gundissalinus on necessary being: textual and … · 2016. 7. 5. · 1954), vol. i, pp. 19–43;...

GUNDISSALINUS ON NECESSARY BEING: TEXTUAL

AND DOCTRINAL ALTERATIONS IN THE EXPOSITION

OF AVICENNA’S METAPHYSICA

NICOLA POLLONIUniversità di Pavia, piazza Botta, 6–27100 Pavia, Italy

Email: [email protected]

Abstract. This article examines the textual alteration strategy carried out byDominicus Gundissalinus in his original works. One of the most striking examplesof this approach can be detected in the large quotation of Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysica I,6–7 in Gundissalinus’ cosmological treatise De processione mundi, in which theSpanish philosopher variously modifies the text he translated a few years before.After a short presentation of Gundissalinus’ double role as translator and philoso-pher, the study moves on to the analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of necessary and pos-sible being, and the five demonstrations of the unrelated uniqueness of necessarybeing offered by Ibn Sīnā. These arguments are directly quoted by Gundissalinus:nevertheless, the author modifies the text in many passages, here examined throughthe analysis of some representative excerpts. The results of this enquiry suggest thatGundissalinus is following an effective alteration strategy, envisaging at least twomain purposes: the clarification of Ibn Sīnā’s line of reasoning, and the doctrinalassimilation of Metaphysica’s theories in his original philosophical system. Inappendix to this article the whole text of the two versions of Metaphysica I, 6–7 ispresented.

Résumé. Cet article envisage la stratégie d’altération textuelle réalisée parDominique Gundisalvi dans ses œuvres originales. Un des exemples les plus signi-ficatifs de cette stratégie peut être reconnu dans la longue citation de Metaphysica I,6–7 d’Ibn Sīnā dans le traité cosmologique de Gundisalvi, le De processione mundi,où le philosophe espagnol modifie différemment le texte qu’il a traduit quelquesannées auparavant. Après une brève présentation du double rôle de Gundisalvicomme traducteur et philosophe, on analyse la doctrine de l’être nécessaire et del’être possible d’Ibn Sīnā, et les cinq démonstrations de l’unicité sans relation del’être nécessaire offertes par Ibn Sīnā. Ces arguments sont cités directement parGundisalvi: l’auteur cependant modifie le texte en plusieurs passages qui sontexaminés à travers l’analyse des cas les plus exemplaires. Les résultats de cetteenquête nous suggèrent que Gundisalvi suit une véritable stratégie d’altération,ayant en vue deux finalités principales: la clarification de la ligne de raisonnementd’Ibn Sīnā et l’assimilation de ses théories dans le système doctrinal de Gundisalvi.En appendice à cet article on présente en entier le texte des deux variantes deMetaphysica I, 6–7.

Dominicus Gundissalinus (c. 1115 – post 1190) is the author of overtwenty translations from Arabic into Latin, which are of considerable

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 26 (2016) pp. 129–160doi:10.1017/S0957423915000144 © 2016 Cambridge University Press

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importance to philosophy and science.1 Working alone or with two col-laborators2 – i.e. Abraham ibn Daud3 and Johannes Hispanus4 –Gundissalinus translated works – such as Avicenna’s De anima andMetaphysica, al-Fārābī’s De scientiis or Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae –that were received with enthusiasm in the Latin world, facilitatingand paving the way for the thirteenth century philosophical transitionto Aristotelianism.These translations were also used by Gundissalinus as the specula-

tive basis for five personal philosophical works, where the authorblends some of the principal results of Arabic, Jewish and Latin enqui-ries into a new doctrinal system quite autonomous from its sources. Atfirst glance, these Gundissalinian treatises might be viewed as noth-ing more than a multiplicity of textual quotations deriving from theworks that Gundissalinus translated and studied. However, upon clo-ser inspection the author’s personal theoretical perspectives becomemore perspicuous: whereas on the one hand the textual proximity ofGundissalinus’ treatises to their sources is undeniable, and thiscounts as a typical feature of his modus operandi, on the other theToledan philosopher accomplishes a real synthesis of some specula-tive perspectives that often not only differ from one another but areeven opposites, an example of this being Avicenna’s ontology and uni-versal hylomorphism.Thus, the close relationship between the Gundissalinian text and its

main sources allows us to understand some interesting nuances ofGundissalinus’ hermeneutics with regard to his Arabic sources, leadingto deeper insight into both his philosophical thought and his transla-tion method. In this contribution, I shall examine a prime example of

1 For an overall account on Gundissalinus’ biography, see Nicola Polloni, “Elementi storiogra-fici e documentali per un profilo biografico di Dominicus Gundisalvi”,Archives d’histoire doc-trinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 82 (2015), forthcoming.

2 For the practical development of Toledan translation activity, see Marie-Thérèse D’Alverny,“Les traductions à deux interprètes, d’arabe en langue vernaculaire et de langue vernacu-laire en latin”, in Geneviève Contamine (ed.), Traduction et traducteurs au Moyen Âge.Actes du colloque international du CNRS organisé à Paris, Institut de recherche et d’histoiredes textes, les 26-28 mai 1986 (Paris, 1989), pp. 193–206.

3 See Marie-Thérèse D’Alverny, “Avendauth?”, in Homenaje a Millás-Vallicrosa (Barcelona,1954), vol. I, pp. 19–43; and Alexander Fidora, “Religious diversity and the philosophicaltranslations of twelfth-century Toledo”, in Constant Mews – John Crossley (eds.),Communities of Learning. Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe,1110-1500 (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 19–36.

4 See Charles Burnett, ” ‘Magister Iohannes Hispanus’: towards the identity of a Toledantranslator”, in Georges Comet (ed.), Comprendre et maîtriser la nature au Moyen Âge.Mélanges d’histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan (Genève-Paris, 1994), pp. 425–36; Charles Burnett, ” ‘Magister Iohannes Hispalensis et Limiensis’ and Qusta ibn Luqa’sDe differentia spiritus et animae: a Portuguese contribution to the arts curriculum?”,Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos, 7–8 (1995): 221–67; Maureen Robinson, “The heritage of med-ieval errors in the Latin manuscripts of Johannes Hispalensis”, Al-Qantara, XXVIII (2007):41–71; andMaureen Robinson, “The history andmyths surrounding JohannesHispalensis”,Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, 80 (2003): 443–70.

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these textual connections, namely the Gundissalinian quotation, in hisDe processione mundi,5 of Avicenna’s demonstrations of the necessarybeing.6 I shall focus on the main philosophical issue directly connectedto the textual modifications that Gundissalinus introduces in his cos-mological treatise, setting aside issues concerning the Latin renderingof the Arabic and differences between the two Gundissalinian versionsof this passage and Avicenna’s original text.7

AVICENNA’S DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE UNRELATED UNIQUENESS OFTHE NECESSARY BEING

Avicenna dedicates Chapters 6 and 7 of his Liber de philosophiaprima seu Metaphysica to the notorious discussion on the ontologicaldifference between God and the creatures according to the theory ofnecessary and possible being.8 The first book of the Metaphysica pre-sents the first concepts and main elements of Avicenna’s ontology,9amongst which there is the famous differentiation between essenceand existence, so influential in later Latin speculations.10The two chapters we are going to examine play a crucial theoretical

role within the philosophical system and within the Metaphysicaitself. Here, Avicenna carries out an analysis of the necessary and pos-sible beings and demonstrates through various important logicalarguments the unrelated uniqueness and unity of the necessarybeing, totally uncaused, self-sufficient, and on the basis of which a dis-tinction between essence and existence is declared impossible.11 Theopposite equivalent in this ontological bipartition is the possible

5 Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, ed. Georg Bülow, Beiträge zur Geschichte derPhilosophie des Mittelalters, XXIV, 3 (1925), 5, 15–17, 10.

6 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, ed. Simone van Riet (Leiden,1983), I, 6–7, 43, 1–55, 55.

7 Regarding the translation methods used and the Latin rendering of the original Arabic textof the Ilāhiyyāt, see Jean Jolivet, “The Arabic inheritance”, in Peter Dronke (ed.), A Historyof Twelfth-CenturyWestern Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 113–48; and Jean Jolivet, “Levocabulaire de l’être et de la création dans la Philosophia prima de l’Avicenna latinus”, inJacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel (eds.), L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophiqueau Moyen Âge (Turnhout, 2000), pp. 35–49.

8 For the global exposition of Avicennian ontology and the arguments on the necessary being,see: JohnMcGinnis,Avicenna (Oxford, 2010), pp. 159–77; Jean Jolivet, “Aux origines de l’on-tologie d’Ibn Sīnā”, in Études sur Avicenne, Études dirigées par Jean Jolivet et RoshdiRashed (Paris, 1984), pp. 221–35; and Olga Lizzini, Avicenna (Roma, 2012), pp. 97–154.

9 Regarding the ontological perspectives of Avicenna and his hermeneutics of Aristotle, seeAmos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’(Leiden-Boston, 2006); and Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition(Leiden, 1988).

10 Cf. Heidrun Eichner, “Essence and existence. Thirteenth-century perspectives inArabic-Islamic philosophy and theology”, in Amos Bertolacci and Nikolaus D. Hasse(eds.), The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics (Berlin-Boston,2012), pp. 123–52.

