guide to the cmc 2012

7/29/2019 Guide to the CMC 2012

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CnB G Cn M Cmmssn s Nvmb 18, 2012

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China Brief s Guideto Central Military CoMMissionsnoveMBer 18, 2012

A Guide to Chinas New Military Leadership

On November 15, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership announced the

nal member of the new Central Military Commission: CCP General Secretary XiJinping. Outgoing President Hu Jintao broke with past precedent by not retainingthe Central Military Commission (CMC) chairmanship for two years after steppingdown from other leadership posts. Arguably, China just underwent its smoothestand clearest transition to a new leadership. That a historic precedent has been setin 2012 serves as a reminder that Chinas leaders have now passed beyond DengXiaopings shadow, placing China watchers in uncharted territory.

Below is a selection of four China Briefarticles assessing this years military leadership

transition. These four articles represent the timeliest and most comprehensivereview of the leadership changes within the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)

currently available.

Additionally, we highlight a two-part series from 2010 by long-time PLA watcherand China Briefcontributor Kenneth W. Allen on using PLA rank and grade as a toolfor analyzing promotion patterns, especially at the CMC level. Allens exemplarywork on the PLAparticularly his unerring attention to detail and how the PLA

organizes itselfhas had a lasting inuence on the China eld and warrantsmention here.

In This Special Report:

New CMC ViCe ChairMeN StroNG adVoCateS for JoiNt, ModerN Military

B on Sk Ms, Mc S. Cs n Bnjmn S. Ps, iii 2

ParSiNG the SeleCtioN of ChiNaS New hiGh CoMMaNd

B B dn tbn, Km fss n Jsn Gb 5

ProfeSSioNaliSM aNd faCtioNaliSM iN the Pla leaderShiP SeleCtioN

B w lm 9

hu JiNtaoS douBtful future oN the CeNtral Military CoMMiSSioN

B P Ms 12

aSSeSSiNG the PlaS ProMotioN ladder to CMC MeMBer BaSed oN

GradeS VS. raNKS Part 1

B Knn w. an 14

aSSeSSiNG the PlaS ProMotioN ladder to CMC MeMBer BaSed oN

GradeS VS. raNKS Part 2

B Knn w. an 17

For comments or questionsabout China Brief, pleasecontact us [email protected]

1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320Washington, DC 20036Tel: (202) 483-8888Fax: (202) 483-8337

Copyright 2011

General Xu Qiliang, New Central

Military Commission Vice Chairman


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The CCP Central Military Commission

Membership (November 2012)

Chairman Xi Jinping

CCP General Secretary

Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong

Former Commander of the Jinan Military Region

Vice Chairman Air Force General Xu Qiliang

Former Commander of the PLA Air Force

General Chang Wanquan

Minister of National Defense

General Zhang Youxia

Director of the General Armament Department

General Fang Fenghui

Director of the General Staff Department

General Zhang Yang

Director of the General Political Department

General Zhao Keshi

Director of the General Logistics Department

Air Force General Ma Xiaotian

Commander of the PLA Air Force

Admiral Wu Shengli

Commander of the PLA Navy

General Wei Fenghe

Commander of the Second Artillery

***

New CMC Vice Chairmen Strong

Advocates for Joint, Modern

Chinese MilitaryBy Oriana Skylar Mastro, Michael S. Chase and Benjamin

S. Purser, III

Originally Published November 16, 2012

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underwentits once-a-decade leadership transition at the 18thParty Congress this week, it also made a series of majorchanges to the top echelon of its military leadershipThis turnover among the top brass included the elevationof new Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

and Second Artillery commanders, heads of thePeoples Liberation Armys (PLA) powerful four generadepartments (General Staff, General Political, General

Logistics and General Armaments) and a correspondingmembership turnover in the Central Military Commission(CMC)the powerful Party body that controls Chinasrapidly modernizing armed forces. Among the mostimportant changes was the promotion last week of twosenior ofcersformer Jinan Military Region (MR)Commander General Fan Changlong and former PLAAFCommander General Xu Qiliangto serve as the new

military vice chairmen of the CMC (Xinhua, November4). As Chinas highest-ranking military ofcers, GeneralsFan and Xu will be responsible for key aspects of thedirection of PLA modernization, including Chinas questo enhance the militarys jointness.

An artilleryman by training, General Fan Changlong, age65, has served in the PLA since 1969 when he joined atage 22. Fan initially served in the Shenyang MRs 16th

Corps artillery regiment for three years as an enlistedsoldier and then fourteen years as a staff ofcer [1]. From1985 to 1990, he served in the 16th Group Army (GA)consecutively, as the 48th Division chief of staff, 16thGA chief of staff and, nally, as the GA commande(Xinhua, November 4). With four armored divisions andmultiple brigades, the 16th GA is one of the ShenyangMRs largest elements. After leading the 16th GA for

ve years, Fan was promoted to major general andve years after that, was promoted to chief of staff forthe Shenyang MR, in 2000. In 2002, he was promotedto lieutenant general and then appointed as one of the


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assistants to the chief of the PLA general staff in 2003.The following year, he became the commander of theJinan MRa position he held until his recent elevationto the CMC.

As Jinan MR commander, he successfully oversawyears of major, international exercises: Sino-RussianPeace Mission 2005, Queshan 2007, Iron Fist 2009 andVanguard 2011 (Ta Kung Pao, November 5). Under Fans

leadershipand in response to personal tasking fromHu Jintaothe Jinan MR effectively carried out a pilotproject for reforming the largest joint logistics system inthe PLA. Fan thus developed an unparalleled track recordfor planning and executing advanced, joint logistics. Heproved that ability in 2008 when he led a major contingentof the forces that responded to the massive Sichuan

earthquake as part of Jinan MRs mission of emergencymanagement (South China Morning Post, October 22).Such successes supplemented Fans service as the generalwith the most time leading an MR and help explainhis completely unprecedented promotion from MRcommander directly to CMC vice chair without havinghad to serve on the CMC as a regular member rst (TaKung Pao, November 5).

General Xu Qiliang is the rst Air Force general in the

history of the Peoples Republic of China to be appointeda vice chairman of the CMC, a body traditionallydominated by the ground forces. Xu, who was born in1950, joined the PLAAF in 1967 and graduated from the8th Aviation School in 1969 as a ghter pilot. At age 34,he became the youngest corps deputy commander (corpsdeputy leader grade) of the PLA in 1984 and then, as thecommander of the 8th Air Corps in Fuzhou, became the

youngest corps commander (corps leader grade) at age40 in 1990. He served the commander of the ShenyangMilitary Region Air Force (MRAF) and as a concurrent

MR deputy commander (MR deputy leader grade) beforebecoming one of the deputy chiefs of the general staff(MR leader grade) in 2004 and then commander of thePLAAF (MR leader grade), which he held from 2007to 2012 [2]. Over the past 40 years, Xu has built forhimself an impeccable military record that culminated in

receiving his three-star rank in July 2007 and becominga CMC member (CMC member grade) in October ofthat year (Xinhua, November 4). Given the expectedretirement age of 70, Xu and Fan probably will completetheir service as vice chairmen to Xi Jinping at the 19th

Party Congress in 2017.

Fans promotion was a surprise to some observers as heskipped the CMC member grade, but Xus appointment isprobably more signicant for two reasons. First, General

Xu is widely known for his strong advocacy of air andspace power, suggesting the promotion could enable Xu torealize his vision of a more modern and capable PLAAFAs PLAAF commander, Xu presided over a period of

transition from a traditional focus on air defense to abroader outlook encompassing more integrated offensiveand defensive operations and emphasizing the increasingrole of space power. Xu has stated the PLAAF must forgea sharp sword and shield capable of winning peace tohelp protect Chinas interests (PLA Daily, November1, 2009). This includes not only more modern combat

aircraft like the J-20 stealth aircraft China unveiled inJanuary 2011 and a second stealth ghter that is nowundergoing ight testing, but also advanced intelligencesurveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), early warning, airdefense and strategic airlift capabilities (Wall Street JournalNovember 3) [3].

If Xus controversial comments about the inevitability ofgreater military competition in space are any indication,Chinas sword and shield also encompasses anti-satellite

and other space control capabilities as well as the objectiveof ensuring Chinas own ability to use space for militarypurposes and limit or deny an adversarys ability to dolikewise. As Xu stated in a November 2009 interview:

The air and space era and information erahave arrived at the same time, and the domainof information and domain of space and air

have become the new commanding height forinternational strategic competition. Consideringthe global trend of a new revolution in military

affairs, competition among armed forces ismoving toward the air and space domain and isextending from the aviation domain to near spaceand even deep space. Such a shift representsan irresistible trend, such an expansion ishistorically inevitable, and such development is

irreversible. In a certain sense, having controlof air and space means having control of theground, oceans, and the electromagnetic space,which also means having the strategic initiativein ones hands (PLA Daily, November 1, 2009).


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Moreover, Xus advocacy for the PLAAFs role in spaceoperations probably reects internal competition overwhich part of the PLA will have primary responsibilityfor an increasingly critical missionone that Chinesestrategists see as potentially decisive in future wars.

Second, Xu is the rst Air Force general to be appointed avice chairman of the CMC, a body traditionally dominantby the PLAs ground force ofcers. Xus promotioncould thus reect a growing desire in the military to

pursue western-style joint operations and perhaps greaterstrategic relevance and inuence for the PLAAF, PLANavy (PLAN) and Second Artillery.

