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CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE CRISIS

IN GUATEMALA:A CASE STUDY IN THE EROSION

OF THE STATE

Hal Brands

May 2010

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FOREWORD

Conventional security threats have receded inLatin America since the end of the Cold War, butunconventional threatsnamely organized crime,drug trafcking, and their attendant violencehavecome to the forefront of the regional agenda. In thismonograph, Dr. Hal Brands examines the evolvingregional security landscape by exploring the relation-ship between crime, violence, and state institutionsin Guatemala. That country is aficted by the actionsof a wide range of criminal groups, and its currentpredicament demonstrates the profoundly corrosiveeffect that crime can have on public security and dem-ocratic governance. It also shows how weak govern-ment institutions, embedded poverty and corruption,and other structural factors stand in the way of any

lasting resolution to this crisis. As a result, tacklingthe challenge of insecurity in Guatemala will requirepatient, holistic efforts that address root causes as wellas symptoms.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph, which it hopes will inform the evolv-ing debate over regional security and unconventionalthreats in Latin America.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Director

Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HAL BRANDS currently works as a defense analystin Washington, DC. He is the author of From Berlin toBaghdad: Americas Search for Purpose in the Post-ColdWar World (2008), as well as recent Strategic StudiesInstitute monographs on drug trafcking and radi-cal populism in Latin America. His next book, Latin

Americas Cold War, will be published in late 2010.Brands has written widely on U.S. grand strategy,Latin American politics and security, and related is-sues. Dr. Brands holds a Ph.D. in history from YaleUniversity.


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SUMMARY

In numerous Latin American countries, organizedcrime and violence are corroding governance andimperiling democratic legitimacy. This phenomenonis most severe in Guatemala, which is currently ex-periencing a full-blown crisis of the democratic state.An unholy trinity of criminal elementsinternationaldrug trafckers, domestically based organized crimesyndicates, and youth gangshave dramatically ex-panded their operations since the 1990s, and are ef-fectively waging a form of irregular warfare againstgovernment institutions.

The effects of this campaign have been dramatic.The police, the judiciary, and entire local and depart-mental governments are rife with criminal inltrators;murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in

recent years; criminal operatives brazenly assassinategovernment ofcials and troublesome members ofthe political class; and broad swaths of territory arenow effectively under the control of criminal groups.Guatemalas weak institutions have been unable tocontain this violence, leading to growing civic disil-lusion and causing marked erosion in the authorityand legitimacy of the state. This problem cannot beaddressed through police measures alone; combatingit will require a holistic strategy that combines robustenforcement and security measures with sustained ef-forts to broaden socio-economic opportunities, com-bat corruption, and, above all, to build a stronger andmore capable state.


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CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE CRISISIN GUATEMALA:

A CASE STUDY IN THE EROSIONOF THE STATE

Across Latin America, the state is under attack.During the Cold War, the region was roiled by politi-cal bloodshed and left-wing insurgencies; today, thethreat emanates from the actions of organized crimesyndicates, extremely violent youth gangs, and inter-national drug cartels. From Tijuana, Mexico, to SaoPaulo, Brazil, these groups participate in illicit activi-ties ranging from drug smuggling to arms dealing tosimple extortion, they use bribery and coercion to hol-

low out state institutions from within, and they mur-der policemen, government ofcials, and citizens whorefuse to cooperate. These tactics have had a devas-tating impact on governance; in the slums of Brazil,cities in Northern Mexico, and elsewhere, the formalstate has effectively collapsed and real power lies withthe predominant gang or cartel rather than with theauthorities. Latin American leaders have struggled torespond to this challenge, and across the region, crimeis driving down condence in government, corrod-ing fragile democratic structures, and compromisingthe authorityand thus the legitimacyof the state.In effect, criminal elements are waging a form of ir-regular warfare against Latin American states, withprofoundly pernicious consequences.

Recent U.S. attention to these issues has focused pri-marily on the narco-violence that has raged in Mexicosince 2006. Yet it is probably in the comparatively ig-


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nored country to Mexicos southGuatemalawherethe situation is most severe. Always a weak state with

a fragmented society, Guatemala is now reeling fromthe activities of an unholy trinity of criminal organiza-tionsdrug-trafcking outts like Mexicos SinaloaCartel and Los Zetas, hidden powers composed ofwell-placed, corrupt Guatemalans, and transnationalgangs such as the notoriousMara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). These groups signicantly expanded their inu-ence amid the disarray following a 3-decade civil war.They are now well-armed, well-funded, and their ac-tions have become increasingly detrimental to publicorder. They have blatantly bribed and intimidatedgovernment ofcials to the point that the police, thejudiciary, and entire local and departmental govern-ments are rife with criminal collaborators and inltra-tors. Murder statistics have surpassed civil-war lev-

els in recent years, and criminal operatives brazenlyassassinate government ofcials and troublesomemembers of the political class. Starved of resourcesand riddled with corruption, Guatemalas state insti-tutions have been unable to reverse or even containthis violence, and from marginal barrios in the capitalto desolate stretches of Petn, large swaths of territoryare now effectively under the control of drug trafck-ers, youth gangs, or other criminal groups.

Indeed, rampant crime is causing the breakdownof democratic governance and a marked erosion ofthe Guatemalan state. Guatemalan institutions havealways been relatively feeble, but the continuingwave of crime now poses an acute challenge to thecredibility and authority of the government. This is

apparent in purely territorial terms, as the inuenceof nonstate criminal actors rivals or exceeds that ofthe government in up to 40 percent of the country. It


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is apparent in institutional terms, as criminal groupshave colonized sectors of the government and turned

the state to their own purposes. It is happening at apsychological level, as well. With the government un-able to suppress criminal activity, Guatemalans arebecoming increasingly skeptical that the current sys-tem can provide them with basic human security. Thisdoubt is leading to diminished faith in democracy,giving voice to latent authoritarian sentiments, and inmany areas, causing a descent into simple vigilantism.Guatemala is not experiencing a simple problem withcrime; it is immersed in a full-blown crisis of the dem-ocratic state. Unless the Guatemalan government andits foreign partnersincluding the United Statescanaddress this challenge and redress the countrys deep-seated institutional deciencies, the region may soonbe confronted with a lawless narco-state at the top of

the Central American isthmus.This monograph examines the relationship be-tween organized crime, internal violence, and institu-tional failure in Guatemala. It aims to increase aware-ness of this growing threat to regional security and toprovide a granular, textured case study of a phenom-enon that, while most striking in Guatemala, is pres-ent throughout Latin America as a whole. Organiza-tionally, the monograph comprises three substantivesections. The rst, offers an overview of the emergingsecurity environment in Latin America, examiningorganized crime as a form of irregular warfare. Thesecond, zooms in on Guatemala, exploring the origins,nature, and effects of the current crisis in that country.The third, considers the implications for Guatemalan

and U.S. policy.


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THE REGIONAL CONTEXT:

ORGANIZED CRIME AND IRREGULARWARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA

Since independence, Latin America has experi-enced relatively little interstate conict and compara-tively high levels of intrastate violence. Many of thesame factors that have made international wars sorarenamely, underdeveloped state capacity anddeep socio-economic and ethnic cleavages withinLatin American countrieshave also conduced to astriking propensity for violent internal strife. Virtu-ally every Latin American state has experienced in-surgency, political revolt, civil war, or other forms ofpolitical bloodshed, as well as less ideologicalbutno less harmfultumults in the form of rampant

banditry, brigandage, and criminal violence. In somecases, these internal conicts have taken on the de-structiveness of major international wars. During theCold War, for instance, long-standing social, political,and economic strains mixed with the ideological po-larization produced by superpower rivalry to gener-ate torrential bloodshed in Guatemala, El Salvador,Peru, Colombia, and elsewhere. The worst of theseconicts (those in Guatemala and Colombia) claimedaround 200,000 lives each, wrecked economic capacityand government institutions, and set Latin Americancountries back by years, if not decades.1

The end of the Cold War brought down the curtainon many of these insurgencies, but it did not bringan end to internal violence and upheaval in Latin

America. Over the last 3 decades, an array of criminalgroupsnotably international drug trafckers, violentyouth gangs, and organized crime syndicateshave


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largely replaced Marxist rebels as the chief purveyorsof disorder. Across the region, these groups have ex-

ploited weak institutions, ofcial corruption, porousborders, poverty and social alienation, and the easyavailability of small arms to expand their operationsdramatically. They have carved out nodes in a vari-ety of illicit activitiesdrug smuggling, human traf-cking, arms dealing, kidnapping, robbery, extortion,money laundering, and othersand made insecuritya fact of life for Latin Americans. Latin America regu-larly competes for the title of most violent region inthe world (in terms of homicides), and its youth mur-der rate was more than twice that of any other regionin 2008. In some Central American countries, violenceis approaching levels last seen during the civil warsof the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels arelower, violence and crime have driven down econom-

ic activity and fostered widespread fear, making lifemiserable for much of the population.2There is no single model of organized crime in

Latin America. Some of the groups responsible forthis turmoil are relatively small street gangs involvedmainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion, drugtrafcking, and the occasional murder for hire. Atthe other end of the spectrum are the sophisticated,multitiered organizations that operate in several cit-ies or even countries. These groupsgangs like MS-13 in Central America and the First Capital Command(PCC) in Brazil, as well as paramilitary groups likeLos Zetas in Mexicocontain hundreds, thousands, oreven tens of thousands of members organized into nu-merous cells and overseen by a centralized hierarchy.

