gpsea - democracy in malaysia fact or fiction

Student name: Muhammad Harris bin Zainul Student ID number: 619019 Course title: Government and Politics of Modern Southeast Asia Course code: A14/15 Tutor’s name: Dr Michael Buehler Question: How far do the 2008 election results reflect a deepening of democracy in Malaysia since the reformasi period? Paper title: A Post-‐2008 Democratic Malaysia: Fact or Fiction? Word count: 5000 Introduction

This essay attempts to demonstrate that although the Opposition’ Pakatan Rakyat had

gained a significant amount of states in the 2008 and 2013 General Elections (GE), it

does not reflect a wider deepening of democracy in Malaysia. This is proven through

evidence that despite the greater Opposition representation in Malaysia’s bicameral

legislature, there is a continued suppression of various civil liberties needed for a

healthy democracy.

Democracy

Abraham Lincoln described a democracy as being ‘government of the people, for the

people, by the people’. Democracy concerns both political and civil rights. The former

consists of inter alia, the right of participation in civil society and politics, and the right

to vote. Meanwhile, civil rights comprises of protections against discrimination, freedom

of speech and expression, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of movement.1

Although Malaysian citizens had enjoyed universal suffrage from the outset of Malaya’s

creation – Malaysia is still described as a ‘semi-‐democratic’ regime because of the limits

it places of civil and political liberties. This is attributed to the Barisan National’s (BN)

1 http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Civil_and_political_rights.html (accessed 9 December 2014)

strategic use of restrictions on certain freedoms such as on communications and

assembly, and also through the manipulation and abuse of legislations. In this type of

regime, a transfer of power is always possible – although highly unlikely.2 This is

because although elections occur at regular intervals, it is considered ‘only partially free

and not fair’.3

On the other hand, Syamsuddin Taya tries to place Malaysia’s ‘semi-‐democratic’ regime

in perspective to her ASEAN neighbours. Through this comparative lens, the state of

Malaysia’s democracy looks healthy because it lacks the political violence often

associated with Marcos’ Philippines and martial Thailand. Taya evidences his claim of a

healthy democracy by stating that in the 2008 GE, the BN not only lost Selangor, Penang,

Kedah and Perak, as well as Kelantan, but also their two-‐thirds majority.4

The Reformasi movement

Malaysian opposition politics has always been synonymous with Anwar Ibrahim – the

once former deputy prime minister of Mahathir Mohamad. This movement had emerged

out of the rakyat’s dissatisfaction with the BN government who had ousted, arrested and

imprisoned Anwar with what many thought were dubious charges of sodomy and

corruption. His arrest is said to be a watershed moment in Malaysian politics as it

galvanised the Malay society who had long been accustomed to UMNO’s claim to protect

Malay interests.5

2 Bridget Welsh, 1996. ‘Attitudes toward Democracy in Malaysia: Challenges to the Regime?.’ In Asian Survey 36 (9):884. 3 Zurairi AR, 2013. “GE13 ‘partially free but not fair’, say think thanks”, The Malaysian Insider, 8 May 2013. 4 Syamsuddin Taya, 2010. ‘Political Legal Perspective: Evaluating Human Rights in Malaysia.’ In Asian Journal of Social Science 38:487. 5 Sheila Nair, 2007. ‘The Limits of Protest and Prospects for Political Reform in Malaysia.’ In Critical Asian Studies 39 (3):351.

Although the Reformasi movement started as non-‐partisan, this changed following the

arrest of the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) Reformasi leaders Tian Chua, Mohamad Ezam

Mohamad Nor, Saari Sungib, Badrul Ambin Baharon, Lokman Adam, Abdul Ghani Harun,

and N. Gobalakrishnan.6

Meredith Weiss attributes the success of the Reformasi movement to its ability to

activate what she describes as, “the latent stores of social and coalitional capital” by

appealing to various civil society agents (CSA). These CSA had gradually introduced new

political norms to the rakyat, and helped convince them that the moment seems

propitious for change.7 This, she describes as being the most important difference

between the Reformasi movement and previous movements, namely that the Reformasi

movement has a relatively new cluster of pro-‐democracy organisations.8

The Reformasi movement has undoubtedly improved the quality of democracy in

Malaysia through the introduction of democratic ideals to the Malaysian public.