11 See Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna (New York, 1992), pp. 49–120.

GUNDISSALINUS ON NECESSARY BEING 131

being, insufficient to itself, as it always requires a cause that distin-guishes its possibility of being from its possibility of not-being. Oncethis process is actuated, the possible being becomes a necessarybeing. However, it is not a necesse esse per se, that is, in itself, but anecessary being per aliud, i.e. depending on a cause that discriminatesbetween his possible not-being and being.12 Hence Avicenna presentsto the reader an ontological system in which God and the creation areclearly and totally different as regards both their causality and theirbeing. Only God is uncaused, while being the cause of all things thatfollow him in the fluxus of being.13 Contrarily, the possible being, thatis, the possible creation that becomes actual in the transition from itspossibility to the status of necesse esse per aliud, always requires acause of its being.In these two chapters, Avicenna notably presents five arguments

that demonstrate the true and unrelated uniqueness of the necessarybeing. As remarked by Lizzini,14 these proofs are based on a commonargument: given two beings that are identical in their definitions andexisting simultaneously, their relation always involves a causalaction. This action will cause either (1.) the existence of both ofthem, and therefore the cause is external to their relationship, or(2.) the existence of one of them, so that the first being is causedand the second is its cause. Hence, in every relation between twobeings, we have only two possible situations: in the first case, theyare both caused by a third cause; in the second case, one is thecause and the other is the caused. Avicenna’s demonstration is pre-ceded by a short paragraph on the characteristics of the necessarybeing, and followed by an ending on the qualities of the possiblebeings. In between, there are the five arguments, among which it ispossible to distinguish two classes of demonstrations: the first twoarguments state the unrelatedness of the necessary being (bymeans of the argument of homology and the argument of the two rela-tives), while the last three demonstrations testify to the absoluteuniqueness of that being. In summary, the demonstrations are asfollows:First argument15 (the “homology argument16”) – the premise of the

argument is the hypothesis of the existence of two necessary beingshomologous in their being and inseparable in existence, neither of

12 Cf. Guy Jalbert, “Le nécessaire et le possible dans la philosophie d’Avicenne”, Revue del’Université d’Ottawa, 30 (1960): 89–101.

13 See Olga Lizzini, Fluxus (fayd). Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica e della fisica diAvicenna (Bari, 2011).

14 Lizzini, Avicenna, p. 119.15 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 46, 72–47, 11.16 Cf. Olga Lizzini, ‘The relation between form and matter’, in John McGinnis (ed.),

Interpreting Avicenna, Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam (Paris, 2004), pp. 175–85.

132 NICOLA POLLONI

which is the cause of the other. If we take one of these necessarybeings (α), it will be either (a.) necessary in itself or (b.) not necessaryin itself.Moreover, option (a.) entails thatgiventhatα isnecessaryper se,in relation to the existence of β we have the following options:

(aa.) β is necessary in itself as well and α may be necessary in itself and invirtue of the necessary being of β, so that α would be necessary per se andper aliud, but this is impossible; or(ab.) being β necessary in itself, α may be necessary in itself and not throughβ, but if their relation were as such, therewould be no way to justify their con-comitance and their bond, and this goes against the premises of the analysis.Hence, the second main option (b.) is to be accepted. α is not necessary initself, so that α is possible in itself and necessary through the interventionof β. However, this second conclusion is also false according to the premises.After thorough examination of their relationship, since the being of α entailsthe being of β, we reach another set of alternative options:either (ba.) the same ontological condition of α also applies to β; or(bb.) α and β are not in the same ontological condition.

The latter conclusion cannot be accepted, for the premise entailsthat the two necessary beings are coaequalia, so that we should sup-pose that both comply with the same conditions; this would mean thatboth of them are possible per se and necessary through the interven-tion of the other. However, this would mean the alternative optionsare:

(baa.) either the possible being of β causes the necessary being of α, and thenthe necessary being of α causes the necessary being of β, but if it were truethat the possible being of β causes the necessity of α, the being of the latterwould not entail any necessity and the relation would be between a cause(β) and a caused (α); and(bab.) or the necessary being of β causes the necessary being of α, and at thevery same time the necessary being of α causes the necessary being of β.However, this latter option implies that the necessity of being of each presup-poses itself, for it is both the cause of the necessary being and essentially sub-sequent to the same necessity of being.

Therefore, it is impossible that two necessary beings which arehomologous in their being exist simultaneously.Second argument17 (hypothesis of the two relatives) – the argument

is based on the hypothesis of two necessary beings of which neither isthe cause of the necessity of the other but their simultaneous presencecauses the necessity of both their beings. It is possible, according toAvicenna, to make two different claims concerning such beings.Firstly (a.) if we consider the existence and essence of α and β onthe basis of their relationship, we must choose between two options:

17 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 48, 12–38.


(aa.) the existence and essence of α and β consist of and derive from theirmutual relation, but in this way they are in themselves possible beings, fortheir necessity depends on the other; and(ab.) the existence and essence of α and β do not consist in their mutual rela-tion, but if this were true, they would not be relatives if not accidentally, fortheir relationship would be extrinsic and added to their essence. Hence, onceexcluded these first options, we should admit that (b.) the relative beingsunder examination have the same essence. Accordingly, the relation betweentheir essences has to be reduced to one of these eventualities, i.e.:either (ba.) the essential definition of α causes the essential definition of βthrough the same essence of α, but in this case it is the being of α that causesthat of β, and so the first is a cause and the latter is caused; or(bb.) there is no causal bond between the essential notion of α and β, and theyintegrally consist of their relationship. This would mean, however, that theiressence derives from an extrinsic cause, their bond is accidental, and theirbeing is caused.So it is impossible that two relative necessary beings exist.

Third argument18 (uniqueness of the definition of necessary being) – ifwe suppose the existence of manifold necessary beings, they will be:

(a.) inasituationwhereeachis identical totheothers intermsoftheir intellectusessentiae, and so the essential notion of αwould be identical to that of β; or(b.) each of them is different from the others in terms of their essentialnotion.

But if we admit the first alternative (a.), supposing an identity oftheir essential notions, the being of α could not be differentiatedfrom the being of the other through its essence, and its differentiation(and identification) would be given by an accident or unessential attri-bute that are inherent to its essence. But this would mean the sup-posed accident would be inherent to the essence of α:

(aa.) through the quiddity of α, which is identical to every other supposednecessary being, and so there would be no principle of identification; or(ab.) through an external cause, but this would mean its individuation isderived from a cause and the necessity of both would derive from theirmutual presence, and this scenario was already refuted.

Hence, it is impossible (a.) that their essential notion is identical.But at the same time, it is unacceptable that (b.) their intellectusessentiae is different, because in that case we face the alternativebetween:

(ba.) the eventuality that the essence of each one coincides with the necessityof its being, but if this were true, there would be no principle of differentia-tion between them; and

18 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 49, 40–51, 79.

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(bb.) the eventuality that their essence is different from their necessity, butin this case the essential definition of each one would be accidental, for theirnecessity of being does not derive from their essence, and they would benecessary beings before the supposed acquisition of necessity, and sincethere would be no possibility of an essential differentiation between them,we are again confronted with the first hypothesis (a.).

Fourth argument19 (division of the necessary being according to thespecies and the individual) – the initial hypothesis is that the defini-tion of the necessity of being can be considered as a species character-istic of many individuals. This division should happen in one of thefollowing two ways:

(a.) through specific difference (as the genus is subdivided into species), butthe species can account for the actual being and not for the definition, and forthis reason it is impossible that such a difference could provide the necessarybeing to a thing; or(b.) through accidents (as the species is subdivided into individuals), but asthe individuals agree on their essence and are differentiated by accidents,this possibility leads back to the first alternative (a.). Hence the necessityof being cannot be constituted as a generic or specific being.

Fifth argument20 (necessity of being as a proper characteristic ofthe necessary being predicable of a multiplicity of beings) –Following the assumption that the necessity of being is a properand predicable characteristic of the necessary being, the samecharacteristic has to be a necessary being, and we are confrontedwith an alternative regarding the possession of this characteristic.If the belonging of characteristic y is necessary to the necessarybeing α to which it belongs, the necessity of α is true only if it pos-sesses y, so α is possible and only y is necessary. If, however, thebelonging of the characteristic y is only possible for the necessarybeing α, we face a contradiction, since the main characterization ofthe possible being is the possibility of being or not being, so thecontradiction resides in the same possibility of being/not being asa characteristic of the necessary being, which is impossible. Thenecessity of being cannot therefore be a characteristic belongingto something. This is also true if we take the characteristic in ageneral sense, since:

(a.) if we consider that the characteristic y is a necessary being and a parti-cular being, y is that particular being; and(b.) if we admit that y is a necessary being but not a particular being, thatbeing is particularized either (ba.) thanks to its essence, but in this way it

19 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 51, 80–52, 12.20 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 52, 13–54, 43.


is a particular being, or (bb.) thanks to an external cause, and y would actu-ally be a possible being.

Having proved the unrelated uniqueness and unity of the necessarybeing, Avicenna can finally state that the necessary being is one inname and number, completely different from the possible being,which is always characterized by the possibility of being or notbeing until the necessary being causes it.21

THE ALTERATION STRATEGY IN GUNDISSALINUS’ HERMENEUTICS OFMETAPHYSICS I, 6–7

The De processione mundi is perhaps Gundissalinus’ most maturephilosophical work. In this text, the author examines creation froma cosmological and ontological point of view,22 describing on the onehand the different stages by means of which the world was createdand on the other the ontological composition of the created being fol-lowing the Gabirolian doctrine of universal hylomorphism.The first pages of the treatise are dedicated to resolving a series of

epistemological issues, directly concerning the very possibility of atheoretical investigation of the first causes. Once the conditions of pos-sibility are clarified, Gundissalinus starts his analysis by descendingfrom the first Cause, God, i.e. the necessary being who causes all thesubsequent beings, and whose possibility of existence is separate fromthe possibility of non-existence. It is in this passage thatGundissalinus presents the long quotation from Metaphysica I, 6–7that we have just examined. This quotation plays a fundamentalrole in the continuation of his analysis, since the ontological differencebetween necessary and possible being is the theoretical basis on whichGundissalinus’ universal hylomorphism is founded.Thus, the focus shifts from the cosmological description to the ana-

lysis of creatural being, and the different logical stages that lead fromthe first creation of matter and form to the first substance, and then tothe particularization of that substance into the first, eternal causedbeings: the celestial intelligences, the planets and the four elements.These first caused beings – first from an eminently ontological point ofview, as from a logical perspective their ontological compositioninvolves more stages23 – serve as secondary cause in the institutionof the creation. After having described the procession of the beings

21 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 54, 38–47.22 See Nicola Polloni, Domingo Gundisalvo, filósofo de frontera (Madrid, 2013), pp. 51–9.23 See Nicola Polloni, “Il De processione mundi di Gundissalinus: prospettive per un’analisi

genetico-dottrinale”, Annali Umanistici, 1 (2013): 25–38.

