Energy Policy 39 (2011) 8046–8050

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Energy Policy

0301-42

doi:10.1

n Tel.:

E-m1 Th

Complu

Steven2 Po

preferre

structur

that infl

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Grid-connected renewable energy in China: Policies and institutions undergradualism, developmentalism, and socialism

Clara Garcıa n

Complutense University of Madrid, Economics and Business School, Pozuelo de Alarcon, 28223 Madrid, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 23 May 2011

Accepted 27 September 2011Available online 19 October 2011

Keywords:

Renewable energy

Political economy

China

15/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.enpol.2011.09.059

þ34 633504758.

ail address: clara.garcia@ccee.ucm.es

e author would like to acknowledge the fi

tense-Del Amo grant, as well as the insights p

Vogel, and various doctoral students at Unive

licies here refer to those rules offered b

d course of action toward a desired outcom

es of economic actors (governmental or cor

uence those actors and relations between th

a b s t r a c t

This communication displays some of our on-going research on the incompleteness of China’s advances

toward ‘‘best practice’’ in policy-making and institution-building for renewables. In particular, this

paper: (1) summarizes how Chinese policies and institutions for the deployment of renewable

electricity are only partially compliant with what is internationally recognized as ‘‘best practice’’;

and (2) contextualizes Chinese policies and institutions for renewables in the broader picture of China’s

political economy. Much as a political economy perspective has aided the understanding of why

Chinese economic reforms were partial and unique, the said contextualization might help explain why

China’s policies and institutions for renewables diverge from ‘‘best practice’’. Further, given that China

proved successful in promoting its economic growth with partial and unique reforms, the partiality and

uniqueness of its renewables policies and institutions need not impede the rapid development of

renewable electricity. This on-going research has so far combined a review of specialized literature and

the business press with semi-structured interviews held with relevant actors in policy, business, and

research related to renewable energies.

& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction1

There is an extensive literature that describes the particula-rities of China’s political economy, as well as, in many cases, theimpact of the said political economy on socio-economic perfor-mance. These are usually studies that deal with quite broad viewsof political economy as well as with broad outcomes (such aseconomic growth). Nevertheless, one observes that less emphasisin trying to relate the features and performance of more specificeconomic sectors (e.g. renewable energy) to the particularities ofthe Chinese political economy.

This paper looks into the Chinese grid-connected renewableenergy (GCRE) sector as an exercise in contextualizing theanalysis of China’s policies and institutions2 within its overallpolitical economy. To be more concrete, this communicationprovides a preliminary explanation of why Chinese policies andinstitutions do not nicely fit into the ‘‘best practice’’ model, in

ll rights reserved.

nancial support of a Becas

rovided by John Zysman and

rsity of California, Berkeley.

y public authorities as the

e; and institutions refer to

porate) and the mechanisms

em.

view of China’s principles for decision-making: gradualism,developmentalism, and socialism.

Our on-going research so far combines a review of specializedliterature and of the business press with the results of semi-structured interviews held with industry elites. The intervieweeswere relevant actors in policy, business, and research related torenewable energies (see Appendix 1 for methodological details).

2. Policies and institutions for GCRE: Chinese divergencesfrom ‘‘best practice’’

A systematic collection of the policy and institutional pre-scriptions recommended in professional reports3 (Garcıa, 2011)shows that those reports consider ‘‘best practice’’ to include:(1) policies that eliminate economic barriers to renewables byleveling the playing field of renewables vis-�a-vis fossil fuels, aswell as by implementing support mechanisms that compensatefor high costs, limited access to finance, and insufficient demand;and (2) institutions that eliminate non-economic barriers byensuring good governance on the part of the State and corporatecompetition.

As shown in Table 1, many of the ‘‘best practice’’ recommen-dations constitute ideals, unlikely to be implemented in full in

3 Such as GWEC (2005); IEA (2007, 2008); IREC (2004); World Bank (2008);

WEC (2004).

Table 1Summary of ‘‘best practice’’ for the deployment of renewables,and the Chinese divergence from ‘‘best practice’’.