However, as this paper will later demonstrate, it has not done enough to make Malaysia

a democratic country.

The Malaysian 2008 and 2013 General Elections

This section of the paper seeks to demonstrate that there is a strengthening of

democracy in Malaysia when it concerns legislative representation.

In the 2008 GE, the BN had seen a severe reduction in its dominance. In the GE four

years earlier, the BN had won 92% of the 219 parliamentary seats, and all state elections

except Kelantan. On the other hand, in 2008 the BN barely managed to get half of the

6 Ibid:353-‐354. 7 Meredith Weiss, 2006. ‘Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia’ (Stanford University Press) page 4. 8 Ibid:19.

7.9million ballots cast and lost the popular vote in Peninsular Malaysia where they only

managed to garner 49% of the ballots. The BN also lost four important states; Selangor,

Penang, Perak and Kedah to the Opposition. The losses in Selangor and Penang were

indicative of the loss of support for the BN by the better educated urban middle class.9

What is arguably the sweetest victory for opposition supporters in the 2008 GE is the

defeat of S. Samy Vellu, the president of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) for three

decades, and had held the Sungai Siput seat in Perak for eight terms.10

Although the swing in Opposition support is impressive as a whole, two events merit

closer analysis. Firstly, the 2008 Pakatan win in Kedah deserves comment because it is

the first time the opposition had won in this Malay-‐majority state. This win is

particularly impressive when considering that the people in Kedah had long benefitted

from UMNO’s pro-‐farmer subsidy policies.11 However, in the 2013 GE, the BN had

managed to wrest control of the Kedah state from Pakatan. This is partially due to its

infighting and PAS’ conservative Islamic policies that did not bode well with the

Kedahans. This is reflected in BN winning ten of the fifteen parliamentary seats, and

twenty-‐one out of thirty-‐six state seats in Kedah.12

Although Kedah is now governed by the BN, it evidences a healthy democracy in the

state as the rakyat are willing to change their ruling governments should they not

perform as expected.

9 Johan Savaranamuttu, 2008. ‘A Tectonic Shift in Malaysian Politics’. In March 8 Eclipsing May 13 (ISEAS Publishing) pages 52-‐53. 10 Kee Thuan Chye, 2008. ‘Merdeka On March 8’. In March 8 The Day Malaysia Woke Up (Marshall Cavendish Editions) page 28, 11 Savaranamuttu 2008:61. 12 http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/ge13/13th-‐malaysian-‐general-‐election-‐result.html (accessed 10 December 2014)

Additionally, during the 2008 GE, Dr Awang Adek, UMNO’s designated Mentri Besar for

Kelantan had lost both his state seat of Perupok and his parliamentary seat in Bacok. Dr

Adek lost despite his strong federal backing, and promises for setting up a Kelantan

University. This loss warrants a mention because it demonstrates a rejection of the lure

of development that had oftentimes translated to ballots.13

Meanwhile in the 2013 GE, the BN managed to form the federal government although it

lost the popular vote for the first time in history – managing to obtain only 46.5% of the

ballots. However, it is pivotal to note that 11.25 million voters or 84.84% of those

eligible to vote had exercised their rights in the 2013 GE. This makes it the highest

percentage of participation in any GE in Malaysia.14

Although still far from perfect – with allegations of phantom voters, blackouts during the

vote counting process, and attempts to smuggle in additional ballot boxes – when

political rights concerning legislative representation, and electorate turnout are

concerned; Malaysian democracy has never been in a healthier state.

As evidenced in Kedah, there is a culture of voting out the incumbent if they do not

perform as expected. Additionally, although the BN government had lost the popular

vote in 2013, the country demonstrated deference towards democracy to accept the

results of the ballots and not descend into racial riots that had plagued the Opposition

victory in 1969.

The Malaysian Election Commission

13 Savaranamuttu 2008:64. 14 The Straits Times, 2013. “Malaysia GE13: Record 85% turnout for polls; BN gets 46.5% of popular vote”, 6 May 2013.

This part of the paper seeks to demonstrate that the Malaysian Election Commission

(EC) is not independent and is often influenced by the ruling government at the expense

of democratic values.

