gojil goettingen journal of international lawvolker röben recent developments in legal assistance...

Articles

Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions: UK Practice Alexander Orakhelashvili

The Legal Significance of Global Development Partnerships: European Development Cooperation and its Contribution to the International Law of Development Markus Kaltenborn

Defending the Emergence of the Superior Orders Defense in the Contemporary Context Jessica Liang The Post-9/11 Discourse Revisited – The Self-Image of the International Legal Scientific Discipline Ulf Linderfalk

Humanitarian Action – A Scope for the Responsibility to Protect: Part II: Responsibility to Protect - A Legal Device Ready for Use? Marie-José Domestici-Met

The Rise of Self-Determination Versus the Rise of Democracy Cécile Vandewoude

Current Developments in International Law

From Kosovo to Catalunya: Separatism and Integration in Europe Christopher J. Borgen

The two Faces of the Internationalized pouvoir constituant: Independence and Constitution-Making under External Influence in Kosovo Michael Riegner The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo: Rules or Principles? Volker Röben

Recent Developments in Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Peter Rackow & Cornelius Birr

The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights at 2010 – An Account of the Millennium Summit Outcome Marie von Engelhardt

Vol. 2, No. 3 (2010)

GoJIL Goettingen Journal ofInternational Law

Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)

c/o Göttingen Institute for International and European Law

Platz der Göttingen Sieben 5

37073 Göttingen

Germany

[email protected]

www.gojil.eu

ISSN 1868-1581

The Goettingen Journal of International Law is published Open Access and semi-annually

by Göttingen Law School students.

Submissions: The GoJIL encourages submissions addressing general international law and

employing methodologies from neighbouring disciplines such as international relations,

history, or economics. The Journal also welcomes contributions emanating from specialized

branches of international law such as international criminal law, international humanitarian

law, and international economic law, in particular if they address issues which are of

general relevance.

The length of contributions is not restricted. However, we recommend a maximum of

15,000 words. Contributors are requested to insert a short abstract to their submission.

Contributions should be saved in MS Word (any version through 7.0) format. Authors

should be prepared to supply any cited sources upon request. The full Author Style Sheet is

available online at http://gojil.uni-goettingen.de/authorguidelines.pdf.

The views expressed in all contributions to the GoJIL are those of the individual authors

and do not necessarily represent the views of the Board of Editors or the Göttingen Institute

of International and European Law.

Except where otherwise noted, all contributions are licensed under the Creative Commons

Licence Attribution - No Derivative Works 3.0 Germany and protected by German

Intellectual Property Law (UrhG).

Advisory Board

Prof. Dr. KAI AMBOS (University of

Göttingen), Prof. Dr. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL

(George Washington University), Prof. Dr.

CHRISTIAN CALLIESS (FU Berlin), Prof. Dr.

GEORG NOLTE (HU Berlin/International Law

Commission), Prof. Dr. ANDREAS L. PAULUS

(Judge at the Federal Constitutional Court,

University of Göttingen), Prof. Dr. DIETRICH

RAUSCHNING (University of Göttingen), Prof.

Dr. WALTER REESE-SCHÄFER (Göttingen

University), Prof. Dr. FRANK SCHORKOPF

(Göttingen University) Prof. Dr. BRUNO

SIMMA (International Court of Justice), Prof.

Dr. PETER-TOBIAS STOLL (Göttingen

University).

Scientific Advisory Board

KATRIN AREND (University of Göttingen),

HELMUT AUST (Humboldt-University of

Berlin), CHEN GE (University of Göttingen),

MATTHIAS GOLDMANN (Max Planck Institute,

Heidelberg), CARSTEN HOPPE (European

University Institute, Florence), STEFAN

KORTE (FU Berlin), THOMAS KLEINLEIN

(University of Frankfurt/Main), BERNHARD

KUSCHNIK (University of Tübingen),

CLEMENS MATTHEIS (University of

Göttingen), NELE MATZ-LÜCK (Max Planck

Institute, Heidelberg), SVEN MIßLING

(University of Göttingen), JÖRN MÜLLER

(University of Göttingen), KILLIAN O’BRIEN

(Walther Schücking Institute, University of

Kiel), NIELS PETERSEN (Max Planck Institute,

Bonn), LYDIA LÖHNER (University of

Göttingen), TOBIAS THIENEL (University of

Kiel), IGNAZ STEGMILLER (University of

Göttingen), MARKUS WAGNER (University of

Miami)

Editorial Board

Editors-in-Chief: ANJA DAHLMANN,

MATTHIAS LIPPOLD, TOBIAS TSCHAPPE

ANTONIA BAUTSCH, FABIAN BISMAYER, ANNE

DIENELT, JOHANNA DORMANN, NIELS EBLING,

SEBASTIAN EHRICHT, JELENA GROßE-BLEY,

JAHANGIR HASSEL, BENEDIKT HEINRICHS,

PETJA IVANOVA, MORTEN JONAS, JOHANNES

JÜRGING, GEORG KALINNA, NICOLAS KLEIN,

CAROLIN KLÜPFEL, ANTONINA KHODZHAEVA ,

JOHANN RUBEN LEIß, RHIAN MORITZ, JULIA

MÖBUS, ANNIKA MALEEN POSCHADEL,

JOHANNA ROCH, GEORG SCHAEFER, KAREN

SCHWABE, PHILIPP SOCHA, LUISA WENDEL,

ELENA-JOSEPHINE WOLTAIRE

Native Speaker Board

NEELA BADAMI, PRIYA BHATIA, ELIZABETH

CAMPBELL, DEEPALOKE CHATTERJEE,

ANDREW EWING, KAREN KIMKANA, ISABEL

MCCANN, ALEX MURRAY, DANIEL PEAT

Vol. 2, No. 3 (2010)

Contents

Editorial

Editorial .................................................................................................... 815

Acknowledgments .................................................................................... 821

Articles

Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions: UK Practice

Alexander Orakhelashvili ......................................................................... 823

The Legal Significance of Global Development Partnerships: European

Development Cooperation and its Contribution to the International Law

of Development

Markus Kaltenborn ................................................................................... 843

Defending the Emergence of the Superior Orders Defense in the

Contemporary Context

Jessica Liang ............................................................................................ 871

The Post-9/11 Discourse Revisited – The Self-Image of the International

Legal Scientific Discipline

Ulf Linderfalk ............................................................................................ 893

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 813-814

Humanitarian Action – A Scope for the Responsibility to Protect:

Part II: Responsibility to Protect – A Legal Device Ready for Use?

Marie-José Domestici-Met .......................................................................951

The Rise of Self-Determination Versus the Rise of Democracy

Cécile Vandewoude .................................................................................. 981

Current Developments in International Law

From Kosovo to Catalunya: Separatism and Integration in Europe

Christopher J. Borgen .............................................................................. 997

The two Faces of the Internationalized pouvoir constituant: Independence

and Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Kosovo

Michael Riegner........................................................................................1035

The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in

Respect of Kosovo: Rules or Principles?

Volker Roeben ..........................................................................................1063

Recent Developments in Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Peter Rackow & Cornelius Birr ............................................................. 1087

The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights at 2010 –

An Account of the Millennium Summit Outcome

Marie von Engelhardt ..............................................................................1129

Vol. 2, No. 3 (2010)

Editorial

At the end of this decade the General Court of the European Union deliv-

ered its judgment Kadi II in which it applied the principles established by

the European Court of Justice in its Kadi-judgment. The bottom line: the

sanction system still lacks effective judicial protection, the improvements

such as establishing a focal point or an ombudsman cannot be regarded pro-

viding sufficient legal protection. The General Court is therefore entitled as

well as obliged to full judicial review “so long as the re-examination proce-

dure operated by the Sanctions Committee clearly fails to offer guarantees

of effective judicial protection”1.

At the end of its judgment the General Court raised an important question:

“It might even be asked whether – given that now nearly 10 years have

passed since the applicant‟s funds were originally frozen – it is not now time

to call into question the finding of this Court […] according to which the

freezing of funds is a temporary precautionary measure which, unlike con-

fiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right of the persons con-

cerned to property in their financial assets but only the use thereof.”2 Nearly

10 years have now passed since the funds of Mr Kadi and others were fro-

zen – one could raise the question whether the Court‟s statement can be in-

terpreted as a call for a return to normality, to a reassessment of the taken

measures. At least, the sanctions as implemented in States have been sub-

jected to judicial review and partly have been challenged successfully. Cur-

rently we are witnessing many legal proceedings focusing on legal questions

about the terror-lists and its implementation: the Kadi-Litigation before the

Courts of the European Union, the pending proceedings in Nada v Switzer-

land as well as Abdelrazik v The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attor-

ney General of Canada and A, K, M, Q & G v HM Treasury before the

1 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, Judgment of 30 September 2010,

General Court, Case T‑85/09, para. 127. 2 Id., para. 150.

816 GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 815-819

United Kingdom Supreme Court, just to name a few. The latter one also

discussed by Alexander Orakhelashvili in this issue. He analyzes in his arti-

cle the UK state practice in interpretation of Security Council Resolutions of

the last ten years and attempts to determine when and whether unilateral

interpretation of Security Council Resolutions takes place. After an intro-

duction on the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, the author

examines a broad range of cases, from the Iraq-intervention over the Pres-

ence in Iraq to the recent terror-list proceedings in the UK as well as Reso-

lution 1244 in the Kosovo Advisory Proceedings.

Even 10 years after 9/11 the Law of Self-Defence and in particular its scope

remains a disputed question. Taking a look at the definition of the crime of

aggression in the Kampala resolution, States decided to define the crime of

aggression as a so-called leadership-crime which has to be attributable to a

State3, non-State-actors are not capable of committing a crime of aggression

per definitionem. Extending the scope of the definition to non-State-actors

could have lead to far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of Arti-

cle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and for the international com-

munity. As Tom Ruys puts it in the most recent book dedicated to this topic

“‟Armed Attack‟ and Article 51 of the UN-Charter” “it is difficult to avoid

the impression that both State practice and opinio iuris have undergone im-

portant shifts since 1986, and especially since 2001. At the same time, it

appears premature to conclude that this shift in customary practice has crys-

tallized in the unequivocal emergence of a new ratione personae threshold,

replacing the traditional one. […] State practice since 2001 has been far

from coherent.”4 One problem with customary international law is that a

new practice is first a violation of the established norm until the practice is

no longer be seen as a violation but as the expression of a new legal norm.

This transition from illegality to legality is a grey area which stresses the

importance of the second element, the opinio iuris and implicitly also the

significance of the international lawyers interpreting the status of law. This

is the starting point of Ulf Linderfalk. He invites us in his essay “The Post-

9/11 Discourse Revisited – The Self-Image of the International Legal Scien-

tific Discipline” to a critical examination of the role of the legal scientific

discourse with regard to the law of self-defence after 9/11. According to the

author the scholarly debate about the scope of Article 51 failed to live up to

3 Cf. Article 8bis para. 1 of the Kampala-Declaration, available at http://www.icc-

cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf (last visited 29 December

2010). 4 T. Ruys, ’Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN-Charter (2010), 486.

Editorial 817

the standards normally applied in serious legal analysis. Mr Linderfalk uses

the debate to elaborate on and to deduce from it a description of the interna-

tional legal scientist as archetype.

This issue covers furthermore a broad range of other topics.

The article of Markus Kaltenborn deals with the legal framework of the

European Union‟s global development partnerships. It discusses legal prob-

lems arising in the context of the European Union‟s development policy and

sheds light on its contribution to the international law of development.

Jessica Liang examines the defence of superior orders as one of the most

controversial defences to be pleaded under international criminal law and

points out how in recent years the resort to superior orders has re-emerged

as a complete defence. Criticizing the motives of this development the au-

thor claims the manifest illegality doctrine as a “middle-way” to be most

workable.

Marie-José Domestici-Met delivers in her second part a description of the

origins of the Responsibility to Protect and discusses whether the World

Summit Outcome 2005 provides a legal tool to protect a state's population

from violations of humanitarian law. She concludes that although the R2P

might not have a striking impact on an ongoing conflict it might help to es-

tablish a new principle leading to national and international measures before

and after a crisis.

With her contribution “The Rise of Self-Determination Versus the Rise of

Democracy” Cécile Vandewoude won the annual Student Essay Competi-

tion. Ms Vandewoude examines the gap between the idea that the right of

self-determination should be lead to the establishment of democratic gov-

ernments and the state practice. She argues that the right of self-

determination should not only be limited by the principle of territorial integ-

rity and by human rights but also by the goal of democratic governance.

It is great to see that the winning contributions of our student essay competi-

tions have been cited so far5 which encourages us to continue the concept of

hosting an annual competition and of accompanying students on the path of

5 Cf. M. Roscini, „World Wide Warfare- Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force‟, 14

Max Planck United Nations Yearbook of International Law (2010), 106; Law Council

of Australia, „A Charter: Protectiong the rights of all Australians- Law Council of

Australia‟s Submission to the National Consultation on Human Rights‟, available at

http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_ uu-

id=8A2A9585-1E4F-17FA-D2E6-585D7F729F44&siteName=lca (last visited 22 De-

cember 2010).

818 GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 815-819

a (first) scientific publication. More information on the 2011 essay competi-

tion will be available at our website www.gojil.eu soon.

This issue‟s Current Developments in International Law section contains

three contributions related to the situation in Kosovo and two more dealing

with recent developments in the areas of legal assistance and the United

Nation‟s Millenium Development Goals.

Christopher Borgen evaluates the implications of Kosovo‟s declaration of

independence on the European Union. In “From Kosovo to Catalunya:

Separatism and Integration in Europe” Mr Borgen compares the separatism

in Kosovo to similar situations in regions of the EU and the increasing role

of regions in the EU in general.

Michael Riegner argues that independence and constitution-making under

external influence in Kosovo represent two faces of the same international-

ized constituent power aspiring for self-determination. According to the

author, the International Court of Justice recognized the constitutional law

concept of pouvoir constituant and discusses its role as well as normative

standards applying to it.

Volker Röben critically evaluates the underlying Lotus-recourse of the In-

ternational Court of Justice: according to the author the rule-centred ap-

proach to international law is not without alternatives. More coherence of

the law, more predictive power and ultimately greater legal certainty can be

expected from a principle-based approach on which he further elaborates.

In “The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights at 2010 – An

Account of the Millennium Summit Outcome” Marie von Engelhardt fo-

cuses on the outcome of the United Nations‟ Millennium Summit of Sep-

tember 2010. She analyses the previous progress made towards the Millen-

nium Development Goals with regard to human rights.

In view of recent events involving Julian Assange the interest in the system

of legal assistance in criminal matters increased noticeably. What are the

legal bases for legal assistance among European States and between them

and third countries? Bilateral agreements between European States, between

European States and third countries, between third countries and the Euro-

pean Union as well as obligations deriving from the European Treaties and

corresponding secondary acts lead to a complex legal situation. In addition,

definitions of crimes differ from country to country.

Peter Rackow and Cornelius Birr illuminate the fundamental principles of

legal assistance and underline the importance and problems of the principle

of mutual recognition in criminal matters paying also attention to the Euro-

pean Union‟s role as an entity to commit its individual members to the ful-

fillment of obligations towards other non-Member States.

Editorial 819

We are delighted to present herewith this issue of the GoJIL to our cher-

ished readership and are hoping that it will be a worthwhile read.

Since the release of the last issue in August the Editorial Board expanded its

field of activity by organizing and hosting the GoJIL‟s first international

conference on “Resources of Conflicts – Conflicts over Resources” from

October 7-9 in Göttingen. It was a remarkable event which was attended by

international lawyers from all over the world. It is a pleasure to rebuke to

the publication of the papers presented during this distinguished event in the

next issue of the GoJIL.

The Editors

Acknowledgments

Without the incredible support and help of the following people, we would

not have been able to accomplish this ambitious project. We would like to

thank:

- All members of the GoJIL Advisory Board and Scientific Advisory Board

- External Reviewers: STEFANIE BOCK; MATTHÄUS FINK, MLE;

ALEXANDER HEINZE; MICHAEL KOEBELE; STEPHAN SCHILL;

MAJA SMRKOLJ; INGO VENZKE, LLM; PROF. SILJA VÖNEKY

- The University and Law Faculty of Göttingen

- The Göttingen Institute for Public International Law and European Law

- The Joachim Herz Stiftung

- The Göttinger Verein zu Förderung des Internationalen Rechts e.V.

- The Göttinger Universitätsverlag

Goettingen Journal of International Law 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-orakhelashvili

Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council

Resolutions: UK Practice

Alexander Orakhelashvili

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 824

A. The Regime of Interpretation of Security Council

Resolutions and the Essence of Unilateral Interpretation ............... 824

B. Iraq: Invasion in 2003 ..................................................................... 827

C. Iraq: The Post-Invasion Governance Regime and Security

Measures ......................................................................................... 830

D. Targeted Sanctions against Terrorism Suspects .............................. 835

E. Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Provisional Governance

of Kosovo ........................................................................................ 840

F. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 842

LLM cum laude (Leiden); PhD (Cantab.); Lecturer, School of Law, University of

Birmingham.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

824

Abstract

Unilateral interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions takes place

where, due to political considerations of the day, one or more States attempt

construing the resolution in question as falling short of, or exceeding, the

agreement between the Council's Member States that the resolution on its

face suggests. Whether unilateral interpretation indeed takes place depends

on what the content of the resolution actually is, which question in its turn

depends on the use of transparent methods of interpretation applicable to

resolutions. After examining the applicability of the 1969 Vienna

Convention in this process, the article turns to four instances of unilateral

interpretation from the UK practice, and to reactions to the attempts of

unilateral interpretation. These four instances demonstrate that the

consistent use of interpretation methods, coupled with the reaction by other

States to that effect, can help maintaining the adherence to the resolution's

meaning. Where the national or international courts are available as forums

to challenge unilateral interpretation, they can further enhance the

maintenance of proper meaning of these instruments.

A. The Regime of Interpretation of Security Council

Resolutions and the Essence of Unilateral

Interpretation

In order for the United Nations Security Council to properly

implement its primary responsibility to maintain and restore international

peace and security, it has to be able to properly communicate to its

membership what steps and measures should be taken in the relevant

situation to maintain or restore peace and security under Chapters VI and

VII of the United Nations Charter. The Council communicates, through its

resolutions, its collective intention as to those steps and measures.

Clarifying the content and scope of those resolutions through the use of a

single and hierarchically arranged set of interpretation rules is necessary if it

is going to be ensured that the steps and actions taken on the ground

correspond to those articulated in the Council’s collective decision. The

hierarchical arrangement of interpretation rules is meant to precisely

identify the parameters of the Council’s collective intention, should States

have a disagreement as to what precisely the Council has demanded,

mandated, authorized or proscribed.


825

The only written and authoritative set of interpretation rules in the

international legal system is provided for under Articles 31 and 32 of the

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. No alternative set of the

rules of interpretation formulated by academics, legal advisers or diplomats

can have the same authority of law as this codified set of rules. Security

Council Resolutions are agreements between Member States of the Council;

even though they are adopted as institutional decisions, they are beforehand

negotiated and agreed by Member States. Even if they can bind States that

have voted against them or are not even members of the Council, they still

remain agreements as between States that constitute the majority in the

Council specified in Article 27 of the UN Charter. Resolutions should

therefore be interpreted as agreements pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the

Vienna Convention. Although Articles 31 and 32 are not formally

designated to apply to Security Council resolutions, their paramount

rationale still is to help identifying the meaning of the agreed written word

so that then States can place reliance upon them, which need is no less

pressing in the case of resolutions that it is in the case of treaties.

Questions regarding the above conclusion will necessarily arise as the

International Court of Justice has suggested in the Kosovo Advisory

Opinion, in somewhat obscure terms, that

“While the rules on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and

32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may provide

guidance, differences between Security Council resolutions and

treaties mean that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions

also requires that other factors be taken into account. Security Council

resolutions are issued by a single, collective body and are drafted

through a very different process than that used for the conclusion of a

treaty.”1

The Court did not specify what those “other factors” are, and how the

drafting process of resolutions is “very different” from that of treaties. In

reality, however, both these drafting processes relate to arriving at the

agreement between States (whether within an institutional framework or

outside it), enshrining that agreement in the written text and enabling the

1 Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in

respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion, [Kosovo-

Opinion] available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (last visited 5.

August 2010) [Kosovo-Opinion], 34, para. 94.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

826

relevant States to place reliance on it whenever their rights and obligations

are at stake. It can also be said that the drafting process of a BIT is different,

or “very different”, from that of the ICCPR; but they are both agreements

regardless, and subjected to the same regime of interpretation. In general, it

is not uncommon in the Court’s jurisprudence to pay a lip-service to the

“special” nature of certain “non-treaty” acts, but ultimately interpret them in

compliance with the Vienna Convention regime.2

The interpretation of resolutions pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 shall

thus demonstrate the objectively intelligible content of the resolution in

question and of the agreement between States it embodies. Only the factors

expressive of that agreement have to be considered, above all the text of the

resolution in the light of its object and purpose as could be inferred from the

resolution’s overall aims and structure. Adopting Articles 31 and 32 of the

Vienna Convention as guidance, even if not as a direct authority, requires

that the primary importance shall be attached to the ordinary meaning of the

text of the relevant resolution in the light of its object and purpose. In the

Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court applied this method of

interpretation to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)3. Through the use

of the object and purpose method, the Court concluded that the regime of

interim administration of Kosovo was fundamentally interim, but retained

its continuous validity until it would be abolished the way it was originally

established.

In the final analysis, interpretation of resolutions is always about

identifying and evidencing the Council’s collective will to the exclusion of

unilateral projection – whether by a single State or a group of States – of the

parameters and scope of the Council’s agreed position. Such use of

interpretation methods confirms the limited role of interpretation – it is

meant to identify what Member States of the Security Council have agreed

upon, as opposed to projecting what would have been reasonable or suitable

for them to agree.

2 In Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain/Canada) the International Court has stated that the

Optional Clause declarations of the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction are sui

generis instruments. However, the actual process of interpretation in this case was

conducted in the same way as the faithful application of the 1969 Vienna Convention

would require, by reliance on the textual meaning of the Canadian declaration as the

crucial factor of the ascertainment of its meaning, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.

Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1998, 432, especially

457-465, paras 61 to 80. 3 SC Res. 1244, 10 June 1999


827

The issue of unilateral interpretation relates not to methods of

interpretation, that is how interpretation should be performed, but who

should interpret the relevant resolution. Individual States, whether or not

they have been part of the drafting process, are obviously not prevented

from expressing their views as to the content of the relevant resolution. The

standing accorded to individual States reflects the principle that United

Nations organs are not the ultimate auto-interpreters of their decisions;

individual States must have the faculty to react when a UN organ adopting a

decision thereby exceeds its delegated powers; or if a State or an organ

implementing that decision construes it to the same effect, or the way that

differs from the decision that has been actually adopted, for instance by

disrupting the required sequence of interpretation methods that are aimed at

clarifying what the Council precisely intended and agreed upon. On the

other hand, unilateral interpretation by States becomes a problem when

attempting to construe the relevant resolution as approving the outcomes

different from those emerging when normal methods of interpretation are

used, and the State which advances an interpretation other than those

defensible under the normal methods of interpretation can be said to be

engaging in unilateral interpretation. Factors that motivate unilateral

interpretation prominently include attempts to stay, nominally at least,

within the range of the United Nations law. The outcome sought through

unilateral interpretation is to project the legal position that either exceeds, or

is narrower than, that envisaged under the Council’s collective decision.

B. Iraq: Invasion in 2003

The UK argument in favor of the use of force against Iraq in March

2003 centered around the following points: Security Council Resolution 687

(1991)4 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under

Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)5 to liberate Kuwait from Iraq; a

material breach of the resolution 687 would revive that authority under

resolution 678; resolution 1441 (2002)6 determined that Iraq was in material

breach of resolution 687; the authority to use force thus revived.7 The

4 SC Res. 687, 3 April 1991.

5 SC Res. 678, 29 November 1990.

6 SC Res. 1441, 8 November 2002.

7 The Use of Force against Iraq, The Attorney-General’s Opinion, 52 International &

Comparative Law Quarterly (2003) 3, 811 at 811-812;Attorney General’s Advice on

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

828

unilateral interpretation thus concerned, as we shall see, all those three

resolutions.

Under paragraph 2 in resolution 678, and in response to Iraq’s

invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council authorized

member States cooperating with Kuwait “to use all necessary means to

uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)8 and all subsequent relevant

resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” It is

arguable that the open-ended language in resolution 678, namely the words

“to restore international peace and security in the area” could, on their face

at least, be interpreted as authorizing the use of force up to the point of

removing the Iraqi regime and occupying Iraq for some time, if that would

be necessary to restore the peace in the area. However, the problem in this

case can be disposed by the contextual reading of resolution 678 which saw

the “breach of the peace” in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – no other event –

and thus authorized the Chapter VII force to deal with, and “restore peace

and security in the area” after that “breach of the peace”. Once this “breach

of the peace” would be reversed, peace and security in the area would be

restored. There was thus no authority granted beyond the liberation of

Kuwait, because no objective of “restoring peace and security in the area”

additional to the liberation of Kuwait has ever been formulated by the

Council. Projecting the authority to use force against Iraq beyond the limits

of the liberation of Kuwait will pose an insoluble question as to precisely

how far such broader authorization would go, what instances it would or

would not encompass. Reading in such broader authorization would thus fall

short of providing any workable guidance on this matter.

The second step of interpretative exercise related to inferring the

authority to use force against Iraq from resolution 687 (1991), which

argument was based on a false premise that the authorization of the use of

force under resolution 678 went beyond the liberation of Kuwait. The FCO

Paper on Legal Basis for the Use of Force suggested that

“SCR 687 did not repeal the authorization to use force in paragraph 2

of SCR 678 … The authorization was suspended for so long as Iraq

complied with the conditions of the ceasefire. But the authorization

the Iraq War Iraq Resolution 1441, 54 International & Comparative Law Quarterly

(2005) 3, 767, 769 8 SC Res. 660, 2 August 1990.


829

could be revived if the Council determined that Iraq was acting in

material breach of the requirements of SCR 687.”9

That argument then led to a consequent assertion that the

determination, under resolution 1441, of Iraq’s “material breach” has

revived – the non-existent as we saw – authority to use force under

resolution 678.

It has to be specified that resolution 687 is clear in acknowledging that

the authorization of the use of force under resolution 678 had lapsed as soon

as Kuwait got liberated. Despite the semantics, what happened in 1991 as

between the Coalition States and Iraq was not really a cease-fire but

termination of hostilities, and the end to war. Resolution 686 (1991)10

spoke

in its preamble and paragraph 8 of “the rapid establishment of a definitive

end to the hostilities” as an aim. Even if resolution 687 spoke of a cease-

fire, this has to be seen as a stage towards “a definitive end to the hostilities”

as envisaged earlier, not as a temporary break in hostilities, if the Council’s

entire position is to be construed consistently. Both preamble and paragraph

6 of resolution 687 manifest the Council’s intention to bring “military

presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of

resolution 686.”

Moreover, quite apart from resolutions 678 and 687, resolution 1441

showed no trace of automatic authorization of force, as has been confirmed

in British and American statements.11

Under paragraphs 1 and 4 the Council

stated the essence of the problem, namely that Iraq’s failure to cooperate

with UN inspectors and the IAEA amounted to a material breach of

resolution 687(1991); under paragraphs 11 and 12 the Council expressed its

intention to obtain the information regarding Iraq’s further non-compliance

and non-cooperation, and “consider” the need to ensure Iraq’s compliance.

9 Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of Force, 52 International & Comparative Law

Quarterly (2003) 3, 813; Attorney-General’s advice, 54 International & Comparative

Law Quarterly (2005) 3, 767, 769, para. 7 10

SC Res. 686, 2 March 1991. 11

The British and American statements did not at that stage claim that this resolution

contained an express or implied authorization to that effect. In fact, the US

Representative in the Council conceded that resolution 1441 contained no hidden

triggers and no automaticity regarding the use of force. Security Council 4644th

Meeting, SC Press Release SC/7564; Security Council, 4644th

meeting, 8 November

2002, S/PV.4644, 3; Letter dated 20 March 2003 from Permanent Representative of

the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the

Security Council, S/2003/351, 21 March 2003.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

830

The legal effect of these paragraphs is straightforward in pointing to the

standing of the Council as the sole entity that has to ascertain the facts of

Iraq’s non-compliance and to consider and decide the steps that should

address this problem. As such, paragraphs 1, 4, 11 and 12 entail no other

effect, and there has thus been no authorization to use force under that

resolution.

C. Iraq: The Post-Invasion Governance Regime and

Security Measures

From May 2003 until the end of June 2004, the British and American

forces had been the forces of occupation in Iraq. On 28 June 2004 the

occupation ended and the interim constitution of Iraq came into effect.

Sovereignty was thus transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government. This

required establishing the new legal basis for the presence of British and

American forces. Thus, the UN Security Council resolution 1546 (2004)12

proclaimed the end of the occupation regime, established the US-led

Multinational force (MNF), and transferred the governmental authority to

the Iraqi Government. The resolution also authorized the MNF to use force

and intern individuals for maintaining security and stability in Iraq. The

powers claimed by British forces in Iraq under that resolution ultimately

have risen to the litigation in the Al-Jedda case before English courts –

Divisional Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords.

Mr Al-Jedda was detained on 10 October 2004 in Baghdad on the

ground that his internment was necessary for imperative security reasons, on

the allegation of recruiting terrorists outside Iraq. He was flown from

Baghdad to a British detention facility in Basra. No charges have been

brought against him and no trial has been held. His detention has been

periodically reviewed and prolonged by senior officers in the British army.

In June 2005, he began proceedings before English courts to obtain the

pronouncement on the legality of his detention. Al-Jedda challenged his

detention alleging the violation of the freedom from arbitrary detention

under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which

applies in English legal system through the 1998 Human Rights Act, and of

Article 78 of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention, which deals with the right of

the occupying power to detain individuals, and the conditions on which such

right can be exercised. Following the decisions of the lower courts, the

12

SC Res. 1546, 8 June 2004.


831

House of Lords dismissed the appeal of Al-Jedda on the basis of the

authorization to intern individuals in Iraq as stipulated in the UN Security

Council resolution 1546(2004).13

The Divisional Court held that this power of detention and internment

was conferred pursuant to Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention, and the

Resolution “provides a clear indication of the intention that the powers

previously derived from Article 78 of Geneva IV were to be continued.”14

The court’s judgment did not address the question whether the detentions

and internments in Iraq were accompanied by the procedure of appeal, as is

required under Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention.15

The Court stated

that “the procedures applied to the claimant’s detention do not strictly meet

the requirements of Article 78, since the decision-maker was a single

individual rather than an administrative board. On the other hand, the non-

compliance is in our view more technical than substantial.” This “technical”

non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 78 did not

allegedly have the automatic effect of rendering the detention unlawful.16

The Court of Appeal’s approach is somewhat less straightforward, but

it subscribes to the same outcome in relation to the interpretation of Security

Council resolutions and their impact on the relevant international law. The

Court of Appeal proceeded from the assumption that

“at the level of international law Article 103 of the UN Charter had

the effect that a State’s obligations under a Security Council Chapter

13

R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence

(Respondent), Judgment of 12 December 2007, Appellate Committee, House of Lords

[2007] UKHL 58, [Al-Jedda (House of Lords)], para. 44. 14

Regina (Al-Jedda) v the Secretary of State for Defence, Judgment of 12 August 2005,

Queens Bench Divisional Court, Case No: CO/3673/2005, paras 87, 92. 15

Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention requires, in its relevant parts, that “[i]f the

Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take

safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to

assigned residence or to internment. Decisions regarding such assigned residence or

internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the

Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This

procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be

decided with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall

be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set

up by the said Power.” Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, 21 October 1950, 75 U.N.T.S., 287, Article 78. 16

R (Al-Jedda) v the Secretary of State of Defence, Judgment of 12 August 2005,

Divisional Court, [2005] EWHC 1809 [Al-Jedda (Divisional Court)], paras 126, 144.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

832

VII resolution prevailed over any obligation it might have under any

other international agreement, such as the ICCPR or the ECHR, in so

far as those obligations were in conflict. If and in so far as UNSCR

1546(2004) obliged member states participating in the MNF to intern

people in Iraq for imperative reasons of security in order to fulfil the

mandate of the MNF, this obligation prevailed over the “no loss of

liberty without due court process” obligations of a human rights

convention or covenant.”17

The Court of Appeal used the Security Council’s qualification of

Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention for further inferring from the

Council’s action the qualification imposed on the freedom from arbitrary

detention under Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights and under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human

Rights.18

Similar to the outcome in Al-Jedda I, in Al-Jedda II Arden LJ

considered it to be clear from Al-Jedda I that the UK had obligations

pursuant to Security Council resolutions which overrode UK’s other

obligations, including those under the IV Geneva Convention.19

Detention

for security reasons was the task MNF was required under resolution 1546,

which obligation allegedly derived from Article 103 UN Charter.20

This

differs from the House of Lords understanding of resolution 1546 as merely

authorizing security detention, for which reason the House of Lords

vigorously asserted in Al-Jedda I that authorizations under a Security

Council resolution produce, via Article 103, effects similar to obligations.

17

R (Al-Jedda) v the Secretary of State of Defence, Judgment of 29 March 2006, Court

of Appeal, [2006] EWCA Civ 327, para. 63. 18

Id., para. 80. 19

Hilal Abdul Razzaq Ali Al Jedda v the Secretary of State for Defence, Judgment of 8

July 2010, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [2010] EWCA Civ 758, para. 84 [Al-

Jedda II]; this case concerned Al-Jedda’s claims for damages for unlawful

imprisonment in Iraq, raised by amendment of his original claims in Al-Jedda I

regarding the habeas corpus. 20

Al-Jedda II, supra note 12, paras 105 & 108 (further using the wording “entitled and

bound”); Arden LJ pointed later on, however, that the actions by British forces had a

legal basis in overarching provisions of Article 103 and the IV Geneva Convention, at

para. 105. On a general plane, however, Article 103 produces no obligations on its

own; it merely requires according the primacy to obligations that the Council has

validly created through its resolutions.


833

It is noteworthy that the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal in Al-

Jedda I did not address the issue of proper interpretation of resolutions; nor

did, on the whole, the House of Lords which essentially upheld the

decisions of the two lower courts in this case. Only Baroness Hale of

Richmond has emphasized that the House of Lords devoted little attention to

the precise scope of the authorization under Resolution 1546, as “there must

still be room for argument about what precisely is covered by the resolution

and whether it applies on the facts of this case.”21

In terms of specific action and measures under resolution 1546, the

Security Council had

“Decide[d] that the multinational force shall have the authority to take

all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security

and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this

resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued

presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks, including

by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United

Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in

paragraph seven above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and

without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political

process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities.”

Broad as it is, the scope of this provision does not specifically refer to,

nor inherently imply, the power of the Multinational Force to intern or

detain individuals in violation of the applicable human rights and

humanitarian law.

The letter of the US Secretary of State, by reference to which the

Resolution 1546 is adopted and the part of which it forms, emphasizes the

need for the Multinational Force to be able to intern individuals:

“Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to

undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of

security and to ensure force protection. These include activities

necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking

to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include

combat operations against members of these groups, internment where

21

Al-Jedda (House of Lords), supra note 6, para. 129.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

834

this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued

search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.”22

However, the letter of the Secretary of State proceeds to state that

“the forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at

all times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of

armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.”23

The exchange of letters thus confirms that the Multinational Force has

the power to intern, but at the same time they will be acting in conformity

with the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, on its face the Resolution 1546

does not divulge the intention to depart from the applicable international

humanitarian law, whose relevance it expressly affirms, nor from human

rights law because it does not contain any indication to that effect.24

Consequently, each and every act of internment must be in accordance with

Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention, and the procedures of review and

appeal must be provided for. It has also to be emphasized that the reference

to the text of resolution 1546 renders moot any exercise in a “human-rights-

friendly” or “harmonious” interpretation of this resolution, because there is

simply no need to go that far. The Divisional Court, for instance, has

rejected the argument of “harmonious” interpretation,25

but it also

disregarded the textual requirements of the resolution, the same problem to

be replicated later in the two judgments of the higher courts. In practice it

matters not whether a resolution should be construed in a “harmonious” way

with human rights norms; it matters instead whether the text of a resolution

shows any authorization to depart from human rights norms – which

resolution 1546 does not – there thus being no need for its “harmonious”

construction; or if, hypothetically, a resolution were to divulge such

authorization to depart from human rights, then the problems would arise

with the validity of that provision in the light of the Council’s paramount

22

Al-Jedda (House of Lords), supra note 6, para.14. 23

Id. 24

The UK is bound by international human rights law, particularly the ECHR, while

conducting its operations in Iraq, as was affirmed in another House of Lords

judgment, Al-Skeini and Others v Secretary of State for Defence, Judgment of 13 June

2007, House of Lords, [2007] UKHL 26, para. 132 (per Lord Brown). para. 90 (per

Baroness Hale), para. 97 (per Lord Carswell). 25

Al-Jedda (Divisional Court), supra note 9, paras 90-108.


835

duty to keep within human rights restrictions both as a matter of the

principles of the UN Charter and of general international law.

The House of Lords’ approach effectively approved a unilateral

interpretation of resolution 1546 contrary to that resolution’s terms. The

outcome thus contemplated is problematic as it projects the Security

Council’s decision to authorize a practically indefinite detention of

individuals contrary both to human rights law and humanitarian law. Placing

Al-Jedda-type detentions within the Security Council’s powers is essentially

confirming a rather scary outcome that the Security Council is also

authorized to approve indefinite detentions of the kind practiced by the US

Government in the Guantanamo Bay.

D. Targeted Sanctions against Terrorism Suspects

Targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the

individuals suspected of their involvement with terrorism are aimed not

against States as such, but against individuals. Resolution 1267 (1999)26

initiated this policy of targeted sanctions, manifested in the travel ban and

the freezing of funds. Resolution 1373(2001) has introduced a number of

general measures to deal with these problems. In the preamble of resolution

1822(2008) the Council articulates the necessity of targeted sanctions

against terrorist suspects the way that terrorism can only be defeated by a

sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation

and collaboration of all States “to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate

the terrorist threat.” By resolution 1735 (2006)27

, adopted “with respect to

Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups,

undertakings and entities associated with them”, the Council decided that all

States freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic

resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and ensure

that such funds, financial assets or economic resources are not made

available to them (paragraph 1(a)).

The interpretation placed on these resolutions by the UK came before

English courts. The High Court in England addressed the implementation in

the English legal system of paragraph 1(c) of Security Council resolution

1373 (2001)28

which obliges States to “freeze without delay funds and other

financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to

26

SC Res. 1267, 15 October 1999. 27

SC Res. 1735, 22 December 2006. 28

SC Res. 1773, 24 August 2007.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

836

commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of

terrorist acts.” In view of that, the 2006 Terrorism Order conferred to the

Treasury the power to act upon the resolution requirements where they have

“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is or may be” committing

the relevant crimes. The High Court rightly pointed out that the threshold set

in the Order was very low and could not constitute a necessary means of

implementing the resolution. The resolution did not extend to those who

were suspected of possible involvement in terrorism, even if the resolution

was not actually limited to those who were actually proved to be performing

those acts.29

The High Court also specified that the objective of asset-

freezing under resolution 1373 was to ensure that funds were not made

available for terrorist purposes; “thus any criminal liability which could fall

on those who make any assets available to a designated person should

depend on whether it was or ought to have been known to the supplier that

the asset in question could result in funds being available for terrorist

purposes.” That at the very least was an appropriate limitation on criminal

liability. The Order did not reflect the resolution’s requirements and was

thus not a necessary measure to implement the resolution or obligations

imposed by the Sanctions Committee.30

The Court of Appeal in the same case acknowledged that the

reasonable suspicion standard is not warranted under the text of resolution

1373, and insists that the resolution is silent on the standard of proof to be

satisfied on the question whether a particular person commits the relevant

terrorist act. The State could thus properly conclude that it was expedient to

provide for the reasonable suspicion test. However, the use of words “may

be” had to be disapproved because the language of resolution 1373 did not

authorize inserting these words in the 2006 Order.31

The reasoning, as well

as evidence – or the lack of it – to substantiate this last point in the appeal

judgment is essentially the same as the one relating to the use of the

reasonable suspicion standard. If the use of words “may be” was not

29

A, K, M, Q & G v HM Treasury, Judgment of 24 April 2008, High Court of Justice,

Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court, [2008] EWCH 869 (Admin), paras

39-40. The reasonable suspicion approach is also disapproved under Security Council

Resolution 1822 (2008) which focuses on “acts of activities indicating” that an

individual or entity is associated with Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden or the Taliban

(paragraph 2). 30

Id., para. 46. 31

A, K, M, Q & G v HM Treasury, Judgment of 30 October 2008, Court of Appeal

(Civil Division), [2008] EWCA Civ 1187, paras 39, 42.


837

warranted by the resolution, nor was that of the reasonable suspicion

standard.

The difference in approaches of the two courts may not be that great if

the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the words “may be” is considered. Any

sensible meaning the reasonable suspicion approach could properly have

refers, in essence, to whatever the State suspects “may be” the case.

Suspicion is a mental process focused on likelihood, potential or possibility,

and is thus definitionally different from certainty that falls within the realm

of demonstration, knowledge and proof. One could never suspect that

something is the case but only that something may be the case, and one’s

assertion to be suspecting that something is the case in effect only means

that one suspects that something may be the case. From the perspective of

an external observer, the expression of a suspicion not substantiated by

evidence points, in any case whatsoever, to the likelihood that suspected

facts could be true, whether or not the person expressing suspicion insists to

be suspecting that this actually is the case. The use, in the 2006 Order, of the

words “suspecting that the person is” thus amounts to an oxymoron. The

Court of Appeal’s rejection of the words “may be” effectively amounts to its

rejection of the reasonable suspicion test as a whole, because in practice it

will be very difficult to approve this test without also approving its

likelihood element.32

This litigation demonstrates that the choice of words in

the 2006 Order has been unfortunate.33

The courts’ approach to interpreting resolution 1373 is a separate

question. While the High Court rightly opposes the adoption of standard of

reasonable suspicion, it also acknowledges that the obvious proof standard

is not required in Security Council resolutions either. Thus, if the High

Court’s approach opposing the reasonable suspicion standard is right, it is

left profoundly unambiguous what is the standard that actually applies the

assets freezing requirement under paragraph 1(c) of resolution 1373 which

again, on the High Court’s interpretation, supports neither of the two

evidentiary standards. Therefore, under the High Court’s approach, the

British Government effectively auto-interpreted paragraph 1(c) by

32

Unless, of course, courts were to defer to the self-judging assertion by the Executive

that the latter’s mere belief and suspicion point to certainty as opposed to likelihood

and possibility, without being in any position to verify it. 33

Even more so in the 2006 Al Qaida Order, Article 4(1) of which enables the taking of

the relevant measures if the HM Treasury has “reasonable grounds for suspecting”

that the relevant person “is or may be” Usama Bin Laden or a person designated by

the Sanctions Committee.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

838

arrogating to itself a greater power over individuals than that paragraph

allocated to it.

On its face, paragraph 1(c) is sufficiently clear by referring to

individuals who “commit”, “attempt to commit” or “facilitate the

commission” of terrorist acts, as opposed to those who are suspected or

presumed to be doing any of that. The text of the resolution does not

mandate any presumptive approach in this regard. It is moreover doubtful

whether the Council could validly subscribe to the reasonable suspicion

standard. Even as targeted sanctions fall within its powers under Article 41,

it is still incompetent to stipulate the reasonable suspicion standard in

relation to what effectively amounts to criminal liability and consequently

offend against fundamental human rights that possess peremptory status.

The Court of Appeal’s decision avoids construing paragraph 1(c),

implemented through the 2006 Order, as actually entailing that result, in

particular through by disapproving the words “may be” which in practice

will preclude the application of paragraph 1(c) as if it approved the use of

reasonable suspicion standard. But as a matter of principle, the Court of

Appeal does not reject the reasonable suspicion standard as such and this

approach, it can be concluded, materialized only due to the lack in the

appeal judgment of any consistent attempt to properly interpret paragraph

1(c) in accordance with methods that govern interpretation of Security

Council resolutions.

The Supreme Court Judgment in this case demonstrates the ways of

interpreting Security Council resolutions to prevent a unilateral modification

of their meaning by States. Lord Hope held that the words of the Order must

be tested against the words used in the resolution. While the Order was

meant to enforce the resolution, “but it does not permit interference with the

basic rights of the individual any more that is necessary and unavoidable to

give effect to the SCR and is consistent with the principle of legality.” There

was “nothing to indicate that the Security Council has decided that freezing

orders should be imposed on a basis of mere suspicion.” Resolution 1373 is

not phrased in terms of reasonable suspicion. It instead lays “specific factual

tests” for association with Al-Qaida and Taliban. By introducing that test to

give effect to resolution 1373, the Treasury had acted ultra vires of that

resolution as given effect in England through the 1946 UN Act.34

34

HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others, Judgment of 27 January 2010,

United Kingdom Supreme Court, [2010] UKSC 2, paras 47, 58-61, 139, 142 (per Lord

Hope), also referring to Guidelines of the 1267 Committee, section 6(d), which

specified the required type of evidence that justified listing and was qualitatively


839

This expansive interpretation also has an impact on the proportionality

of actions claimed to be taken pursuant to resolutions 1373. As Lord Hope

specified,

“The Resolution nowhere requires, expressly or by implication, the

freezing of the assets of those who are merely suspected of the

criminal offences in question. Such a requirement would radically

change the effect of the measures. Even if the test were that of

reasonable suspicion, the result would almost inevitably be that some

who were subjected to freezing orders were not guilty of the offences

of which they were reasonably suspected. The consequences of a

freezing order, not merely on the enjoyment of property, but upon the

enjoyment of private and family life are dire. If imposed on reasonable

suspicion they can last indefinitely, without the question of whether or

not the suspicion is well-founded ever being subject to judicial

determination.”35

Similarly, Lord Mance observed in this context that “A measure

[under the 2006 Order] cannot be regarded as effectively applying that core

prohibition [under resolution 1373], if it substitutes another, essentially

different prohibition freezing the assets of a different and much wider group

of persons on an indefinite basis.”36

All this demonstrates that the principles of interpretation of Security

Council resolutions have been applied by the Supreme Court, above all the

principle of ordinary meaning. This has enabled the Court to identify the

meaning and reach of measures prescribed in resolution 1373, distinguish

them from those projected under the unilateral interpretation made by the

Executive, establish that this unilateral interpretation entails consequences

disproportionate in relation to the objectives set by the Security Council,

and enforce the legal consequences of all that within the English legal

system.

different from mere suspicion, id., para. 140; id., paras 199-200 (per Lord Brown),

paras 225-226 (per Lord Mance). 35

Id., para. 137. 36

Id., para. 230.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

840

E. Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Provisional

Governance of Kosovo

As is well-known, the Security Council intervened with the situation

in Kosovo after the NATO-led war against FRY in 1999, and established its

transitional administration regime in Kosovo through resolution

1244(1999). This resolution established the UN Mission in Kosovo

(UNMIK) to administer the territory on an interim basis, and as a

background it also recognized that FRY’s territorial integrity was not going

to be disrupted. Independence for Kosovo was not envisaged.

On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo assembly issued a Unilateral

Declaration of Independence (UDI), after which Kosovo received

recognition from several dozens of States. Whether this process is

compatible with resolution 1244 depends on the proper interpretation of this

instrument. Both before and after the UDI, including the pleadings before

the International Court regarding this issue, interpretation States placed on

resolution 1244 were not uniform. States supporting the Kosovo

independence argued that resolution 1244 did not preclude the UDI, while

States opposed to independence argue that it did prohibit any unilateral and

non-consensual solution of the Kosovo issue, such as UDI.

When the matter came before the International Court, these competing

claims had to be assessed in terms of the regime governing the interpretation

of Security Council resolutions. Principal questions were, quite simply,

whether resolution 1244 is time-limited, whether it allows a unilateral exit

from its interim arrangements capped by UNMIK, and whether the Kosovo

UDI is thus compatible with this resolution. A number of States, including

the UK, argued that resolution 1244 did allow for an ultimate UDI even in

the absence of a consensual solution.

The background of this problem illuminates that right up to the events

in the eve of the Kosovo UDI, there was a virtual agreement in the

international society that unilateral exit from 1244 arrangements would be

impermissible. States that subsequently recognized Kosovo have confirmed

the impermissibility of a UDI both by voting for resolution 1244 and by

supporting the Contact Group statements on Kosovo.37

Even in the Ahtisaari

37

See statements reproduced in the Declaration by Vice-President Tomka in the Kosovo

case, Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 1, Declaration of Judge Tomka, 7, para. 27,

available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15989.pdf (last visited 20

December 2010).


841

plan, the “supervised independence” for Kosovo was proposed to be

effected through the revision of 1244 arrangements. There was thus a clear

agreement on this point.38

A subsequent revision of position by pro-UDI States took place

around the period when the UDI was proclaimed, from 2007 onwards, and

this got reflected in the pleadings submitted to the International Court when

it was discussing the legality of that UDI. The UK position before the Court

was, by reference to the UN Secretary-General’s view, that “The situation

established under Resolution 1244(1999) was, however, unsustainable in the

long term,” among others because UNMIK was expensive to maintain.39

Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of setting up local provisional institutions was

to transfer authority from the international civil presence over time, until all

authority was vested in local institutions, whose character at that point

would – unless otherwise agreed – no longer be provisional.”40

But this left

the question open as to whether resolution 1244 justifies such transfer of

authorities without the Council’s collective decision, and thus a unilateral

exit from 1244 arrangements. And here it has to be faced that, as a matter of

interpretation of resolution 1244, even if UNMIK and KFOR are regarded

as interim arrangements – which has to be the case unless the Council were

to decide to permanently detach Kosovo from Serbia – their mandate is not

time-limited. The interim nature of 1244 arrangements means that they will

be terminated at some point in the future when the Council comes to an

agreement on this point, to the exclusion of any option of unilateral exit.

This position – the absence of a fixed time-limit on the validity of 1244

arrangements – was regarded as vital back in 1999 when resolution 1244

was adopted, in order not to enable non-NATO States to block the extension

of the KFOR and UNMIK mandates. It is rather inconsistent to argue that

the option of unilateral exit is available now, much as there has been no

agreement to amend resolution 1244.

38

Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of

the Security Council, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. 39

UK Written Submission, 17 April 2009, 111, para. 6.28, available at http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15638.pdf (last visited 20 December 2010. 40

Id., 111, para. 6.29, also referring to the periodic review requirements, para. 6.30,

which however do nothing to reverse the requirement that the actual continuation of

1244 arrangements depends on the collective decision of the Security Council. Even if

UNMIK faced difficulties in administering the entire territory of Kosovo (see para.

6.47), it still does not follow that its mandate or any other aspect of 1244

arrangements could be modified unilaterally, that is without the Council’s collective

decision.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 823-842

842

The International Court’s own position has been that 1244

arrangements, including the UNMIK supervision of the Kosovo authorities,

continues on the terms it has been originally arranged back in 1999.41

The

Court regarded neither material difficulties nor position of pro-UDI States

as factors that could adversely impact that position. Much as the Court

chose to address the problem on narrow grounds, it nevertheless precluded

the validity of such unilateral interpretation of resolution 1244, thus

reaffirming that the interim 1244 arrangements continue in force regardless

of interpretations unilaterally placed upon that resolution.

F. Conclusion

Resorting to unilateral interpretation is principally motivated by

political considerations of the day. It is noteworthy that while, in relation to

the invasion of Iraq, resolution 678 was considered to produce the

authorizing effect far beyond its proper temporal scope of authorization, in

relation to Kosovo the provisional regime of governance under resolution

1244 was argued to have before the decision of the Council to abolish it. In

this latter case too, the unilateral interpretation had challenged not just a

specific aspect of resolution 1244, but the entire rationale and essence of

interim 1244 arrangements.

In procedural terms, options of responding to unilateral interpretation

may be limited, and various systemic models can emerge depending on the

availability of the fora where unilateral interpretations could be challenged.

The Iraq invasion in 2003 was performed pursuant to the unilateral

interpretation of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. There was no court to

exercise jurisdiction and verify the interpretation placed upon these

resolutions. In relation to the detention of Al-Jedda, the House of Lords did

not address the interpretation of Security Council resolutions, but have

plainly confirmed the outcome that the Executive inferred on that basis of

their unilateral interpretation of resolution 1546. In relation to targeted

sanctions against suspected terrorists the UK judiciary was, to the contrary,

quite strict in censuring the Executive’s exercise in unilateral interpretation

of resolution 1373. Finally, the unilateral interpretation of resolution 1244

on Kosovo was disapproved by the International Court in its Advisory

Opinion in relation to the Kosovo UDI.

41

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 1, 33-34, paras 91-93.


doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-kaltenborn

The Legal Significance of Global Development

Partnerships: European Development

Cooperation and its Contribution to the

International Law of Development

Markus Kaltenborn

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 845

A. Introduction ................................................................................... 845

B. Development Policy of the European Union ................................ 848

I. The Partnership between Europe and the ACP-

Countries .................................................................................... 848

II. Relations between the European Union and Latin

American, Asian and Mediterranean countries ......................... 849

III. Global Development Policy of the European Union ................. 853

C. The Legal Framework of European Development

Partnerships ..................................................................................... 855

I. The Basic Principles of Development Policy under

European Union Law ................................................................. 855

Professor of Public Law, Ruhr-University Bochum. The Article is based on a lecture

the author gave as Visiting Foreign Scholar at Fordham University School of Law,

New York, in September 2009, and has been updated (August 2010) in light of the

Lisbon Treaty‟s recent entering into force. The author is grateful to Toni M. Fine,

Assistant Dean for International and Non-JD Programs of the Fordham University

School of Law, for the discussion of the paper and her helpful advice.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

844

1. The Competences of the European Institutions in

Development Politics.......................................................... 855

2. The „Triple C‟ ..................................................................... 859

a) The Demands of Complementarity and

Coordination ............................................................. 859

b) Coherence ................................................................. 860

II. Development Policy of the European Union and the

Requirements of Public International Law ................................ 864

1. Association Partnerships in Conflict with World

Trade Law ........................................................................... 864

2. International Environmental Law and Human

Rights Protection ................................................................ 867

D. Conclusion: European Development Cooperation as Part

of the International Law of Development ...................................... 868

The Legal Significance of Global Development Partnerships

845

Abstract

The global development partnerships of the European Union are embedded

in a legal context which provides several constraints for stakeholders in

Brussels. This legal framework consists both of the rules and principles of

public international law and of the „supranational‟ law of the European

Union. After a short survey of the activities of the European Union referring

to North-South relations, some of the prevailing legal problems of the

Union‟s development policy as well as its contribution to the international

law of development are discussed in this Article.

A. Introduction

In September 2000, the United Nations held its Millennium Summit in

New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration.1 Seven so-

called „Millennium Development Goals‟ (MDGs) were set out as a series of

time-bound targets to be implemented by the global community by the year

2015. One year later – initiated by the developing countries – a further Goal,

MDG 8, was added.2 It aims at setting-up a global partnership for

development and is mainly addressed to industrial countries. In particular,

its objective is to improve development finance, world trade, debt reduction

and transfer of technologies.

The European Union understands its relationship to emerging markets

and developing countries as such a „global partnership‟. In a document

published by the European Commission in 2002, the European Union, as the

world‟s largest donor in development cooperation and one of the most

important trading partners of developing countries, is described as being

„well placed to assume a leading role in the pursuit of global sustainable

development‟.3 The document is entitled „Towards a Global Partnership for

1 GA. Res. 55/2, 18 September 2000.

2 United Nations, Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations

Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/56/326, 6

September 2001, Annex, 58; see also United Nations, Millennium Development Goal

8: Delivering on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development

Goals, MDG Gap Task Force Report 2008 (2008) available at

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Gap%20Task%20Force%20Report

%202008.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010). 3 Commission Communication of 21 February 2002, COM (2002) 82 final, 6.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

846

Sustainable Development‟. In a recent document, giving an account of the

actual state of implementation of the MDG, the European Union again

characterizes itself as a ‟global partner for development.‟4 The term

„partnership‟ is also frequently used to describe the relations between

individual southern countries or regions and the European Union.5

This Article introduces the most important elements of this

development partnership; it offers insight into some of the legal problems of

the partnership6 and shows its significance to the emerging framework of

international development law. Two levels have to be differentiated: at first,

European development policy – as with development policy of other

4 Commission Communication of 9 April 2008, COM (2008) 177 final: “The EU – a

global partner for development – Speeding up progress towards the Millennium

Development Goals”. 5 See e.g. Commission Communication on a new partnership with South-East Asia,

COM (2003) 399 final; Commission Communication of 16 June 2004, An EU-India

Strategic Partnership, COM (2004) 430 final; Commission Communication of 8

December 2005, A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin

America, COM (2005) 636 final; Commission Communication of 27 June 2007, From

Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, COM (2007) 357 final; see

moreover the documents regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, e.g.

Commission Communication of 20 May 2008 on the “Barcelona Process: Union for

the Mediterranean”, COM (2008) 319 final. 6 For a general analysis of European development policy see E. R. Grilli, The European

Community and the Developing Countries (1993); O. Babarinde, The Lomé

Convention and Development (1994); A. Cox, How European Aid Works. A

Comparison of Management Systems and Effectiveness (1997); C. Cosgrove-Sacks

(ed.) The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of

Globalization (1999); A. Cox et al., European Development Co-operation and the

Poor (1999); M. Lister (ed.), New perspectives on European Union development

cooperation (1999); M. Holland, The European Union and the Third World (2002); K.

Arts & A. K. Dickinson (eds), EU Development Cooperation: From model to symbol

(2004); F. Granell, La coopération au développement de la communauté européenne,

2nd ed. (2005); J. Mayall, „The Shadow of Empire: The EU and the Former Colonial

World‟, in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds), International Relations and the European Union

(2005), 292-316; M. Carbone, The European Union and International Development:

the Politics of Foreign Aid (2007); Y. Bourdet et al. (eds), The European Union and

Developing Countries (2007); A. Mold (ed.), EU Development Policy in a Changing

World (2007); W. Hout (ed.), EU Development Policy and Poverty Reduction (2008);

M. van Reisen, Window of Opportunity. Development Co-operation Policy after the

End of the Cold War (2009); T. Hauschild & K. Schilder, Wohin Europäische

Entwicklungspolitik? (2009); O. Stokke & P. Hoebink (eds), Perspectives on

European Development Cooperation (2009).


847

industrial countries as well – is embedded in a public international law

context that includes not only basic rules of international trade law but also

international human rights standards and aspects of international

environmental law. Apart from that, development policy of the European

Union is also confronted with judicial problems where European Union law

is concerned, in particular the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the

European Union (TEU),7 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

Union (TFEU)8 and of secondary legislation. Both public international law

and the „supranational‟ law of the European Union create the legal

framework for global partnerships between Europe and the developing

countries. Part II of this Article offers a short survey of the activities of the

European Union referring to North-South relations. Part III discusses some

of the prevailing legal problems of the Union‟s development policy as well

as its contribution to international development law.

7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ 2008 C 115/13 [TEU].

8 After the Treaty of Lisbon (Draft Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2007 C 306/01), entered into

force on 1 December 2009, the former Treaty establishing the European Community

(TEC) was renamed to Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter

TFEU; for the consolidated version of the TFEU see OJ 2008 C 115/47). For a general

survey of the main innovations in the field of the European Union‟s external relations

see J. Wouters et al., „The European Union‟s External Relations after the Lisbon

Treaty‟, in St. Griller & J. Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism

without a Constitutional Treaty? (2008), 143-203; C. Vedder, „Außenbeziehungen

und Außenvertretung‟, in W. Hummer & W. Obwexer (eds), Der Vertrag von

Lissabon (2009), 267-300; C. Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach

dem Vertrag von Lissabon (2009); especially with regard to development policy see E.

Koeb, „A more political EU external action. Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for

the EU‟s relations with developing countries‟, 21 ECDPM-InBrief (2008), available at

http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/610BD646FDC5

7122C125748100533C75/$FILE/InBrief%2021_e_Lisbon%20final.pdf (last visited

18 December 2010); B. Martenczuk, „Die Kooperation der Europäischen Union mit

Entwicklungsländern und Drittstaaten und der Vertrag von Lissabon‟, 43 Europarecht

(2008) 2, 36; S. Grimm, „The Reorganisation of EU Foreign Relations: What Role for

Development Policies within the European Institutional Setup?‟, German

Development Institute (DIE)-Briefing Paper No 11 (2009) available at http://www.die-

gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ANES-

7YUHGV/$FILE/BP%2011.2009.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

848

B. Development Policy of the European Union

I. The Partnership between Europe and the ACP-Countries

The notion of partnership is vividly expressed mainly in the relations

of the European Union and the so-called ACP-countries. „ACP‟ refers to a

group of developing countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific region

(with main emphasis on Sub-Saharan African partners9). Contractual

relations between these countries and the European Union are not based on

individual bilateral agreements, but on one multilateral agreement. The

partnership has been effective since the 1960s. Over time, the name of the

agreement has been changed several times and the number of participating

countries has steadily grown. Today, 79 countries are parties to the

„Cotonou-Agreement‟10

which is meant to be in force as a contractual basis

9 South Africa is also member of the ACP group. Nevertheless the economic and

financial covenants of the Cotonou-Agreement do not address South Africa. In fact

the European Union agreed on a separate economic and cooperation agreement with

South Africa in 1999 which entered into force in 2004 (Trade, Development and

Cooperation Agreement of 11 October 1999, OJ 1999 L 311/3 [TDCA] and the

Additional Protocol of 25 June 2005, OJ 2005 L 68/33); see furthermore Commission

Communication of 28 June 2006, COM (2006) 347 final. For details of the

relationship between the European Union and South Africa see J. Weusmann, Die

Europäische Union und Südafrika (2005); G. Olivier, South Africa and the European

Union: Self-interest, Ideology and Altruism (2006); L. Petersson, „The EU and South

Africa: Trade and Diversification‟, in Bourdet, supra note 6, 97-119; M. Frennhoff

Larsén, „Trade negotiations between the EU and South Africa: a three-level game‟, 45

Journal of Common Market Studies (2007) 4, 857-881. 10

Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific

Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States,

of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJ 2000 L 317/3 and Agreement

amending the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean

and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its

Member States, of the other part, of 22 December 2005, OJ 2000 L 209/27. See

generally O. Babarind & G. Faber (eds), The European Union and the Developing

Countries: the Cotonou Agreement (2005); D. Dialer, Die EU-Entwicklungspolitik im

Brennpunkt: Eine Analyse der politischen Dimension des Cotonou-Abkommens

(2007); G. Laporte, The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What Role in a Changing

World? (2007); A. Flint, Trade, Poverty and the Environment: the EU, Cotonou and

the African-Caribbean-Pacific Bloc (2008); see also F. Müller, „Storming, Norming,

Performing – Implications of the Financial Crisis in Southern Africa‟, 2 Goettingen

Journal of International Law (2010) 1, 167.


849

for the partnership from 2000 until 2020. The agreement comprises

numerous issues of development cooperation: the one hundred articles of

the treaty contain, inter alia, regulations regarding economic cooperation

and cooperation in trade policy (Arts 34 et seq.), competition policy (Art.

45), investment promotion (Arts 74 et seq.), service transactions (Arts 41 et

seq.), regional economic integration (Arts 28 et seq.) and protection of

intellectual property (Art. 46). Provisions concern the protection of human

rights, good governance and participation of civil society are included in the

Cotonou-Agreement (Arts 2 [2], 9); regulations on a political dialogue

between the partners, in particular with regard to conflict prevention and

fighting organized crime, can be found in the treaty (Art. 8). However, the

central objective of the agreement is to reduce poverty in the ACP countries.

Art. 1 (2) of the Cotonou-Agreement claims: „The partnership shall be

centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty

consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual

integration of ACP countries into the world economy‟. At the institutional

level, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the committee of ambassadors and

the so called balanced assembly, consisting of members of parliament both

from the EU and the ACP partners, keeps watch over the enforcement of the

Cotonou-Agreement (Arts 14 et seq.).

II. Relations between the European Union and Latin American,

Asian and Mediterranean countries

Primarily for historic reasons, Sub-Saharan Africa forms the focus of

European development cooperation, but the European Union also maintains

cooperation relationships with other states and groups of states of the so-

called „Third World‟. Trade agreements usually are the basis for such

cooperation. They often also provide elements of development policy and

therefore are called „cooperation agreements‟. Some Latin American states

are bound to the European Union by bilateral agreements11

but there are also

11

See Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement

between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the

United Mexican States, of the other part, of 8 December 1997, OJ 2000 L 276/45;

Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its

Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, of 18

November 2002, OJ 2002 L 352/3. Beyond these two association agreements with

Chile and Mexico there exists a so-called “strategic partnership” with Brazil; see

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

850

contractual relations with regional organizations such as the Andean

Community12

and the Central American Integration System.13

The European

Union moreover has entered into negotiations with the most important

regional organization in Latin America, the Mercosur, on setting up a

cooperation partnership.14

In addition to contractual relations there is an

intense political dialogue between both continents. As a result of the sixth

„European Union – Latin America and Caribbean Summit‟ which took place

in Madrid in May 2010, the partnership between the continents will focus in

the future on strengthening the science, technology and innovation dialogue

for achieving sustainable development and social inclusion.15

Commission Communication of 30 May 2007, COM (2007) 281 final; see

furthermore A. Poletti, „The EU for Brazil: A Partner Towards a „Fairer‟

Globalization?‟, 12 European Foreign Affairs Review (2007) 3, 271-285; R. Leal-

Arcas, „The European Union and the New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in

Strategic Trade Policy Areas‟, 32 Fordham International Law Journal (2009) 2, 353;

382. 12

Framework Agreement on Cooperation between the European Economic Community

and the Cartagena Agreement and its member countries, of 28 April 1993, OJ 1998 L

127/11; see furthermore M. Bustamante & R. Giacalone, „An Assessment of European

Union Cooperation towards the Andean Community (1992–2007)‟, in P De

Lombaerde (ed.), The EU and World Regionalism. The Makability of Regions in the

21st Century (2009), 149-170. 13

Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and

the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and

Panama, of 22 February 1993, OJ 1999 L 63/39. In May 2010 the EU and the Central

American Integration System signed an association agreement covering trade, political

dialogue and cooperation; see http://www.eu2010.es/en/cumbre_ue-

alc/noticias/may19centroamerica.html (last visited 18 December 2010). 14

Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community

and its Member States, of the one part, and the Southern Common Market and its

Party States, of the other part – Joint Declaration on political dialogue between the

European Union and Mercosur, of 15 December 1995, OJ 1996 L 69/4; see also

European Commission of 2 August 2007 (E/2007/1640). See generally A. G. A.