They employ individuals ranging from hit-men to ac-countants and lawyers, and they occupy key nodes inthe illicit networks described above. With different di-


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visions and subdivisions responsible for intelligence,assassinations, money laundering, drug trafcking,

recruitment, and other activities, these organizationsresemble corporations rather than simple street gangs.These groups also stand out for their propensity to

attack state institutions. They bribe police and judicialofcials, fund candidates for public ofce, and inl-trate their supporters into the civil service. Govern-ment ofcials who refuse to be bribed or intimidatedare brutally murdered. In Mexico, the decapitation ofpolicemen has become common, and the killing of pub-lic servants is a problem throughout Latin America. Insome areas, the violence has become so intenseandgovernment institutions so compromisedthat thesecriminal groups, rather than the authorities, have be-come the true arbiters of internal order. In Sao Paulo,for instance, the PCC collects taxes through extor-

tion, provides services (protection, food, clothing,and money) to loyal residents, punishes those whochallenge their authority, and effectively denies thepolice access to large swaths of territory. In essence,the PCC has substituted its own governance for thatof the state.3

Where this is the case, illicit activity in Latin Amer-ica begins to straddle the demarcation between non-political and political violence, between crime andinsurgency. To be sure, groups like MS-13, the Zetas,and the PCC bear little resemblance to the Marxistinsurgencies of the Cold War era. Their motives areusually pecuniary rather than political (though thesituation is somewhat murky in a few instances), andthese organizations have shown little interest in over-

throwing governments and assuming formal politicalpower. But in countries like El Salvador, Honduras,Guatemala, and Mexico, violence has reached near-


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civil war proportions, indicating something moreprofound than a simple police problem. While drug

trafckers, youth gangs, and organized crime syndi-cates generally lack the coherent ideological or po-litical program often associated with an insurgency,they have weakened the state, established a form ofdominance over parts of the population, and thus hadmany of the same effects as an insurgency.4

This blurring of the line between traditional deni-tions of conict has given rise to an updated analyticalvocabulary among scholars and policy experts. Someobservers classify Latin Americas more advancedcriminal groups as third-generation gangs, arguingthat they distinguish themselves from less sophisti-cated groups (rst and second-generation gangs) bytheir transnational nature and propensity to corrodethe performance and authority of the state. In the

same vein, other analysts describe criminal activity asa new urban insurgency, one that aims, not to over-throw established governments, but to take controlof a city, one neighborhoodor even one blockat atime. While these denitions bear further elaborationand renement, they do underscore the gravity of thechallenge confronting Latin American governments.5

Indeed, from a purely analytical (as opposed to anormative) perspective, it may well be that many Lat-in American countries are beset by a form of irregularwarfare. The 2007 Joint Operating Concept denesirregular warfare (IW) as a violent struggle amongstate and nonstate actors for legitimacy and inuenceover the relevant populations. IW favors indirectand asymmetric approaches, and frequently involves

groupstransnational criminal enterprises, insur-gents, terroriststhat use innovative, unconventionaltactics to overwhelm a stronger foe. As a result, IW


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resides in the gray area between accepted typologiesof conict. It is a complex, messy, and ambiguous

social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean,neat, concise, or precise denition. While some ana-lysts might object to the use of military vocabulary todescribe criminal activity, this descriptionwith allthe nuance and even ambiguity it impliesis well-suited to the recent course of events in numerous LatinAmerican countries.6

Because of this complexity, defending against ir-regular adversaries can be very difcult. It requiresthe threatened government to synchronize police andmilitary programs, and to combine these security-oriented initiatives with a variety of additional proj-ectsincluding social reform, institution-building,and economic developmentaimed at amelioratingthe conditions that allow irregular adversaries to

thrive.7

These tasks are daunting under any conditions,and can be especially so in Latin America. Given thatLatin American armies have historically been turnedagainst the citizenry, there is often strong resistanceto involving the military in domestic security matters,even when the police are clearly overwhelmed. Pov-erty, social alienation, and large youth demographicbulges conspire to make gang membership or otherforms of crime attractive to many Latin Americanyouths. Corruption and the weakness of governmentinstitutionsproblems that pervade Latin America aswell as much of the developing worldunderminethe states countermeasures and pose major obstaclesto deploying a coherent, effective response along allnecessary axes.8

As a result, Latin American governments have sofar struggled to address the phenomenon of crimi-nal insurgency, and the trends seem to be worsen-


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ing in several countries. In Mexico, drug cartels andwell-armed paramilitary groups are waging a war

of attrition against the government and against oneanother, and the resulting narco-insurgency hasclaimed roughly 15,000 lives over the past 3 years. Thegovernment has deployed 40,000 soldiers in an effortto restore order, but ofcial corruption, the advancedcapabilities of groups like Los Zetas, and entrenchedpoverty and state weakness have greatly reduced theforce of this offensive.9 In Brazil, the PCC dominatesthe slums of Sao Paulo and occasionally advertises itsability to throw the entire city into chaos. In May 2006,5 days of PCC attacks against public buildings, privatebusinesses, policemen, and even civilians resulted indozens of deaths, caused millions of dollars in dam-age, and brought life in South Americas largest cityto a standstill. As one Brazilian security ofcial put it,

The sad reality is that the state is now the prisoner ofthe PCC.10Recent upheaval in these countriesparticularly

Mexicohas refocused the gaze of the U.S. policycommunity on issues of narco-trafcking, criminalviolence, and institutional weakness in Latin Ameri-ca. Yet it is in Guatemalaa country that has receivedmuch less attention from the media and policy ana-lystswhere the challenge to internal order is mostprofound, the difculties in confronting this violencemost vexing, and the prospects for the breakdownof the state most real. Since the close of its civil warin 1996, rampant criminal activity has made Guate-mala arguably the most dangerous country in LatinAmerica. Murders increased by more than 120 percent

from 1999 to 2006, with the murder rate in GuatemalaCity reaching an astounding 108 per 100,000 inhabit-ants (compared to a world average of less than 9 per


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100,000).11 In 2008, Guatemala suffered a reported6,200 total murders, giving it a higher per capita in-

cidence than Colombia and Mexico.12

According tothe 2008 Latinobarmetro report, perceptions of citizeninsecurity are worse in Guatemala than anywhereelse in the region, and President lvaro Colom hasremarked that its more violent now than during thewar.13 From Petn in the north, to Huehuetenango inthe west, to parts of Guatemala City itself, as much as40 percent of Guatemalan territory is either subject todispute or effectively beyond the control of the policeand the central government.14 Additionally, organizedcrime has so infested many state institutions as to ren-der them virtually worthless. In 2007, then-Vice Presi-dent Eduardo Stein acknowledged that criminal ele-ments controlled six of Guatemalas 22 departments(the largest geographical and political subdivisions of

the country) and had a strong presence in at least threeothers.15 Guatemalas descent into chaos has been qui-eter, slower, and less remarked upon than events inMexico or other Latin American countries, but it hasprobably been more devastating. As Colom put it in2008, Guatemalas security is dying in an intensivecare room.16

Colom should know. During a bloody electioncampaign in 2007, dozens of candidates and theirsupporters were murdered and assassination rumorsswirled around Colom. For fear of being ambushed,Colom chose to travel by helicopter rather than car andmaintained the company of a doctor skilled in treatinggunshot injuries. Due to concerns about poisoning, healso had to exercise extreme caution in choosing what

to eat. Colom eventually made it into ofce unscathed,but reminders of the countrys vulnerability were om-nipresent. At one rally, Colom threw a dove in the air


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to symbolize his desire for peace. In a moment thatseemed thoroughly emblematic of the countrys pre-

dicament, the bird failed to take ight and went crash-ing into the ground.17

THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA: ORIGINS,CHARACTERISTICS, AND EFFECTS

