8/9/2019 Gpvs. Monte de Piedad

1/2

G.R. No. L-9959 February 9, 1917

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA,defendant-appellant.

The decision rendered in this case was filed in the office of theClerk of the Court on December 13, 1916.1 The parties werenotified on the 14th of the same month. Judgment was entered by

the Clerk of the Court on January 4, 1917. The record was returnedto the lower court on January 15, 1917. Later of writ of executionwas issued and delivered to the sheriff. Subsequently, on January25, 1917, counsel for the defendant filed in this Court of motionpraying for a stay of execution of the judgment and return of therecord for the purposes of the writ of certiorari which thedefendant seeks to see out before the Supreme Court of theUnited States. After due consideration thereof, the said motion isdenied for the reason that the record has already been returned tothe Court of First Instance for execution of the judgment.

Justice Trentis of the opinion that the motion should be granted.

Separate Opinions

CARSON,J., dissenting:

I dissent.

A stay of execution should be granted, it clearly appearing that theparty seeking it has a right under the law to take the moneyjudgment of this court to the Supreme Court of the United Statesfor review, the amount of that judgment being in excess ofP25,000; that he is taking the necessary steps, in good faith, tosecure such a review; that he has used diligence in moving for astay; and that he has tendered a good and sufficient bond tosecure compliance with any judgment which may finally beentered against him.

It is not a sufficient ground upon which to deny relief in this case

to say that as a result of the change of procedure in the methodwhereby such appeals were formerly perfected, we cannot grant awrit of supersedeas in the identical form and manner in which wewere authorized to grant such writs under the old procedure. Thechange of procedure was certainly not intended to have the effectof depriving litigants of any right to stay of execution pendingappeals to the Supreme Court of the United States which wassecured to them under the former statute. Until and unless theSupreme Court of the United States takes jurisdiction this courtand this court alone has jurisdiction in the premises. In every casewherein a litigant seeks to exercise his right to have a judgment ofthis court reversed by the Supreme Court of the United Statesunder the procedure prescribed in the new law, a period of fromsixty to ninety days must elapse from the entry of final judgmentsby this court before the court above can be given an opportunityto take jurisdiction of the case. It must be assumed that during

that period this court has at least sufficient supervisory jurisdictionover the execution of its own judgments to control and restrainany attempt to enforce these judgments in cases wherein theirimmediate execution would deprive the litigant of a right which,heretofore, has always been secured to him, to have executionstayed by the exercise of due diligence in prosecuting his appeala right which it was not the intention of the legislators to destroyby the change in the mode of procedure in prosecuting the appeal.

It is said that had the application been made to us during theperiod of ten days after final judgment was entered and before therecord was returned to the court below, we might then have heldthe record in this court for a time sufficient to allow an applicationfor the writ ofcertiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

But, it is to be observed, in the first place, that while we might

have had the power so to do and while the delay thus incurredwould have had the indirect effect of staying the execution, thepractice of granting such delays while it might conserve the rightsof the losing party in certain cases, would take no account of therights of the prevailing party, who should have execution of hisjudgment without delay unless proper security is furnished by theparty seeking to stay execution pending the appeal. An orderdirecting that the record be retained in the court under suchcircumstances is in effect a grant of a stay of execution, byindirection, in which the prevailing party is deprived of his right tosecurity for the performance of the judgment by the party atwhose instance the stay is granted.

In the second place, a period of ten days from the entry of finaljudgment does not give a litigant sufficient time within which to

determine whether or not he should appeal, and havingdetermined so to do, to furnish the security without which stay ofexecution should not be granted. Heretofore, litigants always hadat least sixty days within which they could secure a stay ofexecution in a case wherein the filing of a supersedeas bond wasauthorized. I do not believe that the substantial rights of thelitigant in this regard are preserved under the rule which it is nowproposed to follow, under which he is deprived of the right to astay of execution unless he moves within ten days after the entryof final judgment.