Valladão et al. (eds), EU-Mercosur Relations and the WTO Doha Round Common

Sectorial Interests and Conflicts (2006). 15

Madrid Declaration „Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership: innovation

and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion‟, of 18 May 2010,

available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/

114535.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010); see also Commission Communication of

30 September 2009 COM (2009) 495/3; furthermore Commission Communication of

8 December 2005, supra note 5. See generally W. Grabendorff & R. Seidelmann

(eds), Relations between the European Union and Latin America: Biregionalism in a

Changing Global System (2005); C. Freres, „Challenges of Forging a Partnership

Between the European Union and Latin America‟, in Mold, supra note 6, 169-199.


851

Asian developing countries and emerging markets are also connected

to the European Union through several cooperation agreements (e.g.,

China16

, India17

and the ASEAN group18

) and via a regular political

dialogue.19

European heads of state and government, the President of the

16

Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic

Community and the People's Republic of China, of 21 May 1985, OJ 1985 L 250/2;

see also Commission Communication of 24 October 2006, COM (2006) 631 final; see

furthermore M. Mattlin, „Thinking Clearly on Political Strategy: The Formulation of a

Common EU Policy Toward China‟, in B. Gaens et al. (eds), The Role of the

European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners, (2009), 95-120; F.

Snyder, The European Union and China, 1949 – 2008: Basic Documents and

Commentary (2009); Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, 396. 17

Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India

on partnership and development of 20 December 1993, OJ 1994 L 223/24; see also

The EU-India Joint Action Plan (JAP) – Global partners for global challenges, of 29

September 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/sum09_08/

joint_ action_plan_2008_en.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010); furthermore S.

Chauvin et al., „EU-India trade and investment relations‟, in R. K. Jain & H.

Elsenhans (eds), India, the European Union, and the WTO (2006), 129-165, in R. K.

Jain (ed.), India and the European Union (2007); S. Baroowa, „The Emerging

Strategic Partnership between India and the EU: A Critical Appraisal‟, 13 European

Law Journal (2007) 6, 732-749; S. A. Wülbers (ed.), EU India Relations: a Critique

(2008); R. K. Jain, „Engaging the European Superpower: India and the European

Union‟, in Gaens et al., supra note 16, 173- 188; S. T. Madsen, „EU – India Relations:

An Expanded Interpretive Framework‟, id., 77-94; Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, 386. 18

Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the

member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, of 7 March 1980,

OJ 1980 L 144/2; see furthermore Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg

Declaration on an EU ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, of 22 November 2007, available

at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asean/docs/action_plan07.pdf (last visited 18

December 2010); for details of the projected Free Trade Agreement see B. Andreosso-

O‟Callaghan & F. Nicolas, „What Scope for an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement?‟,

42 Journal of World Trade (2008) 1, 105-128; D. Camroux, „The Political and

Economic Dimensions of EU-ASEAN Relations: An Overview‟, in J. L. de Sales

Marques et al. (eds), Asia and Europe: dynamics of inter- and intra-regional

dialogues (2009), 183-208. 19

See Commission working document, COM (2000) 241 final. For a general discussion

of the relationship between Asian states and the EU see H. Loewen, „Democracy and

Human Rights in the European-Asian Dialogue: A Clash of Cooperation Cultures?‟,

GIGA Working Paper No 92 (2008), available at http://www.giga-

hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp92_loewen.pdf (last

visited 18 December 2010); R. Seidelmann et al. (eds), European Union and Asia: a

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

852

Commission and the heads of ten Asian countries meet every two years,

European Union-China summits even take place every year.20

However,

dissonances, especially regarding human rights policy, repeatedly put a

strain on the „strategic partnership‟21

the European Union maintains with the

People‟s Republic of China.

A third important region for the European Union in economic and

development policy, and with regard to migration policy22

, is the

Mediterranean. A steadily increasing number of ships with refugees landing

on the Spanish and Italian coasts visualize dramatically the North-South

divide to Europeans. The EU tries to combat this migration problem by

supporting their neighbors located on the other side of the Mediterranean,

both on a bilateral and multilateral level. The Europeans ratified association

agreements with seven of the Mediterranean countries, which form the basis

for political and economic cooperation.23

In addition, the so called „Euro-

Dialogue on Regionalism and Interregional Cooperation (2008); J. Rüland et al.

(eds), Asian-European Relations. Buildings Blocks for Global Governance? (2008). 20

See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/summits_en.htm (last visited 18

December 2010). 21

C. Hackenesch & J. Ling, „White Bull, Red Dragon – EU-China Strategic Partnership

in the Making‟, German Development Institute (DIE) – The Current Column, 2 June

2009, available at http://www.die-gdi.de (last visited 18 December 2010); see also A.

Sautenet, „The Current Status and Prospects of the „Strategic Partnership‟ between the

EU and China‟, 13 European Law Journal (2007) 6, 699-731; J. Men, „Building a

long-term EU-China partnership‟, in F. Laursen (ed.), The EU in the Global Political

Economy (2009), 219-238; X. Dai, „Understanding EU-China Relations‟, in G. Hauser

et al. (eds), China: The Rising Power (2009), 63-86; D. Bingran, „Towards an EU-

China Partnership‟, in de Sales Marques et al., supra note 18, 239-252. 22

See 'Agreed Ministerial Conclusions of the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial

Meeting on Migration' (19 November 2007) available at

http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/8D86D66E-B37A-457E-9E4A-

2D7AFF2643D9/0/20071119AGREEDCONCLUSIONSEuromed.pdf (last visited 10

December 2010); see generally B. Gebrewold (ed.), Africa and Fortress Europe

(2007); R. Kunz & S. Lavenex, „The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External

Relations‟, 30 Journal of European Integration (2008) 3, 439-457; St. Sterkx, „The

External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expanding Fortress

Europe?‟, in J. Orbie (ed.), Europe's Global Role. External Policies of the European

Union (2008), 117-138); P. J. Cardwell, EU External Relations and Systems of

Governance. The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration (2009), 140. 23

See the documents listed at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations

/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r14104_en.htm (last

visited 18 December 2010); see also F. Zaim, „The Third Generation of Euro-

Mediterranean Association Agreements: A View from the South‟, 4 Mediterranean


853

Mediterranean Partnership‟ (EUROMED) – sometimes also called

„Barcelona Process‟ for the place of the foundation conference – was

founded in 1995.24

At the initiative of France‟s President Sarkozy the EU

recently called for an extension of its relations to the Mediterranean

countries, resulting in a „Union for the Mediterranean‟ in 2008.25

In that

context, several specific projects will be implemented, especially with

regard to environmental protection of the sea, transportation and

exploitation of solar energy. Currently there are several problems within that

partnership, in large part due to the difference in attitudes between

Europeans and some Arab states relating to Middle East policy.26

III. Global Development Policy of the European Union

European development policy is not limited to bilateral relations with

single states or groups of states, but also takes place in various global

arrangements. One outstanding example is the Generalized System of

Politics (1999) 2, 36-52; G. Joffé (ed.), Perspectives in Development: The Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership (1999). 24

Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27

and 28 November 1995 and its work programme, available at

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf (last visited 18

December 2010); see H. A. Fernández & R. Youngs (eds), The Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership: Assessing the First Decade (2005); B. Gavin, „The Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership‟, 40 Intereconomics (2005) 6, 353-361; J. Brach, „The Euro-Mediterrane-

an Partnership: The Role and Impact of the Economic and Financial Dimension‟, 12

European Foreign Affairs Review (2007) 4, 555-579; E. Lannon, „The EU's strategic

partnership with Mediterranean and the Middle East‟, in A. Dashwood & M. Mares-

ceau (eds) , Law and practice of EU external relations. Salient patterns of a changing

landscape (2008), 360-375. 25

Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, of 13 July 2008,

available at http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declar

ation_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-

EN.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010); Commission Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2008 on the

“Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, COM (2008) 319 final; see also R.

Gillespie, „A „Union for the Mediterranean‟ … or for the EU?‟, 13 Mediterranean

Politics (2008) 2, 277-286; R. Balfour, „The Transformation of the Union for the

Mediterranean‟, 14 Mediterranean Politics (2009) 1, 99-105. 26

See generally K. Krausch & R. Youngs, „The end of the „Euro-Mediterranean vision‟‟,

85 International Affairs (2009) 5, 963-975.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

854

Preferences that provides tariff advantages for all developing countries.27

Beyond that, the least developed countries (LDC‟s) benefit from the

Union‟s „Everything but Arms‟ (EBA) initiative, which grants such states

duty-free and quota-free market access for all products with the exception of

armaments.28

Furthermore the European Union participates in international

agreements and programs on environmental29

and health protection,30

rural

development,31

energy security32

and humanitarian aid33

. Last but not least,

it is noteworthy that the European Union – as well as its member states – is

27

Art. 6 Council Regulation 732/2008, applying a scheme of generalized tariff

preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011, OJ L 2008

211/1. The European GSP has been redesigned in a response to a decision of the WTO

Appellate Body in 2004, see Appellate Body Report, EC – Granting of Tariff

Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2004; see also L. Bartels, „The WTO

Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community‟s GSP

Program‟, 6 Journal of International Economic Law (2003) 2, 507-532; R. Howse,

„India‟s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European

Community Generalized System of Preferences‟, 4 Chicago Journal of International

Law (2003) 2, 385-406; H. Jessen, „“GSP Plus” – Zur WTO-Konformität des zukünf-

tigen Zollpräferenzsystems der EG‟, 9 Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law

(2004) available at http://www2.jura.uni-halle.de/telc/PolicyPaper9.pdf (last visited 18

December 2010); J. Harrison, „Incentives for Development: The EC‟s Generalized

System of Preferences, India‟s WTO Challenge and Reform‟, 42 Common Market

Law Review (2005) 6, 1663-1689; G. M. Grossman & A. O. Sykes, „A Preference for

Development: The Law and Economics of GSP‟, in G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis

(eds), WTO Law and Developing Countries (2007), 255-282; C. Stevens, „Creating a

Development-Friendly EU Trade Policy‟, in Mold, supra note 6, 221-236. 28

Art. 11 Council Regulation 732/2008, supra note 27; see also G. Faber & J. Orbie

(eds), European Union Trade Politics and Development. „Everything but Arms‟

unravelled (2007).

29 See e.g. Commission Staff Working Paper of 10 April 2001, SEC (2001) 609;

Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2009) 555 final; see also Y. G. Franco & J.

M. Martínez Sierra, „EU Environmental Cooperation with Developing Countries‟, in

Laursen (ed.), supra note 21, 253-268. 30

Commission Communication of 22 March 2002, COM (2002) 129 final. 31

Commission Communication of 25 July 2002, COM (2002) 429 final. 32

Worth mentioning in this context are especially the activities of the European Union

Energy Initiative (EUEI), see http://www.euei.net (last visited 18 December 2010). 33

Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the

Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the

European Commission, The European Union Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, of 18

December 2007, OJ C 25/1 (2008); see also H. Versluys, „European Union

Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?‟, in Orbie (ed.), supra note 22, 91-118.


855

a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)34

and, therefore, one of

the main stakeholders in the negotiations on new international trade

regulations on the basis of the Doha Development Agenda.35

C. The Legal Framework of European Development

Partnerships

I. The Basic Principles of Development Policy under

European Union Law

1. The Competences of the European Institutions in

Development Politics

From a legal point of view it is not self-evident that the European

Union would have its own development policy. As a part of foreign affairs,

activities in development policy fall within the member states´ sovereignty.

The Union (respectively – in the pre-Lisbon system – the Community) was

able to gain its own competences in that political area because of a

correlating waiver of the member states. As early as the founding of the

Community, this took place with regard to the former colonies, especially

34

Art. XI:1 Agreement Establishing the WTO; see also M. E. Footer, „The EU and the

WTO global trading system‟, in P.-H. Laurent & M. Maresceau (eds), Deepening and

Widening (1998), 317-338; P. Hilpold, Die EU im GATT-WTO-System (1999); G. de

Búrca & J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues (2001);

C. Herrmann et al., Welthandelsrecht (2007), 66. 35

See WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001,

Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, 41 International

Legal Materials (2002), 746-754; for an analysis of the North-South divergences

referring to the Doha Development Agenda see M. Khor, The WTO‟s Doha

Negotiations and Impasse: A Development Perspective (2006); Th. W. Hertel & L. A.

Winters (eds), Poverty and the WTO: Impacts of the Doha Development Agenda

(2006); P. van Dijck & G. Faber (eds), Developing Countries and the Doha

Development Agenda of the WTO (2006); H. Jessen, WTO-Recht und

“Entwicklungsländer” (2006), 399; F. Ismail, Mainstreaming Development in the

WTO: Developing Countries in the Doha Round (2007); Y.-S. Lee, Economic

Development throuh World Trade: a Developing World Perspective, 2008; L. Crump

& S. J. Maswood (eds), Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations (2009);

C. Thomas & J. P. Trachtman (eds), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System

(2009); see also Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, 360-366.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

856

those of France and Belgium in Sub-Saharan Africa. Via the legal

instrument of association, these new founded states were bound close to the

Community. After Great Britain entered the Community in 1973, the former

British colonies also joined. Today, Art. 217 TFEU (ex Art. 310 TEC) is

still widely considered to form the legal basis with regard to the Cotonou-

partnership and other association agreements such as with the

Mediterranean countries.36

Art. 217 TFEU (ex Art. 310 TEC) covers all

subject matters that the TFEU allocates to the Union, such as commercial

policy, freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, the

service sector, competition law or aspects of consumer protection and

pollution control. However, as a general rule, the Union is not the only

contracting party in association agreements – the single member states have

to accede to the agreement, too. These treaties are therefore called „mixed

agreements‟.37

This is due to the fact that some subject matters included in

association agreements are not in the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of

the Union but are part of a parallel jurisdiction of the Union and the member

states. This mainly affects regulations regarding the health system,

education, scientific research and cultural matters.

Even though the European Union from the very start had been

involved in development activities apart from association policy,

development cooperation has not been implemented into the EC Treaty as a

domain of independent competence until its reform by the Maastricht Treaty

in 1992. Today, the main legal basis for global partnerships between the

European Union and both newly industrializing countries and developing

countries is laid down in Arts 208-211 TFEU (ex Arts 177-181 TEC)38

– as

long as there are no special regulations in effect, such as specific provisions

with regard to issues of association.

36

H.-H. Herrnfeld, „EGV Artikel 310‟, in J. Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 2nd ed.

(2009), marginal note 4. 37

See generally D. O‟Keeffe & H. G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (1983); A.

Rosas, „The European Union and Mixed Agreements‟, in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion

(eds), The General Law of E.C. External Relations (2000), 200-220; J. Heliskoski,

Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the

European Community and its Member States (2001); P. Koutrakos, EU International

Relations Law (2006), 137-182; G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU

External Relations (2008), 232; R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the

European Community (2008), 147-166. 38

See K. Lenaerts & P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2nd ed.

(2005), 852.


857

According to Art. 208 TFEU (ex Art. 177 TEC), the Union‟s policy in

the field of development cooperation has to be conducted within the

framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action,

which in turn are laid down in the new Art. 21 TEU. This provision

specifies the principles which shall guide the Union's action on the

international scene: „democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivi-

sibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human

dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the

principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.‟39

Moreover

the most important objectives of the Union‟s external action are specifically

articulated in this Article. Among others, its foreign policy is aimed at

consolidating and supporting „democracy, the rule of law, human rights and

the principles of international law,‟ fostering the „sustainable economic,

social and environmental development of developing countries, with the

primary aim of eradicating poverty‟ and encouraging the „integration of all

countries into the world economy, including through the progressive

abolition of restrictions on international trade.‟40

Art. 208 (1) TFEU

reinforces one of these objectives – the aim of reducing (and, in the long

term, eradicating) poverty as the primary objective of the Union‟s

development cooperation policy. Art. 208 (2) TFEU (ex Art. 177 [3] TEC)

obliges both the Union and each member state to comply with their

commitments concerning development cooperation which they have

approved in the context of the United Nations or other international

organizations. Therefore, political declarations executed in these forums –

e.g., concerning the increase of development aid as one of the outcomes of

the Monterrey Conference in 2002 or regarding the achievement of the

MDG – gain legal effect through Art. 208 (2) TFEU (ex Art. 177 [3]

TEC).41

Apart from that, the TFEU neither indicates how to accomplish the

goals circumscribed in Art. 208 TFEU nor provides any specific legal

instruments for the Union to use in order to achieve them. Art. 209 (1)

TFEU (ex Art. 179 TEC) contains a kind of carte blanche, stating that the

39

Art. 21 (1) TEU. 40

Art. 21 (2 lit. b, d and e) TEU. 41

K. Schmalenbach, „EGV Art. 177‟, in C. Calliess & M. Ruffert (eds), Das

Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union, 3rd ed. (2007), marginal note 24; but see

also W. Benedek, „EGV Art. 177‟, in E. Grabitz & M. Hilf (eds), Das Recht der

Europäischen Union, (2003), 49.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

858

European Parliament and the Council are meant to enact measures

„necessary‟ to accomplish the objectives laid down in Art. 208 TFEU.

Measures in this context can be instruments of secondary law like directives

and regulations or just political measures without legal force. Art. 209 (1)

TFEU provides for the so-called „ordinary legislative procedure‟.42

This

means that in development policy the European Parliament has a broad right

to have a say.43

In practice European development policy shows that

Parliament makes extensive use of that right, e.g., lately in the discussion

concerning the establishment of a new secondary law framework for

development aid.44

After an intense debate between the European

Commission and the concerned committee of the European Parliament

several regulations became effective in 2007. They now form the legal

fundament for development activities of the European Union beneath the

level of primary law.45

42

For a survey of the institutions involved in the decision making process in European

Development Politics see P. Hoebink, „From „particularity‟ to „globality‟: European

development cooperation in a hanging world‟, in P. Hoebink (ed.), The Treaty of

Maastricht and Europe‟s Development Co-operation (2005), 47; see also S.

Vanhoonacker, „The Institutional Framework‟, in Hill & Smith (eds), supra note 6,

75. 43

As far as international treaties are concerned, which base in the field of development

policy on Art. 209 (2) TFEU (ex Art. 181 TEC), Parliament has similar rights; see Art.

218 (6) TFEU (ex Art. 300 [3] TEC); see D. Thym, „Parliamentary Involvement in

European International Relations‟, in M. Cremona & B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign

Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), 207. For a short survey of the

Parliament‟s rights regarding the conclusion of international agreements see also

Lenaerts & Van Nuffel, supra note 38, 393; P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law. Text,

Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (2008), 199. 44

See R. Passos & D. Gauci, „European Parliament and Development Cooperation:

Shaping Legislation and the new Democratic Scrutiny Dialogue‟, 43 Europarecht

(2008) Beiheft 2, 138-158. 45

Council Regulation 1085/2006 OJ 2006 L 210/82; EP/Council Regulation 1638/2006

OJ 2006 L 310/1; EP/Council Regulation 1905/2006 OJ L 378/41 (2006); EP/Council

Regulation 1717/2006, OJ 2006 L 327/1; Council Regulation (Euratom) 300/2007, OJ

2006 L 81/1; EP/Council Regulation 1889/2006, OJ 2006 L 386/1; Council

Regulation 1934/2006, OJ 2006 L 405/41. In this context the already existing

humanitarian aid instrument has to be added, Council Regulation 1257/96, OJ 1996 L

163/1. Another important political – not strictly legal – document is the so-called

“European Consensus on Development”, a Joint declaration by the Council and the

representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council,

the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the

European Union, of 20 December 2005, OJ 2006 C 46.


859

2. The „Triple C‟

a) The Demands of Complementarity and Coordination

From the legal point of view, several problems of European

development politics are connected with the so-called „Triple C‟ – the

demands of complementarity, coordination and coherence.46

According to

Art. 208 (1) TFEU (ex Art. 177 TEC), the Union‟s development cooperation

policy and that of the Member States are meant to complement and

reinforce each other.47

Thus, European Union law assumes parallel

competences of the Union and the member states. In this context the

demand of coordination – laid down in Art. 210 TFEU (ex Art. 180 TEC) –

also becomes important. Thereafter, both the Union and the member states

have to coordinate their activities in development cooperation and

harmonize their foreign aid programs.48

In fact the member states´ share of

development aid makes about 80% of the European total.49

Therefore the

European Union is only one out of several stakeholders within the European

partnership with the South. In various respects the different political

programs of the member states compete with each other, as they usually do

not base upon altruistic motives, but follow external – mostly economic –

objectives. Of course, this competitive character is desirable to a certain

46

See generally P. Hoebink, „Evaluating Maastricht‟s Triple C: An Introduction to the

Development Paragraphs of the Treaty on the European Union and Suggestions for its

Evaluation‟, in Hoebink, supra note 42, 1-24; N. Schrijver, „„Triple C‟ from the

Perspective of International Law and Organisation: Comparing the League of Nations,

United Nations System and the European Union Experiences‟, id., 63-96; see also C.

Loquai, The Europeanisation of Development Cooperation: Coordination,

Complementarity, Coherence (1996); J. de Deus Pinheiro, „Consistency, Coordination

and Complementarity‟, The Courier NO 155 (1996), 20-21. 47

See M. Jorna, „Complementarity between EU and Member State Development

Policies: Empty Rhetoric or Substantive New Approach?‟, The Courier No 154

(1995), 78-80; J. Bossuyt et al., Improving Complementarity of European Union

Development Cooperation: From the Bottom Up (1999); L. Dacosta et al.,

„Complementarity of European Union Policies on Development Co-operation‟, in

Hoebink, supra note 42, 97-134. 48

See G. Gill & S. Maxwell, „The co-ordination of development co-operation in the

European Union‟, in Hoebink, supra note 42, 135-182. 49

See OECD, Statistical Annex of the 2010 Development Co-operation Report, table 1

(2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34447_1893

129_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 18 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

860

extent, motivating the member states to a consistent improvement and

widening of their North-South activities. But this competition also results in

a large number of stakeholders with different priorities. Necessarily there

will be losses of efficiency, if these activities remain uncoordinated.

Consequently, deciding for complementarity on the one hand, this on the

other hand requires a high degree of coordination and (if possible)

cooperation.50

This fundamental problem of development partnerships, which is not

unique to European donors, is discussed in the international arena primarily

in the context of the „Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness‟ of 200551

and

the „Accra Agenda for Action‟ being adopted at a follow-up conference in

Ghana in 2008.52

One of the basic principles of these documents relating to

donors focuses on better adjustment and complementarity of aid

programmes. The European Union has met these international obligations

and self-imposed demands fixed in Art. 210 TFEU (ex Art. 180 TEC) by

taking a number of actions – for example in 2007, when a code of conduct

was passed which contained guidelines for a better division of work

between the donors.53

b) Coherence

The two demands of the TFEU, complementarity and coordination in

development aid, are important due to the fact that the donors to the global

development partnership are an alliance of several states. Coherence is a

further important criterion for each development partnership – irrespective

of whether the donor consists of one or more partners. The criterion of

50

Political practice does not always reflect these legal requirements; see J. Orbie & H.

Versluys, „The European Union‟s International Development Policy: Leading and

Benevolent?‟, in Orbie (ed.), supra note 22, 72: “Although the principles of

complementarity and coordination are enshrined in the Treaty, they have been

honoured more in their breach than in their observance.” 51

This document, which has been adopted by the OECD´s Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) and numerous developing countries in March 2005, is available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010). 52

Id.; see furthermore the Commission Staff Working Paper of 8 April 2009, COM

(2009) 160 final. 53

Commission Communication of 28 February 2007, COM (2007) 72 final.


861

coherence54

can be found in the second sub-paragraph of Art. 208 (1) TFEU

(ex Art. 178 TEC); furthermore Art. 21 (3) TEU (ex Art. 3 [2] TEU)

stipulates the institute of coherence explicitly for all sub-sections of

European foreign policy.55

Art. 208 (1) TFEU requires that „ (t)he Union

shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the

policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.‟

The wording of Art. 208 (1) TFEU shows the weak normative force of the

rule. Development goals shall merely be taken into „account‟ which does

not guarantee their priority over other political objectives. In this regard, the

TFEU gives Union institutions wide political scope for making their

decisions – which most scholars on European Union law consider to be

beyond judicial control.56

The corresponding principle of coherence stated

in Art. 21 (3) TEU is not much more precise. Furthermore, both regulations

apply only to the Union and do not impose corresponding obligations on the

member states.57

Art. 11 TFEU (ex Art. 6 TEC) demonstrates that coherence clauses or

cross-section clauses can be drafted in a way that allows more normative

54

P. Hoebink, „Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation: the Case of the

European Union‟, in J. Forster & O. Stocke (eds), Policy Coherence in Development

Co-operation (1999), 323-345; P. Hoebink, „Evaluating Maastricht‟s Triple C: The

‚C‟ of Coherence‟, in Hoebink, supra note 42, 183-218; G. Ashoff, „Enhancing Policy

Coherence for Development: Justification, Recognition and Approaches to

Achievement‟, 11 German Development Institute (DIE) - Studies (2005); M. Carbone,

„Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development‟, 30

Journal of European Integration (2008) 3, 323-342; J. Mackie et al., „Coherence and

effectiveness: Challenges for ACP-EU relations in 2008‟, InBrief No 20 (2008), 1-12.

For a general discussion of the requirements of coherence (consistency) in European

Foreign Policy see U. Schmalz, „The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence:

Bridging the Union's Foreign Policy Dualism?‟, 3 European Foreign Affairs Review

(1998) 3, 421-442; P. Gauttier, „Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences

of the European Union‟, 10 European Law Journal (2004) 1, 23-41; S. Nuttal,

„Coherence and Consistency‟, in Hill & Smith (eds), supra note 6, 91-112; Lenaerts &

Van Nuffel, supra note 38, 899. 55

See F. Hoffmeister, ‟Das Verhältnis zwischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und

Gemeinsamer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel des EG-

Stabilitätsinstruments‟, 43 Europarecht Beiheft (2008) 2, 59. 56

K. Schmalenbach, „EGV Art. 178‟, in Calliess & Ruffert (eds), supra note 41, 1; see

also R. Lane, „New Community Competences under the Maastricht Treaty‟, 30

Common Market Law Review (1993) 5, 978; M. Obrovsky, „PCD – Policy Coherence

for Development‟, OEFSE-Briefing Paper No 1 (2008), 5. 57

Carbone, supra note 54, 330.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

862

power.58

According to Art. 11 TFEU environmental protection

requirements „must be integrated into the […] implementation of the

Union policies and activities‟. This clause certainly does not provide a

priority of environmental policy over other political areas but it at least

allows limited actionability. Though it might not be possible to enforce

certain environmental tasks, single legal acts can be challenged for alleged

violations of provisions covered by Art. 11 TFEU before the European

Court of Justice.59

Due to the vague wording of Art. 208 (1) TFEU, such a

form of judicial control presumably would not be very successful regarding

the development coherence clause.

A legally strict definition of the demand of coherence is important in

light of the fact that European development policy has more than once

found itself the focus of various criticisms. In particular, agricultural policy

causes a massive conflict regarding the goals of European development

policy, given the vast subsidies for European farmers.60

Similar coherence

problems emerge in other policy areas. In foreign trade policy, development

aid is usually linked to the delivery of goods and services from the donor

country.61

Regarding fishing policy, in the past efficient inshore fishing has

been foiled by fishing quotas the European Union has agreed upon with

58

See also Schrijver, supra note 46, 84: ”(C)omparing […] Art. 178 with Art. 6 on

integration of environmental protection […] must lead to the conclusion that

coherence of development policies is not of equal weight as integration of

environmental protection for two reasons.“ 59

A. Käller, „EGV Artikel 7‟, in J. Schwarze (ed.), supra note 36, 12; 18; see also N.

Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC Policies (2003), 30;

M. Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (2005),

44; P. Wenneras, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (2007), 201; J. H. Jans

& H. H. B. Vedder, European Environmental Law, 3rd ed. (2008), 16. 60

K. Bertow & A. Schultheis, Impact of EU‟s Agricultural Trade Policy on

Smallholders in Africa (2007); A. Matthews, „The European Union's Common

Agricultural Policy and Developing Countries: the Struggle for Coherence‟, 30

Journal of European Integration (2008) 3, 381-399. 61

G. Ashoff, „Improving Coherence between Development Policy and Other Policies.

The Case of Germany‟, German Development Institute (DIE)-Briefing Paper No 1

(2002), 2.


863

developing countries.62

Finally, arms export policy often is contradictory to

the conflict preventing programmes in development cooperation.63

Obviously, there is a gap between the legal claim for coherence, as set

out in Art. 208 (1) TFEU on the one hand, and political reality on the other.

But even though legal proceedings in order to control these shortfalls are not

very promising given the current legal situation, Art. 208 (1) TFEU –

(respectively the former Art. 178 TEC) – has not remained completely

ineffective. The Union‟s institutions have taken up several initiatives in

order to improve the coherence of their activities. In a memorandum of the

European Commission published in 200564

twelve policy sectors are

identified – trade, environment, security, agriculture, fishing, the social

dimensions of globalization, migration, research and innovation,

information technologies, transport and energy – in which so called

„coherence responsibilities for development‟ shall be effective. A first

interim report issued in 2007 concerning the „Policy Coherence for

Development (PCD)‟ came to the conclusion that within the institutions of

the European Union there was an increasing awareness for the effect of

different policy areas on developing countries and that on the European

Union level a greater progress in promoting policy coherence could be

gained than in the member states.65

However the European Union still finds

itself, as the Commission itself acknowledged, „at an early stage of PCD

development‟.66

Political conflicts of priority and interest between the

European Union member states and developing countries are considered to

be the main barriers for policy coherence. In a communication published in

September 2009, the Commission emphasized the need for a stronger

concentration on select PCD priority areas, just as climate change, food

security, migration, intellectual property rights and security questions.67

62

C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, „The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor:

the Case of External Fisheries Policy‟, 30 Journal of European Integration (2008) 3,

401-417. 63

G. Ashoff, „Improving Coherence between Development Policy and Other Policies.

The Case of Germany‟, German Development Institute (DIE)-Briefing Paper No 1

(2002), 2. 64

Commission Communication of 12 April 2005, COM (2005) 134 final. 65

Commission Working Paper of 20 September 2007, COM (2007) 545 final, 3. 66

Id., 4; see also Obrovsky, supra note 56; Carbone, supra note 54, 334. 67

Commission Communication of 15 September 2009, COM (2009) 458 final; for a

critical analysis of this report see Concord (ed.), The EC Commission Communication

on Policy Coherence for Development and whole of the Union approach. What does it

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

864

II. Development Policy of the European Union and the

Requirements of Public International Law

1. Association Partnerships in Conflict with World Trade Law

The Union‟s development cooperation is governed not only by the

supranational European Union law but also by the principles and rules of

public international law which provide several constraints for stakeholders

in Brussels when cooperating with Asian, African and Latin-American

partners. The partnership with ACP-Countries recently made that plain. In

the Lomé-Convention and the Cotonou-Agreement, the European Union

granted ACP-countries unilateral trade preferences which essentially are

incompatible with basic rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These preferences do not achieve the reciprocity demands of a free trade

agreement and therefore discriminate against other developing countries. In

the past, such a privilege has only been allowed in the case of special

approval by the WTO partners – a so-called waiver under Art. IX:3

Agreement Establishing the WTO.68

Once this approval terminated at the

end of 2007, the European Union and ACP-countries, when negotiating the

terms of the Cotonou-Agreement, settled on several „Economic Partnership

Agreements‟ (EPAs) which would replace the former trade regulations.

These new agreements will be free trade agreements, connecting the

European Union with single ACP-sub-regions.69

According to Art. XXIV:8

mean for EU Development Policy? (2009), available at

http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=69 (last visited 18 December

2010). 68

See with regard to the Cotonou Agreement WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth

Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, European Communities-The ACP-EC

Partnership Agreement; WTO Doc. WT/MIN (01)/15, Decision 14 November 2001. 69

See generally A. Borrmann et al., „EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements:

Impact, Options and Prerequisites‟, 40 Intereconomics (2005) 3, 169-177; C. Stevens,

„The EU, Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements: Unintended Consequences of

Policy Leverage‟, 44 Journal of Modern African Studies (2006) 3, 441-458; S. Bilal,

„Concluding EPA Negotiations. Legal and institutional issues‟, ECDPM Policy

Management Report No 12 (2007), available at

http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/C04BB76BD863

91E9C12573090047AF15/$FILE/PMR12-e.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010); A.

Borrmann & M. Busse, „The institutional challenge of the ACP/EU Economic

Partnership Agreements‟, 25 Development Policy Review (2007) 4, 403-416; O.

Morrissey, „A Critical Assessment of Proposed EU-ACP Economic Partnership

Agreements‟, in Mold (ed.), supra note 6, 199-220; D. Kohnert, „EU-African


865

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), such free trade areas are

legally allowed as an exception to the most favored nation principle as long

as a deregulation of „substantially all the trade‟ is intended.70

Up to now, negotiations regarding mutual reduction of trade barriers

within these new partnership agreements have proven to be remarkably

difficult. Thus far, the European Union has only been able to enter into one

agreement with the Caribbean states. Other members of the ACP

community accepted only interim agreements in order to keep up basic

preference rules until the conclusion of a permanent agreement.71

These

difficulties are due to the fear, that a broad and efficient deregulation of

Economic Relations: Continuing Dominance Traded for Aid?‟, GIGA Working Paper

No 82 (2008), 12-15; C. Stevens et al., The new EPAs: comparative analysis of their

content and the challenges for 2008. Final Report (2008); Flint, supra note 10, 145-

159; R. Kappel, „Die Economic Partnership Agreements – kein Allheilmittel für

Afrika‟, GIGA Focus (2008), No. 6; G. Faber & J. Orbie (eds), Beyond Market Access

for Economic Development. EU-Africa relations in transition (2009); S. Bilal et al.,

„Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Analysis of and Implications for ACP-EU

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)‟, ECDPM Discussion Paper No 92 (2009). 70

Although the question what is meant by “substantially all the trade” in this clause has

been discussed for more than sixty years, the problem is still not solved; see Appellate

Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,

WT/DS34/AB/R, 19 November 1999, para 48: “Neither the GATT CONTRACTING

PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on the

interpretation of the term „substantially‟ in this provision.” The WTO Appellate Body

(id.) preferred a flexible interpretation by stating that substantially all the trade is “not

the same as all the trade, and […] something considerably more than merely some the

trade”. For an analysis of this provision see generally M. Matsushita, „Legal Aspects

of Free Trade Agreements in the Context of Art. XXIV of the GATT 1994‟, in M.

Matsushita & D. Ahn (eds), WTO and East Asia: New Perspectives (2004), 497-515;

M. T. Hausmann, Das Cotonou-Handelsregime und das Recht der WTO (2006), 124;

A. H. Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements. Problems and Perspectives (2006),

102; M. Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy,

2nd ed. (2006), 568; S. Lester & B. Mercurio, World Trade Law (2008), 361-363; K.

Nowrot, ‚Steuerungssubjekte und –mechanismen im Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht‟,

in C. Tietje (ed.), Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (2009), § 2, 131; A. A. Mitchell &

N. J. S. Lockhart, „Legal Requirements for PTAs under the WTO‟, in S. Lester & B.

Mercurio (eds), Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements. Commentary and Analysis

(2009), 93. 71

For detailed information on the current status of the EPA-negotiations see the „Trade

Negotiations Insight“ of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable

Development, available at http://ictsd.org/news/tni/ (last visited 18 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

866

bilateral trade relations might overcharge the adaptability of the ACP-

countries´ national economies.72

It is not certain whether the differences between the negotiating

parties can be settled and EU-ACP-partnerships according to WTO law can

be maintained. Another solution could be the amendment of the relevant

GATT regulations, in order to provide moderate reciprocity demands for

free trade agreements between industrial and developing countries. In fact

the GATT-regulations regarding trade preference regimes are part of the

reform plans of the Doha Round. It is intended to provide an adequate scope

for absorbing the adjustment costs of trade liberalization for developing

countries. For instance, Art. XXIV:8 GATT, which is actually rather

inflexible, could be redesigned according to the more modern equivalent in

the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)73

, which stipulates

that the legitimacy of treaties on free trade areas with regard to trade in

services has to be handled with „flexibility […] in accordance with the level

of development of the countries concerned‟.74

So it will mainly depend on

the results of the WTO negotiations whether such a flexible provision can

72

A. Borrmann, H. Großmann & Georg Koopmann, „The WTO Compatibility of the

Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and the ACP Countries‟, 41

Intereconomics (2006) 2, 115-116. 73

Id., 117; M. G. Desta, „EC-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO

Compatibility: An Experiment in North-South Inter-Regional Agreements?‟, 43

Common Market Law Review (2006) 5, 1375; A. Zimmermann, „Die neuen

Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen der EU: WTO-Konformität versus

Entwicklungsorientierung?‟, 20 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 1,

6; see also G. Thallinger, „From apology to Utopia: EU-ACP economic partnership

agreements oscillating between WTO conformity and sustainability‟, 12 European

Foreign Affairs Review (2007) 4, 514-515; ACP Group, Developmental aspects of

Regional Trade Agreements and Special and Differential Treatment in WTO Rules:

GATT 1994 Art. XXIV and the Enabling Clause, Commission Communication by the

Mission of Botswana on behalf of the ACP Group of States, WTO Doc.

TN/RL/W/155, 28 April 2004. For a broader discussion of the compatibility of the

EPAs with WTO rules see furthermore C. M. Obote Ochieng, „The EU-ACP

Economic Partnership agreements and the „Development Question‟‟, 10 Journal of

International Economic Law (2007) 2, 363-395; id., „Legal and systematic Issues in

the Interim Economic Partnership agreements. Which Way Now?‟, ICTSD Issue

Paper No. 2 (September 2009), 7, available at

http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/11/ochieng_web_final.pdf (last visited 18 December

2010); L. Cernat et al., „RTAs and WTO compatibility: Catch me if you can? The case

of EPA Negotiations‟, 23 Journal of Economic Integration (2008) 3, 489-517. 74

Art. V GATS.


867

also be incorporated into the law on the trade of goods and – as a

consequence – North-South free trade agreements in future still deserve the

name „development partnerships‟.

2. International Environmental Law and Human Rights

Protection

In addition to international trade law, other fields of public

international law also establish a framework for the development policy of

the European Union. One important example in this context is international

environmental law. Apart from reducing poverty, the problem of climate

change certainly provides the major challenge in current development

policy. It goes without saying that Europeans as much as most other

industrial nations find themselves far away from having made all necessary

efforts in this context, especially with regard to the vast industrial backlog

demand of the developing countries. At the UN Climate Change Conference

2009 in Copenhagen, EU leaders announced the commitment of $ 3.6

billion per year until 2012 to help developing countries combat global

warming.75

NGOs, however, doubt that this contribution will be an adequate

amount; according to Oxfam International at least $ 200 billion per year are

needed to help poor countries reduce their emissions and adapt to a

changing climate.76

International human rights protection is another example for the

importance of public international law for global development partnerships.

Here again, there are still deficits in the cooperation of the Europeans with

their partners in the Global South. For instance it is doubtful, whether the

European Union actually makes sufficient use of all instruments of human

rights protection where it seems to be necessary. As already mentioned, the

Cotonou-Agreement – like its predecessor, the Lomé-Convention – provides

75

see http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2933 (last visited 18 December

2010). See also para 8 of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009: „[…] The

collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional

resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions,

approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012 with balanced allocation

between adaptation and mitigation.”; available at

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (last

visited 18 December 2010). 76

http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-12-07/200bn-price-of-success-

copenhagen (last visited 18 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

868

regulations for human rights protection. According to Art. 96 of the

Cotonou-Agreement, the contracting parties can take „appropriate measures‟

in case of violation of human rights. At the extreme, these measures can

even comprise the suspension of the agreement with regard to a particular

country. Such sanctions are also possible on the basis of other agreements or

with regard to the Generalized System of Preferences.77

However, in

practice these instruments have not been exercised very often so far.78

There

definitely remains much scope for enhancing the importance that is

accorded to human rights protection in the implementation of the EU‟s

development policy.79

D. Conclusion: European Development Cooperation as

Part of the International Law of Development

The topics discussed above – the legal framework of the TEU and the

TFEU, the requirements of the WTO, the problem of climate change and the

human rights clauses of partnership agreements – are just examples of a

broad range of questions which come up when considering European

77

See e.g. Council Regulation 552/97 of 24 March 1997, OJ 1997 L 85/8; see also

Portugal v. Council, Case C-268/94 (Eur.Ct.J. 3 December 1996) ECR, I-6177, paras

23; see generally M. L. Cremona, „Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC‟s

Trade Agreements‟, in N. Emiliou & D. O‟Keeffe (eds), The European Union and

World Trade (1996), 62-80; B. Bandtner & A. Rosas, „Trade Preferences and Human

Rights‟, in Ph. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (1999), 699-722; E. Fierro,

„Legal Basis and Scope of the Human Rights Clauses in EC Bilateral Agreements:

Any Room for Positive Interpretation?‟, 7 European Law Journal (2001) 1, 41-68; L.

Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's Internationl Agreements (2005); P.

Leino, „The Journey Towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and

„Common Values‟ as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law‟, in Cremona

& de Witte (eds), supra note 43, 259-290. 78

See Bartels, supra note 77, 37: “Nonetheless, compared to the range of possible

scenarios in which human rights clauses might be applied, their actual impact on the

EU‟s external human rights policies has been relatively modest. There have been

some positive measures in form of dialogue on human rights and democratic

principles […] However, negative reactions under human rights clauses have been

limited to the Cotonou Agreement and its predecessor, the Lomé IV Convention, and

even there it has been the very poorest of ACP countries that have been targeted,

usually in response to military coups.” 79

See also R. Gropas, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. The Case of the European

Union, (2006), 132.


869

development policy from a legal perspective. But apart from the restrictions,

being imposed on development policy by European Union law and public

international law on the one hand, and, on the other hand, its impetus to the

evolution of this political area, one should not lose sight of the fact that

reciprocal effects can also be recognized: Political positions within North-

South relations are decisive for the further development of the international

legal framework, too. European development cooperation has made an

important contribution to the establishment of a new field of law, the so-

called „international law of development‟. Most scholars regard it as a new

section of public international law which – as a cross-section discipline –

comprises aspects of each part of international law referring to North-South

relations.80

Some experts on international law (especially in France and the

North-African countries) even consider the international law of

development as a new dimension of the international legal order, following

the phases of international law of coexistence and international law of

cooperation.81

This new dimension is characterized by the fact that it is

primarily dedicated to a special objective: overcoming the North-South

contrast and global development disparities. This objective is to be reached

primarily by the use of programmatic and prospective-working norms. Both

states and international organizations are making efforts to establish the new

legal structure, for example by formulating legal principles, that have to be

substantiated further, or by mutual consent on political goals which are not

explicitly fixed in legally binding treaties but remain – at least for a certain

time – in a „soft law‟ status, such as recommendations or resolutions.

80

For a general overview see, M. Kaltenborn, „Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer in

der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft‟, 46 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2008) 2, 205-232. 81

The main publications in this context are: Societé Française pour le Droit International

(ed.), Pays en voie de développement et transformation du droit international (1974);

M. Flory, Droit international du développement (1977); Office des Publications

Universitaires d‟Alger (ed.), Droit international du développement (1978); R.-J.

Dupuy, „Communauté internationale et disparités de développement‟, 4 Recueil des

Cours de l‟Académie du Droit international de la Haye (1979) 165, 11-231, 169; M.

Bennouna, Droit international du développement (1983); M. Benchikh, Droit

international du sous-développement (1983); M. Flory et al. (eds), La formation des

normes en droit international du développement (1984); A. Pellet, Le droit

international du développement, 2nd ed. (1987); G. Feuer & H. Cassan, Droit

international du développement, 2nd ed. (1991). For a critical analysis of this

approach see R. Sarkar, International Development Law. Rule of Law, Human Rights

and Global Finance (2009), 75-148.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 843-870

870

Quite often, international law of development is to a certain extent

disregarded due to these specific characteristics. The mainly vague and

indefinite legal principles, such as the right to development or the principle

of solidarity in international economic law, and the non-binding declarations

adopted by the General Assembly or other conferences held by the United

Nations, are frequently dismissed as legally irrelevant. However, it has been

proved by various experts on international law, that in fact these „soft law‟

instruments have a great role in establishing new „hard law‟ provisions.82

Moreover, international law of development by no means only consists of

„soft‟ elements, but also has – as shown in this Article – a well accepted

position within the „hard‟ part of the international legal framework. The

regulations on the competences and procedures of the European institutions

fixed by the TFEU, the Cotonou-Agreement, the new Economic Partnership

Agreements and last but not least by the WTO rules are all in all thoroughly

legally binding and partly even enforceable provisions which the European

Union has to respect while establishing global partnerships with developing

countries. They are examples of a steadily increasing framework that, on the

one hand, helps to structure and stabilize global development partnerships

and, on the other hand, encourage international stakeholders both in the

North and in the Southern countries to continue their work on establishing a

„just‟ world order.

82

For a discussion of the functions of soft law in the international legal structure see e.g.

U. Fastenrath, „Relative Normativity in International Law‟, 4 European Journal of

International Law (1993) 1, 305-340; J. Klabbers, „The Redundancy of Soft Law‟, 65

Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) 2, 167-182; H. Hillgenberg, „A Fresh

Look at Soft Law‟, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 3, 499-515; K.

Zemanek, „Is the Term „Soft Law‟ Convenient?‟, in G. Hafner et al. (eds), Liber

amicorum in honour of I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998), 843-862; J. J. Kirton & M. J.

Trebilcock (eds), Hard choices, soft law: voluntary standards in global trade,

environment, and social governance (2007); A. Boyle & C. Chinkin, The Making of

International Law (2007), 211-229; S. H. Nasser, Sources and Norms of international

Law: a Study on Soft Law (2008); H. Neuhold, „Variations on the theme of 'soft

international law', in International law between universalism and fragmentation‟, in I.

Buffard, et al. (eds), Festschrift in honour of G. Hafner (2008), 343-360; D. Shelton,

„Soft Law‟, in D. Armstrong (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Internatiol Law (2009),

68-80.


doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-liang

Defending the Emergence of the Superior

Orders Defense in the Contemporary Context

Jessica Liang

Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................ 872

A. Introduction .......................................................................................... 872

B. Superior Orders and the Soldier‘s Dilemma ........................................ 872

C. A Brief History of the Superior Orders Defense under

International Law ............................................................................................. 874

D. Alternative Degrees of Attributing Criminal Responsibility:

Finding the Right Solution to the Soldier‘s Dilemma ..................................... 878

I. Absolute Defense ................................................................................. 878

II. Absolute Liability................................................................................. 880

III.Conditional Liability ............................................................................ 881

1. Manifest Illegality ..................................................................... 881

2. A Reasonableness Standard ...................................................... 885

E. Frontiers of the Defense: Obedience to Civilian Orders? .................... 889

I. Operation under the Rome Statute ....................................................... 889

II. How far should the Defense of Superior Orders Extend to

Civilian Contexts? ................................................................................ 890

F. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 891

Final Year B Com/LLB student, University of Melbourne. An earlier draft of this

article was submitted as part of coursework undertaken for the LLB in the Melbourne

Law School.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 872

Abstract

The defense of superior orders is one of the most controversial defenses to be

pleaded under criminal law. In effect, it condones ignorance of the law and

allows a subordinate to escape criminal liability on a basis other than

culpability. It may therefore come as a surprise that sixty years after the

Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the resort to superior orders has re-emerged as a

complete defense for certain types of crimes. I argue that this defense is based

on sound policy reasons of military necessity, and should be made available on

the condition that the order is not ‗manifestly illegal‘. In contrast to blunt

absolutist approaches, the manifest illegality doctrine presents the most

workable test for distinguishing between the culpability of conduct committed

by soldiers in circumstances of exigency. This ‗middle-way‘ successfully

balances the dichotomous ends of legality and military efficiency and should be

the preferred test under international law.

A. Introduction

As one of the most controversial pleadings within criminal law, the

defense of superior orders has waxed and waned in its application in the history

of international law. The resort to this defense, sometimes termed the

‗Nuremberg defense‘, has achieved infamy through its frequent invocations by

war criminals on trial for the most heinous of crimes. It may therefore come as

a surprise that sixty years after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the resort to

superior orders has re-emerged as a complete defense in contemporary times.

This paper examines the polemic and attempts to define the most appropriate

and workable means of presenting such a defense. This paper is structured as

follows. Part II identifies the basis of the problem that the defense of superior

orders is designed to resolve. Part III offers a brief summary of the current and

historical operation of the defense under international law. Part IV canvasses

the varying forms in which criminal liability can be attributed when a crime has

been committed pursuant to an order, and concludes that an approach based on

manifest illegality is the preferred format for constructing a superior orders

defense. Finally, Part V looks to the frontiers of the doctrine to examine the

implications of extending the defense to civilian orders.

B. Superior Orders and the Soldier‘s Dilemma

The defense of superior orders is pleaded by soldiers who seek to be

excused from otherwise criminal behavior on the basis of policy. This policy


Contemporary Context 873

finds its utmost justification in the strict sense of discipline which binds

members of the military.1 The soldier is confronted with an inescapable

dilemma. He has a duty to obey the orders of his superior officers or be liable to

face disciplinary proceedings in a military court. At the same time, national and

international laws threaten to impose individual criminal responsibility for any

unlawful acts committed by a soldier while following orders. The full force of

this dilemma has been historically recognized by leading jurists. Dicey presents

the two extreme alternatives:

[a soldier] may be liable to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an

order, and to be hanged by a judge and a jury if he obeys it.2

Yet the soldier‘s dilemma not only derives from a legal duty that encases

his actions, but from the process of military training and indoctrination which

demands a psychological reaction to obey.3 When a soldier undergoes a period

of ‗transmogrification‘ from civilian to military personnel, ‗his actions and

thoughts are controlled and channeled… [such that] he is taught to have

confidence and faith in the military ability of his superiors and to respond

without hesitation to their instructions.‘4

The third factor compounding the soldier‘s position is the special

circumstances, experienced in a military context, that precludes him from

ascertaining the legality of an order. In contrast to civilian conditions, where

the onus of knowing the law is borne by individuals, during the ‗heat of the

battle‘ it is neither feasible for the soldier to analyze the lawfulness of his

actions; nor possible for him to have knowledge of the full factual

circumstances which may justify the legality of the order.

Notwithstanding the above, the very existence of a dilemma has been

questioned.5 It has been suggested that the dilemma is illusory and easily

resolvable: the soldier shall obey only lawful orders, and reject any unlawful

orders, with an order‘s illegality providing a complete defense against sanctions

imposed for disobedience. However, this view fails to account for the practical

realities of being a soldier in two ways. First, a soldier‘s ability to exercise a

fully-informed choice is severely impaired in the exigencies of battle. Second,

the choice to disobey may be accompanied by summary punishment, or by the

1 See e.g. Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 27(1), National Defence Act 1985 (Canada)

s 83. 2 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to The Study of The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (1959), 303. 3 See T.C. Brewer, ‗Their‘s not to reason why – some aspects of the defence of superior orders in

New Zealand Military Law‘, 10 Victoria University Wellington Law Review (1979-1980) 1, 45,

45. 4 Id. 5 W. Solf, ‗War Crimes and the Nuremberg Principles‘, in J. N. Moore et al. (eds) National

Security Law (1990) 391, cited in M. J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline &

the Law of War (1999) 51.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 874

reality that immediate resignation is not an option.6 This underscores the grave

dilemma that the defense of superior orders seeks to mitigate.

For these reasons, it is said that ‗[t]he military command structure

imposes upon the subordinate an antagonistic and paradoxical necessity to

respond‘7 to orders. Among the complexities posed by such a situation, the

defense of superior orders emerges as a central means of mediating the conflict

of duties faced by a soldier.

Traditional military justifications stress the essentiality of a strict chain of

command for the efficacy of military operations.8 Herein lies the crux of the

controversy surrounding the defense. To the extent that validity is given to a

defense based on ignorance of the lawfulness of a superior order, legality

becomes subjugated to military discipline. Ultimately, therefore, the

justification for the superior orders defense hinges on the value that is given to

the policy of military efficiency and the degree to which adherence to orders is

considered indispensable to the conduct of successful warfare. The

persuasiveness of this policy in a contemporary context will be discussed in the

latter part of this essay.

C. A Brief History of the Superior Orders Defense

under International Law

A great deal of interpretative controversy surrounds the historical

position of the superior orders defense under customary international law. For

the purposes of background understanding, this section attempts to elicit a brief

summary.9 The trend, until very recently, has been to take an increasingly

expansive position on the degree to which subordinates are exposed to criminal

liability.

It has been posited that prior to World War One, international law

inclined towards a complete defense of obedience to superior orders.

Oppenheim stated in 1906 that ‗[i]n case members of forces commit violations

ordered by their commanders, the members cannot be punished, for the

6 The existence of a ‗moral option to resign‘ varies between countries. In the United States for

example, the ability to resign is more restrictive than in other Western democracies: see Osiel,

supra note 5, 51 fn 33. 7 G.-J. Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law, 2nd ed (2007), 43. 8 See Brewer supra note 3, 45. 9 For a more detailed discussion of the history of the superior orders defense under international

law, see H. Sato, ‗The Defense of Superior Orders in International Law: Some Implications for

the Codification of International Criminal Law‘, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009) 1,

117; J. N. Maogoto, ‗The Superior Orders Defence: A Game of Musical Chairs and the Jury is

Still Out‘, 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform (2007), 185.



commanders are alone responsible.‘10 This view has been questioned11 but for a

period remained authoritative.12 After the conclusion of World War One, the

Allied powers demonstrated a willingness to move away from the absolute

defense position13 but ultimately acceded the authority to conduct war crime

trials to Germany under its Military Penal Code. In response to the pleading of

the defense to charges of homicide, the court took the view that the subordinate

in Dover Castle was not guilty due to a genuine belief in the lawfulness of

reprisals,14 while the defendant in Llandovery Castle was guilty because the

order he had executed was ‗universally known to everybody [...] to be without

any doubt whatever against the law‘.15 The position taken thus concurred with

the manifest illegality doctrine.

By the end of World War Two the debate again experienced a marked

shift. The validation of the resort to superior orders may have exculpated the

most heinous of Nazi war crimes. Socially, conscription drawn from all sectors

of society had raised the intellectual consciousness of the soldier body. The

result was increased autonomy for soldiers to question orders.16 In examining

the codification of the superior orders defense in international instruments

thereafter, the overwhelming position has been to reject the defense. The

Statute for the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg marked the first

occasion in which the defense was codified in an international instrument.

Article 8 provided that

‗[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to orders of his Government

or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be

10 L. Oppenheim, International Law, Volume 2, 1st ed. (1906), 264-265; see also Y. Dinstein,

‗International Criminal Law‘ 20 Israel Law Review (1985), 206, 237, which treats Oppenheim

as the authority for this position. 11 See e.g., N. C. H. Dunbar, ‗Some Aspects of the Problem of Superior Orders in the Law of

War‘ 63 Juridical Review (1951), 234, 243, who regards Oppenheim‘s view as a ‗fallacy‘. 12 Oppenheim‘s view was incorporated into the British Manual of Military Law, 6th ed (1914)

Chapter XIV, art 443 and the United States Rules of Land Warfare (1914) art 366. 13 See Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919

[1920] ATS 1, Arts 228, 229 . 14 ‗Judgment in the Case of Commander Karl Neumann, Hospital Ship ―Dover Castle‖‘, 16

American Journal of International Law (1922) 4, 704, 707. Under §47 para 1 of the German

Military Penal Code (1917), ‗when the execution of a service order involves an offence against

the criminal law, the superior giving the order is alone responsible‘, Id. But the court also found

that this position ‗accords with the legal principles of all other civilized states‘ at 707. 15 ‗Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, Hospital Ship ―Llandovery Castle‖‘, 16

American Journal of International Law (1922) 4, 708, 722. 16 L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed (2008), 337.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 876

considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that

justice so requires.‘17

Bound by the articles of its Charter, the International Military Tribunal

also sought to justify the absolute liability position under general customary

principles. ‗The true test which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law

of most nations is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was

in fact possible.‘18 The use of ‗moral choice‘ by the Tribunal is in fact an

allusion to the concept of duress.19 In qualifying the limited extent to which

obedience to superior orders can be said to exist, the Tribunal amalgamated the

concept of superior orders under the concept of duress. Elucidating the full

extent of the convergence between duress and the defense of superior orders is

beyond the scope of this essay.20 It is emphasized that the modern form of the

superior orders defense is based on a legal duty to obey, which is wholly

distinct from, but operates in parallel to, the element of compulsion that

underlies the doctrine of duress.21

The defense of superior orders was rejected in similar terms by the

statutes of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East22

17 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement by the Government of

the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War

Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, Art. 8, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 288 [London Charter]. 18 ‗International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences‘ 41 American Journal of

International Law (1947) 1, 172, 221. 19 See I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law. 3rd ed. (2007), 59. 20 The two defenses converge where a soldier obeys an order that is not manifestly illegal while

under compulsion to act. The defense of duress provides a further exculpatory avenue for the

soldier who is compelled to obey a manifestly illegal order: see Rome Statute, 17 July 1998,

Art. 31(1)(d), 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 107 [Rome Statute]. 21 The distinction has been stressed by numerous scholars: see, for eg, C. L. Blakesley, ‗Atrocity

and Its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda‘, in T. L.H.

McCormack & G. J. Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes: National and International

Approaches (1997), 220. Contra Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th ed (2005),

142–143, who cites in support Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Sentencing Appeals, ICTY Case No.

IT-96-22-A, 1997 [33]-[36]: at 143 fn 166 (Joint Separate Opinions of Judges McDonald and

Vohrah). However, it is argued that the comments in Erdemovic were made in the context of the

ICTY Statute, which explicitly forbids superior orders as a defense except when the same

factual scenario can be characterized as duress. Judges McDonald and Vohrah themselves admit

that ‗superior orders and duress are conceptually distinct and separate issues‘ at [33]-[34]. 22 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, arts 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 19 January

1946, TIAS 1589.



(IMTFE) and by Control Council Law No. 10,23 the Allied Control Commission

for Germany. Half a century later, the position, and even the wording, remained

unchanged in its application within modern day ad-hoc Tribunals: the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,24 International Criminal Tribunal

for the former Yugoslavia,25 the Panel for Timor-Leste,26 the Special Tribunal

for Lebanon,27 the Special Court for Sierra Leone28 and the Iraqi Special

Tribunal.29 The overwhelming preference towards absolute liability has been

suggested as evidence of such a position prevailing under customary

international law.30 However, these ad-hoc tribunals were designed to try

special international crimes, the seriousness of which may be implicitly

regarded as manifestly illegal.31

Disagreements in attempts to codify a permanent position suggest

otherwise of the existence of such a customary norm. While the absolute

liability position has achieved consistent codification in statutes of ad-hoc

tribunals, the general application of the superior orders defense remained a

topic of constant controversy under customary international law. Within the

1949 Geneva Conventions32 and the 1977 Protocol I,33 the strictness of the

23 Allied Control Council Law No 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes

against Peace and against Humanity, enacted 20 December 1945, Art. II.4.b, 3 Official Gazette

of the Control Council for Germany (1946), 50-5 [Control Council Law No. 10]. 24 Statute to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6 para. 4, annexed to SC Res

955, UN Doc S/RES/955, 8 November 1994. 25 Statute to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7 para. 4,

annexed to SC Res 827, UN Doc S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. 26 Regulation No 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious

Criminal Offences, UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000, Add.3 sec. 21. 27

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 3 para. 3, annexed to Agreement between the

United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for

Lebanon, annexed to SC Res 1757, UN Doc S/RES/1757, 30 May 2007. 28 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 12 April 2002, art. 6 para. 4, annexed to

Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the

Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137. 29 Delegation of Authority regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special Tribunal, Order No 48,

CPA/ORD/9 Dec 2003/48 (2003) (‗IST Statute‘), annexed to Coalition Provisional Authority

(Iraq). 30 P. Gaeta, ‗The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court

Versus Customary International Law‘, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 1,

172; see also Green, supra note 16, 339. 31 Gaeta, supra note 30, 185–186; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed (2008), 279. 32 International Committee of the Red Cross, Remarks and Proposals (1948) 19, 34, 64, 85;

Federal Political Department Berne, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of

1949, Volume II, Section B (1949), 114. 33 See Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International

Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Official Records (CDDH/SR.10) (1978)

307.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 878

Nuremberg standard came under opposition from diplomatic parties.34 The lack

of consensus over the evolution of customary law of the superior orders defense

underscored the debate behind the codification of art 33 of the Rome Statute,35

where general codification was finally achieved after a difficult compromise.36

D. Alternative Degrees of Attributing Criminal

Responsibility: Finding the Right Solution to the

Soldier‘s Dilemma

Three discrete formulations of the superior orders defense have emerged

in international law. Both the absolute defense and the absolute liability

doctrines draw a bright-line at exculpatory behavior with little reference to the

individual circumstances under which the order was executed. These blunt

formulations elevate particular policy concerns above the pursuit of a ‗just‘

solution in the individual case. This section attempts to provide a critique of

each approach and seeks to articulate why a formulation based on conditional

liability would be the most preferable resolution to the soldier‘s dilemma. It

concludes that the ‗manifest illegality‘ principle presents the most workable

criterion for a conditional test of criminal liability.

I. Absolute Defense

The respondeat superior principle recognizes the difficult predicament of

a soldier in being forced upon a strict duty to obey the commands of his

superiors. The notion of fairness underpinning such a principle is embodied in

St Augustine‘s acknowledgement that while leaders may wage wars without

legitimate cause, for soldiers, the ‗conditions of […] service‘ characterizes their

innocence.37 Indeed, this principle transpired in such times when unwavering

obedience was enforced by corporal punishment38 or even death.39 Inasmuch as

obedience is duty-based, in the 19th Century it was tainted by a pervasive sense

34 Maogoto, supra note 9, 185–186; see also L. C. Green, ‗The Defence of Superior Orders in the

Modern Law of Armed Conflict‘, 31 Alberta Law Review (1993) 2, 320, 330–331. 35

Rome Statute, Art. 33(2). 36

Rome Statute, Art. 33(2) which deems crimes against humanity and genocides as crimes which

are manifestly illegal. 37

St Augustine, Civitas Dei, Book 22 Chapter 75, cited in L. C. Green, Superior Orders in

National and International Law (1976) 5–6. 38

See, e.g., Wilkes v. Dinsman, US Supreme Court (1849) 48 U.S. 89, 127 (Woodbury J). 39

See, e.g., Clark v. State, Supreme Court Georgia (1867) 37 Ga. 191, 194 (Harris J).



of coercion.40 Partly because of the dire repercussions inflicted for

disobedience, the complete defense doctrine imposes no individual liability on

a soldier whenever a crime has been committed under an official order.

The principle was also motivated by practical considerations. Kelsen

viewed discipline as being ‗possible only on the basis of unconditional

obedience of the subordinate to the superior.‘41 Even when unconditional

obedience eventually gave way to obedience qualified by the lawfulness of

orders, respondeat superior functioned to preserve military discipline.

Heralding an absolute defense formulation presupposes that by necessity of

duty, the acts of a soldier, and therefore his culpability, are subsumed under

those of his commander. It assumes, in a utilitarian sense, that following the

orders of a central commander would produce the most favorable outcome for

all soldiers during the disorientation of a military offensive. In condoning and

being under-inclusive of criminal culpability, ignorance of the law is

legitimated in this special circumstance.

In addition to policy considerations, the absolute defense finds support in

positivist conceptions of authoritarian philosophies. Hobbes writes:

‗What is ordered by the legitimate King is made lawful by his command

and what he forbids is made unlawful by his prohibition. Contrariwise,

when single citizens arrogate to themselves to judge right and wrong,

they want to make themselves equal to the King, which counters the

State‘s prosperity [...] When I do, by order, an act which is wrong for the

one who commands it, it is not my wrongdoing, as far as the commander

is my legitimate master.‘42

This conception deems the fundamental legality of an order as solely

deriving from the legitimacy of the superior authority.43 Framed in somewhat

patriarchal terms, it is neither necessary nor desirable for a subordinate to

question an order as long as it emanates from a de jure authority. Yet taken in

its entirety, this argument could ‗lead to a sort of reduction ad absurdum’, by

40

N. Keijzer, ‗A Plea for the Defence of Superior Order‘, 8 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights

(1978), 78, 82. 41

H. Kelsen, ‗Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular

Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals‘, 31 California Law Review (1943), 530, 556

(emphasis added). 42

T. Hobbes, Elementa Philosophica de Cive, Ch 12 §§ 1, 2 cited in N. Keijzer, Military

Obedience (1978), 146-147. 43

For a fuller discussion, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International

Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (1999), 454–455.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 880

resulting in a situation where only the Leader of the Armed Forces, or the Head

of State, could be held criminally accountable.44

Incontrovertibly, the applicability of the defense in its absolute form has

fallen out of favor in modern discourse. The expansive jurisdiction of

international law, first into the realm of individuals and then to impose criminal

liability onto those individuals,45 has resulted in a trend of individual

accountability that is antithetical to the very concept of respondeat superior.