General Xus appointment as a CMC vice chair in particularreects a broader trend toward greater representationfor non-ground force services at the top. Since 2004,

more PLAAF, PLAN and Second Artillery ofcers haveserved in important military leadership posts than everbefore. These have included the Academy of MilitaryScience (AMS) and National Defense University (NDU)commandants and the NDU political commissar. Thisis the result of Chinas longstanding efforts to promotethe PLAs joint operations capabilitiesa challengingendeavor in what has historically been a highly groundforcecentric military establishment. Indeed, as of thisparty congress, there are no PLAAF deputies in any of

the General Departments, highlighting that this is a workin progress. Nonetheless, given Xus background, manypredict that PLAAF interests will be better representedthan in the past, especially because Xu is not the only airforce ofcer on the CMC. As the new PLAAF commander,General Ma Xiaotian also will be on the CMC to promotethe vision and interests of the air force. The fact that twoair force ofcers have secured a place on Chinas highest

military body along with the rising fortunes of the PLANand Second Artillery probably foreshadows the looseningof the ground forces sixty-year-long grip on the levers of

military power.

Nonetheless, a true equalization of power and inuenceamong the ground forces, PLAN, PLAAF and SecondArtillery necessary to conduct Western-style jointoperations is still a distant possibility. First, as a CMC

vice chairman, Xu is not in a position to advocate forthe PLAAF in the same way he did when he served asPLAAF commander. At the top of the system, serviceparochialism is supposed to be mitigated by party identityand the need to represent the interests of all parts of the

armed forces. Presumably, in his new role, General Xuwould not want to be perceived as favoring his service athe expense of the rest of the PLA.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the ground forces

still dominate the system in some important respectsThe ground forces dominance is shown not only by theirleadership of the four general departmentswhich is afunction of the fact that the four general departments

serve as the ground forces headquarters more than asa joint headquartersbut also by the structure of thePLA itself. Only ground force ofcers have commandedthe PLAs powerful, geographically-based MRs, even inthe Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs that focus on conictscenarios involving possible sea and air ghts over Taiwanand in the East and South China Seas. Accordingly, major

organizational changes would likely be required if thePLA were making a stronger push toward completejointness, consistent with what an important articlemarking the PLAs 85th anniversary described as theobjective of promoting the transition from coordinatedjoint operations with one service as the main force tointegrated joint operations of multiple services andarms (PLA Daily, July 30).

Three indicators in the form of organizational changes

would signal a changing tide toward greater jointnessFirst, China would move to restructure or replace theMRs with theater commands (warzones) to simplifycommand structures for daily peacetime training aswell as wartime operations. For example, a cross-straitconict with Taiwan primarily would involve the Nanjingand Guangzhou MRs, which means the ground forcePLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery would not only

need to integrate command vertically but also coordinatehorizontally across the MRs, potentially reducing real-time combat readiness. Second, China could start rotating

ofcers from PLAAF, PLAN, Second Artillery as wellas the ground forces through the top positions of thefour general departments. Lastly, to ensure the groundforces are on equal standing with the PLAN, PLAAFand Second Artillery, the Chinese could create a PLAground forces headquarters on par with PLAAF, PLAN

and Second Artillery Headquarters and even upgrade theSecond Artillery to a service instead of its current statusas an independent branch.


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The restructuring or replacement of the MR systemhas been rumored off and on in recent years, but thusfar has failed to materialize. The creation of a separatearmy headquarters and elevation of non-ground forceofcers to head the four general departments would be

major developments as well. Should this come to pass,it would not only symbolize that the ground force is thepeer of the other services but also would indicate thatthe four general departments no longer play the role of

ground force headquarters, but rather would functionas a real joint staff organization. Bureaucratic interestsand organizational culture, however, are likely to remainformidable obstacles to such major organizational changes,suggesting the PLA will continue to face challenges toits ability to effectively conduct joint operations despiteimportant changes at the top of the command system.

Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Fellow at the Center for a NewAmerican Security. Michael S. Chase is an Associate Professor atthe U.S. Naval War College. Benjamin S. Purser III is a doctoralstudent at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The viewsexpressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reect theofcial policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense, anyother entity within the U.S. Government or any other organization.

Notes:

1. Online Chinese wikis provide some of thesourcing for tracking Fan and Xus careers,including and.

2. You Ji, Meeting the Challenge of the UpcomingPLAAF Leadership Reshufe, in Richard P.Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Philip C. Saunders, eds.,

The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, andCapabilities, Washington, DC: National DefenseUniversity, 2012, pp. 216218.

3. For a comprehensive analysis, see, Hallion et al,eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles,and Capabilities, available online at .

***

Parsing the Selection of Chinas

New High CommandBy Daniel Tobin, Kim Fassler and Justin Godby


In choosing the ten uniformed ofcers who make upChinas new Central Military Commission (CMC)seven new appointments and three incumbents, two ofwhom have moved to more senior positionsBeijing hascharted a decidedly middle course. It is crucial to examinenot only how the new lineups career experiences differ orresemble their predecessors, but also the implications of

the alternative selections that did not occur. Given boththe pool of candidates technically eligible and rumors

in the Hong Kong and international press over the pasttwo years about the identity of the leading candidatesBeijing chose against several scenarios that would havehad different implications for the future of the PeoplesLiberation Army (PLA).

The slates of outgoing and newly appointed CMC

members share some common characteristics. Like theirpredecessors, the majority of the new CMC have heldoperational commands at the forefront of the PLAsefforts to train for high-tech war. Several probably caughtthe attention of senior military and civilian leaders whileserving in high-prole roles in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts, which increasingly serve as proxiesfor combat experience [1]. Some fought in Chinas brief

clashes with Vietnam in 1979 and/or the 1980s. Withthe revival of professional military education (PME) inthe 1980s after the Cultural Revolution, almost all havereceived PME and in some cases held senior positions atPME institutions.

There, however, are differences. Chinas new CMC lineuphas slightly greater diversity of experience across Chinasseven military regions than the outgoing group, who

were appointed between 1999 and 2007. Signicantlywith former PLA Air Force (PLAAF) CommanderXu Qiliangs promotion to a CMC vice chairmanthehighest position held by an air force ofcer in the post-Mao eraand his replacement with another PLAAFofcer, non-ground force ofcers now hold four of theten uniformed seats on the CMC.


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Nevertheless, the new lineup as a whole suggestsincremental rather than wholesale change. Though thisis not startling, it is interesting that Beijing did not optfor one of several other scenarios debated by PLAwatchers over the past two years. One possibility included

non-ground force ofcers making up half of the newCMC and two out of the three most senior uniformedpositions [2]. Such a scenario, if combined, with theappointment of reform-minded ground force ofcers,

might have generated momentum to reform the PLAsground-centric command structure. At the other endof a spectrum, one wild card scenarioembodied insome purported CMC lineups circulating on the Chinese-language Internet earlier this yearwas a highly politicalCMC, packed with political commissars. Such a CMCmight have been focused narrowly on preserving party

rule in the face of concerns about political stability inthe wake of the Arab Spring, fears of a slowing economyand several high-level political scandals over the past year,including the fall of Politburo member Bo Xilai. In sucha scenario, Xu Qiliang might have been passed over fora vice chairman position in favor of a career politicalofcer.

There were, however, a few surprises even in the middle-of-the-road outcome that materialized. One was the new

CMC lineups early emergence on November 4withthe appointment of two new CMC vice chairmen at thenal meeting (or plenum) of the outgoing 17th CentralCommittee rather than the 1st Plenum of the 18th CentralCommittee on November 15. Another was Beijingsselection of Jinan Military Region (MR) CommanderFan Changlong, age 65, as the senior uniformed vicechairman over General Armament Department (GAD)

Director Chang Wanquan, age 63. Chang had long beenexpected to become vice chairman, and his promotionwould have followed the pattern of only elevating existing

CMC members to that bodys top posts. Instead, Fan notonly leapt over Chang, but also skipped a military grade,which is extremely rare [3]. Fan is eminently qualied,having served in senior positions in two MRs and in theGeneral Staff Department (GSD) in Beijing. Thoughpreparations began before his tenure, since 2004, the

Jinan MR he led has conducted crucial experiments injoint logistics, command structures and training methods(PLA Daily, December 16, 2008; November 11, 2008).Fan will be past the mandatory retirement age at the nextparty congress and is therefore likely to serve only one

ve-year term.

PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliangs elevation to vicechairman expands the number of service ofcers on theCMC from three to four of ten uniformed members. Xu

a former ghter pilot, who has served in two militaryregions, as chief of staff of the PLAAF, and commanderof the Shenyang MRs air force, also served as a deputychief of the GSD. Already a PLAAF deputy chief of

staff in the early 1990s, General Xu has witnessedrsthand his services extraordinary transformationin the subsequent two decades from a poorly-trainedtechnologically-backward service into an air force withthe worlds third highest number of advanced, fourth-generation ghters [5]. His appointment as a CMCvice chairman testies to the increasing prominence

of the missions of the services at the expense of thetraditionally dominant ground force. NeverthelessBeijing also unexpectedly retained PLAN CommanderWu Shengli in his post rather than promoting him to amore senior CMC position. Observers had tapped Wuto become Minister of National Defense or even a vicechairman. The new lineup is therefore less joint thanit might have been if Wu also had ascended and anothernaval ofcer replaced him as PLAN commander as manyspeculated, bringing the total number of service ofcers

to ve of ten uniformed CMC members.

