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I

° National To&SecretForeign

- ,3 AssessmentCenter

Warsaw Pact Forcesin Czechoslovakia

A Research Paper

Information available as of! February 1980was used in the preparation of this report.

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To ecre

Warsaw Pact Forcesin Czechoslovakia

Overview Since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, both Czechforces and Soviet forces stationed there have been reorganized and equipped

- with newer weapons, and Pact plans for their use have been modified. In awar in Europe, Czech forces and the Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF)in Czechoslovakia would constitute the Southwest Front, one of three first-echelon Warsaw Pact fronts that would conduct the initial offensiveoperations against the NATO Central Region. This front would engageNATO forces in southern West Germany, in an area between Mannheimand the Swiss border.

As Soviet confidence in the reliability of Czech forces has grrwn, the Czechshave been given more responsibility for operations of the Southwest Front.This permits greater flexibility in Soviet planning for the use of the CGF'sfive ground divisions and small air force. Exercises since 1974 indicate that,if necessary, the CGF could be resubordinated to the Central Front or to the

- second-echelon Carpathian Front. The Soviets might also regard a reductionof the CG F as an acceptable option should an agreement be reached onmutual and balanced force reduction.

The most significant effect of the organizational and equipment changes inthe Czech ground forces has been an improvement in their conventionalartillery. Changes have included the formation of an artillery division as wellas increases in the artillery holdings of maneuver divisions. The Czech airand air defense forces are receiving late-model MIG-21s and MIG-23s.

In the CGF, modernization parallels that in other Soviet forces in CentralEurope but is proceeding at a slower pace. New equipment includes self-propelled artillery, mobile surface-to-air missiles, and ground attackhelicopters. Some expansion has also been noted in the tank and artilleryunits of motorized rifle regiments.

Czechoslovakia is overcommittedmilitaiy to the Warsaw Pact, devoting a greater proportion of population tostanding military forces than either Poland or East Germany. The armedforces, already taking a high percentage of annual draft eligibles, will face inthe future a generally smaller conscript pool as well as increasingcompetition for available manpower from the economic sector. Thesedemographic constraints leave little room for significant expansion of Czechforces in the near future

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Contents

PageOverview iiiCzechoslovak People's Army

Ground ForcesMobilization Divisions 6Air and Air Defense Forces 6The Czech Military Burden. 6

The Soviet Central Group of Forces 8Ground Forces 8Air Forces 9Service in Czechoslovakia 9Comparison With Other Groups of Forces 10

Wartime Organization and Role of Warsaw Pact Forces in Czechoslovakia I0Wartime Mission 10

- Mobilization and Reinforcement 12Logistics Considerations 13Czech Reliability 14

Expansion and Modernization 15Expansion of the Czech Ground Forces 15Acquisition of New Equipment in the Czech Ground Forces 15Modernization of Czech Air and Air Defense Forces 16

_ __ Modernization in the CGF 17Outlook 19

Continued Modernization 19Demographic Constraints 19Possibilities of Soviet Withdrawal 21

Figures

1. Peacetime Structure of Czech Armed Forces 22. Wartime Structure of Czech Armed Forces 33. Ground Forces in Czechoslovakia 44. Peacetime Disposition of Air and Air Defense Forces in 7

Czechoslovakia

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5. Divisional Artillery Changes in Czech 2nd 16Motorized Rifle Division

6. Organizational Changes Accompanying Nondivisional SAM 19Deployment in Western Military District

7. Czech Males Reaching Age 18 Annually 20

Tables

1. Organization and Manpower of Czech Ground Forces2. Organization and Manpower of Soviet CGF Ground Forces

in Czechoslovakia3. Projected Wartime Strengths of the Southwest Front4.5. Czech Organizational Changes6. Czech Equipment Modernization

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Warsaw Pact Forcesin Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovak People's Army important role in this territorial system, representing aBy Western standards of military organization, the key command level to ensure that t.he critical territo-Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA) would be con- rial support functions were carricd out and to governsidered a single unified armed service with three major the territory of Czechoslovakia through subordinateoperational components: regional and county territorial military administra-- A ground combat force comprising maneuver divi- tions

sions (motorized infantry and tank) and othercombat and support units, which in wartime would In peacetime, Czechoslovak ground forces are esti-be joined by Soviet forces stationed in Czechoslova- mated to total about 143,000 men and the air and airkia to form a front.' defense forces about 57,000.' In addition, the Border

- A tactical air army, which also is to be part of the Guards (9,500) and Civil Defense Troops (2,000) arewartime front. manned by conscripts and therefore are included in our

" An air defense army consisting of interceptor, estimate of the Czech armed forces total-aboutsurface-to-air missile, and radar units organized into 2 12 ,000.Lan integrated national air defense system.

Ground Forces. In peacetime, the ground forces areBehind these operational components is a unified subordinate to the two military districts, which roughlylogistics support and defense management structure divide the country in half (see figure 3). The military(see figure 1). The management structure at the district headquarters serves in the chain of commandMinistry of National Defense level consists of the between the Ministry of Defense and the tactical unitsGeneral Staff and four main directorates (for combat and is responsible for unit readiness and training. Itpreparedness, political affairs, rear services, and air also maintains links with the civilian population and isand air defense forces), as well as directorates to deal responsible, through the subordinate regional andwith the planning, procurement, training procedures, country military headquarters, for recruitment andand tactical doctrine of the various arms and services. conscription, billeting and construction, military trans-The implementing units for the service and logistic port, and other administrative and logistics functionssupport of the forces are similar to what are called in within its geographical area.the West "service of common concern" components.