Policies and institutions for renewables in the‘‘best practice’’ model

Chinese divergences with ‘‘best practice’’

Policies to overcomeeconomic barriers

Elimination of coal subsidies Negative externalities not fully compensated for

Compensation for the negative externalities of fossil fuels

(pollution, etc.)

Remuneration for the positive externalities of renewables

Compensation for high initial costs (mandated market policies):

quantity-based and price-based schemes

Regulations focus on installed capacity rather than power

generation

Remuneration levels are low, and duration of tariffs is short

Increased access to capital: fiscal and financial aids Regulations do not include enough provisions for reduction of

tariffs

Ensuring sufficient demand (PPAs) PPAs do not ensure connection

Institutions to overcomenon-economic barriers

General legal security General insecurity and uncertaintaies

Capable bureacracy: coordination and cutting of red-tape Incomplete coordination, and complex and lenghty red-tape

Quality of regulations in renewables: specific, legally binding

targets, and predictable instruments

Targets not compulsory, and instruments lacking stability and

transparency

Competition and technology-friendly policies in generation:

unbundling, absence of oligopolies, openness to FDI

Limits to competition in generation (market concentration,

public ownership, and barriers to foreign entry)

Competition and technology-friendly policies in manufacturing:

openness to external trade and FDI

Limits to innovation (barriers to foreign trade and foreign entry)

C. Garcıa / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 8046–8050 8047

any real context. Some items of the ‘‘best practice’’ model areeven impossible to account for (for instance, how precisely can itbe established whether an externality has been fully interna-lized?). Nevertheless, we still find it compelling to explain howand why China’s regulations diverge from the model, given thatthis model is being advanced by relevant actors in the GCRE fieldand is frequently used as the yardstick against which the qualityof country-specific regulations are assessed.

China’s policies and institutions for GCRE4 fit into the ‘‘bestpractice’’ model only partially and imperfectly.5 More concretely,China’s policies diverge from best practice insofar as: negativeexternalities of fossil fuels are not compensated for (as with a coaltax); regulations do not incentivise feeding power into the grid,but instead focus on installing capacity (China’s renewableportfolio standard does not refer to the actual power fed intothe grid but to the installed capacity; and the tender system forwind that prevailed until 2009 had no provisions to ensuregeneration and transmission); remuneration levels are low andduration of tariffs is short, be they tariffs set in tenders, in locallicenses, or through feed in tariffs (FITs); regulations do notinclude enough provisions for the reduction of tariffs over time,necessary for the promotion of cost-reducing innovations; andpower purchase agreements (PPAs) do not ensure connection(Table 1).

Meanwhile, concrete divergences from best practice in institu-tions include the following: general legal insecurity; complex andlengthy red-tape; unpredictable policy instruments (insufficientstability and transparency); insufficient competition in genera-tion due to market concentration, a high market share remainingin public hands, and limits to foreign presence; and restrictions toinnovation in manufacturing brought about by barriers to exter-nal trade and to foreign investment (Table 1).

It should be taken into account that China’s regulations forGCRE are developing rapidly. For instance, in August 2009 a FIT

4 The most relevant laws and policy documents regarding China’s regulations

on GCRE include: the Renewable Energy Law (2006, amended in 2010), the

Medium and Long-term Plan for Renewable Energy Development in China

(2007), and the Renewable Energy Development Plan for the 11th Five Year Plan

(2008). Other provisions issued by the National Development and Reform

Commission, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission, or the Ministry of

Finance are also of relevance.5 See Garcıa (2011) for a more detailed accounting of the specific forms that

China’s divergence from ‘‘best practice’’ takes.

for wind was introduced, and the 2006 Renewable Energy Law(REL) was amended in December 2010. Nevertheless, we believethat the divergences from ‘‘best practice’’ that we have identifiedhere continue to prevail.

Our hypothesis when performing the literature survey and theinterviews was that singularities in Chinese policies and institu-tions for GCRE are better understood in light of the overallframework of the Chinese political economy.6 In particular, thiswork has identified the importance of three principles for policy-making in China, when explaining most particularities of ChineseGCRE’s policies and institutions: gradualism of reforms, devel-opmentalism, and socialism (discussed hereafter).