Wu had seemed a natural t for Minister of NationaDefense owing to his considerable foreign engagementexperience as PLAN commander (South China MorningPost, October 20). The defense minister is the PLAsthird-most senior uniformed ofcer and manages itsrelationship with Chinas state bureaucracies and foreign

militaries, though he holds no operational control offorces in the eld [6]. As the PLA moves incrementallyin the direction of a more joint force, naming a navy

ofcer defense minister also would have been a lessradical departure from precedent than if Wu had beenpromoted to head, for example, one of the four generadepartments.

Instead, Chang Wanquan will become defense minister at

the National Peoples Congress in the spring. Chang mayhave received the defense minister post as a consolationprize, crowding out Wus promotion. There is a remotechance, however, that Changs new position representsan effort to make use of his experience leading the


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GAD, which has primary responsibility for weaponsdesign, development, procurement and maintenance andmanages Chinas space and nuclear weapons programs.Outgoing President Hu Jintao made civil-militaryintegration, particularly in the defense industrial sector,

a high priority (Civil-Military Integration Theme MarksPLA Day Coverage, China Brief, August 12, 2011; Qiushi,August 1, 2011). Chinas defense minister appears to bea senior CMC ofcial who works with staff in different

ofces throughout the PLAs four general departments,but the current setup for the Ministry of NationalDefense lacks the bureaucratic presence of the 1950s-era,Soviet-style Chinese defense ministry that had additionalresponsibilities over the defense industry. If thoseresponsibilities are returned, Changs experience wouldbe invaluable.

The two new service chiefs appointed to the CMC, MaXiaotian, age 63, as PLAAF commander, and Wei Fenghe,age 58, as commander of the Second Artillery, both hadbeen serving as deputy chiefs of the GSD. These positionsgave them experience managing issues for the entire PLAand positioned them in the right grade for promotion tothe CMC, whose membership since 2004 has included theheads of the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery. Wei,who previously served as chief of staff of the Second

Artillery and commanded one of the Second Artillerysbasesa career path very similar to his predecessor JingZhiyuanis young enough to serve two ve-year terms.General Ma, who at one point competed with Xu Qiliangto lead the PLAAF (both were appointed full membersof the Central Committee when only deputy MR-leadergrade ofcers in 2002), is only eligible for one term. Hisresume, however, exemplies the diversity of command,

staff and higher education experiences the PLA seeks forits senior ofcers. Ma served in two MRs and was the rstair force ofcer to head the National Defense University

before becoming the deputy chief of the GSD in chargeof foreign affairs and intelligence (China LeadershipMonitor, No. 24, November 11, 2007).

One other important observation is that Beijing didnot feel the need to follow the precedent of having one

operational track ofcer and one political track ofcerll the CMCs number one and number two uniformedpositions, respectively [7]. With the exception of 20022004, since the early 1990s, one of the CMCs uniformedvice chairs has been a career political ofcer. Chinese

leaders evidently did not think departing from this trendwas destabilizing enough to hold back Xu Qiliangsappointment as a vice chairman.

Heightened concerns about political reliability, however

may have played out in other appointments. The only newcareer political ofcer named to the CMC is the formerGuangzhou MR Political Commissar Zhang Yang, age 61as director of the General Political Department (GPD)

Zhangs youth makes him eligible for two terms, and hehails from an increasingly important military region withresponsibilities for possible contingencies in Taiwan, theSouth China Sea and Chinas land border with VietnamHis most important characteristic, however, may havebeen his quiet contrast to several of the outspokengenerals most familiar to PLA watchers, especially

those associated with particular policy positions or withcross-cutting family ties to civilian elites, who were notappointed to the CMC.

Three military princelings (or children of former high-level ofcials) all surnamed Liu (no relation among them)for example, who were widely rumored in the internationalpress to be contenders for the CMC, will instead remainin their posts [8]. Liu Yuan, political commissar of theGeneral Logistics Department (GLD) and son of former

President Liu Shaoqi, delivered an unusually blunt anti-corruption speech in January and then toppled a GLDdeputy director (Sydney Morning Herald, November 10South China Morning Post, February 1). This may havegiven other senior military leaders pause about theirsecurity should Liu be appointed to higher ofce. Healso had penned the introduction to a prominent publicintellectuals book advocating a particular domestic

reform direction (Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011). Moreexplicitly, Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the NationaDefense University and son-in-law of former President

Li Xiannian, has advocated openly for democratizationand other controversial positions (Want China TimesAugust 1; South China Morning Post , August 1; QiushiAugust 16, 2004). Finally, PLAN Political Commissar LiuXiaojiang is the son-in-law of the late reformist partyGeneral Secretary Hu Yaobang, whose funeral ceremony

sparked the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. AlthoughLiu has not openly advocated reform, he has worked tohonor Hus memorysomething now implicitly linkedto political reforms [9].


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In contrast, two of the new CMC selectees, former BeijingMR Commander Fang Fenghui and former ShenyangMR Commander Zhang Youxia, were long-consideredalmost certain to be appointed to the CMC. Both haveserved in multiple MRs. Both are young enough to

serve two ve-year terms. Both also are politically well-connected. Fang is presumably a protg of outgoingCMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong under whom heserved in the Lanzhou MR. Fang also orchestrated the

PLAs role in Chinas 60th anniversary parade in 2009(South China Morning Post, November 8). Zhang is the sonof former GLD Director Zhang Zongxun, who servedwith incoming Party General Secretary Xi Jinpings fatherin the headquarters of the First Field Army in the 1940s.The younger Zhang is a veteran of both Chinas 1979conict with Vietnam and early 1980s border clashes.

Neither Fang nor Zhang, however, were considered themost likely choice to lead the GSD until early this year,when the leading candidate, executive deputy chief ofthe GSD Zhang Qinsheng, age 64, (no relation to ZhangYouxia) reportedly clashed publicly with his colleagues ata holiday banquet, torpedoing his career (New York Times,August 7). Zhanga prominent defense intellectual andearly enthusiast among the PLA ofcer corps of theway information technology was transforming modern

warfarehad been director of the Campaign Teachingand Research Ofce and then Dean of Studies at ChinasNational Defense University (China Leadership Monitor,No. 17, January 30, 2006). He had served as director ofthe GSDs Operations Department and later as assistantto the chief of the GSD in charge of intelligence andforeign affairs before being given command of theGuangzhou MR in 2007presumably to give him the

operational command experience requisite for higherofce. Had Zhang been selected, he would have broughtconsiderable diversity in terms of staff and higher

education experience to the new lineup, despite beinglimited to one term. Instead, Zhangs collapse openedthe way for Fang to become chief of the GSD. ZhangYouxia became director of the GAD. Zhao Keshi, age65, commander of the Nanjing MR, who would haveotherwise been forced to retire, became director of the

GLD. Zhaos experience in the Nanjing MRwhich isresponsible primarily for Taiwan contingenciesmayhave gured in his selection; however, the necessarilylimited number of senior ground ofcers eligible for thispromotion probably assisted in his rise.

Zhao Keshi and Fan Changlongs appointments attheir advanced age also assures that the CMC willexperience another signicant turnoverof half its

uniformed membersin ve years. In 2017, at leastthe senior CMC vice chairman, director of the GeneraLogistics Department, Minister of National Defenseand commanders of the PLAN and PLAAF are likely

to retire. Beijing will then have another opportunity foreither more thorough reform or retrenchment.

Daniel Tobin, Kim Fassler and Justin Godby are analysts with theDepartment of Defense. The views expressed here are solely thosof the authors and do not reect the ofcial policy or position of thU.S. Department of Defense or any other entity within the U.S

Government.

Sourcing Note: Judgments about the comparative careerattributes of the incoming and outgoing CMC lineupsare derived from data on their individual careers found inthree places apart from ofcial curricula vitae that havebeen cross-checked. The sources are as follows:

(1) Online Chinese wikis with entries on individual CMCmembers, including and

;

(2) Hong Kong journalism, primarily several collectivebiographies of Chinas military leaders, including thefollowing: Xu Santong, Junzhong Shaozhuangpai ZhangwoZhongguo Bingquan [Up-and-Coming Generals TakeOver Chinas Military Leadership], Hong Kong: HayeChubanshe, 2009; Yu Shiping, Xin Taizi Jun: Fubei Da

Jiangshan, Women Bao Jiangshang [The New PrincelingMilitary: Our Fathers Generation Took Power, We WilProtect It], Hong Kong: Mingjing Chubanshe, 2010; and

Jin Qianli, Diwudai Jiangxing: Zhonggong Dui Tai ZuozhangZhongjian Renwu [The Fifth Generations Military StarsThe Chinese Communist Partys Crucial Figures in a Wawith Taiwan], Hong Kong: Xiafeier, 2006, in addition toproles of individual military leaders that have appearedin the Hong Kong magazine Chien Shao [Frontline] over

the past decade.

(3) Biographical details contained in scholarly analysis ofthe last major CMC turnover in 2002 from, especiallyDean Cheng, Ken Gause, Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise


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James Mulvenon and David Shambaugh.