Although the two Czechoslovak military districts areroughly equal in geographic terms, the Western

In wartime, a front headquarters would be formed, and Military District (WMD) has much larger forces thanthe field and tactical air armies would come under the Eastern Military District (EMD) (see table 1).Warsaw Pact operational command, for offensive This inequality has historical roots. A reorganizationoperations outside Czechoslovakia (see figure 2). in 1969 and 1970-planned in large part before theSupport and administrative units remaining within events of August 1968 but shaped to some extent byCzechoslovakia would form a territorial defense sys- the need to accommodate Soviet troops in Czechoslo-tem to be controlled ultimately by the Defense Council vakia-resulted in the merging of the former Westernof State through a territorial military command. The and Central Military Districts into a single district, thetwo military district headquarters would play an Western Military District. At the same time, divisional' In Warsaw Pact terminology afront is a joint forces command, manning was increased at the expense of some supportroughly analogous to a US army group, usually consisting of several units that were deactivated or reduced in size. Thefield armies and a tactical air army plus combat and service supportunits. The Czech-Soviet front has exercised under various designa- 'All rear services personnel serving both ground and aviationtions, depending on the primary focus of the exercise. It is most often units-that is, performing services of common concern-are counteddesignated the Southwest Front and will be referred to as such in this as ground force manpower.aper.

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Peacetime Structure of Czech Armed Forces Figure 1

Top iretat-ot . Moo9 2

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Co nba Oled afis)

Disrict Arn

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Wartime Structure of Czech Armed Forces Figure 2

1 The 7th Air Defense Army is integrated into the Warsaw Pact Air Defense Network

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Figure 3

Ground Forces in Czechoslovakia So" Sra" (Cea

Mitiarn district hdqarer C edqatr

pa" NpLFW ; A he "ad Bolters ( h

' nd s ch5 vTaki a

wARM WESTERN3"a !1,..a2on

-- n. 4^ Oomomc Eax :. re.r MILITARY 23-

x 4se 4*f T **' 41a ARMY r tm -

DISTRICT EASTERN i~a

ra MII~ MILITARY

To Germat DISTRICT

& ustriao

s.;Czech Foces Soviet Forces (CGF)

MR" distrnct headqurtr CG F headquarters

r otriedrifle diiinMotoized rifle divsion'

Tan dvson irTank division

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To p Secteet

Table 1 wartime front headquarters was moved from theMinistry of National Defense to the WMD headquar-

Organization and Madtpower of tcrs at Tabor. (In wartime, the WMD headquartersCzech Ground Forces would split to form both the headgqiartcrs of the

Southwest Front and a territorial headquarters toOrganization Mannn administer the geographic area of the district.)

Peacetime Wartime The WMD incorporates most of the Czech groundHedqurrters, support, 35,000 40,000 forces, including all of the highest strength divisionsarW rear serices and virtually all of tLe nondivisional elements of

operational significance. The two Czech armies, theWestern Miltary District 1st Army (with headquarters at Pribram) and the 4thHeadquarters, combat support, 15,000 65,000 Army (with headquarters at Pisek), are subordinate inand rear services peacetime to the WMD headquarters. Each army1st Army controls four divisions: the 1st Army has three

Ist Tank Division 7,000 9,000 motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) and one tank divi-2nd Motorized 8,500 11,400 sion (TD); the 4th Army has two MRDs and two TDs.Rine Division19th Motorized 8,500 11,400Rifle Division A front-level artillery division (subordinate te the20th Motorized 8,800 11,400 WMD headquarters in peacetime and to the front inArmy support and 11,600 30000- wartime) has been formed in recent years. An addi-rear services ' tional artillery brigade is subordinate to each army.

4th Army The Czechs have three Scud missive brigades, all in the4th Tank Division 6,800 8,800 WMD, with one subordinate to the district and one to9th Tank Division 7,000 9000 each of the two armies. All of the mobile SAMs (SA-4s15th Motorized 8,400 11,300 and SA-6s) are in the WMD; the SA-4 units areRifle Division directly subordinate to the WMD and the SA-6 units3rd Motorized 4,400 11,100 are subordinate to the two armies and to two divisions.Rifle Division Motor transport regiments or brigades are also subor-Army suo rt and 11,200 30,000 dinate to the WMD and to each army. The WMD orrear service

t/brigade 1,500 2,000 elements thereof are the part of the Czech forceMobiizaon motorized ,0 ,000 identified most often as participating in large-scaleMobilizarine division exercises involving the Southwest FrontMobilization tank 9,000division In terms of forces and missions, the Eastern Military

District is much less significant. It has only twoHastern Military Dmct divisions-both at low strength-and few higherHeadqtuarters, combat 3,900 12,000 echelon headquarters or support uissupport, and rear services cunits13th Tank Division 2,700 8,80014th Tank Division 2700 8800 The lesser significance of the EMD divisions is evidentTa,00 8800 in the differences between them and other peacetime

Thital 143,000active divisions. The two EMD divisions are geographi-This tablei cally remote from other divisions and from the NATOborder, and their subelements are scattered over a

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comparatively wide geographic area. In peacetime, the inventory includes about 300 countcrair or air defensetwo divisions are subordinate directly to the EMD aircraft, about 170 ground attack fighters, nearly 100headquarters, with no intermediate army echelon and combat aircraft assigned to reconnaissance units, andno command association with the WMD. Their about 200 combat-capable trainer aircraf Ipeacetime manning is much lower than that of otheractive Czech divisions, and they would require more The Czech 10th Air Army's mission is to providetime to mobilize and deploy. The EM D divisons are tactical air combat support to Czech ground forces andalso not as organizationally complete or as well possibly to Soviet forces when the Soviets are invovedequipped as the other Czech divisions. Neither EMD in Southwest Front operations. Its forces include twodivision has a FROG battalion, and a shortage of tanks subordinate combat divisions, an independent recon-in the easternmost division suggests it may be a hybrid naissance regiment, and some independent helicopterwith two tank re iments and two motorized rifle units (see figure 4). The 1 st Fighter Division has threeregiments. counterair regiments, all equipped with MIG-21

