governance chapter 12 12 - bangsamoro development...

C H A P T E R 12Governance

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12Governance

Bangsamoro Development Plan

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The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

commenced as an Autonomous Regional Government (ARG)

in 1989. The establishment and administration of the ARMM

proved too arduous, and the ARMM Government has been

constantly associated with weak governance. The transition

to the Bangsamoro Government will offer an opportunity to

address structural problems and reconfigure the relationship

among the national, regional, and local governments. It

will also open up the chance to strengthen accountability

mechanisms, particularly those that engage communities in

local governance, in line with the Bangsamoro vision for self-

determination based on strong community engagement.

As Chairman Murad said at the launch of the Sajahatra

Bangsamoro Program in February 2013, “further

development can only be effective when it is people-

centered. One that is determined and undertaken by its

ultimate beneficiaries. One that empowers people and its

processes empowering.”

This chapter discusses the governance challenges facing the

region, presents the transition imperatives from the current

ARMM to the Bangsamoro Government in mid-2016, and

proposes interventions and targets to achieve these.

A. Context: Governance Structures and Systems in the Bangsamoro

A.1. Governance Structure and Intergovernmental Relations

Since its creation, the ARMM has been faced with the

challenges of: (a) lack of genuine autonomy; (b) weak

technical capacity; (c) political patronage and political

dynasties; and (d) accountability deficits.

A.1.1. Lack of Genuine Autonomy

The LGUs—the provincial, city, municipal, and

barangay—comprising the ARMM are not formally

subordinate to the regional government. The LGUs are

pre-existing entities with their own elected local officials

and receive automatic appropriations from the Central

Government. As such, they are effectively autonomous

from the ARMM. Given then that the ARMM is “less

autonomous than local governments…and more

subservient and dependent on the National Government

than any other political sub-division in the country,”123

the ARG has struggled to build consensus around

regional priorities and implement regional policies.

A.1.2. Weak Technical Capacity

Given the poor education outcomes in the ARMM, the

regional and local governments have a shallow pool

of technocrats, particularly for such key governance

skills like planning, budgeting, and accounting. Due to

politicization, appointments are often based on affiliation

rather than qualification, discouraging qualified staff from

remaining in government.

A.1.3. Lack of Accountability

Lack of technical skills is compounded by weak or

nonexistent public accountability systems.124 Minimal

community engagement in local development bodies,

weak public oversight of service delivery, and lack

Governance12


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of a performance-based framework that links access to

public funds to performance have meant that the current

system of governance neither rewards good performance

nor punishes poor performance. The Internal Revenue

Allotment (IRA), given as an automatic appropriation

to LGUs125 regardless of performance, is often used as a

personal “slush fund” of local chief executives or used to

resolve rido.126

A.2. Revenue and Budget Management

A.2.1. Weak Fiscal Autonomy

Although the ARG has instituted a number of governance

reforms, the region remains highly dependent on Central

Government transfers. Figure 31 shows only 2% of the

total amount of government funds available in the ARMM

(including LGU IRA and Central Government line agency

spending) is raised in the region. As a result, this allows the

budget to be subjected to national control.127

A.2.2. Poor Budget Management

Budget management has generally been weak in the region.

A 2010 study on the ARMM’s education budget control

institutions found “weak internal control systems” and

“no clear guidelines for reporting on budget utilization by

the implementing units, and more importantly, a report

correlating budget spent with achievement of physical

outputs or performance targets is nonexistent.”128

With limited reporting on results and outcomes, the Central

Government’s trust and confidence in the ARMM has

fallen. This, in turn, has created a vicious cycle of mistrust,

reduced funding, and diminished autonomy as the Central

Government increasingly implemented development

programs in the ARMM through neighboring regional

offices of national line agencies rather than through the

regional government.

A.3. Civil Society and Community Engagement in Governance

Direct community engagement in governance has been

very limited in the ARMM outside of major community-

driven development projects run by the BDA and the

ARG.129 Mandatory community participation in local

development councils is usually nonexistent. The

Bangsamoro region has a number of capable civil society

networks and organizations that are active in such

fields as human rights, conflict monitoring, and public

service delivery monitoring. However, transparency and

accountability to the public remains limited.

Strengthening participation in local health boards,

parent-teacher associations, and other community

organizations active in service delivery would help to

improve the relevance of services and accountability

to the public. Increasing access to information on

government performance is also critical to fostering

public accountability.

A.4. Judicial Institutions

Injustice is at the heart of the Bangsamoro struggle

for self-determination. It is also the main driver of

violent conflict and poverty in the BCT. Strengthening

judicial institutions to promote social justice and

correct historical wrongs is central to the BDP. And yet,

impunity and limited access to justice for marginalized

members of the community characterize the delivery of

justice services in the Bangsamoro.

Figure 31: Principal Sources of Government Funds to ARMM (2009–2011)

Source: DFAT-Australia and WB (2013)—Basic Education in ARMM


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A.4.1. Legal Pluralism in the Bangsamoro

The BBL “recognizes, protects, and guarantees the customs,

beliefs and traditions of the people of the Bangsamoro”

and “shall adopt measures to ensure mutual respect and

protection of these for the Bangsamoro people and the

other inhabitants of the Bangsamoro.” Article X of the BBL

provides the framework for the administration of justice in

the Bangsamoro, including:

a. Strengthening of the Shari’ah justice system and

expanding its jurisdiction to include civil, commercial

and criminal cases;

b. Establishing an Office for Traditional/Tribal Justice

System and enacting legislation that will promote and

support traditional/tribal justice system appropriate to

IPs;

c. Recognizing the powers of other local courts and

improving their capacity; and

d. Establishing an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

system, including provisions for prior recourse to

ADR in recognition of the principles of conciliation

and mediation.

A.4.2. Access to Justice

Access to justice in the Bangsamoro is generally weak.

Only half of the mandated State Shari’ah Courts are fully

operational, because of major resource constraints. Access

to legal aid is similarly minimal in a region that has very

few legal professionals. As a result, most disputes are

resolved through community-based justice mechanisms at

the village level. Elders and community leaders wield local

authority and legitimacy, but in general they run these

village-level institutions with no training in mediation and

limited knowledge of the law. Significant capacity-building

will be needed to strengthen these institutions.

A.4.3. Women and Access to Justice

Women suffer additional challenges in accessing justice.

Community-based justice systems in particular tend to

reflect local power structures that often discriminate

against women, who are under-represented in positions of

leadership. In the State Shari’ah Courts, although women

are the majority of complainants, there are only three

female judges in the entire system, and cases filed by

women are more likely to be dismissed than those filed

by men.

A.5. Managing Conflict and Strengthening Security

The success of the Bangsamoro Government will largely

be determined by progress made on reducing conflict

and increasing security. With respect to the ceasefire and

the success of the Joint Coordinating Committee on the

Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH) and the IMT, the state-

minority contestation has been a relatively minor source

of violent conflict over the last six years. Rather, recent

data indicate that the incidence of inter-communal and

inter-elite conflict is the main driver of violence in the

Bangsamoro.130

Ensuring peace and security in the Bangsamoro will

therefore require the dismantling of the estimated 43

private armed groups operating in the ARMM,131 in

addition to the redeployment of military forces, the

establishment of an effective Bangsamoro police force,

and the disarmament of combatants.

As discussed in Chapter 10, the resolution of competing

land claims has interlocking environmental, economic,

governance, and security implications. Land management

institutions struggle with limited capacity, appear all

too often open to elite capture, and are insufficiently

resourced to withstand the politicization of land conflicts.

Land conflicts are related to historical grievances and

inadequate and/or failed land reform policies, and serve

as a trigger for rido.

B. Transition Period PhaseBesides the above governance issues that will require

significant time, effort, and resources to resolve, there are

immediate tasks that the Bangsamoro Government will

need to address during the transition period. Adequate

responses to these will build the foundations upon which

solutions to these medium- and long-term challenges can

be resolved.


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The transition from the ARMM government to the final

establishment of the Bangsamoro Government can be

split into three phases, each with distinct governance

arrangements:

1. BTC leadership from mid-2014 up to the passage of

the BBL;132

2. BTA leadership from the passage of the BBL up to the

installation of the elected Bangsamoro Government;

and

3. First term of the Bangsamoro Government.

The challenges and sequencing confronting the Bangsamoro

Government in each phase are summarized in Table 28 and

described fully in the following section.

C. Transition Challenges, Features, and TargetsThis section describes in detail the critical challenges,

features, and targets for each phase of the transition (see

Table 28)

C.1. Overall/General Transition Challenges

Overall challenges in the transition period to the Bangsamoro

Government include: (a) constituency-building by the

Bangsamoro Government promoting inclusivity among its

various constituencies; (b) managing intergovernmental

relations; (c) restructuring regional governance; (d) redefining

relationship with local government units; and (e) encouraging

greater civil society participation and civic consciousness

among the Bangsamoro.

C.1.1. Constituency-Building and Inclusivity

Among the most challenging tasks faced by the Bangsamoro

Government is uniting its constituency. There are two sides

in a social contract: the governed (or the constituency) and

the government.

The Bangsamoro identity as articulated in the BBL provides

a strong impetus for unity and engagement in governance.

In the past, there was no sustained effort to harness the

region’s constituency to strengthen governance. The

element of building and uniting that constituency is

therefore imperative, particularly with ethnically diverse

constituents. Moreover, in establishing unity, the role

of women must be recognized and harnessed, as a

sector that comprises half the constituency. Access to

information needs to be fostered as an important element

in building trust in the Bangsamoro Government.

To strengthen the constituents for the Bangsamoro

Government, inclusivity must be fostered at various levels:

among ethnic groups that comprise the region; in the

distribution of the benefits of the dividends of the peace

process; among groups belonging to different political

factions, particularly among LGU officials, MNLF, among

others; and active participation of women in various facets

of the development task.

C.1.2. Intergovernmental Relations

By its nature, the Bangsamoro Government will need

to have robust intergovernmental mechanisms to

facilitate harmony, cooperation, and coordination

between itself and the Central Government. Ensuring

that concurrent powers are appropriately dispensed will

require establishing mechanisms that ensure the exercise

of exclusive powers are coordinated with the Central

Government’s actions.

C.1.3. Regional Governance

The first phase in establishing the regional government

will consist of hurdling problems associated with

transition. While most of Bangsamoro’s procedural

systems will have to adopt a national standard, some

need to be modified to reflect the unique features of the

Bangsamoro parliamentary form of government. These

include administrative relations between the regional

parliament and the regional government as well as

between the regional government and its constituent local

government units. Budgeting procedures in the context

of the block grant and other Central Government funding

mechanisms and development approach will also have

to be adjusted to the unique structural features of the

Bangsamoro Government.


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Table 28: Challenges, Features, and Targets of Transition Phases I, II, and III

Phase I – BTC leadershipApril 2014 until Passage of the BBL

Phase II – BTA leadershipThe Passage of the BBL until May

2016

Phase III – Bangsamoro GovernmentMay 2016 onwards

Overall / General Transition Challenges

• Constituency-building by promoting inclusivity• Managing intergovernmental relationships• Restructuring regional governance• Redefining relationship with LGUs• Encouraging greater civil society participation and civic consciousness among the Bangsamoro

Critical Features of Transition Phase

• CAB, FAB and its Annexes, and the proposed BBL are the primary documents giving formal structure to the Bangsamoro;

• The BTC, a composite entity (GPH-MILF), has a very limited mandate and limited authority or resources to implement projects or programs on its own;

• The BDA and BLMI, the MILF’s current primary implementation organizations, remain non-government entities with no authority over any government program or body;

• The BBL will not be in effect until passed by Congress

• The ARG remains the government entity authorized to govern and represent the GPH in the core territory of the proposed Bangsamoro.

• The Bangsamoro is established by law and the BTA is created; the BTC will be dissolved;

• The BBL is in effect;• Special Development Fund (SDF)

is released to the BTA by the Central Government;

• ARG shall have transferred its authority over devolved agencies to the BTA. ARG has ceased to exist.

• The elections will preoccupy both the GPH and the BTA; and

• Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to be high.

• Devolution of functions to the Bangsamoro is in full swing;

• The Parliament and Cabinet are installed and the Chief Minister elected;

• New sets of LGU officials are in place;

• The first amounts of block grant, special funds and internal revenue shares need to be appropriated and allocated by the Parliament through a regional budget process;

• Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to remain high; and

• Depending upon the results of the plebiscite and elections, indications of private sector interest to invest in the Bangsamoro begin to show.

Specific Transition Targets

• Organize and prepare a Transition Team to support the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) to prepare for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)

• Organize and prepare a Policy Development Team to support the BTC and BTA in addressing key policy issues

• Formulate the BDP containing programs and projects and their respective cost estimates that can be funded by the Special Development Fund

• Establish, define mandates, and operationalize transitional bodies (JNC, IDB, TJRC, JPST/JPSC, etc.)

• Coordinate with COMELEC on management of the plebiscite

• Turnover of reports, documents, functions, properties and other assets of the ARG is completed

• Ensure uninterrupted delivery of basic services

• Help ensure conduct of a successful plebiscite (in coordination with COMELEC)

• Completion of all preparations for the reorganization of the ARG into the new Bangsamoro Government including the transfer of functions and administrative responsibilities and a reorganization plan ready for implementation.

• Conduct and completion of studies on urgent matters affecting the establishment of the new regional government

• Implementation of a constituency-building campaign

• Reorganize Government and establish new administrative systems

• Develop system support the realization of fiscal autonomy

• Launch campaign to reform LGUs in the Bangsamoro region


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C.1.4. Local Government

The Bangsamoro Government will be inheriting a

convoluted local government system. It will also face

a structure that has thrived on patronage entrenched

through years of misdirection and non-supervision. It

will have to redefine its relationship with the LGUs

to promote greater transparency and accountability

among LGU officials to improve overall welfare of the

Bangsamoro, stabilize the peace and order situation,

and foster prospects of growth and development in the

region under its leadership. The Bangsamoro Parliament

will have to formulate and pass the law that will redefine

this relationship toward a more efficient delivery of basic

services to local communities.

C.1.5. Civil Society

The Bangsamoro Government will need to create

an environment for civil society to adjust to the new

condition of transition and stability. The focus of most

CSOs has been more on peacebuilding and livelihood

development and less on governance and security issues

and improvement of the delivery of basic services by the

regional government. Through partnership with donor

agencies, Bangsamoro CSOs can be strengthened in their

capacity to help effective delivery of the basic services.

The Bangsamoro Government will have to promote

greater civic consciousness among its constituents,

as the development problems confronting the region

will require cooperation and contribution from all

stakeholders to address them successfully.

C.2. Critical Features of Each Transition Phase

The characteristics of each phase limit the types and

nature of activities that can be implemented.

C.2.1. Phase I—BTC Leadership (April 2014 until the Passage of the BBL)

The mandate of the BTC is limited to: (a) drafting the BBL;

(b) identifying possible Constitutional issues that bear on

the authority of the Bangsamoro Government; and (c)

coordinating with GPH agencies and NGOs to assist in

“identifying and coordinating development programs in

the Region, in conjunction with the MILF’s BDA and the

BLMI.”133

The critical features of the first (BTC) phase include the

following:

a. The CAB, FAB and its Annexes, plus the proposed

BBL, are the primary documents giving formal

structure to the Bangsamoro;

b. The BTC, a composite GPH-MILF entity, has a

very limited mandate and limited authority and

resources to implement programs and projects on

its own;

c. The BDA, BLMI, and the MILF’s current

implementation organizations remain to be

nongovernment entities with no authority over any

government program or body;

d. The BBL in draft form is submitted for deliberation

and approval of Congress; and

e. The ARMM remains as the government entity

authorized to govern and represent the GPH in the

BCT.

Given that limitations of the BTC and the MILF during this

context, this phase is best suited to policy development

initiatives, conducting important research studies, and

organizing for the transition process, preparatory to the

establishment of the Bangsamoro Government.

C.2.2. Phase II—BTA Leadership (Passage of BBL until May 2016)

The second phase is marked by the passage of the BBL

calling for the formal establishment of the Bangsamoro

Government and the creation of the BTA as an interim

arrangement.134 The critical features of this phase include

the following:

a. The Bangsamoro Government is established by law

and the BTA is created as an ad-interim body;

b. The BBL is in effect;

c. SDF is released to the BTA by the Central

Government;135

d. ARG shall have transferred its authority over

devolved agencies to the BTA;136


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e. The plebiscite and then the regular election for

Bangsamoro Parliament members will preoccupy

both the GPH and the BTA; and

f. Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to

be high.

The BTA will have fewer limitations during this phase,

but the plebiscite and the regular election are expected

to preoccupy everyone, including the MILF. It is a crucial

stage in the transition process for two reasons: First,

it represents the turnover stage from the ARG to the

Bangsamoro Government through the BTA. At this time,

there will be events requiring detailed and meticulous

planning and various nuts-and-bolts issues will likely

arise. A good transition team would have to be formed

for the tasks. Second, it represents the handover stage,

from the BTA to the first Bangsamoro Government-elect.

Between these two milestones, the BTA will have to

ensure that “the continued functioning of government in

the area of autonomy is exercised pursuant to its mandate

under the BBL.”137 That means that while in office the

BTA will need to guarantee uninterrupted delivery of

public services while new institutions are being created

and their capacity is being enhanced.

C.2.3. Phase III—First Term of the Elected Bangsamoro Government (May 2016 onwards)

The third phase is the “take-off” phase for the new

Bangsamoro Government, during which high

expectations will need to be managed carefully. The

critical features of the third phase will include:

a. Devolution of functions to the Bangsamoro

Government is in full swing;

b. The Parliament and the Cabinet are installed and

the Chief Minister is elected;

c. New sets of LGU officials are in place;

d. The Parliament appropriates and allocates the first

amounts of block grant, and special funds through

a regional budget process; and

e. Donor support for the Bangsamoro Government

(according to pronouncements) is high.

Depending on the results of the plebiscite and the

elections, indications of private sector interest to invest in

the Bangsamoro may begin to show.

C.3. Transition Targets: What Need to be Done

Each of the phases during the transition period will

require different sets of targets/activities, as detailed in

the following section.

C.3.1. Phase I—BTC Leadership (April 2014 until the Passage of the BBL)

In Phase I, the targets/activities will be:

a. To organize and prepare a transition coordination

team to support the BTA in performing its mandate;

b. To organize and prepare a policy development team

to support the BTA;

c. To formulate a BDP that identifies programs and

projects and their cost estimates that will be funded

by the SDF;

d. To establish and follow through on implementation

of the transitional bodies (i.e., JNC, IDB, TJRC,

JPSTs, JPSCs) and task forces on camps and

amnesties and pardons;

e. To establish a body to manage the policing

challenges; and

f. To coordinate with the Commission on Elections

(Comelec) on overseeing the plebiscite.

C.3.1.1. Organizing the CT4T138

A Coordination Team for the Transition (CT4T) should be

organized to perform the following tasks:

a. Facilitate the transfer of properties, official records,

and books of accounts;

b. Receive and review official reports and documents,

as well as properties to be turned over by the ARG;

c. Help identify and act on other immediate issues

confronting the BTA regarding the transition

process; and

d. Help ensure that all functions mandated to the

Bangsamoro Government are transferred to it by

the ARG.


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As of November 2014, the GPH-MILF negotiating parties

had signed terms of reference for the Coordination Team

for the Transition to the BTA; otherwise known as the

CT4T.

C.3.1.2. Organizing a Policy Development Team139

A Policy Development Team would need to be organized

to conduct research and policy studies urgently needed

to inform the BTA and, eventually, the Bangsamoro

Government on priority issues. It could conduct the

policy researches itself, or contract the services of

outside experts to undertake such studies. Under the

latter arrangement, its role would be to ensure that the

contracted consultants produce high-quality outputs

and that their studies addressed appropriate and critical

policy issues confronting the BTA and/or Bangsamoro

Government. The Team would have to be composed of

highly qualified individuals from various disciplines in

the development field with long experience in policy

research and development.

C.3.1.3. Special Development Fund (SDF)

The MILF (with support from BDA and other relevant

units) is expected to provide an estimate of the

development assistance it will require during the

transition period. The BTA is expected to implement or

start implementing selected development programs and

projects during its incumbency. However, the ARG will

have a working budget up to 2015 and the BTC will have

to determine whether the proposed priority programs and

projects of the ARG are covered by the ARG submission

for 2015. If not, these priority programs and projects will

have to be funded by the SDF and other funding sources.

C.3.1.4. Establishing and Following Through on Implementation of the Transitional Bodies

The CAB and the BBL provide for the creation of a

number of transitional bodies (JNC, IDB, TJRC, JPSTs,

JPSCs, the Task Forces on the Six Camps and the Task

Force on Amnesties and Pardons) that will address

specific concerns during the transition process. Some of

these bodies have begun working and others are still to

be established or at the initial organizational stage. The

BTC would need to be regularly updated on the progress of

these bodies, as they are critical in determining the outcome

of the concerns assigned to them.

Of particular importance is the establishment of a body

that will manage “policing” operations. The Independent

Commission on Policing (ICP) has made concrete proposals

on reforms that will be needed in policing the Bangsamoro

region within the stipulations of the agreements between

the GPH and the MILF. A unit would need to be created to

ensure implementation of these proposals.

C.3.1.5. Coordinating with COMELEC on the Management of the Plebiscite

While awaiting approval of the BBL in Congress,

representations could be made with the COMELEC on

preparations for the plebiscite on the BBL as electoral

exercises normally take considerable time and manpower.

C.3.2. Phase II—BTA Leadership (Passage of the BBL until May 2016)

Phase II has five major target activities:

a. Turnover of reports, documents, functions, properties,

and other assets of the ARG is completed in an orderly

manner with minimal complications;

b. Uninterrupted delivery of basic services;

c. All preparations for reorganization of the ARG into

the Bangsamoro Government, including the transfer

of functions and administrative responsibilities, are

completed and a reorganization plan is ready for

implementation;

d. Conduct and completion of studies on urgent matters

affecting the establishment of the new regional

government to be approved by the Bangsamoro

Government; and

e. A constituency-building campaign is underway.

C.3.2.1. Completing the Turnover

As the detailed instructions and authority to implement the

turnover are not contained in the BBL, the CT4T will need

to formulate these guidelines for signing and issuance by

the Office of the President. Also, the CT4T will need to


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assist in receiving and reviewing the various reports to

be submitted by the ARG. These will include financial

reports, property inventories, personnel inventories, and

others, which would be the basis for the formal turnover.

Milestone events of this activity will include the turnover

of physical properties and financial assets and the proper

disposal of those physical assets according to auditing

rules, if needed.140

In addition to the inventory of financial and nonfinancial

assets and official records, the ARG could prepare a

comprehensive baseline on the “state of the different

sectors in the ARMM” (i.e., the “Open Data” project).

This would be an important document that the CT4T

members could preserve and which the BTA and the

Bangsamoro Government could maintain and continue.

C.3.2.2. Completion of Preparations for Reorganization

Preparations for reorganization will cover the following:

a. Design and Approval of Administrative

Bureaucracy and Organizational Structure. This

document will detail the organizational structure

of each agency defined in the BBL, the mandatory

positions, qualification standards associated

with each mandatory position, and the required

competencies.

b. Drafting and approval of an Organizational

Rationalization Program. This will outline in

detail what line agencies and what positions are

to be retained, the process of personnel transfer/

separation, hiring/rehiring, amount of separation

pay, grievance management system, and others.

This will ensure that the rights of civil servants

are protected. The program will be guided by the

approved BBL.

c. Drafting of a Capacity-Building Plan. Staff of all

line agencies of the Bangsamoro Government

will need to undergo intensive reorientation and

training. This plan will outline the capacity-building

requirements of the line agencies and the manner

of delivery. If none is provided in the BBL, this plan

will detail the establishment of a regional government

agency that will be responsible for implementing

technical assistance programs to line agencies and

capacity-building programs for line agency staff.

d. Completion of an Organizational Performance

Implementation Framework and Performance

Evaluation System (OPIF-PES). Until the current

administration, absence of a performance

monitoring and evaluation framework in the ARMM

disabled attempts to evaluate regional operations

at the outcome level. This inability contributed to

inefficiencies attributed to the ARG and stymied

attempts to establish organizational and individual

accountability. The OPIF is an effective framework

for planning line agency programs and activities

based on strategic objectives. It follows the design

of an administrative bureaucracy and organizational

structure. Given the differences between the ARMM

and the Bangsamoro Government, a new OPIF-PES

will be needed.

e. Organization of a Transition Oversight Committee

and Completion of a Monitoring Framework for

Transition. An oversight committee with defined

mandates and composition will be needed to

shepherd the transition process. It would need to be

composed of high-level officials of the GPH and the

MILF, and could also include some members of the

Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) as the transition

involves implementing provisions of the peace

agreement.141 Based on the ARMM experience, it is

important to have strong oversight of the transition

process, to facilitate resolution of issues as these are

encountered.

C.3.2.3. Completion or Commencement of Policy Studies on Matters Needing Immediate Attention by the BTA/Bangsamoro Government

a. Drafting a new regional administrative code for

consideration by the Bangsamoro Parliament. An

administrative code serves as guide to government


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boundaries. Decisions on whether or not business

transactions are within the region will depend on

this study. The study will contain reference maps,

which will need to be closely coordinated with

the National Mapping and Resources Information

Authority (NAMRIA) of the Philippines. It should

provide guidance on what to do with “orphan LGUs”

(municipalities or barangays) that have decided to

join the Bangsamoro and have to be carved out of

their provinces or municipalities.

e. Creating regional special bodies on audit and civil

service. The BBL provides for creation of special

bodies for audit and civil service administration. It

will be important to study how these bodies relate

to the regional government and to their parent

organizations and the range of powers within the

region. The Commission on Audit and the Civil

Service Commission are both constitutional bodies

and their integration into the regional government

will need diligent and careful study.

f. Review and approval of regional local government

code. The LGUs are likely to pose a serious concern

to the new regional government. Ambivalence on the

part of both the Central Government and the regional

government has led to LGUs functioning practically

on their own. The present regional local government

code may need to be reviewed and revised. In the

context of a parliamentary form of government,

the Bangsamoro Government will need to define

new relationships between itself and its constituent

LGUs. It will need the LGUs for revenue generation

purposes (collection of fees and regional taxes), and

the systems and procedures for that purpose need to

be tightened.

g. Conducting a study on promoting the Shari’ah

justice system. A consistent demand of the

Bangsamoro peace negotiators was promotion of

the application of Shari’ah justice system in the

region as part of their adherence to Islamic values

and respect for their distinct cultural identity. It is

operations and decision-making. It can include a

definition of territory and constituency as well as

administrative procedures to guide civil servants in

their day-to-day tasks. It delineates functions among

the different line and staff agencies and other units of

the regional government.

b. Review and enactment of a regional electoral

code. The enactment of a Bangsamoro Electoral Code

is a priority. As proposed in the draft BBL, the first

regular election for the Bangsamoro Government in

May 2016 shall be governed by this electoral code,

although National Omnibus Election Code shall apply

suppletorily, where appropriate.

c. Review and approval of the regional revenue code.

The BBL identifies the revenue sources of the regional

government. These would form the basis for a review

of the present regional revenue code, or its repeal,

as the case may be, based on the study results. Work

on this matter would be urgent, as action on a new

revenue law would be among the first items in the

agenda of the Parliament. It would include drafting

specific guidelines for establishing tax bases, tax rates,

remittance of shares from internal revenue collections,

income from natural resource extraction, incomes of

government corporations from operations in the region,

and other sources. These would help the BTA discuss

procedural matters pertaining to fiscal autonomy with

the Department of Finance. The task would involve

working with an interim Intergovernmental Fiscal

Policy Board (IFPB)and later a permanent IFPB.

This is one of the four priority legislations to be

accomplished by the BTA, including the Bangsamoro

revenue code, the Bangsamoro Electoral Code, and the

Bangsamoro Civil Service Code.

d. Conducting a study defining the land and water

boundaries of the region based on the results of

the plebiscite. The Bangsamoro Government and

the Parliament will need this study because many

decisions will rely on the accuracy of regional


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important that a study on the feasibility of its

expanded application be undertaken, taking into

consideration the pluralistic nature of the justice

system prevailing in the region. The study would

inform discussions in the Bangsamoro Parliament

on promoting wider application of Shari’ah

justice. Further details on Shari’ah justice are in

the next section.

h. Drafting a law to delineate the rights of IPs

in terms of exploitation of natural resources

within their territories. Section 11 of Article XIII

(Economy and Patrimony) of the BBL specifies

that a law will be drafted to define the rights of

the IPs in the exploitation of natural resources

within their territories. This is consistent with the

BBL’s declaration that it recognizes and respects

the rights of IPs residing within the BCT (Section

5, Article IX —Basic Rights of the BBL).

i. Guidelines on receipt of grants and donations

from foreign and local donors. The BBL allows

receipt of grants and other donations from

foreign and domestic entities.The first three

years of the regional government will see many

donors wanting to contribute to the success of

the Bangsamoro experiment. For transparency, it

would be important to have rules on receipt by

the Bangsamoro Government of donations and

foreign assistance.

j. Modifying the regional budgeting and budget

management system. With the block grant

and SDF as predictable sources of funds from

the Central Government, the Bangsamoro

Government may now prepare budgets from

a single regional fund, whereas previously

there were two: allocations in the General

Appropriations Act, and the local fund. The

systems and procedures on budgeting, execution,

and monitoring will need to be reviewed and

modified substantially. A more substantive

performance-based budgeting system could be

expected with the introduction of the Organizational

Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF). The budget

system would need to allow the regional government

to access funding for identified priority projects that are

still covered by national government mandates.

k. Inventory, review, and adaption of relevant

administrative procedures. This task covers two

sets of procedures. The first pertains to procedures

governing relations between the legislature and the

executive (Bangsamoro Parliament and Bangsamoro

Government) in a parliamentary system. The second

pertains to procedures for government operations such

as procurement, government accounts management,

personnel management and other similar systems.

l. Formulating procedures pertaining to relations

between the legislative and executive organs

of the regional government. Rules, regulations,

and procedures governing relations between the

Parliament and the Government (i.e., the Cabinet) in

a parliamentary environment need to be documented.

Such documentation would guide not only officials

and staff of the Parliament, the Chief Minister (and

his/her Deputy) and the Cabinet Ministers, but also

the ministry and Parliament staff who will have to

deal with each other. This is particularly important as

parliamentary procedures are alien to most Filipinos.

m. Formulating procedures on procurement, government

accounts management, personnel management

and others. One of the major issues on regional

administration in the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace

Agreement was the late adoption and documentation

of administrative procedures, which caused confusion

and disorganization. To avoid this mistake, the new

regional government will have to do an inventory

to all relevant manuals pertaining to government

administration, and adapt these to its operations. These

procedures may need to be reviewed in the context of

the ministerial form of governance. Some procedures


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may need to be incorporated into the administrative

code.

n. Optional creation of provisional intergovernmental

bodies. The FAB and its Annexes provide for

creation of six intergovernmental special bodies

relevant to governance, and other special bodies for

the normalization process. The BTA may decide to

form provisional intergovernmental bodies during its

mandate. The GPH and the BTA will coordinate and

cooperate on the composition of these bodies and

on the mechanisms that will guide their operations.

Some of these may be created by legislative fiat,

depending on the advice of the study group.142

C.3.2.4. Implementation of a Constituency-Building Campaign

It would be essential for the BTA to show inclusiveness

in its operations and decisions from the start in order to

build a constituency for the Bangsamoro Government.

Demonstrating representativeness and participation

of all stakeholders in each institution and act would

be critical to winning support from Non-Bangsamoro,

settlers, and non-MILF constituencies. In building new

institutions, there may be a need to capitalize on skills

that are spread across all ethnic groups to ensure adequate

capacity to deliver on its mandate immediately and meet

expectations.

C.3.3. Phase III—First Term of the Elected Bangsamoro Government Officials (May 2016 onwards)

This phase covers the period from the inauguration of the

newly elected Parliament members to the end of 2019.

During this period, the BTA will relinquish its mandate

in favor of the convened Parliament. The BBL defines the

functions and operations of the Bangsamoro Parliament,

the Office of the Chief Minister and the Cabinet, and the

relationship between the Parliament and the Government.

An accepted practice in parliamentary democracies is

that the executive sets most of the legislative agenda. At

this point, the BTA’s Policy Development Team could

be formally integrated into the regional government to

support its agenda-setting role.

With the installation of the first Parliament and the

Bangsamoro Government, the activities/targets for this

phase are: (a) the regional government is reorganized

and its administrative systems are in place; (b) systems to

support the realization of fiscal autonomy are installed; and

(c) the campaign to reform LGUs in the Bangsamoro region

begins.

C.3.3.1. The Regional Government is Reorganized and its Administrative Systems are in Place

Among the key activities under this agenda are:

a. Implementation of the organizational rationalization

program.This program would best be placed directly

under the Chief Minister, who shall organize a

rationalization program committee to oversee its

implementation. Committee members may include

representatives of the Civil Service Commission,

members of the Cabinet, the employees of the

abolished ARMM regional government, the

Government Service Insurance System, and the

Pag-IBIG Fund, and a member of the CT4T. This

program will need to be coordinated closely with

the reorganization of the regional administrative

bureaucracy.

b. Reorganization of the line and support agencies and

offices of the regional government. The design of

the regional government’s structure and designation

of mandates and functions to the different line

(Ministries) and staff (Offices) units shall have been

completed under the BTA. Guided by those, former

ARG departments that have been functioning on

an interim basis will be reorganized into the regular

service delivery units of the Bangsamoro Government.

With the structures defined and mandates allocated,

position qualification standards are defined and the

regional government embarks on a campaign to

attract the best and the brightest in the region. Staff

members of the abolished ARG who are found to be

highly qualified will be encouraged to apply for new

positions.


124

The reorganization will also cover the introduction of

the OPIF, against which each agency’s and individual

staff’s performance will be measured. A Performance

Monitoring System would be needed to allow the

Bangsamoro Government to evaluate achievement of

desired outcomes. Among the first major application of

the OPIF would be the preparation of the Bangsamoro

Government’s First Six-Year Plan. Being outcome-

oriented, the OPIF should be able to provide the

regional line and service agencies, guidance in linking

goals and objectives to agency program, project, and

activity (PPA).

Use of the OPIF framework would facilitate its linkage

to the annual budgets as well as the Medium-Term

Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Medium-Term

Investment Program (MTIP). The reorganization may

include introduction of agency operations manuals.

All staffs would be oriented not only in its use but

also in relevant procurement, government accounting

management, audit, evaluation and reporting systems.

c. Establishment of a regional budgeting and budget

management system. The regional budgeting and

budget management system, designed under the

BTA, will be established in close coordination with

the Central Government’s Department of Budget and

Management. The IFPB and the Cabinet will review the

system before approval. The Policy Development Team

members responsible for the scheme may provide

inputs for the review and approval process. The new

system will result in the preparation and review MTEF-

MTIP, which will dovetail with regional plans. The

new budget system will include a process to enable

the Bangsamoro Government and its constituent LGUs

to access funding for region-identified priority projects

from national agencies.

d. Enactment of an administrative code. The Parliament

is expected to support this basic and important

piece of regional legislation. The concerned Policy

Development Team member could shepherd the

process of approval. As discussed earlier, the Policy

Development Team would have to work with both the

Parliament and the Cabinet to see the draft law pass.

e. Enactment of a law on Shari’ah justice. Similarly,

the Parliament is expected to support this important

legislation. The Policy Development Team could assist

the Parliament and the Cabinet in drafting the bill.

f. Implementation of capability-building plan. A unit

will be established that will focus on providing human

resource development services to the different line

and support agencies of the regional government. It

will be responsible for implementing a capability-

building plan.

g. Forming and operationalization of intergovernmental

bodies. The six intergovernmental bodies pertaining to

governance, mentioned earlier, will be the following,

in order of priority:

i. Intergovernmental Relations Body (from interim to

permanent)

ii. Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Board (from

interim to permanent)

iii. Congress-Parliament Bangsamoro Forum

iv. Intergovernmental Sustainable Development Body

v. Shari’ah Supervisory Board

vi. Joint Body for the Zones of Joint Cooperation

C.3.3.2. Systems to Support the Realization of Fiscal Autonomy are Installed

The key activities to meet this target will include:

a. Organizing the IFPB or converting its status from an

interim organ under the BTA to a permanent organ of

the Bangsamoro Government;

b. A new regional revenue law is passed;

c. Enforcing specific guidelines on the release of

the annual block grant and other fund transfers from the

Central Government;

d. Establishing a system of collecting regional taxes and

fees;


125

e. Passing a law establishing a Shari’ah Supervisory Board

to promote Islamic banking; and

f. Setting guidelines on access to credit financing and use

of alternative financing modes such as public-private

partnership, bond issuance, and others.

i. Organizing the Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy

Board (IFPB). The IFPB is a strategic body necessary

for sustaining fiscal autonomy. It could be envisaged

as the equivalent of a regional Department of

Finance. The Cabinet, led by the Chief Minister, will

be responsible for its formal creation, although an

interim IFPB may be needed to help guide studies

pertaining to fiscal autonomy and secure the SDF. A

Policy Development Team may assist the Cabinet in

planning out its establishment.

ii. Enacting a new regional revenue law. The Policy

Development Team member assigned to study the

subject may shepherd the process of running the draft

through the IFPB, the Cabinet, and the Parliament.

The law could include guidelines pertaining

to remittance of shares from internal revenue

collections, income from natural resource extraction,

incomes of government corporations from operations

in the region, and other sources. These will cover

operational guidelines to be followed by the

Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in withholding the

Bangsamoro Government’s share of internal revenue

collections within the region. Crafting the law will

need inputs from relevant national government

offices such as the BIR, the Bureau of Customs, the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

and others.

iii. Setting guidelines on use of block grant and other

fund transfers from the Central Government. The

CT4T and the Policy Development Team could

work with the Intergovernmental Relations Body

in setting specific guidelines on the release of the

block grant and other fund transfers from the Central

Government, as provided for in the BBL and the FAB

Annex on Revenue Sources and Wealth Sharing.

Similar to the revenue law, crafting this piece of

legislation will need intergovernmental intervention.

iv. Establishing systems for collecting regional taxes

and fees. The regional government will continue

to rely mainly on its constituent LGUs to collect

regional impositions. To avoid the confusion

that characterized the past system, better defined

arrangements between LGUs and the Bangsamoro

Government will have to be made.

v. Establishing a Fiduciary Supervisory Board. There

is need for more banks in the region to facilitate

access to credit, promote savings, and keep

financial transactions secure. The third is critical

to the region’s governance system because many

LGUs are forced to stick to manual systems of fund

management in the absence of banks. The Policy

Development Team could help the Cabinet draft

legislation establishing this board. The task will

include undertaking a policy-focused study on the

regional government’s position on the Al-Amanah

Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines and the

Southern Philippines Development Authority.

vi. Formulating and disseminating guidelines on credit

financing and use of other modes of financing.

Such guidelines will be important at an early stage

to assure the financial community that a policy

framework for developing a regional financial sector

is already being studied.

C.3.3.3. The Campaign to Reform Constituent LGUs Begins

The BTA, with assistance from the Policy Development

Team, shall have developed a reform plan for defining

the Bangsamoro Government’s relationship with local

governments. That plan will be subject of review by the

Cabinet and the Parliament. Among the concerns that

will need to be addressed are: (a) that two laws on local

governments are in effect; (b) corruption and patronage;


126

(c) proliferation of unqualified appointees; (d) monitoring

of performance in the delivery of public services; (e)

action to be taken on municipalities that receive no

allotments from the national budget; (f) greater civil

society engagement in local governance; and (g) the

issue of “orphaned LGUs” arising from their choice to

join the Bangsamoro.

Among the actions expected under this reform agenda

are: (a) decision on Muslim Mindanao Act (MMA) 25,143

with the possibility of enacting a new regional law on

local governments; (b) implementation of an extensive

campaign to emulate the good and shame the bad local

government leaders, and encourage the public to use

current reforms (such as the Full-Disclosure Policy) to

expose malpractices through the media or by networking

with national civil society watchdog organizations;

(c) pressing for greater oversight by the Civil Service

Commission over personnel selection and appointments;

(d) standardization of cash management procedure and

reporting, procurement, asset management, and third

party monitoring of both nationally and locally funded

projects; and (e) broader participation of the citizenry in

monitoring the activities of LGUs.

D. Promoting Shari’ah JusticeShari’ah law has been applied in the Bangsamoro areas

for centuries to bring legal certainty and peace and order

to Muslim communities. Partial recognition of Islamic

law was extended by the Central Government in 1977

through Presidential Decree (PD) 1083, also known as

the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. PD

1083 covers family and personal law issues for Muslims

through a network of Shari’ah District Courts and

Circuit Courts in different parts of Mindanao, under the

supervision of the Supreme Court. Despite being under-

resourced, the formal Shari’ah courts are well regarded,

with surveys indicating relatively high levels of public

satisfaction.144

Parallel to the government Shari’ah courts, Islamic law

is also applied at the community level through non-

state justice mechanisms and through separate judiciaries

run by the MILF, which includes all aspects of the law,

including commercial transactions and criminal justice.

Expansion of the jurisdiction of the government Shari’ah

courts to cover commercial and criminal law was

authorized under the ARMM Organic Act (Republic

Act 9054). However, the relevant enabling legislation

was never adopted by the ARMM Regional Legislative

Assembly.

However, an expanded recognition of Shari’ah has

also been accommodated in the CAB and in the draft

BBL, which stipulates that the Shari’ah courts in the

Bangsamoro shall have jurisdiction over Shari’ah law

enacted by the Bangsamoro Parliament pertaining to

“persons and family relations, and other civil law matters,

commercial law, and criminal law.”

On top of the existing District and Circuit Shari’ah Courts,

the draft BBL proposes to establish a Bangsamoro Shari’ah

High Court that would exercise final and executory

authority over matters of Shari’ah; a Shari’ah Public

Assistance Office; a Shari’ah Special Prosecution Service;

and a Shari’ah Academy.

Furthermore, the draft BBL establishes new standards for

Shari’ah judges, requiring that they have graduated from a

four-year course on Shari’ah or Islamic jurisprudence and

passed the Shari’ah bar examination.145

Making the Shari’ah justice system of the Bangsamoro

fully functional will require actions on multiple fronts:

institutional development, skills development, and

community access to justice.

D.1. Institutional Development

Institutional development will be supported in the

following areas:

a. Support the existing Shari’ah Courts. The

existing Shari’ah Circuit and District Courts in the


127

Bangsamoro lack many basic facilities for handling

current caseloads. Circuit courts in many locations are

non-operational. To ensure that the existing Shari’ah

courts are adequately resourced and to prepare

for the expected expansion of the jurisdiction, an

institutional needs assessment will be launched as

a matter of priority. At the same time, coordination

within the existing courts system in the Bangsamoro

will be necessary and sharing of resources will have

to be discussed, given that caseloads from the civil

and criminal courts will be shifting across the Shari’ah

court system under the Bangsamoro.

b. Create the Shari’ah Academy. Establishing the Shari’ah

Academy is a top priority to ensure that appropriate

training is available to potential judges to fill the

bench of the Circuit Courts, District Courts and the

new High Court and to lawyers to fill the ranks of the

new Prosecution Service and Public Assistance Office.

Given the requirements laid out in the BBL, identifying

appropriate teaching staff, formulating the curriculum,

and establishing procedures for accreditation of

existing courses will be the immediate priorities.

c. Establish the Public Assistance Office (PAO). A PAO

for the Shari’ah courts has been envisaged for more

than a decade under the Expanded ARMM Organic

Act but has yet to be operational. As the jurisdiction

of the Shari’ah system expands into criminal cases, the

availability of affordable legal services becomes even

more important. In delivering these services, the PAO

could also consider cooperation with local legal aid

providers in the Bangsamoro.

d. Establish the Shari’ah Special Prosecution Service.

As noted in the BBL, the prosecution service will

be attached to the National Prosecution Service

of the Central Government. Detailed coordination

will therefore be necessary in the short term to

explore the transition of many functions from the

existing prosecutorial service to the Shari’ah Special

Prosecution Service.

D.2. Skills Development

Establishing the institutions of the Bangsamoro Shari’ah

Justice System will require a significant effort to build

necessary expertise with the qualifications required by

the BBL. Training on Shari’ah law principles and rollout

of the required four-year course on Shari’ah or Islamic

Jurisprudence would be the key priorities for the short-

term period. The BBL provides that all Shari’ah criminal

laws passed by the Bangsamoro Parliament shall be

in accordance with universally accepted principles

and standards of human rights. Accordingly, both the

Bangsamoro Parliament and agencies of the justice

sector will need knowledge not only on Shari’ah and

Islamic jurisprudence but also on international human

rights law.

Accordingly, a targeted skills development plan on

Shari’ah and human rights will be formulated for the

following target groups:

a. Existing judges

b. Members of Parliament and staff

c. Candidate judges

d. Lawyers

In addition to knowledge programs on Shari’ah and

human rights, many Shari’ah judges have had very

little skills training in the past decade or so. Given the

expressed preference for mediation for the resolution

of civil cases through the Shari’ah courts, a program of

mediation skills will be prepared for existing judges.

D.3. Community Access to Justice

The establishment of a PAO would fill an important gap

in terms of access to justice through the Shari’ah court

system. However, legal aid alone would not ensure

access to equitable justice services for the poor. Legal

awareness is a precondition, and yet legal outreach

campaigns have been very limited in the region.

Given the limitless need but finite resources, innovative

ways will be used to inform people of their rights and

obligations and of means of seeking legal redress. This


128

could include working through NGOs, religious leaders,

and regular community meetings through development

projects.

E. Strengthening Fiscal Autonomy in the BangsamoroThe ARMM generates only 2% of its budget internally.

Its heavy dependence on funding from the Central

Government has seriously weakened the ability of regional

officials to determine priority development projects in

the region and to address the development needs of their

people. It has also fostered a patron-client relationship

between Central Government officials and regional officials

whereby the political fortune of the latter depends greatly

on the amount of resources emanating from the former. The

institutionalization of the “block grant” formula in the BBL

is an attempt to strengthen the Bangsamoro Government’s

fiscal autonomy.

The Bangsamoro Government will have to pass additional

internal revenue measures and improve collection

efficiency. As security and normality are restored and the

economy grows at an accelerated basis, private investments

are expected to come, which will expand the Bangsamoro

Government’s revenue base. Initially, however, the

Bangsamoro Government may have to offer incentives,

including tax holidays, to interested investors. In the

medium and the long term, operations of these investors

will contribute significantly to Bangsamoro Government

revenues in terms not only of their tax payments but also of

tax payments and revenue-generating expenditures of their

employees.

Enhancing fiscal autonomy will require judicious use of

government funds. Expenditures will need to be targeted

on activities that will promote greater economic efficiency

and growth, reduce the incidence of poverty, and improve

the human development indicators of the populace.

Transparency and accountability mechanisms will need to

be built to uphold the accountability of local officials in

the use of public funds. Participation of CSOs and ordinary

citizens would need to be encouraged in the workings of

the government. In the past, much of scarce public funds

were captured by rent-seeking officials, which resulted in

poor or absent basic services and in worsening poverty.

Significant deposits of mineral and non-mineral resources

have been reported in the BCT. If properly developed,

the extractive industry can provide huge revenue sources

that can strengthen the Bangsamoro Government’s fiscal

autonomy. However, there is a need for a scoping study

of mineral and non-mineral resources, and feasibility/

engineering studies for their extraction to determine

whether the available volume can be extracted in a way

that is economically viable and environment-friendly.

The concomitant appropriate fiscal regime vis-a-vis the

operations of mining firms could be formulated as a way of

encouraging their entry while ensuring maximum revenue

gains for the Bangsamoro Government.

An open trading regime in areas declared as export

processing zones (e.g., Polloc Port in Maguindanao and

Bongao Port in Tawi-Tawi) with neighboring countries

would encourage the flow of more goods and services in

the Bangsamoro. Consequently, economic activity and

potential revenue sources would increase. An open trading

regime could also reduce prices of basic commodities

for Bangsamoro consumers, as prime agricultural and

manufactured products in neighboring countries are priced

lower than in the Philippines.

F. Normalization and DevelopmentPeace, security, and development are fundamental

aspirations of everyone in the Bangsamoro. The CAB,

together with the Annex on Normalization, provides

the platform for new institutional arrangements that will

ensure that communities affected by the decades-long

armed conflict in Mindanao can return to a peaceful life

and pursue economic activities and sustainable livelihoods

free from fear of violence and insecurity.

Upon its establishment, the Bangsamoro Transition

Authority (BTA) shall assist and support normalization and

development in the Bangsamoro.


129

The Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) shall continue

to coordinate the normalization process with the BTA as

partner until the signing of an exit agreement.

G. Summary of Priority ProgramsA summary of the priority plans and programs for the

transition period can be found in Table 29.

Table 29: Priority Governance and Justice Programs

Objective Priority Programs Components

Support for Transitional Bodies • As provided for in the CAB and BBL

Support for BBL and Plebiscite • IEC campaigns, voter registration, etc.

Capacity-Building, Organizational Development, and Change Management

Requirements from ARMM to BTA

• Training programs on management and leadership, values transformation

• Scholarships in priority technical courses• Drafting of ministry transition plans• Capacity-building for municipalities and barangays

Technical Assistance for Drafting of Key Administrative Laws

• Based on priorities set by the BBL/BTA

Baseline Data Generation • Data generation across all ministries, including a comprehensive assessment of location, number and status of infrastructure and personnel

• Creation of “Open Data” platform for the Bangsamoro

Transparency and Accountability Program • Development of anticorruption strategy• Geotagging and third party monitoring of programs and

projects

Access to Justice, including Shari’ah Justice • Policy and programmatic work on the improving access to justice, including the Shari’ah justice system in the Bangsamoro

Fiscal Autonomy • Reform of government corporations, regional economic policy development, etc.


130

123 Bacani (2005).124 Despite more than 10 years of significant technical capacity-building support for LGUs across the region through the Canadian-funded Local

Government Support Program for ARMM (LGSPA), ARMM’s own reporting showed little improvement in the quality of governance in terms of both fiduciary standards and service delivery outcomes. This experience suggests that the absence of accountability, rather than technical deficiencies, is at the core of ARMM’s government challenges.

125 Only 6% of LGUs in ARMM received the Seal of Good Housekeeping from the DILG in 2013, compared to the national average of 76.6%.126 Torres (2007), page 109. 127 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and World Bank (2014).128 Tribal Helm (2010), pages 32 to 34.129 The Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Program (see www.bangsamorodevelopment.org) and the ARMM Social Fund

Project. 130 Refer to the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) and International Alert (2014).131 Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2011).132 The debate on the draft law could continue through the first quarter of 2015.133 Executive Order No. 120, “Constituting the Transition Commission and for Other Purpose,” December 2012.134 “The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro,” Section VII, Item 9.135 See “Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing,” Section V, Article B.136 “The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro,” Section VII, Item 9.137 Ibid., item 10.138 The CT4T ideally will be supported by professionals with skills corresponding to those of the heads of line and major support departments of the

ARG: Public Works and Highways, Health, Education, Local Government, Social Welfare and Development, Transportation and Communications, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Fisheries, Environment and Natural Resources, Trade and Industry, Regional Planning, Budgeting, Treasury and Accounting, and others that may be identified later.

139 The Policy Development Team, preferably consisting of professionals with stellar experience in action and policy research, would need expertise or specialization in such fields as economics, including agricultural economics, business management or administration, public administration, law including Shari’ah justice, local government administration, taxation, banking and finance, and others that may be identified by the BTA.

140 It may be necessary to create a joint ARG-BTA Turnover Committee to settle problems encountered in the turnover of reports, physical assets, personnel, documents/records, and financial assets. The committee’s formation could be discussed by the ARG and the BTA early on.

141 The TPMT is mandated to monitor the implementation of the CAB.142 About six intergovernmental bodies are identified in the “Annex on Normalization,” together with mechanisms to facilitate consultative process

between the parties in the appointment, employment and deployment of the existing police force and the Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Those bodies are germane to the issue of security.

143 Two laws on local governments apply in ARMM: the Muslim Mindanao Act No. 25 (approved by the Regional Legislative Assembly in 1994) and the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The latter devolved functions from the Central Government to LGUs, including functions pertaining to delivery of social and economic services such as health, agriculture, social welfare, and environment. Under the LGC, LGUs are entitled to their respective shares in internal revenue allotments (IRA) to fund the performance of those devolved functions. On the other hand, MMA 25 did not devolve functions relating to the delivery of health, agriculture, social welfare, and environmental services. Most ARMM LGUs, notwithstanding receipt of IRA allocations from the national government, refuse to perform those four aforementioned functions because according to them, these have not been devolved.

144 See Guerrero, Barra, Mangahas, and Licudine (2007).145 Presidential Decree 1083 requires judges in the District Courts to have the same qualifications as their counterparts in the regular court system, as

well as passing the Shari’ah bar. Shari’ah Circuit Court judges are required to have high school education and to have passed the Shari’ah bar.

NOTES

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