For an EC to carry out its basic duties within a competitive political system, it has to be

regarded as generally or sufficiently fair by all groups. To achieve this, the EC has to

meet two criteria; one, that the EC is competent to carry out its functions. Secondly, it

also has to be impartial when conducting its duties, making its independence a pivotal

element.15

The non-‐partisanship of the EC is questionable after the events of April 2002. The EC

had then sought to amend the electoral laws in response to a court decision that

annulled the 1999 Likas state constituency election due to the presence of phantom

voters on the electoral roll. Dismayed that the election can be voided, the EC initiated

amendments to preclude judicial intervention in the legality of electoral rolls. The

amended Section 9A of the Elections Act 1958 now provides that an electoral roll “shall

be deemed to be final and binding and shall not be questioned or appealed against in, or

reviewed, quashed, or set aside by any court”.16

This amendment removes one of the most basic tenets of a democracy, the separation of

powers. This tenet provides for a system of checks and balances within the different

branches of government to ensure accountability and transparency. With this in mind,

the amendment clearly demonstrates the lack of respect paid by the EC towards to the

functions of a judiciary in a democratic country.

15 Lim Hong Hai, 2005. ‘Making the System Work: The Election Commission’. In Elections and Democracy (Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) page 250. 16 Lim 2005:256.

On the other hand, the Elections Act 1958 was amended to increase the maximum

compensation payable for an objection to the registration of another if it was found to

be made without reasonable cause from two hundred ringgit to one hundred ringgit.

Moreover, the same Act was amended to raise the deposit payable from five thousand

ringgit to twenty thousand ringgit. The Elections Offences Act 1954 was also amended to

increase the ceiling of electoral spending from thirty thousand to one hundred thousand

ringgit for a state seat, and from fifty thousand to a maximum of two hundred thousand

for a Parliamentary seat.17

The implications of these amendments is not limited to deterring smaller, less funded

parties from participating in elections. It also increases the risk of money politics that

will only benefit the better-‐funded political parties linked to the BN government. The

reduction of participatory politics is another sign of the deterioration of democracy in

Malaysia.

Not limited to questionable amendments of legislations, the EC was also criticised for its

use of the infamous not-‐so-‐indelible ink in the 2013 GE. This event is farcical to say the

least, especially in how it played out and the subsequent statements issued by the EC

following the criticisms.

A month before the GE, on 11th April 2013, Bernama reported that the EC chief, Tan Sri

Abdul Aziz Yusof had commented that the National Fatwa Council had given the green

light for the use of indelible ink in the upcoming elections. Additionally, the Health

Ministry and Chemistry Department had declared the use of the ink to be safe. However,

17 Lim 2005:256-‐257.

when the Election Day came, the voters were dismayed that the indelible ink could be

easily washed off with soap, toothpaste, and even in some cases, grass.18

Responding to this criticism, the EC stated that the indelible ink that was used had a

different strength compared to those used in other countries owing to the fact that it

had to comply with both halal and health regulations. Additionally, the EC chairman told

reporters that an official letter from the Ministry of Health had stated that the content of

silver nitrate within the ink must not exceed 1%. This is because a higher content of

silver nitrate could cause internal organ failure.19

This official account clearly contradicts the earlier statements issued by the EC which

had stated that the National Fatwa Council had approved of its halal status. On the other

hand, the claim of a higher silver nitrate content is dangerous is also questionable at

best as the United Nations Development Program had stated that the best practice is to

use a “form of indelible ink based on a silver nitrate solution of 5-‐25%”.20

This event is an obvious breach of trust and faith from the rakyat with the EC, and also

violates the spirit of Article 114 of the Federal Constitution that made the EC

responsible for carrying out elections in the full spirit of democracy without fear or

favor.21

The Malaysian legislations

18 Kasthuriraani Patto, 2013. “Malaysians let down by ‘indelible’ ink scandal”. (accessed 10 December 2014) <http://anilnetto.com/malaysian-‐politics/malaysian-‐elections/the-‐indelible-‐ink-‐scandal/> 19 Zurairi AR, 2013. “Halal status affected indelible ink’s strength, says EC”, The Malaysian Insider, 5 May 2013. 20 http://unpcdc.org/media/222605/undp-‐procurement-‐guide-‐post-‐conflict-‐elections_2005.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014) 21 Kasthuriraani Patto, 2013. “Malaysians let down by ‘indelible’ ink scandal”. (accessed 10 December 2014) <http://anilnetto.com/malaysian-‐politics/malaysian-‐elections/the-‐indelible-‐ink-‐scandal/>