variants. The 34th Fighter-Bomber Division has fourMobilization Divisions. Czech plans envision the subordinate ground attack regiments, which areformation in wartime of at least two mobilization equipped with MIG-21s, MIG-15s, SU-7s, and a fewdivisions-one tank division and one motorized rifle MIG-23s. Helicopter units include one general suoportdivision. The only elements of these two divisions that unit serving the Ministry of National Defense, andare active in peacetime are two FROG battalions, four assault regiments and an independent assaultwhich are subordinate to active divisions. Until 1968 squadron that provide airlift for ground forces.one of these FROG battalions belonged to the 13thTank Division, now an EMD division. Before the The Czech 7th Air Defense Army is an integratedSoviet invasion, the 13th TD was an elite, capital-area force of fighter-interceptors, surface-to-air missiles,unit. After the invasion, it was purged and moved to its and air surveillance and aircraft control radar sites.present garrison area in Slovakia, but its FROG This army controls all air defense operations overbattalion remained in the Prague area. This battalion Czechoslovakia through two air defense zones. Eachremained active and was resubordinated to the 4th zone is operated by an air defense division, whichTank Division, which maintains stored equipment maintains a mix of surveillance radars, interceptors,believed intended for one of the mobilization divisions. and SAMs. The combined force includes threeThe 1st Tank Division, which maintains equipment MIG-21 interceptor regiments, 24 SA-2 and 7 SA-3believed intended for the second Czech mobilization battalions, and more than 50 radar sites. Most of thedivision, also has two active FROG battalions. The SAMs and radars are in the western border region andtanks for the mobilization divisions presumably are near the major cities of Prague, Brno, Bratislava, andamong the 700 tanks the Czechs maintain in storage. Ostrava. In peacetime, the 7th Air Defense Army

apparently has operational-but not administrative-control over the 10th Air Army's three tactical fighter

Air and Air Defense Forces. Both the CSLA and the regimentsSoviet Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czechoslo-vakia possess air elements--the Czechs have a tactical The Czech Military Burden. The burden Czechoslova-air army and an air defense army, and the CGF has a kia's military forces impose on its national resources incomparatively small tactical air force. The Czechs peacetime is at least as great as-and in some areasprovide the bulk of the air and air defense forces based greater than-that of Czechoslovakia's non-Sovietir. Czechoslovakia, with nearly 90 percent of the Warsaw Pact allies in Central Europe. This is mostmanpower, about 85 percent of the aircraft, and all the apparent in Czechoslovakia's combat ground forces.fixed surface-to-air missile sites. The peacetime man- The Czechs maintain a comparatively large number ofpower of the Czech air and air defense forces is about peacetime active ground force divisions (10). East57,000. This is believed to be less than 70 percent of Germany, with a larger overall population and with atheir intended wartime strength. The Czech aircraft greater number of draft-age males annually, maintains

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only six divisions active in peacetime. Poland, with a Ground Forces. In peacetime, the CG F headquarterspopulation more than twice that of Czechoslovakia and at Milovice directly controls one tank division and onewith about three times as many draft eligibles annu- motorized rifle division. The other three divisions-ally, maintains only 13 peacetime active divisions, K] two motorized rifle and one tank-are subordinate tothe 28th Corps Headquarters at Olomouc, which is inWe estimate that none of the seven Czech divisions we turn subordinate-to the CGF headquarters. In=consider to be most combat ready and intended for artime organization, all five divi-early, if not immediate, commitment is manned at sions per orm as an army. Combat support unitsgreater than 80 percent of its authorized wartime directly subordinate to CGF headquarters include anmanning. In view of the comparisons described above, artillery brigade, a Scud brigade, and an SA-4it is not surprising that divisions in both East Germany bridgade. An additional antiaircraft artillery (AAA)and Poland are generally manned in peacetime at a regimen:, which would come under army command inhigher percentage of their authorized wartime strength wartime, is subordinate in peacetime to the 28ththan those in Czechoslovakia. Corps.

The decision to maintain 10 peacetime divisions can The geographic disposition of CGF forces appearsprobably be traced to pressures from the Soviets to designed to meet both combat and occupation mis-maximize the Czech contribution to the Warsaw Pact. sions. The five divisions-arrayed in an arc stretchingIt allows the Czechs to build quickly a sizable wartime from the northwest to the Hungarian border east ofcombat force. From the Czech-and probably the Bratislava-dominate the major lines of communica-Soviet-point of view, the sacrifice in the Czechs' tion with East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Thisimmediate combat readiness in favor of a larger should ensure their independent means of reinforce-wartime combat-force may well be an acceptable risk, ment and resupply from outside Czechoslovakia in aa risk made even more acceptable to the Soviets by the period of tension or during a war. This disposition alsopresence since 1968 of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. places major Soviet combat divisions close to-but notThe Czechs do have the manpower, in the form of a in-the major Czech urban areas, the most likelylarge number of reservists, to mobilize to meet their scenes of renewed Czech political unreswartime authorized manning levels.]

In wartime the three divisions in the northern andCzech leaders northwest part of the country could move to themithe lace o Soviet pressure, western border areas of Czechoslovakia in about 24overcommitted Czech forces when Czechoslovakia hours. The two divisions farther east would requirejoined the Warsaw Pact. The problem was exacerbated about three days to reach the western border, or theyby subsequent demographic constraints and com ti- could be held back as a reserve or to uard theJinesotive economic pressures communication

a former Czehlense minister who said exercise elemcthat t roug out the sixties the consistent Sovietrejoinder to the defense minister's protestations aboutthis problem was an offer to station Soviet troops inCzechoslovakia[-

Although none of the large formations of Soviet troopsThe Soviet Central Group of Forces arc based near the Czech borders with West GermanyThe Soviet Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia and Austria, small units, generally signal andcomprises five ground divisions-two tank divisions radio radar intercept troopsr-_in border areas.and three MRDs-and associated nondivisional sup. small Soviet unitport elements (see figure 3). There is also a small air is permanent based in the Boletice Training Area,force composed of two counterair fighter regiments near the triborder area southwest of Ceske Budejovice.and reconnaissance, transport, and helicopter units.

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Table 2 Air Forces. The CGF air element, the 131st CompositeAir Division, is a small force, much smaller than the

Organization and Manpower Czech air and air defense forces. Peacetime manpower

of CGF Ground Forces of the division is only about 7,400 (believed to be lessthan 70 percent of intended wartime strength). Only

Orgagization Manning about 100 combat aircraft are assigned to the CG F.