The contemporary crisis in Guatemala reects aconuence of relatively recent trends and longer-run-ning patterns. At the deepest level, domestic instabil-ity is rooted in the same historical factorsnamely, aweak state and the socio-economic exclusion of broadsegments of the populationthat have traditionallyleft much of Latin America prone to internal upheaval.Like many of its neighbors, Guatemala has often hadan authoritarian state, but it has never had a strong or

effective state. Rugged geography limits the reach ofthe central government, and the resistance of powerfulelites has kept tax revenues low. This insufciency oftax revenue, in turn, has prevented the developmentof capable state institutions that could provide basicpublic goods like education, justice, and security. Atthe same time, the poverty, inequality, and popularmarginalization characteristic of Guatemalan societyhave created simmering resentments and the potentialfor violence. Over the past 2 centuries, this toxic com-bination of factors has subjected Guatemala to recur-ring cycles of instability and disorder.18

The worst of these convulsions was the civil warthat ravaged the country from 1960 to 1996. Violenceinvolving leftist guerrillas, right-wing death squads,

and government forces took 200,000 lives (out of apopulation base of less than 10 million), with perhapshalf of those deaths occurring in a 2-year period be-


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tween 1981 and 1983. (The intensity of this bloodshedwas unmatched in Cold War-era Latin America. In

comparison, El Salvador lost around 75,000 inhabit-ants during its civil war, and while Colombia sufferedroughly 200,000 deaths during la violencia in the 1940sand 1950s, these losses came out of a much larger pop-ulation base.) The scorched-earth policy pursued bythe Guatemalan government devastated much of thecountryside, and guerrilla attacks took a severe toll oninfrastructure and economic productivity. Over 400villages simply disappeared during the bloodiest daysof the counterinsurgency in the early 1980s, and the un-stinting violence of the period left a legacy of mistrustbetween many social groups and the government. Asrecently as 2005, for instance, indigenous Guatema-lans (who bore the brunt of the counterinsurgency)refused the armys help after devastating oods and

mudslides. The Cold War was a time of insurgencyand civil war throughout Latin America, but nowherewere the traumas as shattering as in Guatemala.19

These traumas, in turn, left Guatemala immenselyvulnerable to a post-conict resurgence of internaldisorder. While war has sometimes catalyzed the for-mation of a stronger state, in Guatemalas case theinternal conict left social, economic, and politicalwreckage that has directly abetted the current crisis.The civil war left the country strewn with weaponsand created a large pool of young men with little edu-cation and few marketable skills other than the abil-ity to handle a gun. It initiated destabilizing refugeeows, and led to the growth of a predatory militaryelite skilled in corruption and intimidation. Just as

important, the civil war exposed many Guatemalansto horric bloodshed as a way of life, and fueled last-ing disenchantment with often repressive govern-


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ment institutions. As U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) ofcials have written, There

exists a widespread acceptance in Guatemala that vio-lence is an acceptable means of resolving conict andGuatemalans do not have faith in the states abilityto provide anything other than partial and arbitraryjustice. Peace accords signed in 1996 were intendedto address these issues, but promised socio-economicreforms have never been carried out, and the decisionto slash the size and mission of the security serviceswhile necessary to convince the Left to sign onto theaccordsweakened the only institutions capable ofmaintaining some semblance of domestic order. Thecivil war magnied the longstanding shortcomings ofthe Guatemalan state, leaving the eld to opportunis-tic elements that would prey upon that weakness.20

The resulting potential for instability has been

greatly compounded by relatively recent shifts in theinter-American drug trade. While Guatemala has longbeen involved in poppy production, its prominence inthe cocaine trade has increased steadily of late. Begin-ning in the late 1980s, U.S. interdiction programs inthe Caribbean forced Colombian trafckers to routecocaine shipments through Central America en routeto Mexico and the United States. Located roughlyhalfway between Colombia and the United States,possessing a largely uncontrolled border with Mexicoand frontage on both the Gulf of Mexico and the Pa-cic Ocean, and characterized by rough terrain thatimpedes effective government surveillance, Guate-mala soon became a primary way station for Andeancocaine. The amount of cocaine transiting the country

has grown exponentially over the last 2 decades, andjumped by 47 percent between 2006 and 2008 alone.U.S. ofcials estimate that between 180 and 400 met-


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ric tons of cocaine transit Guatemala per year, and thevalue of this trade may be $10 billion annually. As the

Guatemalan drug trade has grown larger, it has alsogrown more violent, with numerous entities compet-ing for control of the prots. A weak state prone todisorder and violence has now become a focal pointof the international drug trade, creating lucrative op-portunities for a wide range of criminal elements.21

International Drug trafckers.

Three principal types of criminal organizationsare currently active in Guatemala. The rst group iscomposed of international narcotics trafckers. AsGuatemala has taken center stage in the inter-Ameri-can drug trade, its territory, coastline, and waterwayshave become thoroughfares used by a variety of ma-

jor drug-trafcking organizations (DTOs). During the1980s, Colombian cartels dominated the Guatemalandrug trade, often cooperating with corrupt militaryofcials to move cocaine, marijuana, and heroin ship-ments northward. After these organizationsparticu-larly the Cal and Medelln cartelswere dismantledin the early 1990s, Mexicos Sinaloa cartel stepped intothe void. Sinaloan preeminence lasted for more than adecade, but since 2005, Los Zetas (a rival Mexican orga-nization) have begun to assert their own claim to theGuatemalan drug trade. The Zetas are moving southin part to extend greater control over their supply net-work, and in part to nd sanctuary at a time when theMexican government has launched an all-out offen-sive against the DTOs. According to one ofcial in the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Zetasare seeking to reach out into Guatemala, extend theiroperation into Guatemala, and take over the Guatema-


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la corridor. They compete with smaller Guatemalantrafckers as well as larger international syndicates,

and Guatemala is now experiencing a multi-sided, vio-lent struggle over drug routes and prots.22

These DTOs use a variety of methods for movingdrugs through Guatemala. At the lowest level of so-phistication, mules carry drugs through commercialairports and border crossings, and large shipmentsare often simply driven across Guatemalas borders intrucks or other vehicles. Alternatively, South Ameri-can narcotics arrive at ports like Puerto Quetzal andPuerto Barrios via commercial shipping lines, or aremoved by small, go-fast boats that traverse Guate-malas coastal seas and inland waterways. Anothercommon conveyance is the small airplane. In remoterural areas, trafckers have set up makeshift runways(often just a clearing in the natural vegetation) where

drug-bearing planes can deposit their cargo for theoverland journey across the Mexican border. In somecases, the planes are reused; in others, they are simplyabandoned. According to U.S. ofcials, there are morethan 490 clandestine airstrips in Guatemala. One for-mer ofcial who had recently own over the Petn re-ported seeing numerous makeshift strips and dozensupon dozens of wrecks scattered over the wilderness.23

As these statistics indicate, the drug trade and itsby-products are pervasive in Guatemala. In rural ar-eas of Huehuetenango and Petn, trafckers are ac-cumulating (by purchase, if possible, and by violence,if necessary) privately held properties to be used assafe havens and depots for drugs and arms. The DTOsare also a major source of employment. They pay poor

laborers to clear land that can be used for clandestineairstrips, and provide cash and protection to smallfarmers who cultivate poppy. Narco-money suffuses


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the entire economy. Much of the perhaps $10 billion indrug money that ows through Guatemala each year

is laundered through local banks, business ventures,and public investment projects. The result is an oddcombination of poverty and drug-funded excess. Thesmall town of La Reforma in eastern Guatemala hasno bank or grocery store, for instance, and most of thepopulation can hardly meet their own basic needs. Yetthe town boasts a rst-rate hospital and handful ofmansions, apparently paid for with prots earnedfrom the narcotics trade.24

Immense drug prots invariably bring about a risein ofcial corruption, and Guatemala is no exception.One observer estimates that roughly $1 billion of thedrug money that ows through Guatemala each yearis used to bribe government ofcials.25 This estimateis probably high, but the DTOs have certainly pur-

chased the loyaltiesor at least the acquiescenceofofcials at all levels of government. According to theU.S. State Department, money from the drug tradehas woven itself into the ber of Guatemalan law en-forcement and justice institutions.26 The cartels paysmall-town mayors for the right to set up clandestineairstrips, and bribe judges, police commanders, mili-tary ofcials, and border guards to avoid governmentsurveillance or prosecution. Much of this briberytakes place at the local level, in remote areas wheredrug trafcking is heaviest and state institutions areweakest. As the Guatemalan ambassador to Mexicoconcedes, The co-optation of local power by orga-nized crime in some regions of Guatemala is a fact.27In the past several years, the DTOs have become even

more ambitious, paying off members of the Congressand recent presidential administrations. In September2008, Colom red two top aides (Carlos Quintanilla,


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the Secretary for Presidential Security and Adminis-trative Affairs, and Gustavo Solano, the head of the

