EDITORIAL

Governing water in federal river basins

Lucia De Stefano1,2& Dustin E. Garrick3

Received: 3 July 2018 /Accepted: 3 July 2018 /Published online: 13 July 2018# Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Managing freshwater resources across political borders pre-sents a fundamental challenge for regional environmentalgovernance. The misalignment between river basin bound-aries and political borders contributes to intense disputes overwater resource allocation between neighbouring jurisdictions.In federal political systems, disputes over water may beexploited by politicians to secure electoral gains or pursueconstitutional changes. In devolved or decentralised politicalsystems, water often is a source of dispute, and water politicscan become a reflection of the wider political dynamics(Moore 2018). Rapid social, economic and environmentalchange presents ‘stress tests’ in such settings, illustratinghow politics, institutions and governance matter. This specialissue examines water governance across political borders infederal countries.

Democratisation after the SecondWorldWar spread federalpolitical systems to almost all democracies with large popula-tions and extensive territory. Federal political systems distrib-ute authority between national and subnational governments.Water governance in federations involves important roles forboth national governments and subnational jurisdictions,1 of-ten granting considerable autonomy to the latter (Moore2018). At the same time, political jurisdictions are connectedby the water cycle, particularly in shared river basins, which

means that riparian states are affected by actions upstream anddownstream. Disputes and coordination challenges betweenstates are analogous to those confronted by sovereign coun-tries who share a river basin or aquifer. Unlike internationalriver basins, however, federations share a unifying politicalidentity, an overarching set of rules (e.g. constitution), bindinglegal mechanisms, enforcement capacity, and, often, conflictresolution mechanisms to address disputes between states.

Despite the importance of water governance in theworld’s 25federations, the topic has received limited attention before thepast 10 years. The oldest federations, such as Australia and theUSA, have been studied extensively. However, the relationshipbetween water and federalism has only recently attractedbroader interest. Briscoe (2014) highlighted the importance offederalism in water politics and governance and the need toaccount for (1) politics at all levels, (2) the influence of historyand path dependency, (3) the role of both informal and formalrules and practices and (4) context-specificity of policy lessonsand transfer. A series of additional studies have advanced ourunderstanding of horizontal (state-to-state) and vertical (state-federal) interactions within river basins in federal political sys-tems, illustrating how different jurisdictions behave opportunis-tically and depend on political and institutioanl safeguards tofoster cooperation and resolve disputes (Garrick et al. 2016).

Recent research has developed a global and comparativeperspective on water governance in federations, identifying‘federal rivers’ as a distinct type of transboundary riverbasin. Federal river basins include ‘major river basins’within or shared by a country with a federal political sys-tem (Garrick et al. 2013). Intergovernmental politics andcoordination challenges are a defining and common featureof such river basins (Garrick and De Stefano 2016). At thesame time, this category of river basin is diverse and variesin terms of their hydrological, economic and institutionalattributes. Federal rivers can involve different levels ofinstitutional fragmentation, including interstate river ba-sins shared by multiple states within a single country, largeriver basins falling completely within a single state(intrastate) or basins that span both state and internationalborders (Fig. 1).

1 Federations refer to sub-national jurisdictions with different terms: states,provinces, Länder, autonomous regions and cantons illustrate the range anddiversity of approaches.

* Lucia De Stefanoluciads@geo.ucm.es

Dustin E. Garrickdustin.garrick@ouce.ox.ac.uk

1 Departamento de Geodinámica, Estratigrafía y Paleontología,Facultad de Ciencias Geológicas, Universidad Complutense deMadrid, c/ José Antonio Nováis, 12, 28040 Madrid, Spain

2 Water Observatory, Botín Foundation, Madrid, Spain3 University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Regional Environmental Change (2018) 18:1573–1578https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1383-x

Previous work focused on systematic analysis of federalrivers, by mapping the world’s large rivers within or sharedby federations (Garrick et al. 2013), and developing an inter-disciplinary framework to assess and compare the evolutionand performance of different institutional and governance ap-proaches (Garrick and De Stefano 2016). With this specialissue, we strive to move a step further by examining theunique challenges associated with water governance in feder-ations and comparing different political dynamics and institu-tional responses.