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fromGod to the secondary cause, Gundissalinus ends his treatise witha very brief exposition of some arithmological pertinences.24In this philosophical scheme, the doctrine of the necessary and pos-

sible being serves a double aim. On the one hand, through Avicenniantheory Gundissalinus states the main ontological difference betweenGod and creation and, at the same time, the proofs there presentedare judged by Gundissalinus as fully sufficient for the treatment ofthe existence and characterization of God. On the other hand, the the-ory of the necessary and possible being plays a fundamental role in theevaluation of the creatural being: Gundissalinus connects this doc-trine to the Gabirolian universal hylomorphism, interpreting the cau-sal transition from the possible being to the necessary being per aliudas the actualization of a potential state, characteristic of both matterand form, through their union. In this way, Avicennian ontology ismerged into the universal hylomorphism, forming a new theory inwhich the possible being is that characteristic of both matter andform before their union,25 the necessary being per aliud is the beingof the hylomorphic compound after the union of matter and formand the necessary being per se is the being of God only, first eminentcause of everything.26It is clear that, from a certain point of view, Gundissalinus is taking

Avicenna’s theory to its extreme consequences here, directly linkingthe necessity/possibility of being to the potency/act dialectic, andthen to hylomorphic dynamics. However, it is clear that it wouldhave been difficult for Avicenna to plainly admit such an ontologicalperspective. This is why Gundissalinus often needs to modify somepassages of his sources, in order to offer a stronger consistency tohis treatise.Not every passage where we see an alteration has to be considered

as a voluntary change introduced by Gundissalinus, and not everyalteration voluntarily introduced by the author responds to a theore-tical aim. Gundissalinus seems to be keen to improve the elegance ofthe Latin rendering of the Arabic text he translated, introducing intohis quotations some textual changes which, from a theoretical point ofview, are quite irrelevant, at least in the present study. We will there-fore focus only on the changes that are (a.) deliberately introduced byGundissalinus (b.) with a theoretical aim.Gundissalinus presents several quotations in his philosophical

works, since the doctrinal adoption he accomplishes of many concepts

24 Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 55, 6–56, 12.25 Gundissalinus distinguishes betweenmateriale esse, a potential being proper of both matter

and form before being joined together, and formale esse, an actual being proper of the com-pound and the ontological components after their reciprocal union acted by their cause.

26 See Polloni, “Il De processione mundi di Gundissalinus”.


from his source usually corresponds to a direct quotation of the sourceitself. It is hence possible to define some criteria for the peculiar useGundissalinus made of his sources, highlighting the main aspectsthat characterize his modus operandi.A first criterion (1.) concerns the length of these quotations. In his

work, Gundissalinus inserts (1.1) a high number of very short quotes,often no longer than a simple phrase, covering at best a period. Thesebrief excerpts could be interconnected to other quotations of the samelength, and they are always placed within a very fluent textual ensem-ble, in which – and this is another typical temper of Gundissalinus –an explicit mention of the original author never appears. Due to thisconciseness, the most prominent effect of this procedure is that, bychanging the semantic context of a quote, Gundissalinus often modi-fies its original sense as well.27 However, we cannot say, at least fornow, whether or not Gundissalinus was fully aware of the extent ofthese modifications.A second class of quotations (1.2) includes excerpts whose text is,

approximately, longer than a period but within the limits of a para-graph.28 In this kind of quotations, textual alterations are not spora-dic, and seem to be subordinated to a global philosophical rereading ofthe source used by Gundissalinus, who seems to modify the quotedtexts, through a semantic bending, in order to adapt them to his spec-ulative perspective.The last kind of quotation according to this first criterion (1.3) com-

prises excerpts much longer than a paragraph, texts that are struc-tured in different conceptual kernels and that may arrive to includewhole chapters from the employed sources. Among the more eloquentexamples of this approach, one may include the Summa Avicennae deconvenientia et differentia subiectorum, in the final part of theDe divi-sione philosophiae,29 the presentation of the Avicennian doctrine ofnecessary and possible being in the De processione mundi and, morepeculiarly, the whole structure of the De scientiis.30 The length ofthese passages often offers a series of textual modifications andmean-ingful alterations, introduced in different ways by Gundissalinus.The second aspect we have to point out in order to establish valu-

able criteria to analyse Gundissalinus’ “modus referendi” is (2.) thephilosophical range of each quotation. As a matter of fact, as the

27 This is the case of many quotations from Ibn Gabirol’s Fons Vitae in the De processionemundi.

28 An example of this second kind of quotation is the exposition of the causal scheme receivedby Hermann of Carinthia in De Processione Mundi, 19, 21–20, 6.

29 Gundissalinus, Über die Einteilung der Philosophie, ed. Alexander Fidora and DorothéeWerner (Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 2007), pp. 236–52.

30 See the introduction to Gundissalinus, De scientiis, ed. Manuel Alonso Alonso(Madrid-Granada, 1954), pp. 8–32.

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number of direct quotes in Gundissalinian texts is so high, it is possi-ble to distinguish between (2.1) a class of passages that quote a textualpassage with an important doctrinal kernel, or a quotation that per-forms a distinctive role in the treatise’s theoretical structure;31 (2.2)a group of passages, often very short, that have minor importanceon the doctrinal level both in the original and in the derived text;32and (2.3) those textual passages that are of little relevance in thesource text but that play a primary role in Gundissalinus’ treatises.33The last group is especially important, as it reveals the focus ofGundissalinus’ critical perspective.The last criterion we have to define is (3.) the proper alteration of

the text, a phenomenon already highlighted by Hasse.34 Even inthis case, it is possible to single out three main categories of textualmodifications, namely:

(3.1) – introduction of new textual material in the quoted excerpt(3.2) – elimination of a part of the original text in the passages presented byGundissalinus(3.3) – proper textual alteration, divided into a) lexical andmorpho-syntacticalalterations, and b) changes to the structural order.

All three kinds of alteration are found in the presentation of thedoctrine of necessary and possible being Gundissalinus provides inhis De processione mundi by means of the long quotation fromMetaphysica I, 6–7. Regarding the first two criteria we have just pre-sented, it clearly appears that this excerpt is one of the longest quota-tions (1.3), including two chapters of the first book of Avicenna’s work.Moreover, the doctrine of necessary and possible being is of primaryimportance for both Avicenna and Gundissalinus (2.1). It performs afundamental task in the economy of Gundissalinus’ cosmological trea-tise, since it proves the existence of God and introduces the ontologicaldifference between first cause and the series of caused beings, the the-oretical substrate for the whole exposition of the De processionemundi.35The two versions of the text are very similar to one another, but on

closer analysis a large number of discrepancies appears. We will focus

31 This is the case, for example, with the Summa Avicennae de convenientia et differentia sub-iectorum, as we have just seen.

32 For example, the Gundissalinian passage in De processione mundi, p. 30, 12–14, which is aquotation from Avicebron, Fons vitae, ed. Clemens Baeumker (Münster, 1895), p. 260, 12–20.

33 This is the case, for example, with De processione mundi, p. 29, 1–4 directly derived fromFons vitae, p. 277, 5–9. This is of great importance in Gundissalinus’ treatise, for thanksto his hermeneutics of this passage Gundissalinus distinguishes between the materialbeing and the formal being. See Polloni, “Il De processione mundi di Gundissalinus”.

34 See Nikolaus D. Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West (London, 2000), pp. 13–18.35 See Polloni, Domingo Gundisalvo, filósofo de frontera.


here only on the most significant instances of Gundissalinus’ altera-tion strategy.A first aspect clearly revealed by the textual confrontation is

Gundissalinus’ modification of the order of the arguments.Gundissalinus modifies the structure of the exposition on at leasttwo occasions: the De processione mundi presents us with a textualarticulation that starts with the analysis of the possible being andthen moves on to examine the necessary being, whereas in the Liberde philosophia primawe find a reverse order.36 Likewise, the negativeattributes of the necessary being have a different position in the textin the first Avicenna translation, that is to say as premise to the treat-ment of the necessary and possible being, whereas in the De proces-sione mundi this passage figures as a conclusion and as a summaryof the previous demonstrations.37In addition to these changes in the order of the exposition, the tex-

tual comparison also reveals a high number of textual alterationscharacterized by the insertion, elimination or the plain modificationof passages or words. Often these changes seem to fit the aim of yield-ing more textual intelligibility, both in exposition and lexicon. Such aneed for clarity originates from the significant textual complexity ofthe original Arabic text and leads Gundissalinus to seek terms thatcould be clearer and often more precise, and to break the long sen-tences of the first, literal translation from the Arabic, in order togive more perspicuity to the philosophical reasoning. This is thecase with many word modifications aimed at reinforcing the senseof Avicenna’s line of reasoning, such as, for example, the change ofthe connective vel with aut in order to reinforce the strict necessityof the alternative presented, or the choice of the periphrasis “theyequally accompany themselves” (aequaliter se concomitantur) insteadof “they are equal in the association of being” (coaequalia in concomi-tantia essendi) in the Metaphysica.38 Another typical modification ofthis sort, with some doctrinal implications, is the tendency to substi-tute Metaphysica’s “necesse esse” with the attributive “necessarium

36 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia prima I, 43, 21–23, and Gundissalinus, De ProcessioneMundi, 7, 3–8, 4.

37 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia prima I, 44, 24–30, and Gundissalinus, De ProcessioneMundi, 16, 23–25.

38 Cf. Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 8, 5–10: “Dicimus etiam non posse esse, ut id,quod est necesse esse, habeat aliud necesse, ita ut hoc sit simul cum illo et illud cum isto,nec unum illorum sit causa par alterius, sed aequaliter se concomitantur in necessitateessendi. Cum enim consideratum fuerit unumquodque eorum per se sine alio, aut erit neces-sarium per se, aut non erit necessarium per se”; and Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I,46, 72–77: “Dicemus etiam esse impossibile ut ei quod est necesse esse sit compar aliudnecesse esse, ita ut hoc simul habeat esse cum illo, et illud simul habeat esse cum isto,nec unum eorum sit causa alterius, sed sint coaequalia in comitantia essendi. Cum enimconsiderata fuerit essentia uniuscuiusque eorum per se sine alio, non potest esse quin sitvel necessarium per se, vel non necessarium per se”.