3. Gradualism in reforms

Gradualism is, simply put, an approach to policy-making inwhich changes are introduced incrementally, experimentally, andstemming from the pre-existing policy set-up (i.e., in an evolu-tionary fashion). In referring to the overall Chinese economicreforms, gradualism has been widely documented.7 And addres-sing electric sector reform in particular, Ma and He (2008) andChen (2010) describe how the transformation of policies andinstitutions in China has moved gradually and incompletelytoward those of a market system. Various interviewees for thepresent study described Chinese policies in renewables as beingimplemented slowly, and through experimentation and trial-and-error (author’s interviews).

Indeed, many of the aforementioned divergences from ‘‘bestpractice’’ in the promotion of renewable electricity can beexplained in light of gradualism, such as for instance: increasingbut still insufficient taxation of coal; the focus on promotinginstalled capacity before focusing on efficiency as the goal ofeither mandated market policies or financial incentives; theincreasing but still insufficient remuneration and duration ofmandated market policies (whether tenders, independent pro-jects, or even FITs); and increasing but incomplete regulation and

6 For a comparison of how political economy factors (in particular, principles

and power structures informing policymaking) explain differences between China,

India, and Brazil in reforming electric utilities, see Rufın et al. (2003).7 See, for instance, McMillan and Naughton (1992), and Naughton (1996). The

latter cites Lindblom (1959) ‘‘muddling through’’ as an explanatory of China’s

experience.

C. Garcıa / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 8046–80508048

enforcement of PPAs.8 Also, institution building is clearly under-way, and the following institutional barriers could be seen as theresult of gradualism: general legal insecurity; fragmentation ofthe bureaucracy; targets that remain non-binding; insufficientregulatory details in the REL and its provisions; increasing albeitinsufficient wholesale competition, or the preeminence of publicownership in generation (in spite of many steps toward liberal-ization of the electric sector, as well as the privatization in manyother sectors). Finally, experimentation can be seen in the widerange of policies implemented: China uses (or has used) most ofthe policies in the toolbox, also experimenting with institutions –for instance, frequent modifications of incentives to foreignparticipation in generation or manufacturing.

Nevertheless, interpreting obstacles to renewables in view ofgradualism might suggest that there is but one single path forpolicy- and institution-making for GCRE, which China is follow-ing, however slowly. But – as Naughton (1996) and Rawski (1999)indicated – gradualism implies not only that China crosses theriver by groping for stones, but that it might be unclear what is onthe other side (what the regulatory goals are). If so, the fit ofChinese GCRE policies and institutions with ‘‘best practice’’ mightremain forever partial. Also, because other institutional forces,beyond the transition from a planned economy to a marketeconomy, shape Chinese policies and institutions for GCRE, theperpetuation of divergences from what is considered an optimalframework for investment could occur.9 From among such forces,this paper highlights developmentalism and socialism.10

4. Developmentalism

This work contends that the Chinese State exhibits elements ofdevelopmentalism that help explain some of the uniqueness ofChina’s policies and institutions for GCRE. As in the paradigmaticcases of Japan or South Korea,11 in China developmentalismentails that: (1) economic policy has development goals (as inother countries, the idea of ‘‘development’’ in China has evolvedwith time; more particularly, policy stressed growth targets in the1990s, and – as we will point out – in the current century itpursues a broader concept of development, inclusive of social andenvironmental parameters); (2) development is deemed as neces-sary for political legitimacy and stability; and (3) development isto be achieved by means of the State’s involvement in themobilization and allocation of resources. On similar grounds,McNally and Chu (2006) argue that China is another case of adevelopmental state,12 although a ‘‘diffuse’’ one, insofar as the