Contributions to the special issue analyse distinct watermanagement challenges through the lenses of federalism andmulti-level water governance. The cases cover all six inhabitedcontinents (Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North and SouthAmerica) and a broad array of scales, from the river basin toentire countries and comparative studies (see Table 1 andFig. 1). The level of decentralisation varies from the case of ahighly decentralised political setting in Canada to the constitu-tionally unitary country in South Africa or a country like Spaindefined by some as a ‘quasi-federal’ political system.

Despite differences in methodological approaches and geo-graphic scope, the case studies share common features in their

analysis. All the papers focus on institutional mechanisms,governance arrangements and policy tools that are in placeto manage decision-making processes in a context of distrib-uted authority and institutional overlaps. Some articles ana-lyse water governance arrangements through comparison, ex-amining multiple countries or river basins in order to detectcommon trends and lessons learned from different settings(Benson 2018; De Stefano and Hernandez-Mora 2018;Garrick et al. 2018; Heinmiller 2018; Muller 2018; Wheeleret al. 2018). Several papers emphasise the importance of ob-serving institutional arrangements over time (Chokkakula2018; De Stefano and Hernandez-Mora 2018; Empinotti etal. 2018; Garrick et al. 2018), as decentralisation and intergov-ernmental relationships are constantly evolving to adapt tochanging societies and power dynamics.

Governance challenges

Water governance involves coordination challenges at alllevels from within households to global supply chains. Thisspecial issue examines the governance challenges relevant to

Fig. 1 The world’s federal rivers and geographical distribution of studies within this special issue. Numbers refer to articles and their numerical listing inTable 1. Source: Adapted from Garrick and De Stefano 2016

1574 L. De Stefano, D. E. Garrick

federal political systems, where the territorial division of au-thority contributes to institutional fragmentation and associat-ed distributional conflicts. This section highlights the majortypes of governance challenges across the studies in the spe-cial issue.

First, the distribution of authority between national andsubnational governments adds a layer of complexity to watergovernance and opens up the debate about the ‘most suitable’geographical unit of water resources management. Boundariesbetween political or administrative jurisdictions within federalcountries can almost be as critical as the borders betweencountries. De Stefano and Hernandez-Mora (2018) illustratethe heated disputes that emerged during the past decadearound the delineation of river basin district boundaries inSpain.2 Representation of regional governments in river basindistrict boards and commissions is proportional to the territoryof the basin district belonging to each region. Thus, someregional governments have repeatedly challenged the officialdecision in order to achieve the most favourable delineation.In India, a states’ territorial reorganisation in 1956 turned theMadras state (later renamed Tamil Nadu) into a non-riparianstate to Krishna river, and created a new riparian state (AndhraPradesh), thus changing the configuration of actors in theTelugu Ganga project (Chokkakula 2018). In Brazil, the

interbasin and interstate nature of the São Francisco transferscheme created complex power dynamics and in practicemeant that decision-making authority by river basin bodiesand states was overruled by federal authority (Empinotti etal. 2018). The river basin level is not automatically the pre-ferred scale for water governance; even when strong basininstitutions exist, basin-wide planning efforts may struggleto integrate sustainability and equity into interstate decisionmaking, particularly when water shortages are distributed un-evenly, as experienced in the Colorado river basin (Berggren2018).

Second, politics matters, but via distinct pathways that canbe analysed and sometimes quite predictable or cyclical. Therole of politics—and how it intertwines with water policy—clearly emerges as a common thread in several articles. Thus,Chokkakula (2018) illustrates the nexus of water infrastruc-ture politics and mainstream party politics in relation to theapproval and implementation of the Telugu Ganga project.The project was used by different political leaders both as away of creating territorial cohesion (by India’s government)and as a political weapon for opposition to the central author-ity (by states’ goverments). Muller (2018) in turn shows withseveral interstate and intrastate cases in Southern Africa theinfluence of different levels of government, economic lobbiesand donors in the performance of several water functions. DeStefano and Hernandez-Mora (2018) illustrate that subnation-al intergovernmental interactions over water in Spain often area reflection of relations in the broader political arena, wherethe model of political decentralisation currently is being

2 In the European Union, the implementation of the Water FrameworkDirective has required Member States to delineate ‘river basin district’ meantas the area of land and sea, made up of one or more neighbouring river basinstogether with their associated groundwater and coastal waters, which is iden-tified as the main unit for management of river basins.