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esse”,39 which seems to respond to Gundissalinus’ focus on the ontolo-gical patterns of Avicennian theory.Nevertheless, this clarification does not always obtain the expected

results: Gundissalinus’ choice to change “and it is also impossible thatthe other one be similar or not similar” (et impossibile est etiam quinillud aliud vel sit similiter vel non sit similiter40) to “and so it is impos-sible that the other one be so or not be so” (et tunc impossibile est, quinillud aliud aut sit sic aut non sit sic41) is far from satisfactory, since, inaddition to be cacophonous (at least in the Latin text), it is less clearthan the former expression, even though its insertion springs from theprobable aim to strengthen Avicenna’s argument, by replacing the“similiter” – which implies a likeness between the terms – with“sic”, which conveys a stronger identity for the two beings supposedin this comparison.These kinds of alterations may also involve a straightforward doc-

trinal modification. An example of this procedure is provided by thefollowing passage taken from the discussion of the two possiblebeings, where we read:

Liber de philosophia prima I,45, 52–58

De processione mundi 6, 11–17

Si autem id quod est non estsufficiens ad acquirendum sibiutrumlibet, sed per aliquid aliudadiunctum est sibi esse id quod est,tunc esse illius est ex esse alterius ase, quo eget ad esse, et sic illud estcausa eius. Igitur habet causam; etomnino non habebit aliquod duorumacquisitorum per seipsum, sed percausam: intentio enim essendi est excausa quae est causa essendi, etintentio non essendi est ex causaquae est privatio causae intentionisessendi, sicut scisti.

Si autem non est sufficiens sibi adhabendum esse per se, sed aliquidaliud est, a quo est esse illius –omne autem, cuius esse est ex essealterius a se, qui omnia egit ad esse,illud utique est causa eius – tuncpossibile prius causam habet et nonhabebit quodlibet duorumreceptorum per se nisi per causam.Intellectus enim essendi est ex eo,quod est causa essendi, etintellectus non essendi est ex causaprivante essendi rem

The discrepancy here is not only lexical but also doctrinal: in the ori-ginal version, the “intention of not being” (intentio non essendi)derives from that very cause which is the privation of the cause ofthe intention of being, following a logic-ontological perspective typical

39 For example, cf. Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 8, 20–27.40 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 46, 86–87.41 Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 8, 21–22.


of Avicennian modus speculandi. In the Gundissalinian version, how-ever, the definition of not-being derives from a cause that deprives thebeing of the thing, a supposed negative cause that subsists as a beingthat deprives other things of their being. It is clear, then, that the twoperspectives are different and the textual change is subordinated to adifferent understanding of the argument.In other cases, Gundissalinus modifies the text by depriving it of

some elements and/or re-elaborating the whole passage in a synthesisof Avicenna’s reasoning. An example of this may be seen in the presen-tation of the second of Avicenna’s arguments,42 where Gundissalinusprovides a synthesis of the premise of Avicenna’s demonstration, pre-senting the results of his reasoning and displaying a clear syntacticalrestyling.As we have said, the alterations Gundissalinus introduces are often

aimed at a doctrinal sharpening of Avicenna’s perspective. Two pas-sages are in my opinion paradigmatic in this regard. The first isrelated to the first proof of the uniqueness of the necessary being.This argument is based on the impossibility of the essential definitionof the necessary being to be manifold.The first part of this demonstration refers to the sub-hypothesis

according to which two necessary beings are supposedly identical intheir essential definition. In this case, even though they share thesame essential definition, all the same they are separate from oneanother, so that a differentiating factor must be supposed, such asan accident or an un-essential attribute. At this point, the argumentbifurcates into a further alternative concerning the relationship ofthese supposed accidents with the necessary being. And it is herethat Gundissalinus felicitously modifies the text.Hence, the first possibility of the alternative is linked, both for

Avicenna and Gundissalinus, to the eventuality that the diversitybetween the supposed two beings inheres in their essence in virtueof their very quiddity, that is, thanks to their essence: however, thiswould mean that what should be the principle of their differentiationis identical for both the supposed necessary beings, and that iscontradictory.

42 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima I, 48, 12–17: “Relativorum autem non est necesseunum esse ex altero, sed cum altero. Quod autem facit illa duo esse necessario est causaquae coniungit illa, vel etiam duae materiae, vel duo subiecta de quibus illa praedicantur.Non autem esse duarum materiarum vel duorum subiectorum tantum sufficit ad hoc, sedesse tertium quod coniungit illa”; and Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, pp. 9, 20–10,1: “Relativorum autem alterum non dat esse alteri, sed est simul cum eo; datorum autemesse causa est coniungens illa. Duae etiam materiae vel duae solae substantiae non suffi-ciunt per se ad conferendum sibi hoc esse, quod dicitur de eis, sed egent alio aliquo tertio,quod componat ea inter se”.

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With regard to the second possibility of this alternative, we find aninteresting discrepancy between the two versions of the text:

Liber de philosophia prima I,50, 59–69


Vel accidunt ex causis extrinsecis,non ex ipsa sua quidditate, et tunc, sinon esset causa illa, non differrent.Igitur, si non esset causa illa,essentiae essent una vel non essentuna. Igitur, si non esset causa illa,tunc nec hoc per se solum essetnecesse esse, nec illud per se solumesset necesse esse; igitur necessitasessendi uniuscuiusque eorum,propria et solitaria, est acquisita abalio a se. Iam autem dictum est quodquicquid est necessarium esse peraliud a se non est necessarium esseper se, immo in definitione suaeessentiae est possibile esse. Undeunumquodque eorum estnecessarium esse per se et possibileesse per se, quod est inconveniens.

Vel si accidit eis diversitas excausis intrinsecis, non causisessentiae addictis, tunc, si causailla non esset, profecto nondifferrent. Ergo, si causa illa nonesset, essentiae illorum essent una– sed non sunt una; ergo, si causailla non esset, non haberetunumquodque eorum necessariumesse per se discretum ab alio. Ergonecessitas essendi uniuscuiusqueillorum propria et solitaria est excausa intrinseca. Iam autemostendimus, quod, quicquid estnecessarium esse per aliud, non estnecessarium esse per se. Immo indefinitione essentiae ipsius estpossibile esse, cum unumquodqueeorum, sicut est necessariumesse per se, sic etiam est possibileesse per se, quod est inconveniens.

This second alternative is not only different but presumptivelyopposite in the two versions, as we read “by an extrinsic cause andnot by its own quiddity” (ex causis extrinsecis non ex ipsa sua quiddi-tate) in the Metaphysica’s text, and “by an intrinsic cause not a causeassigned to the essence” (ex causis intrinsecis non causis essentiaeaddictis) in the De processione mundi.43

43 This passage, where we find the alteration of Metaphysics’ “ex causis extrinsecis” to the Deprocessione’s “ex causis intrinsecis”, and the subsequent “acquisita ab alio a se” to “ex causaextrinseca”, is quite problematic. As is known, Bülow chooses the MS Paris, BNF, Lat. 6443as the main manuscript for his critical edition of the Gundissalinian treatise. At the sametime, among the four manuscripts Bülow used for this edition, it should be stressed thatthe MS Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 2186 often presents a stricter proximity to the originaltext of the quotations Gundissalinus presents in his treatise. This is probably due to somecorrections introduced by the copyist, who may have had some of the sources used byGundissalinus at his disposal, and in particular Avicenna’s Metaphysics. It is thereforenot surprising that the MS Lat. 2186 is the only manuscript used by Bülow to report a read-ing concordant with the Avicennian text, that is, “ex causis extrinsecis”. Furthermore, anidentical philological situation can be found with the critical edition by Alonso Del Realand Soto Bruna. Nevertheless, a rapid recension of further manuscript witnesses, unknown


In the Liber de philosophia prima, the hypothesis of an externalpertinence is directly linked to the previous hypothesis regardingthe possibility of an internal pertinence by the quiddity of the neces-sary being. If we admit an external cause that grants its necessity tothat being, said necessity would derive from something other than thesupposed being itself, meaning it could not be said to be a necesse esseper se.Rather, a differentiating factor is supposed in the De processione

mundi, which is developed by a cause inherent to the essence ofthat necessary being, thanks to which the two beings should differfrom one another. This would mean, however, that the necessity ofthese two beings derives from this same internal cause, so that,regarding the definition of their essence, they are possible beings;this latter scenario is inconsistent, however, as they would be simul-taneously possible and necessary beings. Thus, the outcome of thetwo arguments seems to be the same, even if their course is different.As a matter of fact, the consequence of the argument presented by

the Metaphysica is that the pertinence of an external cause is at var-iance with the premise of the reasoning itself: the two beings weresupposed to be necessary per se but they are necessary per aliud.Gundissalinus’ result is minutely different: here, too, the pertinenceof a cause involves the two supposed beings being necessary peraliud, because they are caused. Indeed, everything that is caused isa possible being whose possibility has been granted by its cause:through this distinction of the possibility of being from that of not-being, as we have seen, the possible being becomes a necessarybeing but not per se: it becomes a necesse esse per aliud. In contrastwith the Liber de philosophia prima, here the cause is presented asinternal, and so we might suppose that for Gundissalinus there is acontradiction between the inner necessity of the two beings and thefact that their necessity is caused: they would be simultaneouslynecessary per se and per aliud, which is not possible. The two versions

to Bülow, shows that at least the MSS Toledo, BCT 47–15; Cambridge, Gonville and CaiusCollege 504; Città del Vaticano, BAV, ottob. Lat. 1870; and Bruxelles, KRB II.2558 share thesame version presented by MS Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 2186. This is the only passageexamined in this paper where such a philological outcome can be seen: regarding the otherchanges introduced by Gundissalinus, the manuscript tradition seems to be coherent in pre-senting the textual alteration analysed, alterations that therefore cannot be ascribed to thematerial transmission of the text. However, this fact contributes to the claim of a new criti-cal edition of Gundissalinus’ De processione mundi that takes into consideration the newmanuscript witnesses already found for the elaboration of a new stemma codicum. Untilthen, any use of these new witnesses would be improper, since the parental relationsbetween these new versions are still philologically unclear. I will come back to this topicin a further study.

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of this argument therefore lead to the same conclusion: the impossibil-ity of two necessary beings.The last paradigmatic case of Gundissalinus’ alteration strategy I

would like to underline here belongs to the fourth Avicenna’s argu-ment and is directly linked to the definition of the necessity ofexistence:

Liber de philosophia prima I,51, 83–52, 97


Iam autem notum est quoddifferentiae non recipiuntur indefinitione eius quod ponitur utgenus; igitur ipsae non acquiruntgeneri certitudinem, sed acquirunt eiesse in actu, sicut rationale.Rationale enim non acquirit animaliintentionem animalitatis, sedacquirit ei esse in effectu persuccessionem essendi proprie.