8 Although the amendment to REL introduced in December 2009 specifies the

fine to be payed by non-compliant grids, some analyses contest that rather than

making connection requirements simpler and stronger, the amendment barely

modifies REL, or even complicates its directives (see http://www.chinaenviron-

mentallaw.com/2009/12/28/chinas-renewable-energy-law-amendments; last

accessed 12 December 2010).9 That there is no convergence into a single policy and institutional model,

even when countries might share the same discourse and general pro-market

trends, is stressed in Rufın et al. (2003) for reforms in the electric sector.10 Together with Chinese traditional culture, development and socialism are

identified by Ogden (1989) as the three core values informing decisionmaking in

China11 Frequently cited references on developmentalism in Japan or South Korea

are Johnson (1982) and Amsden (1989).12 A developmental state is basically a state that displays developmentalism,

as defined above: policy pursues development, frequently as the means to political

legitimacy, and by way of public intervention in the economy. It is a term often

used among political economists in order to refer to mostly East Asian states with

sufficient autonomy from other stakeholders, and with sufficient institutional

capabilities, as to set development goals and intervene in the economy to achieve

them. Also, it is frequently used as opposite to a predatory or weak state (Evans,

1995).

central government merely sets the overall incentive and policyframework.

First, the Chinese government is widely recognized as havingdevelopmental goals, in the present century with an emphasis onsocially equitable and environmentally sustainable growth – anemphasis embedded in the idea of Scientific Development.13 Itshould be stressed that China shares with prototypical develop-mental states an emphasis on development goals attached to asomewhat lesser emphasis on rules: concreteness and transpar-ency of regulations are not necessary for development14; andideology can be set aside when deciding regulation, opening thedoor to pragmatism, flexibility, and eclecticism in the choice ofpolicies and institutions.

Bringing the developmental state to electricity and renew-ables, there are very diverse development goals – non-renewable-energy goals – embedded in China’s decisions regarding renew-ables. Goals include energy security (limiting oil imports,avoiding black-outs), socio-economic development (developinglocal industry, providing employment, lessening rural-urbaninequalities and consequent migration, etc.); and environmentalprotection (diminishing local pollution, as well as emissions ofgreenhouse gases) (Martinot and Li, 2007; author’s interviews).Some illustrative examples of particular policies that aim beyonddeploying renewable energies would be the following. The delayin using feed-in-tariffs and the early favoring of tenders reflectthe growth imperative, insofar as the latter instrument keptprices lower than the FIT system would have (Lema and Ruby,2007). Also, the emphasis on deploying capacity (and not onfeeding power to the grid) favors local industry, provided thatlocal companies are able to install capacity but are less capablethan foreign generators to efficiently run said capacity. Finally,the limited remuneration and duration of support schemes alsohelps local companies, given that these are able to operate withlower profit margins and with higher uncertainty than theirforeign counterparts. An emphasis on setting goals, instead ofan emphasis on making regulations concrete and transparent, isalso observable in Chinese policies and institutions for GCRE.Several interviewees noted that the relevance of REL did not hingeon the (few) regulatory details included in that law, but on thesignal it sent to different stakeholders of Beijing’s commitment topursuing renewable-related goals. In regard to pragmatism, andreferring to reforms in the electricity sector, Rufın et al., 2003, seethis as an element of Chinese ideology informing the particula-rities of such reforms.

Second, China’s developmentalism is frequently seen as themeans to preserve its political regime. Changes in policies andinstitutions are not in conflict with the preservation of thepolitical system, but reforms are instead conducive to develop-ment, and therefore necessary to such preservation. For the caseof electricity and GCRE, Yeh and Lewis (2004) argue that theelectric sector reform was not an embrace of competitive marketmodels, but the ‘‘creative, dynamic response to a set of technicaland economic constraints on the one hand, and the politicalimperative to stay in power on the other. This logic of reformmotivates the strategic decision to increase electricity productionin order to meet current demand and fuel future economicgrowth. Such growth, in turn, is part of a larger effort by theparty-state to maintain legitimacy by channeling potential

13 Scientific Development is an established term within China: it is the official

guiding socio-economic ideology of the Communist Party, and it includes, among

other things, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable growth.14 Johnson (1982) portrayed, for the case of Japan, something similar to

China’s stronger emphasis on goals vis-a-vis its emphasis on detailed regulations.

In particular, he stressed the importance of the executive (who set the goals) vs.

the legislative (who set the rules) within the Japanese developmental state.

C. Garcıa / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 8046–8050 8049

citizenship demands into consumption and thus pacifying newlymiddle-class consumers’’ (Yeh and Lewis, 2004: 464). Similarly,it is arguable that if Chinese policies and institutions for GCRE donot fit into ‘‘best practice’’, it is because these are not anadvancement toward the perfection of electricity markets andthe creation of market-friendly institutions. Rather, they are thenecessary response to diverse development needs that, if unat-tended, could lead to a loss of legitimacy of China’s politicalregime.