The following paragraph from Freeman on Executions, togetherwith the citations of authority in support of the pertinent commentin the original, sets forth the doctrine which in my opinion shouldbe applied under the very exceptional circumstances of this case:

Stay of execution other than by appellate proceedings. During the time within which plaintiff is otherwise entitledto execution his right thereto may be suspended ordestroyed by what is commonly known as a stay ofexecution, granted by the court in which the judgmentwas rendered or by some other court of superiorauthority, or arising without any formal order of any courtas a result of proceedings authorized by statute. Thesestays of execution may be regarded as of three classes,first, those which are ordered by the court in which thejudgment was rendered, but not as the result of any

appellate proceedings, and which proceed upon theground that, for some cause, the execution of thejudgment ought to be postponed to some subsequentdate, or, perhaps, ought to take place at all; second,those which are a consequence of, or attend, appellateproceedings; and third, those which result from statutesgranting the defendant a further time in which to satisfythe judgment upon his giving certain security therefor.Each court has such general control of its process asenables it to act for the prevention of all abuse thereof.Hence it may, to prevent the annoyance which might beoccasioned by the attempted execution of a voidjudgment, either stay or arrest the process; and may,where it is clear that the judgment ought not be furtherenforced, order a perpetual stay of execution. If itappears that the proceedings have been instituted whichmay result in the annulment of the judgment or in

granting the defendant a release therefrom, its furtherexecution may be suspended until the result of suchproceedings can be known. If proceedings in bankruptcyof insolvency have been commenced which may result inthe release of the defendant, it is proper to stayexecution for a reasonable time to permit him to so farprosecute such proceedings that his release can either beobtained or denied. If an action has been brought upon ajudgment from which a writ of error has been recovered,execution thereon should be stayed until the first is eitherreversed or affirmed; otherwise, the party prosecutingthe writ of error may, though successful, be deprived ofall benefit thereof. A perpetual stay of execution may begranted by the court in which the judgment wasrendered, when such judgment was void when entered,or when, from some cause occurring after its entry, it is

clear that the further prosecution thereof ought not to beallowed. The most familiar instance, other than that bythe satisfaction of the judgment, of a matter occurringafter its entry and requiring a perpetual stay of execution,is the release of the defendant and his propertytherefrom by a discharge granted him under thebankruptcy or insolvency laws.

When an appellate court has affirmed a judgment andremitted the case to the subordinate court, the latter hasno right to stay execution. This rule ought not to preventa temporary stay of execution upon grounds which do notquestion the correctness of the judgment thus affirmed,as where it is urged that the defendant has a judgmentagainst the plaintiff to the benefit of which he is entitledas a set-off. Such set-off may be allowed him without in

any respect questioning the propriety of the judgment ofthe appellate court, and stay of execution may properlybe granted until the claim of set-off can be investigatedand determined.

The power of court to temporarily stay the issuing ofexecution is exercised in an almost infinite variety ofcircumstances, in order that the ends of justice may beaccomplished. In many cases this power operates almostas a substitute for proceedings in equity, and enables thedefendant to prevent any inequitable use of thejudgmentor writ. Like most other discretionary powers, itis liable to abuse. It is the general practice of the losingparty to ask and for the court to grant a stay of executionfor some designated period after the entry of judgment,for no other reason than that he is not yet ready to

8/9/2019 Gpvs. Monte de Piedad

2/2

comply with the judgment, or perhaps in view ofproceedings by appeal or for a new trial. These staysgenerally result in a delay, and sometimes in the defeatof justice; and the courts ought to be very cautious ingranting them, except in cases where the ultimatesatisfaction of the judgment by the defendant is assured.The power, however, to grant such stays of execution iseverywhere conceded, and it could not be limited by theenactment of any unvarying rule without encounteringevils of greater magnitude than those sought to besuppressed. The exercise of this power will sometimes bereviewed by the appellate court, but never "unless

capriciously exercised or abused." As the statutes in mostof the states purport to give the plaintiff a right toexecution for a definite period of time after the entry ofjudgment in his favor, it seems unreasonable to maintainthat any court has a right to restrict this right or tointerfere with its exercise, even for a temporary period,except for some well-defined reason, and therefore thatthe many orders made granting stays of executionwithout disclosing any other ground therefor than thedesire or convenience of the applicant ought not to besustained. While it was in one instance said that "plaintiffhaving obtained his judgment, is entitled to enforce itunless it be set aside or modified in due course of law,"we infer that this apparently reasonable assertion is notmaintainable under the existing decisions, and that onthe other hand, each court may grant temporary stays ofexecution during which time the plaintiff has no right to awrit for the enforcement of his judgment, and no remedyother than by appeal or writ of error, and that theseremedies will not aid him, except where there has been amanifest abuse of the discretion of the court in grantingthe stay."