In a democracy, a country subscribes to the rule of law. One of the canons of the rule of

law is that only one set of laws should apply to its citizens, and the presence of the

Sharia court and Sharia laws are in a clear violation of this. Moreover, unelected

religious scholars who are making binding fatwas on the Muslim population circumvent

the democratic law making process. Additionally, it is also an offence to question the

validity of these oftentimes-‐absurd fatwas.22

Additionally, over the years there has been an increase in the erosion of women’s rights

when it concerns Sharia law. For example in Kedah, the old Section 17(3)(i) of the Kedah

Islamic Family Law 1984 requires a man to prove that the requested polygamy marriage

is not only necessary, but just. Section 13(3)(ii)(b) of the same Act then requires “equal

treatment to all wives” as a criterion before allowing polygamy. Despite this paper citing

the relevant Kedah state Sharia legislation, similar ones around found in every other

state in Malaysia with the exception of Kelantan. The then strict nature of polygamy is

evidenced in Ruzaini bin Hassan’s application for polygamy in the High Court of Negeri

Sembilan in 2001. Here, the court dismissed his application on financial affordability

grounds.23

However, this position was changed when the aforementioned state Sharia laws were

replaced at the turn of the millennium. The new Sharia family law statutes codify men’s

entitlements at the expense of women’s rights. For example, Selangor’s Islamic Family

Law 2003 made applications for polygamy more lenient. This was achieved through

removing the requirement to satisfy both necessity, and just elements and instead

making it sufficient to satisfy either one.

22 For example, the fatwa banning yoga over fears that it might corrupt Muslims. 23 Maznah Mohamad, 2014. ‘Women, Family and Syariah in Malaysia’. In Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People (SIRD Publishing) page 182.

Not only does the new Sharia law infringe upon women’s civil rights, the Sharia courts

also oftentimes demonstrated blatant double standards when coming to its decisions.

This can be evidenced by analysis the standard of proof required in the Hasnah v Yusoff,

and Halijah binti Abu Talib v Mohd Nadzir bin Salleh case. In the former, the mere act of

defiance in following the husband’s orders was deemed to be sufficient grounds for

divorce. Meanwhile in the latter, the wife had to bring five witnesses to evidence the

neglect and abusive behavior of the husband before a consideration for divorce could be

made.24

When comparing the pre-‐2000 Sharia law with the current one, it is evident that there

has not been a deepening of democracy when it concerns Sharia law. Instead, there are

reasonable concerns that the state of democracy in Malaysia is on a decline especially

when considered in light of the reaction to the “I Want To Touch A Dog” fiasco of this

year25.

Unfortunately, undemocratic legislations is not exclusive to Sharia law in Malaysia, as

there are other legislations that are often used to extend the interests of the ruling

government. The most infamous of which is arguably the draconian Internal Security Act

(ISA). Before the Najib government ultimately replaced it, the ISA allowed for detention

without trial. This infamous draconian law has been used on almost all of the Opposition

leaders including, Anwar Ibrahim, Karpal Singh, and Lim Guan Eng.

While the new Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) that replaces the

ISA is no doubt an improvement, it is by no means a guarantee of Malaysians’ basic

rights will be protected. This is the case despite the Attorney General’s claims that

24 Mohamad 2014:186. 25 Thomas Fuller, 2014. “Want To Touch A Dog? In Malaysia It’s a Delicate Subject”, New York Times, 26 October 2014.

Subsection 4(3) of SOSMA provides that no person is to be arrested under the Act solely

for his political belief or political identity. The Malaysian Bar Council had pointed out

that the extension of the detention period should not be in the purview of a police officer

of or above the rank of Superintendent, but instead, subjected to judicial oversight.

