greek and roman military writers

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY WRITERS

From the men who fought hand to hand to defend their communities,to the signicant economic impact of organizing a large ghting force,war was a central inuence at every level of existence in ancient Greekand Rome. The ancient writers who tell us about technical aspects of military practice and the management of armies shed much light on the murky area of the conduct of war, and convey the importancegiven to the subject in the ancient world.

For this volume Brian Campbell has selected and translated morethan 250 key pieces from the ancient military writers. They cover afascinating range of topics battle formations and manoeuvres, differ-ent types of troops, the art of generalship, methods for conducting andresisting a siege, the construction of artillery and fortifications, and every kind of ploy and trick used by generals to defeat theiropponents.

Some works are highly technical, while others survey the history ofwarfare and the reasons why past generals had been victorious or cameto grief. The book also includes extracts from other ancient historianswho comment on warfare and society. Each piece is annotated withfurther explanation, making this an essential resource for everyonestudying the army and warfare in the classical age.

Brian Campbell is Professor of Roman History at The QueensUniversity of Belfast. He has written several books on the Roman armyincluding The Roman Army 31 BCAD 337: A Sourcebook (Routledge1994) and War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BCAD 284 (Routledge2002).

Routledge Classical Translations

This series offers translations, usually in selection, of important literaryand historical works from Greece and Rome that provide backgroundand context for the best-known writers. It concentrates on writings in elds that are receiving increased study at present. The books, all of which contain an introduction and annotation, will be useful tostudents at all levels but especially on more advanced courses.

Greek and Roman Military WritersSelected readingsBrian Campbell

Letters from Ancient GreecePatricia Rosenmeyer

The History of ZonarasFrom Alexander Severus to the death of Theodosius the GreatThomas Banchich and Eugene Lane

The Story of AthensSelections from the AtthidographersPhillip Harding

Epictetus Handbook and the Tablet of CebesGuides to Stoic livingKeith Seddon

The Roman Book of GardeningJohn Henderson

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY

WRITERS

Selected readings

Brian Campbell

First published 2004by Routledge

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

2004 Brian Campbell

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,

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ISBN 0415285461 (hbk)ISBN 041528547x (pbk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

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FOR MY MOTHER AND IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER

CONTENTS

List of readings viiiList of gures xixPreface and acknowledgements xxiAbbreviations and notes xxiii

Introduction: warfare in the Greek and Roman world 1

1 Organization, training, and discipline 21

2 The generals role 53

3 Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems 88

4 Attacking and defending cities 145

5 Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortications, siege engines, and siege works 179

Select bibliography 212Index of translated passages 218Index of names and subjects 227

vii

READINGS

1 Organization, training, and discipline

1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.14 (value of hunting)2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.14 (importance of physical

tness)3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.56 (training the cavalry)4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.79 (knowing your

position)5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.34 (use of mercenary

cavalry)6 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.1011 (cavalry practice)7 Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons)8 Polybius, Histories 6.34.712 (passing round the watchword)9 Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline)

10 Polybius, Histories 6.39.13; 511 (rewards for valour)11 Polybius, Histories 10.20.15 (Scipio Africanus trains the

infantry)12 Polybius, Histories 18.2932 (comparison of Greek phalanx

and Roman legion)13 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies)14 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.56 (drawing up the battle line)15 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.12 (weaponry of phalanx)16 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants)17 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.12; 1011 (commands) 18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish

sword)19 Josephus, Jewish War 3.716; 858 (training the Roman army)20 Josephus, Jewish War 3.1027 (Roman discipline)21 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipios discipline)22 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius mules)23 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus discipline)

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24 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulos discipline)25 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Pisos discipline)26 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius discipline)27 Arrian, Tactica 3.14; 4.12 (infantry and cavalry weaponry)28 Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals)29 Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command)30 Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.17; 43.24; 44 (cavalry training)31 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military

training)32 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of

military training) 33 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.56 (choosing suitable

recruits)34 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.910 (Roman military

training)35 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.1112 (weapons

training)36 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.1416; 1819 (throwing

missiles; other military skills)37 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.267 (training in battle

manoeuvres)

2 The generals role

38 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.1.56 (qualities required in ageneral)

39 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.12 (skills of a cavalrycommander)

40 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 6.14 (the commandersrelations with his troops)

41 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 8.212 (choosing the rightman for the job)

42 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.12 (role of commander)43 Xenophon, Anabasis 2.6.115 (qualities of a Greek general)44 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.479 (leading by personal example)45 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.3.1011 (the approachable general)46 Xenophon, Anabasis 5.8.1215 (the general and discipline)47 Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.1417 (military psychology)48 Xenophon, Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas)49 Polybius, Histories 9.12.14; 14.15 (varied skills of a

general)50 Caesar, Gallic War 1.246 (battle against the Helvetii)51 Caesar, Gallic War 2.1921 (Caesars role in a battleeld crisis)

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52 Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Romancommander)

53 Caesar, Gallic War 7.858 (role of general in directing thebattle)

54 Onasander, The General Preface 46 (importance of competentgenerals)

55 Onasander, The General 2.13 (moral qualities of generalship)56 Onasander, The General 6.57; 1013 (the general and his

army on the march)57 Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory)58 Onasander, The General 10.12 (preparing an army for battle)59 Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley)60 Onasander, The General 10.256 (making religious

observances)61 Onasander, The General 13.13 (military psychology)62 Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop

dispositions)63 Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology)64 Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best

appearance)65 Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks)66 Onasander, The General 33.12 (the general and personal

combat)67 Onasander, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and

honouring soldiers)68 Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead)69 Onasander, The General 38.12 (dealing with surrenders)70 Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and

conduct in victory)71 Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders

before battle)72 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny)73 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius leadership)74 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men)75 Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems)76 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership)77 Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges)78 Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the

army)79 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus leadership)80 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an

example)

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81 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander)82 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander)83 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander)84 Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexanders way of giving orders)85 Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commanders role in battle)86 Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.13 (endurance and example of

Alexander)87 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.26 (qualities of generalship)88 Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general)89 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1, Preface 13 (generals and

stratagems)90 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example)91 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, Preface (a generals need for military

skill)92 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 11; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates

skill as a general)93 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander)94 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from

stratagems)95 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle)96 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard

against enemy tricks)97 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipios tough leadership)98 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for

action)99 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesars rapport with his

troops)100 Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship)101 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 1213; 18 (role of

general in securing his armys welfare)

3 Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems

102 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.398.2 (skill of light-armed troops)

103 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.34; 33.2; 34(Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria)

104 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.701 (the drift tothe right in hoplite battles)

105 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill andinspirational leadership of Gylippus)

106 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battleat Syracuse)

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107 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenianretreat at Syracuse)

108 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse inattack)

109 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.56; 911 (importance of deception)

110 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.1721 (start of the battle of Cunaxa)111 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.3.1216 (difculties of commanding

the rearguard)112 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.1920 (difculties of the hoplite

marching formation)113 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.8.1012 (changes to the traditional

formation)114 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.379 (Greek practice in night

marches)115 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites)116 Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.1118 (peltasts defeat Spartan

hoplites)117 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.57 (peltasts and cavalry combine)118 Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.815 (battle of Leuctra)119 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation)120 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops)121 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.12 (cavalry formations)122 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres)123 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.26 (defending

against elephant attack)124 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.2731 (battle of

Paraetacene)125 Livy, History of Rome 22.478 (battle of Cannae)126 Livy, History of Rome 26.4.410 (creation of the velites)127 Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed

troops)128 Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations)129 Onasander, The General 21.59 (crescent formation;

counter-attacks)130 Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves)131 Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear)132 Onasander, The General 29.12 (intimidating the enemy)133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.98101 (value of careful preparations

in war)134 Josephus, Jewish War 3.11526 (Roman marching order)135 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages)

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136 Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 17 (importance of writingabout tactics)