Table 1 Main characteristics of the contributions to this special issue

# Contribution Geographical focus Approach Main issues

1 Benson (2018) Western USA andWestern Canada

Comparative(between two federal countries)

Revision of reservoir operation rules

2 Berggren (2018) Colorado basin (USA) Decision analysis and regressionmodelling

Basin-wide planning decisions

3 Chokkakula (2018) Krishna river basin(India)

Historical and policy analysis Conflict resolution mechanisms, nexusbetween politics and water policy

4 Cosens et al. (2018) Columbia basin(Canada and USA)

Legal analysis Recognition and reconciliation of FirstNations and Indigenous Peoples inbasin governance

5 De Stefano andHernandez-Mora (2018)

Spain Comparative (within country) Mechanisms for multi-level cooperation,drivers of conflict and cooperation

6 Empinotti et al. (2018) São Francisco watertransfer (Brazil)

Political ecology analysis Approval and construction of waterinfrastructure

7 Garrick et al. (2018) Australia, Spain andWestern USA

Comparativeinstitutional analysis

Water markets

8 Heinmiller (2018) Alberta and Saskatchewanprovinces (Canada)

Comparative(provinces within a federal river)

Water allocation rules

9 Muller (2018) South Africa and SouthernAfrican countries

Comparative Water resources planning, infrastructuredevelopment, systems managementunder drought

10 Wheeler et al. (2018) Colorado (USA) and MurrayDarling (Australia)

Comparative (between twofederal rivers)

Development and use of watermanagement models

Governing water in federal river basins 1575

questioned by some of the Spanish regions. The role of watergovernance in electoral politics raises important implicationsabout the need to account for electoral cycles and politics ininstitutional design.

Third, several papers shed light on the challenges ofrepresentation and accountability in decision making toaccount for subnational and local interests. Thus, Empinotti etal. (2018) start from the story of approval and implementation ofthe São Francisco water transfer. The formula used to determinerepresentation in decision-making bodies, as well as capacityasymmetries, can undermine participation and decentraliseddecisions in practice. The authors also remark the impact ofthe different speeds of Brazilian states in developing theirinstitutional capacity and how that hinders an effectivedecentralisation of water management. Berggren (2018) findsthat decision-making processes matter greatly to ensure thattrust, participation and legitimacy are built into basin-wide plan-ning efforts. The exclusion of key stakeholders can undermineaccountability and legitimacy. Accountability mechanisms areparticularly important for water reallocation in interstate riverbasins, as highlighted by Garrick et al. (2018); accessible infor-mation on reallocation and its impacts on other national andlocal policy goals underpins the legitimacy of water markets.

Fourth, the overlapping spheres of authority at the nationaland subnational levels exacerbate challenges of waterallocation. In a federal context, the division of authority notonly adds complexity but also opportunities for localinnovation and policy diffusion. Thus, Heinmiller (2018) ex-amines the role of federal and subnational governments inwater allocation in Canada, finding that high levels of decen-tralisation in the Canadian context can foster innovation tomatch allocation policy to local conditions. However, suchlocal autonomy can also pose constraints on interstate coordi-nation and accommodation of national interests, as exempli-fied by the comparison of reservoir operations policies in theUSA and Canada (Benson 2018). Garrick et al. (2018) startfrom a comparison of institutional arrangements to managewater trade in three federal countries (Australia, Spain andthe USA). They find that effective interstate and central-local coordination is needed regardless of the level of decen-tralisation to deal with the distributional conflicts associatedwith reallocating water across political borders in interstateriver basins.

Finally, federations pursue multiple, sometimes conflict-ing, goals. The challenges associated with reconciling envi-ronmental sustainability goals with other policy objectiveswithin a federal context are examined by several authors.Benson (2018) analyses legal and policy issues affectingpotential changes in reservoir operations as an adaptationstrategy in the western USA and southern Alberta in light ofthe distribution of authority in the two federal countries.Cosens et al. (2018) illustrate the confrontation of hydropowerversus salmon and development versus restoration present in

the negotiations of a new treaty on the Columbia river be-tween the USA and Canada. Their paper emphasises not onlythe complexity but also the opportunities posed by negotia-tions between two federal countries, including the increasingopening for ecosystem values and participation of FirstNations. De Stefano and Hernandez-Mora (2018) documentthe challenges associated with water policy goals evolvingtoward environmental sustainability in a context of changingpower dynamics due to evolving decentralisation. Berggren(2018) and Garrick et al. (2018) show how water allocation inlarge basins involves multiple objectives, which cannot simul-taneously be met, creating tension between upstream anddownstream jurisdictions and between human and environ-mental water uses as water is reallocated.