Oportet igitur ut differentiaenecessitatis essendi, si forte suntaliquae, non acquirant necessitatiessendi certitudinem necessitatisessendi, sed acquirant ei esse ineffectu, et hoc est absurdum duobusmodis. Uno, quod certitudonecessitatis essendi non est nisiimpossibilitas non essendi, non sicutcertitudo animalitatis quae estintentio praeter necessitatemessendi, et est esse comitans illam etsuperveniens illi, sicut scisti; undeacquisitio necessitatis necessitatiessendi est acquisitio condicionis decertitudine suae necessitatis: iamautem prohibuimus hoc concedi interdifferentiam et genus. Alio, quiasequeretur quod certitudonecessitatis essendi ad hoc ut essetin effectu, pendret ex alio dante einecessitatem.

Scimus autem, quod differentiaenon recipiuntur in definitione eius,quod ponitur ut genus. Ergo nondant generi essentiam eius, seddant ei esse in actu, sicut rationale.Rationale enim non prodestanimali, quantum adanimalitatem, sed prodest ei, utipsum sit in actu essentiaappropriata. Oportet ergo, utdifferentiae necessitatis essendi, siforte sint aliquae, non prosintaliquid, quantum ad essentiamnecessitatis essendi, nisi ad esse inactu. Hoc autem factum est duobusmodis.

Uno quidem propria essentianecessitatis essendi non est nisiincessabilitas essendi; non sicutessentia animalitatis, quae estessentia praeter essentiamincessabilitatis essendi. Esse enimest consequens illam velsuperveniens illi, sicut scisti. Ergodifferentiae non prosuntnecessitati essendi nisi ad idtantum, quod est inter essentiamsuae formae. Iam autemprohibuimus hoc inter genus etdifferentiam alio modo et ad hoc, utipsa necessitas essendi habeat essein actu: oportet, ut pendeat ab aliodante eam.

The question here concerns the possibility of dividing the necessityof being as a genus in its species, and thus supporting a kind of multi-plicity. Nevertheless, species are not part of the definition of their


genus, since throughout their existence, species only actualize thegenus, i.e. they give it its being in act. This principle can be graspedusing the example of the relationship between the species of rationalbeings and its animal genus: in the definition of animal, rationality isnot included, since not all animals are rational; nevertheless, how-ever, rational animals – like the other animal species – throughtheir existence actualize the genus’ existence. For this reason, ifthere were specifications of the necessity of being, they would notgive their genus the necessity of being but its subsistence in act,and that is not possible. In fact, the same definition of necessarybeing implies, as we have seen, the impossibility of not being as itsproper definition, and a lack of difference between essence andexistence.We can detect in this passage the careful approach Gundissalinus

adopted in his work. If, stylistically, the text presented in De proces-sione mundi is clearer, how Gundissalinus modifies the Avicennianterms intentio and certitudo with the simpler and univocal “essence”(essentia) is very significant: these changes are probably due to theontological stance the author wanted to emphasize in his treatise,linking the whole demonstration to the other parts of his text. Atthe same time, it is very representative of his modus operandi thatGundissalinus modifies the definition of the necessity of being fromthe “impossibility of not being” (impossibilitas non essendi) to themore ontological “unceasing activity of being” (incessabilitas essendi),as well as the subsequent comparison to the animalitas,44 which is dif-ferent from the necessity of being in theMetaphysics since the animal-itas is “an intention beyond the necessity of being that accompanies itand that adds to it” (intentio praeter necessitatem essendi, et est essecomitans illam et superveniens illi), while in the De processione thesame difference is expressed by the being of the animalitas, that “issubsequent to it or that adds to it” (est consequens illam vel superve-niens illi).How can we explain these discrepancies? And what motivates

Gundissalinus to conclude this passage by modifying the Avicenna’s“whence the acquisition of the necessity by the necessary being isthe acquisition of the certainty of its necessity” (unde acquisitio neces-sitatis necessitati essendi est acquisitio condicionis de certitudine suaenecessitatis) into “therefore the differences are not useful to the neces-sity of being except only for what is between its essence and its form”(ergo differentiae non prosunt necessitati essendi nisi ad id tantum,quod est inter essentiam suae formae)? As far as the first question isconcerned, it seems plausible that Gundissalinus was driven by the

44 “Animalitas” is expressing here the possession of a soul in accordance with the logical divi-sions of the Porphyry’s tree.

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intention to clarify the passage, as “being subsequent” (consequens)implies a strict logical consequence that “being companion” (comitans)does not support, bringing the text closer to the specific sense ofAvicenna’s line of reasoning.Regarding the second question, the Metaphysics states the indiffer-

ence of essence and existence for the necessary being, which entailsthe impossibility of the acquisition of its actual being, since it isimplied in its very definition. In the De processione mundi, the textis subtly different: it declares that the differences can be useful (i.e.they can have an active consequence, prosunt) only in relation45 tothe essence of the necessary being’s form, but in this way those differ-ences would cause the existence of the same essence whose existenceis part of its definition: a possibility already previously excluded in theargument. Also here, the textual alteration entails the insertion ofnew doctrinal elements – in this case, the form of the necessarybeing and the direct mention of its essence – that are absent fromthe Metaphysics translation: insertions and modifications that revealGundissalinus’ understanding and hermeneutics of the text.

CONCLUSIONS

A thorough examination of these passages allows us to draw some con-clusive remarks. Firstly, we have to consider whether the doctrinalshifts these changes involve are intentional or not. It seems to me pos-sible to claim that Gundissalinus is not only aware of the theoreticalimplications of his textual alterations, but that these doctrinal modi-fications are actively sought in order to provide his cosmological trea-tise with a coherent philosophical outlook. And for this same reason itis possible to speak of Gundissalinus using a deliberate alterationstrategy.This first remark is directly linked to the question regarding the

translation from the Arabic original. It seems implausible to methat the quotation we find in the De processione mundi could bederived from a second version of the Latin Metaphysica, and this fortwo reasons. Firstly, because there is no real coherence between theminor lessons of the Metaphysica’s stemma codicum and those of Deprocessione, and thus, from a strictly philological point of view,there is no grounds for such a supposition. Secondly, if it could be

45 Although the critical edition by Bülow reads “inter” here, it is possible to suppose a corrup-tion of the text, since the meaning of the text becomes unintelligible and an “inter” is notadmissible for a singular entity (the essence of the form of the necessary being). An emenda-tion of the text could be proposed, reading “intra” instead of “inter”; this is not the right placefor a critical revision of the text, however. Nevertheless, since both readings imply a directrelation with the essence of the necessary being, I choose to use the paraphrases “to berelated” to express both possibilities.


true that the changes introduced by Gundissalinus are aimed at aclearer understanding of the text, at the same time we have seenhow the purpose of these alterations also envisages their insertioninto the doctrinal system presented in the De processione mundi.These remarks, however, do not deny that Gundissalinus may haveelaborated these quoted passages translating directly from the origi-nal Arabic text: on the contrary, since many modified terms show astronger proximity to the Arabic text, it seems plausible to claimthat Gundissalinus undertook a new reading of the Avicennian textin Arabic, using that text for the drafting of the De processionemundi, checking it and choosing the best terms for his purposes.Nevertheless, this would imply that the De processione mundi waswritten in a late period of Gundissalinus’ life, once he could haveacquired a good knowledge of Arabic, leaving aside the necessity ofa collaborator for direct access to the text.A last remark concerns the philosophical importance of this altera-

tion strategy: its analysis shows how Gundissalinus does not read hissources in a sterile way. On the contrary, the “modus referendi” andthe alterations Gundissalinus made in his De processione mundi areparts of a textual and doctrinal balance between different sources,which are interpreted, re-elaborated and blended together byGundissalinus in order to build his own personal philosophical analy-sis of the cosmogenesis and the ontological composition of creatures.

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APPENDIX

Textual comparison between De processione mundi, pp. 5,19–17, 1 and Metaphysica I, 6–7

Metaphysica I, 6 pp. 44, 38–46, 71 De processione mundi, pp. 5, 19–7, 2

Quicquid autem possibile estconsideratum in se, eius esse eteius non esse utrumque est percausam. Cum enim habuerit esse,tunc iam acquisitum est sibi essediscretum a non esse. Cum verodesierit esse, iam acquisitum estsibi non esse discretum ab esse.Igitur non potest esse quinutrumlibet istorum duorumacquiratur sibi ab alio a se vel nonab alio a se. Si autem acquiritur abalio a se, tunc illud aliud est causa.Si vero non acquiritur ab alio a se,manifestum est autem quodquicquid post non esse habet esseiam appropriatum est per aliudquod sibi advenit ab alio a se,similiter et in non esse, tunc, adappropriandum sibi utrumlibet, idquod ipsum est vel est sufficiensvel non sufficiens. Si autem idquod est sufficiens est adappropriandum sibi utrumlibetillorum duorum, ita ut sit aliquidillorum duorum, tunc illud estnecessarium sibi ipsi per se. Iamautem positum erat non essenecesse. Igitur hoc estinconveniens et impossibile. Siautem id quod est non estsufficiens ad acquirendum sibiutrumlibet, sed per aliquid aliudadiunctum est sibi esse id quodest, tunc esse illius est ex essealterius a se, quo eget ad esse, etsic illud est causa eius. Igiturhabet causam; et omnino nonhabebit aliquod duorumacquisitorum per seipsum, sed per

Omne autem, quod possibile estesse, cum consideratum fuerit ipsumin se, eius esse et eius non esseutrumque est ex causa. Cum autemfuerit, iam recepit esse divisum anon-esse; cum vero non fuerit, iamhabet non-esse divisum ab esse. Etnon potest esse, quin utrumqueistorum duorum vel habeat ex alio, velnon habeat ex alio. Si autem habueritex alio, profecto ipsum erit ex causa.