Additionally, Lim Chee Wee, the Bar Council President has made known his reservations

about the definition of a security offence as being too wide.26

The fear of abusing the broad definition of ‘security offence’ is not unfounded – the ISA

had also stated in its preamble that it is only meant to combat “a substantial body of

persons” intent on overthrowing the government by unlawful means.27

On the other hand, the Peaceful Assembly Bill replaced the Police Act 1967 which had

been used to arrest more than 1600 protestors during the Bersih 2.0 rally. Similar to

SOSMA, Najib’s reforms fall short of granting Malaysians a guarantee of their

fundamental liberties. This is attributed to the Bill granting wide powers to authorities

to classify behaviours as illegal or dangerous.28

For example, the Bill allows the police to impose restrictions relating to “the manner of

the assembly” and “the conduct of participants during the assembly”. Additionally, there

are no reasonableness or proportionality requirements, allowing the police to

effectively control the topic of the protest. The deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s

Asia Division, Phil Roberson, described the Bill as a ‘cruel joke’29 on Malaysian civil

society.30

26 http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/the_heat_is_on_sosma.html (accessed 13 December 2014) 27 Ding Jo-‐Ann and Jacqueline Ann Surin, 2011. ‘Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 2011.’ (Centre for Independent Journalism) page 18. 28 Ibid:20. 29 Phil Robertson, 2011. “Political Bait and Switch Trumps Rights Reform in Malaysia”. Human Rights Watch, (accessed 13th December 2014)

Lastly, the Sedition Act 1948, a draconian law that allows the police to investigate

people doing anything that has a “seditious tendency”. The problem with this legislation

that leads to abuse is the absurdly broad definition of the words “seditious tendencies”.

In 2014 alone, N. Surendran, Teresa Kok, Nizar Jamaluddin, Khalid Samad, RSN Rayer,

and Rafizi Ramli, all opposition politicians had been charged under the Sedition Act.

More worrisome, Azmi Sharom, a University of Malaya law professor, Susan Loone, a

Malaysiakini journalist had also been charged.31

This demonstrates the Najib government’s lack of deference to dissenting voices,

instead, opting to muzzle them through intimidation. This is despite Najib’s promise to

repeal the Sedition Act and replacing it with the National Harmony Bill. Political

commentators’ reservations on Najib’s honesty in seeing this through were

subsequently substantiated when Najib declared that the Sedition Act would remain

during the 2014 UMNO General Assembly at Putra World Trade Centre.32

The circumvention of the democratic law making process through binding fatwas and

also the discriminatory Sharia courts infringes upon the civil liberties guaranteed in a

democratic country. In a wider context, the continued abuse of the aforementioned

legislations demonstrates that although the Opposition has been making steady gains in

the GE, the state of Malaysian democracy in respect to civil liberties leaves much to be

wanted for.

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/16/political-‐bait-‐and-‐switch-‐trumps-‐rights-‐reform-‐malaysia> 30 Ding and Surin 2011:20. 31 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/14/malaysia-‐sedition-‐act-‐wielded-‐silence-‐opposition (accessed 13th December 2014) 32 Anisah Shukry and Eileen Ng, 2014. “Sedition Act stays, says Najib”, The Malaysian Insider, 27 November 2014.

The Malaysian judiciary

An impartial judiciary is one of the hallmarks of a democratic country. This is because

only then can judges provide fair and impartial justice. The need for the judiciary to be

independent from the government is due to its responsibility to protect citizens against

unlawful acts of government.33

Sadly, the situation concerning the Malaysian judiciary is far from this idealistic

description. The V. K. Lingam tapes evidence this claim. The aforementioned tapes were

a short, but comprehensive video showing V. K. Lingam, a prominent lawyer in KL,

boasting on the telephone about how he brokered the appointment of judges.34

This lead to approximately 1200 lawyers, Opposition politicians, and also civil society

actors to hand a memorandum to the Prime Minister in what was later billed the “Walk

for Justice”. The memorandum demanded that a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) be

set up to investigate the authenticity of the video and also the state of the judiciary.35

Although today the judiciary is generally regarded to be subservient to the ruling

government, there was a spate of cases in the late 1980s where judges had ruled against

the Government’s interests. These decisions angered Mahathir, the then Prime Minister

and lead to verbal assaults on the Judiciary and also the amendment of Article 121 of the

Federal Constitution. The latter is important because it took away the power of the

judiciary to determine its own jurisdiction, and instead placed it in the hands of the

legislature.36

33 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-‐the-‐judiciary/the-‐judiciary-‐the-‐government-‐and-‐the-‐constitution/jud-‐acc-‐ind/independence/ (accessed 14th December 2014) 34 Azmi Sharom, 2008. ‘We Need To Correct, Correct, Correct The Judiciary’. In March 8 The Day Malaysia Woke Up (Marshall Cavendish Editions) page 228. 35 Ibid:229. 36 Ibid:230.