Responses to governance challenges

Responses to water governance challenges in federations cov-er a broad spectrum, from technical to legal or purely political.Finding ways of managing conflicts across subnational bor-ders in these diverse settings has required innovation, capacitybuilding and institutional arrangements to enable complex de-cision making and conflict resolution. Even in regions whereresponses have been effective, no solutions are permanent,echoing the findings of the Harvard Water FederalismInitiative (Briscoe 2014). The responses described in the pa-pers illustrate the importance of matching the governance ap-proach to the context, and ensuring adequate capacity forsubnational governments to address challenges before theyspread across jurisdictional boundaries.

First, information and knowledge sharing create platformsfor coordination and conflict resolution. Based on the experi-ence of the Colorado and the Murray Darling basins, Wheeleret al. (2018) observe that water resources models in federalgovernance structures act as ‘boundary objects’ to enable thesharing of knowledge across multiple state and national gov-ernments, stakeholder interests and disciplinary perspectivesto support river basin planning. They conclude their analysisby pointing out the importance of including stakeholderknowledge in the development of the models and of ensuringtransparency in how models are built and run in order to gainacceptance and relevance in participatory decision making.Their findings echo results from Spain, where De Stefanoand Hernandez-Mora (2018) identify the importance of build-ing capacity and coordination at the technical level to workacross jurisdictions.

Second, federalism can spur policy innovation and adapta-tion bymatching water governance closely to local conditions.This is evident in situations with high levels of decentralisa-tion, such as Canada. Heinmiller (2018) shows examples ofthis phenomenon through the comparison of water allocationarrangements of two Canadian provinces—Alberta and

1576 L. De Stefano, D. E. Garrick

Saskatchewan. Despite their proximity and being bound by ashared river, the states have found very different policy solu-tions to address water scarcity. The author underscores that thetwo provinces have only limited competition with each otherfor water at this stage, which has meant that decentralisationallows policy innovation for designing different approaches towater allocation well suited to the unique conditions in eachprovince. In the future, the differences in approaches mayprove more problematic if competition between the provincesincreases, requiring inter-provincial coordination.

Third, solutions to water governance often involve address-ing fundamental constitutional debates and wider political dis-putes. Brazil and Spain are both relatively young and evolvingfederal political systems where unresolved tensions at the con-stitutional level are profoundly intertwined with other policyconcerns. Thus, in Spain, at times tensions that manifest in thewater policy arena are rooted outside of it and should besolved as part of a broader debate about the political system.Along the same lines, asymmetric relations between Brazil’sfederal government and some states are symptoms of short-comings in the implementation of the decentralisation modelas a whole and not only of pitfalls of the design of the watergovernance system itself. Even countries with long historiesas federations confront recurring constitutional challenges dueto water disputes, as experienced in Australia during theMillennium Drought, leading to the creation of a new federalauthority to address basin-wide planning.

Fourth, coordination institutions are needed to facilitatecooperation and conflict resolution. Venues for effective inter-state cooperation can involve a range of informal and formalmechanisms. Reliance on courts alone is insufficient. It canprolong decisions and create winner-loser dynamics. This isthe case in Spain, where the constitutional and the supremecourts were asked to decide about distribution of authority andthe boundaries of water management units. In India,Chokkakula (2018) points out that venues for seeking coop-eration and coordination between states are included in theIndian law but few of them are actually in place and those thatexist have little legal capacity. Thus, focus is placed on con-flict management through interstate water disputes resolutionmechanisms—water tribunals—which in turn seem to be in-effective in finding long-term solution to disputes. Garrick etal. (2018) illustrate how coordination institutions are neededto address the conflicts and tensions associated with waterreallocation, particularly when water moves across state bor-ders or involves federal (national) acquisitions of water forenvironmental purposes. Regardless of the level of decentral-isation, a portfolio of coordination mechanisms has beenneeded for interstate water planning, financing infrastructureand sharing data.