Corresponding to this has been a progressive reduction in the severity of

punishment given out to soldiers, as well as a shift in the nature of warfare,

which henceforth relaxed the requirement of strict obedience.46 Momentum

advocating against the automatic immunity approach has accelerated,47 in part

due to the increasingly documented violations of international law in modern

warfare. Respondeat superior is clearly insufficient for deterrence purposes,

and as such, the crux of the debate has now swiftly progressed beyond the

rejection of the complete defense.

II. Absolute Liability

Under the doctrine of absolute liability, the imposition of full

responsibility elevates the supremacy of the law above countervailing

considerations of military necessity. Acting in obedience is not a defense in

itself but can be raised as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

In contrast to Hobbesian thought, the absolute liability approach is

grounded in democratic conceptions of legality. Thus, the lawfulness of an

order does not derive from the legitimacy of the source, but is ultimately

dependent on an overriding higher principle of legality. It was Locke who saw

that obedience was only to law (in the form of public will):

‗[A]llegiance being nothing but obedience according to law, which when

he violates, he has no right to obedience […] and thus he has no will, no

power, but that of the law.‘48

Grotius, following natural law ideals, reached a similar conclusion. He

lectured that responsibility lay with the soldiers to desist from illegality. ‗[I]f

44

Gaeta, supra note 30, 175 fn 4. 45

See Cassese, supra note 31, 40; H. Sato supra note 9, 119. 46

Keijzer, supra note 40, 82-83. 47

Id., 83. 48 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (first published in 1690), 6th ed. (1764), §

151 (emphasis in original).



the authorities issue any order that is contrary to the law of nature or to the

commandments of God, the order should not be carried out.‘49

The primacy given to legality is the underpinning of common law

democratic systems. But in pursuit of this end, the absolute liability approach is

over-inclusive and makes subordinates criminally liable even when

circumstances preclude the exercise of proper judgment. This is unsatisfactory

when measured against Western standards of criminal culpability, which with

its ‗beyond reasonable doubt standard,‘ is predisposed towards finding

innocence where culpability is subject to reasonable doubt. Discomfort with the

extremity of absolute liability may explain why the international community

has failed to agree to the permanent codification of this principle, beyond the

statutes of the ad-hoc international criminal tribunals.

III. Conditional Liability

Establishing a conditional form of criminal liability on the basis of a

distinguishing criterion creates a compromise between the needs of military

efficiency and the ideals of legality. By contrast to absolutist positions,

conditional liability represents a concerted attempt at finding a just

determination for the implicated soldier. In this section, I argue that on practical

and doctrinal considerations, the preferred criterion for culpability should be

manifest illegality, and not reasonableness.

1. Manifest Illegality

Manifest illegality recognizes the special circumstances that confront a

soldier upon receiving an order. Extenuating conditions, prima facie, point

against circumstances that would make it fair to impose criminal culpability.

This does not apply if an order can be objectively regarded as ‗manifestly

illegal.‘

Indeed, manifest illegality has emerged as the dominant test in which the

extremes of absolute liability and absolute defense can be moderated.50 A

partial operation of this position is now codified in the Rome Statute.51 Yet

manifest illegality is not merely a modern construct: early resorts can be found

49

H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres (F. W. Kelsey trans) Vol II (1925 ed), 138. 50 See, for e.g., J. B. Insco, ‗Defense of Superior Orders before Military Commissions‘, 13 Duke

Journal of Comparative and International Law (2003) 2, 389, 393; P. White, ‗Defence of

obedience to superior orders reconsidered‘, 79 The Australian Law Journal (2005), 50, 54. 51 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1)(c). The defence is only available for war crimes, as crimes against

humanity and genocide are both deemed to be manifestly illegal.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 882

in Roman law, where crimes of ‗heinous enormity‘ became disqualified from a

plea of superior orders defense.52

The strongest objections to manifest illegality concern its relevance.

Gaeta and Cassese both argue that, in contrast to the wide variety of crimes

tried under national law, the serious nature of international crimes are such that

they are all implicitly ‗manifestly illegal‘.53 Therefore as a matter of logic the

absolute liability position should prevail in the international context. While this

assumption holds true in most cases, the contrary can also be conceived of in

limited situations. On its face this may appear to be paradoxical, but consider,

for example, the war crime of excessive attacks. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome

Statute criminalizes the act of intentionally launching an attack in the

knowledge that such an attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury which

would clearly exceed the claimed military advantage. The problem is that, in

many circumstances, a soldier on the front-line cannot assess the military

advantage of the attack he is committing. As such, if the order did amount to a

war crime then this cannot be regarded as manifestly unlawful.54 Examples like

these are rare, and in most cases the conduct of the accused may not attract

criminal liability due to the lack of the requisite mens rea.55 However, as a

matter of doctrinal consistency and practical fairness, it is preferable to allow

the existence of a defense, albeit in a limited operation, than to deny the defense

wholly on the basis of a questionable assumption.

Further objections centre on defects in the drafting of the defense rather

than the principle of the doctrine itself. Under Art. 33(1)(b) of the Rome

Statute, the accused must ‗not know that the order was unlawful‘ to be able to

attract the protection of the defense. Dinstein argues that this renders the

defense of superior orders redundant, as in the same situation the soldier‘s lack

of mens rea could equally attract the mistake of law defense under Art. 32(2).56

With respect to this argument, it is first submitted that the operation of the

mistake of law defense is limited in scope and would not cover all situations

envisaged by Art. 33(1)(b).57 Second, not knowing the unlawfulness of an order

52 See Osiel, supra note 5, 2 fn 6. See generally D. Daube, ‗The Defence of Superior Orders in

Roman Law 72 The Law Quarterly Review (1956), 494; Keijzer, supra note 40, 80–82. 53 Gaeta, supra note 30, 185–186. Cassese, supra note 31, 279. 54 Similar situations may arise, for e.g., under Art 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute. 55

See Rome Statute, Art. 32(2) for the defence of mistake of law. Cf the views of Y. Dinstein in

G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of

International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts: A

Commentary, volume 1 (2000), 381–382. 56 Dinstein, supra note 55, 381. 57 See K. J. Heller, ‗Mistake of Legal Element, the Common Law, and Article 32 of the Rome

Statute: A Critical Analysis, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), 419; G. Werle,

Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (2009), 212.



must be distinguished from a mental state where the defendant entirely lacks

the requisite degree of intent and knowledge.58 The superior orders defense

foresees situations where soldiers, because of the exigencies of battle, do not

know the unlawfulness of an order due to ignorance that would not normally be

excused and would render them culpable.

An additional criticism concerns the reasons behind restrictions in the

availability of the defense only for certain types of international crimes. Under

the Rome Statute, the defense can be invoked for war crimes but not for crimes

against humanity or genocide, since the latter two are deemed ‗manifestly

illegal‘.59 This may reflect the perception that crimes against humanity and

genocide are of a more serious nature than war crimes.60 Yet in many ways the

distinction may be regarded as somewhat arbitrary. Given that the elements of

crimes against humanity are specified in substantial detail under Art. 7(2)61, it is

oxymoronic to harbor the expectation that it would always appear manifestly

illegal to soldiers.62 Further, since both crimes against humanity and war crimes

can be pleaded cumulatively, one can foresee the peculiar situation where a

defendant who is indicted for both crimes may automatically resort to the

defense for the latter charge but not for the former.63 In principle, it is difficult

to see why such a blanket distinction would be necessary. For cases concerning

crimes against humanity or genocide, there is no reason why the Court could

not determine, on the facts of the particular case, whether the commission was

indeed manifestly illegal. This manner of drafting merely reflects the

compromise that has been struck in relation to the acceptance of this defense,64

but in no way detracts from the soundness of the manifest illegality principle.

Inevitably, the notion of manifest illegality carries inherent assumptions

about the universality of morals. It does so by linking culpability with the moral

imperative to refrain from the commissioning of an order whose illegality arises

at an instance so easily identifiable that it is instinctive. Such an order, by

58 Rome Statute, Art. 30(1). 59 Rome Statute, Art. 33(2). 60 M. Frulli, ‗Are Crimes Against Humanity more Serious than War Crimes?‘, 12 European

Journal of International Law (2001) 2, 329. See also Werle, supra note 57, 218. Contra Gaeta,

supra note 30, 190, who argue that it is difficult to envisage any international crime which

would not be manifestly illegal. See above fn 53. 61 Rome Statute. 62 See Dinstein, supra note 55, 382; contra Cassese, supra note 31, 279; see also above fn 53. 63 See Cassese, supra note 31, 279. 64 See R. Cryer, ‗The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law‘, 6 Journal of Conflict

and Security Law (2001) 3, 15 fn 80.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 884

example, is the killing of an enemy soldier who has surrendered or been

rendered defenseless.65

In elucidating the notion of manifest illegality, remarks by Judge

Halevy— accepted in the Eichmann trial — reflects the high water-mark

definition for this concept:

‗The distinguishing mark of a ‗manifestly unlawful order‘ should fly like

a black flag above the order given, as a warning saying ‗Prohibited!‘. Not

formal unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, nor unlawfulness discernible

only by the eyes of legal experts, is important here, but a flagrant and

manifest breach of the law, definite and necessary unlawfulness

appearing on the face of the order itself, the clearly criminal character of

[…] the acts ordered to be done, unlawfulness piercing the eye and

revolting the heart, […].‘66

Eichmann had pleaded the absolute form of the defense, having already

acknowledged his complicity.67 By consequence of the court‘s rejection of

respondeat superior he was not able to raise the defense in the face of the

manifest illegality of his crimes.

In military-court jurisprudence from North America, the manifest

illegality principle has been similarly expressed.68 Such an order is something

‗so palpably illegal on its face‘, seen in the eyes of ‗a man of ordinary sense

and understanding.‘69 The reference to a ‗reasonable man standard‘ has been

repeated in numerous other judgments,70 mediated according to the defendant‘s

65 US v. Kinder (1954) 14 CMR 742, 770 (U.S. Air Force Board of Review). In US v. Kinder, the

victim was a Korean intruder in an ‗unconscious or semi-conscious state from injuries‘ and

‗was subdued and […] not resistant to the exercise of physical control over him‘, 769. 66 Chief Military Prosecutor v Melinki (1956) 13 Pesakim Mehoziim 90 (District Court), 44

Peksakim Elyonim 362 (Military Court of Appeal) cited in ‗Attorney-General of the

Government of Israel v Eichmann‘, 36 International Law Reports (1961) 5, 256 (District Court

of Jerusalem); International Law Reports (1962) 277, 296 (Supreme Court of Israel) (emphasis

added). 67 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports

(1961) 5, 258 (District Court of Jerusalem). 68 See generally, L. C. Green, ‗Superior Orders and Command Responsibility‘, 27 The Canadian

Yearbook of International Law (1989), 167, 170–171. 69 US v. Kinder (1954) 14 CMR 746, 776 (U.S. Air Force Board of Review). For a general

discussion of how illegal conduct under a superior order was evaluated according to The

Manual for Courts-Martial, US Army, see 769–777. 70 See, e.g., US v. Keenan (1969) 39 CMR 117, 118; US v. Griffen (1968) 39 CMR 586, 588–589;

US v. Clark (1887) 31 Fed, 710, 717.



background, age, education and military experience.71 Professor Green has

raised a more detailed list of factors relating to the circumstances which

influence the decision to obey, including: the conditions and urgency

surrounding the receipt of orders, the period of deployment, the nature of

hostilities and the characteristics of the enemy party faced by the soldier.72 It

follows that the higher the rank of the defendant, the less likely it appears that

the defense could be successfully pleaded. Indeed, courts have highlighted the

enhanced expertise which they consider to be associated with the holding of an

officer‘s rank.73

At the heart of the principle is a considered exercise of the different

subjective circumstances that contribute to the decision-making process of a

soldier. Only after taking this into account can culpability be decided on the

objective basis of whether the order could be regarded as manifestly illegal.

This demonstrates the capacity of the manifest illegality doctrine to absorb

within its evaluation particulars pertaining to the individual case. Compellingly,

it substitutes the blunt absolutist approaches with a more nuanced and just

determination of individual culpability.

2. A Reasonableness Standard

A broad consensus currently supports the employment of the manifest

illegality doctrine. However, some scholars have presented alternative criteria

which could impose a higher level of moral responsibility.74 Professor Osiel

has, for example, argued for a ‗civilianization‘ of the current position into a

standard based on general notions of reasonableness.75 This would be applied,

at the very least, to officers and non-commissioned officers in developed

countries.76 He contends, from a sociological perspective, that the manifest

illegality standard serves as an inadequate deterrent for the commission of

atrocities. As a relatively undemanding criterion, it adversely skews the

incentives for a soldier to understand the law. In light of this, the next question

for consideration is whether it is appropriate for international standards of

criminal culpability to experience a further shift in priorities.

71 US v. Kinder (1954) 14 CMR 746, 774 (U.S. Air Force Board of Review); see L. C.

Green, supra note 16, 340. 72 L. C. Green, ‗Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man‘, 8 The Canadian Yearbook of

International Law (1970), 61, 102; see also N. C. H. Dunbar, supra note 11, 261. 73 See, e.g., Chenoweth v. R (1954) 1 CMAR 253; Hryhoriw v. R (1954) 1 CMAR 277. 74 B. Paskins and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War (1979), 275–276. 75 Osiel, supra note 5, 358. 76 Id., 8.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 886

From the very beginning of this debate, it has been clear that Kelsen‘s

reference to the unconditional nature of military obedience is no longer

justifiable through ethics or practical necessity. The clear rejection of the

absolute defense in the early 20th Century by the international community

represented a paradigm shift towards individual responsibility.

This was based on the acknowledgement that

‗[t]he obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A

soldier is a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to

respond, like a piece of machinery.‘77

If such a ‗reasoning agent‘ construct is to be accepted, then prima facie a

‗reasonableness‘ standard is feasible. But the proper question is whether it is

desirable, on a policy level, for the international community to further move

towards the paradigm of individualism. Two key considerations may influence

this.

The first factor relates to a change in the nature of warfare which may

diminish the practical importance of military discipline. Osiel argues that

‗[e]fficacy in combat now depends more on tactical imagination and loyalty to

combat buddies than on immediate, unreflective adherence to the letter of

superiors‘ orders […].‘78 Due to this evolution, traditional justifications based

on the necessity of military discipline are less persuasive. In examining his

proposition, certainly the decentralization of military structure is quite apparent.

The pre-modern characterization of the military unit — the blunt, ‗machine-

like‘ mass of foot soldiers, 79 has regressed for a number of reasons. After the

First World War, militaries underwent increasing specialization that is

commensurate with more complex warfare and the availability of new

technology. A somewhat decentralized structure features the existence of

smaller, independent groups.80 This predisposed decision-making towards a

cooperative design rather than a strict hierarchy.81 At the same time, due to the

advanced technicality of military equipment, superiors have come to rely on the

specialized expertise of subordinates.82 This special expertise has eroded the

traditional imperative to follow superior orders unquestioningly. In parallel to

77 United States v Ohlendorf (1950) IV Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military

Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10, 470 (‗Einsatzgruppen Case’). 78 Osiel, supra note 5, 7. 79 See Keijzer, supra note 42, 33–48 for a detailed summary of the key trends in the organizational

structure of military organizations from ancient Rome to the modern era. 80 Id. 43. 81 Id. 43, 65. 82 Id.



this has been an inexorable societal emphasis towards accountability. Keijzer

cites the creation of independent ‗functionaries‘ such as military ombudsmen,

inspector-general and military trade unions as having an indirect ability to

undermine the strict authority of superior orders.83

While the character of the typical military structure has evolved, the

impact of this event should not be over-emphasized. The sophistication of

military warfare does not necessarily imply a seismic shift that justifies a

disregard for discipline. An effective response to hazardous circumstances is

still achieved through the instructions of a central command, and indeed in

some cases the sophistication of communications technology has strengthened

the ability of superiors to effect on-the-ground coordination.84 On the whole,

the top-down hierarchy continues to loom as the dominant framework, and

remains necessary and desirable.85 As Keijzer reminds us, ‗the military

organization is an instrument of violence in the hands of the state.‘86 At the

crux of this notion is the crucial nexus between political control by the state,

and the control of violence itself, which is to be held in check by a strict system

of hierarchy. Therefore, a structural decentralization of the military chain of

command does not destroy the hierarchical attribution of responsibility which

defines the military. The changing nature of warfare alone cannot be a

conclusive reason for radically downplaying the importance of military

discipline.

The second argument for imposing the reasonableness standard concerns

the policy objectives of deterrence. A reasonableness standard imposes a

significantly greater onus on an individual soldier to assess the legality of his

actions. Traditionally, the commission of atrocities has been regarded as a

process ‗originat[ing] ―from below‖ as a result of violent passions or [a]

process of brutalization unleashed by combat.‘87 The manifest illegality

principle can serve as an effective deterrent to these acts because it aligns legal

wrongs squarely with basic moral wrongs. However, in totalitarian regimes

where criminal acts are sanctioned by the state ―from above‖ and

bureaucratized into smaller tasks, the manifest illegality of the conduct may be

easily overlooked. Exemplified by the Eichmann trial, the perpetrator here is

what Arendt conceives as a creation characterized by the ‗banality of evil.‘88 In

83 Id. 45. 84 Id. 47. 85 Id. 46. 86 Id. 87 See S. G. Fritz, Book Review for ‗Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of

War, Mark J Osiel‘ 14 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (2000) 3, 432; see also Osiel, supra

note 5, 173. 88 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1994), 287. ‗From the

viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, [Eichmann‘s]

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 888

this situation, legal wrongs cannot be aligned with moral wrongs. Legally

sanctioned acts obscure the capacity of the individual to recognize moral

wrongs in themselves.89 Osiel argues that in these situations, manifest illegality

fails in its function to alert against the commission of atrocities. This is because

a reasonableness standard is inherently murkier, it encourages individuals to

question orders. Instead of unconsciously resolving questions of legal or moral

difficulty in favor of obedience, the process of ascertaining reasonableness

incentivizes individuals to alert themselves about problems with an order. Acts

falling within the grey area between manifest illegality, and probable illegality,

may be further prevented.

The arguments behind Osiel‘s reasonableness standard are most

persuasive for ‗mass administrative massacres‘90 committed in sophisticated

and developed political systems. Whether this can be applied as a general

international standard is a different question altogether. Certainly, state

sanctioned violence can occur equally in developed and developing states. But

in recent times, the international community, and the International Criminal

Court, has returned their preoccupation to acts of mass violence within Africa.91

By contrast to Nazi Germany, the basis for this violence is associated more

closely with issues of peace and order than mere bureaucratic ignorance. In

these developing states, the threat of external punishment is often more

important for the decision to obey than any reasonableness standard set by

international law.92 Clearly, the increased autonomy given to soldiers in

professionalized armies has yet to manifest in many developing states. Thus,

Osiel himself concludes that the workability of the reasonableness standard is

limited in an international setting. In preference, ‗the manifest illegality

approach provides a useful ―floor‖ for international law, in that it is a norm to

which most states can realistically aspire‘93 to notwithstanding that ‗much of

contemporary warfare occurs in precisely those societies where it may be

unrealistic to expect widespread adherence even to this seemingly indulgent

requirement.‘94 In the face of these circumstances, the ‗manifest illegality‘

normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied […] that

this new type of criminal […] commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh

impossible [for him] to know or feel that he is doing wrong‘, 276. 89 Osiel, supra note 5, 147–148. 90 Id., 151. 91 See e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‗Statement by Human Rights Watch to the General Debate of

the International Criminal Court‘s 7th Assembly of States Parties‘ (15 November 2008)

available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-ASP7-GenDebe-

HumanRW-ENG.pdf (last visited 9 December 2010) 3-4. 92 Fritz, supra note 87, 434–435. 93 Osiel, supra note 5, 362. 94 Id., 362 fn 9.



standard remains the most politically acceptable option for the international

community.

Finally, as a matter of practicality, the reasonableness test is difficult to

accept because the onus it exacts is excessive. Much of the warfare conducted

today still entails the exigencies of combat. While this factor can be taken into

account in assessing the reasonableness of actions, the inherently uncertain

nature of the ‗reasonableness‘ concept detracts from its workability. Such a

standard is bound to vary infinitely across social and cultural lines compared to

a criterion of ‗manifest illegality‘. As such it would exacerbate the soldier‘s

dilemma rather than resolve it. When a heavy onus is imposed by lawyers

removed from the front-lines of battle, or in a court that considers facts with the

benefit of hindsight, the credibility of the standard diminishes along with its

adherence in practice. As a final consideration, the utilitarian virtues of

deterrence should not compromise the importance of attaining individual justice

for soldiers whose duty, ultimately, is to obey.95 Manifest illegality by resort

remains a more concrete and workable standard that can be used

internationally; to this end such a test is preferred.

E. Frontiers of the Defense: Obedience to Civilian

Orders?

For the majority of this paper, the defense of superior orders has been

persistently justified on the basis of the demands of military cohesion and the

rigidity of military discipline. It follows that the concept does not fluidly extend

to civilian orders, absent of these special circumstances. Surprisingly however,

the defense of obedience to civilian orders doctrine has yet to come under

rigorous academic scrutiny. This section discusses the application of the

defense in the context of civilian orders under the Rome Statute and examines

whether the position taken is satisfactory.

I. Operation under the Rome Statute

Under the Rome Statute, the defense of superior orders can be pleaded

‗pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or

civilian.‘96 In doing so, it unambiguously signals that the defense is not

95 Osiel argues that the uncertainty of the standard can be alleviated by a multi-factor test which

‗specify a limited set of circumstances and their relative priority‘ (supra note 5, 360). However,

the multi-factor test itself would involve complex issues of value judgment. This is not a test

that can work easily across diverse cultural lines. 96 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 890

confined to a military framework. There is an express requirement, to be

proven positively, that the subordinate had a legal duty to obey the order,97 that

he or she did not know that the order was unlawful98 and that it is not

manifestly illegal.99 However, the precise limits of Art. 33 are yet to be settled.

The scope of the defense as applied to civilian orders is unclear. A

defendant must have received the order either as part of a chain of command —

military or civilian — or the order must be prescribed by law. 100 In civilian

contexts, this takes account of orders prescribed by law as well as orders

imparted by a governing official that are within authority and not ultra vires.101

But it is unclear whether this includes orders issued by an unofficial, de facto

authority. On the one hand, it may be a small step to include unofficial

commands, if command responsibility already recognizes the level of effective

control on the subordinate exerted by the de facto body.102 However, in a

defense context, ‗control‘ is more closely aligned with the notion of

compulsion and duress, while the receipt of superior orders is a distinct concept

based on the legal duty to obey.103 It follows that such a duty cannot exist in

cases of ‗unofficial subordination‘104 and therefore, the better view is that de

facto orders would not validly meet threshold requirements. From the

recipient‘s viewpoint, it is at the very least logically acceptable to allow the

defense where the civilian superior ‗purports to exercise official authority.‘105

This would conclusively exclude situations emanating from a private body.

II. How far should the Defense of Superior Orders Extend to

Civilian Contexts?

In line with the expansion of command responsibility to civilian

commanders,106 it is warranted that its corollary, the superior orders defense,

97 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1)(a). 98 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1)(b). 99 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1)(c). 100 Rome Statute, Art. 33, heading. 101 A. Zimmerman, ‗Superior Orders‘, in A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (2002), 968. 102 Id. 968–969. See also O. Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court, 2nd ed (2008), 929, who regards command responsibility and superior orders

defence as ‗represent[ing] two sides of the same coin.‘ 103 Rome Statute, Art. 33(1)(a). 104 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International

Humanitarian Law (2003), 323–324. Contra Triffterer, supra note 102, 924, who argues that

the meaning of government extends to de facto governments of the State. 105 Zimmerman, supra note 101, 696. Cf. Triffterer, supra note 102, 926. 106 See Rome Statute, Art. 28(b).



should also be widened to include civilian subordinates.107 On a doctrinal level,

it is accepted that the existence of such a defense for civilians ‗can provide for a

more nuanced and comprehensive moral response to the (non-) sincerity of the

intentions of defendants.‘108 As international law takes an increasingly

expansive view of its jurisdiction over individual criminal responsibility, its

doctrines should evolve to reflect a more just and flexible approach towards

dealing with the actual culpability of an individual.

At the same time, the extension of the application of superior orders to

civilian contexts is fraught with conceptual difficulty. This is because the

assumptions which underlie the existence of superior orders in the military

sphere cannot be directly transferred to a civilian context.

While the legal duty of obedience may apply to a civilian subordinate, a

strict system of discipline, and the exigencies surrounding the consummation of

the order, is less likely to be present. Precisely for this reason, national laws for

civilians generally do not allow ignorance of the law to be an excuse. 109 The

superior orders defense operates under the presumption of military conditions.

As these conditions cannot be presumed in the civilian context, the onus should

be on the civilian subordinate to characterize the situation by analogy to the

extraordinary circumstances faced by a soldier that necessitates strict adherence

to the chain of command.110 The imposition of this element of proof is

necessary to prevent an excessively broad manifestation of the defense. In any

situation where the primacy of legality is subjugated on the grounds of policy,

exculpation on a basis other than the actual culpability of the defendant must be

treated cautiously. In civilian contexts, where policy arguments of necessity are

weak, a circumscribed approach to the defense of superior orders becomes even

more acutely justified.

F. Conclusion

The defense of the superior orders represents an attempt at finding a

balance between the ‗dictates of absolute discipline and efficiency in what is

essentially an instrumentality of power and the equally inescapable subjection

107 See Knoops, supra note 7, 40–41. 108 Knoops, supra note 7, 42. Cf Triffterer, supra note 102, 925, who argues that ‗it is necessary

that […] civilian superiors exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is similar

to that of military commanders.‘ Contrary to this I argue that effective control is not relevant in

the defense context. 109 This is the position in Australia: see, e.g., A v. Hayden, High Court of Australia (1984) 156

CLR 532, 554. 110 Zimmerman, supra note 101, 969.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 871-892 892

of that instrument of power to the authority of the law.‘111 The various

characterizations in which the defense has emerged historically are indicative of

the difficulties in such an exercise. In spite of this, adopting a test based on

manifest illegality resolves many of the problems that arise from the extremity

of the absolute liability and absolute defense positions. This is the

characterization upon which the re-emergence of the superior orders defense

can be justified in contemporary contexts. The justification is ultimately

predicated on the acknowledgement of the significant pressures faced by

soldiers. Conditions on the battlefield may reasonably impair and restrict the

ability to make well thought out decisions. Thus, strict adherence to military

command is an essential element of a soldier‘s duty.

Outside of a situation where strict discipline is the assumed norm, the

justification weakens considerably. In examining the frontier of the defense in a

civilian context, a conceptual difficulty arises when we consider the underlying

basis for the existence of the defense in the first place — given that civilians are

not generally subjected to the same pressures or the strict discipline of the

military. Therefore, the scope of the superior order defense in the civilian

context ought to be limited in deference to preserving doctrinal consistency.

111 H. Lauterpacht, ‗The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes‘, 21 British Yearbook

of International Law (1944), 58, 71.


doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-linderfalk

The Post-9/11 Discourse Revisited – The Self-

Image of the International Legal Scientific

Discipline

Ulf Linderfalk

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 895

A. Part I ................................................................................................ 895

I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 895

II. The Law of 11 September a.m. ....................................................... 903

B. Part II ............................................................................................... 910

I. The New Interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter....................... 911

1. The Relevant Legal Context Defined ....................................... 911

2. The Everyday Meaning of the English “Armed

Attack” .......................................................................................... 912

3. The Object and Purpose ............................................................ 914

4. Subsequent Practice .................................................................. 916

5. Why the Treaty Interpretation Debate was Irrelevant ............... 918

II. The New Rule of Customary International Law ............................. 921

1. The Relevant Legal Context ..................................................... 921

2. Statements Pertaining Directly to International Law ................ 923

Ulf Linderfalk is an Associate Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law,

Lund University, Sweden.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

894

3. Pledges of Support .................................................................... 928

4. The Non-Action of States ......................................................... 931

III. The New Rule of Customary International Law (cont‟d) .............. 933

1. Discussants Paid Little Regard to Negative

Statements ................................................................................ 934

2. Discussants Failed to Cite their Sources Properly .................... 938

3. The Missing Jus Cogens Argument .......................................... 939

C. Part III ............................................................................................. 942

I. The Self-Image of the International Legal Scientific

Discipline ........................................................................................ 942

1. The International Legal Scientist as Archetype ........................ 943

2. The Way Ahead ........................................................................ 948

The Post-9/11 Discourse Revisited

895

Abstract

A few years ago, the legality of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was a

topic much discussed in the international legal literature. This article

approaches the problem from a new angle. Rather than investigating the

relevant issue of legal substance – whether or not OEF was ever consistent

with international law – the article focuses attention on the general scholarly

performance in dealing with this issue. Scrutinizing the literature published

immediately following upon the events of 11 September 2001, the author

suggests that overall, the scholarly debate on the legality of OEF did not live

up to the standards normally applied in serious legal analysis, and that

hence, the debate should be characterized as poor science. The article

presents this criticism in further detail. With said criticism as a basis, in a

concluding part of this article, the author takes the investigation one step

further. As he suggests, when scholars engaged in the post-9/11 discourse,

there was something about the whole situation that greatly constrained them.

They were obviously hesitant to conclude that in circumstances like those of

9/11, there would still not be any right of self-defense to exercise. So much

did they hesitate that they thought the opposite conclusion worth the prize of

far-reaching infringements of the most basic of scientific quality standards.

Why this hesitation, the article asks. What force or forces are compelling

international legal scientists? As the author suggests, this question bears

directly on the particular self-image of the legal scientific discipline and the

role it envisages for itself in the international community. He concludes the

article by initiating a discussion on this very delicate issue specifically,

introducing for this purpose a description of the international legal scientist

as archetype.

A. Part I

I. Introduction

Legal science is a concept generally honored among the legal

profession. As we are used to thinking, legal science is the activity typically

engaging professors of law, research fellows at legal departments, and

doctoral candidates. It produces descriptions and assessments of a legal

system, including the way that system is created and developed. Stated

generically, it provides what legal scholars communicate and deliberate at

legal conferences and through the agency of law journals and scientific

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

896

publishing companies. Two assumptions are implicit in this activity.1 First,

there is the idea that legal science is a good to be desired and pursued. As

most people in the legal profession tend to believe, legal science is an

activity that should be practiced. For some reason – not often openly

declared – we are better off with legal science than without it. Secondly,

there is the idea that legal scientific activities can be assessed in

comparative terms such as better and worse. In the conceptual world of the

legal profession, obviously, there is an ideal legal scholarship that can be

used as a basis for criticism of legal scientific activities. The more legal

scholars can approximate the ideal, the better it is; and vice versa.

All things considered, the mere existence of legal scientific activity

would seem to raise the claim for quality control and review. Generally

speaking, such reviews are warranted for several reasons. First, they are a

means to safeguard the internal rationality of legal science. To be able to

communicate and perform their task efficiently, legal scientists are

dependent on the instrumentality of specific intellectual tools, such as legal

terminology and legal concepts. Largely, these tools are created and

developed through the activities of legal scholarship itself. Legal scientific

activities should be reviewed to ensure that the intellectual tools remain

functional.2 Second, reviewing legal scientific activity is a means to

promote and protect the authority of the legal scientific discipline. Every

legal proposition raises the claim that it be considered correct.3 Therefore, if

on further scrutiny, time after time, the outcome of legal scientific activities

is revealed to be incorrect, the credibility of all legal science will be

jeopardized. Legal scientific activities should be reviewed to ensure that this

does not happen. Third, reviewing legal scientific activity serves as a means

1 Support for this proposition can be found in speech act theory. Searle gave the

example of a person, who says “The cat is on the mat”, see J. R. Searle, Speech Acts

(1969), 11. In Speech Acts he argued that by merely uttering this proposition, a person

inevitably commits herself to its truthfulness. This line of argument can be applied to

legal scientific activity as well. If people engage in legal scientific activities, they

commit themselves to the assumption that legal science is a good to be desired and

pursued. Similarly, if legal scholars spend time comparing and assessing legal

scientific activities, they commit themselves to the assumption that legal scientific

activities can be assessed in comparative terms such as better or worse. 2 Cf. U. Linderfalk, „State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules

Terminology: The Role of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal

System‟, 78 Nordic Journal of International Law (2009) 1, 53. 3 See R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation – The Theory of Rational Discourse

as Theory of Legal Justification (1989), 214-217.


897

to protect the internal rationality of legal systems. Legal science has a

unique task, for which no other legal actor takes responsibility. It systemizes

and analyzes the relevant “legal activities”, that is, the activities of all those

who participate in the creation and development of a legal system. If legal

science does not perform this task well, the coherence of the legal system

will be put at risk. Legal scientific activities should be reviewed to ensure

that this does not happen. Fourth, reviewing legal scientific activities is a

means to protect the legitimacy of law as a form of governance. When legal

research is performed on a legal order, it raises an implicit claim that

overall, the legal order is legitimate.4 Therefore, the continued confidence of

the community in legal science inevitably entails its confidence also in the

legal order. Legal scientific activities should be reviewed to ensure that this

confidence remains intact.

This essay is intended as a contribution to the ideally ever-on-going

quality control of international legal scholarship. The essay will conduct a

review of a particular legal discourse on a particular legal question: the

legality of Operation Enduring Freedom. I assume the reader is already

fairly acquainted with the setting. On 11 September 2001, four commercial

aircraft were hijacked to be used in a large-scale attack carried out in and

against the United States of America. Two of the jets were deliberately

flown into the World Trade Center of New York City, a third struck the

Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a fourth crashed into a field in

Shanksville, Pennsylvania, apparently heading for another target in the

Washington area. The attacks were immediately attributed to a group of

loosely affiliated terrorist organizations, known as the Al-Qaeda network.

On the evening of 11 September, the United States Government declared

itself to be engaged in a “war against terrorism”,5 and five days later, the

Government of the United Kingdom followed suit by issuing a similar

statement.6 On 7 October 2001, the two governments ordered armed forces

to initiate military actions in Afghanistan. Air strikes were launched against

terrorist training camps, but also against military targets – such as air

defense, communication centers, and air bases – throughout the country,

followed by a military campaign on the ground. This military action was

4 See K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (2002), 283-322.

5 Statement by the President of the United States in his Address to the Nation, 11

September 2001, available at http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (last visited on 19

November 2010). 6 See Keesing’s Record of World Events, 44336.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

898

referred to as Operation Enduring Freedom.7 In an attempt to justify it the

two governments invoked their inherent right of self-defense.8

In the international legal literature, the tragic events of 9/11 and the

subsequent military operation in Afghanistan attracted considerable

attention. Articles and monographs were produced in great quantity,9 the

7 As of November 2010, Operation Enduring Freedom still continues.

8 Letters of 7 October 2001, UN Doc S/2001/946 and UN Doc S/2001/947.

9 See Y. Arai-Takahashi, „Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence: Appraising

the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum‟, 36 The International

Lawyer (2002) 4, 1081; J. M. Beard, „America‟s New War on Terror: The Case for

Self-Defense Under International Law‟, 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

(2001-2002) 2, 559; M. C. Bonafede, „Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the

Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the

September 11 Attacks‟, 88 Cornell Law Review (2002-2003) 1, 155; O. Bring &

D. I. Fisher, „Post-September 11: A Right of Self-Defence Against International

Terrorism?‟, in D. Amnéus & K. Svanberg-Torpman (eds), Peace and Security

(2004), 177-191; D. Brown, „Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th:

State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses‟, 11 Cardozo Journal of

International and Comparative Law (2003) 1, 1; M. Byers, „Terrorism, the Use of

Force and International Law After 11 September‟, 51 International and Comparative

Law Quarterly (2002) 2, 401; A. Cassese, „Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial

Legal Categories of International Law‟, 12 European Journal of International Law

(2001) 5, 993 [Cassese, 2001]; J. A. Cohan, „The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging

Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law‟, 15 Pace

International Law Review (2003) 2, 283; J. Delbrück, „The Fight Against Global

Terrorism: Self-Defense or Collective Security as International Police Action? Some

Comments on the International Legal Implications of the „War Against Terrorism‟‟,

44 German Yearbook of International Law (2001), 9; Y. Dinstein, „Humanitarian Law

on the Conflict In Afghanistan, Remarks by Yoram Dinstein‟, 96 Proceedings of the

American Society of International Law (2002), 23; H. Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and

the Framework of International Law (2005); P. M. Dupuy, „The Law After the

Destruction of the Towers', European Journal of International Law, Discussion

Forum, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, once but not any

more available at the web page of the European Journal: http://www.ejil.org, in file

with the author of this essay; T. M. Franck, „Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense‟,

95 American Journal of International Law (2001) 4, 839; G. Gaja, „In What Sense

Was There an „Armed Attack‟?‟, European Journal of International Law, Discussion

Forum, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, once but not any

more available at the web page of the European Journal: http://www.ejil.org, in file

with the author of this essay; M. J. Glennon, „The Fog of Law: Self-Defense,

Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter‟, 25 Harvard

Journal of Law and Public Policy (2002) 2, 539; C. Gray, International Law and the

Use of Force, 2nd ed. (2004), 159-194; C. Greenwood, „International Law and the

Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq‟, 4 San Diego

International Law Journal (2003), 7; E. Gross, „Thwarting Terrorist Acts by


899

Attacking the Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human

Rights Versus the State‟s Duty to Protect its Citizens‟, 15 Temple International and

Comparative Law Journal (2001) 2, 195; E. Katselli & S. Shah, „September 11 and

the UK Response‟, 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2003) 1, 245;

F. L. Kirgis, „Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon‟

(September 2001) available at http://www.asil.org/insigh77.cfm (last visited

19 November 2010); B. Langille, „It‟s „Instant Custom‟: How the Bush Doctrine

Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001‟, 26 Boston College

International and Comparative Law Review (2003) 1, 145; L. Martinez, „September

11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense‟, 72 UMKC Law Review

(2003) 1, 123; K. M. Meessen, „Unilateral Recourse to Military Force Against

Terrorist Attacks‟, 28 Yale Journal of International Law (2003) 2, 341; S. D. Murphy,

„Terrorism and the Concept of „Armed Attack‟ in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter‟, 43

Harvard International Law Journal (2002) 1 [Murphy, 2002a], 41; E. P. J. Myjer &

N. D. White, „The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?‟, 7

Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2002) 1, 5; R. Müllerson, „Jus Ad Bellum and

International Terrorism‟, 32 Israel Yearbook of International Law (2002), 1;

M. E. O‟Connell, „Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism‟, 63 University of Pittsburgh

Law Review (2002) 4, 889 [O‟Connell, 2002]; M. E. O‟Connell, „American

Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense‟, 31 Denver Journal of

International Law and Policy (2002-2003) 1, 43 [O‟Connell, 2002-2003];

E. Papastavridis, „Security Council Resolutions 1368/2001 and 1373/2001: Collective

Security or the Right of Self-Defence‟, 55 Revue Hellénique de Droit International

(2002), 501; J. J. Paust, „Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq,

and Beyond‟, 35 Cornell International Law Journal (2001-2002) 3, 533 [Paust, 2001-

2002]; A. Pellet, „No, This is not War!‟, European Journal of International Law,

Discussion Forum, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, once but

not any more available at the web page of the European Journal: http://www.ejil.org,

in file with the author of this essay; N. G. Printer, „The Use of Force Against Non-

State Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in

Yemen‟, 8 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (2003) 2, 331;

N. Quénivet, „The Legality of the Use of Force by the United States and the United

Kingdom Against Afghanistan‟, 6 Austrian Review of International and European

Law (2001), 205; J. Quigley, „The Afghanistan War and Self-Defense‟, 37 Valparaiso

University Law Review (2003) 2, 541; S. R. Ratner, „Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello

After September 11‟, 96 American Journal of International Law (2002) 4, 905;

P. Rowe, „Responses to Terror: The New „War‟‟, 3 Melbourne Journal of

International Law (2002) 2, 301; M. N. Schmitt, „Counter-Terrorism and the Use of

Force in International Law‟, 32 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2002), 53;

N. Schrijver, „Responding to International Terrorism: Moving the Frontiers of

International Law for „Enduring Freedom‟?‟, 48 Netherlands International Law

Review (2001) 3, 271; C. Stahn, „Terrorist Acts As „Armed Attack‟: The Right to Self-

Defense, Article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism‟, 27 The

Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2003) 2, 35 [Stahn, 2003]; C. Stahn, „Security

Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They Say and What They

Do Not Say‟, European Journal of International Law, Discussion Forum, The Attack

on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, once but not any more available at the

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

900

main part dating from September 2001 to the late fall of 2003. Although a

wide range of legal issues were brought to analysis and commented upon,

the center of all discussion remained the meaning and application of the two

rights of self-defense – those laid down in Article 51 of the UN Charter and

contained in customary international law, respectively; each requires the

existence of an armed attack.10

For two reasons, the categorization of

Operation Enduring Freedom as induced by an armed attack raised the

interest of international legal scholars. First, the assault on New York and

Washington, D.C., had not been performed by any state organ but by a

group of private individuals – the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Second,

although the Al-Qaeda network had been harbored by Afghanistan for many

years, according to the general international law of state responsibility, that

in itself would not make the 9/11 attack attributable to this state.

Personally, I have studied the post-9/11 international legal discourse

with great interest. As expected – considering the great number of scholars

that engaged in the debate, and the complexity of the many legal issues

involved – commentators disagreed on a wide range of issues. Given this

context, it is surprising that something like a general doctrine might

transpire; but this is exactly what happened. It was the opinion expressed or

implied by the great majority of text-writers that at some point between 11

September and 7 October 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom was

officially launched,11

the international law of self-defense changed.12

When

web page of the European Journal: http://www.ejil.org, in file with the author of this

essay, henceforth referred to as Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373;

C. Stahn, „International Law at a Crossroads? The Impact of September 11‟, 62

Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2002), 183 [Stahn,

2002]; G. Travalio & J. Altenburg, „Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of

Military Force‟, 4 Chicago Journal of International Law (2003) 1, 97; G. K. Walker,

„The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom‟s Self-Defense Responses‟, 37

Valparaiso University Law Review (2003) 2, 489; R. Wolfrum, „The Attack of

September 11, 2001, the Wars Against the Taliban and Iraq: Is There a Need to

Reconsider International Law on the Recourse to Force and the Rules in Armed

Conflict?‟, 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2003), 1. 10

See e.g. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14,

103, para. 195. 11

Note that in the Afghanistan Combat Zone Executive Order of 12 December 2001, 19

September was designated as the date of commencement of combat activities. See

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/ (last visited 19

November 2010). 12

See e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1087, 1096 and 1101; Beard, supra note 9,

passim, but see especially 589-590; Bonafede, supra note 9, 206, et passim; Bring &


901

a forcible measure is employed by a group of private individuals, whose

conduct – judged by the general international law of state responsibility –

cannot be attributed to any state, considered from the point-of-view of the

international law of self-defense existing on the morning of 11 September

2001, that measure would never be classified as an armed attack.

Considered from the point-of-view of the international law of self-defense

existing on 7 October 2001, it sometimes would. To facilitate reference,

henceforth, I will refer to this doctrine as the proposition of change.

Strictly speaking, the proposition of change comes in two versions,

depending on the exact rule commentators thought had evolved. According

to the argument of some legal scholars, in the relevant period from 11

September to 7 October 2001, alongside the general international law of

state responsibility, states developed a new criterion of attribution: when a

group of private individuals has been harbored by a state for an extensive

period of time, the conduct of that group will be attributable to said state.13

This criterion bore specifically on the understanding of the concept of an

armed attack.14

Henceforth, according to the international law of self-

defense existing on 7 October 2001, a forcible measure would sometimes

Fischer, supra note 9, 185-191; Brown, supra note 9, 24-29; Byers, supra note 9, 409-

410; Cassese, 2001, supra note 9, 996-997; Cohan, supra note 9, 320-328; Delbrück,

supra note 9, 15-16, implicitly; Glennon, supra note 9, 549-553; Greenwood, supra

note 9, 17; Langille, supra note 9, 146.; Martinez, supra note 9, 160-161, implicitly;

Meessen, supra note 9, 345, et passim; Murphy, 2002a, supra note 9, 45-51;

Müllerson, supra note 9, 43 and 47; O‟Connell, 2002-2003, supra note 9, 45-47;

Printer, supra note 9, 344-352; Quénivet, supra note 9, 221-225; Ratner, supra note 9,

914; Rowe, supra note 9, 304 and 307-308; Schmitt, supra note 9, 77 and 104;

Schrijver, supra note 9, 285; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 189 and 211-214; Stahn,

2003, supra note 9, 38 and 39, speaking about “Article 51(½)”; Travalio & Altenburg,

supra note 9, 101-111 and 116-117; Walker, supra note 9, 532, fn. 182; Wolfrum,

supra note 9, 2, 27-28, 35-39 and 75. For a contrary opinion, see Franck, supra note 9,

840-841; Gaja, supra note 9; Paust, 2001-2002, supra note 9, passim; Pellet, supra

note 9. According to Franck, a terrorist attack like that of 9/11 would have been

classified as an “armed attack” already by the international law of 11 September a.m.

According to Paust, Gaja, and Pellet, at no point – neither before 11 September, nor

after – did a terrorist attack like that of 9/11 classify as an “armed attack”. 13

See e.g. Byers, supra note 9, 409-410; Cohan, supra note 9, 320-328; O‟Connell,

2002-2003, supra note 9, 45-47; Rowe, supra note 9, 304 and 307-308; Stahn, 2002,

supra note 9, 189 and 211-214; Schrijver, supra note 9, 285; Travalio & Altenburg,

supra note 9, 101-111 and 116-117. 14

Hence, as lex specialis, it would have to be applied prior to the criteria provided in the

general international law of state responsibility. Cf. Articles on Responsibility of

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (GA Res. 56/83, 28 January 2002, Annex),

Art. 55.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

902

classify as an armed attack, although, as far as general international law

goes, it would not be attributable to any state. Other commentators viewed

things differently. According to them, from 11 September to 7 October

2001, the question of attribution had been done away with entirely.

Henceforth, according to the international law of self-defense, a forcible

measure would classify as an armed attack, irrespective of whether it was

performed by a state or a non-state agent.15

Whether commentators endorsed

the one version of the proposition of change or the other, henceforth they

will be referred to as proponents of change.

For several reasons, I insist, the post-9/11 debate is an exceptionally

interesting object of scientific study. First of all, it raises some very

interesting questions with respect to the integrity of the international legal

scholarship. Certainly, from 11 September to 7 October 2001 there may

have been a change in the way people conceptually conceive of attacks

perpetrated by international terrorists. However, this is not in itself

tantamount to a change of the relevant international law. A change of

international law is effected using the particular norm-creating processes

recognized by international law. Considering the oft-cited inertness of those

processes, the proposition of change comes out as rather drastic. If,

generally, a change of international law is difficult to accomplish, then it

seems a rather remote idea that a universally or near-universally applicable

rule, such as the right of self-defense, could be changed over a period of just

four weeks. How did text-writers argue to defend this conclusion? To what

extent did their arguments conform to the standards normally demanded of a

well-functioning legal science? For a proper understanding of the

international legal scholarship, these are critical questions. It is the purpose

set for this essay to provide them with an answer.

Subsequent section II of Part I will set the proposition of change into

the context of the wider legal discourse. It remains a fact, that in order to

correctly understand and assess international legal scholars when arguing

that from 11 September to 7 October 2001 the international law of self-

defense changed, some background knowledge is required. We need to have

an idea of the arguments that scholars thought were supporting their

15

See e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1087, 1096 and 1101; Bonafede, supra note 9,

206, et passim; Bring & Fischer, supra note 9, 185-191; Brown, supra note 9, 24-29;

Delbrück, supra note 9, 15-16; Langille, supra note 9, 153; Meessen, supra note 9,

345, et passim; Müllerson, supra note 9, 43 and 47; Ratner, supra note 9, 914;

Schrijver, supra note 9, 285; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9, 38 and 39; Travalio &

Altenburg, supra note 9, 101-111 and 116-117; Walker, supra note 9, 532, fn. 182.


903

assumption about the contents of that law on the morning of 11 September.

It is the purpose of section II of Part I to impart such an idea. Part II of the

essay will establish and critically investigate the series of argumentative

behavior patterns that emerge by a closer reading of the post-9/11

international legal literature. As the investigation will show, discussants

gravely and repeatedly violated a number of the most basic of scientific

quality standards. To put it bluntly, overall, the discourse on the legality of

Operation Enduring Freedom was poor legal science. This conclusion

provokes another host of very interesting questions. Quite clearly,

commentators were hesitant to conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom

was not consistent with international law, or – more generally – that in

circumstances like those accompanying the events of 9/11, there would still

not be any right of self-defense for states to exercise. So much did they

hesitate that they thought the opposite conclusion worth the prize of far-

reaching infringements of the most basic of scientific quality standards.

Why this hesitation, one might ask. What force or forces are compelling

international legal scientists? As it seems, the answer to this question bears

directly on the particular self-image of the legal scientific discipline and the

role it envisages for itself in the international community – and that is the

second reason for why I find the post-9/11 discourse so interesting. In the

concluding part III of this essay, I will allow myself to share a few thoughts

on this delicate issue. Based on generalized personal experience, I will

venture a description of the international legal scientist as archetype. The

description involves a distinction between six different kinds. They are

denoted as the External Observer, the Legal Idealist, The Legal Activist, the

Moral Messenger, the Preserver of the Legal Self, and the Guardian of the

Legal System, respectively. As I will argue, the six types all serve as

possible explanations of the poor scientific quality characterizing the post-

9/11 international legal discourse. Considered from the perspective of the

international legal scholarship in general, they may explain some of the

relationships that obviously exist between the self-image of the legal

scientific discipline and what tends to be the outcome of international legal

scientific activities. Hopefully they may also provide a basis for a more

penetrating general discussion on the role of the legal scientific discipline in

the international community.

II. The Law of 11 September a.m.

As earlier indicated, the proposition of change entails an assumption

about the contents of the international law of self-defense existing on the

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

904

morning of 11 September 2001: When a forcible measure is employed by a

group of private individuals, whose conduct – judged by the general

international law of state responsibility – cannot be attributed to any state,

that measure can never be classified as an armed attack.16

To support this

assumption, apart from earlier scholarly opinions,17

the proponents of

change put their trust in the following authorities:

The 1986 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the

Nicaragua Case.18

According to the argument invoked by the US

Government in defense of its support for the contras, the Government of

16

See supra section I. 17

See e.g. M. Brennan „Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Response,

and the Role of Customary International Law‟, 9 Louisiana Law Review (1998-1999),

1195, 1207, 1209; A. Cassese, „The International Community‟s „Legal‟ Response to

Terrorism‟, 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1989), 589 [Cassese,

1989], 596-597; Y. Daudet, „International Action Against State Terrorism‟, in R.

Higgins & M. Flory (eds), Terrorism and International Law (1997), 201, 203-205;

S. R. Knauft, „Propertosed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State

Responses to Terrorist Attacks‟, 19 Hastings International and Comparative Law

Review (1995-96), 763, 773; J. Lobel, „Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks:

The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan‟, 24 Yale Journal of International Law

(1999), 537, 541; M. F. Lohr, „Legal Analysis of U.S. Military Responses to State-

Sponsored International Terrorism‟, 34 Naval Law Review (1985), 1, 7-10, implicitly,

et passim; J. Paust, „Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of

Force Abroad‟, 8 Whittier Law Review (1986-87), 711 [Paust, 1986-1987], 720-721,

723, but note that according to Paust, if a state uses “clinical” force for the purpose of

quashing terrorists residing within the territory of some other state, that force should

not be considered directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of

that state; O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) [Schachter,

1991], 164-167; O. Schachter, „The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists

in another Country‟, 19 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights (1989) 209 [Schachter,

1989], 216-219; G. M. Travalio, „Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of

Military Force‟, 18 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2000), 145, 152, 156;

Contra, Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed. (2001), 213-22;

R. Wedgwood, „Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden‟, 24 Yale

Journal of International Law (1999), 559, 564, arguing that “[t]here is nothing in the

U.N. Charter or state practice that restricts the identity of aggressors against whom

states may respond – for privates as well as governments may be the sources of

aggressive conduct”. 18

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Brown, supra note 9, 24; Cassese,

2001, supra note 9, 996-997; Cohan, supra note 9, 317; Glennon, supra note 9, 543-

544; Meessen, supra note 9, 345; Schmitt, supra note 9, 69-70 and 92-200; Murphy,

2002a, supra note 9, 44-45 and 51; Ratner, supra note 9, 908; Schrijver, supra note 9,

285-286; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 213 and 218-235; Travalio & Altenburg, supra

note 9, 102-104.


905

Nicaragua had supplied the armed opposition in El Salvador with weapons.

By doing so – this was the argument – Nicaragua had subjected El Salvador

to an armed attack. The Court found that, irrespective of whether or not the

supply of arms to the Salvadorian guerrillas could be treated as imputable to

the government of Nicaragua, it was “unable to consider that, in customary

international law, the provision of arms to the opposition in another State

constitutes an armed attack on that State”.19

This statement invites an

argument a fortiori. If the supply of arms by a government of a state to a

group of non-state agents does not make the activities of that group

attributable to the state in question, then neither should the mere harboring

of such a group.

The work done by the International Law Commission on the topic of

state responsibility.20

In 1980, the ILC provisionally adopted a set of 35

Draft Articles on State Responsibility. According to Draft Article 34, “[t]he

wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international

obligation of that State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of

self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations”21

.

In the ILC Commentary to this Article, the concept of an armed attack is

consistently referred to in inter-state terms. According to the words of

paragraph 3, for instance, “for action of the State involving recourse to the

use of armed force to be characterized as action taken in self-defence, the

first and essential condition is that it must have been preceded by a specific

kind of internationally wrongful act, entailing wrongful recourse to the use

of armed force, by the subject against which the action is taken”22

. The ILC

Commentary adopted in 1996 confirms completely what was already stated

in 1980.23

As for the Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts finally adopted in 2001, it is a

revised and abbreviated version of the earlier Commentaries. Interestingly

it, too, is permeated by the assumption that armed attacks are performed by

states and states only. Hence, according to text explaining the wording of

Article 21, “[t]he essential effect of Article 21 is to preclude the

19

See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,

supra note 10, 103, para. 195, para. 119 and paras 229-230. 20

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Brennan, supra note 17, 1207;

Schachter, 1989, supra note 17, 217-218; Schachter, 1991, supra note 17, 164-165. 21

Yearbook of the International Law Commission [ILC Yearbook] (1980), Vol. II, Part

2, 33. 22

ILC Yearbook (1980), Vol. II, Part 2, 53. For other examples, see id., 52, para. 1, and

53-54, para. 5. 23

ILC Yearbook (1996), Vol. 1, 258-267.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

906

wrongfulness of conduct of a State acting in self-defence vis-à-vis an

attacking State”24

.

International reactions to the bombing by Israeli military aircraft of

the PLO headquarters in Tunis, 1985.25

In late September 1985, three Israeli

citizens were assassinated by a group of terrorists in the port of Larnaca,

Cyprus. Israel imputed the PLO, making the Larnaca killings the latest in a

series of PLO terrorist attacks carried out against Israel and Israeli targets.

On 1 October 1985, Israeli military aircraft penetrated Tunisian airspace and

dropped several bombs at the PLO headquarters, some 20 km south of the

Tunisian capital. In a meeting of the UN Security Council, the Israeli

representative defended the action of his country invoking “its legitimate

right of self-defence”. Interestingly, he used language very similar to that

resorted to by President Bush in his several speeches post-9/11:

“For the past year, the PLO headquarter in Tunisia has initiated,

planned, organized and launched hundreds of terrorist attacks against

Israel, against Israeli targets outside Israel and against Jews

everywhere in the world [...]. Tunisia knew, and it was strong enough

to stop them. It knowingly harboured the PLO and allowed it complete

freedom of action in planning, training, organizing and launching

murderous attacks from its soil [...]. Under no circumstances can Israel

accept the notion that bases and headquarters of terrorist killers should

enjoy immunity anywhere, any time. It was against them that our

action was directed, not against their host country. Nevertheless, the

host country does bear considerable responsibility.”26

All members of the Council, with the exception of the United States,

condemned Israel.27

Statements suggest that not only did members consider

the Israeli bomb raid disproportionate to the original wrong, but they also

rejected the argument that Tunisia, by harboring the PLO, should be

considered responsible for the acts of terror performed in its name.28

24

ILC Yearbook (2001), Vol. 2, 75, para. 5. 25

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Byers, supra note 9, 407; Murphy,

2002a, supra note 9, 46-47. 26

UN Doc S/PV.2611, 2 October 1985, paras 60 and 65-66. 27

UN Doc S/PV.2611, 2 October 1985 and 2615, 4 October 1985. 28

See e.g. statements made by Mr. Bierring (Denmark), UN Doc S/PV.2611, 2 October

1985, 2, para. 17; Mr. Halefoğlu (Turkey), id., 4, para. 44; Mr. Woolcott (Australia),

id., 5, para. 52; Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), UN Doc S/PV.2615, 4 October

1985, 6, para. 60. See also SC Res. 573, 4 October 1985, para. 1, condemning


907

The Strategic Concept of the Alliance, adopted by NATO in 1999.29

On 24 April 1999, the heads of state and government participating in a

meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC approved a new

Strategic Concept of the Alliance. According to paragraph 24 of this

document

“[a]ny armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever

direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington

Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the

global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other

risks of wider nature, including acts of terrorism [...]. Arrangements

exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under

Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-

ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this

kind.”30

By the description of terrorism, not as a matter covered by Article 5 of

the Washington Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty), but as another risk of a

wider nature, clearly, what the Alliance implies is that acts of terrorism are

not to be seen as armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 of the UN

Charter.31

“vigorously the act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian

territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law

and norms of conduct”. 29

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1087. 30

NATO, „The Alliance‟s Strategic Concept‟ (24 April 1999), Press Release, NAC-

S(99)65, available at

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?mode=pressrelease (last

visited on 19 November 2010), para. 24. Emphasis added. 31

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty reads as follows: “The Parties agree that an armed

attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an

attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack

occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of self-defence recognized by Article 51

of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by

taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it

deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the

security of the North Atlantic area.” (North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Art. 5, 34

U.N.T.S. 243, available at

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (last visited on 19

November 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

908

The international reactions to the missile attack carried out by the

USA on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.32

On 7 August 1998, bombs

exploded outside the two American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-

Salaam, respectively, completely destroying all buildings and killing some

200 people. As in the case of the terrorist assault of 11 September 2001, the

United States Government identified Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda

network as the perpetrators. On August 20, US warships fired some 75 to

100 cruise missiles at alleged terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and at

a Sudanese chemical plant suspected of involvement in the production of

chemical weapons. In a letter sent to the UN Security Council on that same

day, the United States government announced that it had been exercising

“its right of self-defence in response to a series of armed attacks against

United States embassies and United States nationals”33

. Reactions from the

international community were mixed. As stated by Professor Sean Murphy,

some states and inter-governmental organizations condemned the attack,34

while others were more understanding.35

Few statements were vested in

express legal terms. The one important exception is the Final Document that

the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) adopted when, on 2-3 September 1998,

it met at Durban, South Africa, to discuss (among other things) the military

actions taken one year earlier by the US against one of its members (the

Sudan). Paragraph 179 of the Document reads as follows:

“The Heads of State or Government […] expressed their deep concern

over the air attack carried out by the United States Government

against the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in the Sudan on 20 August

1998, and considered this as a serious violation of the principles of

international law and the United Nations Charter and contrary to the

principles of peaceful settlement of disputes as well as a serious threat

to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan and the

regional stability and international peace and security. They further

32

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Beard, supra note 9, 562-565; Bring &

Fischer, supra note 9, 181-185; Byers, supra note 9, 407 and 409-410; Murphy,

2002a, supra note 9, 49-50; Schmitt, supra note 9, 106-109. 33

UN Doc S/1998/780, para. 1. 34

See S. D. Murphy, „Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to

International Law‟, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 1, 161 [Murphy,

1999], 164-165, citing statements by the Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya,

Pakistan, Russia, the Yemen, and the League of Arab States. 35

Murphy, 1999, supra note 34, 165, citing statements by Australia, France, Germany,

Japan, Spain and the UK.


909

considered this attack as a unilateral and unwarranted act. The Heads

of State and Government condemned this act of aggression.”36

Although the exact legal basis used for the condemnation is not

clearly stated, there is room for the argument that NAM considered the

assault on the two American Embassies not to form an armed attack in the

sense of the international law of self-defense.

The commonly accepted definition of aggression.37

According to the

English language version of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the exercise of a

right of self-defense requires the occurrence of an “armed attack”.

Interestingly, the equivalent term used for the equally authentic French

version is “agression armée”.38

This would seem to provide an argument

relevant for the interpretation of Article 51, considering what must be seen

as the ordinary usage of this term in the parlance of international lawyers.

From the time of the 1945 London Agreement,39

up until 11 September

2001, international law has always defined aggression in clear and

unambiguous inter-state terms. Prominent examples of this legal usage

include the 1974 Definition of Aggression,40

and the 1996 Draft Code of

Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.41

It can be objected to

36

Final Document of the 12th

Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held at Durban,

South Africa, on 2 to 3 September 1998, para. 179, available at

http://www.nam.gov.za/xiisummit/chap1.htm (last visited 19 November 2010). 37

For commentaries citing this authority, see e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1087;

Delbrück, supra note 9, 15; Meessen, supra note 9, 345; Ratner, supra note 9, 907;

Schmitt, supra note 9, 90-100 and 109; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 213. 38

The full provision reads as follows: “Aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne

porte atteinte au droit naturel de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, dans le

cas où un Membre des Nations Unies est l‟objet d‟une agression armée”. 39

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the

European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279. 40

See GA Res. 3314, 14 December 1974, Annex, Art. 1: “L‟agression est l‟emploi de la

force armée par un Etat contre la souverainité, l‟integrité territorial ou l‟indépendence

politique d‟un autre Etat, ou de toute autre manière incompatible avec la Chartre des

Nations Unies, ainsi qu‟il ressort de la présente Définition.” (“Aggression is the use of

armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of

the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.”) 41

In French, Article 16 of the Draft Code reads as follows: “Tout individu qui, en

qualité de dirigeant ou d‟organisateur, prend une part active dans – ou ordonne – la

planification, la preparation, de déclanchement ou la conduite d‟une aggression

commise par un État, est responsible de crime d‟agression.” (“An individual who, as

leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation,

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

910

this line of reasoning that in the process of drafting the 1974 Definition of

Aggression, Western states warned about the risk that an act of aggression

be confused with an armed attack, which according to them was a distinct

concept.42

The fact remains, however, that in its decision of the Nicaragua

Case – when facing a situation where the concept of an armed attack had to

be expounded – the International Court of Justice resorted to this definition

exactly.43

B. Part II

As indicated earlier, in defending their assumption that at some point

between 11 September and 7 October 2001, the international law of self-

defense changed, proponents of change argued along two different tracks.

Some spent great effort on convincing us that there had been a revision of

the right of self-defense contained in customary international law. They

tailored their arguments to establish the existence of a new opinio juris.

Others described the developments in terms of an evolution of the Charter-

based right of self-defense. They argued that on 7 October 2001, the

relevant legal context was different than the one that they assumed had

obtained on the morning of 11 September a.m., and hence, we would now

be justified for interpreting Article 51 differently. In the organization of my

further review of the post-9/11 legal discourse, I will follow the logic of this

reasoning. Hence, in section III, I will begin my assessment with the

arguments that according to the proponents of change supported a new

interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In sections IV and V, I will

then continue with the arguments that allegedly established the creation of a

new rule of customary international law.

initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a

crime of aggression.”) See also the Commentary adopted by the ILC to this Article:

“[T]he violation by a State of the rule of international law prohibiting aggression gives

rise to the criminal responsibility of the individuals who played a decisive role in

planning, preparing, initiating or waging aggression. The words „aggression

committed by a State‟ clearly indicate that such a violation of the law by a State is a

sine qua non condition for the possible attribution to an individual of responsibility for

a crime of aggression.” (Articles of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and

Security of Mankind, with Commentary, ILC Yearbook, 1996, Vol. II, Part 2, 43,

para. 4.) 42

Cf. A. Randelzhofer, „Article 51‟, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United

Nations. A Commentary, Volume 1, 2nd ed. (2002), 788, 795. 43

See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,

supra note 10, 103, para. 195.