Strategic Analysis Secretariat) for allegedly helpingthe DTOs place listening devices in the presidentsresidence and ofce. According to Stratfor, All execu-tive orders regarding Guatemalas ght against drugtrafcking must now be considered compromised.28

Where plata (money) cannot co-opt the authorities,plomo (lead) is used to batter them into submission.Local and state ofcials who decline to participate innarcotics trafcking have been murdered, often in bru-tal fashion. DTO operatives are also believed to havebeen behind a recent assassination attempt against thegovernor of the Petn.29 While political murders of-ten go unsolved, it is widely suspected that the DTOsplayed a central role in the violence that marred the2007 election campaign. In the run-up to the vote,

seven congressional deputies and dozens of othercandidates and their supporters were murderedina few cases, after being kidnapped and tortured. Thepurpose of this bloodshed was to eliminate politiciansthought to be hostile to a certain DTO, show the rest ofthe political class the price of opposing the drug trade,and thereby neutralize any political will to confrontthe trafckers. Controlling the political system istheir goal, says one Guatemalan analyst.30

The violence attending the drug trade has escalat-ed amid the intensifying competition for dominancein Guatemala. The Zetas ruthlessly target their com-petitors as well as ofcials thought to support rivalDTOs; the Sinaloa cartel and several Guatemalan or-ganizations have responded in kind. In March 2008, a

reght in Zacapa between the Zetas and Guatemalantrafckers claimed 11 lives. Several months later, an-other shootout involving the Zetas, this time in Hue-


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huetenango, left 17 dead. According to press reports,the ghting was so intense that police and military

units elected to wait for the combatants to exhaustthemselves before moving in to restore order. Thatsame month, 15 innocent bus passengers were killedin a nighttime attack that bore all the markings of adrug-related massacre. When there becomes a mis-understanding of sorts, says a DEA ofcial, theyregoing to resolve it one way, and thats by physicallyremoving their competition.31

While the Zetas are hardly the only culprit in thisbloodshed, their arrival bodes especially ill for Gua-temala. The Zetas were initially formed by Mexicanspecial-forces deserters, and many members haveadvanced training in intelligence, counterinsurgency,ambushes, complex assaults, and other techniques.The group is renowned for its brutality, often behead-

ing its opponents and, in a tactic apparently borrowedfrom Iraqi insurgents, posting torture and executionvideos on the Internet. As George Grayson comments,Even mentioning the word Zeta conjures images ofcastrations, decapitations, and immersion in vats oflye.32 The Zetas use a variety of heavy weapons, in-cluding AR-15s, AK-47s, MP-5s, improvised explosivedevices, 50-caliber machine guns, grenade launchers,and bazookas. Thanks to their military training, theywield these arms with devastating efcacy. As twowriters for Stratfor note, Assault ries in the handsof untrained thugs are dangerous, but if those sameries are placed in the hands of highly trained specialforces soldiers who can operate as a re team, they canbe overwhelmingly powerful.33

These capabilities have allowed the Zetas to turnmuch of northern Mexico into what one DEA ofcialcalls somewhere between Al Capones Chicago and


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an outright war, and the group has advanced rapidlyinto Guatemala as well.34 As of mid-2009, the group

had an estimated 300-400 operatives in Guatemala,and Zeta operations have increased in frequency andeffect. In April 2009, Zetas ambushed police carryingout an anti-drug raid, killing ve ofcers. They subse-quently made a successful escape from the scene, leav-ing behind an astonishing amount of repower. Thegroup has established training camps, arms depots,and drug caches in the regions that border Mexico,and Guatemalan ofcials estimate that the Zetas havea presence in 75 percent of the country.35 They are allover, says a DEA ofcial. All this has led Guatema-lan ofcials to complain that we are being Mexican-ized.36

Hidden Powers.

The international DTOs both cooperate and com-pete with domestically based organized crime syn-dicates known as poderes ocultos, or hidden powers.These groups are deeply rooted in the Guatemalanpolitical system. According to a detailed investigationby the Washington Ofce on Latin America, the hid-den powers are networks of powerful individuals inGuatemala who use their positions and contacts in thepublic and private sectors both to enrich themselvesfrom illegal activities and to protect themselves fromprosecution for crimes they commit. They are madeup of prominent businessmen, current and formermilitary ofcers, politicians, civil servants, and de-fense and law enforcement ofcialsin other words,

they are part and parcel of Guatemalas elite. Theseindividuals use their inuence to carve out shares ina variety of illicit networks: drug trafcking, bribery,


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kickbacks, diversion of customs duties, illegal con-tracting practices, illicit resource extraction, extortion,

human trafcking, kidnapping, car theft, and others.In some cases, they mix these illicit activities with licitdealings in the formal economy, such as involvementin the mining and oil industries. While most poderesocultos are relatively informal, protean networks, oth-ers have evolved into quasi-corporate entities thatfeature hierarchical leadership structure, with capi-tal and manpower to run sophisticated enterprises.They employ current or former members of the secu-rity services to carry out their dirty work, and havealso contracted such tasks to Guatemalas large youthgangs (discussed below).37

The hidden powers are an outgrowth of the civilwar. From the 1960s onward, the experience of ght-ing the violent left led to the formation of tight-knit

military fraternities among ofcers who rose throughthe ranks together. At the same time, the fact that themilitary effectively dominated Guatemalan affairs formuch of this period encouraged the rise of acquisitive,praetorian elite. As the army prosecuted a bloodycounterinsurgency against the guerrillas, corrupt of-cers used their inuence and connections to snapup the best arable land, acquire favorable positionsin mining and industry, divert government funds fortheir personal use, and engage in the drug trade andother illicit activities. These tendencies persisted afterwars end, as the emergence of a weak democraticstate offered alluring opportunities for corruption andmalfeasance, and as the need to avert any reckoningwith atrocities committed during the conict encour-

aged military ofcers to maintain professional solidar-ity and seek alliances with other powerful Guatema-lans. The military fraternities formed during the civil


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war thus evolved into the poderes ocultos of today. LaCofrada was originally created by army hard-liners,

and its leaders are thought to include two former gen-erals. El Sindicato contains a contingent of military of-cers from the class of 1973, and is the chief rival ofLa Cofrada. El Archivo was formed by members of thePresidential General Staff, a group deeply involved incounterintelligence and electronic surveillance duringthe civil war. Other organizations, such as Grupo Sal-vadidas, have similar pedigrees.38

The hidden powers have an ambiguous relation-ship with the international DTOs active in Guatemala.Guatemalan crime syndicates originally providedtransportation and protection for groups like the Ze-tas (who still employ a few dozen Kaibiles, counter-insurgency specialists who deserted the Guatemalanarmy). As the Zetas have become more ambitious,

however, they have targeted any groupGuatema-lan or otherwisethat refuses to meet their demands.The November 2008 reght in Huehuetenango dem-onstrated the deteriorating relationship between theZetas and Guatemalan organized crime networks, anda number of recent incidents tell the same story.39

If conict between the hidden powers and inter-national DTOs has become so intense, it is largelybecause their goals are so similar. Like the DTOs, thehidden powers are determined to weaken the Guate-malan state orbetter yetto control it through cor-ruption. They nance political parties and congres-sional campaigns in hopes of bringing confederatesto power, and buy off police ofcials, prison guards,judges, and other civil servants to assure themselves a

free hand. U.S. ofcials believe that the hidden pow-ers have particularly strong ties to the Public Ministry,military intelligence, the judicial system, the National


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Civil Police (PNC), and political parties such as theGuatemalan Republican Front (FRG), which includes

former military dictator Efran Ros Montt and ex-President Alfonso Portillo (2000-04). El Archivo andGrupo Salvavidas were well-represented in Portillosadministration, and government attempts to restrainorganized crime were so transparently insincere thatGuatemala was decertied for U.S. counternarcot-ics aid in 2003. The situation has not much improvedsince then. Guatemala has since been recertied forU.S. aid, but in 2007, Eduardo Stein conceded that or-ganized crime syndicates effectively controlled six ofGuatemalas departments.40

As with the DTOs, the counterpart to corruption isviolence. The hidden powers maim and murder mem-bers of competing organizations and deal roughlywith government ofcials or civil society groups that

threaten their inuence. Organized crime elementshave warned Guatemalan journalists to shut up andstop talking, and human rights activists, membersof the Peasant Unity Committee, and other individu-als who oppose the poderes ocultos have been threat-ened or even lynched.41 Allies of the FRG violentlydemonstrated in order to persuade the Guatema-lan courts to allow Ros Montt to run for president in2003. Advocates of greater government and nancialtransparency have been kidnapped, and witnesses inpolitically charged criminal cases have been killed.42