137 Tacitus, Agricola 367 (battle of Mons Graupius)138 Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle)139 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans)140 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemys plans)141 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy)142 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics)143 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difcult position)144 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deciencies)145 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemys attention)146 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to ght)147 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to ght)148 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to ght)149 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to ght)150 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics)151 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy)152 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush)153 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to

ght to the end)154 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback)155 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy)156 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties)157 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support)158 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry)159 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat)160 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers)161 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion)162 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms

and stratagems)163 Plutarch, Flamininus 8.24 (battle of Cynoscephalae)164 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 111 (Roman marching order)165 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1131 (battle formation against

the Alani)166 Arrian, Tactica 5.23 (importance of orderly formation)167 Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation)168 Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers)169 Arrian, Tactica 16.67 (Scythian cavalry formation)170 Arrian, Tactica 33.12 (Roman willingness to adopt the

practices of other peoples)171 Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.810 (Alexanders stratagem against

carts)

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172 Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.45 (Alexander uses combined tactics)173 Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.45 (Alexanders tactical skill)174 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy)175 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers)176 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms

in the army)177 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the

Spartans)178 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal

operations)179 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush)180 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies)181 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea)182 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexanders ingenuity)183 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river)184 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy)185 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split his

forces)186 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush)187 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy)188 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage

valour)189 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour)190 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics)191 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting

information)192 Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation

against cavalry)193 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in

AD 194)194 Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence)195 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an

inexperienced army)196 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms)

4 Attacking and defending cities

197 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.34 (Thebanattack on Plataea)

198 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.756 (siege of Plataea)

199 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenianblockade of Pylos)

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200 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.12 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection)

201 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.12 (choosing men to guardcity gates)

202 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.13 (choosing day scouts)203 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on

potential traitors)204 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the

gate)205 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.45 (organizing guard shifts)206 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.213 (setting up lanterns at

guard posts)207 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.15 (organizing sorties)208 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.1619 (arranging suitable

passwords)209 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.15 (organizing patrols)210 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.13 (dealing with panics)211 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.12 (dealing with arms

smuggling)212 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.12 (sending secret messages)213 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.12 (protection against siege

engines)214 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.12 (how to counter-attack

siege engines)215 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.12 (how to put out res)216 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.12 (preventing the placing

of siege ladders)217 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.13; 67 (dealing with

tunnels)218 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.16 (how to deal with enemy

incursions)219 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers

are small)220 Philon, (Siegecraft) A323 (positioning of catapults and postern

gates)221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B12 (keeping reserve stocks of food)222 Philon, (Siegecraft) B4950 (preparing ammunition and

supplies)223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C35 (defensive precautions against siege

engines)224 Philon, (Siegecraft) C326 (defensive ditches, guards,

passwords, and signals)

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225 Philon, (Siegecraft) D 5960 (psychology of siege warfare)226 Philon, (Siegecraft) D712 (capturing the vital parts of a town)227 Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply)228 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack)229 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1112 (defence of Marseilles)230 Onasander, The General 39.45; 40 (how to capture a city)231 Josephus, The Jewish War 3.16675; 2715 (siege of Jotapata)232 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack)233 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack)234 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor)235 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged)236 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander)237 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemys attention)238 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river)239 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply)240 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected

quarter)241 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged)242 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire)243 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the

defenders)244 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message)245 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies)246 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about

supplies)247 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie)248 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege)249 Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.89; 21.322 (siege of Halicarnassus)250 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege)251 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders

attention)252 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery)253 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a

mine)254 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city)255 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices used by besiegers and

besieged)256 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel)257 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city)258 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.1012 (siege of Byzantium)

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5 Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortications, siege engines, and siege works

259 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of remachine)

260 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.5.812 (method of crossing a river)261 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 434

(military value of catapults)262 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 447

(construction of a stone-thrower)263 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 658

(construction of the mountain belly-bow)264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 568 (problems with

artillery engines) 265 Philon, Construction of War Engines 767 (repeating and

air-spring catapults)266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A201 (construction of fortications)267 Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine)268 Caesar, Gallic War 7.723 (siege works at Alesia)269 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.1214.3 (tortoise

and battering ram)270 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.226.5 (Hegetors

tortoise)271 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.12 (tensioning a catapult)272 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.12 (history of battering rams)273 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.13; 7 (offensive and defensive

mechanisms)274 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 734 (nature of artillery

engines)275 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 815 (construction of a

torsion catapult)276 Josephus, Jewish War 3.7684 (the Roman military camp)277 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortications 1214 (building a

military camp)278 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortications 4950; 578 (camp

fortications)279 Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.35 (Roman method of bridging a river)280 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1138.17

(importance of siegecraft)281 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7156.1 (how to set

re to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises)282 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the

Danube)

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283 Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.47 (construction of theonager)

284 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.224 (building a militarycamp)

285 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista)286 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning

ballista)

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FIGURES

1.1 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 367) 441.2 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 40.17) 453.1 The three phases of the battle of Cannae 1095.1 Bitons stone-thrower 1825.2 Bitons mountain belly-bow 1845.3 Hegetors tortoise 1935.4 Herons torsion catapult 1985.5 Catapult pull-back system 1995.6 Catapult pull-back system with pulleys 1995.7 Roman military camp (Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp

Fortications 1214) 2015.8 The onager 207

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My original intention was to offer a selection of readings specicallyfrom Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks and compendiaof stratagems. However, it soon became clear that it would be odd to exclude accomplished historians who wrote about military practicesand battles in the course of their work. Indeed historians likeThucydides and Xenophon and Polybius had held military commandwith varying degrees of success. Similarly, although Caesars accountsof his campaigns in Gaul and during the civil war cannot be describedas military textbooks, they are central to our understanding of Romangeneralship and military practice. Other writers were then admittedbecause of particular interest, and here I make no claim for consistencyin my selections. Josephus, for example, who commanded Jewish forces in the Galilee and saw at first hand the violence of a Romanmilitary campaign, offers an incomparable picture of the Roman armyin action. On the other hand, Suetonius, who has little interest inmilitary affairs, happens to preserve the thoughts of the emperorAugustus on what made a good general.

The chapter headings indicate the main themes in the works of themilitary writers and are intended to give some structure to the book,though some passages are potentially relevant to several chapters.Within each chapter passages are cited in chronological order accordingto the author, and there is a short biographical note on the rst occasionwhen each author is cited. It is clear that writers on stratagems andother collectors of uplifting anecdotes like Valerius Maximus had a pool of well-known precepts to draw from, which then underwentexpansion and elaboration. While drawing the readers attention to this feature of such writings, I have tried to avoid citing repetitiveextracts.

I am very grateful to my colleague Professor David Whitehead forallowing me to see a draft version of his translations of Athenaeus

xxi

Mechanicus and Apollodorus of Damascus in advance of publication.In preparing the text I owe thanks to Dr Richard Stoneman and toRoutledges anonymous readers for wise advice.

Figure acknowledgements

Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.45.6 and figure 5.8, E.W. Marsden, Greek andRoman Artillery. Technical Treatises (Oxford, 1971), opposite p. 80 gure 1 (a) and (b); p. 102 gure 6 (a) and (c); pp. 4950, gures 79;p. 259, figure 12, reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. Figure 5.3, I.D. Rowland and T.N. Howe, Vitruvius. Ten Bookson Architecture (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 314, gure 137,reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

P R E F A C E A N D A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

AbbreviationsAFLS Annali della Facolt di Lettere e Filosoa dell

Universit di Siena (Florence)AJA American Journal of Archaeology (New York)ANRW H. Temporini et al. (eds), Aufstieg und Niedergang

der rmischen Welt (Berlin, 1972 )ClasAnt Classical Antiquity (Berkeley)CQ Classical Quarterly (Oxford)CTh Th. Mommsen (ed.), Codex Theodosianus (Berlin,

1905)Digest Th. Mommsen (ed.), Digesta; Corpus Iuris Civilis

vol. I (Berlin, 1872)GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies (Durham,

North Carolina)HSCPh Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (Cambridge,

Mass.)JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies (London)JRS Journal of Roman Studies (London)PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome (London)Pritchett, GSW W.K. Pritchett (197191) The Greek State at War