911

I. The New Interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter

1. The Relevant Legal Context Defined

Like any other treaty governed by international law, the legally correct

understanding of the UN Charter is determined by reference to the rules of

interpretation expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties (VCLT).44

According to Articles 31-33 of this Convention, the

interpretation of a treaty is a process that draws on certain means of

interpretation, commonly referred to as primary and supplementary means

of interpretation.45

The primary means of interpretation are those that can be

employed according to Article 31: conventional language (“the ordinary

meaning”), the context, and the object and purpose of the treaty. The

supplementary means of interpretation are those that can be employed

according to Article 32, including among others “the preparatory work of

the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion”. Stated differently, the

primary and supplementary means of interpretation form the legally relevant

context, upon which we are expected to draw for the understanding of a

treaty. When a proposition is put forth about the legally correct meaning of

a treaty provision, the proposition shall be based on the relationship or

relationships assumed to exist between a primary or supplementary means

of interpretation and the written utterance interpreted.46

Applied to the case

at hand, it would seem that for the purpose of establishing the correct

interpretation of UN Charter Article 51, the legally relevant context is

identical with the contents of the primary and supplementary means of

interpretation. If someone suggests that between 11 September and 7

October 2001, the legally relevant context was altered, so that on 7 October

we would be justified for conferring a meaning on Article 51 that we would

not have been able to defend by legal argument four weeks earlier, then this

44

23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Today, it is the generally held opinion, confirmed

repeatedly by the ICJ, that Arts 31-33 of the Vienna Convention not only give

expression to the rules of interpretation that apply according to the Convention,

between its parties. They are also reflective of the rules that apply according to

customary international law, between states in general. (For further references, see

U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties – The Modern International Law as

Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007), 7.) 45

Although the Vienna Convention itself does not speak about primary means of

interpretation, this terminology seems to be commonly accepted. For references, see

Linderfalk, supra note 44, 19-20, fn. 60. 46

See Linderfalk, supra note 44, 47-52.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

912

assumes that during said period, the contents of the primary and

supplementary means of interpretation changed to that very effect. I will

structure my further analysis based on this observation.

Roughly speaking, it can be said that in defending their assumption of

a new interpretation of Article 51, the proponents of change used arguments

of three kinds. They used arguments based on the everyday meaning of the

English expression “armed attack”; they used arguments based on the object

and purpose of the Charter; and they used arguments based on subsequent

practice. I will now proceed to investigate each of these arguments. I will

construe the arguments in terms of the Vienna Convention, and I will give

the reasons for why I think they should be considered evidence of a legal

science not working properly.

2. The Everyday Meaning of the English “Armed Attack”

In the post-9/11 international legal discourse, several commentators

built arguments on the everyday meaning of the English term “armed

attack”.47

They noted that in the sense of everyday English language,

“armed attack” means simply an attack performed with arms or weapons.

Such an attack, they argued, may be performed by any group of persons,

regardless of whether they act as private agents or as agents of a state. For

two reasons, this argument should be criticized.

First of all, it can be objected that there is really nothing new about the

situation. Obviously, the everyday meaning of the English “armed attack”

did not develop in the period from 11 September to 7 October 2001. It

existed well before the attack on New York City and Washington, D.C.

Hence, the everyday meaning of the English “armed attack” cannot be used

to support the proposition of change. As already stated, in order for the

proposition of change to be considered justified, it would have to be shown

that, in some respect, on 7 October 2001, the contents of the primary and

supplementary means of interpretation was different than four weeks earlier.

47

See e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1084 and 1093; Franck, supra note 9, 840;

Gaja, supra note 9; Paust, 2001-2002, supra note 9, 534; Schrijver, supra note 9, 285;

Schmitt, supra note 9, 76; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 213; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9,

35-36; Walker, supra note 9, 530.


913

Second, although the everyday meaning of a treaty might be seen as a

natural start of any treaty interpretation process,48

it is a mistake to regard

this as the end of all discussion. According to the modern international law

of treaty interpretation expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention, the

ordinary meaning of a treaty expression is not determined by reference to

everyday language alone. The determining factor is conventional language,

which includes apart from everyday language any possible technical

language using the interpreted expression.49

In the case confronted here, this

observation is of great importance, since it would seem that in the sense of

the language of international law, “armed attack” means a forcible measure

attributable to a state.50

Even assuming that an established legal meaning of

the English term “armed attack” does not exist, we still have the

corresponding French language to consider. As may be recalled, whereas

the English language version of Article 51 requires the occurrence of an

“armed attack”, the equivalent term used for the equally authentic French

version is “agression armée”.51

“Agression”, in the parlance of international

lawyers, means a forcible measure performed by a state, as defined by the

general international law of state responsibility.52

In a situation like the one just described, where the everyday and

legal-technical meaning of a treaty expression produce different

interpretation results, no legal hierarchies exist that will automatically allow

preference to be given to either one of the two conflicting meanings.53

As

we will then have to conclude, the ordinary meaning of the expression is

ambiguous. In other words, in deciding whether “agression armée” should

be interpreted in the broader sense of an attack performed by any group of

persons, or in the more limited sense of an attack attributable to a state, we

will have to depend on other means of interpretation than conventional

language. This notwithstanding, a remarkable number of text-writers

confined themselves to an analysis of the everyday meaning of the English

48

Cf. U. Linderfalk, „Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna

Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation‟, 54 Netherlands

International Law Review (2007) 1, 133. 49

See Linderfalk, supra note 44, 61-73, and the further references cited there. 50

See supra, section II. 51



See e.g. Linderfalk, supra note 44, 62-73; M. E. Villiger, Customary International

Law and Treaties (1985), 321-322; M. K. Yasseen, „L‟interprétation des traits d‟après

la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traites‟, Recueil des Cours, Volume 151

(1976), 58.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

914

expression “armed attack”, implicitly claiming this meaning as decisive for

the entire interpretation exercise. As I would suggest, such reasoning shows

scant understanding of the modern law of treaty interpretation, and

therefore, it establishes good reason for criticism. In a scholarly discussion

on the interpretation of a treaty provision like Article 51 of the UN Charter,

discussants are expected to have a fairly robust knowledge of the system of

rules laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention. Alternatively, assuming I

am wrong and that despite all appearances proponents of change were not

unfamiliar with the broad definition given to the concept of an ordinary

meaning, by their strong emphasis on the everyday English language they

revealed bias. According to the criteria of general scientific ethics, scientific

analysis assumes the investigation of an issue from all possible sides.

Failing to conform to this standard, a text-writer will always expose herself

to the criticism of having concluded all discussions before even beginning

her analysis.

3. The Object and Purpose

Judging by the way some proponents of change approached the issue,

the reason why Article 51 of the UN Charter would suddenly have to be

understood differently lies mainly in the object and purpose conferred on

this provision. In the international legal literature of 2001 to 2003, I have

noted the following suggestion to be quite commonly represented: „A state

must always have the possibility of averting a threat to its existence (or –

put somewhat differently – to its territorial integrity or political

independence); hence, we can assume that the expression “armed attack” in

Article 51 of the UN Charter refers to any large-scale attack directed at a

state, whether performed by a state or not.‟54

Expressed in such general

terms, the idea that a state should be able to avert a threat to its existence is

indeed a persuasive one. Still, there is nothing really new about it. In the

organization of the UN Charter, Article 51 is a part of Chapter VII. It has

always been said about the provisions of that Chapter that they form a

delicate balance between two interests: that of establishing a system of

collective security, and that of states being able effectively to protect their

54

See e.g. Bonafede, supra note 9, 185-186; Bring & Fischer, supra note 9, 182; Gross,

supra note 9, 214; Meessen, supra note 9, 353; Printer, supra note 9, 348-349 and

351-352; Quénivet, supra note 9, 222; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 213; Walker, supra

note 9, 531, implicitly; Wolfrum, supra note 9, 36.


915

existence.55

Viewed in this light, the argument cited above is hardly relevant

to the suggestion that on 7 October 2001, the objects and purposes conferred

on Article 51 of the UN Charter were different than those that had been

conferred four weeks earlier.

Of course, the argument could be stated in more elaborate terms. It

could be argued that the events of 11 September brought about a change of

attitude among the members of the UN, in the sense that the relative weight

of the objects and purposes conferred on Article 51 is no longer the same.

After the assault on Washington, D.C., and New York – this is how the

argument goes – states were generally prepared to make greater sacrifices in

the pursuit of national security than they were before. Hence, even if we

consider the objects and purposes of 7 October to be perfectly identical with

those of 11 September, their relationship would be different, and therefore,

any interpreter using the teleological approach would be left with a different

outcome.56

There is a flaw in this argument. It builds on a misunderstanding of

the contents of VCLT Articles 31 and 32. Although Article 31 para. 1

speaks of “the object and purpose” of a treaty in the singular, international

law accepts that a treaty can be interpreted using several of its objects and

purposes.57

Of course, depending on the specific object and purpose drawn

upon, the interpretation of a treaty in the light of its object and purpose

might lead to different results. When it does, the interpreter will simply have

to consider the meaning of the interpreted treaty ambiguous, upon which he

will have to proceed to the context or to the supplementary means of

interpretation. If we consider the two objects and purposes conferred on

Article 51 – that of establishing a system of collective security, and that of

states being able to effectively protect their existence – it is quite clear that

in the case of an attack performed by a non-state agent, the use of the one

object and purpose leads to a different interpretation result than the other,

regardless of whether the interpretation is done at a point in time previous to

11 September 2001, or in the four weeks that ensued. It is possible that

those of us observing the developments experienced a shift in the main

emphasis placed by UN members on the two objects and purposes. But that

would not have involved a significant change of the relevant legal context.

Both before and after 11 September, any person who interprets Article 51 in

the light of its objects and purposes will fail to achieve a clear result.

55

See e.g. Myjer & White, supra note 9, 11-12. 56

Cf. Martinez, supra note 9, 179-181; Cohan, supra note 9, 316. 57

See Linderfalk, supra note 44, 211-217.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

916

4. Subsequent Practice

In search of more convincing arguments, some authors invoked the

existence of a new subsequent practice. In the period of 11 September to 7

October 2001 – this is how the argument goes – developments amounted to

the formation of a practice, which established a new agreement among the

member states of the UN with regard to the meaning of Article 51.58

As I

will insist, this argument must also be regarded as futile.

First of all, it can be questioned whether there is any practice at all.

Arguably, in order for us to conclude that a practice exists in the application

of Article 51 with regard to the interpretation investigated here, the

following three conditions need to be satisfied:59

- The application of Article 51 must be general.

- The application must be constant – it must have occurred on

repeated occasions.

- The application must be fairly uniform.

It is debatable whether this is a fair description of the state of affairs

that prevailed during the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001. Much

depends on whether we limit ourselves to the way Article 51 was applied in

that sole period, or whether we broaden our perspective to include previous

acts of states. The problem can be approached in two different ways.

According to the one approach, the relevant practice developed entirely in

the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001. According to the other,

practice developed over a longer period, but the acts performed from 11

September to 7 October provided the conclusive element that we needed to

be able to speak about a true practice. Since this is a discussion that largely

coincides with the subsequent investigation of a possible change of the right

of self-defense contained in customary international law, I will save it for

section IV.

At present, I will limit my observations to a second aspect of the

problem. When we speak about a subsequent practice as material for the

interpretation of a treaty, we must keep a constant eye on the relevant

provisions of the Vienna Convention. Article 31 para. 3 lit. b of that

58

See e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1093 and 1095; Beard, supra note 9, 568-57;

Bring and Fischer, supra note 9, 186-188; Paust, 2001-2002, supra note 9, 535; Stahn,

2002, supra note 9, 213-214; Walker, supra note 9, 531-532. 59

Compare the criteria established by the ICJ in the case of customary law. See e.g.

I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (2008), 7-8.


917

Convention reads as follows: “[For the purpose of the interpretation of a

treaty, there] shall be taken into account, together with the context: [...] (b)

any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the

agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Obviously, in order

for the state acts of 11 September to 7 October 2001 to be relevant for the

interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, not only must we show that

on 7 October 2001, a practice existed in the sense of a general, constant and

uniform application of Article 51. We must also show the practice to be one

“which establishes the agreement of the parties”. The practice must be good

reason for the assumption that on 7 October 2001, all member states of the

UN were prepared to understand Article 51 in the way the proponents of

change suggested.60

Stated in inverse terms, Article 31 para. 3 lit. b does not

apply to the state acts of 11 September to 7 October 2001 if it can be shown

that one or more states explicitly disassociated themselves from this

interpretation.

Considering such stringent conditions, it appears we have good cause

to ponder the following statement made by Mr. Rodríguez Parilla of Cuba at

a plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly on 1 October 2001:

“Terrorist acts are usually carried out by extremist groups or even

individuals. Faced with such an event, however serious it might be, a

powerful State must not invoke the right to self-defence in order

unilaterally to unleash a war that might have unpredictable effects on

a global scale and result in the death of an incalculable number of

innocent people. Instead, the right of all to the common defence of all

must be exercised [...]. It is Cuba‟s opinion that any use of force

against terrorism will require the explicit and prior authorization of the

Security Council, as established in the Charter. Cuba also believes that

neither of the two resolutions adopted by the Council in the wake of

the attacks of September 11 could be invoked to launch unilateral

military actions or other acts of force.”61

Obviously, Cuba did not share the opinion that according to Article 51

of the UN Charter, a right of self-defense may be exercised upon a large-

60

See W. Karl, Vertrag und spätere Praxis im Völkerrecht (1983), 188-194; Linderfalk,

supra note 44, 167; H. Thirlway, „The Law and Procedure of the International Court

of Justice: 1960-1989, Part III‟, 62 British Yearbook of International Law, (1991), 1,

52. 61

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/56/PV.13, 1 October 2001, 15 and 17.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

918

scale attack, regardless of whether according to the general international law

of state responsibility the attack can be attributed to a state or not. This itself

is reason enough to revoke the argument that from 11 September to 7

October 2001, a new practice developed in the sense of VCLT Article 31

para. 3 lit. b.

In conclusion, we might say that regardless of whether the proponents

of change tried to defend their position by reference to the object and

purpose conferred on Article 51, or by reference to a new subsequent

practice, their arguments could be easily discarded. The question can be

asked whether these arguments were intended at all as contributions to a

scientific discourse. Especially the suggestion that a new subsequent

practice had developed looks very much a long shot. The conclusion that

immediately presents itself is that, in fact – contrary to all appearances –

text-writers were not pursuing the task of disengaged scientific

investigation, attentive to the persuasive force of good reason. Rather, they

were engaged in advocacy. But, of course, this is pure speculation. After all,

perhaps the behavior of text-writers should be attributed simply to a scant

knowledge of the modern law of treaty interpretation. In any case, there are

good reasons for criticism. As already stated in sub-section III 2, in a

scholarly discussion on the interpretation of a treaty provision like Article

51 of the UN Charter, discussants are expected to have a fairly robust

knowledge of the system of rules regulating the discussed field of activity.

5. Why the Treaty Interpretation Debate was Irrelevant

To the very skeptical attitude I expressed in the previous sub-section

III 4, I would like to add a point of clarification. Generally speaking, I do

not exclude the possibility that VCLT Articles 31-33 may sometimes be

invoked to justify a new understanding of a treaty when primary and

supplementary means of interpretation are altered – what is sometimes

referred to as dynamic interpretation.62

Certainly, dynamic interpretation is

a possibility, and from a perspective of principle, nothing prevents a means

of interpretation from changing over such short periods as four weeks. The

point of my argument is that the possibilities for changes are limited. This is

especially so when we deal with treaties having so many parties as the UN

Charter.

62

See e.g. U. Linderfalk, „Doing the Right Thing for the Right Reason – Why Dynamic

or Static Approaches Should be Taken to the Interpretation of Treaties‟, 10

International Community Law Review (2008) 2, 109.


919

As I would argue, given the contents of VCLT Articles 31-33 and the

circumstances of the specific case, a proponent of change would have to

argue her position on the basis of any one of the following four

propositions:

(1) On 7 October 2001, the ordinary meaning of the expression “armed

attack” (French: “agression armée”) was not the same as that given

to the expression on 11 September a.m.

(2) On 7 October 2001, the objects and purposes conferred on Article 51

by the members of the UN were not the same as those conferred on

the morning of 11 September.

(3) In the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001, developments

amounted to the formation of a new practice, which established the

agreement of the member states of the UN with regard to the

meaning of Article 51.

(4) In the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001, developments

amounted to the creation of a new relevant rule of international law

applicable in the relations between the member states of the UN.

As noted in sub-sections III 2 to III 4, propositions (1), (2), and (3) are

untenable. For those proponents of change, who because of the

developments post-9/11 made the claim that a new interpretation of Article

51 was merited, proposition (4) seems the only avenue of defense.

Now, with these observations fresh in our minds, let us return to the

review of the treaty interpretation debate. I will conclude section III with a

critique that addresses the debate in its entirety. Obviously, proposition (4)

assumes the contents of VCLT Article 31 para. 3 lit. b. The provision reads

as follows: “[For the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty, there] shall be

taken into account, together with the context: .... (b) any relevant rules of

international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. In the

terminology of the Vienna Convention, “parties” means all parties to a

treaty.63

Hence, in order for a rule of international law to be applicable in

63

See Linderfalk, supra note 44, 178. For further discussions of this issue, see

U. Linderfalk, „Who are „the Parties‟? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna

Convention and the „Principle of Systemic Integration‟ Revisited‟, 55 Netherlands

International Law Review (2008) 3, 343. For a different opinion, see G. Marceau,

„Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the

WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties‟, 35 Journal of World Trade (2001)

6, 1081.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

920

the relations between the member states of the UN, it must be binding for

each and every one of those states. No international agreement of this

magnitude was concluded in the relevant period. As it appears, the validity

of proposition (4) depends on whether it can be established that in the time

span, the developments affected the contents of customary international law.

With this observation, focus shifts immediately from the debate on the

Charter-based international law to the law of international custom. As

explained earlier, considering how states behaved and expressed themselves

in the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001, the action of states may

have affected the contents of international law in two ways. First, it may

have affected the right of self-defense expressed in Article 51 of the UN

Charter. Secondly, it may have affected the right of self-defense contained

in customary international law. In the present section of this essay, we have

focused on the debate surrounding the allegedly changed UN Charter. The

debate on an allegedly changed customary international law is meant to be

the focus of our attention in the following sections IV to IV. As it now

seems, the identities of the two debates are blurred to some extent: the

former debate cannot be separated from the latter. In the final analysis, the

difficult question to be answered in the treaty interpretation debate is not so

much whether a large-scale attack performed by a group of non-state agents

should be considered to come within the scope of application of Article 51.

The really crucial issue is whether such attacks should be considered to

come within the scope of application of the right of self-defense contained

in customary international law. The treaty interpretation debate seems like a

blind track: it does not lead anywhere.

Still, the fact remains that in light of the developments in the period of

11 September to 7 October 2001 text-writers spent great time discussing

issues relating to the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. If I am

to make a general assessment of this discussion, it would be my conclusion

that it diverted attention from the truly relevant legal questions. This is

serious criticism. In an international community based on a rule of law, it

should be considered a task for legal scientists to assist judicial and political

decision-makers in determining the scope of their discretion. Legal

scientific analysis should bring focus to the legal questions that are relevant

for judicial and political decision-making, rather than the opposite.

Considering this standard, as I conceive of the issue, we should simply

dismiss as poor science the entire interpretation debate.


921

II. The New Rule of Customary International Law

1. The Relevant Legal Context

For centuries, the international law literature has struggled to explain

the existence of customary international law. Considering the discourse as a

whole – and risking the criticism of oversimplification – we may say that

there are two competing theories. According to a traditional understanding

of the concept, a rule of customary international law is derived from the

existence of a state practice and an opinio juris.64

When a person suggests

that, given the existence of some certain conditions {C1, C2, C3}, a right of

self-defense can be exercised by a state under customary international law,

then two things must be shown by that person in order to establish the

proposition as valid. First, the person must prove the existence of a general,

constant, and uniform usage.65

She would have to show that over a certain

period of time, faced with the conditions {C1, C2, C3}, states have

repeatedly and consistently resorted to force. Secondly, the person must

prove the existence of the relevant attitude. Based on the utterances and

behavior of states, she would have to show that in instances where the

conditions {C1, C2, C3} prevail, states generally consider the use of force

warranted according to a rule of customary international law.

According to a second theoretical approach, most prominently

advocated by Professor Bin Cheng, a rule of customary international law is

derived from the mere existence of an opinio juris.66

When a person

suggests that, given the existence of some certain conditions {C1, C2, C3}, a

right of self-defense can be exercised by a state under customary

international law, then she must show only one thing: that in instances

where the conditions {C1, C2, C3} prevail, states generally consider the use

of force warranted according to a rule of customary international law. She

would not have to establish that in instances where the conditions {C1, C2,

C3} prevail, states generally resort to force. For the same reasons, she would

64

See e.g. Brownlie, supra note 59, 7-8. 65

See e.g. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), ICJ Reports 1950,

266, 276-277; Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v.

India), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960, 6, 40. 66

See B. Cheng, „United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: „Instant‟ International

Customary Law?‟, 5 Indian Journal of International Law (1968) 1, 23, later

developed in B. Cheng, „Custom: The Future of General State Practice In a Divided

World‟, in R. St. J. Macdonald & D. M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of

International Law (1983), 513-554.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

922

not have to be overly concerned about the requirements that practice be

general, constant, and uniform. Certainly, if it is established that over a

certain period of time, faced with the conditions {C1, C2, C3}, states have

repeatedly and consistently resorted to force, then that would be good

reason for the assumption that the relevant opinio juris exists. But it does

not form a necessary condition. As long as the relevant opinio juris can be

shown to exist, this should be considered sufficient. This is why the idea

advocated by Professor Bin Cheng and others is often referred to as the

theory of instant customary law.67

On closer analysis, it would seem that a traditional theory of

customary international law cannot explain the creation of a new right of

self-defense in the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001. Clearly, the

acts and omissions of states dating from this period alone did not amount to

a practice in the proper sense. In order for a general, constant, and uniform

usage to develop, some time is required,68

and four weeks is simply not

enough time. Admittedly, the proposition of change can be interpreted

differently. It can be argued that the necessary practice developed over a

longer period, but that the acts and omissions dating from 11 September to 7

October 2001 provided the conclusive element we needed to be able to

speak about a practice in the sense of a general, constant, and uniform

usage. Assessing the proposition of change, a crucial question would then be

whether it can be shown that on the morning of 11 September 2001, a new

rule of customary international law was already emerging. In the recent past,

whenever states were confronted with a situation in all relevant respects

similar to that of 11 September, did they act in favor of an extension of the

hitherto existing rule of self-defense? As revealed by the earlier section II of

this essay, the answer to this question would have to be in the negative.

All things considered, the proposition of change would seem to rely

entirely on the theory of instant customary law.69

Faced with the suggestion

that on 7 October, customary international law allowed for a right of self-

defense to be exercised upon a large-scale attack performed by a non-state

agent, despite the fact that – judged by the criteria provided in the general

international law of state responsibility – this attack cannot be attributed to

any state, what we have to ask for is evidence of a new opinio juris

67

See e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1094. 68

See e.g. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, supra note 65, 276-277. 69

Few commentators recognized this explicitly. See, however, Arai-Takahashi, supra

note 9, 1093-1094; Cassese, 2001, supra note 9, 997; Langille, supra note 9, passim.


923

generalis to this effect. I will structure my further analysis based on this

observation.

Generally speaking, it can be said that in defending their assumption

of a new opinio juris generalis, the proponents of change cited evidence of

three kinds. They cited statements made by states and international

organizations pertaining directly to the contents of international law; they

cited statements constituting pledges of support made to the US

Government; and they cited the inaction of states pursuant to the events of

11 September. I will now proceed to investigate each such group of

evidence.

2. Statements Pertaining Directly to International Law

This is the evidence that proponents of change typically cited: UN

Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373.70

Both resolutions – adopted

on 12 and 28 September, respectively – make express reference to a right of

self-defense.71

In preambular paragraph 3 of resolution 1368, the Security

Council “[recognizes] the inherent right of individual or collective self-

defence in accordance with the Charter”. In preambular paragraph 4 of

resolution 1373, the Council “[reaffirms] the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as

reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001)”.

70

For commentaries citing this evidence, see e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1081-

1082; Beard, supra note 9, 565-566 and 568; Bring & Fischer, supra note 9, 187;

Brown, supra note 9, 29; Byers, supra note 9, 409; Greenwood, supra note 9, 17;

Langille, supra note 9, 153-154; Myjer & White, supra note 9, 6; Murphy, 2002a,

supra note 9, 48; O‟Connell, 2002-2003, supra note 9, 49; Ratner, supra note 9, 909;

Schmitt, supra note 9, 60-61and 77; Schrijver, supra note 9, 282; Stahn, 2002, supra

note 9, 214. 71

Judged by the way some commentators put it, it seems they were of the opinion that

by these references the whole issue would be finally settled: no doubt, customary

international law allows for a right of self-defense to be exercised upon a large-scale

attack performed by a group of non-state agents. Personally, I think we should be

sceptical about this argument. The Security Council is not empowered under the UN

Charter to decide on the contents of the right of self-defense laid down in Article 51.

Even less is it empowered to decide on the contents of the right of self-defense

contained in customary international law. For a contrary opinion, see Arai-Takahashi,

supra note 9, 1081-1082; Gross, supra note 9, 213; O‟Connell, 2002, supra note 9,

892-893; Papastavridis, supra note 9, 507; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9, 39.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

924

Debates held from 1 to 5 October, 2001 during the 56th

session of the

UN General Assembly.72

In discussions on Agenda Item 166 (“Measures to

eliminate international terrorism”), several delegates commented on the

meaning and contents of the right of self-defense held by states under

international law. Mr. Kolby of Norway announced that since

“[i]nternational law confirms the right to self-defence [...] Norway is fully

committed to contributing to the broad alliance that is now forming.”73

Mr.

Šimonović of Croatia reiterated that according to indications given in the

Charter of the UN, “terrorism is a threat to international peace and security

and that every country has the solemn right to defend itself, its citizens and

their peace and security. Therefore, such a right on the part the United States

should not be questioned.”74

Mr. Valdes of Chile remarked that in the view

of his government, Security Council resolution 1373, “together with Article

51 of the Charter, provides the necessary legitimacy and the support of

international law to actions directed at punishing those responsible for this

act of terrorism.”75

In the same vein, Mr. Cowen of Ireland rhetorically

asked: “Who can reasonably argue that the United States does not have the

right to defend itself, in a targeted and proportionate manner, by bringing to

justice those who planned, perpetrated and assisted in these outrages and

who continue to threaten international peace and security?”76

Still with

regard to the debate on Agenda Item 166, Mr. Hussein of Ethiopia reminded

the Assembly “that if and when terrorists do attack a country, as happened

on 11 September, that country has the legitimate right to defend itself.”77

According to Mr. Heinbecker of Canada, “[t]he right of Canada, and of the

United States and of all other United Nations Members, to self-defence is

clear under international law, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations

and recognized again most recently in Security Council resolutions 1368

(2001) and 1373 (2001).”78

Finally, Mr. Andino Salazar of El Salvador

reiterated the support of his Government “for the right of the United States,

as an aggressed State, to adopt measures of legitimate individual and

72

For commentaries citing this evidence, see e.g. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, 1093;

Bring & Fischer, supra note 9, 187; Byers, supra note 9, 409-410, note 46. 73

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/56/PV.12, 1 October 2001, 14. 74

United Nations General Assembly, supra note 73, 24. 75


United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/56/PV.14, 2 October 2001, 6-7. 77

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/56/PV.17, 3 October 2001, 13. 78

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/56/PV.18, 4 October 2001, 22.


925

collective self-defence to ensure the security of its citizens, property and

institutions.”79

Action taken by the NATO.80

On 12 September, the North Atlantic

Council issued a press release with the following contents: “On September

12th

, the North Atlantic Council met again in response to the appalling

attacks perpetrated yesterday against the United States. The Council agreed

that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the

United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the

Washington Treaty”. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,

“[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them

in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against

them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack

occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of self-defence

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will

assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually

and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain

the security of the North Atlantic area.”

In a statement of 2 October, NATO Secretary General, Lord

Robertson, confirmed that evidence pointed conclusively “to an Al-Qaida

role in the September 11 attack”, and that hence, the attack should be

regarded an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.81

Action taken by the Organization of American States (OAS).82

On 21

September, the OAS Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a

resolution resolving

79

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/56/PV.19, 4 October 2001, 18. 80

For commentaries citing this evidence, see e.g. Beard, supra note 9, 568; Bring &

Fischer, supra note 9, 181 and 186; Brown, supra note 9, 28; Byers, supra note 9,

409; Cassese, 2001, supra note 9, 996; Greenwood, supra note 9, 17; Ratner, supra

note 9, 909; Schrijver, supra note 9, 282; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 214; Schmitt,

supra note 9, 61; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9, 42. 81

NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, „Statement‟ (October 2, 2001) available at

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_19011.htm (last visited on 19 November

2010). 82

For commentaries citing this evidence, see e.g. Brown, supra note 9, 28; Byers, supra

note 9, 409; Greenwood, supra note 9, 18; Murphy, 2002a, supra note 9, 48; Ratner,

supra note 9, 909; Stahn, 2002, supra note 9, 214.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

926

“[t]hat these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are

attacks against all American States and that in accordance with the

relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental solidarity, all

States Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal

assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks

against any American state, and to maintain the peace and security of

the continent.”83

According to Article 3 para. 1 of the Rio Treaty,84

“[t]he High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any

State against an American State shall be considered as an armed attack

against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said

Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the

exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Action taken under the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security

Treaty (ANZUS Treaty or ANZUS).85

On 15 September, the Government of

Australia publicly invoked the so-called ANZUS Treaty. The ANZUS is a

Security Treaty concluded in 1951 between Australia, New Zeeland, and the

United States of America.86

According to Article IV para. 2 of this

agreement, any armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the parties “and

all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the

Security Council of the United Nations”. The relevant provision on which

the Australian Government based its action is that contained in Article V:

“For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties

is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of

any of the Parties.”

83

„Terrorist Threat to the Americas‟, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01, available at

http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm (last visited on 19 November 2010). 84

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 2 September 1947, 21 U.N.T.S. 93. 85

For commentaries citing this evidence, see e.g. Beard, supra note 9, 569; Brown,

supra note 9, 29; Schmitt, supra note 9, 62; Walker, supra note 9, 499. 86

Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, 1 September 1951, 131

U.N.T.S. 83 [ANZUS].


927

In order to correctly assess the value of all these statements, a word of

caution is required. We must be mindful of the fact that in no case have

states and organizations made clear reference to customary international

law. In some cases, statements refer to the right of self-defense “recognized

in Article 51 of the UN Charter”. In others, they refer to the right of self-

defense “laid down in the UN Charter”, or – using terms of a generic

character – they simply refer to the right of self-defense, without paying

very much attention to whether this is the right of self-defense laid down in

Article 51, or the right contained in customary international law. Obviously,

the value of these statements as indicators of an opinio juris is contingent on

the assumption that according to the belief of the utterers, the two rights of

self-defense are in every relevant respect identical. Of course, this lowers

the evidential value of these statements considerably, compared to the

hypothetical situation that they clearly referred to the right of self-defense

contained in customary international law. In the post-9/11 international legal

discourse, no one author posed this as a problem. This forms the first point

of my critique. Proponents of change did not openly confess to the relative

weakness of their argument, which is contrary to what we expect from a

legal science working properly.

There is also a second point of critique. Considering the international

legal literature at large, the assumption that the two rights of self-defense are

identical is not free from objection; on the contrary: generally, legal doctrine

has described the two rights as partly different.87

The right contained in

customary international law has been seen to allow the use of force in

situations where the right laid down in Article 51 does not. For example, it

is a fact that while many commentators accept that according to Article 51,

force may not be used by a state for anticipatory purposes, they still claim

the existence of a right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense in

customary international law.88

The question quite naturally follows: if the

87


Nicaragua, supra note 10, 93-94, paras 174-176. 88

See e.g. A. C. Arendt & R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (2003),

71-79; D. W. Bowett, Self Defence in International Law (1958), 192; J. Brunnée &

S. J. Toope, „Slouching Towards New „Just‟ Wars: International Law and the Use of

Force After September 11th‟, 51 Netherlands International Law Review (2004) 3, 363,

373; Delbrück, supra note 9, 14; Gross, supra note 9, 211 and 213; Martinez, supra

note 9, 157-158; Printer, supra note 9, 351-352; Wolfrum, supra note 9, 28-29; . See

also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

928

two rights of self-defense reflect differently upon the case of force used for

anticipatory purposes, then why should they so obviously speak a common

language in the case of a large-scale attack performed by a non-state agent?

Among the great number of text-writers who took the position of a

proponent of change, no one posed this as a problem. I find this striking

reticence good cause for criticism. If legal scholars generally reject the idea

that the two rights of self-defense are identical, but at the same time are

prepared to accept this idea on a case-by-case basis, and they fail to see this

as a problem, then it might seem they have given up on the idea of logical

consistency.

3. Pledges of Support

Among the various statements used by the proponents of change as

evidence of an opinio juris, many display the character of an assurance.89

In

the period of 11 September to 7 October 2001, a great number of states

showed their sympathy with the specific case of the United States

Government by pledging to support its projected military campaign. Some

such pledges of support were very specific. Examples include offers to

assist with intelligence matters;90

offers to grant clearance for the overflight

and landing of US military aircraft;91

offers for the provision of medical

services and transportation;92

as well as offers for the provision of military

equipment;93

and in some cases even military troops.94

Other assurances

remained rather vague, as illustrated by the following list:

- On 23 September, the Gulf Cooperation Council issued a joint

statement expressing “the willingness of its members to

participate in any joint action that has clearly defined

United States of America), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports 1986,

259, 347-348, para. 173. 89

For commentaries citing such statements, see e.g. Beard, supra note 9, 569-573; Bring

& Fischer, supra note 9, 186; Brown, supra note 9, 29; Langille, supra note 9, 155;

Murphy, 2002a, supra note 9, 49; Myjer & White, supra note 9, 8; Schmitt, supra

note 9, 62-63; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9, 35; Walker, supra note 9, 500-505. 90

See e.g. Walker, supra note 9, 502, citing a statement by the People‟s Republic of

China. 91

See e.g. Murphy, 2002a, supra note 9, 49, citing statements by Georgia, Oman,

Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. 92

See e.g. Brown, supra note 9, p. 29, citing a statement by Japan. 93

See e.g. Walker, supra note 9, p. 502, citing a statement by Russia. 94

See e.g. Beard, supra note 9, 569, fn. 37, citing a statement by the Philippines.


929

objectives”, and “to enter into an alliance that enjoys the support

of the international community to fight international terrorism

and to punish its perpetrators”.95

- On 1 October, the UN Secretary General circulated a letter from

the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United

Nations. According to this letter – citing a telephone call to the

President of the United States – Crown Prince and Deputy Prime

Minister Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz had conveyed to the President

of the United States and its people “the full readiness of the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the United States

Government in all matters that might assist in the identification

and pursuit of the perpetrators of this criminal episode”96

.

- According to Professor George K. Walker of the Wake Forest

University School of Law, citing the International Herald

Tribune of 19 September, India – presumably on the 18th

of that

same month – had announced its “fullest co-operation” with US-

led forces.97

In order to assess the value of all these assurances, I find it appropriate

to divide them into two groups, depending on their characterization as either

vague or specific. As to the first group – illustrated by the statements of the

Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, and India – I would hesitate to

ascribe to them any value at all. In my mind, they are simply not specific

enough. Naturally, if a state S offers to support US military action, this can

be an expression of a belief on the part of state S as to whether or not a right

of self-defense can be exercised by the United States. But it cannot be

interpreted in this way until we know more specifically both the contents

and extent of the support and the purpose for which it is given. To illustrate

the problem, we may compare an offer made by state S to assist the US

military campaign in Afghanistan with military troops with an offer simply

to cooperate in the application of existing international agreements for the

95

As quoted by S. D. Murphy, „Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to

International Law‟, 96 American Journal of International Law (2002) 1, 237 [Murphy,

2002b], 245, quoting H. Schneider, „Persian Gulf Arab States Support Anti-Terror

Efforts‟, The Washington Post, 24 September 2001. The member states of the Gulf

Cooperation Council are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United

Arab Emirates. 96

See e.g. Walker, supra note 9, 504. The document number of the letter is UN Doc.

A/56/423. 97

See Walker, supra note 9, 503 and fn. 67, citing The International Herald Tribune.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

930

prosecution of international terrorists. The implications are quite different.

In the former case, the offer made by state S may possibly be seen as an

indication of an opinio juris individualis to the effect that in the prevailing

circumstances, a right of self-defense can be exercised by the United States.

In the latter case, the offer may be equally well interpreted as an indication

of the exactly opposite opinion.

As to the second group of assurances, they are certainly worthy of

more serious consideration. Still, considered as indicators of an opinio juris

generalis they are far from self-explanatory. Most importantly, it is not clear

on what basis offers were made. Admittedly, any offer of this kind would

have to be understood in the light of the broader context, including among

other things international law in general. Of particular interest are the two

principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention. According to the

principle of territorial integrity, a state may not knowingly allow its territory

to be used for activities that are detrimental to the rights of other states.98

According to the principle of non-intervention, a state A may not offer its

intelligence services to a state B for the planning and realization of a large-

scale military operation in and against a third state C, if the purpose of the

operation is the violent overthrow of the existing government of that state.99

Considering this context, it might be assumed about a state, which offers its

intelligence services to the US government, or offers to grant clearance for

the overflight and landing of US military aircraft on its territory, that it acts

on the basis of a very specific belief: that of the projected US military

operation being in accordance with law. However – and this is my point –

the assumption may not be as compelling as it first appears. To put things in

perspective, we may broaden the context even further to include

international politics. Could it not have been the case that states pledging to

support the US military operation in Afghanistan simply chose to

temporarily disregard the legal implications of their behavior? Allowing

airspace and intelligence to be used by US military forces might have been

seen as just or politically advisable – irrespective of whether or not it was

legal – in which case, of course, the only plausible assumption is that

through this behavior a state did not express its opinio juris. Given how

98

The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.

Albania), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22. 99


Nicaragua, supra note 10, 124, para. 241.


931

foreign relations are sometimes conducted by powerful states,100

this

assumption is certainly worthy of serious consideration.

Now, although the significance of said statements can be seriously

doubted, the fact remains that quite a few scholars advanced them as

indicators of an opinio juris generalis. What is more, this was done

unreservedly – without the slightest discussion with respect to the weight

that these statements should be afforded. One would expect at least some

degree of critical response. Since such responses were apparently absent, I

think a critical remark might be called for. It is a distinguishing trait of

scientific analysis that it is performed with a critical mind. A good scientist

is aware of the strength borne by her argument, and she discusses it openly.

In the case of those authors who cited vague statements such as those of the

Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, and India, I am prepared to take

the argument a step further. I will insist that, for reasons already explained,

authors gave the impression of being biased.

4. The Non-Action of States

To further substantiate their proposition of change, several

commentators drew heavily, not on the express statements and reactions of

states in the period of 11 September to 7 October, but on their failure to

react.101

As claimed by these commentators, the inaction of states gave

implicit evidence of an opinio juris generalis to the effect that according to

customary international law, a right of self-defense can be exercised upon a

large-scale attack performed by a non-state agent, despite the fact that –

judged by the criteria provided in the general international law of state

responsibility – this attack cannot be attributed to any state. No doubt, very

few states explicitly objected to the claim expressed by the US Government

and others that under the prevailing circumstances, a military operation on

Afghan soil would be allowed by international law. Considering that we are

100

According to Professor George K. Walker of the Wake Forest University School of

Law, only a few days after India and Pakistan had pledged their fullest cooperation

with the US Government, President Bush revoked sanctions imposed on the two

countries in 1998, subsequent to the nuclear tests then performed. The US

Government also agreed to reschedule a debt of USD 379 million owed by Pakistan to

the USA. (Walker, supra note 9, 503.) 101

Commentators invoking the non-action of states include Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9,

1082 and 1095; Bring & Fischer, supra note 9, 190; Cassese, 2001, supra note 9, 996-

997; Greenwood, supra note 9, 23O‟Connell, 2002-2003, supra note 9, 46; Ratner,

supra note 9, 910; Schmitt, supra note 9, 77.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

932

concerned here with a rule of general applicability, by many considered to

be one of the most important upheld by international law, we have to admit

that on the whole states remained surprisingly inactive. In principle, inaction

of this kind may have legal consequences. According to repeated

pronouncements by the International Court of Justice, the inaction of states

may be evidence of their opinio juris.102

However – and this should be

emphasized – the Court never talked of inaction in general. The inaction

referred to was always a qualified one. Hence, in order for the inaction of a

state S to be considered evidence of an opinio juris individualis to the effect

that according to customary international law, some certain behavior B is

allowed, circumstances need to give good reason for the assumption that

state S would have taken positive action if it believed behavior B was not

prohibited.103

It is against this background that we must assess the apparent inaction

of states in the wake of the September 11 attacks. If states were of the

opinion that according to customary international law, a right of self-defense

may not be exercised by a state under such circumstances as those

accompanying the events of 9/11, I would say that they had little reason to

openly give voice to such a conviction. Quite the contrary: they had good

reason to keep quiet. Few states – apart from those reputed for harboring

international terrorists themselves – had very much of a self-interest to

protect. Of course, if a government believed that according to customary

international law, a right of self-defense could not be exercised, and other

governments had started to champion the exact opposite view, we might

expect the former government to object in the interest of law and order.

However, every government knows the risk that such a message will be

misread or misrepresented. The statement about what is contrary to the law

will often be received as expressing an opinion about what is contrary to

moral standards. We have to remember the enormous social and political

pressure to which governments all over the world were exposed. In the

heated political climate that prevailed, a statement to the effect that the

United States had no right to take up arms to defend itself would have been

regarded as an insult to the American nation and its people. The objector

would have risked retaliatory measures, including not only the cessation of

diplomatic relations, but also economic sanctions, such as the

discontinuance of economic aid, the suspension of projected investments, or

102

See e.g. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment ICJ Reports 1951,

116, 138-139. 103

Id.


933

the introduction of heavy fiscal duties on imported goods. Maybe some

people would even have seen the objector as an accomplice of the terrorists.

Consider the remark made by President Bush in his Address to the Nation,

on 20 September:

“We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another,

drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. […]

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you

are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”104

All things considered, I would insist that if most states did not

explicitly object to the assertion that the USA and the UK were allowed to

use force pursuant to a right of self-defense, this inaction should be taken

very lightly. It cannot be considered a very weighty evidence of any existing

opinio juris generalis. This notwithstanding, the inaction of states was

invoked by a great number of scholars as forming an important argument to

this effect – with no reservations attached. Because of this, in my opinion,

scholars should be criticized. Obviously, they failed to perform the

necessary critical analysis. This is not good science.

III. The New Rule of Customary International Law (cont‟d)

In my review of the post-9/11 international legal debate, assessing the

allegation that between 11 September and 7 October 2001, a new rule of

customary international law was created, up to this point, I have

concentrated on the evidence that the proponents of change themselves used

to support this allegation. My criticism of the debate has concerned partly

the way evidence was presented; partly it has concerned the inferences that

the evidence was claimed to allow. In this section, I will continue my review

from a new angle. I will argue that as much as the proponents of change

should be criticized for what they brought to bear on the discussion, just as

much should they be reproached for what they omitted. Once again, my

criticism can be said to fall into three different categories: proponents of

change paid little regard to negative statements; they did not cite their

sources properly; and they failed to reflect upon the fact that according to

104

U.S. President G. W. Bush, „Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American

People‟ (20 September 2001) available at http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited 19

November 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

934

most international lawyers, the principle of non-use of force is jus cogens. I

will structure this section accordingly.

1. Discussants Paid Little Regard to Negative Statements

The way many scholars described developments between 11

September and 7 October 2001, one gets the impression that at least among

the approximately 200 states of the world, the legality of the projected

British-American military campaign in Afghanistan was never really in

doubt.105

The following passages may serve as an illustration of the very

neat picture rendered in the literature:

“No voices were raised claiming that either the customary right of

self-defense or Article 51 was limited to the context of State action.

On the contrary, there were very visible illustrations […] of the fact

that most States viewed 9/11 as an armed attack meriting actions in

self-defense; in no case, [sic!] was there any suggestion that the right

was dependent on identifying a State as the attacker.”106

“Whatever criticism this [i.e. the characterization of the threat of

future attacks from Al-Qaida as an armed attack] may have evoked

from commentators, it appears to have met with no hostility from

states, even from those normally opposed to U.S. positions.”107

“No state argued that such attacks [i.e. attacks performed by non-state

agents] should not give rise to self-defense.”108

“This widespread, worldwide practice, to which few if any states

persistently objected, further vindicated the legality of U.K.-U.S.

Enduring Freedom operations.”109

105

Apart from the scholars cited in supra notes 104-108, see Cassese, 2001, supra note 9,

996-997; Cohan, supra note 9, 326; Duffy, supra note 9, 187; Langille, supra note 9,

154-156; Murphy, 2002a, supra, note 9, 48; O‟Connell, 2002, supra note 9, 893;

Ratner, supra note 9, 909; Stahn, 2003, supra note 9, 35-36; Stahn, 2002, supra note

9, 187. 106

Schmitt, supra note 9, 77. 107

Greenwood, supra note 9, 23. A footnote is omitted. 108

O‟Connell, 2002-2003, supra note 9, 46. 109

Walker, supra note 9, 532. A footnote is omitted.


935

“State practice has clearly established that an attack of the scale and

effect of September 11th

is an armed attack against a state, giving rise

to the inherent right of self-defense.”110

As I insist, descriptions such as these misrepresented reality. Contrary

to what they suggest, a number of states expressed criticism of the projected

British-American military campaign. Some respectfully called upon the two

governments involved to exercise restraint. Examples of this can be drawn

from debates held in the UN General Assembly, from 1 to 5 October, during

its 56th

session. Discussing Agenda Item 166 (“Measures to eliminate

international terrorism”), Mr. Rodríguez Parrilla of Cuba expounded the

view of his country that

“[t]errorist acts are usually carried out by extremist groups or even

individuals. Faced with such an event, however serious it might be, a

powerful State must not invoke the right to self-defence in order

unilaterally to unleash a war that might have unpredictable effects on

a global scale and result in the death of an incalculable number of

innocent people. Instead, the right of all to the common defence of all

must be exercised. [...] It is Cuba‟s opinion that any use of force

against terrorism will require the explicit and prior authorization of the

Security Council, as established in the Charter. Cuba also believes that

neither of the two resolutions adopted by the Council in the wake of

the attacks of September 11 could be invoked to launch unilateral

military actions or other acts of force.”111

Mr. Hasmy of Malaysia quoted the Prime Minister of his country, Dr.

Mahathir Mohamad:

“While he understood the reasons for the ongoing planning to hunt

down terrorist groups and stop terrorism, he was against the use of

force that resulted in the victimization of innocent civilians. He felt

that retaliatory actions through the use of force would not solve the

problem, as they might only provoke counter-retaliation and were

therefore fraught with risks to international peace and security.”112

110

Brown, supra note 9, 29. 111

United Nations General Assembly, supra notes 61, 15 and 17. 112

United Nations General Assembly, supra note 76, 10.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

936

Mr. Widodo of Indonesia maintained that

“[i]t is in this context that the United Nations, as the only multilateral

organization with universal membership, is uniquely placed to

advance global efforts and to take necessary and effective measures to

combat this alarming increase in terrorist activity. It is the only

appropriate forum to accord legitimacy to undertaking the resolute

action needed to eradicate this phenomenon.”113

According to Mr. Ling of Belarus,

“[t]he possibility of any military intervention to combat international

terrorism on the territories of other States today can and must be

considered from the point of view of threats to international peace and

security, exclusively by the Security Council, which has been given

authority for this under the Charter.”114

According to his colleague of Turkmenistan, Mrs. Ateava,

“[t]he United Nations is the only forum for establishing a global

coalition, as only in this way can we lend global legitimacy to the

long-term struggle against terrorism.”115

To conclude the series of examples, we may consider also the letter

sent by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations,

circulated by the Secretary General on 19 September. In this letter, President

Saddam Hussein of Iraq emphatically condemned “Western Governments”,

and the Government of the United States in particular, using broad and

emotional language of the following kind:

“Some Western States are preparing to participate in a United States

military action, and the indications are that it will be against an

Islamic country. Who, in this case, are the fanatics? Is not the

solidarity and the blanket approval in advance by some Western

leaders of military aggression against an Islamic State the height of

113

United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/56/PV.16, 3 October 2001, 16. 114


United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/56/PV.21, 5 October 2001, 17.


937

the fanaticism of the new crusade? It reminds Arabs and Muslims of

the crusade waged by the West and NATO against Iraq.”116

Assessing these negative statements with the same critical eyes as

those used for an assessment of the positive statements cited in sub-sections

IV 2 and IV 3, we have to admit that only the statements of Iraq and Cuba

clearly indicate an opinio juris on the part of those states.117

Without any

doubt, Iraq and Cuba were unfavorable to the proposition that under such

circumstances as those accompanying the events of 9/11, according to

customary international law, a right of self-defense may be exercised by the

United States and the UK. The positions held by Malaysia, Indonesia,

Belarus and Turkmenistan are ambiguous. Their statements can be

interpreted to express the opinion that the projected military operation in

Afghanistan would not be consistent with the right of self-defense contained

in customary international law. But they can also be interpreted to express

the opinion that even if the operation certainly would be consistent with the

right of self-defense contained in customary law, for various reasons it

would still be advisable to abstain from exercising that right. This

notwithstanding, I would argue that, taken at large, these negative

statements partly neutralize the effect of the alleged positive ones. They

weaken the proposition that according to a generally held opinion among

states on the morning of 7 October 2001, customary international law

allowed for a right of self-defense to be exercised upon a large-scale attack

performed by a non-state agent, although – judged by the criteria provided

in the general international law of state responsibility – this attack cannot be

116

Annex I to the letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of

Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General – Open letter from

Saddam Hussein to the American peoples and the Western peoples and their

Governments, UN Doc. S/2001/888, 19 September 2001, 5. (Emphasis added.)

Compare the statement made by the Iraqi delegate (Mr. Aldouri), at the 56th

session of

the UN General Assembly, during discussions on Agenda Item 166 (“Measures to

eliminate international terrorism”), United Nations General Assembly, supra note 79,

13-16. 117

In the earlier sub-section IV 2, some positive statements were considered ambiguous

since they did not say clearly whether they concerned the right of self-defense laid

down in Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the right of self-defense contained in

customary international law. The negative statements referred to in the present sub-

section V 1 are equally ambiguous, but in this case ambiguity is not a problem. If,

according to what a state utters, no right of self-defense can be invoked upon a large-

scale attack performed by a group of non-state agents, then obviously this means that

according to that state, neither one of the two rights applies.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

938

attributed to any state. Hence, in an assessment of those scholars who acted

as if these negative statements simply did not exist, I would definitely plead

for a reproach. Scientific analysis should be comprehensive: it assumes the

investigation of an issue from all possible sides. Failing to conform to this

standard, a text-writer will always expose himself to the criticism of being

biased.

2. Discussants Failed to Cite their Sources Properly

In academic writing courses, a large amount of time is typically spent

on discussing the issue of citation. The use of endnotes or footnotes is one

among the many characteristics that make academic writing so peculiar,

distinguishing the authoring of scholarly papers, theses, and research articles

from writing in general. It is explained by the idea of science as an ever-

continuing exchange of ideas. In a scientific exchange, the last word on a

topic will never be uttered. Every idea or suggestion submitted is amenable

to appraisal, re-appraisal, and renewed appraisal ad infinitum. In order for a

reader to be able to verify and appraise the propositions submitted by a

writer to a scientific discourse, it is required that the writer states her

sources of information – those sources on which the proposition is allegedly

based. If the reader cannot revisit the sources, appraisal will be impossible,

and the founding idea of all science will be lost entirely.

For similar reasons, academic writing should be attentive to the use of

secondary sources. To grasp the information contents conveyed by an

utterance, we often have to interpret this utterance. Consequently, the more

people that intervene in the communication of an utterance from its original

source to the person using it, the greater the risk that the source will be

misrepresented. Good reasons suggest that secondary sources should be

avoided. However, as every academic knows, for various reasons, this

principle must sometimes be set aside. In such cases, it is of utmost

importance that readers are at least kept informed of the fact that a

secondary source was exploited. If readers are not informed, how can they

ever be expected to make a correct assessment of the proposition or

propositions put forth? Naturally, the same applies to those cases where a

writer builds upon a secondary source of information that cannot possibly be

retrieved or accessed for inspection.

These are basic principles of scientific ethics that ought to be well

known to scientists working in all disciplines. Nevertheless, in the post-9/11

international legal discourse they were repeatedly infringed upon, especially

by text-writers reporting on the various state acts allegedly performed in the


939

period of 11 September to 7 October. In some cases, commentators claimed

the existence of statements without citing any source of information

whatsoever. As already stated, this is contrary to the idea of science as an

ever-continuing appraisal of ideas. When an author submits a proposition to

a discourse, but does not care to state his sources of support, the only

remaining reason to adopt the proposition is the personal authority or

credibility of the author. In this particular case, this is hardly sufficient. In

other cases, text-writers cited sources of a secondary nature, including daily

newspapers, articles by other commentators of international law, who

themselves were unable to specify their sources of information, and

telephone calls allegedly overheard by colleagues. Generally speaking, in a

scientific discourse, secondary sources should always be treated with

suspicion. Naturally, in the particular case addressed – given the

overwhelming sentiments and political rhetoric that infected legal debate in

the period immediately following upon the events of 9/11 – we should be

more than normally skeptical. I have criticized scholars earlier in this article

for underachieving; now I must go for something stronger. This is

unacceptable!

3. The Missing Jus Cogens Argument

Contrary to what was indicated in sections IV and V, let us assume

that based on the utterances and behavior of states between 11 September

and 7 October 2001, the alleged opinio juris generalis can indeed be shown

to exist. Let us assume that according to a generally held opinion among

states on the morning of 7 October, under circumstances of the kind

accompanying the events of 9/11, customary international law allowed for a

right of self-defense to be exercised by the United States and the UK. Even

if we accept this assumption, it does not really solve the matter. Obviously,

anyone who chooses to advocate the creation of a new right of self-defense

according to the assumption above still has one difficulty to confront. The

complication is that she assumes the creation of not just any norm of

customary international law, but a norm of a very particular kind. She

assumes the creation of jus cogens.

This suggestion that the right of self-defense should be regarded as a

norm of jus cogens might not appear as natural to everyone. The thing is

that if we choose to characterize as jus cogens the principle on the non-use

of force (as enshrined in Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter) – indeed, this

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

940

is the description habitually offered118

– we simply have no other

alternative. The right of self-defense forms an exception to the principle on

the non-use of force. Thus, the relevant jus cogens norm cannot possibly be

identical with the principle on the non-use of force as such. If it were, this

would imply that whenever a state exercises a right of self-defense, it would

in fact be unlawfully derogating from a norm of jus cogens.119

Obviously,

the following description of the relevant jus cogens norm simply does not

hold: „If, in the conduct of its international relations, a state resorts to force

directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of

another state, or force otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the

United Nations, then this shall be considered a violation of the international

jus cogens.‟ A correct description would have to account for the fact that the

principle on the non-use of force does have exceptions, such as the right of

self-defense. To borrow a term from legal theory, the principle on the non-

use of force is supervenient on the right of self-defense.120

Hence, compared

to the description above, a better way of representing the relevant jus cogens

norm would be by the following norm sentence:

„If, in the conduct of its international relations, a state resorts to force

directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of

another state, or force otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the

United Nations, and this action is not prompted by an armed attack,

or, given that it is indeed prompted by such an attack, fail to meet the

twofold criterion of necessity and proportionality, then this shall be

considered a violation of the international jus cogens.‟121

118

See e.g. the opinions expressed by the US and Nicaragua Governments, and by the

International Law Commission, as reiterated by the ICJ in the Case Concerning

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 10, 100-

101, para. 190. 119

Cf. VCLT Art. 53: A jus cogens norm “is a norm […] from which no derogation is

permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general

international law having the same character”. 120

See e.g. R. M. Hare, Essays in Ethical Theory (1993), 66-81. 121

I am not saying that this is the correct way of representing the relevant jus cogens

norm. As I have argued extensively elsewhere, it might be that this norm would have

to be put in even more comprehensive terms. See U. Linderfalk, „The Effect of Jus

Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened the Pandora‟s Box, Did You Ever Think About the

Consequences?‟, 18 European Journal of International Law (2007) 5, 853.


941

In order for a norm of customary international law to fit the

description of jus cogens, it must be regarded as peremptory by the

international community of states as a whole. This is evident from the

definition provided in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties: A jus cogens norm “is a norm accepted and recognized by the

international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no

derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent

norm of general international law having the same character.”122

Stated

somewhat differently, a norm of jus cogens presupposes the existence of

two kinds of opinio juris. Let us say we wish to argue the position that the

principle on the non-use of force is a norm of jus cogens. Then, first of all,

we would have to show it to be a widely held opinion among states

throughout the world that, according to a rule of customary international

law, a state shall refrain in its international relations from the use of force

directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the

United Nations. Secondly, we would have to show it to be a widely held

opinion among states that the principle on the non-use of force has a jus

cogens character.

This requirement for a double opinio juris is of great relevance for the

post-9/11 international legal discourse. If scholars advocated the proposition

that from 11 September to 7 October 2001, the right of self-defense

contained in customary international law was put through a process of

revision, then obviously it would not be enough for them to show that in

said period, states changed their opinion with regard to the contents of the

right of self-defense. They would also have to show that states changed their

opinion with regard to the contents of peremptory international law.

Considering the circumstances, this second requirement can hardly be met.

Even if we accept the assumption that an ordinary norm of customary

international law can be brought into existence or modified in a period of

four weeks, it is indeed absurd to imagine that in such a short period, a

similar development could ever be effected with regard to a norm of jus

cogens. It is entirely inimical to the idea of jus cogens as an uncommonly

permanent set of norms. Not one text-writer commenting upon the

developments post-9/11 brought this issue up for discussion. That is why I

refer to it as the missing jus cogens argument.

122

Emphasis added.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

942

In my understanding, the conclusion for sections IV and V of this

essay would have to be very much the same as that for sub-section III 5. If

we accept that the principle on the non-use of force forms part of the

international jus cogens, the proposition of change is doomed from the very

beginning. If a host of international legal scholars suggested that according

to the opinio juris of states on 7 October 2001, under circumstances of the

kind accompanying the events of 9/11 customary international law allowed

for a right of self-defense to be exercised, spending time on carefully

analyzing the invoked evidence to that effect was a meaningless exercise.

What is more, it diverted attention from the legally relevant questions.

Those questions obviously lied elsewhere. These are harsh words indeed;

but in my opinion, if a jus cogens character is conferred on the principle on

the non-use of force, we will simply have to dismiss as poor legal science

the entire legal debate considered in this essay.

C. Part III

I. The Self-Image of the International Legal Scientific

Discipline

I began this essay by sharing my opinion about the post-9/11

international legal discourse. I declared that I have studied with exceptional

interest what international legal scholars wrote about the international law

of self-defense relative to the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in

Afghanistan. I have done so for several reasons. First of all, the post-9/11

international legal literature raises some very interesting questions with

respect to the integrity of the legal scientific discipline. As I explained in the

introduction of this essay, a great majority of text-writers expressed the

opinion that at some point between the attack of 11 September 2001 and the

initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October that same year, the

international law of self-defense substantially changed. Considering how

radical this proposition must appear to most international lawyers, a

legitimate question is to what extent good arguments were actually used to

defend it. By submitting the post-9/11 international legal literature to a

critical legal review, I have tried to provide this question with an answer. As

argued in Part II of this essay, according to the quality standards normally

used for criticism of legal scientific activities, legal science should engage

in independent critical legal analysis. Legal science should bring focus to

the operationally relevant legal questions – it should ask questions that help

determining the scope of discretion conferred on political and judicial


943

decision-makers, rather than the opposite. Furthermore, legal science should

fulfill the criteria of general scientific ethics. As the review clearly showed,

in the post-9/11 international legal discourse, legal science failed on all

counts.

Arguably, this conclusion forms a reason for a number of further

actions. To begin with, obviously, it justifies the categorization of the post-

9/11 discourse as poor legal science. It is good cause to express disapproval

of the way proponents of change acted, and it urges people to be more

skeptical about what they read in the international legal literature – whether

they choose to distrust only the specific literature on international terrorism

and the right of self-defense, or go as far as to be greatly skeptical about the

entire international legal scholarship. Personally, I will approach the issue

from a different angle. As I conceive of the results of Part II, more than

anything else, they give us reason to submit to scrutiny and further

discussion the self-image of the international legal scientific discipline. I

will finish this essay by initiating something of that kind.

1. The International Legal Scientist as Archetype

If we wish to understand the international legal scholarship as it

presented itself in the post-9/11 international legal discourse, I assume we

have to know something about the forces influencing that scholarship. When

scholars wrote about the international law of self-defense relative to the

initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, clearly, there was

something about the whole situation that greatly constrained them.

Something urged scholars to avoid the conclusion that the initiation of

Operation Enduring Freedom was contrary to international law, or – if we

state this in general terms – that in circumstances like those accompanying

the events of 9/11, there would still not be any right of self-defense to

exercise. Given the importance of the legal issue discussed, it would be

interesting to know more about this urge or influencing force – what it is,

and how it works.

Some people would probably say that international legal scholars

acted for ulterior motives, such as, for instance: a personally felt hatred or

sorrow; solidarity with families directly affected by the terrorist assault of

9/11; a loyalty to one‟s country, government, or employer; or a will to

secure future promotions and research funds. Although factors such as these

certainly must have played a part – I would be a fool if I did not admit it – in

my opinion, this explanation is oversimplistic. My reading of the post-9/11

debate tells me – and my earlier experience of the international legal

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

944

literature confirms this – we have to approach the problem at a deeper level.

As I would like to suggest, the main motivating reason lies rather in the self-

image of the international legal scientific discipline and the role it envisages

for itself in the international community. Of course, approaching the issue

on the level of the individual, we cannot speak about the “one role” assumed

by the international legal scholar. Different scholars conceive of their role

differently. They may share the conviction that something like a legal

framework exists, but they certainly have different ideas of what this

framework is and how they, as scholars, should approach it. However, since

these different ideas and approaches would seem to lend themselves to

general classification, I believe we can still talk about the genus of the

international legal scholar. Consequently, I will now venture a description

of the international legal scientist as archetype.123

In fact, according to the

description, there are several archetypes. I will denote them as the External

Observer, the Legal Idealist, The Legal Activist, the Moral Messenger, the

Preserver of the Legal Self, and the Guardian of the Legal System,

respectively. If earlier I have referred to the post-9/11 international legal

discourse as an interesting object of study, it is mainly because in this

discourse, these archetypes are more than usually apparent.

For the External Observer the distinction between descriptive and

normative legal statements is crucial. According to her, since international

law exists in much the same way as natural phenomena, legal scientists can

describe legal norms unaffected by whatever moral or political opinions

they may personally hold. The External Observer admits that in legal

discourses, people may utter statements defending legal norms on moral or

political grounds. Also, people may utter criticism of the law and share

opinions about the new legal norms they think ought to be created. This is

an activity that the External Observer herself refuses to engage in, however.

The role she has assumed is to be a provider of descriptive legal statements,

and descriptive legal statements only. What tends to make her work

complicated is the fact that, like most human beings, the External Observer

is a moral and socially responsive creature. Therefore, when she reaches a

conclusion (C) with regard to the contents of international law, sometimes

she will experience great internal conflict. This conflict is owed either to the

fact that the External Observer finds the conclusion C morally or politically

123

For a similar approach, see e.g. J. Kammerhofer, „Law-Making by Scholarship? The

Dark Side of 21st Century International Legal „Methodology‟‟, working paper,

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1631510 (last visited

11 December 2010).


945

offensive and feels an inner need to express this openly. In the alternative,

the External Observer may feel that she is under great social pressure: she

knows that people generally will not understand that she is taking a neutral

stance, but will think that she considers the conclusion C morally or

politically defensible; and since she believes that most people will not share

this assessment, this bothers her. The External Observer faces a dilemma.

The easy way out of this dilemma is to make sure that the legal description

and the morally or socially more attractive conclusion -C coincide.

Arguably, the greater the External Observer perceives the moral or social

values at stake to be, the more attractive this solution will seem to her.

Considering the strong moral sentiments expressed in the public debate

post-9/11, my suggestion is that the External Observer serves as a possible

explanation for the poor scientific quality characterizing the post-9/11

international legal discourse.

The self-assumed role of the Legal Idealist is to pronounce on the way

states, international organizations, and other international legal subjects

should act, given the existing positive international law. For the Legal

Idealist, international law is a means for the regulation of the behavior and

interaction of its various subjects. Regulation is not seen as an end in itself,

however, and this is where the Legal Idealist parts with the External

Observer. In the view of the Legal Idealist, justice is an essential quality of

law, and therefore, it is a constant requirement that regulation be just. By

very definition, a rule that belongs to the system of international law is

morally sound, and if it is not, it simply does not belong to that system.

Stated in slightly different terms, for the Legal Idealist, international law is a

representation of the set of moral values that justice stands for in the

conceptual world she assumes. Consequently, if the Legal Idealist reaches a

certain conclusion (C) with regard to the contents of international law, and

she finds this conclusion morally offensive, then she will not regard C as

correct, but will search for alternative conclusions. In the public debate post-

9/11, many people regarded as inconceivable the idea that in circumstances

like those then prevailing, the United States would have no right to defend

itself. “National security” and “the self-preservation of states” were said to

demand such a right. Strong moral language of this kind would seem to

reinforce the conception of the Legal Idealist as a valid explanation of the

post-9/11 international legal discourse.