Peacetime Wartime

Headquarter, combat support, 9.900 14,200 The division is notable for its lack of ground attackand rear services fighters. It has two counterair fighter regiments, one

18th Guards Motorized 11.900 12.525 with MIG-21s and the other with M IG-23s, a M IG-21Rine Division reconnaissance regiment, and transport and helicopter15th Guards Tank Division 9.400 9,900 units. The helicopter units include a ground attack

28th Corps regiment equipped with HIND helicopters and fourHeadquarters, combat support. 2.500 2,725 smaller general support units.and rear services31st Tank Division 9,400 92,52 Service in Czechoslovakia. In peacetime the CGF30th GuRrdi Motorized 11.900 2,525 performs not only the usual training to achieve andRifle Division48th Motorized 11.900 12,525 maintain combat readiness but also plays an occupa-Rifle Division tion role. This role has become a passive one, but the

Total 66,900 74,300 Soviet military presence retains important politicalimplications for the populace. The Soviets maintain agenerally low profile in Czechoslovakia, but their

We estimate the overall peacetime strength of the disposition ensures easy access to major urban areas,CGF ground forces to be about 67,000 men, or about and they would be able to deal quickly and decisively90 percent of the estimated authorized wartime with any renewed Czech unrest.=strength of about 74,000 (see table 2). The combatdivisions are judged to be manned at about 95 percent Service in Czechoslovakia is disliked by Sovietof full wartime strength, as are nondivisional combat conscripts, who make up some 75 percent of the CG F.support units. Other supporting elements are probably Although the troops serving in the CGF have certainmanned at lower percentages of intended wartime advantages, such as pay benefits and better qualitystrength. Rear service elements may be manned as low uniforms and medical care than their counterpartsas 45 to 50 percent overall, although certain support receive in the Soviet Union, discipline is stricter, moreelements, such as the mobile rocket technical base time is spent in the field, and restrictions on leave and(supporting the Scud brigade) and the motor trans rt passes normally result in virtually no civilian contactunits, are believed to be more fully manned. for the duration of the conscript's service. Soviet

officers serving in the CGF find the tours moreUnderstrength units probably would be filled out by attractive than do the conscripts, because they havereassigning personnel detailed to peacetime functions fewer leave restrictions, they have increased access tothat would not be performed in wartime and by consumer goods, and they can take their families withmobilizing others, probably including Soviet civilians them=in Czechoslovakia. Soviet civilians (mostly army veter-ans) are known to be working under contract in Soviet CGF work details to the Czech civilian economy,garrisons in Czechoslovakia, but their number and which help ease the Czech labor shortage, are theprecise wartime role cannot be determined from the exception to the lack of civilian contact for conscripts.available evidence. In any case, the combat and In a regular rotation, CGF troops assist in heavy andcombat support units appear to have sufficient man- light manufacturing, in the lumber industry, and inning in peacetime to conduct initial wartime oper-ations. [ -

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harvesting, for which service the unit, not the individ-ual, is reimbursed. Although indications are that this Table 3practice is widespread, the extent to which these detailsaffect the readiness of CGF units is uncertain.L Projected Wartime Strengths

of the Southwest FrontComparison With Other Groups of Forces. The CG F issmaller than the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, is Men' Divisions Tanks Aircraftless modern, and plays a less dominant military rolefrom the overall Pact viewpoint. The CGF may retain Czech 395,000 2 1,400 570more flexible options for wartime involvement, how- Total (CGF) 85,00 5 4,400 605

ever. The CGF is in many respects comparable to the Includes gn, ar, 17 4,740 675Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary. includes ground, air, and national air defense forces.The two forces are about the same size, and each would Includes two mobilization divisions.

probably operate as an army in wartime. The pace ofmodernization appears to be somewhat more rapid inthe SGF, and the SGF may dominate the Hungarian Before 1968 the Czechs had independent nationalmilitary scene more than does the CGF in Czechoslo- responsibility to form the Southwest Front and werevakia. The Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in relied on by the Pact to conduct the initial offensivePoland, with only two divisions and an air force, is not opposite Czech borders. Then as now, a Soviet frontintended for integration with the forces of its host made up of forces from the Carpathian Militarycountry in wartime and has little in common with the District was intended as a second-echelon force in theCG F. area of initiaLCzech_rcsnonsihiitv

Wartme Oganiatin an Rol ofalthoughWartime Organization and Role of Czech forces were nominally supposed to advance toWarsaw Pact Forces in Czechoslovakia the Rhine, they were not really expected to do muchThe Southwest Front, composed of the Czechoslovak more than move into southern West Germany and tiePeople's Army and the CGF, would be one of three up NATO forces in the area until Soviet forces arrivedfronts constituting the initial Warsaw Pact offensive to conduct the major advance.force opposite the NATO Central Region. The esti-mated wartime strengths of the Southwest Front areshown in table 3. The other first-echelon fronts are theCentral Front, which would be made up of the EastGerman Forces, the Group of Soviet Forces inGermany (GSFG), and the two Soviet divisions inPoland; and the Northern Front, which would consist bothof the Polish forces een ano soviet torces in the front'irst echelon,

. .most often as three armies, with the CGF as the armyWartime Mission. Since it was created in the mid- on the right (next to the southern flank of the Centralsixties, the Southwest Front's wartime mission has Front) and the two Czech armies on the leftbeen to conduct operations into southern Germany, in | i | i a third Czech army, appar-the area from Masinheim south to the Swiss border. ently formed from low-strength and mobilizationThe principal Western forces in this area are elements divisions. The Eastern Military District headquartersof the US VII Corps, the West German II Corps, the may have been the nucleus of this army. A third armyFrench II Corps, and the brigade-size Canadian could act as a reserve or second-echelon army, or, givenMechanized Combat Group adequate mobilization and deployment time, it couldfunction as a fourth first-echelon arm of the-Snuth-west Front,

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act plannersexpect-to emp oy the CGF army initially under thecommand of the Southwest Front but consider it aforce that also could be resubordinated to the CentralFront if needed. It could provide a screen for thesouthern flank of that critical front should the Czechforces fail to keep pace When a threat from the Austrian axis is not antici-once the second-echeldn o orrront-arrives on ime pated, EMD divisions are more likely to assume thethe CGF may be resubordinated to it role of reserve divisions, re painet - helon divi-he CGF may initiall an in e- sions as needed.pendent army in the first echelon, becoming subordi- the two EMD-divisions were .nate to a front only later, when it joined the Carpathian i enti e as reserve divisions, one of which replaced aFront as the second echelon advanced. 4th Army first-echelon division several da s after

hostilities be an

t asic Southwest Front mission as arive towar the Rhine, with a disruption of NATO

mobilization and the t int_oNATOforc asminimum goals theSouthwest Front, at east in the late 1960s, was The resence of a third Cz army,intended to be self-sustaining for only the initial phase is unusa ne ogicaiof the offensive, with the second-echelon Carpathian ongin ofrhigher echelon support units for this armyFront to take over on the fourth, fifth, orsixth dav would be the EMD; however, we have identified few

such units in this district.