Quod vero non habeat ex alio, hocimpossibile est esse. Manifestum estenim nullum posse venire ad esse nisiper aliquid aliud, quod habet esse;similiter ad non-esse. Ipsum enim velest sufficiens per se ad habendumesse vel non est sufficiens. Si autemipsum per se est sufficiens adutrumque recipiendum, tunc, cumhabuerit esse, erit ens per se et eritnecessarium esse. Positum est autemnon esse necessarium esse. Simulergo est necessarium et possibile,quod est contrarium. Si autem non estsufficiens sibi ad habendum esse perse, sed aliquid aliud est, a quo est esseillius – omne autem, cuius esse est exesse alterius a se, qui omnia egit adesse, illud utique est causa eius – tuncpossibile prius causam habet et nonhabebit quodlibet duorumreceptorum per se nisi per causam.Intellectus enim essendi est ex eo,quod est causa essendi, et intellectusnon essendi est ex causa privanteessendi rem. Dicimus ergo deintentione essendi possibiliter, quiaesse, quod habet, ex causa sua habetet respectu eius. Quamvis enim non


causam: intentio enim essendi estex causa quae est causa essendi, etintentio non essedi est ex causaquae est privatio causaeintentionis essendi, sicut scisti.

Dicemus igitur quod oportetillud fieri necessarium esse percausam et respectu eius. Si enimnon fuerit necessarium esseexistente essentia causae etcomparatione eius, erit etiampossibile. Unde potest concediillud esse et non esse nonappropriatum aliquo illorumduorum; et hoc iterum eget ut sitaliquid tertium per quodassignetur ei esse post non esse,vel post esse non esse, cum causahabuerit esse; est ergo illud aliacausa, et sic itur in infinitum, etcum hoc non erit ei appropriatumesse nec acquiretur ei esse, et hocest absurdum, non ob hoc tantumquod causae eunt in infinitum (hocautem dubium est hic adremovendum), sed ob hoc quodnondum habet per quodapproprietur; iam autem positumest illud habere esse. Igiturmanifestum est quod quicquidpossibile est esse, non habet essenisi cum necessarium est esserespectu suae causae.

habeat esse, nisi cum sua causaexstiterit, est tamen esse possibile,licet habeat esse vel non esse, nec sitappropriatum alicui illorum duorum.Monstratum est igitur, quod, quicquidest possibile esse, non habet esse, nisirespectu suae causae.

Metaphysica I, 6, p. 44, 24–37 De processione mundi, pp. 7, 3–8, 4

Quod autem necesse esse nonhabet causam, manifestum est. Sienim necesse esse haberet causamsui esse, profecto eius esse essetper illam. Quicquid autem estcuius esse est per aliquid, cumconsideratum fuerit per se, nonhabebit esse necessarium;

Prima igitur causa non est possibileesse, igitur necesse est esse; unde nonhabet causam. Quod enim necesse estesse, non habere causam manifestumest. Si enim necessarium esse habeatcausam sui esse, profecto eius esseesset per ipsam. Omne autem, cuiusesse est per aliud, cum ipsum fuerit

Continued.

Metaphysica I, 6 pp. 44, 38–46, 71 De processione mundi, pp. 5, 19–7, 2

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quicquid autem consideratum perse sine alio non habet essenecessarium, non est necesse esseper se. Unde constat quod, sinecesse esse per se haberetcausam, profecto non essetnecesse esse per se. Manifestumest igitur quod necesse esse nonhabet causam. Et patet etiam exhoc quod impossibile est ut aliquididem sit necesse esse per se etnecesse esse per aliud: si enimeius esse esset per aliud, tuncimpossibile esset illud invenirisine illo alio, impossibile igituresset inveniri necesse esse per se;si enim esset necessarium per se,iam haberet esse, et illud aliudnihil ageret ad illud essenecessarium; quicquid enim est adcuius esse agit aliud, eius esse nonest necessarium per se.

consideratum in se, eius esse nonesset necessarium. Quicquid autemconsideratum in se sine alio noninvenitur habere esse necessarium,illius esse non erit necessarium perse. Unde constat, quod, sinecessarium esse per se habetcausam, non est necessarium esse perse. Manifestum est igitur, quodnecessarium esse non habet causam.Patet quidem ex hoc etiam esseimpossibile unam rem haberenecessarium esse per se et haberenecessarium esse per aliud. Si enimnecessitas sui esse est per aliud, tuncimpossibile est illud esse sine alio.Impossibile est igitur, ut habeatnecessarium esse per se. Si enimfuerit necessarium esse per se,profecto illud aliud non confert eialiquid ad esse. Omne enim, cuialiquid confert ad esse, illud non estnecessarium esse per se. Igiturnecesse esse non habet causam.

Metaphysica I, 6, pp. 46, 72–47, 11 De processione mundi, pp. 8, 5–9, 20

Dicemus etiam esse impossibileut ei quod est necesse esse sitcompar aliud necesse esse, ita uthoc simul habeat esse cum illo, etillud simul habeat esse cum isto,nec unum eorum sit causaalterius, sed sint coaequalia incomitantia essendi. Cum enimconsiderata fuerit essentiauniuscuiusque eorum per se sinealio, non potest esse quin sit velnecessarium per se, vel nonnecessarium per se.

Si autem fuerit necessarium perse, non potest esse quin vel habeatetiam necessitatem respectu suicum secundo, et tunc erit illud

Dicimus etiam non posse esse, utid, quod est necesse esse, habeat aliudnecesse, ita ut hoc sit simul cum illo etillud cum isto, nec unum illorum sitcausa par alterius, sed aequaliter seconcomitantur in necessitate essendi.Cum enim consideratum fueritunumquodque eorum per se sine alio,aut erit necessarium per se, aut nonerit necessarium per se.

Si autem fuerit necessarium per se,aut habebit necessitatem etiam cumalio, cum consideratum fuerit cumalio – et si sic fuerit, tunc hoc eritnecessarium per se et necessariumper aliud, et hoc est inconveniens,sicut supra ostendimus – aut non

Continued.



necesse esse per se et necesse essepropter aliud a se, et hoc estfrivolum, sicut supra ostendimus,vel non habeat necessitatempropter aliud, ita ut esse eius nondebeat sequi ex esse alterius neccomitetur illud, nec esse eiuspendeat ex esse alterius, ita ut hocnon habeat esse nisi et alterumhabuerit esse.

Si autem non fueritnecessarium per se, oportebit tuncut, respectu sui, sit possibile esseet, respectu alterius, sit necesseesse, et impossibile est etiam quinillud aliud vel sit similiter vel nonsit similiter. Sed si illud aliudfuerit similiter, tunc non potestesse quin necessitas esse huius sitex illo, cum illud sit in terminopossibiliter essendi, vel in terminonecessario essendi. Si autemnecessitas essendi huius fuerit exillo cum illud fuerit in terminonecessario essendi, et non ex senec ex tertio contingente, sicutsupra diximus, sed ex illo quod estex ipso et necessitas esse huiusfuerit condicione necessitatisessendi illius cum illo quodacquiritur postea ex necessitateessendi, posterioritate essentiali,tunc non acquiretur necessitasessendi ullo modo. Si autemnecessitas essendi huius fuerit exillo cum illud fuerit in terminopossibilitatis, tunc necessitasessendi huius erit ex essentiaillius, et illo existente in terminopossibilitatis acquirente huicnecessitatem essendi, necacquirente ab isto terminumpossibilitatis, sed necessitatem.Igitur causa huius erit possibilitasessendi illius, cum hoc non sit

habebit necessitatem cum alio, ita utesse eius sequatur ad esse alterius etcomitetur illud.

Immo esse eius non pendebit exesse alterius, ita ut hoc non sit, nisi etillud fuerit, et e contrario. Si autemnon fuerit necessarium per se,oportet, ut consideratione sui per sesit possibile esse, consideratione veroalterius sit necessarium esse. Et tuncimpossibile est, quin illud aliud autsit sic aut non sit sic. Si autem et illudaliud fuerit sic, tunc impossibile est,quin necessitas huius essendi sit exillo, cum illud vel est possibile esse velnecessarium esse. Si autemnecessitas essendi huius fuerit ex illo,tunc illud est necessarium esse; sedhoc non habuerit necessarium esseper se, nec per tertium aliud aliquid,sicut praediximus, sed per illud, quodversa vice habet necessitatem essendiab ipso, et necessitas essendi huiusingerit necessitatem essendi illius,quod e contrario habuit esse postnecessitatem essendi huius et hocposteritate essentiali. Tunc hoc nonhabebit unquam necessarium esseper se ullo modo. Si autem necessitasessendi huius fuerit ex illo, cum illudest possibile esse, tunc necessitasessendi huius erit ex illo existentepossibili et dante huic necessitatemessendi nec accipiente ab illopossibilitatem essendi, sednecessitatem. Ergo possibilitasessendi illius erit causa necessitatishuius, et hoc non erit causapossibilitatis illius essendi.

Ergo non erunt concomitantia, cumunumquodque eorum sit causa per seet causatum per se. Deinde etiamcontingit aliud, quod, cum possibilitasessendi illius fuerit causa necessitatisessendi huius, tunc esse huius non

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causa illius; erunt igitur noncoaequalia, cum unumquodqueeorum sit causa per se etcausatum per se. Deinde contingitetiam aliud quod, cum possibilitasessendi illius fuerit causanecessitatis essendi istius, tuncesse illius non pendebit ex esseistius, sed ex possibilitate eius.Igitur oportebit ut esse huius sitsimul cum non esse illius; iamautem posuimus illa coaequalia;tunc hoc est impossibile: igiturnon est possibile ut sintcoaequalia in esse, ita ut nonpendeant ex causa extrinseca; sedoportet ut unum eorum sitprimum per seipsum et sit ibicausa extrinseca quae faciatutrumque necessario esse,necessitate pendenti inter se, velfaciat necessarium penderenecessitas utriusque.

procedit ex esse eius, sed ex esseillius. Nos autem posuimus illaconcomitantia. Ergo non possunt esseconcomitantia in esse, nisi forte ambopendeant ex alia extrinseca causa. Ettunc oportebit, ut aut alterum eorumsit primum per se, aut sit aliquidaliud extrinsecus, quod det eis essesecundum habitudinem essendi,quam habent inter se, et instituathabitudinem inter ea, secundumquam habeant esse.