For the Legal Activist, law is a means for the realization of some

particular political agenda. If the Legal Activist reaches a certain conclusion

(C) with regard to the contents of international law, and she finds that this

conclusion is contrary to the political agenda she assumes, then the legal

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

946

Activist will argue for a legal change. The same goes for the situation where

the Legal Activist finds that international law does not provide a clear

answer to a given question, but believes that it should. The Legal Activist

shares with the External Observer the task of analyzing and describing

international law, but unlike her “colleague”, the Legal Activist has

assumed also the further role of taking normative action. The distinguishing

mark of the Legal Activist is the way this is done. The Legal Activist acts

on the belief that as long as she acknowledges that something like a legal

framework exists, she has the right to bring arguments to further her

political agenda, even though this is done in a fully partial fashion. A clear

risk comes with this approach. When the Legal Activist makes a statement

on what she thinks the law should be people will easily understand this as a

statement on what the law is; for several reasons. The Legal Activist might

be vague about whether, in her opinion, international law provides a clear

answer to the particular question investigated or not. Or, she might be vague

about what in her account is a description of the law that is, and what is her

opinion of the law that should be. (A conspiratorial mind would perhaps say

that it remains in the interest of the Legal Activist to be vague about these

things exactly.) Given the political importance often attached to the

international law on the use of force, the conception of the Legal Activist

would seem to serve as a valid explanation of the post-9/11 international

legal discourse.

Although it might be said about the Moral Messenger that in a way

she, too, approaches international law from a normative angle, we must be

careful not to confuse her with other archetypes. Unlike the Legal Idealist

and the Legal Activist., the Moral Messenger does not work on the basis of

any general normative concept. What influences her is not so much the

deeply felt conviction that beyond positive international law, a fact or a state

of affairs can be generally desired on moral or political grounds. The Moral

Messenger acts on the basis of more temporary motives. She acts under the

influence of a pathos – the perceived pathos of the particular legal provision

(P) she happens to be studying at the moment. By appealing to the emotions

of the legal scientist – for instance, by warning of immanent threats or

consequences, by appealing to pathetic circumstances, or invoking

supposedly shared values – some agent – be it the law-makers, an NGO, a

lobby group, or a collegiums of other legal scientist – has convinced the

scientist that the provision P stands as a representative of some important

moral value or values. Having adopted this view, for the legal scientist it

will morally obviously make a great difference whether she comes to the

conclusion that P allows a certain line of action or not. To say that a certain


947

line of action is not allowed by P will be tantamount to saying that this line

of action is morally offensive. Add to this the unique position that the

international law on the use of force occupies in international politics and to

some extent also in international legal science. The international law on the

use of force is often referred to as forming something of “an international

constitution”. People speak of it as part of an “international ordre public”

and as jus cogens. Consider also the language of Article 51 of the UN

Charter, where the right of self-defense is described as having an “inherent”

character. Pathetic language of this kind reinforces the suggestion that the

Moral Messenger might be one explanation for the poor scientific quality

characterizing the post-9/11 international legal discourse.

The Preserver of the Legal Self and the Guardian of the Legal System

have very much in common, and therefore, to some extent, they can be dealt

with jointly. When the Preserver of the Legal Self or the Guardian of the

Legal System inquirers into the contents of international law, she works

under the influence of the perceived morality of the international

community at large. She may or she may not have an opinion about the

moral virtues of a particular conclusion (C), but this is immaterial. What

influences the behavior of the Preserver of the Legal Self and the Guardian

of the Legal System is not the set of moral principles that the particular

scientist herself happens to hold. The source of influence, rather, is the

scientist‟s assumption that C will be received by the international

community as morally offensive. For some reason she does not want her

conclusion to be received this way. Therefore, if the Preserver of the Legal

Self or the Guardian of the Legal System reaches a certain conclusion C

with regard to the contents of international law, and she makes the

prediction that the international community will find this conclusion morally

offensive, she will reject C and search for alternative conclusions. In other

words, the predicted reaction of the international community causes the

scientist to give a different description of international law than she would

have given if she would have acted independently of this community. Why

is this? The Preserver of the Legal Self and the Guardian of the Legal

System would answer this question differently. The Preserver of the Legal

Self would answer that she considers it her duty to protect the authority of

international legal science. She is afraid that if the international community

perceives of her conclusions as morally offensive, it will increasingly look

upon international legal science as irrelevant and ignore it. The Guardian of

the Legal System, on the other hand, would answer that it is incumbent upon

her to protect the legitimacy of the international legal system. If, generally,

people tend to think of the international law on the use of force as

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 893-949

948

something of a core of an international legal system working properly, the

morally dubious conclusion C will inevitably raise doubts as to whether

international law is at all an appropriate form of governance. For the

Guardian of the Legal System, as for the Preserver of the Legal Self, it is of

course relevant that in dealing with the spectacular events of 9/11,

international legal science was given an attention in the public debate far

beyond normal. This is why I suggest that the Preserver of the Legal Self

and the Guardian of the Legal System serves as valid explanations of the

post-9/11 international legal discourse.

2. The Way Ahead

Naturally, my description of the international legal scientist as

archetype must be taken for what it is. First of all, since the description is

based not so much on sociological research proper as on generalized

personal experience, it remains rather speculative. Furthermore, let it be

clear that I do not claim to be providing a description of the personalities of

individual legal scientists. Normally, individual legal scientists do not lend

themselves to easy-found categorizations such as those suggested in this

essay. This is mainly because legal scientists act consistent with different

archetypes at different occasions, and because, seemingly, in particular legal

discourses a legal scientist can act consistent with several archetypes at the

same time. Finally, my description of the international legal scientist as

archetype is not intended to be exhaustive. Obviously, the genus of the

international legal scientist can be described on the basis of different

criteria, and depending on the criteria used the ensuing description will

inevitably be different. Nevertheless, even assuming that we were all to

agree on the particular criterion used in this essay – the forces influencing

international legal scientists – I do not exclude the possibility that on further

analysis, additions would have to be made to the description that sub-section

VI 1 provided.

Despite these reservations, it is my understanding that the current

description of the international legal scientist as archetype has great

explanatory value; for several reasons:

- It explains some of the relationships that obviously exist

between, on the one hand, the way we look upon ourselves as

international legal scientists, and, on the other hand, what tends

to be the outcome of our scientific activities. Understanding

these relationships, international legal scientists will be more


949

keen observers of, and participants in, the international legal

discourse. International legal scientific activities will emerge as

more transparent. Thus, the description provided in sub-section

VI 1 will contribute to a more rational international legal

discourse. Perhaps, for this same reason, it will also help re-

establish the ethos of international legal science.

- As I would suggest, a good legal scientist continuously reflects

upon her professional personality. Who am I? What am I doing?

What exactly motivates my action? The description of sub-

section VI 1 will not only encourage these questions, but it will

also to some extent assist in answering them.

Possibly, my description of the international legal scientist as

archetype will form a basis for a more penetrating general discussion on the

role of the legal scientific discipline in the international community. What

exactly is the international community expecting from international legal

science? What role or roles should international legal science be taking in

situations like that of 9/11? To what extent – particularly in 9/11-like

situations – should the international legal scientist feel that she bears

responsibility for the perceived moral deficiencies of international law? To

what extent should the legal scientist be considered responsible for the

authority of the entire international legal scientific discipline and for the

legitimacy of the international legal system? If we agree that the

international legal scientific discipline is constructed by its action in acute

situations in particular, as international legal scholars we should consider

these questions exceptionally important.


doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-2-3-domestici-met

Humanitarian Action – A Scope for the

Responsibility to Protect: Part II:

Responsibility to Protect – A Legal Device

Ready for Use?

Marie-José Domestici-Met

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 953

A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 953

B. The Responsibility to Protect Through an Armed

Operation: A Long Way for a Narrow Opening ............................. 954

I. Assessing the Gap and Some Non-Solutions .................................. 954

1. Humanitarian Sensitivity, Between too Much and

too Little ................................................................................. 954

a) In the Late 1980s: Choosing ingérence (or the

..―Right to Intervene‖) in Order ―not to let them die‖ ............ 955

b) In the 1990s: Peacekeeping Preferred to

ingérence… and Some Shortcomings ................................ 956

2. The Legacy of the So-Called ―intervention

d’humanité” ........................................................................... 957

II. At Last a State-Friendly and UN-Friendly Solution? ..................... 962

Professor of Law at Université Paul Cézanne, Aix-Marseille III, France.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

952

1. The Substitutive R to P Scheme is That of

―intervention d’humanité‖, now put in Line With

Modern International Law‘s Main Features ........................... 962

a) Strictly Limited Triggering Events as an Avatar

of ―Just Cause‖ ................................................................... 963

b) An Institutional Process as an Avatar of ―Just

Authority‖ ........................................................................... 965

c) A Set of Guidelines and Conditions That Hardly

Bind the Decision Makers .................................................. 966

2. A shy Implementation? ........................................................... 968

a) Darfur ................................................................................. 968

b) Nargis Hurricane in Burma ................................................ 970

c) The Responsibility to Protect in a General Sense

– A Wide Domain With Possible Far-Reaching

Consequences ..................................................................... 971

III. The Responsibility to Protect Upstream and

Downstream of the Peak of Crisis ................................................. 971

1. Protecting Upstream Through Prevention .............................. 972

2. Protecting Downstream Through Reconstruction ................... 974

IV.Protecting Against More Than the Four Major Dangers

Listed in the Summit Outcome? ..................................................... 976

Responsibility to Protect – A Legal Device Ready for Use?

953

Abstract

Throughout three issues of the Goettingen Journal of International Law we

are trying and answering the same question: with the recognition of

responsibility to protect, is humanitarian action at last guaranteed? Will this

concept avoid some avoidable deaths and lack of rescue? Our first issue was

devoted to the long quest for a legal regime in favor of humanitarian action

effective delivery. After a step by step review of the many solutions which

have been tried, the paper ended with the ―discovery‖ of physical protection.

After mentioning the Kosovo (and Serbia) air strikes and the 3rd millennium

UN field missions, the paper ended with a worrying assessment: no device

over the past 150 years has succeeded in guarantying neither assistance‘

provision nor protection. And we raised the issue of responsibility to protect

(R to P) as a possible help to solution. Our today‘s paper goes down this

way.

A. Introduction

―Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations

from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity. […] We accept that responsibility and will act in

accordance with it. […] The international community, through the

United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate

diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. […]. In this

context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and

decisive manner […].‖1

This excerpt from the summit outcome of the UN‘s 60th

anniversary is

strong and generally speaking, the wording ―Responsibility to protect‖ still

sounds, if no longer quite brand new, at least, a recent conquest of

humanitarianism.

This is the starting point of our present issue, but we have to discuss it

more in-depth. Indeed, the very concept was already underlying many

aspects of contemporary international law; and, in the aftermath of the

formalization of the concept in a UNGA Resolution, the situation is not that

clear cut. Many authors envisage R to P as a legal way for armed operations,

1 GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 138.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

954

with some of them also suspicious as to the very possibility of such

interventions being carried out with a protective goal. And the literature

practically ignores the other ways of protection that are yet to be found in

the famous summit outcome.

Speaking of armed protective intervention, a long way was necessary

for a narrow opening (B). Yet, broadly speaking, the responsibility to

protect should open onto a wide area with far-reaching consequences (C).

B. The Responsibility to Protect Through an Armed

Operation: A Long Way for a Narrow Opening

It will thus be necessary to focus upon each of these two elements: the

way and the achievement. International humanitarian law and international

human rights law do protect the human being. However, international law

still encompasses sovereignty. In some cases, between human protective

norms and the possibility to have them implemented, there is a gap. It took

years to find a solution to overcome it. We will trace back this way,

including the tentative solutions put forward (I) before describing the

solution found (II).

I. Assessing the Gap and Some Non-Solutions

Some glimpses at some steps of this long way appeared in our

previous issue, as side effects of humanitarian action history review.

However, we are now tackling with quite a different investigation, which

concerns the legal set of rules.

In humanitarian affairs, action is often emotion-driven. Sometimes, a

sense of moral duty brings actors (organizations or States) to disregard

certain legal constraints and to intervene in spite of them; whereas in other

times and places, legalism inspires abstention for the worse. The last thirty

years have shown tremendous efforts made by humanitarian workers in

order to put concepts forward (1) which have to be read in light of a

customary rule of the ancient times, the so-called intervention d’humanité

(2).

1. Humanitarian Sensitivity, Between too Much and too Little

Each decade has brought its legal contribution to answering distress in

difficult conditions.


955

a) In the Late 1980s: Choosing ingérence (or the ―Right to

Intervene‖) in Order ―not to let them die‖

The concept was proudly and provocatively put forward by the then

―French doctor‖ Bernard Kouchner and his friend the law professor Mario

Bettati. Beyond the provocative wording, the idea was not meant to subvert

the principle of sovereignty. Mario Bettati knew all too well how

fundamental it is, and in Bernard Kouchner‘s approach to the question, there

was more indifference towards sovereignty than hostility. The name

―Medecins sans Frontières‖ – the organization he created – signifies a

dedication to rescue efforts throughout the world, but nothing of the kind of

imperialism some ―southern‖ countries have denounced.

The French diplomats took up the motto ―don‘t let them die‖.

Moreover, they attempted to get it accepted by the United Nations as the

basis for a new norm. France put forward a draft UNGA resolution, aimed at

the adoption of a strong position that could help if a local government

showed a lack of cooperation regarding assistance. It was about a legal

device aimed at bypassing this kind of bad will.2

But the topic was handled conservatively by the UNGA. The rationale

behind the proposition was that respecting such sovereign refusal of help

would amount to letting people die without rescue. Every precaution was

used to have this declared on a large basis; therefore France sought as many

co-sponsors as possible for the text. Negotiations ensued, the result of which

was that only a few States – most of West – accepted to co-sponsor a text

with a reference to ―right to life‖ in its preamble. The final output was

resolution 43/131, which left the ―right to life‖ unmentioned, passed on

December 8 1988. It was however construed in a misleading atmosphere.

For France and most European States – as well as for the so-called “Sans

frontierist” movement – it was taken as a victory due to the importance

granted to humanitarian assistance (even without the wording ―right to life‖)

and the fact that NGOs were placed on the same footing as IGOs when it

comes to the responsibilities for rescuing. But, on the latter chapter, the text

gives the local State priority3, reaffirming ―the sovereignty of the affected

States and their primary role in the initiation, organization, co-ordination

2 Cf. M.-J. Domestici-Met, ‗Aspects juridiques récents de l‘assistance humanitaire‘, 35

Annuaire français de droit international (1989), 117. 3 GA Res. 43/131, 8 December 1988, para. 2.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

956

and implementation of humanitarian assistance within their respective

territories‖4. The same occurred once again in resolution 45/100 (1990).

b) In the 1990s: Peacekeeping Preferred to ingérence… and

Some Shortcomings

The UNSC raised great hopes when it identified a ―threat to peace‖ in

some activities aimed at hindering the delivery of humanitarian assistance of

utmost and vital importance.5 The same was stated for activities directly

targeting civilian populations. Thus, according to UN Charter Chapter VII,

namely Art. 39, problems which sought a legal solution eventually came

under UNSC jurisdiction. Hence, the UNSC was, whenever populations

where at risk, entitled to make necessary decisions. And the latter resulted in

entrusting peacekeeping forces with a protective mandate, first in favor of

humanitarian assistance and then in favor of civilian populations.6

But hope turned into disappointment with difficult crises to which the

UNSC jurisdiction was inherently unable to bring remedy. The decision to

rely upon peacekeeping forces, even if entrusting them with the mandate to

defend besieged cities qualified ―security zones‖, proved a lack of security.7

Therefore, after the Rwandese genocide and the Srebrenica slaughter, in

1999, most States embraced a type of operation by-passing both sovereignty

and the UNSC jurisdiction, insofar as it was conducted under the aegis of

protection of populations.

In the Kosovo area, there were two opposing approaches to

legitimacy. Serbia invoked its multi-secular presence in the region it

considers as its birthplace while Albanian Kosovars could invoke their right

to self-determination on a territory in which they constitute 90% of the

population. But legally, Serbia was sovereign and in a position to rely upon

the uti possidetis principle.8 UNSC, in resolution 1199 (1998) ignored any

contestation of Serbian sovereignty and established a commission – the

Kosovo Verification Mission to be set up by the OSCE – in order to monitor

4 Id.

5 SC Res. 767, 24 July 1992, SC Res. 770, 13 August 1992.

6 Cf. M. Bothe, ‗Peace-keeping‘, in B. Simma (Ed.), The Charter of the United Nations.

A Commentary, 2nd ed. (2002), paras 13-71. 7 SC Res. 819, 16 April 1993, SC Res. 824, 6 May 1993 and SC Res. 836, 4 June 1993.

8 Cf., for the latter point, Opinion No. 2 of the (Badinter) Arbitration Commission of the

Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in 31 International Legal

Materials (1992), 1497, 1498.


957

a cease-fire while checking the conditions for the Albanian Kosovar

population. Protection was then in the forefront. Protection, precisely, was

the ground on which NATO launched its military intervention in March

1999. Neither authorized nor condemned and certainly not prized by UNSC,

was the so-called ―humanitarian intervention‖, or ―humanitarian

intervention‖ or even ―humanitarian war‖, which ended up with the UN

simply taking into account the new situation9 – the end of Serbian control

over the territory – and organizing what was due to be the ―substantial

autonomy‖ of Kosovo.10

However, the fact that NATO had fostered the release of the Serbian

grasp on Kosovo was prized by large parts of public opinion, which showed

evidence of an ―International moral consensus‖.11

The fact that NATO had

achieved the result through the use of force without any UN mandate was

strongly challenging the UN. Was it the survival of an old customary

exception to sovereignty?

Indeed, the pre-UN and pre-League of Nations era offered a device for

which the French language has a specific word: ―intervention d’humanité”,

not to be confused with intervention humanitaire12

, while in English

―humanitarian intervention‖ covers both. Was something in the old

customary rule helpful for finding the requested solution to the gap in

protection?

2. The Legacy of the So-Called ―intervention d’humanité”

The given concept is a legacy rooted in previous centuries. In the 19th

and early 20th

centuries, the formula stood for a short military operation

aimed at saving lives that were immediately threatened.13

From the then

9 SC Res. 1244, 10 June 1999.

10 Id.

11 The Kosovo Report by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (also

known as Goldstone Commission), available at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm (last visited 28

December 2010). 12

The expression ―intervention humanitaire‖ can be used with a very wide scope, as a

synonym of ―humanitarian operations‖ encompassing all activities of humanitarian

assistance and protection. Some authors however use it instead of ―intervention

d’humanité‖. 13

Indeed Lebanon is only a part of the ―Syrian province‖, but it is the part where the

intervention took place. Cf. with regard to the legal nature A. Pillet, Revue générale de

droit international public (1894), 1, 13, who pointed at the starting point of this

concept the so-called ―droit commun de l‘humanité‖.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

958

―Syrian province‖ – of Ottoman Empire (1860) – today Lebanon14

to

Beijing – (where western diplomats had underwent a 55 days nightmare in

1901) – a kind of legal regime had arisen from practice. That regime

encompassed a partial collective approach – the authorization or ratification

according to the Concert des Nations, together with proportionality, the

prohibition of using this intervention with a purpose different from what

was alleged. This customary exception to the major rule of sovereignty has

been theorized in the last years of this period.15

In some later cases the given rule has been invoked in troubled areas

such as Congo – in 1960 (Leopoldville), 1964 (Stanleyville-Paulis) and

1978 (Kolwezi) – but also in Cambodia (1978)16

and Uganda (1979)17

.

Two false interpretations must be refuted with regard to intervention

d’humanité. Many say that it is a western practice.18

However, the last two

aforementioned cases involved both Vietnam putting an end to the Khmer

Rouge regime, and Tanzania putting an end to the Idi Amin Dada regime.

Another false statement refers to the so-called rescue operation in favor of

nationals. Both of these cases, as well as older ones, demonstrate that the

operations do not necessarily benefit to nationals of the intervening State.

For instance during the Kolwezi operation, French (and also some

Senegalese) soldiers rescued people of 54 diverse nationalities.

14

Cf. I. Pogany, ‗Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French

Intervention in Syria re-examined‘, 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly

(1986), 182, 186; S. Chesterman, Just war or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention

and International Law (2001), 32. 15

A. Rougier, ‗La théorie de l‘intervention d‘humanité‘, 17 Revue Générale de Droit

International Public (1910) 1, 468; Brownlie says that by the end of the nineteenth

century the scholars had accepted the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention

but notes that the doctrine was ‗inherently vague‘ and ‗open to abuse by powerful

states. Cf. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), 338. 16

Cf. T. M. Franck, ‗Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian intervention‘

in J. L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal,

and Political Dilemmas (2003), 204. 17

F. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention. An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 3rd ed.

(2005), 228. 18

This impression may derive from the important French – and also British – activity in

this regard. Besides, the topic is especially popular among American authors, cf. e.g.

M. Reisman & M. McDougal, ‗Humanitarian Intervention to protect the Ibos‘, in R.

Lillich (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973), 167, 172; J.

Fonteyne, ‗The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention :

Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter‘, 4 California Western International Law

Journal (1973), 203; W. M. Reisman, ‗Editorial Comments‘, 94 American Journal of

International Law (1999), 824.


959

One last peculiarity makes the so-called ―intervention d’humanité”

distinct from humanitarian action. If the latter helps mitigate a disaster, the

former helps prevent or stop it. Humanitarian intervention is active upon the

consequences of the slaughter, while the ―intervention d’humanité” is active

upstream, upon the causes of suffering.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, at the onset of the associative

humanitarian adventure, this legacy was still vivid for associations which –

unlike the ICRC – do not rely upon the local State‘s cooperation. Proof of

this rests with the fact that States or politicians that want to criticize a given

intervention d’humanité, usually accuse its authors of having forged a

―false‖ or ―pseudo‖ intervention d’humanité. A good example is to be found

in the USSR‘s criticism towards the US intervention to Stanleyville-Paulis

(Congo, 1964).19

Thus, after the UN Charter entered into force, States went on referring

to this customary rule,20

which had become contrary to a general treaty. If

an explication is to be found, it can be that the inefficiency of the UN

collective security system made it appear as something virtual.

But with the new international paradigms, and namely the end of

Security Council paralysis, both sovereignty and the UN security system

have to be taken into account even more. The Kosovo case showed an up-

to-then hidden reality: behind the aforementioned failed attempts (so-called

―ingérence‖, peacekeeping…), there was a real need for a solution bridging

the protection gap. In order to put an end to both deadly abstention and

unilateral intervention, an answer had to be found.

After the 1999 operation, Kofi Annan tackled two challenges. One

was peacekeeping operations efficiency, which he knew well, as a former

head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Ways to better UN

peacekeeping missions were sought after in 2000 by the Brahimi report,

19

More precisely, this criticism was forwarded by Pravda, the official newspaper of the

Communist Party of the USSR; cf. M.-J. Domestici-Met, ‗Aspects juridiques récents

de l‘assistance humanitaire‘, Annuaire Français de Droit International, 35 (1989),

117. 20

There is evidence for a State practice, e.g. Vietnam in Cambodia, (1978), Tanzania in

Uganda (1979), NATO in Kosovo; however it is not clear whether this practice was

based on an opinio juris. In the literature, Bowett and Stone still considered the

humanitarian intervention legal under the Charter, since Art. 51 does not exclude the

right of self defense which derives from customary law. The case of Humanitarian

Intervention as part of customary law should then still be admissible, D. W. Bowett,

Self-Defence in International Law (1958), 154, 182; J. Stone, Aggression and World

Order. A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression (1958), 95.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

960

which was the first of a series of documents leading to the CAPSTONE

doctrine.21

In a less technical way, there was the problem of a norm

allowing emergency protection, often aimed at minority groups‘ safety.22

He

addressed the issue as follows:

―(…) if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault

on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica

– to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every

precept of our common humanity?‖23

A new approach developed throughout some group reports, and led to

Kofi Annan‘s own report.24

The ICISS established by Canada issued its

report in December 2001 with the title: ―The Responsibility to Protect‖.25

The timing was not ideal, since after September 11, the common approach

to security shifted from mass killing to terrorism. Indeed, it could have been

an opportunity to think of human security, since terrorism intrinsically

targets civilian population. Even though the September 11th

attacks‘ death

toll was ―only‖ around 3000: killing some 3000 people is already mass

killing. However, the UNSC focusing its resolutions upon the United States‘

right to self-defense and the George W. Bush‘s announcement of the ―war

on terror‖,26

together shifted the focus upon the State‘s security. And with

the 2003 Iraq war, many small States raised concerns about the possible use

21

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines (2008) available

at

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Download.aspx?d

ocid=895&cat=10&scat=0 (last visited 28 December 2010). 22

―On constate l‘émergence lente, mais inexorable, je pense, d‘une norme internationale

contre la répression violente des minorités, qui aura et doit avoir préséance sur les

questions de souveraineté‖, Kofi Annan, cited in 3 Revue de l’OTAN (1999) 3, 24-27

available at http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/fra/9903-fr.pdf (last visited 30

November 2010). 23

Report of the Secretary- General, We, the peoples: the role of the United Nations in

the twenty-first century, UN Doc A/54/2000, 27 March 2000, para. 217. 24

Report of the Secretary General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and

human rights for all, UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 25

The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention

and State Sovereignty available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf

(last visited 30 November 2010), as to this concept cf. M. Zambelli, ‗Putting People at

the Centre of the International Agenda‘: The Human Security Apporach‘, 77 Die

Friedenswarte (2002), 17. 26

SC Res. 1368, 12 September 2001 and SC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001.


961

of the ―Responsibility to Protect‖ as a pretext for invasion. Thus, enthusiasm

was lowered, and the first conceptions of the ICISS did not immediately

result in official inter-states documents. But Kofi Annan entrusted a High

Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, with a view to include

genocide prevention in the 2005 UN reform. In December 2004, the High

Level Panel released a report ―A more secure world. Our shared

responsibility‖,27

where the ―responsibility to protect‖ was qualified an

―emerging norm‖28

. That same year, the 2005 World Summit Outcome

showed the success of the latter norm.

The legacy of intervention d’humanité and that of the 1990 Security

Council major resolutions merge into a new concept.

―[…] paragraphs 138 and 139 of the R2P may signify the

crystallization of customary international law, as evidenced by state

practice and opinio juris in respect of the interpretation of ‗threat to

peace‘ in chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. That is, in the

wake of 1990s developments such as the Security Council‘s

determination on more than one occasion, that serious or systematic,

widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law

may contribute to a threat to international peace and security, as well

as action taken outside the Security Council in Kosova, the General

Assembly has seen fit to acquiesce to such an interpretation.‖29

The following year, the Security Council solemnly recalled

paragraphs 138 and 139, in a kind of quasi legislative resolution, adopted on

April, 28 2006 under number 1674 and devoted to the protection of civilians

in armed conflicts.

However, on this long way towards R to P, the International

community has not yet reached the end, as will be shown in Section II and

point C. Still, the debate is now well framed in new terms: the hypothesis of

an armed intervention has to be linked to the UN, since the present state of

the world makes it impossible to rely on the old intervention d’humanité

without taking into account world institutionalization. And the responsibility

27

A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc A/59/565, 2 December 2004, 8. 28

Id., 57, para. 203. 29

E. Massingham, ‗Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the

responsibility to protect doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for

humanitarian ends?‘,91 International Red Cross Review (2009) 876, 803, 823-824.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

962

to protect regime does take it into account. Filling the gap called for some

precise conditions that R to P was due to fulfill.

II. At Last a State-Friendly and UN-Friendly Solution?

The long expected solution for answering the protection gap was

shaped by some collective reflexions aimed at shifting the stress from the

intervention and its actors to those in need of rescue; from a right to

intervene, to a responsibility to protect. And this was an answer to a call for

a re-appraisal of sovereignty. In this regard, former UN SG Boutros Boutros

Ghali was a forerunner. In 1992, when reporting upon UN activities in

1991,30

he warned against any counterproductive dilemma of ―sovereignty–

protection‖. And the new approach had been drafted, even before the

Kosovo intervention, with the very concept of ―sovereignty as a

responsibility‖ by Francis Deng – the present UNSG Special adviser for the

Prevention of Genocide – then working within the framework of the

Brookings Institution. Here lies the change: as quoted in the introduction,

―each individual State‖31

endorses the responsibility to protect its population

and UN members are ―prepared to take collective action‖32

, as a substitute

means of protection. It is now up to us to focus upon the possible

substitution of a State by the International community. And as for armed

intervention, the result is by no means a revolutionary one. On the one hand,

there is a strange convergence between the criteria set up for armed

intervention in the name of the responsibility to protect and those of the old

intervention d’humanité (1). On the other hand, a kind of shyness in practice

goes against the primary impression that a big step forward has been made

(2).

1. The Substitutive R to P Scheme is That of ―intervention

d’humanité‖, now put in Line With Modern International

Law‘s Main Features

This convergence is worth highlighting since it concerns rules

belonging to two dramatically different ages of international law.

30

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/46/1, 13

September 1991, 5. 31

GA Res. 60/1, supra note 1, para. 138. 32

Id., para. 139.


963

Not all of the conditions of legality of the old intervention d’humanité

are stated in the World Summit Outcome. The given only refers to

- on the one hand a ―right authority‖ – through an institutional

process – which is in line with ICISS‘s statement that

―A. […] The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as

a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better

than it has. B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be

sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out.‖33

- and, on the other hand, a threshold of atrocities, which is to be

read in the light of the concept of ―just cause‖.

The present state of international law allows for a better framing of the

four ―horsemen of the apocalypse‖ that constitute the scope of substitutive

protection (a). And the existing institutional system allows an institutional

process (b). However, further conditions were envisaged in the ICISS and

High Level Panel reports and by Kofi Annan34

as a ―set of guidelines […]

which […] the Security Council […] should always address in considering

whether to authorize or apply military force.‖35

a) Strictly Limited Triggering Events as an Avatar of ―Just

Cause‖

As ICISS states in its report ―Military intervention for human

protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary

measure‖.36

This is in line with both the ban of the unilateral use of force in

the UN Charter (Art. 2 para. 4) and the prohibition made to the organization

to interfere in domestic affairs (Art. 2 para. 7). And not every attempt

against life or physical integrity can be taken as a pretext. This was perhaps

possible in the pre-UN era, but it is no longer the case today. Some groups

in the international community could have been in favor of a broader

33

The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 25, para. 6.14. 34


human rights for all, supra note 24. 35


Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 27, 53. 36

The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 25, para. 4.18.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

964

approach.37

But in the aftermath of the Kosovo affair, a resolutely limitative

scope has been chosen. However, it is possible to notice an evolution in the

wording in terms of time and context.

The 2000 African Union Constitutive Act enshrines in art 4 (h) ―the

right of the Union to intervene in a member State in respect of graves

circumstances‖.

In the ICISS report (2001), the given events are mainly approached

through their result, more or less regardless of the means carried out. It

considers a military intervention aimed at averting a ―large scale loss of life,

actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product

either of deliberate State action, or State neglect or inability to act, or a

failed state situation‖38

. The same result-based approach prevails for a

―large scale ‗ethnic cleansing‖, actual or apprehended, whether carried out

by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape‖39

.

In the High Level Panel, it is not just the wording that evolves.40

Moreover, there is a noticeable addition: ―serious violations of international

humanitarian law‖41.

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the topic was rephrased and the

language is now ripe. It is about genocide (already targeted by the

convention since 1948), crimes against humanity (condemned since

Nuremberg), crimes of war (condemned by a full corpus of law) and ethnic

cleansing (condemned since ICC), which we consider as being ―the four

horsemen of the apocalypse‖.

37

According to Massingham ―Some African states had favoured the inclusion of the

overthrow of democratically elected regimes as part of the doctrine; this was (and still

is) also supported by some academics. In 1945 France unsuccessfully proposed that

the United Nations Charter be drafted so as to allow intervention in situations where

‗the clear violation of essential liberties and of human rights constitutes a threat

capable of compromising peace‘. Others have more recently suggested that the

irradiation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism should also invoke a

responsibility to protect.―, Massingham, supra note 31, 818. 38


Id. 40

―in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious

violations‖, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 27, para 203. 41

Id.


965

b) An Institutional Process as an Avatar of ―Just Authority‖

This one can be defined by the central role of international

organizations. Unlike what would have been authorized with Tony Blair‘s

―doctrine of the international community‖42

and in line with the 1948

Convention for repression and prevention of the crime of genocide, the UN

is the one called upon to decide and act whenever the world‘s fate is at

stake.

As already quoted, ―[t]he task is not to find alternatives to the Security

Council as a source of authority, but to make it work better than it has‖43

.

The UN Security Council‘s jurisdiction in this domain is self evident. Kofi

Annan notices: ―As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes

against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and

security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security

Council for protection?‖44

But the SC is not the only one involved.

Apart from the ―Uniting for peace‖, which can involve the General

Assembly, what about regional organizations? There was a strong position

taken by the African Union in the Ezulwini consensus. ―Since the General

Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts

and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation

of the nature and development of conflict situations, it is imperative that

Regional Organizations, in areas of proximity to conflicts are empowered to

take actions in this regard. The African Union agrees with the Panel that the

intervention of Regional Organizations should be with the approval of the

Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be

granted ―after the fact‖ in circumstances requiring urgent action. In such

cases, the UN should assume responsibility for financing such operations.45

But the text of paragraph 139 does not ratify this large approach. Chapter

VIII of the Charter is referenced with regard to ―diplomatic, humanitarian

and other peaceful means‖; and ―should peaceful means be inadequate and

42

T. Blair, Doctrine of the International Community, speech given at the Economic Club

of Chicago, 24 April 1999 available at http://www.number-

10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp (last visited 28 December 2010). 43


Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 27, para. 54. 44


human rights for all, supra note 24, para. 125. 45

The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The

Ezulwini Consensus”, 7 March 2005.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

966

national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations‖46

, the

recourse to Chapter VII is foreseen ―in cooperation with relevant regional

organizations‖47

.

Another point in the institutional process should be devoted to

decision making. It is well known that the UN Security Council has for

decades severely suffered from its decision making process. And if the end

of the Cold War gave it some added efficiency, the veto system is not dead;

and , precisely, the topic of protection could become one field for veto, due

to the high level of the stakes, both protection of the human being and

sovereignty. Therefore, the ICISS has tried and drafted in advance a kind of

check list or memento for decision stakeholders, which amounts to listing a

set of conditions. And these have not been invented in the conceptual

framework of the R to P; but they are close to the intervention d’humanité

legacy, and also paralleled to ―just war‖ conditions. But the Summit

outcome seems to stand back on this topic.

c) A Set of Guidelines and Conditions That Hardly Bind the

Decision Makers

Even though the nature of the given guidelines is not clear, and their

compulsory character not guaranteed,48

we cannot avoid quoting the way in

which they were envisaged by the preparatory reports of the Summit:

- Right intention: ―The primary purpose of the intervention must

be to halt or avert human suffering‖49.

The wording is important.

It is not about the deep motive but the official intention. And it is

about the primary purpose unlike in the early intervention

d’humanité doctrine, where it was the only one.50

46

GA Res. 60/1, supra note 1, para. 139. 47

Id. 48

Barbara Delcourt has listed the diverse qualifications given by different States to R to

P: guidelines, principles, joint commitment, concept. The author speaks of ―moral

obligation‖, B. Delcourt, ‗La communauté international reactions coercitives: la

responsabilité de protéger et le principe de l‘interdiction du recours à la force.

Communication de Barbara Delcourt‘ in Société Française de Droit, Colloque de

Nanterre. La Responsabilité de Protéger (2007), 311. 49

The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 25, para 4.33. 50

Bellamy gives as an example a country wanting both to halt injustice and to secure

borders. (A. J. Bellamy, ‗Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy of

humanitarian intervention‘, 3 Journal of Military Ethics (2004) 3, 216) This was the


967

- Last resort: ―Every diplomatic and non-military avenue for the

prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must

have been explored […] with reasonable grounds for believing

that, in all the circumstances, if the measure had been attempted

it would not have succeeded‖51.

There is some similitude with

the relation between Arts 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Second,

if the stage before intervention is a pacific one, it is also a

preventive one, compared to a reactive one. With great accuracy

of judgment, the ICISS adds: ―The responsibility to react… can

only be justified when the responsibility to prevent has been

fully discharged‖52

.

- Proportional means: ―The scale, duration and intensity of the

planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary

to secure the humanitarian objective in question‖53

. This was a

significant aspect of the intervention d’humanité.

- Reasonable prospects: There must be ―a reasonable chance of

success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that

triggered the intervention in the first place. Military intervention

is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the

consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be

worse than if there is no action at all‖54

.

However, the World Summit did not take up the given items, preferring

to envisage the decisions for recourse to arms to be taken ―on a case-by-case

basis‖. Was this a real choice for a method, or simply the quickest way to

reach a consensus?

Anyhow, the precise scheme drawn in the Summit outcome has hardly

been implemented. Is it shyness?

case of Viet-Nam as to the Khmer Democratic Republic and Tanzania as to Idi

Amin‘s Uganda. 51


Id. 53


Id.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

968

2. A shy Implementation?

The situation in Darfur, raised large expectations for international

protection, which has not yet been met; and the Nargis Hurricane was

followed by a rough refusal of humanitarian workers, which sounded like a

set back.

a) Darfur

The alert was given by UN Deputy Secretary General Egeland

regarding Darfur in 2003. Humanitarian assistance hardly arrived several

months later, but the killings did not stop. Due to chronology, Darfur could

have been a striking case study for protection by the international

community. In October 2004 the Secretary General appointed Antonio

Cassese as Chairperson for the International Commission of Inquiry on

Darfur. And January 2005 offered two important milestones. On the one

hand, the Cassese Commission issued its report: while there was evidence of

war crimes and crimes against humanity, there was no intent for a genocide.

And, on the other hand, almost simultaneously, a peace agreement was

finalized in Naivasha (Kenya) about the South Sudan conflict.

Soon after, in a resolution 1590 from March 24, 2005, which was

devoted both to south Sudan and Darfur, the UNMIS – UN mission in

Sudan – was created and was due to settle first in the South. A week later on

March 31, in resolution 1593, the Security Council, ―acting under Chapter

VII of the Charter, [decided] to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July

2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court‖.

Thus, both substitutive protection and punishment where on the tracks

when, in September 2005, the World Summit issued its outcome, with

paragraphs 138 and 139 devoted to the responsibility to protect.

On August 31, 2006, the Security Council, in resolution 1706, making

reference to R to P, decided that ―UNMIS‘ mandate shall be expanded […],

that it shall deploy to Darfur‖55

. It was building upon Darfur peace talks in

Abuja56

and on the desire expressed by the African Union to transmit the

peacekeeping mission it had had in Darfur to the UN. In the given

resolution, the Council immediately added ―and therefore invites the

55

SC Res. 1706, 31 August 2006, para. 1. 56

Peace agreement dated 5 May , 2006, after a Humanitarian cease fire dated N‘djamena

2 April 2004.


969

consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment‖57

. This

latter sentence is not commonly used in UNSC resolutions that aim at

creating peacekeeping forces even though the consensual nature of peace

keeping forces is well known. Was this a forerunning element of a necessary

failure?

To Sudan, this UN military presence in Darfur was not easy to admit.

While UNMIS was due to begin in October and complete its deployment in

December. In November High level consultations were still on the agenda.

Held in Addis Ababa, and endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council58

they resulted in the creation of a Hybrid AU–UN operation instead of

UNMIS deploying directly to Darfur. The latter was created by SC Res.

1769 with the symbolic name of UNAMID, D meaning Darfur even though

Darfur is part of Sudan. Dated July 31, 2007, and welcomed as an audacious

step forward, it reflects a climate of strong cooperation between

organizations59

, but also the reduced presence of extra African forces.60

The

resolution was not implemented until January 2008. And organizing a

relatively strong presence of European forces in the area was made possible

for the Security Council only when it started addressing the Chad and

Central African Republic situation. This resulted in another complex device

made of the UN so-called MINURCAT61

, reinforced for some months by

the EUFOR62

. This device itself took a long time to set up. February 2008

was, finally, the moment when a force able to oppose the Janjaweed became

settled. Moreover, it only had jurisdiction for their cross border razzes; still

it was in a position to defend the Darfuri refugee camps.

Thus, four years were needed and the death toll had risen. Indeed, it

was not really expedient. And the legal analysis shows that the UNSC was

reluctant to use the coercive device provided by UN Charter Chapter VII.

The latter is not quoted at the end of the preamble in 1706 or in 1769, but is

only devoted to the ―necessary actions‖ it authorizes the force to take in

remote paragraphs.

57

SC Res. 1706, supra note 56, para 1. 58

30 November 2006. 59

Appointment of the AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada,

and Force Commander Martin Agwai. 60

―UNAMID […] shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light

Support Packages to AMIS‖, SC Res 1769, 31 July 2007, para. 2. 61

SC Res. 1778, 25 September 2007. 62

Id., para. 6.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

970

Even worse, the judiciary reaction has itself proven to be weakened by

politics. After the case was referred to the ICC, the ICC Procurer Office

requested the pre-trial chamber to issue a warrant of arrest for Ahmad Al

Bashir, the President of Sudan. The first warrant was issued in March 2009

against him as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator, under

Art. 25 para. 3(a) of the statute regarding war crimes and crimes against

humanity.63

Bashir not only considered it a political decision inspired by the

western and humanitarian world, but also had many of his fellow heads of

State join him in this interpretation. As a matter of retaliation, he expelled

13 humanitarian organizations in early 2009. The African Union, although

audacious in principle upon these kind of affairs (cf. supra I,B,1), showed

solidarity to Bashir, who goes on participating in international meetings.

Even more, after his re-election in May 2010, he was sworn in front of a

sizable part of the international community.

Is there a possible comparison with Myanmar/Burma?

b) Nargis Hurricane in Burma

The situation seems quite different. However, the Myanmar regime,

by refusing any entry to rescuers, helped to increase the number of

casualties. Furthermore, part of the affected populations belonged to ethnic

minorities, which could entail the suspicion of hostile intent, beyond the

―pure‖ refusal of foreign humanitarian workers.

But, when the situation had been evoked in the Security Council in

January 2007 upon human rights purposes, Russia and China vetoed a

resolution, which led the international community to proceed with great

caution in 2008. Therefore, when relief supplies and workers were shipped

63

The Court found ―reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir is criminally

responsible as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator, under Art. 25

para. 3(a) of the Statute, for: i. intentionally directing attacks against a civilian

population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities as

a war crime, within the meaning of Art. 8 para. 2(e)(i) of the Statute; ii. pillage as a

war crime, within the meaning of Art. 8 para. 2(e)(v) of the Statute; iii. murder as a

crime against humanity, within the meaning of Art. 7 para. l(a) of the Statute; iv.

extermination as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of Art. 7 para. l(b) of

the Statute; v. forcible transfer as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of

Art. 7 para. 1(d) of the Statute‖, .Situation in Dafur, Sudan in the Case of the

Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), ICC-02/05-01/09

(Pre-Trial Chamber I), 4 March 2009, 7.


971

on some western navy vessels to Burma, and when the Myanmar Junta

pretended to fear an invasion, little was made to make it change its mind.

Thus, up to now, the 2005 Summit outcome has not dramatically

changed the face of protection when the local State is unwilling to hear the

international community‘s plea for its population‘s protection from of an

imminent danger. However, when it comes to less tense situations, where

the danger is not as imminent as in the aforementioned cases, things can be

different.

c) The Responsibility to Protect in a General Sense – A Wide

Domain With Possible Far-Reaching Consequences

Up to now in the part B of this paper we have concentrated upon

protection through an armed operation. As we have just seen, certain

conditions are exacting and difficult to meet. At the same time, guidelines

for making decisions on intervention have not been adopted. Thus, the

probability of a licit intervention carried out in the name of the international

community, and according to a mandate conferred by the Security Council,

seems very low. The Darfur case, in spite of the above mentioned resolution

1706, has proven not to be the expected case for a first successful

application of the responsibility to protect.

Yet, responsibility to protect is not necessarily linked to armed

intervention, since other ways are possible even if they are not as popular as

military operations (I). And there is room for raising the question of

potential responsibility to protect from more than the mere four events listed

in the Summit outcome (II).

III. The Responsibility to Protect Upstream and Downstream of

the Peak of Crisis

Though it constitutes the major concern of authors,64

military

intervention is not systematically necessary to protect. It can be so only at

64

Some of whom show scepticism like Massingham: ―As such, genocide, war crimes,

ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, can now surely be said to constitute

‗threats to peace‘ pursuant to the United Nations Charter. This is the most significant

legal advance provided by the R to P, and in effect its crowning glory. […]However,

[…] it seems little will change in respect of humanitarian intervention. [Whilst] the

crux of the doctrine remains devoted to the question of military intervention‖,

Massingham, supra note 31, 815.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

972

the peak of crisis – and even then, it is not always efficient. Military

intervention is a response to the extreme consequence of the lack of

protection. Actions can be taken upstream and downstream by the relevant

State or by the international community in its substitutive protection. And

the latter substitution has proven to be sensitive and to encounter reluctance

from some States.

However, the responsibility lies with the international community

over a wide scope, from reacting to early warnings with soft measures, upon

re-building the potentially war-torn society. It is what Ban Ki-moon names

his ―deep‖ approach in the Berlin Speech: ―Our conception of

Responsibility to Protect, then, is narrow but deep. Its scope is narrow […]

At the same time, our response should be deep, utilizing the whole

prevention and protection tool kit available‖65.

1. Protecting Upstream Through Prevention

Here, protection is granted at an early stage. Ban Ki-moon asserts:

―Our goal is to help States succeed, not just to react once they have failed to

meet their prevention and protection obligations‖66

, commenting in bold

terms that ―[i]t would be neither sound morality, nor wise policy, to limit the

world‘s options to watching the slaughter of innocents or to send in the

marines. The magnitude of these four crimes and violations demands early,

preventive steps – and these steps should require neither unanimity in the

Security Council nor pictures of unfolding atrocities that shock the

conscience of the world‖.67

The Concept is that of ―Sovereignty as a Responsibility‖, according to

the expression put forward by Francis Deng the change is of importance,

even if one may quarrel Weiss‘ interpretation. According to him, the

responsibility to protect adds a fourth characteristic, ―respect for human

rights‖, to the other three characteristics dating back to the Westphalian

treaties.

According to the vision adopted by the Summit outcome, each State

has to enhance protection of its population through all possible means. Its

65

Ban Ki-moon, speech given at Berlin event on ‗Responsible sovereignty: International

cooperation for a changed world‘, 15 July 2008 available at

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm (last visited 28

December 2010). 66

Id. 67

Id.


973

judiciary system must be independent and efficient, allowing due recourses

by people whose rights seem to have been encroached upon. Safety must be

guaranteed to everyone through effective governance, a wise policy vis a vis

the clans when they do exist, and a strong struggle against gangs in order to

effectively control its territory. Civil society must find the necessary

freedom to be able to organize the defense of rights. The police must be

carefully overlooked and monitored by the government, as well as all forces

using arms. This is the picture of the society in a State duly protecting its

population.

However, the relevant State may show bad will or be unable to give

its population due protection.

Hence, the international community may be entitled to help a State

in order to prevent it from failing.

According to Ban Ki-moon, its implementation can be eased by the

innovative recognition of a third ―pillar‖ apart from the State‘s

responsibility to protect and the subsidiary responsibility of the international

community. This third pillar was put forward in 2008, when he, first,

highlighted the strength with which in the 2005 Summit outcome

―Governments unanimously affirmed the primary and continuing legal

obligations of States to protect their populations -- whether citizens or

not -- from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity, and from their incitement. They declared -- and this, is the

bedrock of RtoP -- that ‗we accept that responsibility and will act in

accordance with it‘‖68.

Building upon this assessment in his 2008 Berlin speech, Ban Ki-

moon underlined that:

―In this context, capacity-building could cover a range of areas --

from development, good governance and human rights to gender

equality, the rule of law and security sector reform. Our goal is not to

add a new layer of bureaucracy, or to re-label existing United

Nations programmes; it is to incorporate the responsibility to protect

as a perspective into ongoing efforts‖69

.

68

Id. 69

Id.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

974

No genocide will occur in a State with good governance or in a State

that respects human rights. Moreover, helping a State ―succeed‖ means

capacity building, i.e. developing what is needed for protective governance.

Hence, capacity building may entail institutional building… As a

consequence, almost the entire scope of UN activities according to Art. 1

para. 370

of the Charter comes under this heading… To incorporate the

responsibility to protect ―as a perspective into ongoing efforts‖, is to create

―mainstreaming‖, which finally gives more coherence to UN policies.

Another role of the international community in prevention is early

warning, which makes it possible to take measures aimed at stopping a

lethal process. For example, discriminatory laws may prepare persecutions

against a group within the population. Furthermore and more upstream,

identifying members of the population by their religion or their ethnicity

may lead to discriminatory laws. Hence, diplomatic measures can be taken

when such a situation is assessed (like the Council of Europe has done with

some of its members).

2. Protecting Downstream Through Reconstruction

After a crisis, stigmas make sufferings last. Reconstruction has to begin

and, in the more and more frequent case of a civil conflict, the social fabric

has to be repaired through a sense of reconciliation, which often needs

emblematic punishment of some criminals.

Indeed, when a civil war ends, the role of the State in control may seem

ambiguous, since it does not necessarily reflect the whole population. Often,

the people in charge will emanate from the so-called ―victims‖ group, as in

the case of Rwanda. In other cases, power will remain with the main group,

even though the minorities‘ position is improved. Such was the situation

between North and South Sudan when a peace agreement was brokered in

1972. And the situation may be the same at the end of an inter-States

conflict, due to the destabilization which can entail the overthrow of the

defeated State‘s regime.

Whereas the task is difficult for State authorities, it can be easier for the

international community.

70

Which reads as follows ―To achieve international co-operation in solving international

problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting

and encouraging universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and for

fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or

religion‖.


975

It could be easier with stakeholders which are external to past disputes.

The international community has developed a range of means to rebuild

war-torn societies. It starts with power sharing, a formula which tightly

associates former enemies for the exercise of power. And, in addition, it

reconstitutes the very power of authorities by restoring the actors of

constraint through two major ways: DDR – the result of which is the

suppression of irregular troops, and SSR – which amounts to vetting those

in the police or other regular armed forces, who are major offenders of the

law and/or do not show the necessary loyalty to common interests. The

latter, according to the theory is represented and carried out by the State;

thus police and military officers have to obey the State first.

The international community is often equally associated with the

struggle against impunity, which allows for reconstruction of the social

fabric through criminal justice or transitional justice. A striking example of

the responsibility to protect – even before the latter was proclaimed — rests

with the case of Sierra Leone. The Lomé agreement provided amnesty for

RUF warriors in spite of (or – alas – perhaps thanks to) their terrible actions.

Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General, pushed in the opposite direction,

so as to have the Special Tribunal created.

Another strong benchmark of the international community acting in

the name of R to P is the creation of international authorities in charge, or

partially in charge, of a country during a transition period. There, the

international community goes beyond influencing the situation. In the sense

that it considers being mandated for, possibly up to the exercise of direct

control over the territory and the population of the affected State or region.

In a softer formula, it may restrict giving assistance to a young power in

need of effectiveness: such is the case of UNAMA in Afghanistan, whereas

MINUK in Kosovo – at least in the beginning – had the power. Moreover,

be it local or international, a young power needs a safe environment to

impose its rule. Therefore, certain stabilization forces have been created:

SFOR71

, ISAF72

, MINUSTAH73

and MONUSCO74

.

71

Stabilization force, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the creation of which was authorized by

UNSC resolution (after the Implementation force), SC Res. 1088, 12 December 1996,

para. 18. 72

International Security Assistance Force, SC Res. 1386, 20 December 2001. 73

United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, created by SC Res. 1542, 30 April

2004, para. 1. 74

United Nations Stabilization Mission in DRC. The mission was initially created as

MONUC and slightly transformed in order to mark of the 50th

anniversary of Congo,

SC Res. 1925, 28 May 2010, para. 1.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

976

Thus, upstream and downstream the peak of crisis, there is room for

national or international actions aimed at protection and – which is more –

carried out in the name of the responsibility to do so. However, we believe it

is possible to go even beyond this ―narrow but deep‖ approach developed by

Ban Ki-moon.

IV. Protecting Against More Than the Four Major Dangers

Listed in the Summit Outcome?

The summit outcome expresses a vision of responsibility to protect

which is narrower than what was in view in some former documents.

Therefore, we can envisage an enlargement in different directions.

Let us quote pro memoria some authors who have argued for ―a

collective ‗duty to prevent‘ nations […] from acquiring or using WMD‖,

namely those ―run by rulers without internal checks on their power‖75

. This

brings to mind policies run by the UN – sometimes unilaterally – with

regard to North Korea, Iran and Iraq. In resolutions, the UN Security

Council, acts in the name of his mandate. But, since peace is invoked, it is

not directly about protecting the threatened population of one State.

Personally, we shall focus more on natural disasters. Cyclone Nargis,

which hit Burma on May 3, 2008, gave a field for arguing in a broader sense

about R to P. Whereas 2.4 million people were heavily affected, the

Burmese authorities obstructed relief operations in the name of sovereignty.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner – who once put forward the

ingérence or ―right to intervene‖- invoked the R to P. Unlike what has been

commented76

by some critics, it was not with the intent of deploying a non-

consensual force, but with the intent of getting the Security Council to adopt

a resolution in line with the ones previously adopted when humanitarian

assistance was endangered in Somalia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.77

Kouchner‘s position read as follows:

75

L. Feinstein & A.-M. Slaughter, ‗A duty to prevent‘, 83 Foreign Affairs (2004) 1, 136,

137. 76

―Mr. Kouchner is one of the unrepentant ‗humanitarian warriors‘ who gave

‗humanitarian intervention‘ such a bad name that we had to rescue the deeply divisive

idea […]. There would be no better way to damage R2P beyond repair in Asia and the

developing world than to have humanitarian assistance delivered into Myanmar

[Burma] backed by Western soldiers‖, R. Thakur, ‗Should the UN invoke the

‗Responsibility to Protect‘, The Globe and Mail, 8 Mai 2008. 77

SC Res. 751, 24 April 1992 (Somalia) and SC Res. 776, 14 September 1992 (Bosnia-

Herzegovina).


977

―We are seeing at the United Nations whether we can implement the

Responsibility to Protect, given that food, boats and relief teams are

there, and obtain a United Nations‘ resolution which authorizes the

delivery (of aid) and imposes this on the Burmese government‖.78

But the Security Council did not adopt any such resolution. The cause

is likely (as already mentioned hereabove) that in January 2007, upon

human rights purposes, Russia and China vetoed a resolution which led the

International community to great caution in 2008.

Enthusiasm was absent around Kouchner‘s solution, on the side of

institutions as well as on that of R to P proponents. Common sense favored

great caution in order to maintain the consensus reached in 2005. Edward

Luck, special advisor to the UN Secretary General on the Responsibility to

Protect was clear: ―We should take care not to undermine the historic but

fragile international consensus behind the responsibility to protect by

succumbing to the temptation to stretch it beyond what was intended‖.79

More theoretically, according to UNSG Ban Ki-moon

―extending the principle (of the responsibility to protect) to cover

other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or response to

natural disasters, would […] stretch the concept beyond

[…]operational utility.‖80

However, on the opposite side, Lloyd Axorthy, initiator of the ICISS

as Canadian Foreign Minister argued that R to P applied to Nargis and could

provide ―the basis for a resolution to expedite relief efforts‖.81

One cannot but understand the difference between natural disasters

and the four criminal activities referred to in the Summit outcome.

Distinguishing natural from man-made disasters is, of course, relevant.

78

Communiqué issued by the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 8 May 2008. 79

Statement of Dr. Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to the Secretary General, United

Nations, New York, NY in International Disaster Assistance: Policy Options.

Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign

Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection of the

Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 17 June 2008, 29. 80

Ban Ki-moon, supra note 65. 81

L. Axworthy, ‗International community has a responsibility to protect Myanmar‘,

Edmonton Journal,, 13 May 2008.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

978

But we both agree and disagree with Gareth Evans when he writes

that in front of a natural disaster, ―human security language is sufficient‖.82

For sure, a natural disaster triggers human insecurity, both personal,

sanitary, economic, as well as food insecurity. And, probably, it will likely

be the result of political insecurity leading to environmental insecurity.

Moreover, a natural disaster can hit a specific community, displace its

members in different directions and affect the community security.

However, this analysis in terms of human security/insecurity is not

enough, since it does not tell much about what is to be done. The assessment

about human security/insecurity does not provide a solution per se, when

public authorities neither bring a remedy, nor allow others to do so. And is it

not still a crime –at least in the broad sense – to impede rescue attempts?

When such an attitude amounts to raising the toll paid by the population is it

not somehow a kind of indirect ―mass killing‖? Would the responsibility to

protect not help?

Indeed, R to P in its narrow sense could already be invoked after a

natural disaster under specific circumstances. Given the frequent diversity

of a State‘s population, minorities may be at risk. And, sometimes, a natural

disaster striking a particular community is followed by the State‘s refusal of

access to it for foreign rescuers nor allow others to. When Armenia was

struck in Spitak (1988), the USSR did not immediately open its borders.

Such a case might enlighten the Nargis affair, since the cyclone , namely,

stroke the Karen community. For this aspect of Nargis, one could perhaps

have identified a hostile intent, not to say the very beginning of a genocidal

process which could have led to R to P even in the ―narrow but deep sense‖

if there had been enough sensitivity to Karens‘ fate.

Thus, one perceives a possible difference in status between refusing

rescuers‘ access to a minority and refusing rescuers‘ access to people

belonging to the branch of a population from which the rulers stem. Indeed,

in the Nargis case, the question was not put forward in those terms. But

another ethnic group, in another case, could catch more attention.

Yet, the treatment of such problems must not rely on the popularity

of a given ethnic group. Is it not better to consider that there is a

responsibility to protect the whole population in front of a natural disaster?

Refusing such an assertion would have the dangerous consequence of

denying any State‘s obligation to prevent and/or prepare for catastrophes.

82

G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect – Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for

All (2008), 349.


979

And, still, such an activity is the basis for risk reduction. The same refusal

would have the even more dangerous consequence of exempting the State

from maintaining a civil protection mechanism and service, whereas the

given are mentioned in the Geneva Law83

. And, in line with what has just

been argued, the ICISS report (2001) provided a condemnation of State

neglect.

In comparison, the 2005 Summit outcome text looks as an ad

minima consensus. And, as we have seen, this consensus could, today, be

seen as even more fragile and threatened with promotion as big powers of

States which used to traditionally oppose any supposed threat to their

sovereignty (e.g. India). This is a sufficient explanation for the Security

Council not passing, in the name of the responsibility to protect, a resolution

calling upon Burma, to either promptly and efficiently offer rescue, or

accept foreign rescue efforts.

And things went on after the Nargis case, namely with the 2009

debate in the UN General Assembly. Indeed, the Summit outcome foresaw a

further debate of the UN GA. The latter took place in 2009 after Ban Ki-

moon delimited the target by his report ―Implementing the responsibility to

protect”. The debate showed that the concept of responsibility to protect is

still subject to reluctance in some segments of the international community.

A large group of sponsors84

and additional sponsors85

proposed a short but

positive text for the resolution due to conclude the debate:

―1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary General

and of the timely and productive debate organised.

2. Decides to continue its consideration of the responsibility to

protect.‖86

83

In the first 1977 Protocol, civil defence is presented as something the targeting of

which would be an offence to civilian population (Arts 63 and 64). 84

Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Costa

Rica, Côte d‘Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,

Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Italy,

Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland,

Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda; Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden,

East Timor, Trinidad and Tobago, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay. 85

Andorra, Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Guinea, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia,

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malta, Norway, Paraguay, Papua-New Guinea,

Slovakia. 86

GA Res. 63/308, 7 October 2009.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 951-980

980

But Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Equator, Syria, Sudan and Iran

expressed their defiance towards the proposed text for this final resolution.

These States spoke of manipulation ―by the powerful to justify intervention

in the weaker States‖. A compromise was proposed by Guatemala: it was

the suppression of the words ―with appreciation‖87

in the final text of the

resolution.

But, with the development of civil society in the so-called ―emerging

states‖, will this kind of ―setback‖88

of R to P be sustainable?

We have now to go back to humanitarian action. As exposed in the

previous issue, humanitarian action has suffered for decades from what we

can call a ―protection gap‖. Therefore humanitarian actors have been

constantly looking for concepts that provide for access in view of delivery

to persons in need. The famous UNGA resolutions 43/131 (1988) and

45/100 (1990)89

, without using the expression, are written in R to P-friendly

terms. Twenty years ago, the picture was already in place for a dual level

responsibility: first the State, and an important contribution of the

international community. And up to the formulation of the responsibility to

protect in 2005, the process was long and winding throughout a rather hectic

decade, the 1990s, which have offered great hopes and great failures. Even

though the task is not yet completed,90

perhaps could R to P provide the

expected concept?

87

One could find a follow-up of the given resolution in the 6th

commission debates upon

the protection of persons in front of natural disasters. 88

S. K. Sharma, ‗Towards a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to

Implementation‘, 16 Review Essay Global governance (2010), 121-138. 89

GA Res. 43/131, supra note 3, GA Res. 45/100, 14 December 1990. Of course the

legal basis for humanitarian assistance in war times lies in the Geneva Conventions

and Protocols. 90

―Today, the responsibility to protect is a concept, not yet a policy, an aspiration, not

yet a reality. […] Friends, the task is considerable […] to turn promise into practice,

words into deeds.‖, Ban Ki-moon, supra note 64.


doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-2-3-vandewoude

The Rise of Self-Determination Versus the Rise

of Democracy

Cécile Vandewoude

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 982

A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 982

B. The International Prohibition of Racist and Segregating

Regimes ........................................................................................... 985

C. The Interdependence of Human Rights .......................................... 988

D. The Emerging Norm of Democratic Governance in

International Law ............................................................................ 988

E. Testing the Hypothesis: The Situation in Iraq................................. 994

F. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 995

Licentiate in Law, University of Antwerp, Belgium (2003), LL.M. Georgetown

University Law Center, USA (2005), Ph. D. Candidate Ghent University, Belgium.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

982

Abstract

This article challenges the traditional conception that the right to self-

determination does not require a certain outcome. This article examines

what restrictions international law imposes on peoples‟ choice to freely

determine their political status. This article concludes that the right to self-

determination calls for the installment of a form of government which is

based on the consent of the governed, is substantially representative of all

distinct groups in the country and respects human rights. Regardless of these

duties imposed on governments one may only conclude from State practice

that it is not observed by many States. As such the rise of self-determination

may not automatically be equated to the rise of democracy.

A. Introduction

The existence of the right to self-determination is well established in

international law.1 It evolved from a political principle to a human right,

codified in several human rights treaties,2 and is accepted as a rule of

customary international law.3 Several scholars even argue that the right has

acquired jus cogens status.4

Despite the prominent status of the right to self-determination within

various international treaties and instruments and many scholarly writings

on the subject “no norm has emerged that comprehensively defines the

scope of the right to self-determination”5. Notwithstanding the differing

interpretations of the right to self-determination, there does seem to be a

consensus on the fact that there are two dimensions of self-determination: an

1 Thomas Franck even traces the principle of self-determination back to 1000 B.C.. See

T. M. Franck, „The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance‟, 86 American Journal

of International Law (1992) 1, 46, 53. 2 Id., 52-56; H. Hannum, „The Right to Self-Determination in the Twenty-First

Century‟, 55 Washington and Lee Law Review (1998) 3, 773, 774-775. 3 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia

(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),

Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16, 31, para. 52. 4 Supporters of this view include I. Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law 7th

ed. (2008), 553; A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (2005), 65. 5 A. Kreuter, „Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of States: Somaliland

and the Case for Justified Secession‟, 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law

(2010) 2, 363, 367-368.


983

external one and an internal one.6 However, no consensus seems to exist on

the exact relationship between the two. During the Cold War more emphasis

was put on the external dimension, while currently more attention is being

paid to the internal meaning.7 Although some authors claim that the internal

meaning has fully supplanted the external meaning,8 the majority of scholars

does seem to accept that the two dimensions coexist.9

The external dimension is said to define the status of a people in

relation to another people or States, meaning the right to political

independence from alien domination or an already existing sovereign

State.10

Whether this right applies to minorities and thus includes a right to

secession from sovereign States is disputed.11

The wording in Article 1

Charter of the United Nations is said to refer to the external dimension.12

The internal dimension is said to concern the relationship between a

people and its own State or government.13

It entails a people‟s choice about

its governance.14

Some authors argue that the internal dimension is

formulated in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,

6 Id., 368-369.

7 R. Ezetah, „The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry‟, 22 Brooklyn Journal of

International Law (1996-1997) 3, 495, 504. 8 G. H. Fox, „Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?‟,

16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1994-1995), 733. 9 See for example A. E. Eckert, „Free Determination of the Determination to be Free?

Self-Determination and the Democratic Entitlement‟, 4 UCLA Journal of

International Law and Foreign Affairs (1999-2000) 1, 55, 68; R. Ezetah, supra note 7,

503-504; R. A. Miller, „Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of

Democracy?‟, 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2002-2003) 3, 601, 617. 10

Patrick Thornberry, „The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with

Some Remarks on Federalism‟, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-

Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? (1993), 101; A.

Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995), 5; Ezetah, supra

note 7, 503-504. 11

Fox, supra note 8, 738-739. 12

This is supported by Art. 1 (3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

(ICESCR) which reads “The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those

having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust

Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall

respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United

Nations”; see also Fox, supra note 8, 738-739. 13

Cassese, supra note 10, 101; Thornberry, supra note 10, 101. 14

Ezetah, supra note 7, 504.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

984

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).15

Others disagree.16

Another

contested element of the right to self-determination is the definition of

peoples.17

This paper will examine the scope of the internal dimension of the

right to self-determination. Article 1 (1) ICCPR and ICESCR states: “All

peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they

freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,

social and cultural development.”18

But what exactly do the Covenants

entitle peoples to do? Do peoples have the freedom to choose any form of

government, including a dictatorship? Or does international law impose

certain restrictions on the peoples‟ choice?

The international community has historically answered the latter

question negatively; otherwise, it was argued, one would confuse the

necessary means, a free determination of political status, with a particular

end, a determination to be free or democratic. A determination in which

there can be only one legitimate outcome, democracy, cannot truly be

considered a free act of self-determination.19

This article will question that statement. Currently, the international

community already accepts that the right to self-determination is non-

absolute and may be limited by the principle of territorial integrity.20

This

article will argue that international law also imposes at least two other

limitations and possibly a third one, concluding that the right to self-

determination only contains the right to opt for a certain type of

government, namely a government that fulfills certain standards. These

standards are derived from the limitations that will be examined in the

following paragraphs.

The two first limitations are explicitly formulated in international law:

they are the prohibition of racist and segregating regimes, and the

international obligation to protect human rights. The third limitation is more

controversial and stems from the emerging entitlement to democratic

governance. Since the beginning of the 1990s it has been argued by some

15

Miller, supra note 9, 620; Ezetah, supra note 7, 509. 16

Fox, supra note 8, 739; Hannum, supra note 2, 773-777. 17

Id., 739; Hannum, supra note 2, 774. 18

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Art. 1, 999

U.N.T.S. 171; [ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, 16 December 1966, Art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]. 19

Eckert, supra note 9, 69-70. 20

J. Vidmar, „The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of

the Same Coin?‟, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010) 2, 239.


985

scholars that the internal aspect of self-determination entails “a people‟s

democratic choice about its governance (emphasis added)”21

. As the

existence and content of a possible right to democratic governance is

disputed, its ability to possibly limit the exercise of the right to self-

determination is also disputable. The three limitations will be examined

next.

B. The International Prohibition of Racist and

Segregating Regimes

On two occasions in history the international community has

explicitly outlawed a political regime, i.e. after World War II the Nazi

regime and in the 1970s the Apartheid regime. The Nazi regime was called

by the Nuremberg Tribunal a “complete dictatorship”22

. The Nuremberg

judgment describes in detail how Hitler came to power and how he used and

maintained it. In addition, the Tribunal criminalized membership in certain

organizations.23

Hitler‟s political program consisted of twenty-five points, of which the

following is of particular interest in this context: “Point 1. We demand the

unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany, on the basis of the right

of self-determination of peoples”24

. This goal was to be achieved through a

policy of aggressive war. In order to be able to pursue such a policy the

regime had to gain complete control of the machinery of government. In

addition to the series of measures aimed at subjecting all branches of

government to their control, the Nazi Government also took active steps to

increase its power over the German population.25

In the field of education,

everything was done to ensure that the youth of Germany was brought up in

the atmosphere of National Socialism and accepted National Socialist

teachings. The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the nation in support

of their policies through the extensive use of propaganda. As a result,

21

Ezetah, supra note 7, 504. Ezetah bases this argument on Thomas Franck‟s

revolutionary idea that a democratic entitlement is emerging in international law, see

Franck, supra note 1, 52. 22

Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,

(14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946) available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/

Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf (last visited 14 June 2010), at 225. 23

Id., 12. 24

Id., 174. 25

Id., 176.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

986

independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered quite

impossible.

The second, more recent, example of a universal26

condemnation of a

political regime is the Apartheid regime. The crime of Apartheid is defined

in both the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and

Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA)27

and in the ICC Statute28

26

It should be noted that “Western” nations have never signed nor ratified the

International Convention. on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of

Apartheid, 30 November 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [ICSPCA]. For a complete list of

ratifications see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&

tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-7&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited 24

September 2010). However, the crime of Apartheid has been endorsed – albeit in a

weaker form – in other instruments, for instance in the 1977 First Additional Protocol

to the Geneva Conventions (Art. 85, para. 4(c)), Art. 18(f) of the Draft Code of

Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which does not mention the word

“Apartheid”, but refers to “institutionalized racial discrimination” as species of crime

against humanity and Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 27

Art. 1 ICSPCA states that “Apartheid is a crime against humanity and inhumane acts

resulting from the policies and practices of Apartheid and similar policies and

practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the

Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a

serious threat to international peace and security”. Art.2 defines the term “the crime of

Apartheid”, “which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation

and discrimination as practiced in Southern Africa [and] shall apply to the following

inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination

by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and

systematically oppressing them: Denial to a member or members of a racial group or

groups of the right to life and liberty of person: By murder of members of a racial

group or groups; By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of

serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by

subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or

groups; Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions

calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part; Any legislative

measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from

participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the

deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development such a groups or

groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human

rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade

unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right

to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom

of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and

association;


987

and criminalizes certain acts committed in the context of institutionalized

regimes of racial segregation and discrimination. Apart from the specific

situation in South Africa, the crime was used to sanction the political regime

in South Rhodesia.29

The term has also been used by human rights defenders

and the media with regard to the Israeli occupation of Gaza.30

From this it follows that the right to self-determination cannot be

understood to include the right to choose a system of Apartheid or a Nazi

regime. Should peoples opt for such a system, international law would not

consider it to be legitimate and would possibly subject the system to

sanctions, as illustrated by the South Africa and South Rhodesia cases.31

Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along

racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial

group or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial

groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or

members thereof Exploitation of the labor or the members of a racial group or groups,

in particular by submitting them to forced labor; Persecution of organizations and

persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose

Apartheid.” See GA Res. 3068, 30 November 1973. 28

Art. 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court states that “„crime against

humanity‟ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or

systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the

attack”. In Art. 7 para. 2(h) the term is further explained: “„The crime of apartheid‟

means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1,

committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and

domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed

with the intention of maintaining that regime”. 29

M. S. McDougal & W. M. Reisman, „Rhodesia and the United Nations: The

Lawfulness of International Concern‟, 62 American Journal of International Law

(1968) 1, 1. 30

See for instance J. Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of

Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967, UN Doc A/HRC

4/17, 29 January 2007; an open letter written by International Solidarity Movement:

Open letter to Bono: entertaining apartheid Israel… U 2 Bono? available at

http://palsolidarity.org/2010/01/10627/ (last visited 20 October 2010) and Boycot

Israel Apartheid Campaign: Tell MEC to Stop Supporting Israeli Apartheid! available

at http://www.boycottisraeliapartheid.org/node/48 (last visited 9 June 2010). 31

Regarding South Africa: The UN Security Council imposed sanctions upon South

Africa. See for instance SC Res. 311, 4 February 1972, para. 1. The United Nations

refused to recognize the South African representatives‟ credentials to the UN General

Assembly in 1974. See GA Res. 3206, (XXIX), 30 September 1974. See also

A. Barnard, „Slegs Suid Afrikaners – South Africans Only? A Review and Evaluation

of the International Crime of Apartheid‟, 7 New Zealand Journal of Public and

International Law (2009) 2, 317, 335-336. Regarding South Rhodesia: The UN did

not recognize the regime in Rhodesia as the legitimate government. See for instance

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

988

C. The Interdependence of Human Rights

A second limitation flows from the duty under international law on all

States regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems to respect

human rights. This obligation is not controversial in principle, as it is

enshrined in the Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter and in

Article 6 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. Moreover,

all States who voluntarily have accepted jurisdiction of a human rights court

capable of evaluating its human rights record clearly accept the legality of

the principle; otherwise they would not accept possible conviction when a

violation has been established. Even States who are not members of regional

human rights mechanisms or who frequently violate human rights do not

claim that they are not bound by human rights law. They justify violations

on alternative grounds.

Human rights law strives to have States respect all human rights as

they are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The exercise of one

human right may not lead to the violation or abolishment of another human

right. Article 30 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and

Article 5 ICCPR and ICESCR state that “[n]othing in this Declaration may

be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage

in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the

rights and freedoms set forth herein”. Consequential, this means that the

exercise of the right to self-determination may not lead to the violation or

abolishment of other human rights.

D. The Emerging Norm of Democratic Governance in

International Law

The possible existence of a right to democracy in international law has

been the subject of fierce debates in several international32

, regional33

and

SC Res. 288, 17 November 1970. See also McDougal & Reisman, supra note 29, 17-

18. 32

For the discussion within the United Nations framework see inter alia an Agenda for

Development, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/48/935, 6 May 1994;

Human Rights Commission Res. Human Rights U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, 27

April 1999; for the Inter-Parliamentary Union see the Universal Declaration on

Democracy (1997). 33

The right to democracy has only been explicitly recognized within one region, namely

by the Organization of American States (OAS). See Art. 1 of the Inter-American

Democratic Charter (2001) available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1


989

national34

fora. In international scholarship, the idea was first expressed in

1988 by Professor Henry Steiner, but it was only through Professor Thomas

Franks‟ article “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” that the

idea gained fame internationally.35

Over the years the notion has been both

widely supported36

and criticized37

in the literature. One of the theory‟s

_en_p4.htm (last visited 21 October 2010); Declaration of Nuevo León (2004)

available at http://www.oas.org/documents/specialsummitmexi

co/DeclaracionLeon_eng.pdf (last visited 21 October 2010), Draft Declaration of

Quito on Social Development and Democracy, and the Impact of Corruption (2004)

available at http://www.oas.org/xxxivga/DeclaracionQuito_eng.pdf (last visited 21

October 2010). Nevertheless, the issue of democracy has been widely discussed

within the other regions: for Europe see for instance the OSCE Document of the

Copenhagen Meeting on the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE

(1990) available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf (last

visited 21 October 2010) and the OSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990)

available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf (last visited 21

October 2010); for Africa see for instance Lomé Declaration (2000) available at

http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/april/ pa/apr7/meeting.htm

(last visited 21 October 2010), African Union Declaration on the Principles governing

Democratic Elections in Africa (2002) available at

http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/elections/declaration -africa-02.pdf (last

visited 21 October 2010); for the Arab Region see the Sana‟a Declaration on

Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court (2004)

available at http://www.undp.org.ye/reports/Sanaa%20Decleration%20on%20D

emocracy%20Human%20RIghts%20and%20the%20Role%20of%20the%20Internatio

nal%20Criminal%20Court.pdf (last visited 21 October 2010); for Asia see the Asian

Charter on Human Rights (1998) available at

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ASIA,,,4 52678304,0.html (last visited 21

October 2010) which contains a specific section on the right to democracy. 34

The national legal German system is unique because it considers democracy to be an

individually assertable right: “what is guaranteed to Germans entitled to vote is the

individually assertable right to participate in the election of the Bundestag and thereby

to cooperate in the legitimation of state power by the people at federal level and to

have an influence over its exercise”. Therefore functions and powers of substantial

importance must remain for the German Bundestag. See Manfred Brunner and Others

v. The European Union Treaty, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, reprinted in 1

Common Market Law Report (1994), 57, para. 247 and Judgment of 30 June 2009,

Cases 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 and 2

BvR 182/09 available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/

es20090630_2bve000208en.html (last visited 22 October 2010), paras 40-41. 35

H. J. Steiner, „Political Participation as a Human Right‟, 1 Harvard. Human. Rights.

Yearbook (1988), 77 and T. Franck, supra note 1. 36

G. H. Fox and B. R. Roth, „Democracy and International Law‟, 27 Review of

International Studies (2001) 3, 327; G. H. Fox, „The Right to Political Participation in

International Law‟, 17 Yale Journal of International Law (1992) 2, 539; Ezetah, supra

note 7; S. Wheatley, „Democracy and International Law: A European Perspective‟,

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

990

most contested elements is the formulation of the right and implicitly the

underlying understanding of the concept of democracy.38

Not only its content is disputed – also its relationship to other human

rights remains unclear. The definition proposed by most proponents is

generally deducted from, and connected to, an existing human right, i.e. the

right to political participation39

, the right to free and fair elections40

or the

right to self-determination41

. Support for such a limited approach is said to

be found in the current state of international law and the current limited

willingness of the international community to accept a broader concept.42

Such a limited conception is also endorsed in the national German legal

system.43

The choice for a limited conception of (the right to) democracy is

contested by other authors,44

the OAS Inter-Democratic Charter45

and the

51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002) 2, 225; C. M. Cerna,

„Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?‟,

27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1995) 2, 289;

J. N. Maogoto, „Democratic Governance: An Emerging Customary Norm?‟,

5 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review (2003), 55. 37

Eckert, supra note 9; N. J. Udombana, „Articulating the Right to Democratic

Governance in Africa‟, 24 Michigan Journal of International Law (2003) 4, 1209;

J. Ebersole (reporter), „'National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging

Norm of Democracy in International Law‟ (panel discussion), 86 American Society of

International Law Proceedings (1992), 249; Susan Marks, The Riddle of all

Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (2000),

164. 38

See for instance S. Marks, „The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic

Governance”‟, 91 American Society of International Law Proceedings (1997), 372. 39

Steiner, supra note 35. 40

Franck, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 36. 41

Wheatley, supra note 36; Ezetah, supra note 7. 42

R. Burchill, „The EU and European Democracy –Social Democracy or Democracy

with a Social Dimension?‟, 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2004) 1,

185, 186. In addition Gregory Fox points out that “elections are something that

international institutions can be very good at monitoring and evaluating”. See

Ebersole (reporter), supra note 37, 270. 43

See footnote 34. 44

Marks, supra note 37; Miller, supra note 9, 608-609. 45

Art. 1 Inter-Democratic Charter grants “the peoples of the Americas […] a right to

democracy” and imposes on “their governments […] an obligation to promote and

defend it”, however it does not define the right. The Charter does stipulate in Arts 2

and 3 that democracy should be representative and participatory. As essential elements

of representative democracy the Charter lists, inter alia, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms in their universality, indivisibility and interdependence, access

to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of

periodic free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an


991

former United Nations Commission on Human Rights,46

who all seem to

favor a more comprehensive definition of democracy.

Although international consensus on, and recognition of, the existence

of a right to democracy in international law might still be considered to be

premature, let us assume for the purpose of this article that the right to

democracy exists in international law. Regardless of whether one accepts a

limited or a more comprehensive definition, it is clear that respect for

human rights is at the heart of the discussion.

A consensus does appear to exist on the fact that no single model of

democracy can exist.47

However, the absence of a universal political model

does not negate universal democracy. Both proponents of broad and limited

perceptions of democracy consider the legitimation of governance by the

consent of the governed to be the core element of a democracy.

Governance is legitimated through political participation which

includes, but is not limited to free and fair elections. The right to political

participation is enunciated in both Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 ICCPR.

Article 25 ICCPR reads “[e]very citizen shall have the right and the

opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and

without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public

affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.

expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties

and organizations and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of

government (see Arts 3 and 7). The constitutional subordination of all state

institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law

on the part of all institutions and sectors of society are also mentioned as essential

elements of democracy (Art. 4). 46

Operational para. 2 Commission for Human Rights Res., Human Rights Documents.

E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, 28 April 1999; stated that “the rights (sic) of democratic

governance include, inter alia, the following:(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and

expression, of thought, conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and

assembly;(b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas

through any media;(c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens‟ rights,

interests and personal security, and fairness in the administration of justice and

independence of the judiciary;(d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as

free voting procedures and periodic and free elections;(e) The right of political

participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; (f)

Transparent and accountable government institutions;(g) The right of citizens to

choose their governmental system through constitutional or other democratic

means;(h) The right to equal access to public service in one‟s own country”. 47

This principle has been reaffirmed on multiple occasions by the UN General

Assembly: preambular para. 7 GA Res. 62/7, 13 December 2007; preambular para. 7

GA Res. 61/226, 14 March 2007; preambular para. 10 GA Res. 60/253, 2 May 2006.

Also mentioned in preambular para. 8 GA Res. 55/96, 28 February 2001.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

992

Based on Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 ICCPR, a government that

is not based on the consent of the governed is not considered to be

legitimate. In addition, the government must be substantially representative

of all distinct groups in the country.48

Representation should be manifest in

active participation such that “representation and participation [are]

experienced as part of a continuum.”49

This means that true participation

goes beyond the initial consent expressed through free and fair elections.

Consequently, its exercise should continuously be guaranteed. When a State

precludes effective participation, it also denies its people their right to self-

determination. Acts such as mass electoral fraud, anti-democratic coups, or

persecution of minority groups constitute violations of a people‟s collective

rights by which it is ruled.50

As a consequence, the right to self-determination – tempered by the

core components of universal democracy – only allows opting for a system

that is based on the consent of the governed and that is substantially

representative of all distinct groups in the country. Electing any other

government could be sanctioned by national or international courts, as

illustrated below.

As the exercise of one human right may not lead to the violation or

abolishment of another human right, the exercise of the right to self-

determination may not limit or exclude the future exercise of that right by

particular groups or individuals. For instance, the right to take part in the

conduct of public affairs includes not only the right to free and fair elections

but also comprises of the right to participate in the elections as a candidate.

The right to freedom of association allows for the establishment of political

parties. However, one may not form any kind of political party. Political

parties engaging in activities aimed at the destruction of any of the rights

and freedoms [set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights] may

48

This follows logically from the wording “everyone has the right to take part in the

conduct of public affairs”. 49

Thornberry, supra note 10, 116. 50

The true exercise of the right to self-determination supposes a governmental system

which takes into account the rights of minorities. Pure majoritarianism will by

definition exclude some citizens from the decision-making process, thus making the

consultation at the core of self-determination incomplete. Only a theory of democracy

that takes into account the concerns of all individual components of state-based “self”

is convincing as a species of self-determination. See Fox, supra note 8, 771.


993

be dissoluted by the government or by a court.51

In addition to the cases

brought before the European Court of Justice, a similar event has taken

place in Belgium. On 21 April 2004 the Ghent Court of Appeals found three

nonprofit organizations in breach of the anti-racism law as they all three

assisted a political party (“Vlaams Blok”) that had clearly and repeatedly

committed acts of racism and discrimination. This judgment led to the

transformation of the “Vlaams Blok” into “Vlaams Belang”.52

Moreover, election of a non-democratic party may also cause

international institutions or other States to take sanctions. This question was

raised within the European Union when Austrian elections in 1999 brought

the controversial People‟s Party into the government. The EU members felt

that this was contrary to European values, including the value of democracy,

and downgraded unilateral relations with Austria. There were calls from

certain Member States for EU action to be taken but no clear legal action

under the EU treaties could be taken as there had been no clear violation of

Article 6 Treaty on the European Union (current Article 2).53

It was argued

that all Austria did was to recognize the results of a free and fair election. At

the same time it was said, that had the Austrian government engaged in any

practices which were contrary to established human rights protection,

questions could have been raised about adherence to the principles of

Article 6 TEU.54

In conclusion, the exercise of the right to self-determination is

currently limited by the core components of universal democracy.

Consequently, the right to self-determination only allows peoples to opt for

a system that is based on the consent of the governed and that is

substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country. The reality

51

United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (1998), 26 E.H.R.R. 121,

para. 60; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 51, para. 53;

Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey (1999) 26 E.H.R.R. 12, para. 45. 52

Cour d‟Appel Ghent, Decision of 21 April 2004, available at

http://www.diversiteit.be/index.php?action=rechtspraak_detail&id=322 (last visited

18 November 2010) and Cour de Cassation, Decision of 9 November 2004, available

at http://www.diversiteit.be/index.php?action=rechtspraak_detail&id=45 (last visited

18 November 2010); See also E. Brems, Belgium: The Vlaams Blok Political Party

Convicted Indirectly of Racism, 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law

(2006) 4, 702. 53

Treaty on the European Union, 7 February 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992) [TEU]. 54

R. Burchill, „The Promotion and Protection of Democracy by Regional Organizations

in Europe: The Case of Austria‟, 7 European Public Law (2001) 1, 79, 84-85 and

Burchill, supra note 42, 197.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

994

must however be acknowledged that peoples may opt for a form of

government violating these components. However, by doing so, such a

government would expose itself to possible sanctions.

E. Testing the Hypothesis: The Situation in Iraq

After the 2003 invasion, the UN Security Council has reaffirmed on

several occasions “the right of the Iraqi people to freely to determine their

own political future and control their own natural resources.”55

From the

wording listed in subsequent resolutions it becomes clear that the Security

Council imposes the restrictions discussed above on the Iraqi people. The

Security Council encouraged “the people of Iraq to form a representative

government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to

all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender”.56

Another

paragraph reads “[w]elcoming the commitment of the Transitional

Government of Iraq to work towards a federal, democratic, pluralistic, and

unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights”57

.

Finally, the Security Council welcomed “the assumption of full

governmental authority by the Interim Government of Iraq on 28 June 2004,

the direct democratic elections of the Transitional National Assembly on 30

January 2005, the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and the recent

approval of the draft constitution by the people of Iraq on 15 October

2005”58

.

The Security Council added to these restrictions that the Government

has to “play a critical role in continuing to promote national dialogue and

reconciliation and in shaping the democratic future of Iraq”59

.

This supports the idea argued in the above paragraphs, namely that

international law calls for the installation of a system of representative

government that respects human rights and must continue to do so. The

Security Council also accepts other characteristics of democracy, namely

the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for the principle of the rule

of law.

55

SC Res. 1483, 22 May 2003; See also SC Res. 1546, 8 June 2004; SC Res. 1637, 8

November 2005, SC Res. 1723, 28 November 2006. 56

SC Res. 1483, 22 May 2003. 57

SC Res. 1637, 8 November 2005. 58

Id. 59

Id.


995

F. Conclusion

This article examined whether international law imposes certain

restrictions on the right to self-determination and has come to the conclusion

that current international law imposes two restrictions on the right to self-

determination, and possibly a future third one. Taken into account these

limitations, the “internal” right to self-determination calls for the installment

of a form of government that is based on the consent of the governed, is

substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country and respects

human rights.

As the international law of democracy further develops, in the future a

third limitation may be imposed, namely respect for the right to democracy.

This norm‟s currently disputed character makes it very difficult to correctly

assess its future effect on the right to self-determination.

Regardless of which definition of the right to democracy the

international community will adopt in the future it is clear that the respect

for human rights is at the core of the discussion. Both minimalist and more

comprehensive conceptions consider the consent of the governed and the

true representative character of the government to be the core components

of a democratic government.

As these two core elements are currently protected under human rights

law60

it may be said that they already influence the exercise of the right to

self-determination, that is in theory at least.

As stated above, respect for internal self-determination is a continuous

process. The international right to self-determination does not end when a

certain mode of government has been elected. The right to self-

determination imposes on the government a duty to ensure that peoples

under his jurisdiction have the opportunity to continuously exercise its right

to self-determination. As such internal self-determination may be considered

to be the extension of the external right to self-determination. As the choice

for independence or a certain level of autonomy does not grant the peoples a

blank check, theoretically the exercise of external self-determination should

equate to the promotion or expansion of democracy, or at least democracy‟s

two core elements. Unfortunately history has illustrated that that is not the

case, for example the creation of numerous post Cold-War States has not

60

Although acknowledging that if the right to democracy would be recognized, a more

extensive interpretation might be given to these rights as is the case in the German

legal system.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 981-996

996

dramatically increased the number of democracies, rather it has been said to

have advanced an undemocratic climate in which ethnic-nationalism has

blossomed.61

Similarly, any exercise of internal self-determination should respect

human rights and the core components of democracy in a nation. However,

in many nations – both democracies and non democracies – which formally

respect the right to self-determination, the participatory rights of certain

groups remain very controversial.

For these reasons the rise of self-determination may not automatically

be equated to the rise of truly representative and participatory democracy.

61

Miller, supra note 9, 608; T. Franck, „Tribe, Nation, World: Self-Identification in the

Evolving International System‟, 11 Ethics and International Affairs (1997) 1, 151;

B. R. Roth, „Evaluating Democratic Progress‟, in G. H. Fox & B. R. Roth (eds),

Democratic Governance and International Law (2000), 493, 493-494.


doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-2-3-borgen

From Kosovo to Catalonia: Separatism and

Integration in Europe

Christopher J. Borgen

Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................... 999

A. Introduction: A Tale of Two Opinions............................................ 999

B. Kosovo and the Law of Self Determination .................................. 1001

I. Kosovo‘s Declaration .................................................................. 1001

II. International Law and Self-Determination ................................. 1003

III. The ICJ and the Kosovo Advisory Opinion ................................ 1006

IV. Reactions and Implications ......................................................... 1008

C. Nationalism and the EU: Blood, Soil, and Globalization ............. 1009

I. Nations and States ....................................................................... 1009

II. Many Nationalities in One Nation: Spain .................................... 1011

1. The Basque Country ............................................................... 1013

2. Catalonia ................................................................................. 1016

III. Kosovo (as Seen from Spain) and the Limits of the ICJ ............. 1018

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for International Studies at St. John‘s University

School of Law in New York City. This essay benefited from comments and

suggestions from Lori Outzs Borgen, Peggy McGuinness, and Brad Roth. I am also

grateful to Nicole Rosich for her excellent research assistance in preparation of this

essay and to the editors and staff of the Goettingen Journal of International Law for

their fine editorial work. Any mistakes are solely my own. The main text of this article

was completed in December, 2010.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 998

IV. The EU and Conflicting Nationalisms ........................................ 1021

1. The Evolution of Regions ....................................................... 1021

2. EU Membership and Separatist Aspirations ........................... 1026

D. Separation in an Age of Integration (and Vice Versa) .................. 1029

From Kosovo to Catalonia: Separatism and Integration in Europe 999

Abstract

In July 2010 the International Court of Justice rendered its Advisory

Opinion on the legality of Kosovo‘s declaration of independence and the

Constitutional Court of Spain rendered an opinion concerning the autonomy

of Catalonia. Two very different cases, from very different places, decided

by very different courts. Nonetheless, they each provide insights on the

issue of separatism in the midst of European integration. Does the Kosovo

opinion open the door for other separatist groups? Does the process of

European integration increase or undercut separatism? In addressing these

questions, this article proceeds in three main parts. Part A briefly recaps the

legal issues involved in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Part B discusses the

relationship between self-determination and EU institutions and practices

with a particular focus on Catalonia and the Basque country. Finally, part C

assesses the seemingly contradictory impulses of separatism and European

integration.

A. Introduction: A Tale of Two Opinions

On July 10, 2010 over a million people marched in the streets of a

major European city, spurred to action by the legal furor over a court case

that was perceived to be about the self-determination of peoples. The city

was not Belgrade or Pristina (although there had been demonstrations in

those cities regarding another, better known, case), but Barcelona.

Catalonia, one of the seventeen Autonomous Communities (AC‘s)

recognized by the Spanish Constitution, had revised its Autonomy Statute in

2006. On July 9, 2010 Spain‘s Constitutional Court issued an opinion

striking down various expansions of authority in those revisions and finding

that there was no legal basis to define Catalonia as a ―nation‖1. The result

was many Catalonians arguing that autonomy within Spain was no longer

feasible; separation was required to defend their language, their culture,

their national identity.

1 ‗Catalan protesters rally for greater autonomy in Spain‘ (10 July 2010) available at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10588494 (last visited 17 Dec. 2010); see also,

D. Fombonne, ‗Madrid 1 – Barcelona 0: Spain‘s Constitutional Court stops Catalonian

Nationalist Ambitions‘ (10 November 2010) available at

http://www.legalfrontiers.ca/2010/11/madrid-1-barcelona-0-spains-constitutional-

court-stops-catalonian-nationalist-ambitions/ (last visited 17 Dec. 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1000

On a weekend when Spanish flags were flying high in anticipation of

the July 11 World Cup final between Spain and the Netherlands, Catalonian

flags were fluttered above protesters who filled block after block in

Barcelona. For many Catalonians, the affront to the Catalonian region

eclipsed the World Cup aspirations of the Spanish State. But, aside from a

few short articles in the international press, not many people around the

world took notice.

Less than two weeks later, on July 22, the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) issued its Advisory Opinion finding that Kosovo‘s declaration

of independence did not contravene international law. Although opinions of

the ICJ do not often garner much attention by journalists, the Kosovo

opinion was in the spotlight of the world press corps. Moreover, foreign

ministries, political parties, and separatist enclaves from all around the

world issued official statements concerning the opinion. Interpretations of

what the opinion meant abounded: some said it made declarations of

independence legal under international law; others said it was a special case

that could not apply to other secessionist disputes.

While these two opinions dealt with very different situations and were

issued by very different courts, there is an important overlap: they each

provide insights on the issue of separatism in the midst of European

integration. Does the Kosovo opinion open the door for separatist groups in

Scotland, Flanders, Corsica, Catalonia, the Basque country, or elsewhere?

Does the process of European integration increase or undercut separatism?

In addressing these questions, this article proceeds in three main parts.

Part A briefly recaps the legal issues involved in the Kosovo Advisory

Opinion. part B discusses the relationship between self-determination and

EU institutions and practices with a particular focus on Catalonia and the

Basque country. Finally, part C assesses the seemingly contradictory

impulses of separatism and European integration.

In the end, I argue that while commentators tend to focus more on the

pronouncements of the ICJ in delineating the scope of self-determination as

a legal right, we are entering into an era where, at least in regards to

separatist struggles in Europe, the definition and viability of self-

determination norms will relate primarily to the institutional regulations and

policies of the EU and other international organization. Although heralded

as a right applicable to all peoples, the realities of self-determination in

Europe will have more to do with bureaucratic push-and-pull among States,

their regions, and Brussels and less with the decisions of the World Court.


B. Kosovo and the Law of Self Determination

I. Kosovo‘s Declaration

On February 17, 2008, members of the Assembly of Kosovo issued a

statement declaring ―Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state‖2.

The Declaration stated: ―[W]e shall act consistent with principles of

international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United

Nations, including resolution 1244‖3.

Nonetheless, Kosovo‘s declaration started a diplomatic firestorm. The

U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, most other EU Member States, and a host

of other countries recognized Kosovo as a new State almost immediately.4

They were cautious to say, however, that Kosovo‘s declaration and the

subsequent recognition did not constitute legal precedent regarding the

creation of a State under international law.5

2 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 47 I.L.M. (2008) 1, 467, 467; C. J. Borgen,

‘Introductory Note to Kosovo‘s Declaration of Independence‘, 47 I.L.M. (2008), 461. 3 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, supra note 2, 468, para. 12. Security Council

Resolution 1244 provided the framework for the conflict resolution process in Kosovo

after the 1999 NATO air campaign. 4 For an updated list of recognitions, including dates of recognition, see ‗Who

Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?‘ available at

http://www.kosovothanksyou.com (last visited 14 December 2010). 5 For example, in announcing the recognition of Kosovo by the United States, Secretary

of State Condoleezza Rice explained:

―The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation – including the

context of Yugoslavia‘s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against

civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration – are not found

elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as

precedent for any other situation in the world today.‖,

Secretary of State C. Rice, 'U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State‘ (18

February 2008) available at http://kosova.org/docs/independence/United-States-

Recognizes-Kosovo-1.pdf (last visited 16 December 2010).

Moreover, in a statement to the UN Security Council following Kosovo‘s declaration,

British Ambassador John Sawers said that

―the unique circumstances of the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the

unprecedented UN administration of Kosovo make this a sui generis case, which

creates no wider precedent, as all EU member States today agreed‖,

‗Ban Ki-Moon urges restraint by all sides after Kosovo declares independence‘, (18

February 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID

=25659&Cr=Kosovo&Cr1= (last visited 14 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1002

However, European States that themselves had ongoing concerns

regarding minority populations criticized the declaration. The Romanian

Defense Minister, perhaps mindful of the ethnic Hungarian population in

Transylvania, said that such a declaration ―is not in keeping with

international law‖6. The Cypriot Foreign Minister warned against the EU

―breaking international law‖ by recognizing Kosovo.7 And, on the day of

Kosovo‘s declaration, Spain‘s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos

said: ―‗We will not recognise [Kosovo] because we consider … this does

not respect international law‘‖8.

While some States were in favor of recognizing Kosovo but against

enunciating a more general legal principle in support of Kosovar

independence and other States were against the idea of even recognizing

Kosovo, separatist groups embraced the declaration of the Kosovars. The

European Free Alliance, a coalition of national independence parties in the

European Parliament (such as the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru of

Wales, and Basque and Catalan separatist parties) issued a joint declaration

stating that the Kosovo declaration was a ―historic event which underlines

the rights of all European nations to decide freely their own futures, and

which demonstrates that this right is an essential democratic principle of the

European Union‖9.

On October 8, 2008, at the request of Serbia, the UN General

Assembly, by a vote of seventy-seven in favor, six against, and seventy-four

abstaining, referred to the ICJ the following question for an Advisory

Opinion: ―Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international

law?‖10

6 ‗Romania not to recognize unilateral Kosovo independence, says minister‘, available

at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/content_7231934.htm (last visited

14 December 2010). 7 H. de Quetteville & B. Waterfield, ‗EU-US showdown with Russia over Kosovo‘, (12

December 2007), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=

/news/2007/12/11/wkosovo111.xml (last visited 14 December 2010). 8 S. James, ‗EU Reactions to Kosovo‘s Independence: The Lessons for Scotland‘

(August 2008) available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/39433019/EU-Reactions-to-

Kosovos-Independence-The-Lessons-for-Scotland, 5, quoting from Spain says won‘t

recognize Kosovo independence, Reuters (18 Feb. 2008). 9 European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, ‗Kosovo – Independence

declaration welcomed‘, Press Release (19 February 2008) available at

http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/pressreleases/dok/220/220880.htm (last visited 16

December 2010). 10

GA Res. 63/3, 8. October 2008. The voting record is as follows:


This placed the ICJ center stage in the drama that was unfolding. And

yet, its dialogue would be muted, at best. Before turning to the Advisory

Opinion, I will consider briefly the disagreements over how to define self-

determination as a legal concept.

II. International Law and Self-Determination

Although self-determination was mentioned in Woodrow Wilson‘s 14

Points, the U.N. Charter,11

and in major human rights treaties,12

jurists at

―In favor:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia,

Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica,

Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the

Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial

Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India,

Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,

Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Myanmar,

Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,

Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia,

Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,

Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, United Republic of

Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United

States of America.

Abstaining:

Afghanistan, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,

Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,

Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco,

Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Peru,

Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Saint Lucia,

Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sweden,

Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad

and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, Vanuatu, Yemen‖,

U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.22, 8 October 2008, 10. 11

See Art. 1, para. 2 and Art. 55 Charter of the United Nations. 12

Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states: ―All peoples

have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their

political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1004

least into the 1990‘s have found that ―international law as it currently stands

does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination‖13

.

At its most basic level, the right to self-determination is generally

understood to be ―the right of cohesive national groups (‗peoples‘) to choose

for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to other

groups‖14

.

The assumption is that the choice of political system and pursuit of

economic, social and cultural development would occur under the auspices

of an existing State, and would not require the establishment of a new State.

This conception of internal self-determination makes self-determination

closely related to the respect of minority rights. Furthermore, modern views

of self-determination also recognize the ―federalist‖ option of allowing a

certain level of cultural or political autonomy as a means to satisfy the norm

of self-determination.15

As understood in the 1960s, self-determination was essentially another

term for decolonization: stating that all peoples had a right to self-

determination meant that all colonies had a right to be independent.16

As the

era of decolonization waned, the question became what effect would a right

to self-determination have outside of the colonial context. There were thus

two questions that needed to be resolved: (a) who has a right to self-

determination; and, (b) what does the right entail outside of the

decolonization context?

U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 1 para. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 1, para.1. 13

Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497,

1498 (1992). 14

I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (2008), 580; see also D.

Thurer, ‗Self-Determination‘, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 4 Encyclopedia of Public

International Law (2000), 367.I have described elsewhere how the concept of ―self-

determination‖ is used in the diplomatic strategies of great powers and how it effects

the diplomatic strategies of those powers, see C. J. Borgen, ‗The Language of Law

and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in

the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia‘, 10 Chicago Journal of International Law

(2009) 1, 1. 15

D. Thurer, ‗Self-Determination, 1998 Addendum‘, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 4

Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2000) 373. 16

P. Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to

Secession, (1996) 3–4. But see A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal

Reappraisal (1995) 51, stating that by the time the self-determination language of

Article 1 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was adopted in

1955, few States argued that the principle only applied to colonial rule.


Both of these questions were considered by the Québec Commission,

a group of experts convened by a committee of the National Assembly of

Québec to provide advice concerning the legal issues implicated by a

hypothetical secession of Québec. The Commission found that the right to

self-determination is context dependent, that different definitions of

―peoples‖ lead to different applications of the right to self-determination,

and that secession is only recognized as a remedy in the case of

decolonization.17

Academic commentators, particularly Europeans, argued that in cases

other than decolonization, as long as a State allows a minority group the

right to speak its language, practice its culture in a meaningful way, and

participate effectively in the political community, then that group is said to

have internal self-determination. Secession, or external self-determination,

was strongly disfavored. According to this view, a right of self-

determination was not a general right of secession.18

However, commentators also explained that one cannot say that

international law made secession illegal. If anything, international law is

largely silent regarding secession, and attempted secessions are, first and

foremost, assessed under domestic law.19

Thus, the law of self-determination, as understood after the era of

decolonization, can be summarized as follows:

- Self-determination for a colonized people allows for the

ability to separate the colony from the colonial State so

that the colony may gain independence and become a

sovereign State;

- For a State as a whole, self-determination means the right

to be free from external interference in its pursuit of its

political, economic, and social goals;

- For communities that are not colonies and are within

existing States, self-determination means internal self-

17

T. M. Franck et al., ‗The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the

Attainment of Sovereignty‘, in A. F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in

International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (2000), 241, 248, 279–280. 18

See Cassese, supra note 16, 40 (stating that self-determination does not mean a right

to secede). 19

Concerning the silence of international law, see, for example, P. Daillier, A. Pellet &

N. Q. Dinh, Droit International Public (2002), 526, para. 344 no. 1: ―la sécession

n‘est pas prise en compte en elle-même par le droit international,‖ that is, ―secession

in itself is not taken into account by international law‖.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1006

determination, the pursuit of minority rights within the

existing State.20

However, this view was not accepted by all. Some argue that in non-

colonial cases, ―[a] right to external self-determination […] [including at

times the assertion of a right to unilateral secession] arises in only the most

extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances‖21

. The

idea of secession as a right under certain circumstances has been, in the

words of Professor Malcolm Shaw, ―the subject of much debate‖22

. While

the request for an Advisory Opinion related to Kosovo‘s declaration of

independence may have seemed like an opportunity for the ICJ to clarify

and define the relationship between self-determination and secession, it

actually showed the limits of ICJ adjudication in the midst of a political

dispute.

III. The ICJ and the Kosovo Advisory Opinion

The Advisory Opinion itself is misunderstood. Commentators

oversimplified the opinion, saying that it found that the declaration of

independence was legal. It did not quite do that. Rather, the ICJ stated that,

based on the wording of the question, the answer ―turns on whether or not

the applicable international law prohibited the declaration of

20

See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (2006), 127–

128. 21

In re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R 217, 126 (Canada) (second emphasis

added). 22

M. N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (2003), 271 fn. 140. Jurists who interpret the

law of self-determination in this way generally contend that any attempt to claim

secession as a remedy must at least show that: ―(a) the secessionists were a ‗people,‘

(b) the state in which they are currently part brutally violates human rights, and, (c)

there are no other effective remedies under either domestic law or international law.‖

I discuss the evolution and application of the law of self-determination to issues of

secession at greater length in Special Committee on European Affairs, ‗Mission to

Moldovia – Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in

Moldova‘, 61 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (2006) 2,

196, 239 (hereinafter ―Moldova Report‖), a report of which I am the principal author,

and also, generally, C. J. Borgen, ‗Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The

Legal Geography of Eurasia‘s ―Frozen Conflicts‖‘, 9 Oregon Review of International

Law (2007) 2, 477.


independence‖23

. The Court concluded that the historical record ―does not

point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the

making of a declaration of independence in such cases‖24

.

Significantly (although rarely noted by lay commentators), the Court

also found that the principle of territorial integrity is not implicated in cases

of declarations of independence. Instead, it ―is confined to the sphere of

relations between States‖25

, as opposed to the actions of non-State entities.

As for whether there is a right to ―remedial secession‖ under

international law, the Court noted that there were ―radically different views‖

among the States taking part in the proceedings regarding secession outside

of the context of decolonization and, if such a remedy existed, whether it

could be applied to Kosovo. But the ICJ did not further investigate this issue

as it ―consider[ed] that it [was] not necessary to resolve these questions in

the present case‖26

.

The ICJ chose restraint and narrow readings. We are left with what

may have been the consensus before we started: declarations of

independence are primarily domestic affairs, and the UN does not condemn

such declarations unless there is a separate violation of international law

(such as the prohibition on the use of force).

Rather than dismissing the idea of remedial secession outright, the

Court merely said it was highly contentious, and there was no need to

decide the issue.27

This leaves the door open that there may be a right of

remedial secession, a topic that many commentators previously thought was,

in effect, closed.28

Whether the ICJ, as a whole, meant its opinion to have

such an implication is itself an open issue.

23

Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in

Respect of Kosovo, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010,

para. 56 (hereinafter Advisory Opinion) (emphasis added); see also C. J. Borgen,

Introductory Note to the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on

Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of

Kosovo, 49 ILM (forthcoming 2010). 24

Advisory Opinion, supra note 23, para. 79. 25

Id., para. 80. Thus, when the Security Council condemned particular declarations of

independence, such as those of Rhodesia or Northern Cyprus, the issue related to an

―unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of international law,‖ in

particular, jus cogens. Id. para. 81. 26

Id., paras 82-83. 27

Id. 28

See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 20, 247; Dailler, Pellet & Dinh et al., supra note 19,

526, para. 344 no. 1 (―la sécession n‘est pas prise en compte en elle-même par le droit

international,‖ that is, ―secession in itself is not taken into account by international

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1008

IV. Reactions and Implications

While the ICJ may have cleared the way for recognition, concerns

over domestic separatist groups made recognition of Kosovo politically

risky for many governments. Serbia‘s B92 radio reported that Italian

Foreign Minister Franco Frattini ―added that the ICJ‘s decision clearly states

that Kosovo must remain a unique case and that it cannot cause a domino

effect, since such an event would lead to a crisis of international

relations‖29

. None of the five members of the EU who had not previously

recognized Kosovo have shown a new inclination to recognize Kosovo in

the wake of the ICJ opinion.30

In the words of the International Crisis

Group: ―The cascade of post-ICJ recognitions Pristina expected has not

materialized, and there is little indication that Kosovo‘s friends are putting

great effort into persuading others to accept it as a sovereign state‖31

.

While States may be treating this opinion as ―water under the bridge,‖

and attempting to move on, separatists keep referring to the opinion, or at

least to their interpretations of what it means. Sergei Bagapsh, the putative

president of Abkhazia said that:

―The decision of the International Court once more confirms the right

of Abkhazia and [fellow breakaway Georgian region] South Ossetia to

self-rule. And from a historical and legal point of view, Abkhazia and

South Ossetia have much more right to independence than Kosovo.‖32

Within the EU, national minorities argued that the opinion backed

their own claims and aspirations:

law‖); Franck, supra note 17, 248, 279–280 (stating that secession is only recognized

as a remedy in the case of decolonization); Cassese, supra note 16, 40 (stating that

self-determination does not mean a right to secede). But see Shaw, supra note 22, 271

fn. 140 (stating that a posited right of remedial secession is ―the subject of much

debate‖). 29

‗Italy: Kosovo Talks Must Continue‘ (July 25 2010) available at

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=25&nav_

id=68669 (last visited 16 December 2010). 30

International Crisis Group, ‗Kosovo and Serbia After the ICJ Opinion‘, Europe Report

No. 206, 1 (last visited 14 December 2010) available at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/206-kosovo-and-serbia-

after-the-icj-opinion.aspx. 31

Id. 32

‗Reaction in Quotes: UN Legal Ruling on Kosovo‘ (22 July 2010) available at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10733837 (last visited 16 December 2010).


―Laszlo Tokes, an ethnic Hungarian MEP [Member of the European

Parliament] from Romania compared the situation with that of the

Hungarian minority in the country, saying that Hungarians should now

take to the streets to demand autonomy.‖33

Aitor Estaban, a representative from Spain‘s Basque Nationalist Party

(PNV) said that ―the main consequence is that Spain cannot keep saying that

the international rules don‘t allow for a split of the country for a new

Basque independent country into the European Union. So I think that should

be already over and that‘s good news for us‖34

. Alyn Smith, a Member of

the European Parliament (MEP) from the Scottish National Party, did not go

into detail concerning the situation in Scotland, but did say that the opinion

set an international precedent.35

Frieda Brepoels, an MEP from the New

Flemish Alliance, looked forward to ―the prospect of EU membership‖ for

Kosovo.36

While the Advisory Opinion has spawned (hopeful) rhetoric from

separatist groups, has it really changed anything in regards to the European

conflicts? Before addressing this, I will first consider the roles of nations,

regions, and States in the EU.

C. Nationalism and the EU: Blood, Soil, and

Globalization

I. Nations and States

Nationalism has been a major force in European history. It has been

the source of conflict and, more generally, of anxiety. Bruno Coppieters

33

‗Kosovo Independence No Violation of Law, Finds International Court of Justice‘ (22

July 2010) available at http://euobserver.com/9/30529 (last visited 16 December

2010). 34

H. Jamar & M. K. Vigness, ‗Applying Kosovo: Looking to Russia, China, Spain, and

Beyond After the International Court of Justice Opinion on Unilateral Declarations of

Independence‘, 11 German Law Journal (2010) 8, 913, 925. 35

‗Court says Kosovo independence ‗not illegal‘‘ (July 23 2010) available at

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/court-says-kosovo-independence-not-illegal-

news-496583 (last visited 16 December 2010). 36

Kosovo Independence No Violation of Law, Finds International Court of Justice,

supra note 33.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1010

contends that ―[t]he EU condemns exclusive types of nationalism as morally

retrograde and conducive to conflict‖37

. Although – or perhaps because –

Europe is in the process of constructing an ever closer union, there are

currently twenty to twenty-five ―significant‖ separatist movements across

the continent.38

Most are non-violent political and cultural movements;

some groups seek greater autonomy within an existing State, others seek

outright independence. Each of these hearkens back to a national

community that does not currently have a State of its own.

The bomb-throwing radicals of years past are largely gone, but in

some places popular support for autonomy or separation is stronger than

ever.39

Consider Scotland: although a 2008 opinion poll showed only about

19 percent of the population in favor of full independence, the ongoing

politics makes majority support ―not [...] inconceivable in the long term‖40

.

The marriage that is Belgium is, at the time of this writing, facing the

serious possibility of divorce, with Flanders and Wallonia each going their

own way. In the summer of 2010 separatists from across Europe came

together at a festival in Corsica called the Days of Corte to talk about…

separating.41

The seeming irony that people from across Europe come together at a

cook-out to talk about separating is an apt symbol for the phenomenon of

local fragmentation in the midst of European integration. Some separatist

movements are against both central and regional governments ―but others

either constitute or are part of the regional government or – in the case of de

facto States – are in control of a population and a territory‖42

.

Kosovo‘s declaration of independence and now the ICJ‘s Kosovo

opinion have been very important events for these groups. But have the

37

B. Coppieters, ‗Secessionist Conflicts in Europe‘, in D. H. Doyle (ed.), Secession as

an International Phenomenon: From America’s Civil War to Contemporary

Separatist Movements (2010), 237, 247. 38

Id. 241. 39

See, e.g., B. R. Barber, Jihad Vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are

reshaping the World (1995), 172 (noting ―In Brittany, though the old separatist bomb-

throwers are gone and secession is no longer an issue, Breton cultural nationalism is

probably running ‗stronger today than at any other time this century.‘‖). 40

Coppieters, supra note 37, 242. 41

M. Kimmelman, ‗Cultures United to Honor Separatism‘, New York Times Online

available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/arts/14abroad.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1&ref=t

odayspaper (last visited 14 December 2010). 42

Coppieters, supra note 37, 242. Regarding de facto States, see Moldova Report, supra

note 22.


recognition of Kosovo by over seventy States and the ICJ‘s opinion actually

changed the legal context for these separatist groups, or are these events just

symbolically important? Before answering these questions, I will turn to the

stories of the Basque country and of Catalonia as two examples of

regionalism and sub-State nationalism within the EU.

II. Many Nationalities in One Nation: Spain

Spain provides at least two different views into the issues of

nationalism in the midst of integration. Despite both being within a single

country, Catalonia and the Basque country have unique histories.

It has been said that many Spaniards put loyalty to the region or

locality on the same level with, or above, loyalty to the country.43

But such

regional affinity is not the same as separatism.

Spain is a single State with at least three major languages – Spanish

(Castilian), Catalan, and Basque – and a whole host of dialects. It is a

country with a richness of regional cultures.

During the Franco regime (and at other times before Franco), the

Spanish government treated such diversity as a threat and tried to force a

linguistic and cultural uniformity on the various groups. Languages other

than Spanish were not permitted and were devalorised: everyone was told to

―speak Christian‖.

After Franco‘s death in 1975, Spain reacted against the centralization

of the previous decades (if not centuries). A new Constitution was drafted

and came into force in 1978. Article 2 touches on the issue of peoples and

nations and reads:

―The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish

nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it

recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities

and regions which make it up and the solidarity among them‖44

.

The question became how to square the circle of a single Spanish

nation made up of autonomous nationalities. The answer, at first, was to

recognize the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia as ―historical

nationalities‖ that had a fast track to become Autonomous Communities

within the Spanish State. Other regions within Spain also had their own path

43

J. Hooper, The New Spaniards (2006), 218. 44

Spanish Constitution (1978), Sec. 2 (emphasis added).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1012

that they could follow to become AC‘s. Such a community could be

comprised of a single province or several neighboring provinces. Each AC

would have its own president, legislature, and supreme court.45

The

decentralization of the State accelerated as provinces either singly or

together sought AC status.

Power shifted from Madrid to the new AC‘s as these new sub-State

governments took on greater policy responsibilities. An autonomy statute

may grant to the region any competence not reserved to the national

government.46

Others policy areas would be under the dual responsibility of

the central government and of the AC‘s. Once power moved from the center

to the AC‘s, it was difficult for Madrid to regain the power as action by both

the regional and the central government is needed to amend an autonomy

statute.47

However, the central government in Madrid would maintain

exclusive authority for ―foreign affairs, external trade, defense, the

administration of justice, merchant shipping, and civil aviation‖48

.

While the government of Spain‘s fledgling democracy wanted to

exorcise Franco‘s centralism from the country, they were also wary of the

State flying apart. Also, none of the AC charters

―give any right of secession, much as some Basques and Catalans

would like one. Words are carefully chosen: Andalusia is a

‗nationality‘, not a ‗nation‘. The Catalans‘ charter admits that,

although they think of themselves as being a nation, the rest of Spain

does not.‖49

Madrid opposed the use of ―federal‖ terminology in describing this

arrangement of power and responsibilities as overly divisive.50

Today there

are seventeen AC‘s.51

As one observer wrote in 2007:

45

Hooper, supra note 43, 38. 46

Spanish Constitution (1978), Sec. 149, (3); see also H. Hannum, Autonomy

Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights

(1996), 271. 47

Spanish Constitution (1978), Sec. 152 (2); see also Hannum, supra note 46, 270. 48


‗The Spanish Centrifuge‘ (1 March 2007) available at http://www.economist.com/

node/ 8786353 (last visited 14 December 2010). 50


J. Bengoetxea, ‗The Participation of Infra-State Entities in European Union Affairs in

Spain: the Basque Case‘, in S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (eds), The Role of Regions and

Sub-National Actors in Europe (2005), 50.


―Although the country is not a federation, it increasingly looks like

one. Spain is one of Europe‘s most decentralised States—more than

some overtly federal ones, says Francisco Balaguer, at Granada

University. The regions control some 36% of public spending.

Ministries in Madrid are seeing their budgets dwindle fast.‖52

As the focus of discussions on separatism turned to Kosovo in 2008,

Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was already four

years into a program of revising the charters of the AC‘s. Valencia,

Catalonia, and Andalusia were the first three AC‘s to have expanded

powers. Prime Minister Zapatero was in favor of such an expansion of

responsibilities for all seventeen regions. Once begun, decentralization had

its own gravity: ―The opposition is officially against, but their local chiefs,

like politicians anywhere, rarely dislike extra power‖53

.

While the various AC‘s want greater autonomy, Catalonia and the

Basque country are the two that have the strongest separatist movements. If

―all politics is local,‖ (in the words of the American Congressperson

Thomas ―Tip‖ O‘Neill) then the politics of self-determination and secession

are the most local of politics. To understand separatism in any given

instance, one must understand the local history and lore of the persons or

groups involved. While there are certain similarities that will allow for

comparison – the Basque Country and Catalonia are both in Spain and each

have adopted very similar governmental functions in their AC‘s –54

there are

also striking contrasts, which will be discussed below.

1. The Basque Country

The Basque people are ethnically and linguistically different from the

other peoples that surround them. Some anthropologists believe that the

Basque predate the migrations that brought Indo-European languages to

Europe 3,000 years ago.55

There are references to the Basque in writings

52

The Spanish Centrifuge, supra note 49; see also James, supra note 8, 5; Hooper, supra

note 43, 43 (stating ―In just over four years, one of the most centralized nations on

earth had been carved into seventeen self-governing administrative units, each with its

own flag and capital‖.). 53

The Spanish Centrifuge, supra note 49. 54

Hannum, supra note 46, 271, fn. 798. 55

Hooper, supra note 43, 232.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1014

from the Roman Empire and the end of Roman rule was the last time that all

Basques were under the same political administration.56

The Basque country

took more or less its present form in 1530 when part of it was in the then-

new Kingdom of Spain and part was across the border in France.57

Modern Basque nationalism was defined in the late nineteenth century

by Sabino de Arana Goiri. Arana coined the word ―Euskadi‖, meaning

―collection of Basques‖, to refer to the Basque ―nation‖ that exists within

both Spain and France.58

By the 1930‘s, the Basques were on the road to gaining autonomy like

the Catalans but then the Spanish Civil War began in 1936.59

While the

1930‘s Basque peasantry was ―deeply reactionary‖ and middle-class

nationalists were ―quasi-fascists‖60

, the regions of Guipuzcoa and Biscay

opted for autonomy, which in effect made them supportive of the Republic.

The result was the horror of Guernica and, once Franco consolidated his

power, punitive decrees ending autonomy.

It should be little surprise that these regions became the birthplace of

Euskadi Ta Akatasuna (―ETA‖), the violent Basque paramilitary group.

ETA‘s history is one of factionalization and withering in which ―each time

the more violent, less intellectual group survived intact‖61

. ETA became

widely condemned as a terrorist organization, responsible for killings and

kidnapping. The cycle of violence, repression, radicalization, and further

violence and repressions seemed endless. By the early 1970‘s about one

quarter of the Guardia Civil was stationed in the Basque country. Residents

of the Basque country, irrespective of whether or not they were ethnically

Basque or even if they were a recent ―immigrant‖ from another part of

Spain, increasingly felt that they were a separate community, held apart

from the rest of Spain. Franco‘s oppressive centralism spurred regionalism.

It is important to note, in this respect, that ETA should not be equated

with the totality of Basque separatists. There was also a non-violent cultural

resistance to Franco‘s policies. In the late 1950‘s, for example, the

population of the Basque country founded the ikastolas, primary schools

with education in Euskera,62

the Basque language. Also. various Basque

56

Id. 235. 57

Id. 58

Id., 242-243. 59

Id., 229. 60

Id., 244. 61

Id., 245. 62

Id., 246.


political parties took up the causes of autonomy or separatism in the

political arena.

This sense of being apart from, if not in actual opposition to the rest of

Spain, remained after Franco‘s death. The Basque country had the highest

―no‖ vote regarding the 1978 Spanish Constitution,63

possibly a sign of the

Basque not wanting anything further to do with the Spanish central

government or, at least, that it wanted even more autonomy than provided

for the in AC-structure. Moreover, eight years later there was a sense that

Spain‘s accession to the European Communities in 1986 ―somehow pre-

empted or dispossessed the [Basque Autonomous Community] of its

recently assumed powers‖64

.

There have been periodic ―cease-fires‖ called by ETA. However, even

if the use of violence as a tactic waxes and wanes, the sense of apartness

remains among the ETA: ―even if the [Spanish State] were to become a

model of democracy […] it wouldn‘t change things as far as we were

concerned. We are not, nor have we been, nor shall we ever be Spaniards‖65

.

Herri Batasuna, one of the major Basque separatist political parties,

states that Basque goals are independence from Spain and reunification with

the French Basque territory; short of that they seek the withdrawal of

national security forces, integration of Navarra, amnesty for Basque

―political prisoners,‖ the legalization of separatist political parties, and the

possibility of independence.66

However, Herri Batasuna was declared illegal

by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2003 due to its alleged political ties with

ETA. This decision was further ratified by the Spanish Constitutional Court

and legislature. An appeal by Herri Batasuna to the European Court of

Human Rights failed, on the logic that the government of Spain acted based

on a ―pressing social need‖67

.

Basque separatism for the better part of its history conformed with

common assumptions about separatism: a difficult, at times violent struggle,

dotted with terrorism and atrocities from both sides. As between ETA and

the Spanish government, it is a clash of absolutes. But while this oft-violent

63

Id., 249. 64

Bengoetxea, supra note 51, 47, 48. 65

As quoted in Hooper, supra note 43, 247. 66

Hannum, supra note 46, 276-277. 67

U.S. Department of State, ‗2009 Human Rights Country Report on Spain‘ (11 March

2010) available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136059.htm (last

visited 14 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1016

opposition exemplifies separatism‘s past, it is not necessarily indicative of

the future of separatism in Europe.

2. Catalonia

Discussions of Basque separatism often emphasize the uniqueness of

the Basque language and culture, the deep roots of the Basques in the land

called ―the Basque country,‖ and, unfortunately, the violence of ETA. It is a

story of blood (in both the ethnic and violent senses) and land. The stories

that describe the Catalonian ―national identity‖ often emphasize Catalonian

pride and, related to this, whimsy. The pride is apparent: One Catalan

website begins answering the questions ―What is Catalonia?‖ by explaining

―Catalonia is an old european nation. Today, Catalonia is nation [within]

Spain. But in the past, Catalonia has been one of the greatest nations in the

world‖68

. Jordi Pujol i Soley, the President of Catalonia‘s Generalitat from

1980 to 2003, has said that ―Catalonia is as much a nation as Slovenia or

Estonia‖69

.

But the whimsy is also displayed: in response to Franco‘s attempt to

quash Catalonian regional affinity, a Catalonian audience at a musical

performance that he attended in Barcelona regaled him with the Catalan

national anthem. In a response to Spain‘s adoption of a silhouetted bull

(originally the mark of a sherry company) as a cultural symbol, Catalans

responded with the ―Planta‘t el burro‖ campaign to adopt the silhouette of a

donkey as a symbol of Catalonia.70

And then, following the decision of the

Constitutional Court concerning the Autonomy Statute, Catalonia outlawed

bullfighting in the Summer of 2010, in a move that was ostensibly about

animal welfare but perhaps more pointedly about cultural practices that

were not native to the region. And the list goes on.

Be they serious, whimsical, or somewhere in between, the underlying

discourse in all of these activities has to do with the identity of Catalans as a

distinct people with its own language and culture and a heritage as a

significant nation in European history. Catalans may emphasize that they are

different from Castilians, but they do not equate separation with insularity.

The Catalans emphasize their desire to return Catalonia to what they see as

its proper place as a nation within the broader European family of nations.

68

‗What‘s Catalonia?‘ (31 August 2009) available at http://www.catalonianewstate.com/

2009/08/whats-catalonia.html (last visited 14 December 2010). 69

Barber, supra note 39, 174. 70

Hooper, supra note 43, 218.


Whether that means ―nation‖ in the sense of an autonomous people within

the Spanish State or ―nation‖ in the sense of independent nation-State is a

topic of debate among Catalans. Catalanism is a big tent that includes those

who want autonomy within Spain as well as those who seek Statehood.71

(Nor, I should emphasize, are the Basques necessarily insular, although their

rhetoric historically has been less about rejoining the European community

of nations and more about just being left to govern themselves.)

This essay is too short to discuss the history of Catalonia in depth.

Suffice it to say that the struggle between Catalonia and central authority

has been a long one, though not always successful.72

The early years of the twentieth century held some small promise for

Catalonian aspirations. In 1931 the Spanish parliament allowed for ―the

organization of autonomous regions within the Spanish State out of

provinces ‗with common history, culture and economy‘‖73

. Catalonia

assumed administrative responsibility over natural resources, certain

property rights, and other issues of public policy.74

There was also a

complex revenue-sharing agreement. The Catalonian government was called

the Generalitat.

But this was only a brief glimmer of hope. The statute was abolished

by Franco in 1938. The last words of the president of the Generalitat before

being executed by Franco‘s men were ―Visca Catalunya! (Long live

Catalonia!)‖75

. It would be a difficult life.

However, it was not an especially violent one. Catalonia did not have

a significant guerilla opposition to the Franco regime (in contrast to the

Basques). Although (or perhaps because) speaking in Catalan was all but

outlawed under Franco, the lifeblood of Catalan nationalism during this era

flowed from the Catalan linguistic and cultural renaissance of the nineteenth

century.76

Already a key part of cultural identity, after the death of the

dictator in 1975, promotion of the Catalan language became a central part of

regional policy. In 1993 Catalonia introduced Catalan-only education for

children between three and eight years old; this was upheld by the Spanish

71

Id., 258. 72

In 1640 Catalans and Portuguese rebelled against the centralism of Castile: the

Portuguese succeeded in establishing their own State, the Catalans did not. In the War

of Spanish Succession, from 1702 to 1713, the Catalans sided with the losing

(Habsburg) side, reprisals from the victorious Bourbons followed. Id., 226-27. 73

Hannum, supra note 46, 264. 74

Id., 264-65. 75


Hannum, supra note 46, 267.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1018

Constitutional Court in 1994.77

At the time of Franco‘s death 60% of

Catalonians spoke Catalan; by 2001 the percentage had increased to 76%.78

Walk in the Barcelona airport and you see main signs printed in Catalan,

English, and Castilian – in that order. Bookstores in Catalonia are increasing

the shelf-space for books being translated into, or originally written in,

Catalan. Given that one can assume that nearly everyone who reads Catalan

also reads Spanish, the decision by publishing houses to put the resources

into increasing their holdings in Catalan is anecdotal evidence of a sense of

a continuing trend towards the use of Catalan as the primary language in

Catalonia.

In the mid 1990‘s Benjamin Barber wrote that the Catalans viewed

theirs as a different kind of separatism, ―deny[ing] that there is any

relationship between what they advocate and the kinds of ethnic warfare

being conducted further in the east. Some see themselves as securing

bastions of local democracy, seedbeds for real participation in the all-

European federation that will presumably emerge‖79

. He continued,

Catalonia ―integrates itself into Europe precisely by segregating itself from

Spain‖80

. It is not an insular separatism, but a separatism geared for an era

of globalization.

III. Kosovo (as Seen from Spain) and the Limits of the ICJ

As discussed above, separatist groups across Europe welcomed the

Kosovo decision as ―legalizing‖ calls for autonomy or independence. For its

part, Spain was one of the five EU States that did not recognize Kosovo and

stated that it viewed the separation as a violation of international law. In

light of the preceding discussion of Catalan and Basque separatism, the

arguments that Spain made in its written submission to the ICJ are

instructive of the concerns of States regarding how self-determination may

or may not be defined as a legal right.

Spain‘s original submission focused on sovereignty and territorial

integrity and requested that the ICJ concludes that the declaration of

independence was not in accordance with international law because it

77

Id., 491-92. 78


Barber, supra note 39, 173. 80

Id., 174.


ignored Serbia‘s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity.81

In

subsequent written comments, Spain sought a statement that the acts of sub-

State actors, such as independence movements, could be held to violate

international law:

―the fact should not be overlooked that a violation of the principle of

territorial integrity through actions carried out by domestic actors with

the State will inevitably bear international consequences […] Spain

considers it untenable to reduce the principle of territorial integrity to

a principle operating at an exclusively international level.‖82

The ICJ ultimately disagreed with this assessment, placing the

obligation to respect territorial integrity as only running between State

actors.

Spain also sought a statement that a right of self-determination does

not have to ultimately result in independence. It argued, that international

law allows for multiple ways to express self-determination, from self-

government within an existing State (essentially autonomy) to full

independence. Spain argued that, as international law does not favor one

solution or another, one cannot assume that independence should be the

result of a self-determination claim.83

Moreover, the Government of Spain

also wanted to emphasize that secession ―as a form of sanction or remedy

[...] has no proper place in contemporary international law‖84

.

As described above, the ICJ was vague as to the issue of secession as

a remedy, merely stating that there were radically different views on the

issue and that it did not need to be decided here.

Spain and like-minded States may well be frustrated with this

Advisory Opinion as it (a) declined to extend the respect of territorial

integrity to sub-State actors; (b) refrained from closing the door to the

possibility of remedial secession; and (c) found there was no general

81

Written Statement of Kingdom of Spain on Accordance with International Law of the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (April 2009), 55-56,


December 2010). 82

Written Comments of the Kingdom of Spain on Accordance with International Law of

the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (July 2009), 3-4,


December 2010). 83

Id., 4-5. 84

Id., 5.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1020

prohibition in international law against declarations of independence.