Mobilization and Reinforcement. A period of mobili-zation would be necessary to bring the SouthwestFront to full combat readiness. Czech forces inparticular require considerable additional manning.

_ , _ ndcr some contin- Seven divisions are maintained at about 75 percent ofgency plans the two diisions of the Eastern Military their wartime manning level and could probably beDistrict would not be used in a Pact offensive into the brought to full strength, in accordance with CzechNATO Central Region but would remainin he rear mobilization plans, within 24 hours; another 24 hoursarea for territorial defens the EMD might be required for assembly and movement todivisions have participate m the offensive against concentration areas. Still more time would be requiredNATO but as reserve divisions with a role less for operational deployment. About four days of prep-significant than that of the two Czech mobilization aration is considered the minimum time necessary fordivisions he EMD divi- coordinated Southwest Front offensive operations withsions apparent y i participate in t e first echelon of two armies. Fleshing out the additional lower strengththe Southwest Front, as part of a third Czech field peacetime active divisions and two intended mobiliza-army probably formed from the EMD and the tion divisions would require additional timemobilization divisions.

There is some evidence that the Czechs may plan agreater combat role for the two mobilization divisionsthan for the lower strength peacetime active divisionsof the Eastern Military District and thusjnlac ahjiihpriority on their mobilizationtwo Czech armies, the mobilization ivisions have been

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integrated into the first-echelon armies, while thelower strength peacetime active divisions have re-mained as individual reserve divisions. While thisseems paradoxical, it may have been made possible bythe positioning of stored equipment, the peacetimedesignation of two FROG battalions as mobilizationunits, and the use of professional cadres from activedivisions and school faculties to form the nuclei of themobilization divisions. A tank storage site atDobricany, for example, has long maintained a regi-ment of tanks newer than those in some peacetimeactive units. T-54 tanks were in storage there in 1965, Logistics Considerations. Logistics in the Southwestwhen some T-34s were still in use in active units. Front are structured according to Warsaw PactMoreover, these T-54s were replaced by new T-55 doctrine, with the organizational flow of field suppliestanks as early as 1971 running from the front supply base downward to

regimental supply points. Ammunition and POL areAnother possibility for the employment ofmobilization the priority supply items. Depot capacities identifieddivision s their appear more than adequate to meet the needs sug-integration with lower strength peacetime active divi- gested by the various exercise scenariosions to form a third Czech army. This _wouldjnrobablv_require at least thelfull twoweek[ The rear service organization in both forces is difficult

so reflected the to detail, but in the critical area of transportation botheventual mobilization of five more Czech divisions, for seem to have adequate resources. Three motor trans-a total of 17 (and three Czech armies). Little is known port brigades, a motor transport regiment in eachof these additional mobilization divisions; apart from army, and several smaller motor transport units havebridging equipment appropriate for a possible addi- been identified in Czech forces, and the Czechs havetional motorized rifle division, uipment to outfl established a system for mobilizing large numbers ofthem has not been identified$ civilian vehicles. The CGF includes two motor trans-however, the Czechs have the-b-i1ity to mobihlze a port regiments among its service-support units, morenumber of light infantry divisions for occupation than usual for a five-division army.purposes.

The transportation system in Czechoslovakia is wellThe CGF, like other Soviet forces in Central Europe, suited for the movement of large military forces. Theprobably could m, re to concentration areas in 24 distribution of major cities assures a road networkhours. Some callup of reservists may be necessary, in covering most of Czechoslovakia, and major roads areparticular to fill out rear services units, but the force is being upgraded to expressways. The basic rail systemassessed as capable of going to war, especially to is good, with many multitrack lines, but it offersdefend against an attack, on short notice limited alternatives for major east-west movementjtraining across the country. Major Czech rail lines have beenalert stressing spee uire the regiment o clear the converted to the Soviet broader clearance and heavierbarracks area in 45 minutes. (Soviet restrictions on loading standards. Numerous transloading points andleave and passes help ensure a speedy alert and an extension of the Soviet broad-gauge system haveminimize a provocative presence in the civilian com- been built near the Soviet border in eastern Slovakia.munity.) In wartime, however, many of the supplies and

reinforcements from the Soviet Union would probablycome through southern Poland, bypassing Slovakiaaltogether, and enter the Czech transportation net-work at points offering more options for furtherforward movement u7 ]

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The extent to which Czech and CG F forces in the Another measure of the restored Soviet confidence inSouthwest Front would rely on each other for rear the CSLA may be the cosidservice support in combat is uncertain, but the Soviets' ity displayeapparent desire to maintain an independent capability | Tjint CSLA-CGFfor their forward-based forces suggests they would tactical training, w ich has been more in evidence inmake an effort to ensure the CGF's wartime self- recent years, Czech elements are sometimes undersufficiency. The CG F's proximity to neighboring Pact Soviet command, and Soviet elements may exercisecountries-along with its apparent capability to con- under Czech command. In all cases, however, overalltrol the major lines of communication from these Soviet domination is implicit, if not explicit.countries-contributes to the Soviet ability to intro-duce additional forces or supplies into Czechoslovakiawith or without Czech cooperation. Although considerable anti-Soviet feeling remains in