Third, the policy and institutional instruments to achievedevelopmental goals are close to those of developmental EastAsia (World Bank, 1993). Essentially, these include a wide array ofnon-market-distorting instruments, as well as instruments thatdo distort resource allocation. In other words, the role of the Statein China is not one of creating and perfecting markets, or ofensuring that the proper market institutions are in place, butrather to control these in search of the aforementioned develop-mental goals (Huang, 2008; McNally, 200815) Involvement of theState in the allocation of resources is exerted via a range ofmechanisms that extend from indicative planning to industrialpolicy and direct ownership of companies. Indicative planningcan be seen, in general, in China’s Five Year Plans; and, in the caseof GCRE, in documents such as the National Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China. Also, thecorporatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) was not simplya gradual move toward privatization, but an attempt to createnational-scale holding companies where ‘‘state ownership was ina controlling position, to develop large-scale enterprises acrossterritorial and product sector lines, introduce advanced technol-ogy, create new products, and work toward achieving interna-tional competitiveness. Although it was unstated, this wasessentially the model of the huge ‘‘Korean enterprise groups’’(Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 42). In other words, the most recentadvancements in industrial reforms demonstrate mixed elementsof industrial policy (an effort to nurture certain industrial sectors)and public ownership as means to achieve developmental goals.The tender system for wind (delays in implementing FITs), lowremuneration, and other aforementioned limits to foreign com-petition in power generation (not to mention in distribution) arebetter understood in light of China’s intentions to preserve andnurture public control and even ownership over strategic sectors.

5. Socialism

Finally, socialism also informs policymaking and institution-building in China. The ongoing prevalence of socialism, even afterthirty years of reform, is observable in the official branding ofChina’s economic regime as Socialism with Chinese Characteris-tics, or in the endorsement, since 1993, of a Socialist MarketEconomy (SME). This system, simply put, entails public owner-ship of companies (especially in key sectors) while at the sametime requiring all entities to participate within a market system.Also, the SME includes a desire for self-reliance, no longerunderstood as autarchy but via strategic integration into theglobal economy (Liu, 2007).

It could be argued that the two previously analyzed principlesfor decision-making (gradualism and developmentalism) some-how hinge on socialism. Ma and He (2008) portray gradualism asthe result of ‘‘communist ideology, nationalistic ambitions, etc.and less opposition from interest groups’’ (Ma and He, 2008:1699). Also, socialism partly shapes developmentalism. Although

15 McNally (2008) indicates that ‘‘China’s industrial capitalism remains

heavily shaped by the hand of the state’’ (McNally, 2008: 116).

the latter, by definition, has to include development goals andpublic intervention in pursuit of those goals, it need not include asimilar emphasis, as present in China, on developing localenterprises (as a path to self-reliance) or on preserving publicownership in key sectors. The presence of both these elements inChina’s version of developmentalism might be traced to its SME.

Given that the two defining elements of current socialism inChina are also two elements embedded in China’s specific brandof developmentalism, the impact of socialism on regulationresembles that of developmentalism. Hence, let us simply recallsome of the aforementioned policies and institutions that cater tothe need to preserve public and/or local ownership and control.These would include: the delay in implementing FITs and theearly favoring of tenders; the focus on installing capacity ratherthan on feeding power to the grid; low remuneration andduration of support schemes; uncertainties in law implementa-tion and excessive red-tape; the absence of privatization in theelectricity sector, in spite of the splitting of government andbusiness roles into different government agencies (Ma and He,2008) and in spite of ‘‘corporatization’’; and limits to foreigncompetition in power generation (not to mention in distribution).

6. Conclusions

This work has looked into China’s grid-connected renewableenergy (GCRE) as an exercise in overcoming the mainstream de-contextualization of the analysis of Chinese policies and institu-tions when it comes to specific economic sectors. To be moreconcrete, this paper has reviewed how Chinese policies andinstitutions do not nicely fit into a ‘‘best practice’’ model; and ithas tried to explain such imperfect fit by virtue of China’sprinciples for decision-making: gradualism, developmentalism,and socialism.