Parts IV, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California

Notes[ ] enclose letters that no longer exist in the surviving text but

have been restored by modern scholars[- - -] indicate a lacuna where no restoration has been attempted( ) indicate explanatory supplements by this translator. . . indicate words or passages omitted by this translator

xxiii

Modern equivalents of ancient units of measurement

Greek

1 dactyl = 19.3 mm (0.76 in)1 palm = 77.1 mm (3.04 in)1 span = 231.2 mm (9.12 in)1 foot = 308.3 mm (12.16 in)1 cubit = 462.4 mm (18.21 in)

Roman

1 foot = 296 mm (11.64 in)1 inch = 24.6 mm (0.97 in)1 palm = 73.9 mm (2.91 in)1 digit = 18.5 mm (0.73 in)

All references to measurements in feet in the translated passages are toGreek or Roman feet.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S A N D N O T E S

xxiv

INTRODUCTIONWarfare in the Greek and

Roman world

Greek warfare

In early Greece around 1200 BC battles were probably decided by arelatively small number of aristocratic warriors using heavy thrustingspears. Chariots are also recorded in the Linear B tablets from the palacecentres at Pylos and Cnossus, but seemingly these were normally used for transport to and from battle. The mountainous terrain of main-land Greece with its small plains is unsuitable for large-scale chariotmanoeuvring. The Homeric poems shed further light and perhapsindicate the situation in the ninth to eighth centuries BC. Then aristo-cratic warriors fought individually as infantry, using throwing spearsand swords, supported by groups of the less well off, who were poorlyarmed and equipped. The aristocrats fought for their honour andprestige, but also served their communities, and by doing so conrmedand enhanced their political and economic domination of society, sinceapart from ghting they ran the government, conducted diplomacy,and acted as priests. In this kind of warfare, which was virtually arrangedbetween aristocratic lites, casualties could be kept to a minimum.One significant development in the course of this period was theadoption of iron instead of bronze, certainly no later than the eleventhcentury, especially in the manufacture of swords and spears, thoughbronze was later to reappear.

After c. 750 BC as the Greek world was progressively opened up tooutside inuences, new ideas and opportunities in turn inuenced thenature of warfare. Communities in Greece developed as independentcity-states, each with its individual system of government, fiercelyloyal to its own identity and traditions. So there was no Greek army as such. However, these communities often fought against one another,and consequently warfare was a constant factor in Greek society. Thecitizens of each city-state were part-time soldiers and therefore armies

1

tended to be small and warfare seasonal since the crops had to beplanted and the harvest brought in. Now, in this period there wereimportant political, social, and economic changes and it is temptingto associate these with signicant alterations in the style of ghtingadopted eventually by all Greek communities. The increase in tradeand the gradual rise in disposable wealth meant that more people hadaccess to arms and armour of better quality, and therefore more citizenscould potentially contribute to the defence of the city-state. Eventuallythe hoplite became established as the principal instrument of war inthe Greek city-states. He was an infantryman who took his name fromhis arms and armour,1 and when he was fully equipped this consistedof body armour, helmet, sometimes greaves, a large round shield, anda heavy thrusting spear about two or three metres in length. TheGreeks also adopted the phalanx formation, in which hoplites foughtside by side in close array eight to sixteen ranks deep. When the frontlines engaged the ranks behind pushed forward to add weight to thecharge. It was important that the phalanx retained its formation anda ute player helped to keep the hoplites in step. The phalanx con-tinued the Greek tendency to rely on heavy infantry and in a way suited Greek terrain by confining the battle to a small area. When one side gave way the soldiers tended to throw away their shields inorder to retreat more rapidly. It was unusual for the victors to pursuethem for any distance since without cavalry they had little chance ofcatching them. Hoplite battle though bloody, with the possibility of terrible wounds especially to the throat (from a downwards thrustover the opponents shield) or to the groin (from a thrust under theshield), restricted the number of casualties and this was importantsince, as the army was simply the citizen population under arms,manpower was limited.2

The exact origins and nature of these military developments aremuch debated. For example, it may be that the hoplite weaponry was adopted piecemeal and that the phalanx emerged subsequentlywhen the full potential of the new weapons had been realized. On theother hand, as more men became available for military service itperhaps made sense to make use of the bigger numbers by establishinga formation that allowed them to ght in a large group. That in turncould have encouraged the development of the large round shield thatmade ghting in formation far more effective.3 It was convex in shapeand rimmed or sometimes entirely covered with bronze. The soldierheld it by means of a strap through which he passed the left arm as faras the elbow, and also grasped a leather thong at the edge of the shield.This made it easier to carry the shield but more difcult to move it

I N T R O D U C T I O N : G R E E K A N D R O M A N W A R F A R E

2

across to protect the right-hand side. Therefore the soldier needed tostand close to the man on his right to ensure protection from his over-lapping shield. And so it could be said that the shield was for the sakeof the entire line.4 Furthermore, it is also worth considering that inthe longer run possession of a hoplite shield reduced the need for heavybody armour and increased the opportunity for those who could affordonly light armour or none at all to ght in the phalanx.

In general, it is unclear how far these military changes inuencedpolitical developments. Since more citizens now could join in the statesmilitary initiatives and there was a greater sense of community involve-ment, it is plausible to suggest that in time the dominating role of thearistocrats would be reduced, and that there might be a correspondingincrease in the role of relatively well-off citizens in government and thedecision-making process, as those with grievances now had a greateropportunity to do something about them. It is also interesting that the Greek city-states made little use of cavalry or light-armed troopsin warfare. Of course the terrain of Greece was not suitable for rearinghorses or for the widespread deployment of cavalry. Furthermore, horseswere expensive to maintain, which meant that they tended to be thepreserve of the rich. On the other hand, the absence of light-armedtroops may reflect social conditions, in that the citizen army was built round relatively well-off farmers who could equip themselves as hoplites. Those who controlled the government might at a pinchaccept them, but be reluctant to make use of men at the margins whocould afford only light equipment.5

Naturally the city-states differed in the organization and training of their military forces, and their skill and application of tactics.6 Infact formal training in weapons drill and unit formations seems to have been limited, and many citizens may have had only some kind ofathletics training.7 The Spartans, however, were famous for their out-standing prowess in hoplite warfare.8 The unique social and politicalconditions in Sparta contributed to this, apart from any predilectionof the Spartans for the military life. A large subject population, thehelots (descendants of the original defeated inhabitants of Laconia)worked the land, leaving Spartan citizens free to devote their time to military training and exercise. The organization of the state alsoprovided for the careful preparation of young men for a future mili-tary role. Other Greeks believed that the skill and discipline andtraining of the Spartan hoplite army were such as to render it virtuallyinvincible in normal conditions. In respect of army command, evenamong the Spartans, generals had no specialist training and were notdedicated military men, at least until the later fourth century with the


3

emergence of mercenary leaders. Indeed, in the case of a traditionalGreek hoplite battle, once the two phalanxes were set on course arguablythe commander could do little to inuence the outcome except inspirecondence by his presence and perhaps engage in combat himself.9

The defeat of the Persian invasion of 480479 BC, when unusuallya number of city-states co-operated in a common military strategy,seemed to conrm the superiority of Greek methods of heavy infantryfighting. The Peloponnesian War (431404 BC) fought betweenAthens and Sparta and their respective groups of allies ended in thecomplete defeat of Athens and apparently demonstrated again the dominance of the Spartan way of war. Nevertheless, the length ofthe war was unprecedented and involved at times virtually year-roundmilitary activity. One reason for the length of the war was that Athenshad built up a strong navy that was able to inflict damage on thePeloponnese and disrupt Spartan interests. Athens, protected by herfortication and the long walls that connected the city to its harbour,the Piraeus, could accept the occupation or ravaging of its territoryand still carry on the war relying on supplies imported by sea.Furthermore, the Athenians developed other forms of ghting on land,using mercenaries and light-armed troops. The shock reverberatedround the Greek world when a force of Spartans surrendered to a mixedforce of Athenian hoplites and light-armed troops on the island ofSphacteria in 424 BC.10