Czechoslovakia, the Czech military establishmentAlthough some rear service facilities are shared in would probably go along with Soviet military deci-peacetime, the Soviets maintain a separate rear service sions, and Czech soldiers would probably follow theirorganization, including POL and ammunition depots, officers, at least in the initial phases of conflict.railheads, quartermaster storage, military hospitals, Certainly the Czechs could be expected to fight moreand engineering, maintenance, and repair facilities. enthusiastically in their own defense, particularl in aVarious Czech rear service storage facilities were battleonCzechsoilturned over to the Soviets as part of the agreement on Teythe stationing of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia; might be ess reliable in an extended offensive opera-others have since been built by the CGF tion, particularly against stiff NATO resistance

In wartime, the CGF would apparently require Czech Political training in the CSLA stresses the threat fromsupport in heavy bridging to ensure the crossing of NATO (particularly from West Germany); neverthe-major Czech rivers, in particular, the Elbe and Vltava. less, most Czechs would need to be convinced that aNo suitable nondivisional bridging units have been NATO attack was imminent and warranted a preemp-identified in the CGF. The Czechs, however, put tive attack on the part of the Warsaw Pact. This needconsiderable emphasis on river-crossing capability, to persuade the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact of a graveand they are known to have stockpiled heavy bridging danger would require a period of time in which tensionat major crossing points and to have assigned units the and appropriate anti-NATO propaganda would betask of keeping the crossing points open, presumably built up. This in itself would tend to neutralize thefor Soviet as well as Czech forces. Should the Czechs element of surprise in a Pact attack.prove uncooperative, however, this could be a point ofserious Soviet vulnerability in moving forces through The Soviets probably realize that they might have toCzechoslovakia=l| act without Czech participation in some contingencies.

If our (and the Soviets') estimates of Czech reliabilityCzech Reliability. A thorough purge of the CSLA are ill founded, for example, and the CSLA cannot beofficer corps in the immediate postinvasion years and a persuaded to fight, the CGF might be forced to act onsubsequent concerted effort to instill in the Czech its own in an offensive. Moreover, if a crisis situationmilitary a loyalty to the Warsaw Pact transcending got out of control and required forces to move intoloyalty to individual national leaders have apparently action quickly (in a day or so), only the CGF and oneincreased Soviet confidence in CSLA reliability or two Czech divisions would be ready for offensivethis confidence may combat. The presence of even one Czech division,

approac pre-9681 eEls, w en the Czechs had the however, would have considerable symbolic value andprimary responsibility for the Southwest Front. would serve to involve the Czechs from the start

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Expansion and Modernization An artillery division is not an entirely new organiza-In recent years, Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia tional feature of the Czech Army. Major Czechhave undergone significant modernization and expan- reorganizations during the early 1960s reduced exist-sion. Organizational changes have affected all types of ing army-level artillery divisions to brigades. Thisforces--combat, combat support, and service sup- downgrading of conventional artillery coincided withport-and have included both the formation of new the introduction of nuclear-capable surface-to-surfaceunits and the upgrading or resubordination of existing missiles (SSMs). Excess conventional artillery appar-units. Equipment introduced into the forces has ently was stockpiled, and some of this probably wascovered a wide range used to create the 7th Artillery Division

Expansion of the Czech Ground Forces. Like other Recent changes within maneuver divisions alsoWarsaw Pact forces, the Czechs have been increasing underscore Czech attention to improvement in conven-the number and size of artillery units and the quantity tional artillery. In the divisional artillery regiment theand qualit of artillery equipment in active units. changes have included the separation and expansion ofRecent, writings state that the impor- the MRL battalion into an independent unit with 18tance of conventional artillery in modern combat has launchers and the addition of a third gun battalion tobeen "underestimated" and that the Czech artillery the regiment. These changes, if completed, will makeforces have suffered an "ill-considered limitation." Czech divisions more like their non-Soviet WarsawThese articles stress that a concerted effort is bein Pact (NSWP) counterparts. But Czech regimentalmade to build up conventional artillery forces. artillery will remain unique among NSWP forces in

that it will have an MRL platoon of two launchers inThe Czechs are in the process of making a significant each motorized rifle battalion.' (See figure 5 for anincrease in their breakthrough artillery with the example of divisional artillery developments. Addi-formation of a front-level artillery division. The tional organizational expansion, involving tank anddivision's wartime table of organization calls for four FROG battalions, as well as chemical, reconnaissance,brigades of four battalions each, including three 72- motor transport, and construction units, is summarizedpiece gun brigades (one each of 152-mm, 122-mm, and in table 5.)130-mm weapons) and one multiple rocket launcher(MRL) brigade to be equipped with the 122-mm Acquisition of New Equipment in the Czech GroundRM-70. This is the only artillery unit of this size Forces. In the past decade Czech forces have received aamong the East European forces. Only one brigade- variety of new equipment, some of it designed orwith a mixed-weapons inventory-is active now. Filled produced by the Czechs. This modernization hasout to its intended size, the division would effectively included the steady replacement of T-34 tanks withtriple the higher echelon (front and army level) T-55s and the acquisition of the BMP armoredartillery of the Czech forces. Its presence reaffirms the infantry combat vehicle, the 122-mm self-propelledindependent wartime operational role of the Southwest howitzer, the SA-4 and SA-6 SAMs, new ATGMFront, launchers, a new antitank grenade launcher

(RPG-75), and the RM-70 multiple rocket launcherThe artillery division, designated the 7th, is known to (see table 6). Many of these weapons were first seen inhave existed m some f~ormduringthe-914-5lraining Czech hands by Western observers in a May 1975ear. Liberation Day parade in Prague. With the exceptionIt has since been noted of the RPG-75, each has subsequently been confirmedrepeatedly. Divisional headquarters and the only in operational units. The Czechs have also designedbrigade confirmed active to date are at Zamberk in and developed a 152-mm self-propelled gun, six ofnorthern Czechoslovakia. We currently estimate the which have been seen w' h the artillery regiment of thedivision's pea'cetime strength at 750 men. Its .arlime 19th MRD.

authorized strength is probably at least 4,500Some Soviet regiments along the Sino-Soviet border have recentlyacquired a battery of six 122-mm MRLa

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Divisional Artillery Changes in Czech 2nd Motorized Rifle Division Figure 5