Following this, the then Lord President, Salleh Abas had wrote a letter to the King

requesting that His Majesty to stop Mahathir’s accusations and comments against the

judiciary. 37

Mahathir argued that the act amounted to misconduct, and subsequently created a

special tribunal on the matter. The composition of the tribunal itself was questionable as

it was headed by the acting Lord President Hamid Omar, the man who would become

lord president if Salleh Abas were to be found guilty. The blatant conflict of interests

that would impinge on Salleh Abas’ rights to a fair hearing obviously did not matter to

Mahathir then.38

Salleh Abas had sought to challenge the constitutional propriety of this tribunal in the

High Court, and subsequently in the Federal Court. When the Federal Court had granted

the stay requested, the acting lord president sacked George Seah and Wan Suleimen, two

of the senior judges who heard the appeal in the Federal Court.39

After the Salleh Abas’ appeal was disposed of, he was subsequently sacked. This lead to

what Azmi Sharom describes as a “slide into the state of ignominy for the Malaysian

judiciary”. This is best evidenced by the High Court judge, Muhammad Kamil Awang’s

final case before retirement on the legality of a by-‐election where he had stated in open

court that he had been instructed to rule in favour of the government.40

Although Abdullah Badawi had issued an apology and offered ex gratia payments to the

unfairly dismissed senior judges, the RCI’s recommendations to try those who were

37 Ibid:231. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

linked to the V. K. Lingam tapes were not taken up. 41This demonstrates the continued

impunity to prosecution enjoyed by the ruling elite where even the administration of

justice is subservient to their private interests.

Another issue that had plagued the Malaysian judiciary is the inconsistency of judges

recusing themselves for perceived or actual bias. In PP v Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor, the

judge had recused himself on grounds that His Lordship’s brother was the head of the

prosecution service and had signed the charge against the accused. This demonstrates

that His Lordship had taken seriously public perception for perceived bias.42

Contradictingly in Bumicrystal Technology v Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd, the judge had

refused to recuse himself although the PAS-‐led government owned one of the parties in

the case and His Lordship had previously been a legal adviser for UMNO.43

The lack of judicial certainty will undoubtedly erode the administration of justice and to

a greater extent the civil liberties guaranteed in a democracy.

Moreover, there has also been outcry over the lack of written judgments in Federal

Court cases concerning the Perak Crisis. Edmund Bon, a prominent Malaysian human

rights lawyer had stated that; “written judgments are important as matters concerning

public interest and constitutional importance must be sufficiently explained and

reasoned”.44

41 Ibid:232-‐233. 42 Edmund Bon, 2010. ‘Bias, Public Perception and Recusal: Judicial Consistency At Last?’. In Perak: A State of Crisis (LoyarBurok Publications) page 7. 43 Ibid:8. 44 Edmund Bon, 2010. ‘Tell Us Why, Please?’. In Perak, A State of Crisis (LoyarBurok Publications) pages 39-‐40.

The absence of well-‐reasoned legal judgments in important public interest cases only

goes to further reduce the Malaysian public’s confidence that the judiciary is free from

political interference.

The Malaysian media

No paper on Malaysian democracy is complete without an analysis of the Malaysian

media. This is because “deep-‐rooted press freedom is not just important but essential to

a functioning free democratic society”. The justification of this is that without a free

media, the public will not be fully able to make a learned choice in elections thus

degrading the quality of democracy.45

In Jason Abott’s Electoral Authoritarianism, he sought to code political bias in two

Malay, two Chinese-‐language, and two English language newspapers during two

separate month-‐long periods. The first period coincides with the 12th GE in 2008, and

the second which acts as a control, in the same date period in 2006, representing a

midpoint in the Malaysian electoral cycle.46

The Malay newspapers chosen for his study was Berita Harian, which was founded on

the same day Malaya gained its independence in 1957. Following numerous takeovers,

Media Prima now owns it. Although throughout its existence it was in private hands,

there has always been a close link to UMNO through close personal connections and

share ownership.47

45 https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-‐commentary/-‐complex-‐links-‐between-‐free-‐press-‐and-‐functioning-‐democracy-‐/s6/a553464/ (accessed 14th December 2014) 46 Jason Abbott, 2011. ‘Electoral Authoritarianism and the Print Media in Malaysia: Measuring Political Bias and Analyzing Its Cause’. In Asian Affairs: An American Review 38:3. 47 Ibid:5.