Nevertheless, the predominance of Sparta after 404 meant that forthe moment the emphasis on hoplites continued. Indeed the reputationof the hoplite phalanx was demonstrated by the recruitment of tenthousand Greek hoplites by Cyrus to assist his rebellion against hiselder brother, the Persian king. He was defeated and killed at the battleof Cunaxa in 401 BC, but the Greeks acquitted themselves withdistinction and later successfully marched back to the coast.11 The onestriking development in hoplite tactics emerged when the Thebansunder their leader Epaminondas challenged the Spartan hegemony.The Spartans had previously exploited a tendency of the hoplite battleline, which inclined to drift towards the right as each man tried tomove closer to the protection offered by the shield on the left arm of the man next to him. Accordingly, Spartan commanders used thediscipline and training of their men to outank the enemy left wing.However, at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC Epaminondas created awedge formation by making the left wing of his phalanx exceptionallydeep and holding back the centre and the right wing. As the Spartanstried their outanking manoeuvre he attacked through his left wingand won a decisive victory.12


4

This brought the end to Spartan domination of Greek militarypractices and opened the way for further developments. The most notable of these was the increasing use of light-armed troops, inparticular the peltasts, who were equipped with the Thracian shield(pelte) and javelins, and could be used as skirmishers or to seize vantagepoints. They could also keep hoplites at bay by throwing their javelins,and in certain circumstances could even break down a hoplite forma-tion. This famously happened in 390 BC when 600 Spartan hopliteswere caught in an isolated position at Lechaeum (the western port of Corinth) and outmanoeuvred by peltasts under the command of the Athenian Iphicrates, who built up a distinguished reputation as a commander of this kind of force.13 He illustrates another feature ofthis age, in that he served virtually as a mercenary commander.Mercenaries played a more prominent part in the fourth century asmilitary service gradually became separated from the role and dutiesof a citizen.14 This in turn placed greater pressure on states to nd thenecessary money. These developments required a more exible tacticalapproach by commanders, though cavalry still played a minor part incampaigns.

Under Philip II the kingdom of Macedon rose to prominence and at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip defeated the forces of theGreek coalition organized against him by Athens and Thebes, andfrom then on directed Greek affairs as suited him. A major part of hissuccess depended on his reorganization of the Macedonian army. Hemodied the phalanx, discarding the cuirass and equipping the soldierswith a small shield attached to the shoulder by a strap, which left their hands free to hold a pike (the sarisa) up to ve metres long. Thephalanx was deeper, containing at least sixteen and as many as thirty-two ranks, and there were lite units of cavalry and infantry known as the Companions that attended the king. The phalanx was carefullytrained and drilled in a number of manoeuvres. Philips son andsuccessor Alexander the Great exploited this army to confirm hismastery of the Greek world and to overthrow the Persian empire. Hewas adept in making effective use of cavalry, which now assumed a crucial offensive role for the first time in Greek history, and in developing a combined tactical deployment in which slingers, archers,and light-armed troops all had their part to play. From his easternopponents Alexander also adopted the use of elephants.15

After Alexanders death in 323 BC his empire became the centre of a series of civil wars waged by his generals, and eventually the moresuccessful established personal domains and adopted the royal title.From this emerged the characteristic dynastic monarchies of the


5

Hellenistic period (Seleucid, Ptolemaic, Antigonid, Attalid), whichneeded large and enormously expensive armies including large con-tingents of mercenaries to compete against their rivals for territory.Warfare in the Hellenistic period was not particularly innovative. The kings relied on the heavy infantry phalanx used by Philip andAlexander, and maintained, even if they did not signicantly develop,the use of cavalry in an offensive role. However, on occasion Hellenisticgeneralship and tactical skill in the deployment of large compositeforces were impressive.16

In the fth century Greek communities traditionally defended theirterritory from attack and the destruction of crops and olive trees.Attackers who fought their way through to the city relied on blockadeor betrayal from within. They could build an encircling wall with the aim of reducing the besieged to famine and making better use oftheir own forces. A further renement was the epiteichismos, a strong-point built in enemy territory from which the attackers could ravagethe land all year round. But Pericles, when he had to defend Athensagainst annual invasions by the Peloponnesians, devised a new strategyof evacuating the territory and concentrating on the defence of the city itself and the long walls. He advised the people to think of them-selves as islanders, who could rely on supplies from the sea. By thefourth century Greek communities tended to resort to a defensivestrategy in which they combined defence of the principal city with anattempt to outmanoeuvre the enemy using their superior knowledgeof the terrain.

These developments meant that the attackers faced the need for anall-out assault on cities. Now, Pericles had allegedly been the first to use siege engines, including rams, at the siege of Samos in 440439 BC,17 and siege warfare was certainly one area where signicantdevelopments occurred in the fourth century. There were now moremercenaries available, which might reduce the losses among the citizenhoplite soldiers, who were a precious commodity and who were in any case not well suited to assaulting walls. The balance was with thedefenders until the second half of the fourth century,18 when there wereimportant developments in the mechanisms of assault. Greeks mayhave borrowed some ideas for siege towers and rams from the east and from Carthage. But the development of the arrow-ring catapultor belly-bow was ascribed to Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, whoemployed siege towers and catapults at the siege of Motya in 398 BC.19

The belly-bow was a large composite bow equipped with a pipe inwhich the dart was inserted; it was cocked by the artilleryman usinghis stomach to press forward on a groove until the bow was fully


6

extended.20 In his treatise on siege warfare Aeneas Tacticus (mid-fourthcentury BC) mentions an array of siege devices including wheeledtowers, rams protected by screens, drills, tortoises, scaling ladders,mining techniques, and catapults.21 Philip and Alexander deployed a formidable siege capacity in their campaigns and a wide range ofcatapults and devices. Alexanders bombardment of Halicarnassus in334 used stone-throwing catapults, and it is likely that the inventionof the torsion catapult had taken place in Philips reign. Here springsof hair or sinew provided the propulsive power, and they overcame thetechnical limitations of the belly-bow by using a base, which a winchto tighten the ring mechanism. These developments increased thevelocity of missiles and improved range and accuracy.22

The besieged were now under greater threat since walls could bedemolished, even though the design of fortications had also improved,with the building of anking towers, the deployment of catapults bythe defenders, and the development of tunnelling techniques to under-mine siegeworks.23 Among the Hellenistic kings who succeededAlexander, Demetrius son of Antigonus (336283 BC) was famous forhis ingenious conduct of sieges and won his nickname, Poliorcetes (TheBesieger), from the year-long though ultimately unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (305304 BC).24 Nevertheless, technology did not alwayshave the upper hand. When Aeneas Tacticus offered advice on how to survive under siege he devoted much of his attention to the problemof dealing with internal revolutions and rebellions. It seems Greekdisunity and internal dissension continued to be a potent weapon insieges.25

Roman warfare

In the early period the king, his retainers, and the nobles constitutedRomes army. As the need for more soldiers grew a levy was conductedamong larger groups of citizens, effectively creating a kind of citizenmilitia, which was probably equipped as heavy infantry and operatedlike the Greek hoplite phalanx. King Servius Tullius (c. 580530 BC)according to tradition divided Roman citizens into six wealth classesthat determined not only their political rights but also their militaryduties. The lowest group (the capite censi, i.e. registered by a headcount) had no property and were excluded from military service. Therichest group was that of the equites, who made up the cavalry.Therefore, from early times an obligation was placed upon Romancitizens to serve in the Roman army, but this was also a kind of privilegethat identied a mans social standing and contribution to the state.


7

Probably by the mid fourth century the phalanx formation had beenmodied with the introduction of maniples, subgroups that could beformed into three battle lines, making a more flexible formation.Soldiers were equipped with a thrusting spear or a throwing spear, thetwo-edged Spanish sword, and a long shield. The word legion (fromlegio a levy) began to be used to describe a division of troops.