1975 1979

58161 3-0 A

The Czech tank inventory is a mix typical of NSWP assigned to Czech forces replaced antiaircraft guns inforces and includes T-54, T-55, and some T-34 tanks. nondivisional AA units, resulting in considerableThe Czech arms industry produced the T-54 from reallocation and resubordination among AA elements,1958 through 1964 and has produced the T-55 since as shown in figure 6. Two additional SA-6 regiments1965. Many of these indigenously produced tanks have have replaced AAA regiments in two 1st Army MRDs,gone to equip the Czech forces; others have been the 19th and the 20thexported to other Pact and Third World nations. Webelieve all active Czech units are equipped with T-54s Modernization of Czech Air andAir Defense Forces.and T-55s, for a total of 2,640 tanks. Another 700 The development of the Czech air and air defensetanks, including some T-34s, are in storage at various forces has paralleled that of the ground forces. A 1969sites in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs apparently do not reorganization brought the force more in line withplan to introduce the T-62 into their forces. The Soviet command and control doctrine, establishing airCzechs are expected eventually to produce a new tank, elements with clear tasks of ground support or airprobably the T-72, but not before 1981. defense. This force is being steadily modernized with

newer, high-performance combat equipment. BothBoth the SA-6 and the SA-4 mobile SAMs have been ground attack and interceptor elements are beingintroduced into service with Czech forces. The single equipped with late-model MIG-21 Fishbeds. InSA-4 brigade and the first two SA-6 regiments to be January 1978, the Czech forces began to acquire the

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Table 5

Czech Organizational Changes

Unit Affected Development/Change Remarks

7th Artillery Division The 7th is a new unit; it will have four brigades of This unit is in the early stages of development; onlyfour battalions each, one brigade is active.Artillery regiment ofmaneuver division

MRL battalion This unit became independent of the regiment; it is The independent MRL battalion has been establishednow directly subordinate to the division. Its in all Ist Army MRDs and in at least one MRD andlaunchers increased from 12 to 18. one TD in the 4th Army. Two of the 1st Armybattalion (and possibly a third) have 18 launchers.Gun battalions A third gun battalion was added; gun reallocation The changes affecting the gun battalions have beenresulted in one battalion with 152-mm howitzers tied to the MRL reorganization. The new gunand two battalions with 122-mm howitzers, battalions have been confirmed only in the 2nd MRDbut probably are also in the 19th.Artillery units in motorized The artillery unit has been reduced from a This change has been confirmed only in the 2ndrifle regiments battalion (18 pieces) to a battery (six pieces). MRD. It is contrary to the trend in Soviet divisionsand may be only a temporary measure to providetowed 122-mm howitzers for the divisional artillery

S- regiment, pending acquisition of more self-propelled122-mm pieces.

Tank battalions in motor- The number of tanks in a platoon increased from The change has been completed in the I st Army and isized rifle regiments throe to four the net battalion number increased at least partially complete in the 4th Army.from 31 to 4o.FROG battalions The number of launchers has increased to a The reorganization is complete in the 1st Army and instandard of four launchers per battalion, at least one division in the 4th Army.Chemical defense units at all In the Army, the regiment has been upgraded to a -levels brigade; in the division, the company has been

expanded to a battalion; and in the MRR, theplatoon has become a company.

Reconnaissance platoons in The platoon has been upgraded to a company. This change is tied to the deployment of BMP combattank regiments of MRDs vehicles in reconnaissance units. The change isprobably complete in the 1st Army.Road construction brigades One brigade has been disbanded; two new bri-

gades have been formed.Motor transport units A reorganization has taken place at military Two army-level brigades have been resubordinsted todistrict and army level, the Western Military District; new regiments have

been formed in the 1st and 4th Armies.

MIG-23 Flogger and to date have acquired a small Modernization in the CGF. Although the introductionnumber of both ground attack and interceptor of new equipment and the organizational developmentsvariants. Czechoslovakia was the second NSWP coun- associated with Soviet force modernization elsewheretry, after Bulgaria, to receive the MIG-23. The Czechs have begun in the CGF, those forces have generallyhave also acquired four Hind D helicopters. Other lagged behind other Soviet forces in Eastern Europe infeatures of Czech air and air defense modernization receiving new equipment. icuea icatbne osrcinpormadLinclude an aircraft bunker construction program andthe general upgrading of air-warning capabilities with The CGF is credited with an inventory of about 1,400new and/or improved radars and supporting command tanks. The bulk of these are T-62s; the T-55 remainsand control means the predominant tank only in the easternmost division.

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Table 6

Czech Equipment Modernization

Weapon Extent of Identified Deployment

WMD/Front 1st Army (3 MRDs, 1 TD) 4th Army (2 MRDs, 2 TDs) EMD (2 TDs)BMP armored infan- In one motorized rifle regiment Some in one motorized rifletry combat vehicle and reconnaissance battalion of regiment of each division; some

each division; in reconnaissance in other reconnaissance ele-company of some additional ments.regiments.

122-mm self- One battery confirmed (in 49thpropelled gun MRR, 20th MRD)(Gvozdika)

SA-4 SAM One brigadeSA-6 SAM, Three regiments (one at army One regiment (army level)

level, one subordinate to 20thMR D. one subordinate to 19thMRD)

RM-70 MRL In artillery In all divisions In at least two divisions Possibly in bothdivision divisions

BRDM-2 with anti- In at least two motorized rifletank guided missile regimentsCzech 152-mm self- One battery in artillery regi-propelled gun ment of 19th-MRD(wheeled chassis)

' See figure 6 for a schematic representation of organizationalchange accompanying nondivisional SAM deployment.