During the 2007 campaign, the hidden powers appar-ently competed (or perhaps collaborated) with inter-national DTOs to murder and intimidate potentiallytroublesome politicians. According to one account,

the strategy used by the hidden powers was one ofpruning the eld of electoral candidates to guaranteethat the winners stay in line. In one case, this strategy


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entailed kidnapping, torturing, and executing a candi-dates 14-year old daughter.43

The mixture of corruption and violence perpetratedby these groups was most pungently demonstrated bythe PARLACEN (Central American Parliament) kill-ings of 2007. In February, three Salvadoran represen-tatives to PARLACEN became separated from theirconvoy while traveling through Guatemala. The threemen and their driver were assassinated in what wasapparently a drug-related slaying (the precise motiveremains unclear), their bodies burned and left besidethe road. This crime shocked Salvadorans and Guate-malans alike; even more appalling was the aftermath.Guatemalan authorities apprehended four policemenin connection with the slayings, but while the menwere being held prior to trial, they themselves weremurdered. There was no question that these latter kill-

ings were abetted by ofcial complicity, as the victimswere being held behind eight sets of locked doors in aprison near Guatemala City. To top off the whole sor-did episode, the judge investigating the killings wasmurdered in July 2008, and the alleged mastermindof the affair was later identied as a former congres-sional deputy and mayor. The entire affair was deeplytroubling to many Guatemalans, and it laid bare theextent to which organized crime and its attendant vio-lence had penetrated the countrys institutions.44

Pandillas and Maras.

Extremely violent youth gangs make up the thirdmajor group of criminal elements in Guatemala.

Rampant gang activity has plagued much of CentralAmerica since the 1990s, and Guatemala ts squarelywithin this pattern. The most reliable estimates put


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the number of gang members in Guatemala at around14,000 as of 2006or just slightly less than the total

size of the Guatemalan army. These individuals be-long to hundreds of gangs of widely varying structureand size. Pandillas are relatively small, at organiza-tions that operate in a single neighborhood and havea few dozen members.Maras are larger, more sophis-ticated groups that can have tens or even thousandsof members spread across several different countries.They are organized hierarchically, with numerous na-tional cells, or clicas, that report to a centralized gangleadership.45

The dominant maras in Guatemala are the MaraSalvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (18th Street)gangs. MS-13 contains roughly 80 percent of gangmembers in Guatemala; 18th Street commands theloyalties of another 15 percent.46 Both gangs have a

strong presence throughout northern Central Ameri-ca and Mexico, and they enjoy working relationshipswith various Mexican and Colombian drug trafckers.MS-13, for example, is thought to be particularly closeto the Sinaloa cartel and its enforcers. These maras alsohave tens of thousands of members spread across morethan 40 U.S. states: organized crime analyst SamuelLogan calls MS-13 Americas most violent gang.47

While the various national branches of 18th Street andMS-13 retain some operational independence, theyare also expected to be responsive to directives issuedby their respective transnational leaderships. In 2007,a federal grand jury indicted two MS-13 leaders forallegedly ordering murders in the United States fromtheir prison cells in El Salvador. MS-13 and 18th Street

are thus far more advanced than simple street gangs;they are sophisticated transnational criminal organi-zations (TCOs) in their own right.48


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The top-level leaders of these maras are often ex-perienced criminals in their 30s and 40s, but the rank-

and-le come from a younger demographic. Mostgang members are between 12 and 24 years in age(although some are far older), and about 90 percentare male.49 A few of these individuals are sociopathswho like to commit crimes, but the vast majority joinsgangs for more mundane reasons. Most mareros suf-fer from poverty, unstable family backgrounds, a lackof educational, social, or professional outlets, or somecombination of these factors. They have no realistichope of getting anywhere in the modern world, saysone USAID ofcial, and they are very much prone towhatever the streets have to offer them.50 For margin-alized youths, gang membership offers a steady cashow, a sense of status and belonging, and, for men,access to women. Says one expert, These kids look

at the power the gangs have in terms of the chicks,the money. Gang membership also allows these indi-viduals to develop a distinct social identity, as marasand pandillas have unique hand signals, grafti, tat-toos, and manners of dress. (Tattoos have become lesscommon of late, as gang members seek to make them-selves less obvious to the police.) For disadvantagedteens and young adults, Guatemalan gangs fulll animportantif perversesocial function.51

The gang problem in Guatemala has its origins inthe civil war, when displaced and uneducatedbutoften well-armedyoung people turned to crime as asolution to the challenges of demobilization and recon-struction. This phenomenon subsequently received amajor boost from destabilizing refugee ows. During

the 1980s and 1990s, tens of thousands of Guatema-lans who ed the violence in their own country settledin Southern California. Preyed upon by established


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youth gangs, Guatemalan and other Central Ameri-can immigrants formed their own gangs, including

18th Street and MS-13. Because the founders of thesegangs had often acquired some military experienceduring the civil war, these maras quickly becamesome of the most feared criminal organizations in LosAngeles, and they participated in the Rodney Kingriots and other major disturbances during the 1990s.Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, U.S. authoritiesincreasingly deported gang members to Guatemalaand other Central American countries. In the 8 yearsafter 1996, nearly 500,000 Latin Americans were de-ported for committing crimes that carried at least a1-year sentence, and in FY 2006, Guatemala receivedaround 3,600 criminal deportees. Many deporteesspoke imperfect, anglicized Spanish (or none at all),lacked economic opportunities in Guatemala, and had

no skills to trade upon other than their criminal pro-ciency and their gang connections. Consequently, thegang problem in Guatemala metastasized, with gangpopulations swelling over the past ten years and lawenforcement agencies struggling to keep pace.52

Maras and pandillas are at the center of the crimeepidemic aficting Guatemala. The pandillas focus onpetty extortion, robbery, small-scale drug trafcking,and occasionally kidnapping and murder. The marasare involved in all of these activities, and use their in-ternational connections to participate in arms smug-gling, human trafcking, large-scale car robbery, rack-eteering, and other organized crimes. They sometimesaid the larger cartels andpoderes ocultos by providingsecurity for drug shipments, or by distributing cocaine

and other narcotics in the small but growing Guate-malan market. In other cases, they carry out contractkillings for organized crime syndicates.53


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As gang activity has increased, so has violence.Gangs competing for control of a particular block,

neighborhood, or city attack each other with weaponsas unsophisticated as makeshift knives, as fearsomeas AK-47s and fragmentation grenades. Brutality hasbecome a form of psychological warfare in these con-tests, and gang members who fall into the hands oftheir opponents are sometimes tortured or dismem-bered before being killed. This is particularly the casein Guatemalas overcrowded prisons, which haveincreasingly become central arenas for gang-on-gangviolence. In one instance, gang members decapitatedand burned seven victims in a prison east of Guate-mala City.54

The majority of gang violence is directed against ri-val gangs, but a substantial portion affects the broaderpopulation. The compatriots of a fallen gang member

sometimes take revenge against the entire family ofhis or her murderer, and as gang-versus-gang compe-tition has intensied, these organizations frequentlyseek to shock the population of a certain area intosubmission. One detailed study reports that in 2004,initiation into the 18th Street Gang required the rape,disguration, and murder of a young woman.55 Inmany instances, violence against the population issimply the natural concomitant of gang-related crime.El Flaco, a member of MS-13 who claims to have killed22 people, explains the ruthless methods by which thegang extorts money from afuent Guatemalans. Wehave a saying: If you dont pay, we wont hurt the fa-ther, sadly, its the children wholl pay, he explains.We send them a letter. Then we surveil their kids.

We ask for $5,000 to $13,000, depending on the kind ofbusiness hes in. If he doesnt pay, we kidnap his wifeor a child, and we kill them. Then we send him body


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parts showing him we mean business, and we keepkidnapping family members until he pays.56

This approach to extortion is evident in anotherfavored gang tacticattacking the heavily used bussystems in Guatemala City and other urban centers.The gang that dominates a certain bus route normallycharges around $13 per day for the right to transit thezone unmolested, and drivers who refuse to pay aresummarily murdered. To reinforce this climate of fearand intimidation, gang operatives occasionally con-duct widespread, simultaneous attacks on transporta-tion infrastructure, as happened in Guatemala City inearly 2009. Overall, 255 bus drivers, and their assis-tants were murdered nationwide in 2008.57 Though theextent of gang activities in Guatemala has sometimesbeen exaggerated, their brutality and destructivenesscan hardly be disputed.

Violence, Corruption, and the Erosion of the State.