Finally, the limitations of courts and formal coordinationvenues has underscored the importance of informal networksto bridge gaps. Thus, Cosens et al. (2018), Berggren (2018)

and De Stefano and Hernandez-Mora (2018) point out howthey can be used to build trust and foster cooperation in formalvenues. Finally, Muller (2018) remarks the role of informalinteractions of key governmental and nongovernmental actorsin contributing to effective (or not) performance of water gov-ernance functions such as infrastructure development andmanagement of droughts. All these authors also warn againstthe risks associated with the potential decrease in transparencyand accountability.

Future research directions

Federal rivers are a distinct type of transboundary river basin,but they are highly diverse. Together, the papers illustrate theevolving governance challenges in federations and the diver-sity of global experience responding to these challenges. Theexamples from the special issue highlight differences betweencases and over time for a set of key themes: decentralisedversus centralised governance, reliance on formal versus in-formal institutions for coordination and conflict resolution,and the need to balance basin-wide versus local decision mak-ing. Each of these issues illustrate the coordination challengesin federations.

The papers from the special issue suggest that federalism isan important variable in regional environmental politics andgovernance with implications for theory, evidence and prac-tice. Theoretically, federalism contributes to wider researchadvances on multi-level governance, and intersects with trans-disciplinary research on the governance of social-ecologicalsystems through networks, polycentric governancearrangements and hybrid approaches that blend markets,communities, states and transboundary institutions. Thesystems theory of federalism developed by Bednar (2008)identifies some of the key areas for future research. She arguesthat the distribution of authority and safeguards in federalpolitical systems are integral to problem solving and adapta-tion for complex societal challenges like water and the man-agement of other natural resources; a better understanding ofthe factors and institutions shaping conflict and cooperation infederations can yield insights for designing and evaluatingcoordination institutions to work across political borders andlevels of government as water scarcity, shortages and climateshocks intensify.

Empirically, there has been increasing attention by scholarsand practitioners to define—and measure—indicators of goodgovernance; the coordination issues in federations are oftenmissing from this analysis. Existing indicator frameworks fo-cus on national water policies and local capacity. The collect-ed papers on water governance in federations show that fed-eral rivers have specific coordination challenges, and oppor-tunities for innovation, that are relevant in these discussions.Future research on water governance indicators can focus on

Governing water in federal river basins 1577

coordination institutions for cooperation and conflict res-olution and identify, measure and compare their designand performance across different settings. Studies of wa-ter governance in federations cannot strictly rely on staticsnapshots, however, but should build observatories of in-stitutional adaptation that facilitate rigorous benchmarkingand evaluation over time. The studies in this special issueshow that diverse methods are used for such longitudinalanalysis, and there are opportunities for methodologicalinnovation and rigour in areas of process tracing, networkanalysis and multi-method approaches. Increasing analy-sis of historical institutional change and performance canidentify trajectories and trends that enrich understandingof adaptation and inform current and future institutionalreforms. Such research can also improve our understand-ing of the interplay of water politics, electoral politics andconstitutional changes in federations.

Key future research priorities will identify how federationsvary and how this variation influences patterns of conflict andcooperation in water governance. The special issue highlightssome of the emerging questions. How does decentralisationaffect distributional conflicts in water allocation and the adap-tive capacity to deal with rapid social, economic and environ-mental changes in shared river basins?What is the appropriateblend and sequencing of coordination institutions to facilitatecooperative development of river basins and negotiate trade-offs, and how do these vary across political, economic andenvironmental conditions? How are water politics linked withelectoral cycles and constitutional choices, and what are theimplications for water governance?

Addressing these questions will contribute to both researchand practice. It will require continued commitment to a multi-pronged research programme and community of practice, in-cluding initiatives such as the Forum of Federations FederalRivers project (www.federalrivers.org). Indicators of goodgovernance in federal political systems, assessments of casesover time and comparative research can offer an appropriateblend of depth and breadth to generate insights for regionalresponses to complex and contentious water policy challengesin a period of rapid change.

Acknowledgements The authors thank the following organisations andfunders for supporting an authors’ workshop in June 2016 at theUniversity of Colorado-Boulder: Social Sciences and HumanitiesResearch Council of Canada (Grant 611-2015-0464), Forum ofFederations, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, McMasterUniversity and the Getches-Wilkinson Centre for Natural ResourcesEnergy and the Environment of the University Colorado Law School.

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