Notes:

1. According to the Hong Kong press, for example,

Liang Guanglie and Fan Changlong drew theattention of senior leaders (including then-VicePresident Hu Jintao) during ood ghting effortsin 1998. See the chapter on Fan in Jin Qianli cited

above, pp. 300314.2. If both Xu Qiliang and Wu Shengli had been

promoted to more senior CMC positions, theirpresence combined with their replacementsas air force and navy commanders, along withthe presence of the commander of the SecondArtillery, would have made for ve of ten

uniformed ofcers on the CMC not hailing fromthe ground force. This was the most favoredscenario by many China leadership watchers.

3. Our understanding of the crucial role of the PLAgrade structure in determining the eligibility ofCMC candidates is based upon the published andunpublished work of Kenneth Allen. Any errors,however, are the authors own. See, for example,Assessing the PLAs Promotion Ladder to CMCMember Based on Grades vs. Ranks Part 1

China Brief, July 22, 2010, and Assessing thePLAs Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Basedon Grades vs. Ranks Part 2, China Brief, August5, 2010.

4. Guo Boxiong had been promoted to the CMC in1999 as a deputy chief of the GSD. This, like Fanspromotion directly into a vice chairman position,was a violation of the PLAs rules regarding

military grade (deputy chief of the GSD is nota CMC-member grade position), but it at leastgave Guo experience on the CMC that Fan lacks.

And Guo was likely chosen for this promotionprecisely because he was young enough to servetoo terms.

5. The PLAs terminology refers to these as thirdgeneration rather than the Western fourthgeneration. For the scope of this transformation,

see, for example, David Shlapak, Equippingthe PLAAF: The Long March to Modernityin Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and PhillipC. Saunders, eds., The Chinese Air Force: EvolvingConcepts, Roles, and Capabilities, Washington, DC:

National Defense University, 2012, pp. 191211.6. For a discussion of the role of the Ministry of

National Defense see Dennis J. Blasko, The ChinesArmy Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21sCentury, Second Edition, New York: Routledge

2012, pp. 3637. Based on the defense ministerspublic appearances in ofcial state media, howeverwe think the defense ministers responsibilitiesare broader, including civil-military integration

defense education, defense legislation before theNational Peoples Congress and the peacetimepreparatory aspects of coordination with civilianofcials on defense mobilization issues.

7. In the outgoing CMC, for example, ViceChairman Guo Boxiong was an operational trackofcer and Vice Chairman Xu Caihou was a

political track ofcer.8. Another prominent princeling, politica

commissar of the Second Artillery and formerpolitical commissar of the Chengdu MRZhang Haiyang, who is the son of formerCMC Vice Chairman Zhang Zhen, may havebeen disqualied owing to close ties with fallenPolitburo member Bo Xilai.

9. See the account provided in the chapter on LiuXiaojiang in Yu Shiping, cited above, pp. 255297

***

Professionalism and Factionalism

in the PLA Leadership SelectionBy Willy Lam


The Beijing leadership has reshufed the high commandof the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) as the militarygoes through its own leadership transition separate frombut linked to the 18th Party Congress beginning later thisweek. The move, which was announced last week, has alsogiven hints about the reorganization of the policy-settingCentral Military Commission (CMC). The membershipof a much rejuvenated CMC will be conrmed by the18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, whichis due to open on November 8. Although this round


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of personnel selection reinforces the PLAs increasingdedication to professionalism in its upper echelons, thisseries of personnel changes also reects intense horse-trading among the partys principal factions.

The new chiefs of the Four General Departmentsthe General Staff Department (GSD), General PoliticalDepartment (GPD), General Logistics Department(GLD) and General Armaments Department (GAD)

are respectively General Fang Fenghui (age 61); GeneralZhang Yang, age 61; General Zhao Keshi, age 65; andGeneral Zhang Youxia, age 62. Moreover, General MaXiaotian, age 63, and General Wei Fenghe, age 58, havebeen appointed Commander of respectively the Air Forceand the Second Artillery. The incumbent Commander ofthe Navy, Wu Shengli, age 67, is expected to remain in his

post for the foreseeable future. Also named were a dozen-odd new deputy and assistant chiefs of the headquartersunits as well as the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery(PLA Daily, October 25; China News Service, October25).

The chiefs of the four general departments as well as thethree military services will become ordinary membersof the CMC. Uncertainties, however, still hang overthe identities of the top CMC leadership. According to

reports out of Beijing and Hong Kong, President Hu,age 69 will stay on as CMC chairman for at least two yearsbeyond his retirement from the Politburo and the CentralCommittee at the 18th CCP Congress. The precedentfor this in the post-revolutionary generation was set byex-president Jiang Zemin, who continued being CMCchair for almost two years after his retirement from allother party slots at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.

This means that Vice President Xi Jinping, age 59, whois slated to soon replace Hu as CCP general secretary,will remain CMC vice chairman for the time being. The

two new CMC vice chairmen are former PLA Air ForceCommander General Xu Qiliang, age 62 and Commanderof the Jinan Military Region General Fan Changlong(age 65). The newly retired GAD Director, GeneralChang Wanquan, age 63, is set to replace General LiangGuanglie as Defense Minister (Xinhua, November 4; Wen

Wei Po [Hong Kong] October 26; South China MorningPost, October 26;Apple Daily[Hong Kong] October 25).

The just-named Chief of the General Staff GeneralFang perhaps best exemplies the new generation of

professionally savvy ofcers. Fang, a native of ShaanxProvince and graduate of the elite National DefenseUniversity, was the youngest of Chinas seven regionacommanders when he was given the No. 1 post of theBeijing Military Region (MR) in 2007. Apart from his

command-and-control skills, Fang is a much-publishedauthor on military strategy, particularly in the areas ofcomputer-aided war games and the synchronization ofdifferent branches of the military forces. One of Genera

Fangs favorite mottoes is that radically changing timesdemand innovation in strategic theories. President Huwas said to be very impressed with Fangs orchestrationof the 2009 military parade in Bejing, which markedthe 60th anniversary of the founding of the PeoplesRepublic. Last year, Fang won plaudits when he supervisedcomplicated-scale maneuvers involving more than 30,000

soldiers from the Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu MRsWhile the great majority of his predecessors as BeijingMR commander went into retirement after serving in thissensitive position, General Fang seems to have a brightfuture ahead of him (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong] October26; Southern Metropolitan News [Guangzhou] October 25Ifeng.com [Beijing], August 29, 2011).

Two hot contenders for the post of GPD director lostout apparently due to their close association with the

disgraced Politburo member and Chongqing PartySecretary Bo Xilai. They are the Political Commissar ofthe General Logistics Department General Liu Yuan, age61, and the Political Commissar of the Second ArtilleryGeneral Zhang Haiyang, age 63. Like Bo, who is the sonof revolutionary hero Bo Yibo, Generals Liu and Zhangare deemed high-prole princelings. General Liu is theson of the late state president Liu Shaoqi, while Genera

Zhang is the son of former Politburo member GeneraZhang Zhen. While Bo has never served in the PLA, hehas a large following amongst the princeling generals.

The charismatic former Politburo member is due tobe put on trial for alleged crimes including large-scalecorruption and dereliction of duty (Sing Tao Daily[HongKong] October 24;Ming Pao [Hong Kong] October 24).

After Bo was detained by authorities in mid-March, PLA

disciplinary authorities have run numerous campaignsto promote the ideal of the partys absolute leadershipover the army. An August 1 Army Day commentary inthe PLA Dailymade an unusual reference to the armysimmunity against being manipulated by ambitious


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careerists in the mould of Bo. In the midst of eventhe most dangerous situations, not a single troop inour armys history has mutineered or surrendered tothe enemy, said the Dailycommentary, And not eventhe most cunning and ambitious careerist has been able

to use the army to realize his conspiracy (PLA Daily,August 1; Xinhua, August 1). In a talk last month, then-CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou urged ofcers andsoldiers to ensure that the troops must uphold a high

level of unison with the central party leadership and theCMC in the areas of thought and politics. Xu addedWe must resolutely listen to the directions of the partycentral leadership, the CMC and Chairman Hu (Xinhua,October 11; PLA Daily, October 11).

In terms of factional dynamics, President Hu seems to be

a major beneciary of the reshufe. Apart from Chief ofthe General Staff General Fang, GPD Director GeneralZhang is said to be close to the supremo. Given that theGPD controls functions including appointments anddiscipline, Hu may through his close ties with GeneralZhang be able to maintain some say in personnelmatters even after his departure from the CMC. Husclout also is evidenced by the surprise appointment ofanother protg, the relatively inexperienced Hong KongGarrison commander Zhang Shibo, as General Fangs

successor as Beijing MR commander. Before assumingthe Hong Kong posting in late 2007, Zhang, a 60 year-oldlieutenant general, was commander of the 20th GroupArmy (Apple Daily, October 26; Sina.com, October 24].

Other appointments may reect the preferences of ex-president Jiang and Vice President Xi. The probablepromotion of Jinan MR Commander General Fan to the

CMC vice chairmanship reects Jiangs residual inuence.General Fan is the protg of soon-to-retire CMC ViceChairman General Xu, who is deemed Jiangs unofcial

representative in the CMC. Both Generals Xu and Fanhad served for long periods in the 16th Group Army.Earlier this year, General Fan (age 65) was expected tobe leaving the armed forces after having reached themandatory retirement age for regional commanders. Xisinuence in the PLA has been adversely affected by the

fact that the career of several princeling generals has beenhurt by their association with Bo Xilai. New Air Forcecommander General Ma Xiaotian and GAD DirectorGeneral Zhang Youxia, however, are notable princelings.General Zhang is thought to be particularly close to Xi.