For a country that never fully recovered from thecivil war, the effects of this criminal activity havebeen devastating. Economic performance is sufferingbecause crime deters investment, impedes licit trade,and diverts both public and private money from de-velopment into security initiatives. As early as 1999,crime cost Guatemalan businesses an average of $5,500annually, and this amount has probably risen overthe past decade.58 Future economic performance andsocial development are also under threat from grow-ing drug consumption, which has spiked as narcoticssaturate the country. About 10 percent of the cocaine

that enters Guatemalan territory is now kept for inter-nal consumption (a high proportion given the smallsize of the Guatemalan market), and drugs are easily


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acquired at hotels, bars, and clubs. Drug treatmentcenters are lled beyond capacity. Five years ago, one

center in Guatemala City had 20 patients; now it hasto accommodate 250.59Even more problematic is the overall level of vio-

lence. As noted above, homicide rates in Guatemalaare stratospheric. Drawing on data collected by theUnited Nations (UN) Ofce on Drugs and Crime, theCongressional Research Service notes that, along withEl Salvador, Guatemala is among the most violentcountries for which standardized data has been col-lected.60 Citizens and ofcials lament that the countryis more violent now than during the civil war, and thenumbers bear this assertion out. While recent murderrates have not approached the levels of violence seenin 1981-83, homicide totals since 2006 have surpassedthe average number of murders between 1970 and

1996. In numerous areasnot just in remote regionslike Petn and Huehuetenango, but also in marginalbarrios in the capital and other citiesviolence is sointense and criminal organizations are so powerfulthat the police can enter only at the sufferance of thepreeminent gang or DTO.61

This rise in violence has been matched by a markedupsurge in ofcial corruption. Corruption is difcultto measure precisely, but all serious observers agreethat criminal elements have been hugely successful inpenetrating the security forces, judicial institutions,and practically every other ofce or agency chargedwith maintaining law and order. DEA ofcials reportthat corruption is rampant at the local level, and in2007, Guatemalan police chief Erwin Sperisen estimat-

ed that 40 percent of the PNC was tarnished.62 Thiscorruption goes all the way to the top. As mentionedpreviously, Colom red two close advisers on suspi-


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cion that they had fed sensitive information to drugtrafckers. The head of the PNC, Porrio Prez Pani-

agua, was recently dismissed on suspicion that he andmore than a dozen subordinates pilfered hundredsof thousands of dollars and nearly 120 kilograms ofcocaine. Corruption, former Vice-President Stein hasremarked, is part of a web that includes the NationalCivil Police, the Public Ministry, the judicial branch,the nations Justice Department and the penal system.. . . All the entities here have been penetrated by orga-nized crime.63

These effects are not lost on Guatemalan of-cials, and, over the past half-decade, three presiden-tial administrations have deployed various counter-measures. In 2003-04, Portillo launched Plan Escoba(Clean Sweep), an anti-gang offensive that lockedup over one thousand mareros. His successor, scar

Berger, sent small groups of Guatemalan soldiers intothe Petn to destroy clandestine runways. In 2007,the Guatemalan Congress agreed to the creation ofthe International Commission against Impunity inGuatemala (CICIG), a UN-sponsored body chargedwith ghting corruption and investigating high-pro-le crimes.64 The Berger administration bolstered thePNC by hiring 3,000 army veterans, and, when Colomwas campaigning for president in 2007, he promiseda zero tolerance stance toward organized crime andcorruption.65

These measures have permitted some very mod-est progress in combating criminal activity. In 2008,the government terminated more than 1,000 corruptpolice ofcers and eradicated record levels of opium

poppy. Overall, however, the situation in Guatemalais not much improved, and it may actually be deterio-rating. Only one major drug trafcker was arrested in


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2008, and he was quickly released on a technicality.The gang population is growing, murders continue to

rise, and incidents like the PARLACEN killings andrecent narco-massacres indicate that trends are run-ning in the wrong direction. For all of Coloms efforts,violent crime, disorder, and insecurity are still perva-sive in Guatemala.66

In some sense, this disappointing outcome owes toforces beyond Guatemalas control. Aggressive U.S.deportation policies have ooded Guatemala withthousands of criminals each year, and information-sharing on these deportees is limited. Guatemala alsosuffers from being located between the worlds chiefproducer of cocaineColombiaand its chief con-sumerthe United States. As Interior Minister Fran-cisco Jos Jimmez put it in 2008, Guatemala is themeat in the hamburger.67

Yet the chief enabler of continuing insecurity inGuatemala is the fundamental weakness of the state.Nearly 2 centuries after independence, the Guatema-lan government is still incapable of raising revenue,administering justice, or providing basic public goods.Because tax rates on individuals and businesses arelow, and tax collection is inefcient, tax revenue re-mains remarkably low at 10-12 percent of gross do-mestic product (GDP) (the average in Latin America is18 percent, and developed countries generally collecttax revenues equivalent to 30-45 percent of GDP).68 Asa result, government institutions are immature andunderdevelopedshortcomings that are crippling toeven well-intended law and order programs. The pris-ons are stuffed beyond capacity, making it impossible

to maintain sanitary conditions or even police theincarcerated population. CICIG is underfunded andoverworked, while oversight of the banking system


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is spotty at best. The situation in the judicial systemis even worse. A dearth of trained prosecutors and

forensic examiners, a lack of modern equipment, andan unreasonable workload for judges have combinedwith other factors to ensure that only 2 percent ofmurder cases are ever solved.69

This dynamic is even more pronounced with re-spect to the police and military. The former institu-tion is chronically underfunded, and, with militaryspending amounting to only .33 percent of GDP, it ishardly surprising that the forces of order are severelyovermatched. The security forces are smallGua-temala has around 20,000 police ofcers and 15,000soldiers, compared to at least 14,000 mareros and thou-sands more DTO andgrupo clandestino afliatesandcompletely inadequate to patrol the countrys roughterrain and porous borders.70 Naval vessels that chug

along at 10 knots can hardly interdict go-fast boats thatreach 50-60 knots, and police side-arms are no matchfor the fragmentation grenades, automatic weapons,armor-piercing ammunition, and rocket launchersused by organized crime. These are things we haveonly seen in photos of Iraq and the Gulf, one policecommander laments. As the Zetas establish them-selves in Guatemala, this mismatch will only becomemore lopsided.71

Of all the factors inhibiting a successful govern-ment response, corruption may be the most impor-tant. While corruption is ultimately a personal choice,it also reects crucial failures of the state: the failureto offer salaries sufcient to maintain an honest work-force, the failure to provide a climate of security that

will permit honest ofcials the option of refusing towork with criminals, the failure to root out corrupt of-cials from the bureaucracy, and so on. So far, these


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failures have eviscerated the effectiveness of Guate-malan anti-crime initiatives. In the early 2000s, the

Anti-Narcotics Operations Department (DOAN), anagency created specically to deal with drug trafck-ing, had to be shut down after it became known thatits members were involved in crimes including kid-napping and murder. Organized crime elements regu-larly receive early warning of impending governmentraids, and recent reports indicate that security ofcialsmay have helped drug trafckers steal AK-47s andUzi submachine guns from military armories.72 CICIGis far less corrupt than most government institutions,but its achievements have been limited by the fact thatit has to work through those very institutions. Thenarco nexus may be stronger than the state now, saysformer Deputy Minister of Security Julio Csar Go-doy. The narcos abuse and kill, and nobody says any-

thing because the judges, prosecutors, military com-manders, and governors are all bought off.73 In thesecircumstances, even honest ofcials have little choicebut to go along with the ethos of corruption that rulestheir agencies. As one U.S. ofcial has explained ofthe situation in Guatemala: Prosecutors are reluctantto vigorously pursue criminal cases because they fearbeing compromised at every level. Police ofcers aremistrustful of their peers because corruption is perva-sive within their ranks. The courts, the prosecutors,and the police are afraid of compromise, and all arewithout mutual support of each other. The result is analmost complete refusal by any of these three entitiesto effectively engage in the counterdrug mission.74

Finally, the Guatemalan government lacks the re-

sources to address persistent social strains that makecrime such an attractive option for many youths. Be-cause the state is starved of funding, it has long been


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unable to provide decent public education, offer basicservices in poor neighborhoods, or otherwise com-

bat the effects of extreme poverty. While Colom hasspoken to this issue, the Guatemalan political class asa whole has responded anemically to calls for socio-economic redistribution or even an expansion of pub-licly funded educational or social outlets. Funding forprevention and rehabilitation programs remains inad-equate, and while privately and foreign-funded pilotprojects have shown promise, they have not yet beenreplicated on a wide enough scale to have a nation-wide impact. As a result, enforcement-rst initiativeslike Plan Escoba have had only a supercial effect onthe gang problem. In fact, by locking up vulnerableyouths in overcrowded detention facilities where gangafliation is crucial to survival, it may have simply re-inforced gang loyalties and thereby compounded the

crisis. Institutional weakness and deep-seated socio-economic problems have long left Guatemala vulner-able to internal upheaval, and these issues now standin the way of any lasting solution to that turmoil.75