On the other hand, in the 1960s Utusan Malaysia had been a fair newspaper. Initial

attempts by UMNO to influence editorial policy was met with a strike by its editor, Said

Zahari. When UMNO took over Utusan Malaysia, Zahari argued that it represented “the

death of the press”. True enough to his predictions, Utusan Malaysia today is viewed as

one of the most pro-‐government papers in circulation.48

Measuring opposition bias from the 2006 data sets show that the opposition barely

received any column inches in either newspapers. For example, out of the 472 items

evaluated in Utusan Malaysia for 2006, only 10 contained an opposition bias. The Berita

Harian finding closely mirrors this. In contrast, the 2008 analysis shows a large spike in

the number of articles with an opposition bias. Out of the 515 items coded in Utusan

Malaysia, 194 had an opposition bias. On the other hand, 265 of the 380 items coded in

Berita Harian carried an opposition bias.49

This shows the effective strategy employed by the UMNO controlled media, to not only

push for biased articles to be publish, but also to severely limit any sort of political

coverage for the opposition during non-‐election times.

Not limited to that, the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) 1984 also restricts

the freedom of the press. Section 3 of the Act requires all publications to apply for an

annual permit from the Home Ministry – which can be refused, revoked, or suspended at

the Home Minister’s discretion without the option of a judicial review. Moreover,

Section 7 allows the government to ban the publication, circulation, or import of any

books that it deems to be either prejudicial to public order, or morality, or security.50

48 Ibid:17. 49 Ibid:8. 50 Ibid:15.

The unfettered nature of powers awarded to the Home Minister by the PPPA is

worrisome as it leaves it open to abuse. This is seen when PAS was forced to restrict the

publication of its Harakah newspaper from biweekly to bimonthly. Additionally, Sin

Chew Daily and The Star had their licenses revoked during the racial tensions of 1987.51

However, it is also important to note that Pakatan Rakyat does not have clean hands

when it comes to press freedom either. The Selangor Times demonstrates this due to the

presence of the Selangor Mentri Besar’s political secretary and his press secretary as

advisors who vet the paper before it goes to print. Although admittedly there has been

no evidence of political interference, it is still potentially problematic from the point of

view of press freedom52.

This arguably demonstrates that Pakatan understands the needs for the freedom of the

press greater than the BN coalition. It is submitted that without a truly free press, a

democratic Malaysia is only a pipedream. A healthy democracy requires the freedom of

speech, and any sort of restrictions is severely frowned upon.

Conclusion

Although in the 12th and 13th GE the Pakatan Rakyat had been steadily increasing its

representation in both State and Parliamentary seats – one could argue that it is not

reflective of a wider trend of the democratisation of Malaysia. Prime Minister Najib’s

backtracking on his previous promise to democratise Malaysia through the replacement

of the Sedition Act demonstrates this perfectly.

While Najib has to be credited to some extend for the replacement of the Police Act and

the ISA, his half-‐hearted attempts at democratic reform leaves much to be desired for. 51 Ibid. 52 Ding and Surin 2011:52.

The broad unreasonable provisions found within both the Peaceful Assembly Bill and

SOSMA do not contain the necessary safeguards for democratic civil liberties.

On the other hand, the farcical nature of the EC with reference to the use of indelible ink

also places another dark spot on the state of democracy in Malaysia. Lastly, the

continued use of the media as a tool for government propaganda, while muzzling

legitimate dissent demonstrates the lack of deference towards the freedom of speech

necessary for a healthy democracy.