The Punic Wars (264146 BC) had a dramatic impact on Romanmilitary organization, since many more troops were needed and theywere required to serve for longer. However, although the war againstHannibal inflicted serious casualties, the hard-fought campaigns will in the end have made the Romans more resilient and increasedtheir self-condence in their military establishment. Polybius famousdescription of the Roman army probably refers to the army as it wasafter the final defeat of Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC.26 The legionnumbered between 4,200 and 5,000 men and was recruited from those aged 1746 who met the property qualication. Each man wasexpected to be available for service for sixteen years and might berequired for up to six years continuous service. Soldiers received a dailyallowance. The legion continued to operate in a triple battle line, witheach line containing ten maniples drawn up with gaps between them,though these were perhaps closed as the armies engaged. The hastatiand the principes made up the rst two ranks and the triarii, the mostexperienced soldiers, the last. The rst two ranks were equipped withthe pilum (throwing spear) and Spanish sword, the last rank with thehasta (thrusting spear). All soldiers had an oval shield and, when fullyequipped, helmet, body armour, and greaves. In addition a screen oflight-armed troops (velites) engaged the enemy rst before retreatingthrough the ranks. The hastati and principes threw their spears and thenengaged with swords at close quarters. If they were unsuccessful thetriarii came forward for a nal assault. Rome required her Italian alliesto provide additional troops as part of their treaty obligations. IndeedRomes cavalry was largely supplied by these allies and was normallydeployed on the wings. There were also 300 cavalry attached to eachlegion.

In the early period the Romans had engaged in limited, seasonalwarfare, but as they developed a territorial empire the legions came to have virtually a permanent station in certain provinces, and therewas increasing pressure on reserves of manpower. Gaius Marius waselected consul in 107 BC largely through popular support since he hadpromised to end the long war in Africa against Jugurtha. The recenttrend had been to reduce the property qualication for service in thearmy, and Marius took this further by enlisting volunteers from those


8

with no property and had them equipped at the states expense. Mariusis usually credited with the introduction of a new tactical deployment,the replacement of the maniple with the cohort. The legion was nowdivided into ten uniformly equipped cohorts of 480 men, though thefirst cohort may have had a larger complement. However this may have been a more gradual development to which Marius added thenishing touches, and since the maniple did not immediately disappearit is possible that for a time both formations existed as alternatives. Butby the time of Caesar the cohort was clearly the tactical sub-divisionof the legion, although later writers sometimes anachronistically usemanipulares meaning soldiers. Marius also improved the design of thepilum by introducing wooden pegs to hold the iron tip to the shaft.These broke on impact and made the spear difficult for the enemy to extract from a shield and throw back. The use of the thrusting spearwas now discontinued. It was probably from this time that the eagle(aquila) was adopted as the symbol of each legion, indicating itspermanent identity. The soldiers of the legions were expected to carry in their packs all the gear needed to make them virtually self-sufficient in the field and were nicknamed Marius mules.27 Thelegions equipped in this way and organized tactically in cohorts out-manoeuvred and outfought the Macedonian phalanx at the battles ofCynoscephalae (197 BC) and Pydna (168 BC). The legionary formationcould be adapted quickly to suit circumstances and terrain and alsopermitted the use of reserves. Doubtless the phalanx if combined withcavalry and other troops as Alexander had done could still have been a valuable instrument of war. But the Romans had superior resources,determination, and resilience, and above all a political unity that theGreeks lacked. The rival monarchies that dominated the city-stateswere defeated individually by the Romans.

In the Social War (9187 BC) Rome fought her recalcitrant Italianallies, and although victorious in the campaign granted Roman citi-zenship to the allied communities in Italy. This conrmed a substantialreservoir of manpower, which became increasingly necessary as Romesoverseas responsibilities increased, with more provinces requiring apermanent military presence. Furthermore, the army had acquired a political dimension, which accidentally arose from Marius changes.Soldiers tended to be loyal to the commander who had recruited them,and since many had few resources, they expected a reward in cash or land when they left military service. Since the senate refused toaccept that the state should be responsible for this, it was often left to individual generals to secure it for their men, who could be expectedto be suitably grateful. So, the personal association between general and


9

soldiers was enhanced, and instead of one Roman army, we nd a seriesof armies personally loyal to their commanders. As political instabilityincreased, leading gures exploited popular support to acquire impor-tant army commands, which they then used to enhance their wealthand reputation and to build up military support. Caesar when governorof Gaul increased his original force from four to twelve legions and by a series of wars turned it into a highly experienced army, which hethen led against his rival Pompey in 49 BC after doubling legionary pay. Caesar became dictator, but was murdered in 44 BC and from thelong civil wars that followed his death his grandnephew Octavianemerged as master of the Roman world in 31 BC and four years laterwas granted the name Augustus by the senate and people.28

Augustus reorganized the Roman army, combining traditional practices with substantial innovations. He conrmed the idea of a pro-fessional, standing army with legions permanently stationed in certainprovinces. He also established terms of service, which were nalizedby AD 5. Legionaries, who had to be Roman citizens, served for twentyyears (and probably five in the reserves) on an annual salary of 900sesterces; they also received a gratuity on discharge, in either land or money, to the value of more than thirteen times a years salary. Thisformed the basis of the armys organization for the next 250 years, with length of service eventually being set at twenty-ve years. Romehad from time to time used non-Roman troops in specialist roles, and Augustus incorporated into the formal structure of the army such units of auxiliaries (auxilia); they were originally ethnic groups of non-citizens and served in units of cavalry (alae) or infantry (cohorts).In time the ethnic character was diluted and already by the end ofAugustus reign they were as numerous as the legions. Augustus alsoestablished the praetorians as a personal bodyguard, nine cohorts strongwith either 500 or 1,000 men in each. The annual cost of the army was in the vicinity of 450 million sesterces and was an enormous drainon the empires resources. Such was the cost of Augustus desire forsecurity, prestige, and glory. He presented himself to the Roman peopleas a successful military commander and to the army he became anobject of personal loyalty, a model invariably followed by his successors.The armys size and cost steadily increased and by the third century ADit numbered around 450,000 men.29

Roman warfare continued to be based on the heavy infantry of thelegions, with the tactical deployment of cavalry, auxiliaries and archerswhere appropriate, and the use of reserves. Yet military practice wasnot static, and the Romans experimented with new formations tocounter the heavy cavalry and mounted archers of the Parthians and


10

Sarmatians. For example, Arrian used an innovative deployment basedon the traditional Greek phalanx formation to repel the invasion ofCappadocia by the Alani.30 By the second century AD the Romans hadestablished their own armoured cavalry units. Roman armies had astrong siege capacity, leaving the enemy nowhere to hide. Nothingthey did was particularly innovative, but from the early third centuryBC the Romans had understood the potential value of artillery, and the imperial period was the time of greatest development. They usedGreek designs and probably Greek artificers and Romans who had been trained in Greek techniques. The legions could deploy arrow-shooting and stone-ring engines, and also carroballistae that were usedin open battleeld conditions. By AD 100 they had the most powerfularrow-shooting engines ever used in the ancient world. The finaladdition to their armoury was the onager, a large, one-armed stone-thrower, probably in use from the third century AD.31

The centurions were central to the command structure of the Romanarmy. They commanded centuries of 80 men, six of these making upa cohort. Since there were only ve centurions in the rst cohort, which,however, was probably double in size, there were 59 centurions in each legion. Often they were very experienced and presumably anexcellent source of advice. There were also six military tribunes in eachlegion, one of senatorial and ve of equestrian rank. The legion wascommanded by a senator of praetorian rank. The provincial governorhad overall command of the army in his province and he was usually a senator of consular rank. Although these men sometimes had onlylimited experience, it is not clear that this significantly inhibitedtactical developments or innovations. Furthermore, there continuedto be a strong interest in Roman society in warfare and militarypractice, as we can see to some extent in the range of writings aboutstratagems and military formations.