The governments failure to provide even a mini-mal level of domestic security has been profoundlycorrosive to the national psyche. Persistent violenceand unstinting corruption have made Guatemala asociety characterized by fear, cynicism, and mistrust.Even those who have not been directly victimized bycrime are terried of its effects. According to a studyconducted by USAID, 86 percent of Guatemalanssurveyed feel that the level of insecurity facing Gua-temala presents a threat to the future well-being ofthe country, and 45 percent feel that insecurity poses

a threat to their own personal security.76 There is nocondence that the government can stem this tide oreven protect those citizens who are brave enough to


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crime is cited as the top justication for a militarycoup. Guatemalans are increasingly turning away

from an ineffective democratic state, further depriv-ing it of legitimacy and authority.80This trendwith all its pernicious consequenc-

esis already well-underway, and is nding clearestexpression in two related phenomena. The rst is theprivatization of security. With the police either corruptor overmatched, well-to-do Guatemalans are turningto private security rms for protection. This industryhas ourished of late, and private security person-nelwho are often well-armednow outnumber po-lice by roughly 7.5 to 1. The growth of this industryhas furnished afuent citizens a measure of security,but it has also reinforced the fact that the state has lostits monopoly on the use of force. Just as troubling, thisdevelopment has merely underscored the suffocating

inequality that suffuses Guatemalan society. The for-tunate few can purchase personal safety; the impov-erished many cannot. As the state erodes, security isno longer a public good, but rather a luxury availableonly to those of means.81

The second phenomenon is an immensely disturb-ing trend known as social cleansing. Citizens frus-trated with the states inability to protect them havetaken the logical next stepvigilante violence. Buscompanies, store owners, white-collar professionals,and others subject to extortion or intimidation nowemploy hired thugs to eliminate their tormentors. Al-most every night, reports the Washington Post, teamsof gunmen storm into the nations poorest neighbor-hoods to seize another man, woman, or teenager

deemed guilty of wrongdoing. Almost every morn-ing, another corpse turns up showing signs of tortureor strangulation.82 The perpetrators of these execu-


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tions call themselves Avenging Angels and JusticeMakers. They often wear commando-style uniforms,

and there is mounting evidence that some vigilantesare off-duty police or military personnel. Were help-ing Guatemala to clean up all this garbage, says onevigilante.83 According to one analysis, extrajudicial ex-ecutions increased by 60-70 percent from 2001 to 2005(though this may be a conservative estimate), and thedeath toll has reached into the hundreds in each ofthe past several years. Not surprisingly, many of thedead are victims of mistaken identity or simple score-settling. Ominously, this violenceoften directed atresidents of poor neighborhoodshas revived mem-ories of the death-squad terror inicted on much ofthe population during the civil war.84 With the statediscredited, Guatemala is descending into vigilantismand chaos.

This development should be a source of concern toobservers in both the United States and Latin Ameri-ca. The continued destabilization of Guatemala wouldprovide transnational gangs and DTOs responsible fora large share of drug trafcking into the United Stateswith a safe haven and an improved base of operations.It would impede U.S. counternarcotics operations inCentral America, and make the restoration of order inMexico all the more difcult by providing the Zetasand their rivals with a cross-border sanctuary. Mosttroubling of all, the collapse or effective evisceration ofthe Guatemalan state would set a troubling precedentin a region where representative government remainsfragile and countries from Mexico to Brazil are fac-ing the same type of threat from organized crime and

internal violence. Accordingly, the following sectionconsiders options that Guatemalan and U.S. ofcialsmight weigh for addressing this crisis.


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POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The rst imperative in dealing with organizedcrime in Guatemala is to understand the depth andcomplexity of that issue. The current crisis is manifestin the actions of heavily armed, well-funded, ruthlesscriminal organizations, but it is both rooted in andcompounded by a number of powerful, long-runningstructural factors. A lack of constructive social outletsand economic opportunities, heavy drug consump-tion in the United States and other destination coun-tries (and, more recently, in Guatemala), ubiquitousofcial corruption, and the fundamental debility ofGuatemalan state institutions have consistently abet-ted criminal activities and made this challenge excep-tionally difcult.

To view the challenge in Guatemala as simply alaw enforcement problem is thus to attack it in su-percial and unproductive fashion. Just as expertson counterinsurgency and IW emphasize the need toembed the use of force in a larger scheme of militaryand non-military programs, anti-crime initiatives inGuatemala must address both the symptoms and theunderlying causes of the current unrest. Guatemalanofcials will need to implement a strategy that com-bines robust enforcement and security measures withsustained efforts to broaden socio-economic oppor-tunities, combat corruption, and, above all, to build astronger and more capable state. Such a strategy mustinclude a wide range of complementary initiatives:aggressive, targeted actions against organized crime,

an expansion of educational opportunities and basicservices, overhauling inefcient and outdated institu-tions, purging corrupt ofcials, increasing public and


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private investment in communities, and others. So thatgovernment revenues will rise and the rest of these

measures will be possible, strengthening the tax codeand improving tax collection will also be necessary.Moreover, these initiatives will have to be integratedinto a coherent whole. Economic development and in-stitutional reform cannot occur in a climate of violentchaos, while, as the recent experience with mano duraprograms in El Salvador and Honduras has shown,enforcement-oriented programs will accomplish little,if not partnered with a more holistic approach.85

If this sounds like a daunting task, it is. Grapplingwith organized crime and building a more effectivestate will require an unprecedented commitment fromGuatemalans of all stripes. Economic elites will have topay more taxes and acquiesce to a degree of economicredistribution, the political class will have to confront

corruption and take social questions seriously, andthe rest of the population will have to overcome itsingrained cynicism about government motives andcapabilities. Accordingly, a central prerequisite of thestrategy outlined above will be the establishment ofsome sort of national compact between the Guatema-lan government, the political class, and civil society.So far, a consensus has been elusive. The well-to-dohave traditionally resisted paying more taxes to a cor-rupt government, the corrupt have shown little in-terest in exposing their own transgressions, and thepolitical system remains polarized and fragmented.This last problem was on display in early 2009, whenaccusations of murder and corruption against Colomprovoked dueling demonstrations by his mostly ru-

ral, lower-class supporters and the urban, middle, andupper-class groups that opposed his election.86Yet there is reason to hope that this political paral-


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ysis may eventually be overcome. Popular frustrationwith crime and disorder is on the rise, pushing impor-

tant sectors of society toward the conclusion that thecosts of a more assertive strategy are worth bearing.In early 2009, Colom succeeded in getting the CatholicChurch and civil society organizations to approve thegovernments national security agenda, and he wran-gled a $1 billion security budget (an increase over therecent past) out of the Congress. As crime imposes arising toll on the private sector, the business class hasclamored for a stronger government response and hasslowly become more receptive to the need for socialinvestment and poverty-reduction programs. As thebusiness class moves in this direction, it may gradu-ally pull its political patrons along. In Mexico and Co-lombia, the current governments have turned popularanger at persistent internal violence into a political

consensus in support of aggressive government actioncoupled with ambitious state-building projects; the taskfor Colom and his successors will be to do the same.87

While the impetus for any such strategy mustcome from within Guatemala, the United States willhave an important supporting role to play. VariousU.S. agencies have extensive experience in wrestlingwith the type of problems now manifest in Guatemala,and U.S. assistance can serve as a force-multiplier forGuatemalan initiatives.88 For the most part, this doesnot mean starting from scratch. The State Department,DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USAID,and other U.S. organizations have long been active inGuatemala, and in 2008, the U.S. Congress approvedthe Merida Initiative, a regional counternarcotics pro-

gram that includes $6-18 million per year for Guate-mala. As part of the same general package, Guatemalawill also receive a roughly equivalent amount in Me-


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rida support funds administered by USAID.89Still, these programs need to be seen as the be-

ginning, rather than the culmination, of U.S. sup-port for security and stability in Guatemala. U.S.aid to Guatemala actually fell (in both absolute andreal-dollar terms) between 2002 and 2007, and insuf-cient resources are a problem for nearly every U.S.program in Guatemala. While the Merida Initiativewill provide a limited infusion of new resources, it isslated to last just 3 years. This is not a sufcient timehorizonthe current crisis in Guatemala (and in LatinAmerica more broadly) has taken shape over decadesif not longer, and containing it will also be a lengthyprocess. It may thus be necessary for resource levelsto rise modestly. Greatly expanded U.S. assistance isclearly not feasible given current American commit-ments and priorities. But devoting an extra $30-40 mil-

lion per year to U.S. programs in Guatemala wouldrepresent a large proportional increase in U.S. assis-tance while adding only a small burden to the overallforeign aid budget. And if this assistance helps headoff a more acute crisis, it will generate long-term sav-ings for the United States.90