The fathers of Xi and General Zhang, respectively XZhongxun and General Zhang Zongxun were close allieswhen both worked in northwestern China before theCCP came into power in 1949 (Ming Pao, October 25Sing Tao Daily, October 25).

The marathon reshufes also have followed the traditionbegun by President Hu of the frequent movement ofpersonnel not only across different military elements

but also from headquarters to the regions. For examplethe Political Commissar of the Chengdu MR, GeneraTian Xiusi, was made the Political Commissar of the AirForce. Assistant GPD Director General Wei Liangzhongbecame the Political Commissar of the Guangzhou MRwhile General Wang Guanzhong, the veteran Director ofthe PLA General Ofce, was appointed a Deputy Chief

of the GSD (Ming Pao, October 26; Ta Kung Pao, October25). Also notable are the proverbial helicopter ridestaken by the likes of General Fan of the Jinan MR andGeneral Zhang of the Hong Kong Garrison. It is veryrare for a regional commander to be elevated directlyto CMC vice chairman. General Zhangs promotion tothe post of Beijing MR Commander is also unusual. Inlight of the importance of the Beijing MR, only ofcerwho had held senior posts such as deputy commander orchief of the general staff of the countrys seven MRs had

been named to that sensitive slot (Ta Kung Pao, October24;Apple Daily, October 24).

Given that factional loyalty is a key consideration behindthe on-going personnel movements, it is perhaps notsurprising that not as much priority has been given toweeding out corruption in the military. This is despitethe fact that General Liu Yuanone of the high-prole

losers in the promotion sweepstakeswas praised highlyfor initiating an anti-graft campaign within the GLDearly this year. Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor

at the National Defense University and a respectedmilitary commentator, pointed out recently that corruptgenerals were an even more serious problem thancorrupt cadres. Last month, Liu said Corruption isthe only force that can defeat the PLA. Yet the forcesof corruption are more powerful than those of ghting

corruption, he added. And perpetrators of corruptionare more resourceful than graft busters (Wen Wei PoOctober 8; Sina.com, October 8). The onus is on thepost-18th Party Congress leadership to demonstratethat members of the newly promoted top brass live up


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to the oft-repeated motto of decai jianbei, that is, havinghigh moral attributes as well as being professionallycompetent.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown

Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions ininternational media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, SouthChina Morning Post and the Asia-Pacic Headquarters ofCNN. He is the author of ve books on China, including the

recently published Chinese Politics in theHu Jintao Era: NewLeaders, New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor ofChina studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at theChinese University of Hong Kong.

***

Hu Jintaos Doubtful Future on the

Central Military CommissionBy Peter Mattis

Originally Published August 16, 2012

With the Beidaihe retreat coming to a close this week andChinese leaders reemerging from behind closed doors,

Chinas leaders are in the home stretch for deciding theoutcomes of the 18th Party Congress. Some of the issuesat stake are the size of the Politburo, who will make itinto the Politburo Standing Committee, and a miscellany

of other important personnel appointments, likeShanghais party chief. One of the most consequentialquestions is whether President Hu Jintao will hold ontothe chairmanship of the Central Military Commission(CMC), which oversees the Peoples Liberation Army(PLA), after he resigns as general secretary this fall. Somespeculation suggests Hu will follow his predecessors

path and oversee military affairs in quasi-retirement (MingPao, July 22;Apple Daily, May 30). The idea of precedentlooms large for a China-watching community starved ofreliable, current information. President Hu, however,appears unlikely to retain the CMC chairmanship past the18th Party Congress based on the factors that allowedJiang Zemin to continue in that capacity after resigningas general secretary.

The idea of President Hu staying on as chair of the Central

Military Commission has precedent with both DengXiaoping and Jiang. In 1987, Deng resigned from all ofhis posts except for the CMC chairmanship, ostensibly toturn governance over to the rising generation, led at thattime by the ill-fated General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. As

Hu Jintao took the party reins in 2002 at the 16th PartyCongress, then-President Jiang Zemin did not relinquishthe CMC chair, following in Dengs footsteps [1].

Around the rst National Peoples Congress after the16th Party Congress, the PLA started to express somereticence about Jiangs continuing leadership of militaryaffairs while another leader, Hu, ostensibly led the rest ofthe party and government. In an editorial by a senior PLADailyeditor, the PLA suggested this arrangement was nohelpful: Having one center is called loyalty, while having

two centers will result in problems. Having multiplecenters is the same as having no center, and having nocenter results in having no success in any area (AsiaTimes, March 12, 2003; PLA Daily, March 11, 2003). Thatthis became an important issue is suggested by Jiangsremarks at the time his resignation was announced. Jiangsaid the three key positions of Chinese powerpartygeneral secretary, state president and CMC chairmostappropriately and necessarily should belong to the sameperson (Xinhua, September 20, 2004).

There is little reason to suggest the PLA has changed itsposition on the perils of a divided command. Since aleast March, the propaganda line has been a consistentstatement about the clear relationship between the partyand the armynot between a civilian leader and thePLA. The recognition of Hu Jintaos role as leader ofthe party and the role of the partys general secretary

also suggests the PLA stands by Jiangs reasoning forunity of command (Army Day Coverage Stresses PLAsContributions and Party Control, China Brief, August 17

The Diplomat, July 3).

The next question is whether Hu would have the supportof the military to overcome this reluctance. When Jiangretained the CMC chair, the PLA was one of the strongestinstitutional supporters of his contribution to Chinese

ideological canon, the Three Represents, promulgatedon July 1, 2001. Through the next year, senior PLAgeneralsincluding the ambitious Cao Gangchuanand then-CMC Vice Chairmen Chi Haotian and ZhangWannianfell over themselves to endorse the concepts in


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the PLA Daily,Qiushi[Seeking Truth], Xinhua and other

outlets, elevating Jiang Zemin to positions comparable toMao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping for his contributionsto Marxist thinking and Chinas development (The PLAand the Three Represents: Jiangs Bodyguards or Party-

Army? China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2002). Although thePLA did not quite declare fealty to Jiang, this propagandablitz raised questions about the re-personalization of themilitary and suggests the PLA supported retaining Jiang

on the CMC. The PLAs endorsement of Hus scienticdevelopment concept, by comparison, is rather proforma, suggesting he lacks the same kind of institutionalsupport.

A second and related question is whether Chineseleaders believe the international situation is sufcientlydangerous that the ostensible uncertainty caused by aCMC leadership transition would be undesirable. This was

the reason given in 2002 that justied Jiangs continuedCMC chairmanship (Xinhua, September 19, 2004; WenWei Po, September 16, 2002). In July, Hong Kong mediasuggested tensions in the South China Sea could beused by Hu to do just that (Ming Pao, July 22). Beijingsaggressive but adroit diplomacy, however, seems to havesettled the latest round of territorial spats that began thisspring at Scarborough Shoal (Sansha: New City in the

South China Sea, China Brief, August 17; China Pusheson the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses, ChinaBrief, August 3). Given the seemingly paranoid viewsof Western cultural inltration, the ve poisons, andWestern hostile forces, it is difcult to get a clear graspof what Beijings threat perceptions truly are at any giventime (Red Flag, May 24;Qiushi, January 1). The ostensiblymost authoritative recent public assessment of Chinasthreat environment comes from the well-connected

Beijing University professor Wang Jisi. Wang, however,while noting Chinas more constrained international

situation, did not endorse a sense of crisis in Beijingsposition (Global Times, June 13).

If Hu Jintao retains the CMC chair, then it probably willhave been the result of a power play that demonstratesHu has had more power than is typically ascribed to him.

He has seemed to oat between rhetorical inconsequenceand the ability to target individual opponents within theChinese system, such as Chen Liangyu and Bo Xilai (TheSoapbox and the Truncheon: Hu Jintaos Amorphous

Power, China Brief, July 19). Retaining the CMC chair

would allow Hu to play a lasting role in Chinese nationasecurity policymaking, but the position probably wouldbe limited in terms of promoting the members of hisChina Youth League faction up the ranksexcept as a

one-time bargaining chip to trade away. Given the reportsof a contentious relationship with some military leadersincluding one he promoted to generalthe former maynot be sufcient reason for Hu to want to stay on (New

York Times, August 7;Ming Pao, July 22).

On balance, however, the prognosis does not look goodfor Hu Jintao retaining the CMC chair for the next twoyears unless new signs of the PLA rallying behind him inthe coming weeks amid some sort of crisis. Whether Husteps down or not, it may not indicate anything importantabout the institutionalization of Chinese politicsNevertheless, if the positions of party general secretary

state president and CMC chair transition smoothly to XJinping at the 18th Party Congress, then China still wilhave seen its rst clear transition of power under theChinese Communist Party.

Peter Mattis is Editor of China Brief at the JamestownFoundation.

Notes:

1. The best analysis of the CMC transition fromJiang Zemin to Hu Jintao appeared in JamesMulvenons articles for the China LeadershipMonitorfrom 2002 to 2005, especially issues 4, 57 and 13.