There have been reports of T-64s or T-72s with the Organizational changes observed elsewhere are ex-CGF, but none have been confirmed. An early version pected to be carried out throughout the CGF. Inde-of the T-64 reportedly was used in the 1968 invasion, pendent tank battalions have been identified with allbut the tanks were replaced with older models when , three motorized rifle divisions, all tank battalions inthe unit assumed its occupation duties- motorized rifle regiments have been expanded from 31

to 40 tanks, and the artillery holdings of motorizedNew or additional equipment identified in the CGF rifle regiments have been increased from six to 18suggests that its modernization parallels that taking pieces. Modernization of CGF air elements has in-place in other Soviet and NSWP forces. New equip- cluded the conversion in 1976 of a fighter regiment toment includes the 122-mm and 152-mm self-propelled the MIG-23 Flogger, and the establishment in 1977 ofartillery pieces, the SA-4, SA-6, SA-8, and SA-9 a new ground attack helicopter regiment equipped withmobile surface-to-air missiles, the ZSU-23-4 self- about 40 Hinds, the first deployment of that helicopterpropelled antiaircraft gun, and the BMP armored in Czechoslovakia.infantry combat vehicle. The CGF's motor transportcapability is being improved by the introduction of thenew heavy-duty Kamaz prime mover.

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Organizational Changes Accompanying Nondivisional SAM Deployment Figure 6In Western Military District

1975 1978

3~7BO-CIA

Outlook We expect modernization to continue in the CGF,Continued Modernization. We expect the force mod- although at a slower pace than in the GSFG. Man-ernization programs undertaken by the Czech forces power increases, if any, probably will be minimal, asand the CGF, now in various stages of completion, to some of the increases required by organizationalbe fully realized. Future modernization almost cer- expansion are offset by the lower manpower require-tainly will emphasize qualitative rather than quantita- ments of newer equipment, such as self-propelledtive improvements, as demographic constraints limit artillery and the T-64/72 tanksfurther expansion of Czech forces

Demographic Constraints. Demographic and eco-Much of the Czech modernization can be linked to an nomic pressures help to explain why the Czechs do noteffort-which has also been noted in Soviet forces-to man their divisions in peacetime at levels comparableincrease conventional artillery capability, reversing the to those of other Pact countries. Ample availabletrends of the early 1960s. This effort has raised Czech information shows that the Czechs' resources areartillery and rocket launcher holdings in active units strained. This is not a new dilemma butitisarwinfrom 1,280 to 1,400 since 1973. If the artillery division more severe.is filled out in peacetime and the divisional artilleryexpansion is implemented throughout the force, unitholdings will increase by another 400 pieces.

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TopSeret

Figure 7Czech Males ReachingAge 18 Annually housand

130

100

908501974 75 soas9

more draft eligibles annually than does Czechoslova-Czech open- kia. The comparable figure for East Germany (prob-source literature has lamented a "shortage" or a "tense ably the most appropriate country for comparison) isbalance" of manpower, which has caused "serious about 60 percent and for Poland it is closer to 50economic problems" in the fourth and fifth five-year percent

plan (encompassing the years 1966-75), with the"future outlook even less favorable.' There is evidence that the number of conscripts in 1978

was less than in 1977, perhaps as much as 10,000 toAvailable figures on the number of males reaching 12,000 less, and that they were drawn from a smallerdraft age (18) annually have shown a 17-percent drop pool of draft-age men. Also, at least some of thoseover the past six years. This figure will fluctuate drafted in the spring of 1977 were to be released threethrough 1990 (see figure 7), but at no time during that months earlier than the end of their regular two-yearperiod will it reach the levels of the mid-I 970s term of service (at the end of December 1978) in orderto "balance the year groups." This release is notInformation available for 1977 indicates that the completely understood but may be another indicationCzechs drafted a total of about 74,000 men in the that conscription totals in 1978 were lower than thosespring and fall induction periods that year. This is a for 1977. Information on the 1979 conscription sug-fairly high percentage (67) of the number of males gests that it may very nearly match that of 197reaching age 18 that year (110,000). This ratio is not

absolute, since the draft pool in any given year would In addition to the manpower needs of the armed forces,include some men other than those reaching age 18, Czech state planners must also accommodate theand the 110,000 figure for males reaching age 18 does competitive demands made by the economic sector.not take into account physical condition or any criteria One indication of such accommodation is an arrange-other than age. Nevertheless, it permits some useful ment offering some draft eligibles an abbreviatedcomparisonsJ active-duty service term, as short as five months, ifthey agree to serve longer terms in certain keyThis percentage is higher than the comparable figures industries-coal mining, for example. Soldiers fromfor East Germany and Poland, both of which have active units are also detailed every year to help with the

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harvesting and planting, and some units detail soldierson a rotating basis year round to work in certainfactories. All such accommodations serve to undercutthe combat readiness of the Czech forces.j

Possibilities of Soviet Withdrawal. There has beenevidence since 1974 to indicate that the Soviets haveregained confidence in the CSLA to the point that,should an MBFR agreement be reached, they mightregard a reduction of the CGF as an acceptable option.Indeed, the June 1978 Soviet MBFR counterproposalsuggesting withdrawal of a corps focuses attention onthe CGF, which includes the only known corps amongthe Soviet groups of forces7

From a military point of view, all or part of the three-division 28th Corps would be a likely candidate forwithdrawal. This part of the force, farthest from theNATO border, might be moved to the CarpathianMilitary District from where it could be reintroducedfairly quickly in a period of rising tensions. Anotherpossibility would be the transfer of this part of the forceto East Germany to replace forces withdrawn from theGSFG. Withdrawal of three divisions would leave thetwo westernmost CGF divisions with a role similar tothat of the two-division Northern Group of Forces.Such a force would retain the flexibility-albeit withgreatly reduced capabilities-to bolster the SouthwestFront or join the Central Front --

From a political viewpoint, the occupation mission-still a factor in the stability of Czech-Sovietrelations-could be accomplished with fewer forces.Soviet discretion in keeping their forces generallyapart from major population centers and largelyconfined to garrison makes their presence perhaps evenmore intimidating than if their forces were constantlyvisible. While aware of an "official" figure of 60,000,Czech citizens have no idea how many Soviet soldiersare in their country, with common estimates rangingfrom 500,000 to I million. Although a partial Sovietwithdrawal could have a tonic effect on the Czechoslo-vak population, 10 years of tranquility have demon-strated the ability of the Husak regime to maintainorder. If, therefore, other considerations argue for apartial withdrawal, Moscow is unlikely to be dissuadedby apprehension over the reaction of the Czechoslovakpublic.L

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