Just as the Guatemalan government will need tocombine law enforcement programs, social and eco-nomic initiatives, institution-building, and other mea-sures, U.S. policy should emphasize a holistic, inte-grated approach to combating instability. Americanpolicy should combine sustained, long-term effortsto address the structural enablers of violence withmore immediate, enforcement-oriented measures thatwill produce visible successes and help restore gov-

ernment credibility. Similarly, U.S. ofcials must beattuned to the multiplier effect that can result fromcoordinated action on several frontsthe way that


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reducing police corruption induces greater commu-nity cooperation and thus better intelligence, the way

that enforcement measures against a certain criminalorganization can create space for social and educa-tional projects in a specic neighborhood, and so on.Finally, with numerous U.S. agencies involved in thisprocess, it is imperative that American ofcials forgea common strategic outlook and make effective use ofexisting mechanisms (such as the Country Team)for substantive interagency coordination. This is espe-cially the case with counternarcotics programs, whichinvolve myriad ofces and agencies and continue tobe plagued by a lack of collaboration between partici-pants.91

Within this framework, there are a number of is-sues that merit particular attention. With respect to se-curity and enforcement, it is crucial to leverage intelli-

gence and law enforcement assets so as to improve thequality (not necessarily the quantity) of arrests. WhileGuatemala has not gone as far as its neighbors in en-acting mano dura anti-gang programs, Plan Escoba andother police initiatives have shown a similar tendencyto scoop up and incarcerate large numbers of suspect-ed gang members. Unfortunately, these sweeps areneither effective nor resource-efcient. They tax Gua-temalas already-strained police and prison capaci-ties and do little lasting harm to the maras. Most ofthe individuals arrested are low-level operatives whopossess few specialized criminal skills and are easilyreplaced by the maras or the DTOs.

A more effective approach would be to targetmara and DTO leadership elements, operatives who

possess valuable skills (such as experience in moneylaundering or electronic surveillance), and the experi-enced sicarios (hit-men) who are responsible for much


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of the violence. (This latter category is actually smallerthan one might think; according to one U.S. ofcial,

perhaps 80 percent of murders are committed by 20percent of murderers.)92 This key player approachwill place a premium on information-sharing, but itwill also entail helping Guatemalan law enforcementagencies build the capabilitieswitness protection, agreater capacity for wire-tapping and undercover op-erationsnecessary to undertake successful prosecu-tions against organized crime higher-ups. Similarly,Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) woulddo well to improve information-sharing on deporteeswith gang or criminal backgrounds, as current pro-cedures relay only limited informationsometimesnot made available until the deportee in question hasalready arrived in his or her home countryto Guate-mala and other recipient nations.

A necessary counterpart to better targeting andinformation-sharing will be a redoubled campaign toattack the nancial disadvantage the government cur-rently faces. At present, the PNC is out-gunned by thecriminals because the government is being out-spentby them. As mentioned above, while Colom obtaineda $1 billion security budget in 2009, the proceeds fromdrugs smuggled through Guatemala may be as muchas $10 billion annually. Over the long term, redress-ing this imbalance will require raising greater taxrevenues and thereby expanding the governmentsresource base. In the short term, it is essential that U.S.and Guatemalan ofcials tackle the other side of thisproblem by attacking the nances of criminal organi-zations. In particular, U.S. agencies with experience in

disrupting illicit nancial ows can help rene Gua-temalas emerging anti-money laundering laws andtrain the personnel to enforce this regime. They can


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also aid Guatemala in developing more effective assetforfeiture laws (so that the government can avail itself

of resources seized from the cartels) and building acentralized tracking system to ensure that these assetsdo not disappear into the pockets of corrupt ofcials.As the State Department recently reported, these mea-sures are central to evening the nancial mismatch be-tween the government and organized crime.93

As recent experience has shown, aggressive en-forcement strategies will produce desired results onlyif carried out by competent, honest ofcials. Address-ing current deciencies in the PNC and other law en-forcement organizations will require thoroughgoinginstitutional reform over a long period. In the interim,it will be necessary to nd more immediate ways ofimproving police performance, if only at the margins.High levels of corruption notwithstanding, there are

pockets of trustworthy, courageous Guatemalan se-curity personnel. U.S. policy should seek to identifythese groups, augment their capabilities, and gradu-ally build a core of reliable law enforcement profes-sionals. The United States possesses several tools thatcan be useful in this regard: personnel exchanges withU.S. law enforcement agencies, interaction with policeofcers from Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and oth-er cities where community policing techniques havebeen used to good effect, and assistance in trainingand vetting the small, elite forces that will be neededto carry out sensitive operations.94

More effective police will need to be supported bya more effective judicial system. As discussed above,Guatemalas institutions are simply too weak at pres-

ent to support any meaningful law and order pro-gram. Corruption, a lack of laws tailored specicallyto ghting organized crime, insufcient training for


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prosecutors and investigators, and even the simpleabsence of administrative and physical infrastructure

have rendered the judicial system an embarrassmentand fed public alienation. Redressing these weak-nesses will need to be an important part of any com-prehensive U.S. assistance strategy. U.S. agencies canassist the Guatemalan judiciary in developing specicanti-gang laws, provide training for investigators andforensic examiners, and offer assistance in developingeffective prosecution strategies. At an administrativelevel, USAID should emphasize the development ofpersonnel and management systems that reward goodperformance. The key in all this is to take a building-block approach: Start with small, basic tasks thatcan form a foundation for more ambitious measureslater on. In some cases, USAID is already involved inpromising pilot programs oriented along these lines.

Cooperation with the Public Ministry has led to moreeffective investigative techniques and increased thenumber of murder prosecutions in Guatemala City.The construction of 24-hour courts in Villa Nueva hashelped streamline a notoriously slow judicial processand ensure that those accused of a crime go before ajudge in timely fashion. Given additional resources, itmay be possible to expand upon these programs andbegin to undertake system-wide initiatives.95

This mixture of selective engagement and insti-tutional reform should form the basis of U.S. policytoward the Guatemalan military as well. The militaryis currently prohibited from participating in domes-tic policing missions due to its human rights record,but because the PNC is so often outgunned and over-

stretched, the armed forces are being tacitly reinte-grated into this role. As this happens, it makes sensefor the United States to engage and build the capacity


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of those units involved in interdiction activities (as theState Department is doing on a limited scale through a

partnership with Guatemalas Joint Task Force Fuen-tes), but U.S. offcials should also work to ensure thatGuatemalan military institutions continue to developin a way compatible with democratic norms. Over thepast decade, one of the more successful U.S. programsin Colombia has been to provide nancial, technical,and political support to the ofce charged with inves-tigating human rights abuses by the military, and asimilar effort may be useful in Guatemala.96

U.S. policy must also address the social conditionsthat provide a steady stream of recruits for maras,

pandillas, and other criminal organizations. The needis not for programs like Plan Escoba, which lock upGuatemalan youths without offering them any mean-ingful alternative to gang membership. The need is

to invest in education, vocational training, and after-school activities that will keep kids off the streets andgive them some hope of succeeding in a licit line ofwork. Similarly, it will be necessary to strengthen thenetwork of organizations and programs that focus onreintegrating ex-gang members into society and there-by lessening the chances of recidivism.

To its credit, USAID and its partner organiza-tions have been very active in exploring these sorts ofprograms. The Challenge 10 television show (par-tially funded by USAID) depicted ex-gang memberscooperating to start small businesses, and follow-onprojects placed around 170 former mareros in gainfulemployment as of November 2009. Over the past sev-eral years, USAID has also worked with rotary clubs,

churches, and other civil society organizations to es-tablish several community centers where Guatemalanyouths can learn to use computers, take classes in a


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trade, or simply hang out. The centers offer communi-ty members access to constructive activities, a chance

at self-improvement and, not least of all, a refuge fromthe trouble and insecurity that they would otherwiseencounter. They are also extremely cost-effective.Start-up costs run about $16,000, and because the cen-ters are often based in spaces donated by churchesand rely on volunteers for stafng, they cost just a fewhundred dollars per month to sustain. If this sort ofinitiative can be partnered with expanded educationalopportunities, it can provide young Guatemalans withan alternative to gang membership and crime.97

As the Challenge 10 and community center pro-grams illustrate, the social and economic aspects ofGuatemalas crime problem are best addressed notthrough direct resource transfers from U.S. agencies topoor Guatemalans, but by emphasizing public-private

partnerships that encourage communities to invest inthemselves. Mobilizing private business, the church-es, and other civil society groups entails a number ofbenets: it brings additional resources (both nancialand human) to bear on the problem, taps into socialnetworks that can provide y

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