This research has found that gradualism helps understandmost of China’s particularities in policies and institutions forGCRE, such as, among others, negative externalities that are notfully compensated for, remuneration levels and tariff durationsthat grow gradually, increasingly secure PPAs, gradual specifica-tions and predictability of regulations, or a paced opening tocompetition. Developmentalism, in turn, explains, for instance,the multi-faceted goals of GCRE policies and institutions (theseincluding energy security, environmental, and socio-economicgoals); the lack of details and unpredictability of regulations;and all limitations to competition – insofar as competition couldendanger industrial policy or public ownership. Finally, socialismalso helps understand any measures favoring public corporations(from the delay in using FITs to regulatory uncertainties).

Further research efforts would be necessary both to answer ingreater detail the issues here considered, and to expand investi-gation beyond the research questions found in this article. As fordeepening the political economy explanation of China’s approachto GCRE, the following studies would be relevant:

(1)

Exploring whether there are more elements to the Chinesepolitical economy that should be taken into account in orderto better understand the departure of China’s policies andinstitutions for GCRE from ‘‘best practice’’ (certain proceduresof decision-making, such as fragmented authoritarianism,decentralization, and government-to-business coordinationmay deserve special attention).

(2)

By way of further interviews, trying to go beyond the‘‘cataloging’’ of political explanatory factors of China’s policiesand institutions for GCRE. That is, exploring which of thedriving forces determining each of the aforementioned parti-cularities of China’s approach might be most fundamental.

C. Garcıa / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 8046–80508050

As for new research questions arising from this work, thefollowing would be relevant:

(1)

16

betwee

double

Establishing causality between China’s particularities inGCRE (as detailed in Garcıa, 2011) and its actual record indeploying renewables. So far, this record has been demon-strably positive,16 and it could prove valuable to answer thequestion of whether China’s particularities in its renewablespolicies and institutions truly help to explain such success,or else why they haven’t constituted significant obstacles.

(2)

Comparing China’s approach to GRCE to that of othercountries. Probably no country adheres fully to the afore-mentioned ‘‘best practice’’ model. It would therefore beinteresting to determine similarities and differencesbetween China’s and other countries’ proximity to ‘‘bestpractice’’; also worthwhile would be to compare howpolitical economy factors explain differences in regulatoryoptions.

Appendix 1. Design and implementation of interviews

To begin, we identified about 35 relevant actors in policy,business, and research related to renewable energies (mostly inChina). This identification was done through the analysis ofprofessional and academic literature, as well as by reviewingnames of frequent participants in professional and academicmeetings related to best practice and/or to Chinese policies andinstitutions for renewables.

Of the 35 persons contacted by email, 18 responded positivelyand 18 interviews were consequently performed. These werecomprised of interviews with: Western government officials;World Bank and European Union officials involved in the promo-tion of renewable energy in China; businesspeople at multina-tionals dealing with renewable electricity in China; and Chineseresearchers at the Energy Research Institute, Peking University,and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Interviews were performed between December 2008 andFebruary 2009. On an average, each interview lasted 1 h and45 min, ranging from 3 h to half an hour. Interviews wereperformed at a very early stage of research, in a way that allowedfor the identification of Chinese principles of policy-making as aresult of those interviews, instead of trying to test the previouslychosen principles via the interviews. That is, this research hasapplied the methods of grounded theory, by which categories ofanalysis (in this case, gradualism, developmentalism, and social-ism) are chosen via data collection (in this case, opinions posed byrelevant actors through interviews). A survey of the literature onChina’s political economy and principles for decision-makingserved thereafter in choosing the precise names of the conceptsthat had emerged in interviews, as well as to describe thoseconcepts more fully, in connection to such literature.

Given that interviews were performed at an early stage ofresearch, they were semi-structured interviews, in which theinterviewer posed open-ended questions regarding the qualityof policies and institutions for GCRE in China, as well as regardingpossible political economy explanations for such policies andinstitutions. Depending on interviewees’ answers, other questions– not so directly linked to the research object – would be posed.