Relativorum autem non estnecesse unum esse ex altero, sedcum altero. Quod autem facit illaduo esse necessario est causa quaeconiungit illa, vel etiam duaemateriae, vel duo subiecta dequibus illa praedicantur. Nonautem esse duarum materiarumvel duorum subiectorum tantumsufficit ad hoc, sed esse tertiumquod coniungit illa, et hoc estquoniam non potest esse quin esseet certitudo uniuscuiusqueduorum vel sit esse cum alio, ettunc esse eius per se erit nonnecessarium; igitur erit possibile;itaque erit causatum, et erit sicutdiximus, quod causa eius non estcomitans illud in esse, et ita causa

Relativorum autem alterum nondat esse alteri, sed est simul cum eo;datorum autem esse causa estconiungens illa. Duae etiam materiaevel duae solae substantiae nonsufficiunt per se ad conferendum sibihoc esse, quod dicitur de eis, sed egentalio aliquo tertio, quod componat eainter se. Necesse est enim unumistorum duorum esse, scilicet ut velesse uniuscuiusque horum etcertitudo non sit, nisi fuerit cum alio –et ita tunc suum esse per se non ergoerit necessarium, ergo possibile, ergocausatum; unde ipsum et sua causa,sicut diximus, non comitabuntur se inesse, ergo sua causa erit aliqua resalia, quapropter hoc et illud non eruntcausa habitudinis, quae est inter illa,

Continued.



eius erit aliud, et tunc illudet aliud non erunt causahabitudinis quae est inter illa, sedillud aliud. Vel non sit esse cumalio, igitur hoc esse cum alio eritaliquid noviter adveniens supersuum esse proprium etconsequens illud, et etiam essequod est ex parte eius non erit excomitantia inquantum suntcomitantia, sed ex causapraecedente, si ipsum fueritcausatum. Tunc ergo ipsum esseeius aut erit ex suo comite, noninquantum est comes, sedinquantum est esse sui comitisquod est ei proprium, et ita nonerunt comitantia, sed causa etcausatum, et comes eius erit etiamcausa habitudinis aestimativaeinter ea, sicut pater et filius, auterunt comitantia secundum hocquod nullum eorum est causaalterius, et habitudo eritnecessaria ad esse eorum. Igiturprima causa habitudinis erit resextrinseca, faciens esse duasessentias eorum, sicut scisti, ethabitudo erit accidentalis; undenon erit ibi comitantia nisi peraccidens separabile velinseparabile. Sed hoc est aliud abeo in quo sumus; habitudo autemquae est per accidens erit causasine dubio; unde secundumcomitantiam erunt utraquecausata, et ita nullum eorum estnecessarium esse per se.

sed illa alia causa – vel ut non sitnecesse esse simul cum alio; et ita hocsimul esse erit quidem accidensinutile ad esse eius proprium. Undeproprium esse eius non erit excomitantia comitantis, secundumquam est suum comitans, sed excausa praecedente, si ipsumcausatum fuerit. Tunc ergo esse eiusaut erit ex comitante, non ex eo, quodest comitans, sed ex proprio essecomitanti. Et ita non eruntcomitantia, sed causa et causatum. Etetiam comes eius erit causa putativaputatae habitudinis, quae est interilla, ut pater et filius. Aut eruntcomitantia secundum hoc, quodnullum eorum est causa alterius ethabitudo erit necessaria ad esseeorum. Sed propria prima causahabitudinis erit causa extrinsecainstituens duas essentias eorum,sicuti scisti, et habitudo erit accidens.Unde non erit illi comitantia, nisi peraccidens separabile, vel inseparabile.Hoc autem est praeter propositum; idautem, quod est per accidens, erit excausa indubitanter. Unde ex partecomitantiae erunt duo causata; et itanullum eorum necessarium est esseper se.


Dicemus etiam quod necesseesse debet esse una essentia; sinautem, sint multae, igitur

Dicemus etiam, quod necessariumesse debet esse unum in se. Sin autemsint multa et sit unumquodque eorum

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154 NICOLA POLLONI

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unaquaeque earum erit necesseesse; necesse est autem utunumquodque eorum incertitudine suae essentiae vel nondifferat ab altero aliquo modo veldifferat. Si autem non differtunum ab alio in intellectu suaepropriae essentiae, differt autemab eo per hoc quod hoc non estillud (hoc enim differentia est sinedubio), profecto unum differt abalio in eo quod est praeterintellectum essentiae. Intellectusenim essentiae quae est in eis nonest diversus; sed est adiunctum eialiquid per quod factum est hoc velin hoc, vel est adiunctum ei aliquidquod est hoc vel in hoc nec illud estadiunctum alteri, sed est eiadiunctum per quod factum esthoc, vel quod hoc est hoc ipsum; ethaec est appropriatio aliqua,scilicet ipsa intentio per quam estinter ea diversitas. Igiturunumquodque eorum differt abaltero per eam, nec differt abaltero in intentione ipsiusessentiae, sed per vires rerumquae sunt ipsamet intentio.

Sed coniunctio intentionis suntaccidentia et consequentia nonessentialia, et haec consequentiavel accidunt ex certitudine esserei, inquantum est ipsa certitudo,et tunc oportet ut omniaconveniant in ea. Iam autemposiumus ea differre in illa; igiturconveniunt et differunt in eisdem,quod est inconveniens. Velaccidunt ex causis extrinsecis, nonex ipsa sua quidditate, et tunc, sinon esset causa illa, nondifferrent. Igitur, si non essetcausa illa, essentiae essent unavel non essent una. Igitur, si non

necessarium esse: necesse estunumquodque eorum in sua essentiavel non differre ab altero aliquo modo,vel differre. Si autem non differuntunum ab alio intellectu suaeessentiae propriae, differt autemunum ab alio in eo, quod unum nonest aliud – haec enim differentia estsine dubio: profecto unum differt abalio per aliquid, quod est praeterintellectum essentiae. Intellectusenim essentiae est in eis non diversus,sed est adiunctum aliquid, per quodfactum est hoc, vel est in hoc, per quodhoc factum est hoc, nec illud est adaliquid iunctum. Est autemadiunctum unicuique aliorum aliquid,per quod hoc factum est hoc, et econtrario, vel quod hoc est hoc, idemaliud. Haec enim idem sunt inessentia, et est in eis alteritas, alia estdiversitas: ergo sic teneamus, quodunumquodque eorum sit idem inessentia cum alio et differat ab alio.Dico ergo, quod ea, quae affixa suntextrinsecus essentiae, sunt denumero accidentium consequentium,non essentialium. Haec autemaccidentia consequentia, si acciduntipsi essentiae ex hoc, quod est ipsaessentia, necesse est tunc, quodomnia conveniunt in eis. Iam autemdiximus illa differre in eis: ergoconveniunt et differunt in eisdem,quod est inconveniens. Vel si acciditeis diversitas ex causis intrinsecis,non causis essentiae addictis, tunc, sicausa illa non esset, profecto nondifferrent. Ergo, si causa illa nonesset, essentiae illorum essent una –sed non sunt una – ; ergo, si causa illanon esset, non haberet unumquodqueeorum necessarium esse per sediscretum ab alio. Ergo necessitasessendi uniuscuiusque illorum


esset causa illa, tunc nec hoc perse solum esset necesse esse, necillud per se solum esset necesseesse; igitur necessitas essendiuniuscuiusque eorum, propria etsolitaria, est acquisita ab alio a se.Iam autem dictum est quodquicquid est necessarium esse peraliud a se non est necessariumesse per se, immo in definitionesuae essentiae est possibile esse.Unde unumquodque eorum estnecessarium esse per se etpossibile esse per se, quod estinconveniens.

Ponamus autem illa differre inaliquo inhaerente, postquamconveniunt in intentioneessentiae; igitur impossibile estquin illud in quo differunt vel siteis necessarium ad necessitatemessendi vel non sit. Si autem fueritnecessarium ad necessitatemessendi, manifestum est tuncoportere ut conveniat in eoquicquid est necesse esse. Siautem non est necessariumnecessitati essendi, tuncnecessitas essendi ab eo sine illoest solitaria necessitas sui esse,illud vero est adveniens eiaccidentaliter et adiungitur eipost plenitudinem necessitatis suiesse. Iam autem ostendimus hocesse absurdum; igitur impossibileest ut differant in aliquo.

propria et solitaria est ex causaintrinseca. Iam autem ostendimus,quod, quicquid est necessarium esseper aliud, non est necessarium esseper se. Immo in definitione essentiaeipsius est possibile esse, cumunumquodque eorum, sicut estnecessarium esse per se, sic etiam estpossibile esse per se, quod estinconveniens.

Ponamus autem illa differre inaliquo accidente essentiali, postquamconveniunt in intellectu essentiae.Hoc autem, in quo differunt,impossibile est, quin sit velnecessarium ad necessitatem essendiunumquodque, vel non sit. Si autemnecessarium fuerit necessitatiessendi, necesse est tunc, ut omniaconveniant in eo quicquid estnecessarium esse. Si autem non estnecessarium esse necessitati essendi,tunc necessitas essendi est discretaab eo et est necessitas per se. Illudautem essentiale est accidens affixumextrinsecus et adveniens necessitatipost plenitudinem, sive perfectionemnecessitatis essendi. Hoc autem iamostendimus esse absurdum. Igitur innullo debent differre.


Oportet autemutadhucaddamussuper hoc manifestationem aliomodo, hoc est quia impossibile estnecessitatem essendi dividi inmultitudinem, nisi uno duorummodorum; scilicet, aut dividi perdifferentias, aut per accidentalia.Iam autem notum est quoddifferentiae non recipiuntur in

Debemus autem hoc adhuc ampliusalio modo ostendere. Impossibileenim est necessitatem essendi dividiper multa, nisi uno duorummodorum,scilicet vel sicut res dividuntur perdifferentias vel sicut dividuntur peraccidentia. Scimus autem, quoddifferentiae non recipiuntur indefinitione eius, quod ponitur ut

156 NICOLA POLLONI

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definitione eius quod ponitur utgenus; igitur ipsae non acquiruntgeneri certitudinem, sedacquirunt ei esse in actu, sicutrationale. Rationale enim nonacquirit animali intentionemanimalitatis, sed acquirit ei essein effectu per successionemessendi proprie.