***


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Assessing the PLAs Promotion

Ladder to CMC Member Based on

Grades vs. Ranks Part 1By Kenneth W. Allen

Originally Published July 22, 2010

As China approaches the 18th Party Congress inlate 2012, followed by the 12th National PeoplesCongress (NPC) in early 2013, China watchers havebegun to speculate about the next cadre of Chinesemilitary leaders who will become members and vicechairmen of the Communist Partys Central Military

Commission (CMC) [1]. The premise of these analysestend to focus on which ofcers either already have ormight receive their third star (shangjiang) as a generalor admiral between now and 2012. Unlike the U.S.military, whose generals and admirals wear four stars,PLA generals and admirals wear only three stars. Whilemilitary rank is an important distinction in the PeoplesLiberation Army (PLA) hierarchy, a closer examination

of the promotion path to becoming a CMC memberreveals that it depends more on the PLAs 15-grade(zhiwu dengji) structure than the 10-rank (junxian)structure [2].

This two-part series thoroughly examines the graderequirements for PLA ofcers to become the directorof each of the four General DepartmentsGeneralStaff Department (GSD), General Political Department

(GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), andGeneral Armament Department (GAD)and thecommander of the Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF),and Second Artillery. These articles also discuss theirrespective protocol order on the CMC, which is differentfor the four directors (based on position) and the three

commanders (based on seniority). This is importantbecause the protocol order and placement of the PLAN,

PLAAF and Second Artillery commanders on the CMCas a policy promotion, which is not an automaticpromotion upon becoming the commander, implies thatthe eight members of the CMC may not be equal in termsof their authority.

Although the articles do not speculate on potential

CMC members in 2012, it does lay down an analytical

framework, which leads to the speculation that thenext Second Artillery commander may not immediatelybecome a CMC member until he meets time-in-graderequirements. The article raises the question whether

non-Army ofcers might serve as CMC vice chairmen.

PLA Grades vs. Ranks

The terms grade and rank are basically synonymousin the U.S. and Chinese military, whereby each branchhas 10 ofcer grades and their equivalent rank (e.g. an0-10 can be a four-star general or admiral). In the PLAhowever, grades are based on an ofcers position andare more important than ranks. As a result, PLA writingsusually refer to ofcer positions or grades and have few

references to ranks.

Within the PLA, an ofcers grade, not the rank, reectsauthority and responsibility across service, branch, andorganizational lines. While rank is a key indicator ofposition within the hierarchy of foreign militaries, gradeis the key indicator of authority within the PLA. In thePLA commanders and political commissars (PC), whoare collectively called leaders (lingdao or shouzhang), areco-equals and hold the same grade, but they often do not

wear the same rank.

For example, the current commanders of the BeijingMilitary Region (MR), Lanzhou MR, and Nanjing MRall received their third star as a general on July 19, 2010while each MRs political commissar remains as a two-starlieutenant general. Meanwhile, the political commissarsfor the Guangzhou MR and Chengdu MR received theirthird star, while the commanders remain as two stars

(Xinhuanet, July 19, 2010). .

Each PLA Organization Is Assigned a Grade

Another major difference between the U.S. militaryand the PLA is that the U.S. military assigns grades toofcers and billets, but not to organizations, whereasthe PLA assigns grades to every ofcer and billet, as

well as every organization (e.g. operational and supportunit headquarters, academic institutions, and researchinstitutions). With only a few exceptions, the organizationsgrade is the same as that of the commander and politica


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commissar. For example:

The Four General Departments are all CMCmember-grade organizations, and each director isa CMC member-grade ofcer.

The PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery areMR leader-grade organizations, and each politicalcommissar is an MR leader-grade ofcer;however, each commander is currently a CMC

member-grade ofcer (see discussion below). The Academy of Military Science (AMS) and

National Defense University (NDU) are MRleader-grade organizations, and each commandantand political commissar is an MR leader-gradeofcer.

The one exception is that the Ministry of National

Defense (MND), which actually serves as theforeign affairs arm of the PLA, is not assigneda grade.

Current Grade and Rank Structure

In 1988, the PLA implemented its current grade and ranksystem, which has 15 grades and 10 ranks, as shown inFigure 1. The previous system, which had 17 grades, wasimplemented in 1979. The PLA implemented its rst

rank system in 1955 and abolished it at the beginning ofthe Cultural Revolution in 1965. It did not re-institute anew system until 1988.

Figure 1: Current PLA Grade and Rank Structure

Retirement Age Grade Primary Rank Secondary Rank

70?

CMCchairman(junwei zhuxi)CMCvicechairmen(junwei fuzhuxi)

N/AGEN/ADM N/A

68/70? CMCmember(junwei weiyuan) GEN/ADM N/A

65 MRleader(daqu zhengzhi) GEN/ADM LTG/VADM

63 MRdeputyleader(daqu fuzhi) LTG/VADM MG/RADM*

55Corps leader(zhengjunzhi) MG/RADM* LTG/VADM

Corpsdeputyleader(fujunzhi) MG/RADM* SCOL/SCAPT

50

Divisionleader(zhengshizhi) SCOL/SCAPT MG/RADM*

Divisiondeputyleader(fushizhi)/(Brigadeleader)

COL/CAPT SCOL/SCAPT

Most importantly, each grade from Platoon leader to MRleader has a primary and secondary rank. At the same timehowever, certain ranks, such as a one-star (major general/rear admiral) can be assigned to one of four grades (MRdeputy leader, corps leader, corps deputy leader, and

division leader as noted in * underneath Figure 1). Inaddition, each grade has a mandatory retirement age. Itis not clear, however, what the mandatory retirement agefor CMC members is, but it may be either 68 or 70. The

retirement age for CMC vice chairmen is also unclear, butmay be 70 or above.

The PLA did not implement a mandatory retirementage of 65 for MR leader-grade ofcers until 1995. Basedon interviews with PLA ofcers, the mandatory age forCMC Members following the 16th Party Congress was

set at 70, but that may have changed following the 17thParty Congress.

Grade and Rank Promotion Schedule

When discussing PLA promotions, one must clarifywhether it is a promotion in grade or a promotion in rankbecause they typically do not occur at the same time. Inthe PLA, ofcers must serve in a particular grade and rankfor a minimum amount of time before being promoted

to the next grade and rank. Furthermore, with only a fewexceptions, PLA ofcers are not normally promoted ingrade and rank at the same time. For example, regulationsspecify that ofcers from rst lieutenant to colonereceive a rank promotion every four years, but


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receive their grade promotions from platoon leader todivision leader every three years.

PLA regulations specify three years time-in-gradeand four years time-in-rank for platoon to corps-level

ofcers. PLA Ofcer Rank Regulations Amended on20 December 2002. PLA Active-Duty Ofcer Law,Published on 28 December 2000. Interviews withPLA ofcials in Beijing during November 2006 and

November 2010.

This stair step approach is reected in the primary andsecondary rank structure shown in Figure 1 above. It is notclear what the time in rank and time in grade requirementsare for one-star ag ofcers and corps leader and abovegrades, but it appears that there is denitely a minimum

requirement for eachpossibly three to four years.

It is also important to understand which billets have thesame grade. For example, unit deputy commanders andthe Chief of Staff (e.g. director of the HeadquartersDepartment) always have the same grade.

PLA units have multiple deputy commanders. Forexample, every Military Region has ve deputycommanders, one of which, since 1988, is the Military

Region Air Force (MRAF) commander. Since 1988,the commander of each of the PLA Navys threeeet headquarter has also concurrently been a MilitaryRegion deputy commander.

As a result, a Chief of Staff can move directly to becomingthe commander. For example, the current director of theGAD, General Chang Wanquan, previously served as the

Figure 2: CMC Members under the 16th and 17th PartyCongresses (Protocol Order)

OrganizationalProtocol Order

Position ProtocolOrder

16thPartyCongress

17th PartyCongress

CMC ProtocolOrder Criteria

Army GSD ChiefoftheGeneralStaff

1 1 BasedonOrganization

GPD Director 2 2GLD Director 3 3GAD Director 4 4

Navy Commander 6 6 BasedonSeniorityAirForce Commander 5 7SecondArtillery Commander 7 5

Lanzhou MR Chief of Staff and the Beijing MR Chiefof Staff before becoming the Shenyang MR commanderHe did not serve as an MR deputy commander.

CMC Member Grade

Knowing what grade the PLA assigns to each billet helpsChina watchers understand what the probable promotionladder to the CMC member and vice chairmen grades

looks like. Yet, the CMC member grade, as well as themilitary region leader grade, is complicated.

First, the current senior CMC member, GeneraLiang Guanglie, is concurrently the Minister ofNational Defense [3].

Second, the grade for all of the Four Genera

Departments and each director is CMC membergrade.

Third, the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artilleryare MR leader-grade organizations, but theircommanders are CMC member-grade ofcers.

Figure 2 provides information for the CMC membersand their protocol order under the 16th and 17th PartyCongresses. Their protocol order, which is based on eithertheir organization or seniority, provides some insight into

the CMC member grade.

As can be seen, the protocol order for the four GeneralDepartments, regardless of who the leaders areremains the same. The reason for this is that these fourorganizations are assigned the grade of CMC memberFor example, even though Li Jinai and Liao Xilongbecame CMC members in 2002, Chen Bingde, who

became the GAD director in 2004, is still listed rst duehis position as Chief of the General Staff based on theprotocol order for the Four General Departments.