For instance, in wind, installed capacity increased from 0.34 to 25.82 GW

n 2000 and 2009; and newly installed capacity per year has more than

d each year since 2005 (Li et al., 2010).

Throughout the article we do not refer to particular interviews(and individual interviewees are not included in the referencessection) for the sake of the anonymity granted to interviewees –they were assured that, in order to achieve more open conversa-tions, their opinions would only be reported in combination withthose of other interviewees. Furthermore, reference to specificinterviews is unnecessary given that this research soughts only toreport those opinions or views that were widely shared amonginterviewees.

References

Amsden, A., 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization.Oxford University Press, NY, USA.

Chen, L., 2010. Playing the market reform card: the changing patterns of politicalstruggle in China’s electric power sector. The China Journal 64, 69–96.

Evans, P., 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA.

Garcıa, C., 2011. Policies and Institutions for Grid-Connected Renewable Energy:‘Best Practice’ vs. the Case of China, World Renewable Energy CongressProceedings, Linkoping, May 2011.

GWEC, 2005. Wind Force 12. A Blueprint to Achieve 12% of the World’s Electricityfrom Wind Power by 2020, Report, Global World Energy Council and Green-peace, June 2005.

Huang, Y., 2008. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Entrepreneurship andthe State. Cambridge University Press, NY, USA.

IEA, 2007. Global Best Practice in Renewable Energy Policy Making Expert Meet-ing, Workshop Proceedings, International Energy Agency, June 2007.

IEA, 2008. Deploying Renewables. Principles for Effective Policies, InternationalEnergy Agency, Paris.

IREC, 2004. Policy Recommendations for Renewable Energies, document producedat the International Renewable Energy Conference, Bonn, June 2004.

Johnson, C., 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925–1975. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Lema, A., Ruby, K., 2007. Between fragmented authoritarianism and policycoordination: creating chinese market for wind energy. Energy Policy 35,3879–3890.

Li, J., P. Shi, and H. Gao, 2010. China Wind Power Outlook 2010, Report, ChineseRenewable Energy Industries Association, Global Wind Energy Council, andGreenpeace, October 2010.

Lindblom, C.E., 1959. The science of muddling through. Public AdministrationReview 19, 79–88.

Liu, J., 2007. What is Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, document presentedat the Congr�es Marx International V, Paris, October 2007.

Ma, C., He, L., 2008. From state monopoly to renewable portfolio: restructuringChina’s electric utility. Energy Policy 36, 1697–1711.

Martinot, E. and J. Li, 2007. Powering China’s Development. The Role of RenewableEnergy, Special Report, WorldWatch.

McMillan, J., Naughton, B., 1992. How to reform a planned economy: lessons fromChina. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 8 (1), 130–143.

McNally, C.A., 2008. The Institutional Contours of China’s Emergent Capitalism. In:McNally, C.A. (Ed.), China’s Emergent Political Economy. Capitalism in theDragon’s Liar, Routledge, NY, USA.

McNally, C.A., Chu, Y.W., 2006. Exploring capitalist development in greater China:a synthesis. Asian Perspective 30 (2), 31–64.

Naughton, B., 1996. Growing out of the Plan. Chinese Economic Reform 1978–1993. Cambridge University Press, NY, USA.

Ogden, S., 1989. China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development and Culture.Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA.

Rawski, T.G., 1999. Reforming China’s economy. What have we learned? The ChinaJournal 41, 139–156.

Rufın, C., Rangan, U.S., Kumar, R., 2003. The changing role of the state in theelectricity industry in Brazil, China, and India: differences and explanations.American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62 (4), 649–675.

WEC, 2004. Renewable Energy Projects Handbook, World Energy Council, London.World Bank, 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy.

Oxford University Press, NY, USA.World Bank, 2008. REToolkit: A. Resource for Renewable Energy Development,

Issues Note of the REToolkit, World Bank, June 2008.Yabuki, S., Harner, S.M., 1999. China’s New Political Economy. Westview Press,

Boulder, CO, USA.Yeh, E.T., Lewis, J.I., 2004. State Power and the Logic of Reform in China’s Electricity

Sector. Pacific Affairs 77 (3), 437–465.