Oportet igitur ut differentiaenecessitatis essendi, si forte suntaliquae, non acquirant necessitatiessendi certitudinem necessitatisessendi, sed acquirant ei esse ineffectu, et hoc est absurdumduobus modis. Uno, quodcertitudo necessitatis essendi nonest nisi impossibilitas nonessendi, non sicut certitudoanimalitatis quae est intentiopraeter necessitatem essendi, etest esse comitans illam etsuperveniens illi, sicut scisti; undeacquisitio necessitatis necessitatiessendi est acquisitio condicionisde certitudine suae necessitatis:iam autem prohibuimus hocconcedi inter differentiam etgenus. Alio, quia sequeretur quodcertitudo necessitatis essendi, adhoc ut esset in effectu, penderet exalio dante ei necessitatem. Igitursuum esse illius intentionis quares est necesse esse, esset ex alio;nos autem loquebamur de necesseesse per se; ergo res essetnecessarium esse per se etnecessarium esse per aliud, quodiam destruximus. Manifestum estigitur quod necessitatem essendidividi per illa non est sicut dividigenus per differentias.Manifestum est etiam quodintentio quae intelligiturnecessitas essendi non potest esse

genus. Ergo non dant generiessentiam eius, sed dant ei esse inactu, sicut rationale. Rationale enimnon prodest animali, quantum adanimalitatem, sed prodest ei, utipsum sit in actu essentiaappropriata. Oportet ergo, utdifferentiae necessitatis essendi, siforte sint aliquae, non prosint aliquid,quantum ad essentiam necessitatisessendi, nisi ad esse in actu. Hocautem factum est duobus modis. Unoquidem propria essentia necessitatisessendi non est nisi incessabilitasessendi; non sicut essentiaanimalitatis, quae est essentiapraeter essentiam incessabilitatisessendi. Esse enim est consequensillam vel superveniens illi, sicut scisti.Ergo differentiae non prosuntnecessitati essendi nisi ad id tantum,quod est inter essentiam suae formae.Iam autem prohibuimus hoc intergenus et differentiam alio modo et adhoc, ut ipsa necessitas essendi habeatesse in actu: oportet, ut pendeat abalio dante eam. Unde intentionecessitatis, per quam res estnecessarium esse, pendebit ex alio.Nos autem loquebamur de necessarioesse per se. Ergo res erit necessariumesse per se et necessarium esse peraliud, quod iam destruximus.Manifestum est igitur, quodnecessitatem essendi dividi per illanon est, sicut genus dividi perdifferentias. Manifestum est etiam,quod essentia, cui debetur necessitasessendi, impossibile est aliquid essegenerale, quod dividatur perdifferentias aut per accidentia. Restatergo, quod sit aliquid speciale.Dicimus autem esse impossibile, quodnecessitas essendi sit aliquod specialepraedicamentum de multis.


intentio generalis quae dividaturper differentias vel per accidentia.Restat igitur ut sit intentiospecialis.Dicimus autem esse impossibileut eius specialitas praedicetur demultis. Singularia enim cuiuslibetspeciei, postquam non suntdiversa in intellectu essentiae,sicut supra docuimus, tunc unumsunt in eo, sed debent esse diversaaccidentibus; iam autemostendimus hoc non posse esse innecessitate essendi.

Singularia enim cuiuslibet speciei,sicut iam docuimus, postquam nonsunt diversa in intellectu essentiae,debent esse diversa accidentibus. Iamautem ostendimus nullum accidensposse esse in necessitate essendi.


Possumetiamhoc idemostenderealio modo breviter, sed reduceturad id quod iam diximus. Dicemusigitur quod necessitas essendi, sifuerit proprietas alicui in quo est,vel ex necessitate ipsa erit in illopropriato, et tunc necessarioalterum eorum erit proprietas, etsic impossibile erit illam esse inalio praeter illud: unde oportebitut sit in illo solo. Aut erit in illopossibiliter, non ex necessitate, ettunc oportebit ut haec res sit nonnecesse esse per se; iam autemipsa erat necesse esse per se.Igitur hoc est inconveniens; igiturnecessitas essendi non est nisi unitantum.

Si quis autem dixerit quod eamesse proprietatem huius nonprohibet illam esse proprietatemalterius (eam enim esseproprietatem alterius nonremovet eam debere esseproprietatem huius), dicemusquia per hoc quod dicimus quodnecessitas essendi cum assignaturproprie illi rei, inquantum est

Possumus etiam hoc idem alio modoostendere summatim. Dicimus enim,quod necessitas essendi, cum dealiquo dicitur, in quo est, aut omninoest propria eius, quod non habet essenisi per eam nec praeter esse, necalterius, et sic oportet, ut necessitasessendi non habeat nisi unumsingulare; aut eam habeat possibiliteraut necessario: unde haec res erit nonnecessarium esse per se, cum ipsa sitnecessarium esse per se, quod estimpossibile. Ergo necessitatemessendi non potest habere nisi una restantum. Si quis autem dixerit, quod,cum haec una res habeatnecessitatem essendi, non prohibeturtamen habere eam alia res; vel, cumalia res habuerit eam, non prohibeturtamen haec res habere eam: dicimus,quod nos non loquimur de necessitateessendi modo, in quantum est propriahuius, secundum quod est huius sineconsideratione alicuius alterius; nonenim potest esse, ut haec eademproprietas sit alterius, sed alia etconsimilis et conformis, quae sicdebetur ei, sicut et illa huic.

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158 NICOLA POLLONI

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illius, non consideratur essealterius, intelligitur quod non estproprietas alterius ipsamet, sedconsimilis eius, quoniam ipsa nondebetur nisi illi soli.

Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 53, 27–54, 43 De processione mundi, pp. 15, 9-16, 8

Veldicemusaliter quodpostquamunum eorum est necesse esse,tunc vel idem ipsum erit unumtantum: et tunc, quicquid estnecesse esse erit idem ipsum etnon aliud praeter ipsum; velipsum esse necesse esse erit aliudquam ipsum esse ipsum: et tuncconiunctio eius quod est ipsumesse ipsum cum necesse esse velerit per seipsam vel per causamaliam praeter se et occasionemfacientem illud necesse esse. Siautem fuerit per seipsum quodipsum est necesse esse, erit idemipsum tunc quicquid est necesseesse. Si vero fuerit per causam etoccasionem facientem illud essenecesse esse, tunc de hoc quodipsum est idem ipsum erit occasio,et proprietatis sui esse solitariierit causa. Igitur erit causatum,quod est inconveniens. Sed quianecesse esse unum est in nomine,non sicut species sub genere, etunum est numero, non sicutindividua sub specie, sed estintentio quae designat illudtantum suo nomine, in cuius essenihil aliud sibi communicat. Superhoc autem alias adhuc addemusexplanationem . Ideo non estmultiplex. Hae igitur suntproprietates quibus appropriaturnecesse esse.

Dicimus etiam aliter, quia, si hoc,quod unumquodque eorum estnecessarium esse, est id ipsum tunc,quicquid est necessarium esse, est idipsum et non aliud. Si autem hoc,quod est necessarium esse, non idipsum est, immo necessarium esseadiunctum est ei, quod est id ipsumesse, profecto hanc coniunctionem authabet ex se ipso aut ex alio. Si autemhabet ex se ipso et ex hoc, quod estnecessarium esse, est id ipsum: tunc,quicquid est necessarium esse, est idipsum. Si autem habet ex alio, tunchabet eam ex causa, quae est alia a se.Ergo hoc, quod est id ipsum, est excausa, et proprietas essendi, quae esteius solius propria, est ex causa, ergoest causatum. Necessarium autemesse unum est, expers comitantis.Non enim est ut species sub genere etunum sub numero est, non sicutsingularia sub specie, sed intellectumsui nominis non habet nisi ipsumtantum. Unde in suo esse noncommunicat ei aliquid aliud. Hocautem alias exposituri sumus.


Metaphysica I, 7, pp. 54, 44–55, 55 De processione mundi, p. 16, 9–22

Eius autem quod est possibileesse, iam manifesta est ex hocproprietas, scilicet quia ipsumnecessario eget alio quod faciatillud esse in effectu; quicquid enimest possibile esse, respectu sui,semper est possibile esse, sedfortassis accidet ei necessario esseper aliud a se. Istud autem velaccidet ei semper, vel aliquando.Id autem cui aliquando accidit,debet habere materiam cuius essepraecedat illud tempore, sicut iamostendemus. Sed id cui semperaccidit, eius quidditas non estsimplex: quod enim habetrespectu sui ipsius aliud est ab eoquod habet ab alio a se, et ex hisduobus acquiritur ei esse id quodest. Et ideo nihil est quod omninosit exspoliatum ab omni eo quodest in potentia et possibilitaterespectu sui ipsius, nisi necesseesse.

Hae sunt proprietates, quas habetnecessarium esse. Iam autemostendimus proprietatem eius, quodest possibile esse. Proprietas enimeius est, quod non eget alio, per quodhabeat esse in actu. Omne autem,quod possibile est esse, cumconsideratur per se ipsum, semper estpossibile esse. Contingit autemaliquando ipsum necessarium esseper aliud, et quod sic est, aut nonhabet necessitatem essendi semper,sed aliquotiens, et quod sic est, opushabet materia, quae ipsum praecedittempore, sicut mox ostendemus, autnecessitatem essendi habet semper etper aliud, et quod sic est, omnino nonest simplex. Aliud est enim, quodhabet consideratione sui ipsius,et aliud, quod habet ex alio. Id ipsumenim, quod est, habet ex utroque,scilicet ex se et alio; et propter hocnihil est adeo primum, adeo simplex,quod non habeat aliquidpossibilitatis, et potentiae in se ipsonisi necessarium esse tantum.


Quod cum certificaverimus,sequetur quod necesse esse nonest relativum nec mutabile necmultiplex nec communicat eialiquid aliud in suo esse quod estei proprium.

Constat ergo, quod necesse esse nequeest relativum, neque est mutabile, necmultiplex, sed solitarium, cum nihilaliud participat in suo esse, quod estei proprium; et hoc non est nisi solusdeus, qui est prima causa et primumprincipium omnium, quod unumtantum necesse est intelligi, non duovel plura.

160 NICOLA POLLONI

gundissalinus on necessary being: textual and … · 2016. 7. 5. · 1954), vol. i, pp. 19–43;...

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