What discretion did a commander have? What did he actually haveto do in an ancient battle? In terms of Roman warfare, if we judge fromancient writings on battle tactics, a responsible commander wouldconduct careful scouting and assessment of enemy forces, take properprecautions for fortifying a suitable camp in hostile territory, know howto draw up his battle line, deploy reserves, be aware of relevant strata-gems for particular situations, including ambush, and make speechesof encouragement to his troops. He must also be skilled in battlepsychology and be capable of dealing with the aftermath of battle, thatis conducting a retreat or bringing the campaign to a close by nishingoff the enemy in the most appropriate way. The commander thereforecontrolled the battle, and rarely would become involved in the ghting.


11

From the late third century onwards the Romans had to adapt to a changing balance of power and assaults on the empire from diversequarters by swiftly moving raiding parties. We nd in the third centurymoves to increase cavalry provision, and the emperor Gallienus estab-lished an independent cavalry unit that could be sent to repel incursions.In a development that was originally piecemeal, Gallienus began to replace senatorial army commanders with equestrians; these mentended to have more military experience than senators, and oftenindeed had been promoted from experienced centurions and seniorcenturions. Diocletian (AD 284305) provided a period of stabilityand military regeneration for the empire and greatly increased thenumber of legions; indeed the number of soldiers will have beendoubled if the legions were kept at their normal complement, thoughthis is unclear. He also began to establish the eld army, a number of units of infantry and cavalry drawn from the rest of the army, inde-pendent of any provincial location, and capable of moving relativelyspeedily to deal with the empires strategic requirements. Diocletianensured all-round defence of imperial territory by continuing thepractice of stationing troops in individual provinces. These reformswere consolidated by Constantine (AD 30637), who enhanced the size and status of the eld army (Comitatenses), though troops continuedto be stationed permanently in the provinces as a static covering force(Limitanei).32

The Romans had no inherent physical superiority over their oppo-nents and no overwhelming numerical superiority. The tribes on the Rhine and Danube had far larger reserves of manpower to draw on. Although the army was large it was never concentrated in one place,and by the second century there were no more than three legions in any one province, and then in only a few cases. Furthermore, whereasthe Romans were well equipped they had no decisive superiority inarmaments. However, the essential qualities of Roman warfare con-tributed to the armys consistent success through four centuries of warfare. The Romans had a professional standing army, which was well disciplined and competently organized and led, with a soundframework of nancial support for most of the imperial period. Theordnance, supplies, and medical treatment in the army were of a highorder. The Romans ruthlessly applied relatively simple battle tacticsand the follow-up was equally aggressive as they inspired terror with their siegecraft and the sacking of cities. Roman soldiers had thepsychological advantage of being on the attack, since that was howtheir generals operated, and the ruling class had no political or moraldoubts about the desirability of preserving the empire.


12

Ancient writers on warfare33

Many of the authors whose work is translated in this book claim thatthey are writing to educate their audience in the skills of army com-mand, with the expectation that their work will be interesting anduseful. Aeneas Tacticus in his work How to Survive under Siege pointedout that defending your polis and everything that you held dear temples, native land, parents, and children was not like ghtingin a foreign country. Therefore those who are to ght for these belovedthings must not fail in readiness or effort but must work out manydifferent actions so that if they fail it should not seem that they are to blame.34 The implication is that they should start by reading hiswork. Asclepiodotus sums up the benets of sound tactical principles:They mean safety for those who observe them and danger for those who ignore them.35 Among writers of the Roman period, Frontinussays specically of the skilful operations of commanders that he hasrecorded:

For in this way army commanders will be equipped withexamples of good planning and foresight, and this will developtheir own ability to think out and carry into effect similaroperations. An added benefit will be that the commander will not be worried about the outcome of his own stratagemwhen he compares it with innovations already tested inpractice.36

Onasander was condent that generals could learn from his writings:

Finally I may say condently that my work will be a trainingschool for good generals and a memorial to retired generals in this period of imperial peace . . . I shall make clear whysome generals have suffered mishap, and why others have beensuccessful and become glorious.37

What is more, in seeking the good will or patronage of emperors,authors often claimed to be offering advice that was congenial andhelpful. So, Vitruvius could introduce to Augustus his work onarchitecture by saying that the emperor built on a grand scale and thatguidance was appropriate: I have provided a detailed survey so that byreferring to it you can teach yourself how to evaluate the works thathave been completed and those about to be started.38 Vitruvius alsoincluded in his work a section on the construction of catapults and he


13

notes his special expertise in this respect, since Augustus had appointedhim to survey the construction and repair of engines of war. Thebuilding of catapults protected against danger and provided security.39

Aelian had taken the trouble of sounding out Frontinus about hisproposal to write about Greek military tactics, and his address to Trajansingled out the emperors military prowess and the Romans experienceof warfare. The implication is that his work will find a responsiveaudience, and he even inserted headings for each section so that theemperor would not waste time in nding what he wanted.40 Polyaenuswas more direct when he addressed his treatise to Marcus Aurelius andLucius Verus as they prepared to ght the Parthians. He was sure thathis collection of stratagems would help the emperors in their wars, andhe produced an elaborate justification of his Macedonian ancestry and inherited superiority over eastern peoples, almost certainly makingup for his total lack of military experience.41

We have in these examples explicit statements of purpose and claimsof usefulness. Yet many of these works to our eyes seem formulaic andremote from reality. Should we take it at face value when our writersclaim a didactic purpose? Second, even if the works were genuinelyintended to be didactic, were they of value and did generals read them? It was of course conventional for writers to claim relevance fortheir work and attempt to interest their addressee or sponsor. On theother hand, in the context of ancient culture and society there was aninterest in the past among both Greeks and Romans, and often a desireto identify with their cultural heritage, as well as respect for prominentindividuals who had won honour by their actions. Polybius said in the introduction to his history, Man possesses no better corrective toconduct than knowledge of the past, and went on to point out that all historians claimed that their writing was an education and a trainingfor a political career.42 Similarly, Sallust claimed that among pursuitsof the mind, writing the history of past events was most useful.43 Inthe reign of Tiberius, Valerius Maximus published in nine books the memorable deeds and saying of Romans and non-Romans as anexample to all. As he put it, referring to the emperor: The virtuesabout which I am going to speak are benevolently fostered, while faultsare severely punished.44 Traditionally Romans claimed to have greatrespect for exempla, that is, guides on how to behave in certain circum-stances. This related not merely to practical experience but couldinvolve reading about the deeds of famous people and trying to emulatethem, or consulting manuals.45 In a farming context we can see this in the advice offered by Columella to the aspiring farmer who wantsto increase his fortune by tilling his elds:


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He should take special care to consult about everything themost knowledgeable farmers of his own day. He should alsocarefully examine manuals written in the past and evaluate theviews and teachings of their authors, to see if all the informa-tion passed down by older writers is relevant to contemporaryagriculture or out of step in some way.46

Now, we can imagine that at least down to the fifth century BC military know-how and experience were traditionally passed on by word of mouth among friends and family. By the end of thePeloponnesian War, the military detail of which was meticulouslyrecorded by Thucydides, the military arts had become a subject for thelecture hall as a branch of technical knowledge. As such it could betaught by academics with little if any experience of battle. Xenophon,who was very experienced in military service and army command,brought a new realism and personal expertise to writing about militaryaffairs, especially in his work The Cavalry Commander. He clearly didnot mean this to be a collection of trivial anecdotes. Aeneas Tacticusshared the same kind of approach and may indeed be seen as one of the pioneers of this kind of writing, since he wrote several otherworks as well as On Siegecraft.47 Aeneas writes like a man who personally knew his subject and, if he can indeed be identied with Aeneas ofStymphalus,48 was a genuine soldier who knew all about the realitiesof warfare and sieges. He presumably aimed to provide a guide for the authorities in a city and for any individual who aspired to be acompetent leader. From the third century BC onwards treatises con-tinued to be written both by experts and by laymen with variedinterests. So, Xenophon was to nd his emulator in the experiencedArrian,49 and there was also a tradition of precisely detailed technicalworks on the construction of war engines, which persisted into theRoman period. Yet the mathematical precision and geometric shapesthat accompanied phalanx manoeuvres continued to attract writerslike Asclepiodotus who had no military experience.