However, this opinion has not led to a deluge of new recognitions for

Kosovo. States that wanted to recognize Kosovo have done so; States that

have had no interest in doing so show no change of heart.

The parties seem to have moved on, so to speak. For Serbia and

Kosovo, the issue seems to no longer be what the ICJ has said, but rather

what the EU will do. After Serbia submitted a failed draft resolution to the

General Assembly seeking new negotiations on ―all outstanding issues‖

concerning Kosovo,85

Serbia and the EU had negotiations culminating in a

new resolution with a compromise text drafted by Serbia and the twenty-

seven members of the European Union.86

The General Assembly passed the

resolution by consensus on September 9, 2010. The released resolution draft

―[a]cknowledges the content of the advisory opinion‖ and ―[w]elcomes the

readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between

the parties […]‖87

.

I have written elsewhere that the next chapter in the history of Serbia

and Kosovo will likely be less about the ICJ and the UN, and more about

the law and politics of EU accession for each of these aspirants.88

As one

ICJ observer put it, this was ―an appropriate opportunity for the Court to

voice its reluctance to be the receptacle of multilateral disputes that it cannot

solve‖89

. Short of that, it was reluctant to write a grand opinion in the midst

85

UN Doc. A/64/L.65, 27 July 2010. See also International Crisis Group, supra note 30,

4. 86

General Assembly, ‗Adopting Consensus Resolution, General Assembly

Acknowledges World Court Opinion on Kosovo, Welcomes European Union

Readiness to Facilitate Process of Dialogue‘, U.N. Press Release GA/10980

(September 9 2010), available at

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10980.doc.htm (last visited 14 December

2010) [hereinafter GA Consensus Resolution Press Release]. 87

UN Doc. A/64/L.65/Rev.1, 8 September 2010. Serbia‘s Foreign minister described the

resolution as a ―status-neutral‖ document. General Assembly, supra note 86. The

United States also welcomed the adoption of the resolution, emphasizing, for its part,

that the ICJ‘s opinion was clear that the declaration did not violate international law. 88

Borgen, ICJ, supra note 23. 89

J. d‘Aspremont, ‗The Creation of States Before the International Court of Justice:

Which (Il) Legality?‘, in The International Court of Justice and Kosovo: Opinion or

Non-Opinion?, Amsterdam Center for International Law, 3 (September 28 2010)

available at www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/12/079.html (last visited 14

December 2010).


of a ―universal multilateral political dispute that the international

community had not been able to settle itself‖90

.

Inasmuch as the ongoing viability of Kosovo – and Serbia – is related

to their relationships to the EU, it will be the EU more so than the ICJ that

will be the key norm-maker concerning self-determination in Europe. But,

unlike the ICJ, the norm-setting powers of the EU will rarely be through

juridical opinions, as opposed to the ongoing discursive practice of EU

politics.

IV. The EU and Conflicting Nationalisms

1. The Evolution of Regions

The relationship of EU institutions and of the process of European

integration to separatist movements is complex. It is overly facile to say that

European integration helps or hurts secessionism by national groups within

current or aspirant EU Member States. What can be said is that European

integration ―will not necessarily resolve [secessionist disputes], but it will

affect how the parties to a conflict perceive their own interests and

identities‖91

. This next section will consider some of the ways in which EU

institutions and the politics of accession affect claims of self-determination.

In considering the role of sub-State regions within the EU institutional

structure, one should keep in mind that regions are being used here as

proxies for ―peoples‖ or ―nations.‖ EU regional policy has become the

stalking-horse for discussions about autonomy or self-determination of sub-

State groups. Neil McCormick, an alternative representative to the

Convention on the Future of Europe and a Scottish nationalist, noted that it

was inappropriate to use the general term ―regions‖ for some sub-State

entities that are better termed nations; he attempted to put ―Stateless

nations‖ on the agenda.92

He did not succeed.

90

D‘Aspremont, supra note 89, 2. 91


S. Weatherill, ‗The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union‘, in

S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (eds), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in

Europe (2005), 22.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1022

Regions have historically had two basic responses to the EU: ―Let us

in‖ or ―Leave us alone‖.93

The first response is a call for allowing regions to

become greater policy-making participants, while the second seeks to

minimize the effects of EU policy-making on autonomous sub-State

regions. Each response has been affected by, and has affected, the EU‘s

institutional structure.

In order to provide official status for regions, a Committee of Regions

was established by the Treaty of Maastricht. However, its function was only

advisory, leading one commentator to conclude in 2005 that while there was

much talk of a ―Europe of the Regions,‖ the reality was that it was still a

―Europe of the States‖94

. States were the negotiators at the Commission

level. The Committee of the Regions was weak, rife with structural

problems.95

Regions had no veto and only had as much real say as their

State allowed. Even worse:

―The result is a potential disempowering of the regional level of

governance to the advantage of the EU level, and it is at the EU level

that the central authorities of the State are themselves directly

involved in law-making. The implication will frequently be that a

State is induced the centralize power within its domestic order so as to

secure an effective platform for engaging in negotiation and securing

subsequent compliance at the EU level.‖96

The Regions lost policy prerogatives and were left to implement

directives that they had no say in negotiating. The ―Europeanization‖ of

policy areas that had previously been the competence of a region could lead

to tension between the regional leadership and the national government.97

Brussels was late in appreciating the differentiation among types of

regions across EU Member States. Some regions had very little power

within their State. Others, like Catalonia and the Basque country, had

significant legislative capacities. Separatist groups existed across different

types of regions, but it was the leadership of the regions with legislative

93

C. Jeffery, ‗Regions and the European Union: Letting them In, and Leaving them

Alone‘, in S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (eds), The Role of Regions and Sub-National

Actors in Europe (2005), 34, 35, citing to the nomenclature of Ivo Duchacek. 94

Weatherill, supra note 92, 2; 19. 95

Jeffery, supra note 93, 36. 96

Weatherill, supra note 92, 7. 97

See, e.g., Weatherill, supra note 92, 9.


capabilities that were especially affected by the State-centric policy-making

process of the EU and the weakness of the Committee of the Regions. In

response, they formed the unofficial REGLEG (―Regions with legislative

power‖) network.98

As of this writing, there are 73 EU regions with

significant legislative power spread across eight Member States: Austria,

Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.99

REGLEG has grafted an informal, non-hierarchical network onto a

pre-existing formal hierarchy. Such networks ―are designed both to share

information among like-minded sub-State actors as well as allowing

collective action designed to increase the chances of extracting a more

vigorously influential role before EU institutions‖100

. The European Free

Alliance (EFA) is another such network, this one made up of sub-State

national parties in the European Parliament and in national parliaments.101

Between 2004 and 2009, EFA member parties had six MEPs (Scottish,

Welsh, Basque, Catalan, Latvian, and Transylvanian) and a broad network

across national parliaments.102

While REGLEG and EFA were ad hoc attempts to give regions

increased say in the corridors of power in Brussels or Strasbourg (and,

arguable in EFA‘s case, within the home countries of its members), they

could not make up for the structural weakness of regions in the Maastricht

formulation of the Committee of the Regions. The Treaty of Lisbon, which

98


‗About Regleg‘, available at http://www.regleg.eu/index.php?option=com

_content&view=section&layout=blog& id=2&Itemid=2 (last visited 14 December

2010). 100


Members include: Alands Framtid, Bayernpartei, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Chunta

Aragonesista, Die Friesen, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Eusko

Alkartasuna, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Libertà Emiliana-Nazione Emilia, Liga

Repubblica Veneto, Ligue Savoisienne, Lithuanian Polish People's Party, Mebyon

Kernow, Moravana, Mouvement Région Savoie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partei der

Deutschsprachigen Belgier, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Partit Socialista de

Mallorca i Menorca Entesa Nacionalista, Partito Sardo d'Azione, Partitu di a Nazione

Corsa, Plaid Cymru-the Party of Wales, Rainbow-Vinozhito, Scottish National Party,

Silesian Autonomy Movement, Slovenska Skupnost, Sociaal Liberale Partij, Strana

regionov Slovenska, Süd Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Union du

Peuple Alsacien, Unitat Catalana.

European Free Alliance (EFA), ‗Manifesto for the June 2009 European elections:

Vision for a People's Europe‘, available at http://www.e-f-a.org/efaactive.php?id=124

(last visited 14 December 2010). 102

Id.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1024

entered into force on December 1, 2009, was avowedly an attempt to make

real the idea of a Europe of the Regions. According to the EU‘s own

description, the treaty gives more weight to local councils, county councils,

and regional parliaments who must be consulted when new EU legislation is

drafted. The Committee of the Regions can now challenge new EU laws in

the European Court of Justice when it believes that those laws violate the

subsidiarity principle. The Commission, Council, and the Parliament are

required to consult the Committee of the Regions and if the Committee is

not consulted, it can involve the ECJ. The treaty recognizes local and

regional autonomy.103

In particular, Article 2 of the Protocol on the Application of the

Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, reads:

―Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult

widely. Such consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account

the regional and local dimension of the action envisaged. In cases of

exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such

consultations. It shall give reasons for its decision in its proposal.‖104

Whether and how much this empowers the regions remains to be seen.

In considering the effects of regional policy on self-determination claims

within the EU, one needs to consider two scenarios. In the first, regions

remain comparatively weak in the policy process and, in the other, the

Lisbon Treaty truly empowers regions, making them significant participants

in EU policy-making, along with States and EU decision-makers.

If regions remain relatively weak, dissatisfaction with the EU among

the regions is likely to grow and further strengthen the more separatist

elements within the regions. Frustration with distant/culturally insensitive

decision-makers is fodder for separatists. Such frustrations would not

necessarily be aimed at the EU, but at the national government for refusing

to represent regional interests in Brussels. However, if regions remain weak,

103

European Union: Committee of Regions, ‗The Lisbon Treaty: More Democracy for

Europe‘, available at http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/DecentralizedDetailTemplate

.aspx?view=detail&id=939712e9-6c54-4f49-a1fd-9cd610bdb57b (last visited 14

December 2010). 104

European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the

Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01,

Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Art.

2.


separatists will increasingly argue that their region should seek Statehood in

order to have a seat at the bargaining table.

But let us assume that the Lisbon Treaty (and/or other reforms)

empowers regions into being significant brokers in the policy process. One

possibility is that this will undercut the rhetoric of separation by

strengthening the legal guarantees and political power of the minority

group.105

As a legal matter this would weaken claims for external self-

determination (if one even accepts the claim that such a remedy may exist)

and may, as a political matter, make separatist rhetoric more difficult to

justify.

A second possible result, though, is that empowered and networked

regions will effectively out-negotiate their central governments at the EU

level. More direct ties between Brussels and the empowered regions could

make the States seem increasingly irrelevant. Financial ties between the

regions and Brussels already exist through programs such as the European

Regional Development Fund.106

If EU institutional reform results in national

governments having less of a mediating role in financial transfers between

Brussels and the regions, then,

―there is ever more pressure on central governments to justify their

existence.

A complex circle, one sees ever more demands for regional autonomy.

Autonomous regions demand more subsidies and transfer payments.

Oft blackmailing already broke central governments with the threat of

untying.‖107

This empowered autonomy may actually spur claims for more

independence and, ultimately, separation.108

105

Coppieters, supra note 37, 254-255. 106

See, e.g., ‗Regional Policy – Operational Programme ‗Catalonia‘‘ available at

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=ES&gv

_reg=576&gv_PGM=1114&gv_defL=9&LAN=7 (last visited 14 December 2010)

and ‗Regional Policy – Operational Programme ‗Basque Country‘‘ available at

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=ES&gv

_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=1113&gv_defL=7&LAN=7 (last visited 14 December 2010). 107

J. Enriquez, The United States of America: Polarization, Fracturing, and Our Future

(2005), 217. 108

See, e.g., E. Jenne, ‗National Self-Determination: A Deadly Mobilizing Device in

Negotiating Self-Determination‘, in H. Hannum & E. F. Babbitt (eds), Negotiating

Self Determination (2006), 7 noting: ―a history of autonomy and military support are

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1026

While States will remain the main actors in the EU in the medium

term, one can see that the discourse over a ―Europe of the Regions‖, and the

institutional reforms that will or will not occur, may have a significant effect

on the arguments over the scope of what can be expected in terms of self-

determination. If expectations are raised as to the ―regionalization‖ of

Europe and this does not occur, the rhetoric of frustrated self-determination

will likely be amplified. If, on the other hand, regions are increasingly

empowered, then one possible result is that the legal and political bases for

arguing for separation will be undercut. Another result, though, is that

increasing the institutional power of regional governments may allow them

to continue exacting ever greater concessions from their central

governments, a situation which may largely gut the central governments of

any significant power over those regions.

2. EU Membership and Separatist Aspirations

The politics of recognition and accession to the EU are other areas that

can affect the efficacy of secession as a remedy. Policies of recognition and

accession have already played an important role in the entry of the new

States formed from the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the USSR, as well as

in the democratization of the former Warsaw Pact countries.109

These issues

would be as – if not more – important in the case of a separatist region

seceding from an EU Member State, yet these are issues that are often

ignored.

Recognition of Statehood or EU membership cannot be assumed by

any secessionist region.110

Kosovo‘s track record on recognition

demonstrates that EU members that themselves have sub-State groups with

claims of inadequate respect of the rights of self-determination have been

reluctant to recognize Kosovo‘s independence, even if the majority of their

the strongest predictors of minority claims to self-determination and, second, that wars

over national self-determination are both bloodier and more protracted than other

internal wars‖. 109

See, Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16

December 1991) 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992); Declaration on the Guidelines on the

Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 December

1991) 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992). 110

See J. A. Frowein, ‗Non-Recognition‘, in R. Bernhardt et. al. (eds), 3 Encyclopedia of

Public International Law (1992), 627. Recognition itself is not a formal requirement

of Statehood. Rather, recognition merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus

recognition is ―declaratory‖ as opposed to ―constitutive.‖ Nonetheless, no State is

required to recognize an entity claiming Statehood.


EU colleagues have. Whether Kosovo will be successful in entering the EU,

when five Member States do not as of yet recognize it as a State, also

remains to be seen. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome requires unanimity of

current Member States for the admission of a new State to the Union.

Nonetheless, regions within the EU that are contemplating secession

rarely discuss the hurdles of recognition and accession. To the extent that

they do, they do not see them as hurdles. The Scottish National Party (SNP),

for instance, asserts that, if Scotland becomes independent, it will

―automatically remain part of the EU‖; they base their argument on Vienna

Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties (VCSS).111

As a

matter of public international law, that argument is difficult to sustain. The

VCSS may be in force, but there are only twenty-two parties, no large EU

States, but for Poland,112

and it is not widely accepted. As a simple matter

then, it is not binding as a treaty on most of the members of the EU.

Moreover, there is no strong argument that the VCSS has become

customary international law.

Furthermore, the VCSS is not applied if it would be ―incompatible

with [the] object and purpose of the treaty‖113.

The SNP‘s argument would

allow the VCSS to circumvent the Treaty of Rome‘s requirement for

111

James, supra note 8, 1; Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties

946 U.N.T.S. 3; 17 I.L.M. (1978), 1488. Scottish nationalists (and other separatist

groups) have extended this argument to apply to other international organizations. The

Scottish executive wrote:

―3.22 With independence, Scotland would become a full member of the United

Nations and other international bodies, such as the Commonwealth, the World Health

Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the

World Trade Organisation. This would give Scotland its own voice on the

international stage, allow the distinctive views of its people to be expressed on the

range of issues facing the world today, and allow Scottish Ministers to argue for

Scottish interests in international negotiations directly affecting the interests of the

nation (for example, on international trade)‖.

‗Choosing Scotland‘s Future – A National Conversation: Independence and

Responsibility in the Modern World‘, para 3.22 (14 August 2007) available at

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/08/13103747/0 (last visited 20

December 2010). Quebecois nationalists have also argued for Quebec‘s automatic

succession to NAFTA. 112

See, United Nations Treaty Collection Database, available at

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-

2&chapter=23&lang=en (last visited 14 December 2010). 113

Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties, supra note 111, Art

34.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1028

Member State unanimity, arguably frustrating an object or purpose of that

treaty.114

Based on these arguments, it is clear that if a region of an EU Member

State secedes, it will not only have to seek recognition as a State, but also

apply to re-enter the EU, this time as a Member State. This makes outright

separation less attractive than may have been assumed. While the power of

regions within the EU may be increasing in relation to existing States, once

a region secedes, thus leaving the EU, that region‘s bargaining power is

greatly decreased in comparison to the pre-existing State, whose

acquiescence is needed for any accession bid. In short, secession removes

one from the bargaining table and reduces one to almost being a

supplicant.115

Another scenario should be considered though, one that is more like

the Kosovo scenario and less like Catalonia: the case of the separatist region

in a State that is not as of yet a Member State of the EU, but hopes to accede

in the short to medium term. This could apply to the ―frozen conflict‖ States

of Moldova (with Transnistrian separatism), Georgia (South Ossetia and

Abkhazia), and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) as well as other potential

aspirants. In these cases, the strategy is to use the possibility of EU

accession as a carrot for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. In the case of

Cyprus, the EU tried to use the possibility of a reunified Cyprus being the

only way that Northern Cyprus would enter the EU as an inducement to

settle the conflict. While the prospect did help the Northern Cypriots sign-

on to a UN peace plan, the Greek Cypriots scuttled the deal, thus showing

the fragility of such techniques. It may have worked if it was used as both a

carrot and a stick, stating that the only way either part of the island would be

allowed into the EU was if they resolved their conflict.

In the case of Kosovo and Serbia, although the separation has already

occurred, the prospect of EU accession for each State seems to be a

bargaining chip that is being used by EU negotiators to lead to better

relations between the two parties. It has at least resulted in Serbia

withdrawing is first post-Advisory Opinion resolution in favor of a

compromise resolution with the EU. Where these negotiations may go from

here remains to be seen. Ultimately, EU membership for both a pre-existing

State and its former region provides a ―common framework for [the] two

114

James, supra note 8, 2. 115

See, James, supra note 8, 13.


sovereign states, facilitating the process of reconciliation within a

multilateral framework‖116

.

Whether this technique may be useful regarding the frozen conflicts is

related to how credible an aspirant each State is for membership in the EU.

If a State is considered to be unlikely to be accepted into the EU, then trying

to entice a separatist region to resolve a conflict so that it may enter along

with the parent State is not a strong bargaining position. What this shows, at

least, is another bargaining possibility in which EU accession policies may

be used to help resolve separatist conflicts not only in the EU, but in the

European neighborhood.

D. Separation in an Age of Integration (and Vice Versa)

The process of European integration has affected the interests and

strategies of sub-State groups seeking greater autonomy and independence,

and it has affected the States that are responding to such groups. Neither

these putative nations nor the States in which they exist use purely local

strategies. Transnational networks of regions and of States jostle for

advantages at both the local and the European level. For local advantage,

one must build global networks. And in the international competition for

power, you need to be mindful of constituencies within your own State. The

local and the global conflate. All politics is glocal.

As such, there are at least two ―europeanizations‖ of regional issues.

One strengthens national governments by providing a means to undo

domestic political bargains between a region and a central government by

making the central government the sole negotiator with Brussels and the

other central governments. Another aspect of this State-supporting

Europeanization is by defining separatists as terrorists and then addressing

separatist conflicts ―only under the auspices of antiterrorist cooperation‖117

.

Another form of Europeanization empowers the regions vis-a-vis the

national governments. This is the Europeanization where regions are given a

seat at the bargaining table or direct access to supranational policy-makers

in Brussels. To a certain extent, this is also the bootstrapping of regions into

greater political power through the use of informal transnational networks.

This version of Europeanization is still nascent. Article 2 of the Lisbon

Treaty allows for greater consultation and for rights of action before the

116

Coppieters, supra note 37, 254-255. 117

Coppieters, supra note 37, 252.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1030

European Court of Justice, but the preponderance of power still lies with the

States. Over time, the interplay of informal networks, and the kernels of

possibilities embedded in the Lisbon Treaty may grow into a more robust

Europe of the Regions. Some have argued that this is the trend in European

politics as there is an unstated alliance between supranationalists who want

strong European institutions and separatists, who want increased regional

power. Both parties have an interest in weakening the State. In the short to

medium term, they can do this by increasing regional prerogatives and

increasing the direct dialogue between regions and Brussels.118

Of what purpose is separation when many separatists also claim to be

ardent Europeanists? Two issues seem to recur. One is a sense that local

cultures and languages will be better respected via European institutions

than by their own States. Maite Goientxe, a Basque representative at the

Days of Corte, noted:

―Like all cultural questions, language is ultimately a political matter.

Basque is not permitted today in my part of France, which means

Basque representatives from my region can speak Basque at the

Parliament in Brussels, but not back home. From our perspective

that‘s discrimination. Critics say separatists promote division and

exclusion, but we say independence movements are about the opposite

of exclusion. We want to get rid of the exclusion we feel today.‖119

The irony is that while the prospect of constructing a supranational

Europe, rather than homogenizing, say, Basques and Occitanes, into

undifferentiated ―Europeans‖, has helped these movements to define

themselves more clearly. At one time, this may have been due to founded or

unfounded fears of homogenization spurring a group to action (or at least to

a sharper sense of self-definition). Think of the Basque reticence to Spain‘s

accession to the EC. But the effect of Europeanization seems to have

changed the strategy of nationalists into an appreciation of the advantages of

a supranational Europe. Perhaps more so than the much-anticipated ICJ

Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, EU policies towards language rights and

118

See, e.g., Barber, supra note 39, 172-173 (arguing that some see in the work of the

Western European Language Bureau, a group that encourages the use of regional

languages, ―a subtle strategy of national deconstruction by which the European whole

nurtures the subnational fragments, all the better to undercut the resistance to

wholeness on the part of the nation-states‖.). 119

As quoted in Kimmelman, supra note 41.


cultural diversity will likely be important factors in framing the ongoing

push-and-pull between national minorities and national governments in the

EU. If the Days of Corte are any indication, linguistic and cultural politics

(more so than ideological or ethnic politics) will likely remain the central

issues in this debate.

Besides language and culture rights, a second reason driving separatist

politics within a framework of European integration is economics. Various

secessionist movements had elements of ―tax exits‖ or resource control

struggles in which the separating group wanted to stop paying rents to the

central government and/or wanted to keep resources within their own

territory for themselves. The Transnistrian, Slovenian, and Croatian

separations or secessions all had elements of tax exits.120

Separatist conflicts

and insurgencies in East and Central Africa are in part over the control of

diamond mines and other valuable resources. While tax exits or resource

control may not be the only (or even the main) reason motivating calls for

separation, the availability of local resources is an important aspect in the

viability of such claims for separation.121

The economic advantages of

separation (for both Catalonia and the EU) has not been lost on the Catalans;

Catalan MEP Oriol Junqueras has said:

―There is a growing body of academic research which supports the

assertion that smaller nations are better equipped to deal with

economic difficulty in the longer term. This is particularly relevant

during this current time of economic difficulty when we see how, for

example, the size of the Spanish state has not helped avoid recession.

Catalonia is netly contributing 10% of its GDP to Spain each year and

yet the state has hugely increased its debt, threatening the euro and

Euro stability. Catalan independence is clearly in the EU interest.‖122

120

P. Collier & A. Hoeffler, ‗The Political Economy of Secession‘, in H. Hannum &

E. F. Babbitt (eds), Negotiating Self Determination (2006), 46 (concerning Slovenia

and Croatia). But see Slovakia as a counter-example, where maintaining federation

would have been more economically advantageous, id., 50-51. 121

See, e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 120, 37, 46 (arguing ―secessions depend upon

the invention of an imagined political community and that natural resources will often

be instrumental in transforming this invention from the pipe dream of a handful of

romantics to the reality of a large political or military organization.‖). 122

European Free Alliance, ‗EU must be ready for enlargement from within‘ (16 Nov.

2010) available at http://www.e-f-a.org/news.php?id=583 (last visited 14 December

2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 997-1033 1032

This economic logic for separation from a current State and then

reintegration in the EU is common. Juan Enriquez wrote:

―Given that Europe, in 1500, had approximately five hundred political

entities, and that the EU umbrella greatly reduced the cost of

independence, the unwinding of existing countries might continue for

a long time [...] Think about what would happen should the Basques

become a sovereign country. No need to establish a new currency.

They‘d keep the euro. Nor would they need to build up a large army.

Got NATO to protect them. EU passport allows them to trade, work,

and travel anywhere in Europe. Not surprisingly, Europeans with

separatist agendas, like Basques and Catalans, tend to be among the

most supportive of EU integration.‖123

But while this may point to certain economic and administrative

advantages, it misses the legal and political reality that these benefits of EU

(and NATO) membership are predicated on first achieving recognition and

actual membership, an issue which is not a foregone conclusion if the pre-

existing State is already a member of these institutions and unhappy about

the secession of its former territory. Bargaining over international

organization membership is likely to become one of the key areas of

disputation related to separatism in and around the EU.

The aftermath of the ICJ Advisory Opinion may be to show the

limited relevance of that opinion and perhaps, more broadly, of the ICJ in

relation to secessionist issues in Europe. The locus of norm-making has

moved from the United Nations and its various organs to the EU. The key

debates are no longer over the broad political-juridical issues such as ―what

is self-determination‖ but rather over narrower topics such as ―what are the

scope of language rights within the EU‖ or ―how may one regulate cultural

practices‖. Self-determination, in the sense of minority rights, is a given; the

debate has moved on to implementation.

Related to this, the ongoing evolution of the power of regions within

the EU will affect whether national aspirations will be realized within

existing States or by attempted separations. In the case of attempted

secession, the relevant issues now include questions of accession and

succession to international organizations such as the EU (above and beyond

the issue of recognition). Consequently, the technical body of laws

123

Enriquez, supra note 107, 216.


concerning international organizations, as well as the internal regulations of

the relevant organizations, may have as much – or even a greater – effect on

the claims of (and the viability of) nationalist movements as the holdings of

cases like the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. The Kosovo opinion has

seemingly had little impact in terms of increasing recognition for Kosovo;

had the opinion explicitly said Kosovo‘s declaration was illegal, one can be

skeptical that any State that had previously recognized Kosovo would have

withdrawn its recognition. But, whether a national group seeking separation

will find itself without any recognitions or the ability to join a key regional

trade group or a security alliance may affect whether or not that group even

claims a right to secede. Moreover, the rules that may affect accession to

these international organization may affect how a nationalist group makes

its claims and how a State may respond to those claims. Thus, the

administrative and organizational regulations of international organizations

such as the EU may do more to frame national claims, at least in particular

cases, than the opinions of the World Court. And, in doing so, new habits of

State practice begin.

These developments may be viewed as the maturing of international

law as a legal system, at least within one region. It may also mark the

relative depth of regional norm-creation in contrast to the difficulty of

global norm-creation. Within Europe (and to a lesser extent within other

regions), policy-makers are moving from largely philosophical questions to

more precise issues of implementation and administration. This may be a

promising development. But then again, the devil is in the details: It remains

to be seen whether this move from the aspirational rhetoric of self-

determination to the technical language of organization will actually assist

in conflict prevention or resolution.


doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-riegner

The Two Faces of the Internationalized pouvoir

constituant: Independence and Constitution-

Making Under External Influence in Kosovo

Michael Riegner

Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................... 1035

A. Introduction ................................................................................... 1037

B. The Historical Context and the Evolution of the two

Faces of the Internationalized pouvoir constituant in

Kosovo .......................................................................................... 1040

I. The Historical and Political Context ............................................. 1040

II. Internationalizing the two Faces of the pouvoir

constituant in Kosovo ................................................................... 1041

1. Creating the International pouvoir constitué and

Preconfiguring the pouvoir constituant ................................ 1042

a) The Constitutional Framework for Provisional

Self-Government of Kosovo............................................. 1042

b) The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo

Status Settlement .............................................................. 1044

2. Exercising the pouvoir constituant..................................... 1046

The author is Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and

International Law in Heidelberg and attorney-at-law. He is an advisor to the legal reform

project of the German development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische

Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in Kosovo. The views expressed in this article are the author‟s

views and do not reflect the position or policies of GTZ.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1036

a) The Unilateral Declaration of Independence .............. 1046

b) The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo .............. 1048

C. Assessing the Legality of the Exercises of the

Internationalized pouvoir constituant in Kosovo .......................... 1049

I. Independence and the pouvoir constituant in the ICJ‟s

Advisory Opinion .......................................................................... 1050

1. The Law Applicable to the Internationalized

pouvoir constitué in Respect of the Declaration of

Independence...................................................................... 1050

2. Identifying the pouvoir constituant as Author of

the Declaration of Independence ........................................ 1052

3. No International Law Standards for Assessing the

Legality of the Exercise of the pouvoir constituant

with Regard to Independence ............................................. 1054

II. Potential Standards of Legality for the Internationalized

pouvoir constituant with Regard to Constitution-Making ............ 1055

1. International Law of Belligerent Occupation as a

Standard for Internationalized Constitution-

Making?.............................................................................. 1055

2. Security Council Resolution 1244 ..................................... 1056

3. The Unilateral Commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan

in the Declaration of Independence.................................... 1058

D. Conclusion: Emerging Standards of Legitimacy for the

Internationalized pouvoir constituant ........................................... 1059

The two Faces of the Internationalized pouvoir constituant

1037

Abstract

This article discusses the concept of the internationalized pouvoir

constituant with regard to the ICJ‟s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. It argues

that independence and constitution-making under external influence in

Kosovo represent two faces of the same internationalized constituent power

aspiring for self-determination. It is submitted here that the ICJ‟s Opinion

implicitly recognizes the constitutional law concept of pouvoir constituant

and its relevance in international law. While the Court‟s reasoning is limited

to the legality of the declaration of independence, international involvement

in constitution-making in Kosovo equally raises questions of legality and

legitimacy under international law. The paper discusses some of these

questions by drawing from constitutional law and theory. In order to do so,

the article briefly sets out the historical and political context, before

describing how the two faces of the internationalized pouvoir constituant

evolved during the period of international administration in Kosovo. In the

next step, it analyzes the treatment of the constituent power in the ICJ‟s

Advisory Opinion, and then attempts to assess the legality of international

involvement in constitution-making in Kosovo. Finally, it discusses some

potential standards of legitimacy for the internationalized pouvoir

constituant.

A. Introduction

Traditionally, constitutional law and international law have been

regarded as distinct legal orders and as distinct disciplinary fields of study.

These distinctions have been eroding for some time. Three trends contribute

to that erosion process: First, scholars have increasingly investigated the

influence of international law on existing domestic constitutional regimes,

notably with respect to human rights and democratization.1 A second trend

1 See for instance B.-O. Bryde, „Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und

Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts‟, 42 Der Staat (2003), 61; J. A. Frowein,

„The transformation of constitutional law through the European Convention on

Human Rights‟, 41 Israel Law Review (2008), 489; T. Franck, „The Emerging Right

to Democratic Governance‟, 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) 1, 46.

On transition states, see the contributions by G. Nolte, G. Malinverni & J. Rubenfeld

in „The International Influences on National Constitutional Law in States in

Transitions‟, 96 ASIL Proceedings (2002), 389. On Eastern Europe, see in particular

P. Sonnevend, „International Human Rights Standards and the Constitutional

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1038

is the discourse on constitutionalization of international law, which attempts

to enrich the international legal order with principles familiar from domestic

constitutionalism.2 Finally, the international community has increasingly

been involved in processes of state-building in recent years, and these

processes have often included the creation of altogether new constitutional

orders. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, state-building and

internationalized constitution-making have gained particular momentum

since the mid-1990s, notably in Bosnia, East Timor, Sudan, Afghanistan and

Iraq – and most recently, Kosovo.3

The ICJ‟s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo stands at this crossroads

between constitutional and international law, where ideas from both legal

orders intersect, collide and sometimes merge into new concepts. One such

new concept is the idea of the “internationalized pouvoir constituant”4,

which is the main theme of this article. Hence, this paper will describe the

two faces of this internationalized constituent power in Kosovo, and address

its legal framing and taming in international law. In doing so, the article will

make three main arguments: First, it is submitted here that the ICJ Advisory

Opinion presupposes the appearance of an internationalized Kosovar

pouvoir constituant on the stage of international law. Arguably, the Court‟s

reasoning mainly rests on the distinction between the pouvoir constitué

established by international law and the pouvoir constituant emerging from

both international and constitutional law.

Second, I hope to show that the internationalized constituent power

has two faces, one turned to the outside and one to the inside: It has shown

its first face when declaring independence, which can be seen as the external

exercise of popular sovereignty by a Kosovar pouvoir constituant,

Jurisprudence of Transition States in Central and Eastern Europe‟, 96 ASIL

Proceedings (2002), 397. 2 Bryde, supra note 1; J. A. Frowein, „Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts„, 39

Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (2000), 427; J. Klabbers,

A. Peters & G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 2009. 3 For an overview, see A. v. Bogdandy et al., „State-Building, Nation-Building, and

Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an

Appraisal of Different Approaches‟, in: A. v. Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (eds), 9 Max

Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2005), 579, and further contributions in that

volume; S. Chesterman, You, the People. The United Nations Transitional

Administration, and State-Building (2004); N. Feldman, „Imposed Constitutionalism‟,

37 Connecticut Law Review (2004-5) 4, 857, and the responses to his contribution in

the same issue. 4 P. Dann & Z. Al-Ali, „The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant: Constitution-

Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor‟, in: A. v. Bogdandy

& R. Wolfrum (eds), 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2006), 423.


1039

engineered by members of the international community. It has shown its

second face when enacting a constitution, which can be considered as the

internal manifestation of the constituent power. This manifestation was

equally internationalized, because the international community has also

accounted for a prolonged process of constitutionalization in Kosovo. This

international involvement in constitution-making can be seen as the flipside

of independence, which remains, in that sense, “supervised”. While this

intuitively seems to be a fair tradeoff for Kosovo, such international

involvement does raise questions of legality and legitimacy under

international law.

Hence, my third argument is that not only the external, but also the

internal manifestation of the internationalized pouvoir constituant deserves

attention when it comes to assessing its legality and legitimacy under

international law. For the enactment of a constitution is not only one of the

core attributes of sovereignty, but is also regarded as an inherently

democratic exercise, at least in the liberal tradition of constitution-making.

Consequently, the involvement of international actors in such

constitutionalization processes raises the question of the legality and

legitimacy of such external influence. In fact, it is submitted here that the

ICJ‟s recognition of the internationalized pouvoir constituant in Kosovo

draws attention to the fact that self-determination is not only about

independence, but also about constitution-making.

While acknowledging the various understandings of the notion of

pouvoir constituant,5 and in particular a longstanding positivist tradition,

6

this article employs a more substantive concept and follows the tradition of

liberal constitutionalist thinking. This tradition accentuates the values of

individual and collective autonomy in constitution-making – a view which

is not necessarily referring to natural law,7 but can increasingly be grounded

in evolving international law standards of human rights and democratic

governance.8

In the following sections, I will first describe briefly the historical and

political context and will then demonstrate how the two faces of the

5 On the notion, see C. Möllers, „Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution –

Constitutionalisation‟, in: A. v. Bogdandy_& J. Bast (eds), Principles of European

Constitutional Law (2006) 183. 6 H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed. (1960), 201.

7 See for instance H. Maurer, „Verfassungsänderung im Parteienstaat‟, in: K. Kästner,

K. Nörr & K. Schlaich (eds), Festschrift für Martin Heckel (1999), 828. 8 Cf. supra note 1.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1040

internationalized pouvoir constituant have evolved during the period of

international administration (B). The next step analyzes the treatment of the

constituent power in the ICJ‟s Advisory Opinion, and then attempts to

assess the legality of international involvement in constitution-making in

Kosovo (C.). The conclusion discusses some potential standards of

legitimacy for the internationalized pouvoir constituant (D.).

B. The Historical Context and the Evolution of the two Faces

of the Internationalized pouvoir constituant in Kosovo

The internationalized constitution-making in Kosovo did not take

place in a vacuum, but in the context of Kosovo‟s earlier constitutional

status within Yugoslavia and of the armed conflict in the late 1990s. I will

briefly recall this context before setting out the internationalization of

constitutional developments in Kosovo in more detail.

I. The Historical and Political Context

The story of Kosovo‟s status in former Yugoslavia and of the violent

conflict need not be recounted again here in detail.9 Suffice it to say that

under the constitutional system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and

the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo had enjoyed considerable autonomy as an

autonomous province since 1974. In 1989/90, a constitutional reform largely

abrogated these prerogatives. In reaction, the former ethnic Albanian

members of the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo an independent

sovereign state, the „Republic of Kosova‟, in September 1991. However,

Albania was the only country to recognize this declaration of

independence.10

The ensuing Kosovo conflict displayed at least three relevant

characteristics which are important for the context of later internationalized

constitution-making in the territory. The first aspect is the conflict‟s nature

as an armed conflict in the international law sense, which has to be

9 For detailed accounts, see I. Cismas, „Secession in Theory and Practice: The Case of

Kosovo and Beyond‟, 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law (2010) 2, 531;

L. Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (2002); Independent

International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report. Conflict, International

Response, Lessons Learned (2000), Part I.; N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History

(1998). 10

Cismas, supra note 9, 555-580; Sell, supra note 9, 65-93.


1041

considered when looking for potential international law standards for the

pouvoir constituant. The second characteristic is the ethno-political nature

of the conflict. Figures concerning current population shares in Kosovo

vary, but range from 88-92% Albanian, 5-8% Serb and 4-5% others, with a

total population of roughly two million inhabitants.11

These demographics,

and the prolonged history of inter-ethnic violence, had to be taken into

account by any constitution-maker seeking to integrate a divided multi-

ethnic society into one political polity.

The third aspect relevant to later constitution-making is the

internationalization of the conflict. As is well known, Security Council

Resolution 124412

, adopted on the basis of Chapter VII on 10 June 1999,

authorized an international peacekeeping force to deploy in Kosovo, placed

the territory under UN interim administration and resulted in the

establishment of numerous international presences, taking over basic

governmental functions.13

Hence, further constitutional developments in

Kosovo took place in a highly internationalized setting, both in terms of

applicable law and the nature of the actors involved.

II. Internationalizing the two Faces of the pouvoir constituant

in Kosovo

During the following period of international administration, the two

faces of the internationalized pouvoir constituant developed in parallel.

Before analyzing the notion of pouvoir constituant in more detail, I would

like to set out the factual developments. These were marked by four

documents of constitutional relevance: First the “Constitutional Framework

11

Cf. UNMIK/Kosovo Ministry of Public Services, „Kosovo in Figures‟ (2005), 9,

available at http://web.archive.org/web/20080309073836/http://www.ks-

gov.net/esk/esk/pdf/english/general/kosovo_figures_05.pdf (last visited 10 December

2010); CIA, „World Factbook, Kosovo‟, available at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html#People

(last visited 17 November 2010). 12

Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf (last visited 17

November 2010). 13

On international territorial administration, see for instance J. Friedrich, „UNMIK in

Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty‟, in: A v. Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (eds), 9 Max

Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2005), 225; C. Stahn, „International

Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and

Challenges Ahead‟, 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und

Völkerrecht (2001), 107.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1042

for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo” promulgated in May 200114

;

second, the “Comprehensive Settlement Proposal” put forward by Martti

Ahtisaari in March 200715

; then the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

(UDI) issued in February 2008; and finally the Constitution of the Republic

of Kosovo which entered into force in June 2008.16

International involvement in these steps, and hence the

internationalization of both faces of the pouvoir constituant, can be analyzed

according to three criteria: First, the degree of international influence, which

can be total, partial, or marginal. The second criterion regards the object of

the influence, which can either be the procedure of the constitution-making

or the substantive outcome of the process. A final distinction concerns the

actors involved in the process, which can be either local, or individual

states, or multilateral institutions.17

Through the lens of this categorization,

it will be seen that international actors initially were in full control of the

process, but ceded power to local representatives over time, without

however giving up their influence altogether.

1. Creating the International pouvoir constitué and

Preconfiguring the pouvoir constituant

a) The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-

Government of Kosovo

A first cautious step in the transfer of power to Kosovar authorities is

represented by the “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-

Government of Kosovo”.18

It was contained in UNMIK Regulation 2001/9

of 15 May 2001 and promulgated by the Special Representative of the

Secretary General (SRSG) in Kosovo, who held broad legislative, executive

and judicial powers under Security Council Resolution 1244.19

These

14

Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (last visited 17

November 2010). 15

Available at http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html (last visited 17

November 2010). 16

Both available at http://www.assembly-kosova.org (last visited 17 November 2010). 17

On these categories, see Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 4, 428-430. 18

On the Framework in detail, see C. Stahn, „Constitution Without a State: Kosovo

Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government‟, 14 Leiden

Journal of International Law (2001) 3, 531. 19

Cf. SC Res. 1244 (1999), operative clauses 6, 10, 11; Friedrich, supra note 13, 233-

242; Stahn, supra note 13, 134, 150.


1043

included the responsibility to promote substantial autonomy and self

government in Kosovo by “[o]rganizing and overseeing the development of

provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government”

and transferring administrative responsibilities to these institutions.20

The

only real actor in constitution-making at this stage, however, was the SRSG,

who retained total control over both procedure and substance of the law-

making.21

Whether the Framework represents a constitution at all, has been

disputed.22

On the one hand, the Framework regulates matters which are

ordinarily the subject of internal constitutional law: It contains provisions on

human rights protection and the organization of government, including a

rudimentary separation of powers among the PISG themselves and judicial

review of acts of Parliament, and takes particular care to ensure

participation of all ethnic communities in political affairs – notably of the

Serb community, who had transformed from a majority within Serbia to a

minority within Kosovo. In that sense, the Framework establishes a pouvoir

constitué with classical features of government.

On the other hand, the Constitutional Framework reserved

considerable discretionary powers to the SRSG, without subjecting him to

any form of review. Also, there is no normative hierarchy with regard to

other acts of the SRSG, who could at any time explicitly or impliedly repeal

any aspect of the Framework. In addition, the SRSG could not be

considered as a representative of those subjected to the legal order he

created. As a consequence, the entire Framework lacks important material

aspects of a constitution as understood in liberal constitutional theory.

Hence the pouvoir constituant in Kosovo was largely absent in the

interim period – at least if understood in the liberal sense, which requires it

to be connected in some way to the will of the people. Still, the Framework

may contain a hint at the potential subject of future constitution-making:

The preamble notes “the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kosovo

20

SC Res. 1244 (1999), operative clause 11 (a), (c), (d). 21

Friedrich, supra note 13, 256-260; A. Borgolivier, „Behind the Framework‟,

UNMIK/FR/0040/01 (25 May 2001), available at

http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/features/fr040.html (last visited 17 November 2010);

V. Morina, „The Newly Established Constitutional Court in Post-Status Kosovo:

Selected Institutional and Procedural Concerns‟, 35 Review of Central and East

European Law (2010), 129, 131. 22

Cf. Friedrich, supra note 13, 260; Stahn, supra note 18, 543-549. Indeed, UNMIK

resisted Kosovar desires to enact a proper constitution, pointing to Kosovo‟s unsettled

status and SC Res. 1244, Borgolivier, supra note 21.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1044

[…]”, and Art. 1.1 holds that “Kosovo is an entity under international

administration which, with its people, has unique historical, legal, cultural

and linguistic attributes”. While this clause can be interpreted in different

ways, it can be read to acknowledge common attributes of a nation, the

“people of Kosovo”,23

from which a pouvoir constituant may later emanate

– after having gone through an internationalized status settlement process.

b) The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status

Settlement

The status settlement process launched in 2005 culminated in the

“Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (CSP/Ahtisaari

Plan). The CSP was submitted by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-

General, Martti Ahtissaari, on 26 March 2007.24

It framed both faces of the

pouvoir constituant: First, it recommended supervised independence as the

only viable solution for the Kosovo conflict. At the same time, the Ahtisaari

Plan contained seven pages of detailed prescriptions for the future

constitutional order of the new Republic of Kosovo (CSP Art. 1-3, 10 and

Annex I). These pertained to the substance of the constitutional document as

well as to the procedure according to which it was to be drafted and enacted.

It envisaged a parliamentary republic with a modern human rights catalogue

including directly applicable international human rights instruments, as well

as a sophisticated system of minority protection and participation

mechanisms, to be enforced by a constitutional court and, if need be, by an

“International Civilian Representative” (ICR) replacing the SRSG.25

23

This would, however, be problematic in as much as it excludes the non-Albanian

communities, who do not share the linguistic and cultural attributes, from the “people

of Kosovo”. 24

For detailed accounts of the status settlement process see H. Perrit, The Road to

Independence for Kosovo. A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (2010); M. Weller,

Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence (2009). 25

On the international governance structures established by the CSP, see R. Muharremi,

„The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) from the Perspective

of Kosovo Constitutional Law‟, 70 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht

und Völkerrecht (2010) 2, 357; M. Spernbauer, „EULEX in Kosovo: The Difficult

Deployment and Challenging Implementation of the Most Comprehensive Civilian

EU Operation to Date‟, 11 German Law Journal (2010) 8, 769; E. de Wet, „The

Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and

Functioning of Eulex‟, 103 American Journal of International Law (2009) 1, 83.


1045

The CSP was the result of prolonged diplomatic negotiations between

delegations from Serbia and Kosovo, which comprised ministers and

government officials on the Serbian side, while Kosovars were represented

by a “Unity Team” mainly formed by political party leaders. The

composition of the Kosovar delegation was influenced by the SRSG and

was largely determined by the success of each respective party in the free

elections held earlier in Kosovo. The negotiations touched upon all major

issues of dispute between the parties, including such sensitive constitutional

issues as local self-government and minority protection and participation.26

Yet the two sides did not reach agreement, and Ahtisaari unilaterally

submitted a final draft of the CSP to the Secretary-General. Due to

disagreements with Serbia and Russia, it was neither included in an

international agreement nor endorsed in a Security Council resolution, but

only adopted by the Kosovo Assembly in 2007.27

In this phase, international involvement receded to partial influence,

exerted mainly by Ahtisaari and his team, who had been appointed by the

UN Secretary-General. It was largely multilateral and took the form of

mediation in the beginning, but also involved some substantive decision-

making in deadlock situations and towards the end of the process. In

addition, some individual states represented in the so-called “Contact

Group” and the “Troika” influenced the process, with the US inclined to

push for independence and Russia tending to oppose it.28

Other actors were

Serbian diplomats, representing one individual state pursuing a particularly

strong interest of preserving its own sovereignty, and representatives from

Kosovo, mainly drawn from the Albanian majority population. As a

consequence, Kosovo Serbs sometimes felt underrepresented in the

negotiations.29

The diplomatic modus also meant that the talks were mainly

held behind closed doors, and consultations with other actors in Kosovo not

directly taking part in the negotiations seem to have been rare. The

substantive outcome reflected the international‟s and Serbia‟s commitment

26

Perrit, supra note 24, 119-161. 27

Id., 171; „Declaration of the Assembly of Kosovo in accordance to the Report Martti

Ahtisaari‟ [sic] (5 April 2007), reprinted in English, in: OSCE, Assembly Support

Initiative Newsletter, No. 27, (May 2007), 5, available at

http://www.osce.org/publications/mik/2007/04/24145_831_en.pdf (last visited 17

November 2010). 28

Perrit, supra note 24, 119-122, 128-131. 29

Id., 141, 145.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1046

to minority protection, and did take over a number of important features

from the Constitutional Framework.30

The CSP represented a significant step in the internationalization of

both faces of the nascent pouvoir constituant in Kosovo. It was for the

“people of Kosovo” that the CSP envisaged independence, while at the

same time attaching conditions to such “supervised” independence. These

conditions pertained in particular to constitutional standards for the internal

organization of a future independent polity. These standards were mostly

inspired by, or even identical with, widely accepted international human

rights instruments and mechanisms for minority protection and

participation.

To sum up, constitution-making was largely preconfigured by, and

partly occurred in the guise of, diplomatic negotiations on independence.

Independence was made conditional upon a constitutional order largely

prescribed by the international community, or in other words: The pouvoir

constituant in Kosovo was allowed to break free and declare independence

if and when it subjected itself to the bonds of liberal constitutionalism and

international law, with particular emphasis on minority protection. Thus,

internationalization necessarily concerned both faces of the pouvoir

constituant.

2. Exercising the pouvoir constituant

a) The Unilateral Declaration of Independence

During 2007, it became clear that neither a negotiated solution nor a

Security Council resolution in relation to Kosovo‟s status were feasible.

Since prolonging the dissatisfactory situation of international administration

was seen less and less as a viable option, international actors were looking

for an alternative solution. This solution was represented by the exercise of

the local pouvoir constituant, albeit supervised in both of its faces by the

international community.31

The result was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)

promulgated in Pristina on 17 February 2008. It was adopted in an

extraordinary session of the members of the Assembly of Kosovo, who had

been elected in largely free and fair elections under the Constitutional

30

On the details of the plan, see id., 163-170. 31

On the political options and decision making, see id., 177-189.


1047

Framework, supervised by the international community. All 109 deputies

present at that session voted in favor, including nine representatives of non-

Serb minority communities. Eleven deputies representing Serbian national

minority boycotted the proceedings, so that the Serb minority population in

Kosovo was not represented in the final vote.32

The language of the UDI itself makes no mention of the Assembly as

a Provisional Institution of Self Governance. Rather, its authors identify

themselves as the “democratically elected leaders of our people”, who

“declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state”, which “reflects

the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations

of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for

the Kosovo Status Settlement”. Hence the deputies claimed some sort of

democratic legitimacy for themselves, aspiring to be the “representatives of

the people” and a pouvoir constituant also in the liberal democratic sense.

Furthermore, the signatories of the declaration announce that “[w]e

shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our

commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all

our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human

Rights. The Constitution shall incorporate all relevant principles of the

Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a democratic and deliberative

process.” Finally, they “affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that

Kosovo shall be legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in

this Declaration, including, especially, the obligations for it under the

Ahtisaari Plan. […] We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely

upon this declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and

friendship”.

It emerges from the UDI‟s language that its authors consider

themselves to be, at the same time, the framers of a future constitution,

thereby equalizing the pouvoir constituant declaring independence and

adopting the constitution. It becomes clear from the UDI‟s text that its

framers were fully cognizant of the internationalized context, and the

“supervised” nature, of their exercise of the pouvoir constituant. At this

stage, the international community had stepped backstage and let local

actors take the floor, while still retaining a partial influence over procedure

and substance through the Ahtisaari Plan requirements and their inclusion in

the UDI.

32

See the official transcript of the Kosovar Assembly session, available in Albanian at

http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/proc/trans_s_2008_02_17_al.pdf (last

visited 17 November 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1048

b) The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

The final step in the exercise of the internationalized constituent

power was the adoption of the “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo”.

Formally, the constitution-making process meticulously followed the

procedure set out in the CSP33

: Two days after independence was declared,

a Constitutional Commission was convened by the President of Kosovo. It

elaborated a draft constitution, held a series of public debates and submitted

a final draft in April. According to the CSP, this draft had to be “certified”

by the ICR, which had largely replaced the SRSG. In his assessment, the

ICR relied namely on expert advice from the Venice Commission, which

represents another noteworthy form of multilateral involvement in

constitution-making. Only after certification was the draft adopted by the

Assembly, and entered into force on 15 June 2008. Its content reflected the

substantive prescriptions of the CSP, sometimes even to the letter, including

the normative supremacy of the Ahtisaari Plan over the Constitution in case

of norm collisions as well as supra-constitutional prerogatives of the ICR.34

While the official process closely followed the procedure foreseen in

the CSP, constitutional developments had in reality been set in motion

already in March 2007 in parallel to the political discussions about the

CSP.35

Kosovar members of the Constitutional Commission were selected

in early 2007 in consultation with international advisors, including the US

Agency for International Development (USAID) and other donors. These

advisors accompanied the drafting process and acted as mediators when

Kosovar representatives were unable to reach an agreement. The subsequent

draft texts were kept confidential pending a diplomatic settlement of

Kosovo status, and even though a draft was ready by December 2007, it was

published on a website only some hours after the declaration of

independence.36

The role of the international community in the drafting process was

twofold: First, it was involved in the selection of the Commission members,

33

Cf. Art. 10 and 11 of the CSP and the official website of the Constitutional

Commission at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,1 (last visited 17 November

2010). 34

On the substance of the constitution see in detail J. Marko, „The New Kosovo

Constitution in a Regional Comparative Perspective‟, 33 Review of Central and East

European Law (2008) 4, 437. 35

J. Tunheim, „Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution‟, 18 Minnesota Journal of

International Law (2009), 371, 374-375. 36

Id., 376-378.


1049

ensured the Ahtisaari Plan procedure was followed and provided technical

assistance and legal expertise to the drafters. Second, it made sure that the

substantive prescriptions of the CSP, to which the UDI had committed the

Republic of Kosovo, were duly integrated into the new constitutional

document. International influence remained partial and was exercised

formally through the multilateral institutions created in Kosovo, namely the

ICR and the Venice Commission, who retained a veto right over the final

constitution. At the same time, the European Union and some individual

states yielded more influence in the process than others. For instance,

USAID provided strong technical support to the Constitutional Commission,

and the Constitution‟s language is at times reminiscent of US constitutional

law terminology, without however adopting other features such as the

presidential system.37

In short, while the ultimate decision-making power in both

independence and constitution-making lay with the representatives of the

Kosovar population, these representatives were acting within the procedural

and substantive limits set by the international community – and hence

embodied the internationalized pouvoir constituant.

C. Assessing the Legality of the Exercises of the

Internationalized pouvoir constituant in Kosovo

This article departed from the proposition that Kosovo represents an

instance of the internationalized pouvoir constituant at work. The following

part will substantiate that proposition. I would like to show that the ICJ

implicitly recognized the internationalized pouvoir constituant in Kosovo,

and inquire into the legality of its exercise, first with regard to

independence, and second with regard to constitution-making. Since the

legality of the declaration of independence has been covered widely

elsewhere38

, I will mainly focus on standards for international involvement

in the constitutionalization process.

37

On US-American influences and respective criticism see Marko, supra note 34, 442,

446. 38

See, inter alia, M. Vashakmadze & M. Lippold, „“Nothing but a Road Towards

Secession”? – The International Court of Justice‟s Advisory Opinion on Accordance

with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of

Kosovo‟, 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law (2010) 2, 619; M. Bothe,

„Kosovo – So What? The Holding of the International Court of Justice is not the Last

Word on Kosovo‟s Independence‟, 11 German Law Journal (2010) 8, 837; R. Howse

& R. Teitel, „Delphic Dictum: How Has the ICJ Contributed to the Global Rule of

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1050

I. Independence and the pouvoir constituant in the ICJ‟s

Advisory Opinion

While the distinction between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir

constitué is well established in constitutional theory, international law‟s

relationship to the two concepts is less clear. However, it is argued here that

the distinction between the two ideas is at the very heart of the ICJ‟s

Advisory Opinion. This is less apparent in the first part of the Court‟s

reasoning on the accordance of the UDI with general international law.

However, when assessing whether the UDI is in violation of Security

Council Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework, the Court

enters the crossroads between international and constitutional law in order

to distinguish between the pouvoir constitué and the pouvoir constituant.

1. The Law Applicable to the Internationalized pouvoir

constitué in Respect of the Declaration of Independence

When determining the law applicable to the UDI, the Court first had

to make an important decision. While it was uncontroversial that Resolution

1244 was crucial in assessing the legality of the UDI, there was some

dispute during the proceedings as to whether the Constitutional Framework

was an act of internal law or of international law.39

The Court explicitly

ruled on this question and found that the Constitutional Framework

possessed international legal character, because it derived its binding force

from Resolution 1244 and ultimately the UN Charter.40

In that sense, the

Constitutional Framework represented an “international law constitution”

for Kosovo, even if it lacked some attributes of liberal constitutionalism.

Law by its Ruling on Kosovo?‟, 11 German Law Journal (2010) 8, 841;

R. Muharremi, „A Note on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo‟, 11 German Law

Journal (2010) 8, 867; H. F. Koeck, D. Horn & F. Leidenmuehler, From Protectorate

to Statehood (2009); R. Muharremi, „Kosovo‟s Declaration of Independence: Self-

Determination and Sovereignty Revisited‟, 33 Review of Central and East European

Law (2008) 4, 401; K. Wirth, „Kosovo am Vorabend der Statusentscheidung:

Überlegungen zur rechtlichen Begründung und Durchsetzung der Unabhängigkeit‟, 67

Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2007), 1065;

C. Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community (2002). 39

Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in

Respect of Kosovo, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010,

(“Kosovo-Opinion”), para. 88. 40

Id., para.88, 93.


1051

This finding is an important step in the Court‟s reasoning for two

reasons: First, the Constitutional Framework thus establishes an

international pouvoir constitué and determines its shape, which is a

prerequisite for being able to distinguish it from other actors involved in the

process. Second, the international nature of the Framework enables the

Court to argue that it established standards of legality only for the pouvoir

constitué, because this is an international law institution. In

contradistinction, according to the Court, international law does not set

standards to assess the legality of declarations of independence by other

actors.

Hence, an important next step in the Court‟s reasoning was to

determine who, then, the authors of the UDI were. Were they to be

identified with the PISG established by and under international law, or were

they someone, or something, else? If the declaration had indeed been issued

by the PISG, then they were surely bound by the legal framework which had

established them, namely Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional

Framework. Consequently, had the PISG themselves authored the UDI, the

declaration would have been an act of the pouvoir constitué instituted by

international law. Inevitably, the declaration would then have been ultra

vires, because the legal order which had created the PISG did not allow

them to declare independence unilaterally.

The Court however does not go down that avenue. Rather, it takes the

view that the UDI was not an act of the pouvoir constitué in Kosovo: “[T]he

Court considers that the authors of that declaration did not act, or intend to

act, in the capacity of an institution created by and empowered to act within

that legal order [established by Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional

Framework] but, rather, set out to adopt a measure the significance and

effects of which would lie outside that order.”41

The distinction between the

pouvoir constitué and actual authors thus seems to rest on one decisive

criterion: The authors‟ subjective intent to act, and to produce effects,

outside the Constitutional Framework. Even though the Court proceeds to

make an additional argument with regard to the language of the UDI and the

special procedure chosen for adoption of the declaration42

, these factors are

ultimately in the hands of the authors of the UDI themselves. So far, the

subjective intent not to act as pouvoir constitué seems decisive.

41

Id., para. 105. 42

Id., para. 107.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1052

This is question-begging, since the mere intent to evade an otherwise

applicable legal order is generally insufficient to actually render it

inapplicable. Even more importantly, it leaves open the question who, or

what, the authors of the UDI were instead, if not the pouvoir constitué.

2. Identifying the pouvoir constituant as Author of the

Declaration of Independence

In fact, the ICJ itself seems to feel uneasy with its focus on subjective

intent, and provides two more arguments to back up its reasoning. These

two arguments, taken together with the intent criterion, support the view that

it was in fact the pouvoir constituant which declared independence of

Kosovo.43

Firstly, as regards intent, the finality of the UDI was not simply

to “act outside” the Constitutional Framework. The declaration‟s language

is unambiguous in that its intent is to effect independence and become a

sovereign state. The UDI is an act of self-determination, and as such, an act

of the pouvoir constituant if understood in the liberal sense.

This leads to the second criterion used by the ICJ: Popular sovereignty

and democratic legitimacy. The Court holds that “the authors of the

declaration of independence [acted] as persons […] in their capacity as

representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the

interim administration”44

. The authors are not the pouvoir constitué but the

“representatives of the people of Kosovo”. This language is indeed

reminiscent of liberal constitutional terminology, which requires the pouvoir

constituant, if legitimate, to be connected in some way to the will of the

people. Consequently, observers have noted that the Court itself seems to

“flirt with ideas of popular sovereignty and pouvoir constituant”45

.

This view is supported by the language of the declaration itself: Its

authors identify themselves as the “democratically-elected leaders of our

people” and declare Kosovo “an independent and sovereign state”. This

aspect of democratic legitimacy is crucial, and it is one factor (among many

others) which distinguishes the case of Kosovo from other secessionist

movements. Another distinguishing factor is the internationalization of the

process, which was crucial in creating the democratic legitimacy claimed by

43

In that sense, see also Z. Oklopcic, „Preliminary Thoughts on the Kosovo Opinion‟,

EJIL Talk (26 July 2010) available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/preliminary-thoughts-on-

the-kosovo-opinion/ (last visited 17 November 2010). 44

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 39, para 109. 45

Oklopcic, supra note 43.

http://www.ejiltalk.org/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-kosovo-opinion/

http://www.ejiltalk.org/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-kosovo-opinion/


1053

the “representatives of the people”: It was the international territorial

administration that first established the basic requirements for a free and

democratic system of government, which could then midwife a pouvoir

constituant seen by many as legitimately representing the will of the

majority of the Kosovo people.

However, even these two criteria seem insufficient to see the authors

as the pouvoir constituant. In fact, the Court hints at a third criterion when

discussing the acquiescence of the SRSG with the UDI, a criterion which is

factual in nature: A sufficient degree of social acceptance of, or at least

acquiescence in, the exercise of constituent power. In the words of the legal

philosopher Hans Lindhal: The act of the constituent power must be “taken

up”, the “normative innovation must catch on”46

, or, put differently: The

revolution must be successful, and for it to be successful it must trigger a

certain degree of social acceptance. This points to a factual element in this

context, which seems to be a common feature in the formation of new states

and in the revolutionary tradition of constitution-making and tends to be

relevant to constitutional theory and international law alike: While

constitutional theory seems to accept the establishment of a new

constitutional order by the constituent power retrospectively if it has

become successful,47

international law attaches importance to the

effectiveness of governmental functions within an entity purporting to be an

independent state, and, to some extent, recognition by other subjects of the

international legal order.48

In the case of Kosovo, the exercise of the constituent power had

triggered 71 recognitions by October 2010, a fact which clearly

distinguishes the UDI from earlier declarations of independence and many

other such attempts worldwide. What is more, the ICJ itself does hint at that

factual element when it notes, in order to support its reasoning on

authorship, that the SRSG did not take any action to revoke or repress the

declaration of independence.49

The Court takes this as evidence supporting

the view that the UDI was not an act of the PISG. However, it can also be

seen as the acceptance of a successful exercise of the pouvoir constituant –

the representative of the old order gives way to a new order, instituted by

46

H. Lindahl, „Acquiring a Community: The Acquis and the Institution of European

Legal Order‟, 9 European Journal of International Law (2003) 4, 433, 441. 47

Id., 442. 48

On state formation and recognition see generally J. Crawford, The Creation of States

in International Law (2006). 49

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 39, para. 108.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1054

representatives claiming for themselves a higher degree of

representativeness with regard to the will of the people.

3. No International Law Standards for Assessing the Legality

of the Exercise of the pouvoir constituant with Regard to

Independence

However, while the Court takes great pains to distinguish the authors

of the UDI from the pouvoir constitué, it does not draw any consequences

from its “off-the-cuff remark” on “the people of Kosovo”50

: It simply goes

on to find that the UDI is legal because neither general international law nor

the legal framework of UN territorial administration contain a prohibition

on declarations of independence by representatives of “the people of

Kosovo”. This refusal to draw any consequences from the pouvoir

constituant concept begs the somewhat ironic question to what extent it

would have damaged the Court‟s reasoning if independence had been

declared “by envoys from the Planet Zoltar”51

.

Significantly, it seems that the high degree of internationalization of

the entire process leading to independence, and a considerable international

legal framing of the pouvoir constituant, are of no consequence at all for the

regime of international law governing independence and secession. The

international nature of the pouvoir constitué has no consequences for the

pouvoir constituant, whose internationalization is equally obvious from the

text of the UDI and its reference to its own preconfiguration by the Ahtisaari

Plan. As a result, one is left with the impression that, according to the ICJ,

international law is largely indifferent to the exercise of popular sovereignty

by the pouvoir constituant, even if brought about by strong international

involvement in a highly internationalized legal setting.

In short: Even though the pouvoir constituant is being framed by

international law, this does not mean that it is necessarily being tamed by

international law – at least in the view of the ICJ. While this reasoning of

the ICJ with regard to independence has attracted much criticism,52

I would

now like to draw the attention here to the fact that not only independence,

50

Oklopcic, supra note 43. 51

Id. 52

See for instance the dissenting opinion of Judge Simma attached to the Kosovo-

Opinion, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15993.pdf (last visited 1

December 2010); Vashakmadze & Lippold, supra note 38, 619; Bothe, supra note 38;

Howse & Teitel, supra note 38; Muharremi, supra note 38; Oklopcic, supra note 43.


1055

but also international involvement in constitution-making in Kosovo raises

questions of legality and legitimacy under international law.

II. Potential Standards of Legality for the Internationalized

pouvoir constituant with Regard to Constitution-Making

In the liberal tradition of the pouvoir constituant, the adoption of a

constitution is not only one of the core attributes of sovereignty, but is also

regarded as an inherently democratic exercise. Consequently, the

involvement of external actors in such constitutionalization processes raises

the question of the legality and legitimacy of such external influences.

Hence, the well-known constitutional law debate on whether the pouvoir

constituant is bound or unbound by law also arises in, and inspires,

international law.53

Raising these questions is not tantamount to outright rejection of

international involvement in constitution-making. To the contrary, it is

widely accepted that the success or failure of a new a constitutional order

depends at least partly on its legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, which in

turn is influenced by its legality. Inquiring into potential standards for the

legitimacy and legality of internationalized constitution-making may thus

prove to be important for the success of such constitutionalization efforts in

Kosovo and beyond.

The legal regime governing international influences over the

constitution-making process might be derived from at least three sources. A

first set of norms potentially affecting the legality of external influences

over constitution-making is the international law of belligerent occupation.