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Conclusion

Although the author does not assume to predict thepotential CMC members in 2012, the author doesspeculate that the next Second Artillery commander may

not immediately become a CMC member until he meetstime-in-grade (TIG) requirements. The promotions in2010 will provide the rst glimpse at the PLAs possibleleaders who will emerge at the 18th Party Congress in

2012. However, one should not focus on the ranks buton the grades, especially the MR leader-grade level thatwill be addressed in the second part of this series. Thisis particularly important when determining who the nextNavy, Air Force and Second Artillery commanders, aswell as the next Chief of the General Staff, will be.

Kenneth W.Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense GroupInc. (DGI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force ofcer, whose extensiveservice abroad includes a tour in China as the Assistant AirAttach. He has written numerous articles on Chinese militaryaffairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in internationalrelations from Boston University.

Notes

1. See Cheng Li, Chinas Midterm Jockeying: Gearing

Up for 2012(Part 3: Military Leaders) and Alice L.Miller, The 18th Central Committee Politburo:A Quixotic, Foolhardy, Rashly Speculative, butNonetheless Ruthlessly Reasoned Projection,in China Leadership Monitor, June 28, 2010, Issue33, which is available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor. See alsoJoseph Y. Lin, Reorientation of Chinas Armed

Forces: Implications for the Future Promotionsof PLA Generals, China Brief, Vol X, Issue13, June 24, 2010, 7-10, which is available at

http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_010_64.pdf.

2. The information in this article is taken mostlyfrom Kenneth W. Allen and John F Corbett,Jr., Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes,and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, Dr.

Andrew Scobell and Dr. Larry Wortzel, eds.,Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2004,Chapter 8, 257-278, which is available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdfles/pub413.

pdf; and Chinas Navy 2007, The Ofce ofNaval Intelligence, Chapters 1 and 2, 1-16,which is available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf.

3. In China, the Ministry of National Defense is

responsible only for implementing the PLAsforeign affairs. It does not have a politicalcommissar. Liang Guanglies two predecessors,Cao Gangchuan and Chi Haotian, were

concurrently CMC vice chairmen.

***

Assessing the PLAs Promotion

Ladder to CMC Member Based onGrades vs. Ranks Part 2By Kenneth W. Allen*

Originally Published August 5, 2010

On July 19, Central Military Commission (CMC)Chairman Hu Jintao promoted 11 military ofcers tothree stars (general/admiral), bringing the total since

1988 to 129 ofcers (Xinhua News Agency, July 27)[1]. Based on previous patterns, the Peoples LiberationArmy (PLA) will most likely promote a few more ofcerto three stars during at least one ceremony per year in

mid-2011 and 2012. Together, these promotions will helpdetermine the next cadre of members and vice chairmenof the Partys CMC to be elevated during the 18th PartyCongress in late 2012. These promotions will also helpdetermine the next Minister of National Defense, sinceGeneral Liang Guanglie will have met his mandatoryretirement age by the next Party conclave.

Although these rank promotions are important indicatorsof who the next leaders might be, the purpose of thistwo-part series is to add another important analyticatoolthe PLAs grade structurefor China watchersto use in discerning patterns in the promotion ladderwithin the PLA. While rank and grade promotions, aswell as an ofcers age, are visible indicators, personarelationships (guanxi) and an Army-dominated systemadd a less predictable but arguably equally important


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layer, especially for ascertaining who the next CMC vicechairmen will be. China watchers therefore must use allof these tools to help predict who the next cadres ofChinese military leaders will be.

Age as a Key Factor

Age is also a key factor in predicting who the next CMCvice chairmen and members will be. According to Dr.

Alice Miller of the Hoover Institution:

The retirement age of 68 for Politburomembers is based on the year they were born andthe year that a Party Congress opens or closes.Specically, if the Party continues to adhere tothis rule for the 18th Party Congress in 2012,

any Politburo member who was born in 1944 orbefore will retire, and anyone who was born in1945 or after is eligible to remain in their positionuntil the next Party Congress. The year 1945would be the cutoff date for Politburo members.So if[emphasis added] the 1994 PLA regulationsstill hold, then 1) the retirement age for CMCmembers is 70, which means their cutoff date toretire would be 1942, and 2) they could remain intheir position if they were born in 1943 or later.

However, if the age for CMC retirement has beenlowered to 68, then 1945 is the cutoff date [2].

Figure 1: CMC Vice Chairmen (1995-2010)

Vice Chairman Concurrent Positions Previous Position

GuoBoxiong(2002-2010)

Member,16thand17thCCPPolitburoExecutiveDCGSandCMCMember(1999-2002)

XuCaihou(2004-

2010)

Member,17thCCPPolitburo

Member,16thCPCSecretariat

Director,GPDandCMCMember

(2002-2004)

CaoGangchuan(2002-2007)

Member,16thCCPPolitburoMinisterofNationalDefense(2003-2007)

Director,GADandCMCMember(1998-2002)

ZhangWannian(1995-2002)

Member,15thCCPPolitburoCGSandCMCMember(1992-1995)

ChiHaotian(1995-2002)

MinisterofNationalDefense(1993-2003)CGSandCMCMember(1987-1993)

CMC Vice Chairmen

As Figure 1 shows, there does not appear to be a setpattern for who is appointed as CMC vice chairmenexcept that each one previously served as a CMC

member. Whereas the 16th Party Congress CMC hadthree vice chairmen, one of whom served concurrentlyas the Minister of Defense, the 17th Party Congresshas only two vice chairmen, neither of who is serving

concurrently as the Minister of Defense. In light of thecurrent circumstances, it is safe to say that the 18th PartyCongress will have at least two vice chairmen, but it is notclear if one of them will also be the Minister of Defense

Of note, although two military ofcers have served onthe CCP Politburo for at least the past two decades, none

have served on the Politburo Standing Committee sinceLiu Huaqing retired in 1996 [3].

Minister of Defense

Whereas Chi Haotian and Cao Gangchuan servedconcurrently as CMC vice chairmen, members of theCCP Politburo and Minister of National Defense, thecurrent Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglieis concurrently a CMC member but not a vice chairman

or Politburo member. As a result, it is difcult to predictwho the next Minister of National Defense will be andwhether he will be a CMC member or a vice chairman.


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Even if he is appointed as a vice chairman, there is noguarantee he will also be a concurrent Politburo member.Finally, because the Ministry of National Defense issubordinate to the State Council, the next Minister ofNational Defense will most likely not be appointed until

the 12th National Peoples Congress (NPC) in early 2013.

CMC Members

Part 1 identied the CMC member billets and brieydiscussed the protocol order and difference betweenthe directors of the four General Departments andcommanders of the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery.The following paragraphs discuss the Military Region(MR) leader-grade billets and how they are a stepping-stone to the CMC member grade.

The MR leader grade is the most complicated grade tounderstand, because the PLAN, PLAAF and SecondArtillery are MR leader-grade organizations, but theircommanders are CMC member-grade ofcers. Figure 2shows the key billets with MR leader grades.

Figure 2: Military Region Leader-Grade Billets and Ranks[4]

Billets

Ranks(Primary

andSecondary)

M Rleader

CommanderandPC,MR

CommanderandPC,PLAN

CommanderandPC,PLAAF

CommanderandPC,SecondArtillery

CommandantandPC,

AMS CommandantandPC,

NDU Deputychiefsofthe

GeneralStaff Deputydirectors,

GPD

GeneralandLt.General

According to retired Colonel John Corbett, the July2010 group of promotions demonstrates the path tofull general, which combines rank and grade promotionsconsisting of three observable steps:

Step One: Lieutenant generals (LTGs) in a

Military Region (MR) deputy leader-grade movlaterallyto a second position in the same grade Step Two: After three or so years, they receive

agrade promotionto an MR leader-grade position

and Step Three: After three years or so as a LTG in

an MR leader-grade position, they receive a rankpromotionto full general [Note: not all MR leader-grade ofcers receive their third star] [5].

In order to become a CMC member-grade ofcer, an

ofcer rst serves in one of the above MR leader-gradebillets; however, not every ofcer who serves in one ofthese billets becomes a CMC member.

Analysis of previous CMC members, the followingparagraphs, along with John Corbetts three-step cycleidentify some basic patterns in the PLA promotionladder. See below for more information about the PLANPLAAF and Second Artillery commander grade situation

Chief of the General Staff

The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) is the director ofthe General Staff Department. As shown in Figure 3, theCGSs have always served in at least one assignment asan MR commander. The current CGS since 2007, ChenBingde, served previously as the commander of theNanjing MR (1996-1999), commander of the Jinan MR

(1999-2004) and director of the GAD (2004-2007) [6].

The GSD generally has four to ve deputy Chiefs of

the General Staff (DCGS) billets. Until the early 2000sArmy ofcers held almost all of those billets. Since thenhowever, PLAN and PLAAF ofcers, but no SecondArtillery ofcers, have served as a DCGS. To date, noArmy ofcers who have served as a DCGS have becomethe CGS; however, Guo Boxiong served as the executive

DCGS and concurrently as a CMC member before beingpromoted directly as a CMC vice chairman. On the otherhand, serving as a DCGS is one of three possible MR


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Figure 3: Chiefs of the General Staff (1987-Present)

GSDDirector

PreviousPosition

PreviousPosition

ChenBingde Director,GAD

Commander,JinanMR

LiangGuanglie(2002-2007)

Commander,NanjingMR

Commander,ShenyangMR

FuQuanyou(1995-2002)

Director,GLDCommander,LanzhouMR

ZhangWannian(1992-1995)

Commander,JinanMR

Commander,GuangzhouMR

leader-grade billets, along with serving as the commandantof the Academy of Military Science or National DefenseUniversity, for Navy and Air Force ofcers to becometheir respective service commander and a CMC member.