Julius Caesars Commentaries on the war he fought in Gaul are uniquein ancient literature. They are not just a retrospective justification for his determination to protect his dignitas in political life, but also a demonstration of his skill in the detailed requirements of militaryleadership and battle management that could serve as an example toothers. Indeed many of his exploits were picked up by later writersand incorporated into the tradition of military ingenuity. The themeof the generals skill and use of stratagems is represented in the sur-viving collections of stratagems compiled by Frontinus and Polyaenus,


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and in a treatise on the art of generalship by Onasander. Of these authorsonly Frontinus had experience of commanding an army. The descriptionof the manoeuvres of the phalanx was still regarded as a worthwhiletheme by Aelian, and is discussed by Arrian in his Tactica, which alsodealt with cavalry-training exercises. Arrian had held a militarycommand and, as noted above, also wrote a description on his marchingand battle formations against a predicted attack from the Alani. Thisis unique in our military literature, and he presumably expected it to be taken seriously. The complicating factor in the imperial period is that in seeking examples both Greeks and Romans tended to lookbackwards, Greeks because that was when their great deeds had beenaccomplished, and Romans because it was usually safer to review pastmilitary conduct rather than that of the ruling emperor.

In the social and cultural context in the ancient world most armycommanders were not professional soldiers, and in many cases notparticularly experienced in commanding men. In the Roman republicaristocratic generals, who were expected to serve the state in whatevercapacity it asked, thought that entitlement to command came fromwinning the support of the assembly that voted them into ofce. Theydoubtless expected to take advice passed down by family and friends.But manuals could also play a part, though genuine experience wasalways preferable.50 In the imperial period emperors had direct controlover their appointees to military command and could, if they so chose, impose rules of suitable experience. There is little sign that they did so, and there was no military academy, formal training, or highcommand of senior ofcers. Much was left to the initiative and con-science of individuals. Naturally a general would be guided by whateverexperience he had, would take advice from others including juniorofcers and centurions, and would learn from actually carrying out hisduties.

What was the value of military handbooks in this? Some survivingworks could have been helpful in preparing a city for a siege, in prac-tising phalanx manoeuvres, in training the cavalry, in building warengines, and we can surmise that lost works on tactics and militarydeployment in the Roman period might have given specic technicaldetails of direct relevance to ofcers. Indeed, even knowledge of howthe Greek phalanx operated turned out to be useful for Arrian.51 It isalso reasonable to suppose that a textbook on how to build war enginescould be useful in the artillery workshops, even though the articerswho kept the legions catapults in working order probably had acommon understanding of what needed to be done, without readingVitruvius or other writers on catapult design.


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However, what is perhaps more important is that the nature of manyof the surviving works from the Roman imperial period suggests thatthey were concerned with how a man could prepare himself for thetask of commanding men in battle, get into the right frame of mind,and recognize the range of his responsibilities. Frontinus and Polyaenuson stratagems and Onasander on the art of generalship are greatlyinterested in the moral qualities of the commander and the psychologyof warfare. He needed to be alert, full of ingenuity and resourceful-ness, ready to do and prepare for the unexpected, exploit fear andappearances, and use deception where necessary. He must also learnhow to maintain discipline and enthusiasm in the army and, in short,display a range of characteristics that could be used to good effect in other areas of life. Indeed there is something of this theme in AeneasTacticus On Siegecraft, where the advice and instructions are to becarried out by a man of talent and resolution, capable of organizing aneffective resistance and controlling his fellow-citizens. If by readingthese works a general could get into the spirit of military command,he could also put some stratagems to practical use. Technological devel-opment in weaponry was slow, the technical demands of controllingand manoeuvring infantry and cavalry did not change much, and ploys used by previous generals could be repeated, not least becausecommanders seemed prone to fall for old tricks.52

To sum up, Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks do nott easily into a single category. These works were partly historical,offered general guidance of moral value and some potentially usefulpractical and technical information, but also were intended to amuseand delight the upper classes. An enthusiastic readership suggests acontinuing interest in a culture of warfare and violence. Military booksalso provided a platform on which the authors could display literaryskill, erudition, and mastery of a technical subject. These writersranged from accomplished military men to those with a dilettanteinterest in the military arts. Greek writers of the Roman period mayindeed have hoped to demonstrate that the Greeks too had been noinsignicant warriors. The important point is perhaps not that generalsactually read military handbooks just as they went into battle, but that the whole genre is typical of a mindset in society about the role of a commander, his responsibilities in battle, and perhaps also thequalities of character essential for dealing with matters of life anddeath.


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Notes

1 See Lazenby and Whitehead (1996).2 For weapons, see Snodgrass (1964); partial reintroduction of bronze

weapons ibid., 1334; early warfare Greenhalgh (1973); developmentof hoplites Cartledge (1977); Osborne (1996), 1624; 1706; van Wees(2000a); nature of hoplite battle Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 13454;Holladay (1982); Krentz (1985a); Hanson (1989); Lazenby, in Hanson(1991); casualties and care of wounded ibid., 1012; Krentz (1985b).

3 Hanson, in Hanson (1991) argues that the emergence of hoplite arms andarmour c. 700 BC was a response aimed at improving the combat efciencyof men who were already ghting in some kind of massed array.

4 In contrast to body armour, which could only protect individuals(Plutarch, Sayings of the Spartans, Moralia 220A).

5 Snodgrass (1965) doubted that the hoplite reform had immediate politicalconsequences, while Salmon (1977) argued that the hoplite reformsupplied the weapon for political reform though not necessarily the willfor it. For the continuing debate, see Raaaub, in Raaaub and Rosenstein(1999), 13241, arguing that the farmer-hoplites were brought intoegalitarian polis structures not primarily because of their contribution tothe phalanx; van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), doubts theconnection between political regimes and citizen militias; however see thecomments of Gabrielsen, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 8992. Forcavalry in Greek warfare, see Spence (1993); for a useful general survey ofGreek warfare Ducrey (1985); Sage (1996), xivxxviii; van Wees(2000b).

6 See the survey in Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 20831.7 Argued by van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 702.8 Cartledge (1977); Lazenby (1985)9 For the role of the hoplite general, see Wheeler, in Hanson (1991),

especially 14752, who doubts that the general normally stationedhimself in the rst rank of battle; the death and wounding of commandersmay often have occurred in the second stage, as the hoplite battle brokeup.

10 See below, no. 103.11 Under Xenophons leadership, see below, p. 21.12 The exact nature of the manoeuvre is much debated; see Anderson (1970),

165220; Buckler (1985); Lazenby (1985), 15562; Tuplin (1987);Hanson (1988).

13 Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 11725; Best (1969) argues that peltasts wereoperating before the end of the fth century. They were of two types:those who carried two javelins and fought at long distance, and those whocarried a long thrusting spear and fought at close range. Iphicrates maynot have made any signicant reform of the ghting practices of peltasts;his skill was in deploying them to the best advantage. For the battle atLechaeum, see no. 116.


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14 Parke (1933); Grifth (1935).15 Adcock (1957); Brunt (1963); Anderson (1970); Schullard (1974); Milns,

in Bosworth (1976); Engels (1978); Markle (1978); Bosworth (1988),25977.

16 See no. 124, battle of Paraetacene; Bar-Kochva (1976); Hamilton, inRaaaub and Rosenstein (1999).

17 Diodorus Siculus 12.28.23.18 See Whitehead (1990), 25.19 Garlan (1974), 164.20 Marsden (1969), 512.21 Sections 323; 367; see also Garlan (1974), 173; Whitehead (1990).22 Marsden, op. cit., 1441; 56; he believes that torsion artillery was rst

introduced between 353 and 341 BC. There was presumably a long seriesof practical experiments down to the mid-third century BC to establishthe best dimensions for the catapult and work out a suitable formula forcalibration; see Marsden, op. cit., 62. Ctesibius worked on air-spring andbronze-spring catapults, though these were not a notable advance onexisting forms of propulsion. Subsequent development work aimed atincreasing the amount of spring-cord that the tightening winches couldtake. See also below, Chapter 5.