Second, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 laid down obligations and

limitations with regard to constitution-making. Third, the Ahtisaari Plan,

although in itself not a source of international law, became binding upon

Kosovo by virtue of its unilateral adoption in the UDI.

1. International Law of Belligerent Occupation as a Standard

for Internationalized Constitution-Making?

Since Kosovo emerged from an international armed conflict between

NATO and Serbia, the law of belligerent occupation is one potential source

53

Cf. Möllers, supra note 5 and Kelsen, supra note 6; C. Sunstein, Designing

Democracy (2001).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1056

of (il)legality. In particular the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that

where one state occupies another, the occupant must maintain an orderly

system of governance; that the occupant has limited legislative powers and

may not make permanent changes in fundamental institutions; and that it

must utilize already existing local laws where possible.54

Under this regime,

instituting a new constitutional framework and institutions of (self-)

government would probably be illegal, as has been argued for instance with

regard to transitional constitutional arrangements in occupied Iraq.55

However, this set of norms is limited to situations where there is an

occupation by a state bound by the Geneva Conventions. On the face of it,

the international presence in Kosovo may look like an occupation, but the

fundamental difference to Iraq, for instance, is the thorough multilateral

foundation of the international presence in Resolution 1244. Since

Resolution 1244 explicitly aimed to promote autonomy and self-government

in Kosovo for an interim period, the law of belligerent occupation does not

apply to the extent that the UN administration established the PISG under

the Constitutional Framework for a transitional period – be it by virtue of

Article 103 of the UN Charter or the lex specialis principle. Had the

occupying powers attempted to institute a permanent order themselves,

declared independence themselves, or annexed the territory, such actions

would probably have been illegal under, inter alia, the law of belligerent

occupation. This is not the case however, as the UDI and the Constitution

are still attributable to the local, if internationalized, pouvoir constituant.

2. Security Council Resolution 1244

A second set of standards can be found in Resolution 1244, which

contains three main requirements for the new international legal order

established in Kosovo: It must, first, establish “substantial autonomy and

self-government”, second this self-government must be “democratic”,

including the holding of elections, and third the new order must be

“provisional”, pending a final settlement.56

These were mainly requirements

for the first step in the Kosovo constitutionalization process, i.e. the

Constitutional Framework, but they have some bearing on later steps, too.

Whereas the Constitutional Framework certainly established

autonomy and some degree of self-government, the question arises whether

54

Cf. Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 4, 450. 55

Id., 452-453. 56

SC Res. 1244 (1999), para 11 lit a), c).


1057

the legal order it created satisfied the requirement that it must be

“democratic”. Since the Constitutional Framework has become, at least de

facto, obsolete, such a discussion may seem somewhat academic. Suffice it

to say here that the unelected SRSG‟s virtually unlimited powers seemed to

be at odds with essential features of a liberal concept of democracy, if taken

to include the separation of powers as a democratic requirement, not only as

a postulate of the rule of law.57

On the other hand, historical experience

from Bosnia and elsewhere shows that premature democratization may be

detrimental to the long-term governance of a political entity, as it may lock

in political constellations and elite influence prevalent at the time of

devolution of power. Consequently, it is probably most convincing to

interpret the “democracy” postulate in Resolution 1244 as a teleological

principle,58

which requires the UN administration to continuously adopt

steps to the progressive realization of more democratic forms of governance.

In that respect, the evolution in Kosovo may have been slow, but not to the

extent to make UN administration and the Constitutional Framework illegal.

Some doubts also pertain to the “provisional” nature of the

Constitutional Framework. Even though it was formally designed to be an

interim regime, it preconfigured later constitutional arrangements in the

CSP and the Constitution, ranging from the basic form of government

(parliamentary republic, not presidential system) to such important details as

the number of seats in the Kosovo Assembly reserved for minority

representatives (consistently 20 out of 120 in all documents). In that sense,

it tended to establish a fait accompli with regard to basic features of the

pouvoir constitué envisaged in later constitutional documents. It is doubtful

however whether this makes the Constitutional Framework itself illegal.

Rather, the “provisional” condition should be taken to require later actions

by international representatives to allow for an open-ended discursive

process on constitutional arrangements among the eventual framers, which

does not preclude these framers from drawing inspiration from the

Framework.

A second aspect of the “provisional” requirement pertains to the

continued role of the international community in the making of a permanent

Constitution of Kosovo: As outlined above, international actors were

57

On varying conceptions of democracy in the face of international law, see

A. v. Bogdandy, „Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft des Völkerrechts – eine

Bestandsaufnahme‟, 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und

Völkerrecht (2003), 853. 58

N. Petersen, Demokratie als teleologisches Prinzip (2009).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1058

instrumental in the negotiation of the CSP, they supervised the drafting

process of the final Constitution and ensured compliance with the Ahtisaari

Plan requirements. Even after this stage, the Constitution itself reserves to

the ICR the authority to ensure compliance of the Constitution and actions

there under with the Ahtisaari Plan, including the power to oust public

officials and annul acts violating the CSP. While international involvement

in the status settlement negotiations is covered by Resolution 1244, which

explicitly envisages such a process, it is doubtful whether the making of a

permanent constitution for an independent Kosovo including a more

permanent international supervisory function can be based on the

Resolution. However, even if one assumes for the moment that such a legal

base in international law was needed, and that Resolution 1244 did not

provide it, another source is at hand.

3. The Unilateral Commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan in the

Declaration of Independence

In fact, such a legal basis can be found in the UDI, read together with

the Ahtisaari Plan. The latter‟s legal nature initially remained unclear,

because it was neither endorsed by a Security Council resolution nor

included into any other legally binding instrument, unlike for instance the

Dayton Agreements which included a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, the UDI itself represents a unilateral commitment in the sense of

the sources doctrine in international law. It commits Kosovo to abide by the

Ahtisaari Plan, and thus creates obligations of international law.

Consequently, Kosovo, if considered a subject of international law at all, is

under an obligation towards other states to respect the provisions of the

CSP. In addition, the UDI represents an invitation under international law

for the international presences, including the ICR.

This construction has the advantage of retracing the international

community‟s continued constitutional role in Kosovo to the democratically

legitimated pouvoir constituant. It is sometimes criticized for making the

continued international involvement dependent on Kosovar consensus and

for risking permanent minority protection in Kosovo. This however can be

countered by two arguments: First, although the legal consequences of

unilateral commitments in international law are not fully clear, the UDI

explicitly states that its unilateral commitment is “irrevocable”. Second,

international supervision and minority protection have an additional legal

basis in the Constitution. Both elements are safeguarded against

constitutional amendments by three devices within the text of the


1059

Constitution59

: First, the supremacy of the Ahtisaari Plan over the

constitution; second, the role of the ICR; and third, a super-majority rule for

constitutional amendments which requires minority consent for any

constitutional reform, a procedure in turn protected by the equally

internationalized constitutional court.

Hence, international involvement in the Kosovo constitution-making

process has a double legal basis in international and constitutional law. This

holds true for the period following the UDI and the adoption of the

Constitution and provides not only arguments for legality, but also for the

legitimacy of international involvement, since it is retraced ultimately to the

democratically legitimized pouvoir constituant.60

This line of arguments

does not cover, however, the period before the UDI was adopted, namely

the important decisions made in the drafting process in 2007. Although

these may be based internally on the adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan by the

Kosovo Assembly in 2007, one is left with a legal vacuum in the

international legal sphere. There is no apparent international legal basis for

this period, which begs the question whether such a basis is needed at all. If

applying the ICJ‟s approach, one would probably have to look for a rule of

international law prohibiting or at least regulating external interference with

the pouvoir constituant. Again, applying the Court‟s reasoning, such a rule

can hardly be found in Resolution 1244, nor have attempts to find such rules

in general international law yielded results.61

D. Conclusion: Emerging Standards of Legitimacy for the

Internationalized pouvoir constituant

The absence of generally applicable international legal standards for

exercises of the internationalized pouvoir constituant does not mean,

however, that one is left with a complete normative vacuum. Instead, it is

submitted here that constitutional theory does offer normative standards, if

not for assessing legality, then at least for discussing the legitimacy of

external involvement with the pouvoir constituant. Even if legitimacy may

be a less clear-cut standard than legality under international law, asking the

legitimacy question enables us to draw from two other discourses at the

59

Articles 143; 146 and 147; 144 (2) of the Constitution of Kosovo. 60

Whether the absence of any mechanisms for legal control of the ICR is in line with

liberal constitutional doctrine is doubtful, but goes beyond the scope of this paper. 61

On the absence of standards in general international law see Dann & Al-Ali, supra

note 4, 451.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1060

crossroads between international constitutional law, mentioned at the

beginning of this article: First the debate on constitutionalization of

international law, and public law approaches to international law,62

and

second, discussions of international law‟s influence on established domestic

constitutional orders. I will focus here on the discussion of the legitimacy of

external involvement in constitution-making,63

which may also offer,

mutatis mutandis, some guidance when it comes to international influence

on independence processes.

A public law perspective contributes in several respects to the

legitimacy question in respect of internationalized constitution-making: In

the first place, it enables lawyers to ask the question of legitimacy at all. If

one accepts that international law is also public law, then issues of

legitimacy of the exercise of public authority by international actors come to

the fore. And what could be a more essential exercise of public authority

than the genesis of a constitution, and involvement in such a process?

Second, a public law perspective provides ideas and concepts for framing

the legitimacy debate, without however succumbing to all too easy domestic

analogies.64

For instance, the concept of popular sovereignty offers a

number of insights on legitimate forms of outside intervention in

constitution-making: It may for example inspire calls for external actors to

be as unobtrusive as possible.65

Furthermore, it supports arguments that

involvement should be transparent and geared towards specific aims, which

are legitimate in themselves and do not seek to impose the self-interest of

the external actor.66

Second, a constitutional perspective may help to identify which aims

of external involvement exactly could be considered legitimate. For

constitutional law inspires a certain desire to avoid self-interested factions

taking over politics, and constitutional politics in particular. Consequently,

one such legitimate aim for external involvement would be to ensure the

inclusiveness of and equal access to the constitution-making process. If one

accepts that there is no naturalistic “will of the people”, but that

62

See A. v. Bogdandy, P. Dann, & M. Goldmann, „Developing the Publicness of Public

International Law: Towards a Legal Framework of Global Governance Activities‟, in:

A. v. Bogdandy, et. al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International

Institutions. Advancing International Institutional Law (2009), 3. 63

For a similar treatment of other processes see Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 4, 454-455. 64

v. Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 62, 19-20, 24. 65

In that sense, Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 4, 460. 66

Id., 459.


1061

constitution-making always bears features of elite consensus, too, then

international involvement can be an important counterbalance to

disproportionate factional influence on the process.67

This is particularly

true in multi-ethnic polities characterized by violent conflict and domination

of one particular ethnic group.68

Even if external actors may not represent

the local people, the insistence on inclusiveness advocated here does lend

some sort of functional legitimacy to external involvement, somewhat

comparable to the role of constitutional courts and their counter-majoritarian

tendency. In this respect, the involvement in Kosovo, which tended to be

geared towards ensuring equal representation in the constitutional process,

was one of the more successful examples of the internationalization of the

pouvoir constituant, even if it could have been even more inclusive with

regard to ethnic minorities living within Kosovo during the decisive phase

of the Ahtisaari-led negotiations.

If disproportionate factional influence on constitution-making is to be

avoided, so is domination by self-interested external actors. In this respect, a

comparative analysis of internationalized constitution-making processes

seems to point into the direction that a limited, disinterested and clearly

focused international involvement is more likely to occur if and when

external actors are multi-lateral in nature, because they tend to be less driven

by self-interest than individual states.69

Of course, this holds true only to the

extent that these actors themselves remain true to their multilateral vocation

and do not become a vehicle of one individual state‟s interests. Also in this

respect, the Kosovo process seems comparatively positive, although it is

sometimes difficult to distinguish necessary political leadership from undue

self-interested influence.

A less positive assessment is warranted as regards calls to the effect

that involvement in the procedure should be transparent.70

As set out above,

the Ahtisaari process and constitution-making throughout 2007 were largely

conducted behind closed doors. This may have been due to diplomatic

constraints, but made the process and external involvement not very

transparent. It also led to the fact that many of the substantive decisions had

already been made when public consultations on the actual text began. This

67

Id., 458; Feldman, supra note 3, 880-883. 68

S. Choudhry, „Old Imperal Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building: Constitutive

Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities‟, 37 Connecticut Law Review (2005)

4, 933, 936-939. 69

Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 4, 460-461. 70

For such a view, see id., 461.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3 1035-1062

1062

leaves room for improvement in an otherwise relatively progressive process

of internationalized constitution-making, when compared to other such

instances.

As regards international involvement with the substance of the

constitution, research on international law influences on existing domestic

constitutional orders offers insights on what states appear to consider as

acceptable substantive influences. This perspective tends to show that the

imposition of certain substantive outcomes seems to be perceived as more

legitimate when based on universally or at least regionally accepted

multilateral instruments, rather than on the legal order of a particular state.

Consequently, drawing and borrowing from international or regional human

rights instruments or minority protection regimes seems helpful. If

comparative constitutional law is used as a source of inspiration, then a

comparative basis of more than one country seems more likely to avoid self-

interested solutions. In this respect, reference to widely accepted multilateral

human rights instruments in the Kosovo Constitution adds a modicum of

legitimacy to the otherwise rather obtrusive influence on the substance of

the Kosovo constitution, even though the list of directly applicable treaties

seems to have an element of selectivity to it.71

While these considerations apply to the legitimacy of external

involvement in constitution-making, it may be worthwhile to examine in

future in how far these categories are equally valid for processes leading to

independence. Suffice it to say here that an “earned sovereignty” approach

is connected to constitutional standards, too, which may be considered as

prerequisites for independence. For the time being, we can conclude that

international law is evolving and increasingly framing both faces of the

pouvoir constituant. When it comes to its taming however, international law

offers little guidance, even if there is strong international involvement in its

exercise. One is left with the less clear-cut category of legitimacy of

external influences on the pouvoir constituant. In this respect, the crossroads

of international law and constitutional law still offers important signposts

pointing down a road towards even more legitimate and legally tamed

exercises of the internationalized pouvoir constituant.

71

For instance, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is conspicuously

absent from the list, which otherwise contains most building blocks of the

“international bill of rights”, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See

on this point Marko, supra note 34, 447.


doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-2-3-roeben

The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral

Declaration of Independence in Respect of

Kosovo: Rules or principles?

Volker Röben

Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................... 1065

A. Introduction ................................................................................... 1065

B. What the Court Said: a Rules-Centered View of

International Law, and its Application to the Case at Hand .............. 1067

I. The Premise: There Must be a (Prohibitive or Permissive)

Rule of International Law ............................................................. 1067

II. General International Law: Territorial Integrity as a

“Horizontal” Rule.......................................................................... 1068

III. Security Council Resolution 1244 is an Interim

Arrangement Only ......................................................................... 1069

IV. There is no Right to a Declaration of Independence

in a Non-Colonial Context ............................................................ 1071

C. A Critique of the Court‟s Rule-Centered Approach and its

Alternative: Principles in International Law ..................................... 1072

D. Conceptualizing Self-Determination as a Principle in a Non-

Colonial Context After Kosovo? ....................................................... 1073

I. Self-Determination as a Principle of Positive

International Law .......................................................................... 1074

Professor Dr. Volker Röben, Swansea University School of Law.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1064

1. The UN-Charter ................................................................. 1074

2. The Principle of Self-Determination in the Non-

Colonial Context: The Kosovo Opinion and its

Take on Lotus ..................................................................... 1075

II. Changing the Shared Understanding of Self-

Determination ................................................................................ 1078

1. Empirical Change ............................................................... 1078

2. Extrinsic Normative Change .............................................. 1078

3. Intrinsic Normative Change ............................................... 1080

4. Declarations of Independence in a Non-Colonial

Context ............................................................................... 1081

E. Conclusions ................................................................................... 1085

The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of

Independence in Respect of Kosovo: Rules or Principles?

1065

Abstract

In its Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice

concluded that the declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo in its

precise historical circumstances "did not violate any applicable rule of

international law". In its reasoning, the Opinion is concerned with territorial

integrity, self-determination and Security Council competence under

Chapter VII UN Charter. The Court‟s Opinion – its reasoning and outcome

– can be assessed from several angles. Adopting instead the perspective of

legal theory, our concern will be what we can learn from the Opinion about

the normative structure of international law in general, and as applied in the

context of secessions in a non-colonial context. The paper will argue that the

approach of the International Court of Justice to international law, as

evidenced in the case at hand, may be labeled rule-oriented. After

reconstructing the main planks of the Court‟s reasoning, the paper will set

out an alternative conceptual framework, arguing for a shift from a rule-

centered to a principle-based approach to international law in the interest of

legal certainty. It will then explore what room there is for such an approach

to secessionist situations based on the understanding of self-determination

as principle.

A. Introduction

A UN General Assembly resolution adopted on 8 October 2008

backed the request of Serbia to seek an Advisory Opinion from the

International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's unilaterally

proclaimed independence.1 The International Court of Justice delivered its

Advisory Opinion on 22 July 2010.2 It concluded that the declaration of

independence in respect of Kosovo in its precise historical circumstances

"did not violate any applicable rule of international law".3 For the Court of

Justice, this was a case of first impression insofar as it touches on the matter

of secession in a non-colonial context, a matter concerning the fundamental

1 GA Res. 63/3, 8 October 2008.

2 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in

Respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010

[Kosovo-Opinion], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (last

visited 28.11.2010). 3 Para 3 of the operative clause, Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 44, para. 123.

../../../../../../Documents%20and%20Settings/LAROEBEV/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly

../../../../../../Documents%20and%20Settings/LAROEBEV/wiki/Advisory_opinion

../../../../../../Documents%20and%20Settings/LAROEBEV/wiki/International_Court_of_Justice

../../../../../../Documents%20and%20Settings/LAROEBEV/wiki/International_Court_of_Justice_advisory_opinion_on_the_legality_of_Kosovo%2527s_unilaterally_proclaimed_independence



GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1066

structure of international law. In its reasoning, the Opinion is concerned

with territorial integrity, self-determination and Security Council

competence under Chapter VII UN Charter. The Court‟s Opinion – its

reasoning and outcome – can be assessed from several angles. A doctrinal

standpoint for instance would query the compatibility of the Court‟s

pronouncements with the system of international law as hitherto understood

or properly to be understood. A consequentialist or functional standpoint for

instance would ask whether the outcome of the opinion on secession in a

non-colonial context is conducive to the values of the international

community. In that respect, it could be stated that the Opinion furthers a

negotiated outcome, by removing rights that either the territorial state or the

group seeking secession may use to hold back. There is now no legal right

against secession that the territorial state could invoke and which would

allow it to hold out during the negotiations. Lacking a right to oppose the

potential case of secession, the territorial state is well advised to fully

engage in any international process of negotiations set up by the

international community. But neither has the group a recognized right to

remedial secession. They also can be assured of making a declaration of

independence not running foul of the law only at the issue of fruitless

negotiations. So they, too, have an incentive to engage in these negotiations.

None of these perspectives, all of them interesting in their own right,

shall concern us in these pages. It is felt that these perspectives cannot

exhaust the matter, or do justice to this rich Opinion. Adopting instead the

perspective of legal theory, our concern will be what we can learn from the

Opinion about the normative structure of international law in general, and as

applied in the context of secessions in a non-colonial context.4 The Court‟s

Opinion lends itself to this perspective for it positions itself very clearly.

The paper will argue that the approach of the International Court of Justice

to international law, as evidenced in the case at hand, may be labeled rule-

oriented. A Rule is any norm whose structure can be described as

consecutive. If the conditions x are fulfilled, consequence y results. The first

part of this paper will reconstruct the main planks of the Court‟s reasoning,

showing that the Opinion‟s rule-centered approach. Part 2 will offer a

critique that it does not further the value of legal certainty as much as the

Court may have hoped. It will then set out an alternative conceptual

framework. It will argue for a shift from a rule-centered to a principle-based

4 For a more detailed account of the underlying legal theory see A. Halpin & V.

Roeben, „Introduction‟, in A. Halpin & V. Roeben (eds.), Theorising the Global Legal

Order (2009).1-8



1067

approach to international law. Part 3 will explore what room there is for

such an approach to secessionist situations based on the understanding of

self-determination as principle. The paper will finish with a number of

conclusions.

B. What the Court Said: a Rules-Centered View of

International Law, and its Application to the Case at

Hand

This part of the paper will offer a reconstruction of the Kosovo-

Opinion by focusing on four critical junctures. These junctures are: the

premise that the Court must look for prohibitive rules of international law

only (I), the “horizontal” rule-interpretation of territorial integrity (II), the

equally rule-modeled interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1244

(III), and the inconclusiveness of a right to remedial self-determination in a

non-colonial context (IV).

I. The Premise: There Must be a (Prohibitive or Permissive)

Rule of International Law

Throughout the Opinion, the Court of Justice consistently adopts a

specific lens or premise for identifying and construing relevant norms. This

premise is articulated in the opening paragraphs of the Opinion,5 shaping the

subsequent reasoning of the Court. This premise of the Opinion is that it is

the General Assembly‟s request for an Advisory Opinion on the

“Accordance with international law of the declaration of independence”

means “non-prohibition by international law”. In other words, there must

not be norms prohibiting the DI, or expressly permitting it as that would

logically exclude a prohibition. It is noteworthy that the Court here relies on

procedure only, on an interpretation of the request of the General Assembly

for an Advisory Opinion. There is no attempt to link this procedural point to

a consideration of underlying substantive structure of international law.6 But

5 Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 19, paras 49-51.

6 Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 21, para. 55 and 56 seemingly do so. But they really

consider the subtly different question of the consequences of a declaration of

independence. By contrast, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in Lotus,

placed the very notion of prohibitive rules in the context of substantive law, “Lotus”,

Judgment, No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 18. See below sub III.1b).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1068

folded into this explicitly articulated statement of the Court there is a second

yet unarticulated premise. This second premise is that the relevant norms

will be constructed as rules in the structural sense outlined above. They will

not be seen or construed as principles.

This two-fold premise leaves the Court with a clean course for the

remainder of the Opinion. It will be checking whether there are rules that

prohibit (expressly permit) the declaration of independence in relation to

Kosovo. The Court focuses in turn on general international law (2), S/Res

1244 (3) and self-determination (4), each of which it discards in turn.

II. General International Law: Territorial Integrity as a

“Horizontal” Rule

The first substantive yardstick that the Court employs is territorial

integrity, in this case of Serbia. This is seen as a norm of general

(customary) international law although it is also enshrined in the Charter

making it treaty law, but the Court really makes short shrift of it by simply

and authoritatively stating that territorial integrity applies between States

only, horizontally, but not vertically within one state.7

It can therefore not

prohibit acts of a non-state actor such as a declaration of independence

expressed by a people claiming self-determination. Territorial integrity is

directed against other states only. Not against non-state actors.

The Court is not ready to interpret territorial integrity in a more open

way. As such it is not open to a broader interpretation that would have resort

to the spirit of the norm as reflected in relevant documents. As a matter of

positive international law, the exclusively horizontal understanding of

territorial integrity is a somewhat problematic interpretation of the principle

that may be seen as disconnected from the development of PIL since the

adoption of the Charter. A closer analysis of the documents cited by the

Court itself would reveal that they are concerned with territorial integrity in

a horizontal context. That is arguably true for the so-called safeguard clause

of the Friendly Relations Declaration8,

as it is for Art. 46(1)9 of the

7 Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 30, Para. 80.

8 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.

9 Article 46 (1) reads: Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for

any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform

any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or

encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the



1069

Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples.10

Be that as it may, the Court

could not have expressed itself more clearly: For the Court, territorial

integrity is a rule the meaning of which is precisely determined.

III. Security Council Resolution 1244 is an Interim

Arrangement Only

A similar approach underlies the interpretation and application of the

controlling Security Council resolution 1244(1999). The Court proceeds to

the question whether S/RES 1244(1999) prohibits the declaration of

independence in relation to Kosovo. The Court denies this question. The

Court initially advances an interpretative theory for Security Council

resolutions.11

This Court acknowledges the relevance of Arts. 31-32 Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, but it emphasizes that the resolutions of

the Security Council are collective acts of the organ of an international

organization. This interpretative theory remains somewhat unfinished

business and it is not clear which parts of the Court‟s subsequent reasoning

bear it out. It seems, however, to support a rather narrow reading of Security

Council 1244, as a sort of stop gap measure: The resolution does not apply

in the case at hand, so says the Court, for it only addresses itself to the

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, which, however, did

not issue the declaration. As to S/Res 1244, the Court finds it to be

essentially an interim arrangement, establishing provisional territorial

administration including the PISG and an internationalized framework for

negotiations that stops well short of determining the final status of

Kosovo.12

S/Res 1244(1999) is a rule the meaning of which is precisely

determined. In this reading, S/Res 1244 cannot adapt to changing realities

and cannot be seen as a measure that can steer a process rather than an

arrangement frozen in time. That leaves the Court with secondly stating

whether the declaration of independence is an act of the PSIG and as such is

covered by S/Res 1244 or not. According to the Court, the declaration of

independence is an act not of the PISG but of members of the PISG acting

in a different capacity.13

Here much rides on the facts, namely the precise

territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States (emphasis

added). 10

GA Res. 61/295, 13 September 2007. 11

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 34, para. 94. 12

Id., 36, para. 99. 13

Id., 36, para 102 reads: “The Court needs to determine whether the declaration of

independence of 17 February 2008 was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1070

timing of the declaration of independence and the circumstances

surrounding it. It is worthwhile quoting the relevant para. 105 of the

Opinion:

“105. The declaration of independence reflects the awareness of its authors

that the final status negotiations had failed and that a critical moment for the

future of Kosovo had been reached. ...Proceeding from there, the authors of

the declaration of independence emphasize their determination to “resolve”

the status of Kosovo and to give the people of Kosovo “clarity about their

future” (thirteenth preambular paragraph). This language indicates that the

authors of the declaration did not seek to act within the standard framework

of interim self-administration of Kosovo, but aimed at establishing Kosovo

“as an independent and sovereign state” (para. 1) (emphasis added).

From this, the Court then concludes that this is not an act ultra vires of

the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)14 but rather that the

declaration of independence was taken by self-constituting representatives

of the Kosovo people rather than the PSIG.15

The problem with this is that there now is actually much less legal

certainty than meets the eye. It remains doubtful whether the declaration of

independence is actually an act by the pouvoir constituant of the Kosovo

people rather than the pouvoir constitué of the PISG.16

While the elections

to the PISG conferred would have conferred authority from the Kosovo

people on the administration of the self-governance regime under Res. 1244

only, it would not have conferred the authority for setting up a new

constitutional regime. Most glaringly, it remains unclear whether the

framework of S/Res 1244 would have taken a position on a hypothetical

declaration of independence at an earlier point in time. Further crucial issues

the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, established under Chapter 9 of the

Constitutional Framework, or whether those who adopted the declaration were acting

in a different capacity.” 14

Id., 39, para. 108. 15

Id., 39, para 109 reads: “The Court thus arrives at the conclusion that, taking all

factors together, the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008

did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the

Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity

as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim

administration.” 16

As for instance Germany argued in its Written Comments, July 2009, available at

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15690.pdf 7. In that vein, all further action by

the PISG such as the adoption of a constitution would also reflect the authority of the

pouvoir constituant acting through the existing institutions.



1071

remain unresolved, namely whether the Security Council under Chapter VII

could actually set parameters for the final status negotiations, whether the

resolution remains in force even after self-constituting acts of the sovereign.

However, the Opinion does not give answers to all of these points. It would

seem fair to say that little or no guidance on declarations of independence in

a secessionist context can be taken from the rule-centered line of reasoning

of the Court.

IV. There is no Right to a Declaration of Independence in a

Non-Colonial Context

A right (for whichever bearer) to independent statehood would

encompass the right to issue a declaration of independence as a necessary

preliminary step. Such a right would be an explicit permissive rule that

would logically exclude any prohibitive rule applying to the same set of

facts. The Court approaches this issue twice. At the very outset of the

opinion, the Court deals with self-determination in its colonial dimension.

The Court clarifies this by stating that the right to self-determination of

peoples under colonial domination does indeed extend to the right to create

an independent state, and so the Court implies, making a declaration of

independence is a step in the process of creating that state. That right may

not be opposed by other states including the colonial power. But self-

determination has not matured into a right to statehood outside of this

context. At the end of its Opinion, the Court then revisits the issue, tackling

the question of self-determination as a right for a group to secede from an

existing sovereign. In reply, the Court quite simply points to the

inconclusiveness of States‟ views as expressed in their Written Statements.

There is no opinio iuris.17

Quite what the status of a declaration of

independence in a non-colonial context is the Court does not say. The Court

does not need to dig any deeper here since anything below a fully fledged

17

It is an interesting question what legal value accrues to the positions taken by States in

Written Statements and Comments made in the proceedings of the Kosovo-Opinion. A

full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, but surely these are first of all part of

court proceedings, and the position may be taken that they collectively have value

only to the extent that the Court makes reference to them in the text of the decision or

opinion. However, it may also be argued that it surely would seem contradictory for

each state that has gone on record through a Written Statement to express a legal

opinion not in line with the Statement on other occasions, unless justified by reference

to the Court pronouncement on the issue.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1072

right would not logically exclude a prohibition of a declaration of

independence, which is what the Court is interested in.

C. A Critique of the Court‟s Rule-Centered Approach

and its Alternative: Principles in International Law

Throughout its Opinion, the Court adopts rules-based approach. That

is true even with respect to territorial integrity and self-determination both

of which would naturally lend themselves to a different principle-based

approach. With respect to territorial integrity, the Court essentially foregoes

resort to the spirit of territorial integrity. It does so by interpreting territorial

integrity as rule fixed in its conditions and consequences as accepted at a

certain point in time. Similarly, self-determination is seen as a rule or rather

a reservoir of rules. There is one in for a declaration of independence in a

colonial context and one for a declaration of independence in a non-colonial

context. Security Council resolutions are also subjected to a narrow reading

seeking to distil them into rules fixed in time and meaning.

Several possible justifications for such a rule-based approach can be

thought of. The consensual legitimacy of international law could be such a

justification as could be the self-perception of an international court as a

dispenser of justice not as an activist developer of international law. Both of

these justifications would coalesce around legal certainty. An assessment of

the Opinion against the yardstick of legal certainty leaves the following

result: the state of affairs for declaration of independence in a colonial

context remains unsettlingly uncertain in spite of the apparent clarity and

rigor of the Court‟s reasoning. It remains unclear what the coverage of the

Court‟s findings really is beyond the precise historical circumstances of the

case. Does the Opinion extend to declaration of independence in the precise

historical circumstances only as determined by the Court, i.e. by a group of

persons issuing the declaration of independence at the unsuccessful

completion of a lengthy internationalized negotiation process? Would it

have covered an earlier declaration of independence as well, or can the law

be considered to frown on such a premature DI? These questions cannot

easily be answered from the Opinion, if at all. Ultimately, this uncertain

state of affairs is the result of the exclusively rule-centered approach of the

Court. Measured against the yardstick of legal certainty, not so much seems

to speak in its favor.

The rule-centered approach to international law is not without

alternatives. More coherence of the law, more predictive power and

ultimately greater legal certainty can be expected from a principle-based



1073

approach. Rules and principles are the two sides of a basic distinction in

legal theory, and the characteristics of one category of norms are the reverse

of the other category‟s characteristics. Principles are inter-subjective values,

but more than that a legal principle is directive in nature. A norm having the

structure of a principle allows for a reasoned or discursive understanding of

the spirit of the norm, which may change over time, and it also allows for

varied consequences to be provided. The consequences of rules are limited

to the dichotomy of lawful or not lawful. Rules allow for a binary logic

only. Principles are not limited to this binary logic as to the potential

consequences. Rather the understanding of the function and spirit of the

principle and the range of consequences correlate. It is a fair statement that

there is now considerable agreement in legal theory about the distinction

between principles and rules.18

There is less clarity about the proper way of

concretizing principles, of progressively developing the spirit of a principle,

which, of course, the possibility of which is, of course, very much the point

of having principles in the first place. Several approaches can be envisaged.

One would be empirical. A second conceptual approach may be seen as

normative in nature. Again, there are two ways through which normative

concretization of a given general principle can conceivably be achieved, one

extrinsic and one intrinsic. Extrinsic normative concretization of a given

principle may be achieved through balancing with conflicting extrinsic

principles under proper principles of conflict and coordination. Intrinsic

normative concretization may be achieved through adducing additional

principles that do not conflict with but rather complement the principle in

question. Intrinsic may be understood as here are referring to issues that

arise in and of itself at medium levels of abstraction.

D. Conceptualizing Self-Determination as a Principle in

a Non-Colonial Context After Kosovo?

Part 3 of this paper will apply this theoretical framework to the

positive law of self-determination in a non-colonial context, bearing in mind

the parameters set by the Court in Kosovo. This will be undertaken in four

steps: there is a principle of self-determination in positive international law

18

For an excellent recent discussion of the principle-rule distinction including intrinsic

and extrinsic elements as well as further relevant references see S. Macdonald, „A

suicidal woman, roaming pigs and a noisy trampolinist: refining the ASBO'S

definition of "anti-social behaviour"‟,69 Modern Law Review (2006) 2, 183-213.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1074

(I). A shared understanding of its meaning in a non-colonial context can be

achieved intrinsically (II). This understanding requires proceduralization

and internationalization (III). A declaration of independence within these

parameters is then best understood to be an allegation of competences

(Kompetenzbehauptungen), whose relative weight depends on the precise

historical circumstances in which they are made (IV).

I. Self-Determination as a Principle of Positive International

Law

1. The UN-Charter

Self-determination is a principle of positive international law. The UN

Charter enshrines the foundational principles of modern international law.

One of these principles is the self-determination of peoples.19

There is a core

shared understanding of the principle of self-determination that has been

established through state practice and the decisions of the Court, and that is

the right to self-determination for colonial peoples. The right to self-

determination of peoples under alien domination has legally undergirded

and politically driven the creation of a large number of new states in Africa

and Asia.20

Indeed even the emphatic statement of the International Court of

Justice that there is a “right” to self-determination not a mere objective

principle may be seen to refer to the colonial context. Beyond that core, in a

non-colonial context, the meaning and indeed function of self-determination

have remained subject to controversy, mainly as to the position of socially

and culturally discreet groups within a state. This is because self-

determination of colonial peoples does not endanger the territorial integrity

of any of the existing equal sovereigns, while self-determination resulting in

the secession of a people from the territorial sovereign obviously does. As a

minimum, it can be said that a consensus view distinguishes internal and

external self-determination, primarily as a doctrinal distinction, but there

19

In the context of the Charter, this principle has both an inherent and a functional

significance. Inherent insofar as it is a collective human right, functional insofar as its

full realisation will be conducive to the maintenance of international peace and

security, the overriding objective of the Charter, by removing causes for conflict

between peoples and nations. 20

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 30, para. 79: self determination developed in such a

way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing

territories and peoples subject to alien domination.



1075

remain doubts as to what external self-determination potentially means and

whether it may even comprise so-called remedial secession in response to

sustained systematic suppression of a minority. In some respects, therefore,

the operationalization of the right to self-determination is asymmetrical.

Well developed in the colonial context, much less well developed in other

contexts. Alas, practically important is mostly the latter today.

2. The Principle of Self-Determination in the Non-Colonial

Context: The Kosovo Opinion and its Take on Lotus

SD as a principle might in its spirit also extend to declarations of

independence in a non-colonial context. The precise consequences would

then have to be determined. But how much room is there for a principle of

self-determination in a non-colonial context after the Kosovo-Opinion? The

Court states that there is no right to remedial secession flowing from self-

determination for lack of consistent opinio iuris. That leaves the reader

baffled. Is there no substantive law on the issue, a non liquet of sorts? The

Court, of course, does not say that either, it rather says that for procedural

reasons it will look for prohibitive or permissive rules only. Whether there is

any other substantive law will not retain the Court here. But the Court has in

the past recognized that the procedural mandate for prohibitive rules does

not exhaust the cosmos of law applicable in a given case. Quite the reverse,

prohibitive rules receive their meaning in the context of such law and in

particular principles only. This is the essence of the Lotus case. The

reminiscences of the well known Lotus case in which the Permanent Court

of Justice formulated its view of the structure of international law have

already been highlighted.21

In Lotus, of course, the PCIJ was also

proceeding from a procedural perspective, the compromis between France

and Turkey, which asked the PCIJ to identify prohibitive rules restricting

the extraterritorial exercise of Turkish jurisdiction. But the Lotus-Court

went beyond the compromis, expressly stating that it was in line with the

substantive structure of international law. The Lotus-Court‟s restatement of

substantive international law in its completeness contextualized the

21

Declaration of Judge Simma, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/

15993.pdf (last visited 28.11.2010), 1, para. 2.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1076

prohibitive rules on state conduct. It is worth quoting the original passage

from the decision:22

“The Court, having to consider whether there are any rules of

international law which may have been violated by the prosecution in

pursuance of Turkish law of Lieutenant Demons is confronted in the

first place by a question of principle which […] has proved to be a

fundamental one. [...] the Turkish Government takes the view that

Article 15 [of the Turkish law] allows Turkey jurisdiction whenever

such jurisdiction does not come into conflict with a principle of

international law. The latter view seems to be in conformity with the

special agreement itself. [...] According to the special agreement,

therefore, it is not a question of stating principles which would permit

Turkey to take criminal proceedings, but of formulating the principles,

if any, which might have been violated by such proceedings. This way

of stating the question is also dictated by the very nature and existing

conditions of international law. International law governs relations

between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States

therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in

conventions or usages generally accepted as expressing principles of

law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-

existing independent entities with a view to the achievement of

common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot

therefore be presumed.”

The quote reveals that Lotus did not state that the Turkish exercise of

extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction fell into a vacuum under international

law. Rather it is covered by state sovereignty as a residual principle of

international law of a general nature which, however, will cede to more

specific rules. Far from saying that there was no international law other than

the prohibiting rules, the PCIJ actually stated that the foundational

international law principle of state sovereignty – or in Charter terms: equal

sovereignty – would permit state action of any type, including

extraterritorial jurisdiction, unless another rule of international law

prohibited it. Under Lotus, a sovereign state is allowed to act as it wishes as

long as it is not prohibited from doing so by a rule of international law. State

22

Lotus Case (France v Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, PCIJ Series A, No. 10,

18 (1927). (emphasis added).



1077

sovereignty under international law thus permits all action by a state unless

prohibited by a consensual rule (or expressly allowed by such a rule). This

encompassing principle forms the bedrock of the claim of international law

to forming a coherent legal order23

rather than a mere collection of norms.

As a legal order, international law will declare the legality or otherwise of

any given course of action of states, but it will not countenance legally

indifferent states of affairs24

In Lotus, far from letting procedure stand on its own, the PCJI self-

consciously reflected its procedural approach on the level of substantive law

where the prohibitive rules were then perceived as constituting exceptions to

a comprehensive permissive principle of international law, i.e. state

sovereignty. The Kosovo-Court emulates the Lotus-Court only in respect of

the procedural level but it does not explicitly reflect the procedure on the

substantive level of international law. The Court‟s silence in this respect

does not foreclose space for a substantive principle of self-determination to

cover Declarations of Independence in a non-colonial context and to provide

for their consequences. Indeed, a direct transposition of the Lotus principle

to the case at hand is not possible since state sovereignty cannot provide the

underlying principle justifying the Declaration of Independence in respect of

Kosovo for the simple reason that Kosovo is not (yet) a sovereign state. But

self-determination of peoples can take the place of state sovereignty. As

pointed out above, the UN Charter recognizes self-determination as one of

the principles upon which friendly relations between States shall be based.

The Charter thus recognizes its foundational quality. This quality lies in the

aspirational claim to political self-organization and self-government of a

people that self-determination underpins. This claim encompasses all the

steps that need to be taken en route to the establishment of statehood. Once

statehood is reached, the people`s claim to self-determination is subsumed

by its claim to territorial sovereignty, at which point Lotus becomes

applicable.

23

Cf. A. Halpin & V. Roeben, „Conclusions‟, in: A. Halpin & V. Roeben, supra note 4,

273-278. 24

Cf. V Bruns, „Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung‟, 1 Zeitschrift für ausländisches

öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1929), 1, 6.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1078

II. Changing the Shared Understanding of Self-Determination

There may have been a shared understanding if not shared support for

function and spirit of self-determination at the time of drafting and entry

into force of the UN Charter. Self-determination was meant to bring

colonialism to an end and to help the former colonies become sovereign

states. As such the principle was applied, and through application and

experience it hardened into a right of self-determination. But its underlying

power of conviction also resided in the fact that there was a shared

understanding if not necessary shared political support that this is what the

Charter intended. Beyond this shared core, there is no fixed understanding.

The question arises, then, how to achieve a shared understanding of self-

determination in a non-colonial context. For self-determination to say

something about declaration of independence in a non-colonial context

presupposes a change in the received shared understanding of self-

determination. Such change can be brought about by inclusive normative

principles (3). On the other hand, the Kosovo-Opinion forecloses

empirically changing the understanding of self-determination (1), and it also

forecloses extrinsic concretization of the self-determination (2).

1. Empirical Change

The Kosovo-Opinion provided an opportunity for the Court, the

principal judicial organ of the UN, empirically to advance and change the

proper understanding of self-determination. The Court preferred, however,

to adopt a restrictive rules-centered approach that positively restated the

shared understanding that self-determination was a right in a colonial

context.

2. Extrinsic Normative Change

The Court also makes it impossible to achieve any extrinsic normative

concretization of the principle of self-determination. Such normative

concretization would require the balancing of self-determination with

another extrinsic principle. It is true that a clear candidate for an extrinsic

principle to be balanced extrinsically with self-determination would be

territorial integrity. Some of the written statements of States to the Court

have anticipated this question, suggesting a legal framework for the exercise

of the right to self-determination. A fine example of this approach is the

Written Statement of Finland. Finland set forth the two principles of



1079

territorial integrity and self-determination, and sought to achieve to balance

them in the instance of the case, achieving praktische Konkordanz.25

The

doctrinal foundations of this elegant approach have, it has to be said, been

knocked away by the Court‟s view that territorial integrity does not have a

vertical application or protection against interference as a matter of positive

international law. According to the Kosovo-Opinion, as has been seen

above, territorial integrity applies horizontally only but not vertically and

can therefore not be balanced with self-determination. The Court opinion

may be seen as rejecting the relevance of extrinsic principles – such as

territorial integrity – and this is a pronouncement that needs to be taken

seriously. Thus, the Kosovo-Court spoke firmly on territorial integrity

asserting its constitutional court functions. Under the firm pronouncement

of the Court, territorial integrity does not bind non-state actors. This

restrictive “horizontal” interpretation of territorial integrity chimes with the

interpretation that the ICJ has given it in the context of the right to self-

defense against an armed attack that a territorial sovereign enjoys under

Art. 51 UN Charter. In both Oil platforms26

and in Congo/Uganda27

, the

Court has reconfirmed that self-defense can only be exercised against an

armed attack by another state, but not by other actors. The possibility of that

interpretation, of course, had been implied by the Security Council in its

resolution 1244 stating that the right to self-defense of the US was engaged

by the Al/Qaida attacks of September 11th

2001.28

It would seem that in this

line of cases the Court is reaffirming its authority as the principal judicial

organ of the UN making it the ultimate interpreter of the quasi-constitutional

layer of public international law. Such authority of the Court would prevail

over pronouncements of both the political organs of the UN and of its other

judicial organs such as the International Criminal Court for the Former

Yugoslavia. As a consequence, territorial integrity remains the law

governing the relations between territorial sovereigns. There is no space left

25

Written Statement of Finland, 16 April, p. 2-3, available at http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15630.pdf (last visited 10 December 2010). The Written

Statement of Germany follows a similar line of reasoning, Written Statement of

Germany, 17 April 2009, 32-36, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141

/15624.pdf (last visited 10 December 2010) 26

Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I. C.

J. Reports 2003, 161, 186, para. 51 27

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.

Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, 168, 223, para. 147. 28

SC Res. 1368, 12 September 2001.

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15726.pdf

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1080

for either the Security Council or the GA developing it in a different

direction.

3. Intrinsic Normative Change

This leaves normative change through intrinsic principles. This is the

theoretical approach outlined above that focuses on additional intrinsic

principles to advance the understanding of the most abstract or general

principles. The general principle that we are concerned with here is of

course self-determination. Such a quest first should be directed to

identifying such principles as would intrinsically advance our understanding

of self-determination. Additional principles of medium abstraction that

could be advanced would be the proceduralization of substantive law and

territorial administration. Such a principle of proceduralising contentious

substantive law positions can be induced from a number of reference areas.

UN practice supports the conceptualization of (external) self-

determination in its non-colonial context as process. In the first instance,

UN Security Council secondary law is procedural sing the exercise of self-

determination.29

The Kosovo-Court acknowledges the manifold Security

Council action regarding Kosovo and Serbia, and it expressly recognizes the

resulting territorial administration of Kosovo as a legal concept. This may

be seen as recognition of the continuing involvement of the UN in the

process of achieving a negotiated and internationally supervised

independence on the basis of self-determination. But the Court did not

foreclose progressive development of self-determination in the non-colonial

context by the UN‟s political organs through secondary law-making. Rather

it implicitly endorsed the developments achieved by the political organs of

the UN not just in Kosovo but also in other secessionist instances. It may

even be lawful for the UN (the Security Council) to go beyond the template

of S/Res 1244(1999) and to impose obligations not on the internationalized

institutions of self-government of a people but on the people itself. Thus, the

Court finds that the Security Council has proceeded to setting forth the

inviolability of Cyprus and parameters of the final status of the disputed

territory. By pointing to relevant Security Council Resolution/Res 1251

(1999)30, the Court arguably states that the potential authority of the Security

Council exists to set parameters for the possible outcomes of

internationalized negotiations in a secessionist situation. Such a parameter

29

In Lotus terms, the subsequent placing of limitations on unfettered self-determination. 30

Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 40, para. 114.



1081

can certainly be the preservation of the integrity of an existing territorial

sovereign if the Security Council so wishes.31

Seen in this light, the Kosovo-

Opinion creates space at the level of primary law for the Security Council

and the General Assembly progressively to develop self-determination in a

non-colonial context through secondary law-making. At this point in time,

the law has been evolving to the point that a case of systematic repression is

a tipping point for the internal and the external dimension of self-

determination but that there is an expectation on the people concerned that it

will have to seek an internationalized negotiated solution with the territorial

sovereign. The international community, acting through the UN Security

Council, has the right to establish a territorial administration provisionally

barring the territorial sovereign from exercising its powers while

internationalized negotiations between the sovereign and the would-be

secessionists are being conducted. In the practice of international law, it is

increasingly becoming accepted that the response to instances of

suppression involves the organized international community. Much as the

original decolonization did. This involvement has taken various shapes and

sizes, ranging from supervised elections to fully fledged territorial

administration. In line with the way that international law is developing

generally, there will be further cascading or incremental concretization of

what the international community can do, on the one hand, and of what is

expected of the people seeking secession, on the other. This development is

achieved not through a balancing of the right to self-determination with

conflicting principles of the same normative hierarchical value but through

the development of secondary law by the UN – both through the Security

Council and the General Assembly - within the sphere of application of the

right to self-determination. It is also clear that this limitation on the exercise

of the right to external self-determination is of a general nature, not confined

to the specific instance of Kosovo.

4. Declarations of Independence in a Non-Colonial Context

Understanding self-determination as aspirational self-government can

be the basis for all acts falling under the thus determined remit. And a

31

“The Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty

and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and

territorial integrity safeguarded”, SC Res. 1251, 29 June 1999, para 11. See also most

recently resolution SC Res. 1930, 15 June 2010 on the situation in Cyprus focusing on

the ongoing negotiations between the parties.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1082

declaration of independence certainly fits this remit. The legal effects of

such a declaration of independence must then be carefully determined.

There is, the Court has pointed it out, not a right to make a declaration of

independence as step on the way to nationhood that other states would have

to respect. The fact that there is no right to self-determination through

secession does not mean, of course, that Declarations of Independence in

these contexts cannot be conceptualized legally. The Court was simply not

concerned with any conceptualization below the level of a full blown legal

right - a rule - that would positively permit the declaration. The declaration

of independence in the case at hand is best conceptualized as an allegation

of competence (Kompetenzbehauptung). A competence is alleged, but the

consequence (only) is that the allegation may be challenged by states,

including the territorial state.32

Declarations of independence are not outside

the law. There would be, of course, the possibility that international law

does not extend to declarations of independence, that they belong to the

political rather than the legal functional system. Indeed, while potentially

unlimited in its reach, any given legal order may restrict its substantive

reach. But the Court did not say that such declarations were outside of the

reach of international law.33

Rather the Court clearly says that the law – in

the instance self-determination – can extend to declarations of independence

and that is has done so in the colonial context. Declarations of independence

are not per se out of reach of international law, they may be encompassed by

self-determination. It is to be determined what position self-determination

takes in respect of each historical declaration.

At the conceptual level, it is very much possible to argue that external

self-determination is increasingly being operationalized through

proceduralization and internationalization. It is arguably the case that S/Res

1244, even under the narrow interpretation of the Court, would not have

tolerated a declaration of independence at an earlier stage when negotiations

for a peaceful settlement were still under way. At an earlier juncture, the

authors could not have viably claimed to speak as the pouvoir constituant.

S/Res 1244 would arguably have forbidden it. It may be concluded that

32

But the declaration of independence in the case at hand has had an effect on the UN

and the territorial administration it has set up. In fact, the UN Secretary General

started to reconfigure the functions of UNMIK as reaction to the Declaration, see e.g.

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration of

Kosovo, S/2008/692 of 24 November 2008, para.50. 33

But see UK Written Statement, 17 April 2009, 125, available at http://www.icj-

cij.org/docket/files/141/15638.pdf (last visited 12 December 2010).



1083

general international law frowns upon premature declarations of

independence. The concrete declaration of independence at issue here

escaped this frowning because it was made at a point in time when

negotiations had been undertaken but had exhausted themselves. The

inconclusiveness of the Opinion in respect of the law that actually governs

the situation in Kosovo after the declaration of independence has been

discussed at Security Council. At the meeting of the Security Council on 3

August 2010, Member States agreed that the Opinion had not changed

parameters significantly.34

The Security Council meeting did not issue a

resolution or any statement. As an organ, the Council remains silent, and

this may be interpreted as acquiescence in the evolving framework for

negotiations including the administrative restructuring of the role of

UNMIK by the UN Secretary General.35

By contrast, the GA has taken a

position36

, for which it is competent under Arts. 10 and 11 UN

Charter37

.The resolution endorses the continued regionalized negotiations:38

34

Security Council 6367th meeting, 3 August 2010, UN Doc S/PV 63.67. UK and US

have welcomed the opportunity to continue negotiations. Russia continues to consider

the declaration of independence illegal, and so does Serbia which also continues to

oppose it. In the Security Council meeting of 3 August 2010, The UNSG, who also

heads UNMIK has emphasised that after the Opinion, outstanding issues may be

solved through negotiation, that the status of S/RES 1244 remains unaffected, and that

he is engaged in active negotiations with EULEX, Report of the Secretary General

S/2010/401. 35

In spite of Russian and Serbian protests, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

proceeded with the reconfiguration plan. On 15 July 2008, he stated: "In the light of

the fact that the Security Council is unable to provide guidance, I have instructed my

Special Representative to move forward with the reconfiguration of UNMIK... in

order to adapt UNMIK to a changed reality". According to the Secretary-General, the

"United Nations has maintained a position of strict neutrality on the question of

Kosovo's status", Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/458, 2. On 26 November 2008, the UN

Security Council gave the green light to the deployment of the EULEX mission in

Kosovo, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 26 November 2008,

S/PRST/2008/44. The EU mission is to assume police, justice and customs duties

from the UN, while operating under the UN resolution 1244 that first placed Kosovo

under UN administration in 1999. 36

GA Res. 64/298, 13 October 2010. 37

The Kosovo-Opinion, supra note 2, 16, para 40, confirms this, reading as follows:

“While the request put to the Court concerns one aspect of a situation which the

Security Council has characterized as a threat to international peace and security and

which continues to feature on the agenda of the Council in that capacity, that does not

mean that the General Assembly has no legitimate interest in the question. Articles 10

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1084

“ /2 Welcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a

process of dialogue between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself

would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that

dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to

the European Union and improve the lives of the people.”

This is an endorsement by the GA of the dialogue between Serbia and

Kosovo on the way to full secession and full membership of the EU and of

the continuing international oversight of the process. In other words, the

GA, in the absence of another positive statement by the Security Council,

has provided an indication by the organized international community about

the possible final status solution. It is by implication full statehood of

Kosovo as only sovereign states can be members of the EU. The

international oversight of the process is a joint international and regional

one. The international element continues to be provided by UNMIK, the

regional by EULEX.39

and 11 of the Charter, to which the Court has already referred, confer upon the

General Assembly a very broad power to discuss matters within the scope of the

activities of the United Nations, including questions relating to international peace and

security. That power is not limited by the responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security which is conferred upon the Security Council by

Article 24, paragraph 1. As the Court has made clear in its Advisory Opinion on Legal

Consequences cf the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ,

paragraph 26, „Article 24 refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive,

competence‟. The fact that the situation in Kosovo is before the Security Council and

the Council has exercised its Chapter VII powers in respect of that situation does not

preclude the General Assembly from discussing any aspect of that situation, including

the declaration of independence. The limit which the Charter places upon the General

Assembly to protect the role of the Security Council is contained in Article 12 and

restricts the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations following a

discussion, not its power to engage in such a discussion.“ 38

The UN GA did not fail to notice that its resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008 had

requested the International Court of Justice to render an Advisory Opinion on the

following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”, but

that it received the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 22 July

2010 on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of

Independence in respect of Kosovo. 39

As of 15 December 2010, 72 out of 192 (37%) United Nations member states have

formally recognised the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state,for an overview

see http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited 10 December 2010). Notably, 22

out of 27 (81%) member states of the European Union and 24 out of 28 (86%)



1085

E. Conclusions

This most anticipated Opinion of the Court undoubtedly disposes of

the issue at hand. The opinion does, however, only shed light on a small

fraction of the full normative picture relating to the matter of declarations of

independence in a non-colonial context. The real value of the opinion may

lie not so much in what it says but in what it does not say but implies.40

It is,

to use a metaphor, the dark side of the moon that should attract our

attention. There are indeed two aspects to the Court‟s Opinion. The Court

explicitly says that no rules of international law prohibit the declaration of

independence in this non-colonial context. What it says not explicitly but

impliedly is, however, probably more interesting. What it implies is that not

rules but rather principles govern such secessionist situations: There is room

for basing on self-determination such acts forming part and parcel of

secession, but the consequence is not a right that would have to be respected

by the other subjects of international law but rather a mere allegation of

competence. As such, the declaration of independence will initially remain

contestable by the territorial sovereign, but will increasingly be less so as

negotiations progress and ultimately conclude.

This principle-centered approach may indeed be seen as inspired by

the conception of international law first evidenced in the well-known Lotus

case of 1927. A re-reading of the Lotus case confirms that the PCIJ in the

case does not at all limit itself to determining negative, prohibitive rules.

Rather it advances the idea of a system of international law centered on

principles. State sovereignty as in Lotus may be seen as one – at the time

probably the only principle of positive law – that could underlie the claim of

international law to be a coherent normative system: a legal order. In

modern international law, sovereignty is complemented by self-

determination.

There then becomes visible a division of competence between the ICJ

and the political organs of the UN for the progressive development of the

foundational principles of international law. The Court of Justice assumes

responsibility at the constitutional level setting the fundamental parameters

member states of NATO have recognised Kosovo. Russia and Serbia refuse

recognition and China has expressed scepticism. 40

Niklas Luhmann has not failed to point out that the law (as other societal functional

systems) operates by putting distinctions into an existing unity. The focus on one side

of the distinction does not mean that the other ceases to exist, rather the unmarked

space it is always present. And the law can revisit this other side and start drawing

new distinctions from there.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1063-1086 1086

of the foundational principles, to the exclusion of the Security Council. But

practice namely of the Security Council but also the General Assembly can

then flesh out these fundamentals. The Court is leaving open the field of the

law of self-determination in a non-colonial context to be progressively

developed by other actors, namely the UN Security Council, the UN

General Assembly, and the UN Secretary General. These bodies‟ law-

making capacity is recognized and left unfettered, fleshing out the principle

through the development of institutions of medium-level abstraction as well

as permissive and prohibitive rule-making that matures over time. Such law

will be secondary in nature in the sense that it results from the activity of the

organs established by the Charter as primary law. The legal status of such

secondary law will vary depending on the powers of each organ under the

Charter. But that sustained practice of the Security Council will generate

concept of a general nature on which it may draw when regulating specific

instances of a conflictual self-determination. The Security Council enjoys

broad discretion in framing the parameters for solving each case, including

the permanent status of a territory.


doi: 0.3249/1868-1581-2-3-rackow-birr

Recent Developments in Legal Assistance in

Criminal Matters

Peter Rackow & Cornelius Birr

Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................... 1089

A. Introduction and Foundational Principles ..................................... 1090

B. Recent Developments.................................................................... 1095

I. Development of the Framework of Legal Assistance Law

in the EU: from Schengen to the Stockholm Programme ............. 1096

1. The Schengen Agreement as Predecessor to

Mutual Recognition ............................................................ 1097

2. The Stockholm Programme and its Corresponding

Action Plan ......................................................................... 1099

II. Present Application Difficulties of Mutual Recognition .............. 1101

III. Simplifying Legal Assistance by the Introduction of

Mutual-Recognition-Based Tools? .............................................. 1106

1. Basic Doubts Concerning the Applicability of the

Principle of Mutual Recognition to the Area of

Evidence-Gathering............................................................ 1107

Authors Cornelius Birr and Peter Rackow do research work and lecture at the German

Police University (Münster-Hiltrup). Professor Rackow heads the Department for

Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Crime Politics, Attorney at Law Birr

works as research assistant and lecturer. The authors‟ contribution draws from a

speech delivered by Rackow at a CEPOL-seminar at Münster-Hiltrup on 25

November 2010.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1088

2. Further Steps ahead: Initiatives of the Commission

and a Member State group ................................................... 1108

a) The Green Paper ......................................................... 1109

b) Draft Directive on the European Investigation

Order in Criminal Matters (Investigation

Order) .......................................................................... 1110

IV. Intercontinental European Union Acts ................................. 1121

1. Mutual Legal Assistance between the EU and the

USA ...................................................................................... 1122

a) Extradition .................................................................. 1124

b) Other Assistance ......................................................... 1125

2. Mutual Legal Assistance between the EU and Japan ........... 1126

V. Conclusion .................................................................................... 1127


1089

Abstract

The field of legal assistance in criminal matters is deeply influenced by, and

intertwined with, international law. However, legal assistance in criminal

matters, which accordingly has been traditionally ruled by conventional

tools of mutual legal assistance, is beginning to change: Heretofore, legal

assistance in criminal matters has been rendered in compliance with basic

principles which reflect the international law parity of the interacting States

while being open to modifications by way of bilateral or multilateral treaties

between individual States. Now, far-reaching changes seem to be well

underway: The European Union is gaining ground as a global player, aiming

to implement an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. In order to reach

this ambitious goal, a most important trend in criminal policy from a

European perspective is to extend the principle of mutual recognition, which

originally stems from the common market, to the area of criminal law.

Taking an international perspective it is a remarkable evolution to see the

European Union as an (arguably) idiosyncratic entity to commit its

individual members to the fulfillment of obligations towards other non-

Member States which the Member States themselves have not chosen.

While both new approaches may be deemed more easily applicable beyond

the realms of criminal law matters, namely in a commercial context, they

indeed appear to be big steps in the sensitive area of criminal law which has

traditionally been the sole responsibility of the sovereign State itself.

Therefore the ongoing developments are bound to have international law

repercussions. The following essay deals with these new developments in

the field of legal assistance in criminal matters from a combined

international and European perspective. We will be focusing specifically on

the principle of mutual recognition since its implementation provides a

litmus test for the state of procedural rights in the area of legal assistance in

criminal law as well as its application within a reference-system previously

governed by international law ultimately will modify international law.

After describing foundational principles of legal assistance in criminal

matters the ground will be prepared for further considerations by having a

look at exemplary present application difficulties of mutual recognition,

delve into the perspective of a rather radical simplification of transnational

evidence gathering by application of the principle of mutual recognition. To

give a complete picture we will examine the Intercontinental dynamics of

legal assistance which has been put into effect under the rule of the

European Union.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1090

A. Introduction and Foundational Principles

Legal assistance law which traditionally encompasses extradition,

assistance in the execution of foreign judgments and other assistance in

criminal matters can be seen as a measure of the integration of international

law in interstate relationships: According to general international law a

sovereign State is not obligated to lend legal assistance. Neither is it

reconcilable with its own sovereignty to impose on it the tolerance of

sovereign acts of foreign States, e. g. the arrest of fugitives.1 In principle

States without further ado do not have self-interest in law enforcement with

regard to violations of foreign penal laws. Hence, there is no acknowledged

rule of international customary law, according to which States are required

to extradite; instead of that, the granting of extradition is a right of the

sovereign State.2 Keeping this background in mind, classical legal assistance

law in criminal matters is characterized by several material key principles,

which relate to one foundational thought, namely the assumption that

sovereign States are on par with each other. Those key principles are as

follows: The principle of reciprocity, which states that the requested State is

only prepared to comply with the request if it can (reasonably) expect that

the requesting State complies with a request in analogous situations.3 The

ramifications of the principle of sovereignty on legal assistance manifest

themselves probably most clearly in the principle of reciprocity. There

seems to be a consensus that the principle of reciprocity emerges from the

sphere of international politics.4 Given the interstate equality, it would be a

violation of the requested States‟ sovereign dignity if it were to assist

another State unilaterally. The principle of double criminality is a rule that

assistance in criminal matters depends on double criminality in terms of the

act in question being punishable and prosecutable in both States involved.5

Thus, the principle of double criminality allows States to deny assistance

regarding acts which they have not criminalized, or at least not to the degree

of severity as the requesting State. The principle of double criminality in its

1 Cf. e.g A. Verdross & B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd ed.(1984), § 1020.

2 W. Wagner, „Building an Internal Security Community‟, 40 Journal of Peace

Research (2003) 6, 695, 702-703. 3 H. Van der Wilt, „The principle of reciprocity‟ in: R. Blekxtoon & W. van Ballegooij

(eds), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (2005), 71. 4 Id., 71.

5 S. Alegre & M. Leaf, European Arrest Warrant (2003), 34; T. Hackner et al.,

Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (2003), para. 25.


1091

effect primarily enables the requested State to uphold its decisions regarding

the criminalization (only) of certain acts.6 Those domestic crime-policy-

decisions would be infringed upon if a State was obliged to extradite

somebody whose acts are in accordance with the State‟s own national law to

another State. As a consequence, the double criminality principle enables

the individual to regulate his or her conduct (only) in accordance with the

country of residence. The principle of specialty can be considered the third

key principle. It states that judicial cooperation will only be granted

regarding specific offences which have been clearly defined in the request

for legal assistance. The person in question must not be prosecuted for any

offence that was not included in the original request. Since the application

of the principle of specialty requires a prognosis regarding the prospective

acts of the requesting State, the requested State will demand a binding

confirmation of the requesting State by verbal note that it will adhere to the

principle of specialty in order to obtain a base for a prognosis.7 The idea

behind the specialty-principle is to prevent States from requesting a person

for an (extraditable) offence and then, once the person has been transferred,

prosecuting another offence for which extradition could not have been

granted (for example because of the double criminality rule). Insofar, the

principle of specialty safeguards the interests of the requested State and

concurrently gives certainty to the person whose extradition is requested as

to the charges which will effectively be held against him.8

After all, even a superficial look at the ideas behind legal-assistance-

laws‟ key principles make it apparent that the conditions which derive from

reciprocity, specialty and the double-criminality-rule are not focused

exclusively and not even primarily on the protection of the interests of the

accused. On the contrary, the focus lies first and foremost on the interests of

the assisting State, mainly the safeguarding of its own sovereignty. Thus the

requested State characteristically in principle has an open-ended discretion

as to how and if it will carry out the request.9 Accordingly, the extradition-

6 In this sense the principle of double criminality derives from the principle of

reciprocity. The protective effect in regards to the rights of the accused is just an

indirect result of the application of the dual-criminality principle and has entered into

focus later on, cf. W. Schomburg et al., Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen,, 4th.

ed .(2006), § 3, para. 2. 7 Cf. Schomburg et al., supra note 6, § 11, para. 9.

8 Cf. Alegre & Leaf, supra note 5, 47.

9 Cf. the example given by J. R. Spencer, „The Green Paper on obtaining evidence from

one Member State to another and securing its admissibility‟, 5 Zeitschrift für

Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2010) 9, 602.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1092

procedure is split into a first phase wherein a court (e.g. the Higher Regional

Court in Germany) proves the admissibility according to mere-judicial

standards. But after that, the granting of extradition is proven by the

executive; that means in principle the Ministry of Justice (cf. s. 74 German

Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, IRG); which

in its core-content remains open to foreign-policy-considerations.10

Keeping

this background in mind the basis of “classical legal assistance” is as

Spencer had put it recently “a polite request: „State B, please would you

take this step for us? – if you can and when you can‟”.11

But despite all that, it may be underlined that aforementioned basic

structures and foundational principles of legal assistance in criminal matters

of course are open to modifications: Material principles as well as

procedural aspects of legal assistance can be modified by bi- or multilateral

treaties. