 22 Goff-man's actor puts on a variety of faces invarious settings and before particular audi-ences in an effort to comport him- or herselfto the exigencies of the social gathering andto uphold the definition of the situation.IM's social actor, on the other hand, has ahidden agenda as he or she goes about thebusiness of presenting the self; there is al-

ways a concerted effort to keep a private re-ality from surfacing during any particularpublic presentation.

Tseelon (1992a) explains the disjunctionbetween the GoffmantraditionandIM as fol-lows:

The Goffmanesqueapproachviews people'spresentational ehaviour s a processof nego-tiation.It is a gameof representation. In con-

trast, the position advanced by IM researchersviews presentational behaviour as manipula-

tive. According to this view people presentvarious images of themselves as a strategic

2()For an even more explicit treatment of

Habermas's importance to nursing practice, seePorter (1994). Even given this preference for

Habermas or critical theory over Goffman among

authors concerned with issues of professionalpractice, Habermas's program is neverthelessviewed by many as overly abstractand hopelesslydetached from the empirical social world.Robinson's (1994) discussion of Habermaswithrespect to the field of education and pedagogy isillustrative of this sentiment: "[Habermas's] work

does not provide a methodology thatis applicable

to the conduct or evaluation of dialogical prac-tice. Habermas's theory of communicativeactionis concerned to defend an ideal of rationality,founded in the universal presuppositions of

speech, and this ideal cannot be directly appliedto everyday situations" (p. 72). What we need,suggests authors such as Robinson (1994),Frankford(1994), and Young (1989), is a way tomove from Habermas's"universalpragmatics" oan "empirical pragmatics,"the latter referring tothe study of actual utterances that occur in spe-cific social contexts. Given this emphasis on

empiricizing actual speech in concrete settings, it

is interesting that Goffman's work in this area

(e.g., 1971, 1974, 1981, 1983a) has been largely

ignored. Finally, in offering suggestions for pos-sible resources for pursuing such a critical in-

quiry, Robinson (1994) points to Argyris's(1993a, 1993b; Argyris and Schon 1974) action

research: "The work of Argyris offers a norma-

tive theory which is compatible with the value

base of critical theory and which incorporatesa

methodology by which it can be applied to dia-

logical sequences" (p. 72).

21 Welsh (1984) argues that the presented selfis a product of a capitalist society which places apremium on appearances. That is, because bu-reaucraticactors are constantly monitored and as-sessed with regard to their job performance andeffectiveness, this fetish of appearance has givenrise to an overweening emphasis on impressionmanagement on the part of these actors (also see

Willmott 1993). This view of the actor is closerto impression managements's, and even Haber-mas's, more cynical view of the actor as a savvymanipulator concerned merely with working the

system for the enhancement of self.22 For useful discussions of the divergence of

Goffman and IM within the context of organiza-tional behavior, see Giacalone and Beard (1994)and Rosenfeld, Giacalone, and Riordan(1994).




move. Unlike Goffman's approach,this 'game'

is not an end in itself but a means to an end of

gaining benefits. It is a game of misrepresenta-tion. (P. 116)

It is my contention that Habermas, as well

as many researchers working on therapeutic

approachesto improving communicationand

interaction practices in professions or orga-

nizations, tend to make the mistake of lump-

ing together Goffman's work and thatof IM.What Habermasandmany other astute social

thinkers have failed to understandclearly is

that, although all deceptive presentationsare

staged, not all staged presentations are de-

ceptive or geared towardobfuscation or dis-tortion.

The theory of communicative action, then,

must address two difficult and interrelated

issues-one ontological, one epistemologi-cal-if it is to advance any further.With re-

spect to ontology, the theory must specifymore concretely the nature of impressionmanagement,or rather, t must be able to an-

swer the question, to what extent is the pre-

sented self a naturally occurring aspect ofhuman interaction? With respect to episte-

mology, the theory must be able to address

the question, how are we to know the aimsor intent of the presentedself? And knowing

this, how then can we reconcile the realities

of impression managementwith the potentialfor communicative action contained in the

analytic of the presentedself?

These and others issues point the way to-

ward a continuing refinement of the theory

of communicative action and reaffirm theimportantrole that Goffman's dramaturgical

theory of action can play in achieving this

end. Most significantly, the achievement of

such an empirically-grounded heoryof com-municativeaction holds the potentialfor ush-

ering in a new era in applied sociology, es-

pecially with respect to the study and expli-cation of organizational behavior and com-

munication.

In fact, I envision a refinement of theHabermas-Goffman communicative action

schema which could eventually serve as the

basis for a clinical sociology practice. This

professional practice would involve helping

people, groups,or organizationsthat are hav-

ing difficulty-communicative or other-

wise-in their daily relationships. This

would not be a counseling service per se, aswould be typical of social work or psycho-therapeuticpractice (see Kubacki 1994), butwould involve applying the skills of

Verstehen to everyday situations, stressingthe social or cultural factors, rather than theindividual, psychological, or symptomo-logical factors, implicated in such distur-bances. I hope to develop and present thisapplied schema in a future work.

James J. Chrissrecentlycompletedhis Ph.D. insociology at the University f Pennsylvania.Hismainareas of interestare sociological theory,criminology,and organizationalbehavior.His

current rojectsncludea studyofhowmalesandfemalesdiffer n theirattitudes owardparticipa-tion in populardance,the sociology of consult-ing in organizations, mbezzlements an ongo-ing practicalaccomplishment,ndgettingErvingGoffman's issertation ublished.

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