23 For fortications see Winter (1971); Garlan (1974), 24469; Lawrence(1979). Leriche and Trziny (1986).

24 Garlan (1974), 20244 describes Hellenistic techniques, noting thatassault was the norm rather than investiture.

25 For this idea see Garlan (1974), 179; Whitehead (1990), 2533; alsobelow, pp. 14952.

26 6.1926.27 For a general survey of the army of the republic, see Smith (1958);

Harmand (1967); Keppie (1984); Rosenstein, in Raaaub and Rosenstein(1999).

28 Brunt (1988) is essential for the role of the army in this period.29 Development and history of imperial army Keppie (1984), 13298;

Webster (1985); Le Bohec (1989); Campbell (1994), and in Raaaub andRosenstein (1999); (2002); warfare and tactics Goldsworthy (1996);Sabin (2000); recruiting and veterans Mann (1983); the auxilia Cheesman (1914); Saddington (1975); Holder (1980); M.P. Speidel(1994); praetorians Durry (1938); Passerini (1939); Kennedy (1978);size of army MacMullen (1980); Roth (1994); pay and conditions M.A. Speidel (1992); Alston (1994); logistics Roth (1999); arms Bishop and Coulston (1993). For the impact of the army on the societyand culture and life of the eastern part of the empire see the excellentstudy of Isaac (1992); the army in Egypt Alston (1995).

30 See below, no. 165.31 See Marsden (1969), 17498; also below, Chapter 5. 32 For the later Roman army see Jones (1964), 60786; Williams (1985),

91101; Southern and Dixon (1996).


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33 For descriptions of pitched battles in Greek historians, see Pritchett, GSWIV (1985), 4493.

34 Preface 3.35 12.11.36 Bk 1, preface.37 Preface 4.38 1, preface 3.39 1, preface 2; 10.10.1.40 Preface 34; 7.41 5, preface; see below, nos 89, 91, 94, 96.42 1.12; cf. Vegetius (no. 32).43 War with Jugurtha 4.44 1, preface.45 Campbell (1987), 201.46 On Agriculture 1.1.34.47 See Whitehead (1990), 36 speculating on the possible links between

Xenophon and Aeneas.48 See p. 149. 49 See below, p. 40. Arrian in his writings sometimes identies himself with

Xenophon.50 Campbell (1987), 213.51 See no. 165.52 For the effectiveness of surprise attacks and ambushes and all kinds of

trickery, see Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 15689; Wheeler (1988); see alsobelow, no. 109.


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1ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND

DISCIPLINE

1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.14 (value of hunting)

Those who enthusiastically follow the pursuit of hunting will reapgreat advantages, for it makes the body healthy and improves sight andhearing. It also slows down the process of growing old, and is especiallyuseful as training for the art of war. First, men experienced in huntingwill not tire when they are marching over difcult roads under arms.They will endure hardships like this because they are accustomed tocarrying arms in the capture of wild beasts. They will also be capableof sleeping on a hard bed and of effectively guarding the positionassigned to them. In attacks on the enemy they will be able to fall upon him and simultaneously carry out orders passed along the linebecause they do the same things on their own initiative when huntinggame. If positioned in the front line they will not desert the ranks,because they possess endurance. If the enemy ees, they will be able to pursue him directly and safely in any type of terrain because of theirexperience.

Xenophon was born c. 430 BC into a wealthy Athenian family. He probably servedin the Athenian cavalry in his youth, but is likely to have been out of sympathy withthe democratic government of Athens and was an enthusiastic admirer of Spartanpractices. During the rule of the Thirty Tyrants he fought against the democrats inthe civil war (404403), and although protected by the subsequent amnesty, mayhave thought it wise to leave Athens for a time. He took mercenary service with Cyrus,who was staging a rebellion against the Persian king. Xenophon was one of tenthousand Greek mercenaries who fought in the campaign, which ended in Cyrusdefeat at Cunaxa. After the murder of the Greek generals Xenophon became one of theleaders who guided the army from Mesopotamia to Byzantium. Subsequently hecommanded the survivors of these troops in the interests of Sparta, and after ghtingon the Spartan side at the battle of Coronea in 394 was exiled from Athens. There wassome reconciliation with Athens, and his son, Gryllus, was killed ghting with theAthenian cavalry at the battle of Mantinea in 362.

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Xenophon wrote a variety of disparate works, ranging from the a survey of theupbringing and career of the Persian king Cyrus the Great to accounts of Greek history,most notably the Hellenica, in which he took up Thucydides narrative, which endedin 411 BC. He also wrote about technical aspects of hunting, and horsemanship, inwhich he offered advice on choosing and looking after horses and explained goodpractice in training and all aspects of riding. His advice seems broadly in line withmodern instruction in horse riding. Two other works reflect Xenophons militaryexperience. In the Cavalry Commander he looks at the organization of the Atheniancavalry and concentrates on the duties of the cavalry commander, battle tactics, andthe importance of good leadership. In the Anabasis he describes his role in leading theGreek mercenaries after the defeat of Cyrus. The work is partly historical record, butalso could serve a didactic purpose, as it demonstrates the importance of stratagems,military psychology, good leadership, and discipline. It also shows some aspects of goodpractice in hoplite warfare of the fourth century, though there is much self-justicationof Xenophons role (at least one other mercenary leader had written about thecampaign) and the description of the battle of Cunaxa is insufciently detailed to bereally helpful; see Anderson (1974).

In this extract Xenophon is referring to the hunting of hares and other animals onfoot.

2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.14 (importance of physical tness)

Socrates, noticing that one of his companions, although young, was in poor physical condition, said, Epigenes, you seem to be neglectingyour physical training. The young man replied, I am merely an ordi-nary citizen, Socrates. Socrates answered, You need physical trainingjust as much as those intending to compete at Olympia; or does the life and death struggle with their enemies which the Athenians willundertake someday seem of small importance to you? Indeed, manymen die amid the dangers of war or are saved in some disreputablefashion because of their bad physical condition. Many are capturedalive for this very reason, and if this happens to them spend the rest of their lives in the harshest slavery, or are reduced to the mostmiserable condition and pay a ransom beyond their means and spendthe rest of their lives lacking the basic essentials and in desperate straits. Furthermore, many gain a disgraceful reputation because oftheir physical weakness because they seem to be cowards. Do youdespise the penalties of the poor physical condition of these men andthink that you could put up with something similar? I think that the lot of the man who pays proper attention to his physical conditionis much easier and more pleasant.

The Memorabilia comprise a series of conversations designed to illustrate Socratesmethod of debate and incidentally reveal useful details about Athenian life andattitudes.

O R G A N I Z A T I O N , T R A I N I N G , A N D D I S C I P L I N E

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3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.56 (training the cavalry)

When you have ensured that the horses are in suitable condition thenext task is to train the cavalrymen, rstly so that they can leap up ontotheir horses, since many before now owe their lives to this. Secondly,they must learn to ride over all types of terrain, since wars occur in allsorts of location. As soon as they have obtained a good seat the next task is to make sure that as many as possible can throw their javelinsfrom horseback, and that they become accomplished in all the skills ofhorsemanship.

4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.79 (knowing your position)

If this formation has been adopted it is essential that through word ofmouth passed on by the unit commander every le-leader knows wherehe has to go, just as the unit commanders have their position in theattack explained to them by the commander-in-chief. If commandsare given in this way the army will be better disciplined than if the menget in each others way like a crowd leaving the theatre. Furthermore,if there is a frontal attack, the men in the rst ranks are much morewilling to ght if they know that this is their position. And those inthe rear ranks, if there is a sudden attack from the rear, understandthat it is disgraceful to leave their position. But if the soldiers aredisorderly, they bring confusion to each other on narrow roads and atriver crossings, and on the battleeld no one willingly takes his positionin the ghting line.

5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.34 (use of mercenary cavalry)

I believe that the full cavalry complement of one thousand men wouldbe reached far more easily and with less trouble to the citizens if we hiretwo hundred mercenary cavalry. I think that the addition of these menwould make the whole cavalry force more obedient and would fosterrivalry among its members in displays of courage. I know that theLacedaemonian caval

greek and roman military writers

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