Director, General Logistics Department

A review of the career track for the PLAs four GLDdirectors since 1978, as shown in Figure 4, provides someindications of the qualications required to become thenext director. Of particular note, the last three ofcerswere military/command track ofcers rather thanlogistics track ofcers, while Zhao Nanqi was a politicalofcer [7]. In addition, Fu Quanyou moved from the

GLD to become the CGS in 1992.

Figure 4: GLD Directors (1987-Present)

GLDDirector

PreviousPosition

PreviousPosition

Liao

Xilong

Commander,

ChengduMR

Deputy

Commander,ChengduMR

WangKe(1995-2002)


Commander,LanzhouMR

FuQuanyou(1992-1995)

Commander,LanzhouMR

Commander,ChengduMR

ZhaoNanqi(1987-1992)

DeputyDirectorandDeputyPoliticalCommissar,GLD

PoliticalCommissar,JilinMilitaryDistrict,ShenyangMR

Director, General Armament Department

A review of the career track for the PLAs four GADdirectors since 1998, as shown in Figure 5, provides someindications of the qualications required to become thenext director. As can be seen, there is no specic patternfor selecting the GAD director. While Cao Gangchuan

who later became the Minister of National Defense anda CMC vice chairman, spent his career in the equipment/armament track, Li Jinai was a political ofcer, and ChenBingde and Chang Wanquan were military/commandtrack ofcers. Of particular note, no deputy directors ofthe GLD or GAD have become the director. The mainreason for this is that, unlike the DCGS and GPD deputydirector billets, the GLD and GAD deputy director billetsare MR deputy leader-grade billets, not MR leader-grade

billets, and their primary and secondary ranks are one and

two stars. As a result, they would most likely not skipa grade to become the GLD or GAD director. As withevery PLA rule, however, there are occasional exceptionsFor example, one of the GAD deputy directors since2001, Li Andong, was promoted to three stars during theJuly 2010 ceremony [8]. It is not clear what this promotionmeans for Li Andongs next assignment.


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Figure 5: GAD Directors (1998-Present)

GADDirector

PreviousPosition

PreviousPosition

CaoDirector,CMCMilitaryTradeOfce

GeneralPlanning

Division,MilitaryEquipmentDepartment,GSD

LiJinai(2002-2003)

PoliticalCommissar,COSTIND

DeputyPoliticalCommissar,COSTIND

ChenBingde(2004-

2007)

Commander,JinanMR

Commander,NanjingMR

ChangWanquan


ChiefofStaff,LanzhouMR

PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery Commanders

The situation is also complicated for the PLAN, PLAAFand Second Artillery commanders. As shown in Figure2, the grade for these three organizations is that of MR

leader; however, the commander of each organizationwas designated a CMC member with the equivalent gradein 2004 [9].

As noted in Part 1, although the protocol order within

the PLA for the three organizations is always Navy, AirForce and Second Artillery, the protocol order for thethree commanders at the 16th and 17th Party Congresswas based on their seniority as commanders.

According to the authors interviews with various PLA

ofcials during meetings in Beijing, the reason for thisis that the three commanders are CMC members based

on a policy promotion (zhengce shengji), which is not anautomatic promotion upon becoming the commander.As a result, they are listed by their individual seniorityrather than their organizations protocol order. The factthat they are policy promotion CMC members mayimply that they do not have the same authority as thedirectors of the four General Departments.

To replace the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery

commanders as CMC members, their successors mustrst serve in an MR leader billet and have the rank ofthree stars. The three MR leader-grade billets that arelogical stepping-stones for the PLAN and PLAAF

commander position are DCGS, AMS commandantand NDU commandant. For example, Zhang Dingfaserved as the AMS commandant from November 2002until he became the PLAN commander in 2003 and

CMC member in September 2004. Both Xu Qiliang andWu Shengli served as a DCGS until they became theirservices commander.

Second Artillery, which is an independent branch(bingzhong) rather than a service (junzhong) like the ArmyNavy and Air Force, may have to delay placing Jing

Zhiyuans successor immediately on the CMC. As of nowno Second Artillery ofcers are in an MR leader-grade

billet. Although Jing Zhiyuan became a CMC memberin 2004, no Second Artillery ofcers have ever served asa deputy in any of the Four General Departments or asthe commandant of AMS or NDU. The possibility existsthat Jings successor, like Wu Shengli in 2006, will serve asthe commander with the grade of MR leader for a periodof time before being appointed as a CMC member.

Figure 6 provides information concerning Jing ZhiyuansWu Shenglis and Xu Qiliangs path to the CMC membergrade and three stars, which is helpful in illustratingthe situation. Any possible successors must meet thegrade, rank and age requirements to be eligible. This isparticularly important because, in the PLA, one cannotskip a grade and must serve in a grade for a certain periodbefore being promoted to the next grade.

Given their birth years, Jing will be required to retire atthe time of the 18th Party Congress in 2012, while Wu

and Xu will not be required to retire until at least the 19thParty Congress in 2017.

Conclusions

As noted, the purpose of this two-part series is to

encourage China watchers to focus on the PLAs gradesystem rather than just the rank system. While promotingofcers to three stars is an indicator of who might be


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Figure 6: PLAN, PLAAF and Second ArtilleryCommander Promotions

Ofcer DOBCMCMember

Commander 3 StarsPreviousPosition

JingZhiyuan,Commander,SecondArtillery&CMCmember

1944 Sep2004 Jan2003 Sep2004Chiefofstaff,SecondArtillery

WuShengli,Commander,PLAN&CMCmember

1945 Oct2007 Aug2006 Jul2007 DCGS

XuQiliang,Commander,PLAAF&CMCmember

1950 Oct2007 Oct2007 Jul2007 DCGS

assigned as the next cadre of leaders, the ofcers mustapparently also meet certain time-in-grade requirementsbefore moving to the next higher grade. This is especiallyimportant when trying to predict who will replace JingZhiyuan as the Second Artillery commander and whenhe will be appointed to the CMC. In addition, gradeconsiderations are important in predicting who willbe appointed as the next CMC vice chairmen and the

Minister of National Defense. While the two-part seriesexamines the grade and rank structure, it is still too early

to denitively predict who will assume all of the keypositions in 2012.

Kenneth W.Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense GroupInc. (DGI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force ofcer, whose extensiveservice abroad includes a tour in China as the Assistant Air

Attach. He has written numerous articles on Chinese militaryaffairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in internationalrelations from Boston University.

The author would like to recognize the input of John

Corbett, Dennis Blasko and Dr. Alice Miller whomprovided valuable information for this two-part series.

Notes:

1. Since the PLA reintroduced ranks in 1988, theCMC has promoted 125 PLA and 4 PeoplesArmed Police (PAP) ofcers to three starsin 17 ceremonies. From 1994 through 2006,ceremonies were held every two years. Specialceremonies have been held since 2004 forcertain ofcers assuming CMC member- or MRleader-grade billets. During 2007-2009, four

ceremonies were held, but for only 10 ofcersaltogether.

2. Correspondence with Dr. Alice Miller on July28, 2010.

3. In August 1982, Liu Huaqing became the thirdPLA Navy commander and a member of theCCPs 12th Central Committee. In January 1988,he replaced his Navy uniform with an Armyuniform to begin the nal phase of his military

career in the CMC, where he eventually becamethe senior vice chairman. From 1992 to 1996,

he also served as a member of the 10th CCPCentral Committees Politburo and the PolitburoStanding Committee.

4. See www.22826.com/question-109717182.html and http://mop.com/topic/main/readSubMain_10495434_0.html.

5. Correspondence and discussions with JohnCorbett on July 27, 2010.

6. Background information for all of the ofcersdiscussed in this series comes from their internet


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biographies on China Vitaeplus more detailed

information from Proles of China CommunistParty Central Committee Members from 1921-2003, Chinese Communist Party School Press,October 2004.

7. The PLA has ve ofcer career tracks: military/command, political, logistics, equipment/armament, and special technical.

8. Li Andong has served most of his career in

equipment and armament-related billets withinthe GSD and then the GAD after it was formedin 1998. http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Andong/career.

9. In 2004, the PLAN, PLAAF and SecondArtillery commanders were appointed to theCMC as members. Zhang Dingfa and JingZhiyuan became the rst PLAN and SecondArtillery commanders to be appointed as CMC

members; however, Qiao Qingchen was thethird PLAAF commander to be a CMC member.The rst PLAAF commander, Liu Yalou, wasa CMC member from November 1956 to May1965, and the fourth commander, Zhang Tingfa,was a member from August 1977 to September1982. To further complicate the situation, thepolitical commissar for the Navy, Air Force, and

Second Artilleryeach of whom hold the gradeof MR leaderare the Party Secretary for theirrespective organizations Party Committee, whilethe commanders serve as the deputy Secreta

guide to the cmc 2012

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