Bibliography Books Ding, Jo Ann and Jacqueline Ann Surin. 2011. Freedom of expression in Malaysia 2011. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Independent Journalism. Gomez, Edmund. 2004. The state of Malaysia: Ethnicity, equity and reform. London: Routledge/Curzon. Ooi, Kee Beng. 2009. Arrested reform: The undoing of Abdullah Badawi. Kuala Lumpur: Research for Social Advancement. Rahman, Rashid. 1994. The conduct of elections in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing. Thayaparan, S. 2014. No country for righteous men and other essays in a culture of offendedness. Petaling Jaya: SIRD Centre. Weiss, Meredith. 2006. Protest and possibilities: Civil society and coalitions for political change in Malaysia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chapters from edited volumes Bon, Edmund. 2010. “Tell us why, please?”. In Perak, a state of crisis, edited by Audrey Quay Sook Lyn, 39-‐44. Malaysia: LoyarBurok Publications. Bon, Edmund. 2010. “Bias, public perception and recusal: Judicial consistency at last?”. In Perak, a state of crisis, edited by Audrey Quay Sook Lyn, 7-‐10. Malaysia: LoyarBurok Publications. Harun, Art, 2010. “The Perak ‘may’hem – a simplistic view”. In Perak, a state of crisis, edited by Audrey Quay Sook Lyn, 31-‐38. Malaysia: LoyarBurok Publications. Kee, Thuan Chye. 2008. “Merdeka on March 8”. In March 8 the day Malaysia woke up, edited by Kee Thuan Chye, 24-‐35. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions. Lim, Hong Hai. 2005. “Making the system work: The election commission”. In Elections and democracy, edited by Mavis Puthucheary and Norani Othman, 249-‐291. Bangi: Penerbit University Kebangsaan Malaysia. Mohamad, Maznah. 2014. “Women, family and syariah in Malaysia”. In Misplaced democracy: Malaysian politics and people, edited by Sophie Lemiere, 175-‐192. Petaling Jaya: SIRD Centre. Ong, Kian Ming. 2008. “Making sense of the political tsunami”. In Political tsunami: An end to hegemony in Malaysia?, edited by Nathaniel Tan and John Lee, 1-‐12. Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks. Savaranamuttu, Johan. 2008. “A tectonic shift in Malaysian politics”. In March 8 eclipsing May 13, edited by Ooi Kee Beng, Johan Savaranamuttu and Lee Hock Guan, 33-‐79. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Sharom, Azmi. 2008. “We need to correct, correct, correct the judiciary”. In March 8 the day Malaysia woke up, edited by Kee Thuan Chye, 24-‐35. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions.

Weiss, Meredith. 2014. “Introduction: Patterns and puzzles in Malaysian electoral dynamics”. In Electoral dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the grassroots, edited by Meredith Weiss, 1-‐17. Malaysia and Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Journal articles Abbott, Jason. 2011. “Electoral authoritarianism and the print media in Malaysia: Measuring political bias and analysing its cause”. Asian Affairs: An American Review 38:1-‐38. Nair, Sheila. 2007. “The limits of protest and prospects for political reform in Malaysia”. Critical Asian Studies 39 (3):339-‐368. Taya, Syamsuddin. 2010. “Political legal perspective: Evaluating human rights in Malaysia”. Asian Journal of Social Science 38:485-‐504. Welsh, Bridget. 1996. “Attitudes towards democracy in Malaysia: Challenges to the regime?”. Asian Survey 36 (9):882-‐903. Newspaper articles The Straits Times. 2013. “Malaysia GE13: Record 85% turnout for polls; BN gets 46.5% of popular vote”, 6 May 2013. Fuller, Thomas. 2014. “Want to touch a dog? In Malaysia it’s a delicate subject”. New York Times, 26 October 2014. Robertson, Phil. 2011. “Political bait and switch trumps rights reform in Malaysia”. Human Rights Watch, 16 December 2011. Shukry, Anisah and Eileen Ng. 2014. “Sedition Act stays, says Najib”. The Malaysian Insider, 27 November 2014. Zurairi, AR. 2013. “Halal status affected indelible ink’s strength, says EC”, The Malaysian Insider, 5 May 2013. Zurairi, AR. 2013. “GE13 ‘partially free but not fair’, say think tanks”. The Malaysian Insider, 8 May 2013. Public documents United Nations Development Programme. 2005. Procurement Guide For Elections In Post Conflict Countries.

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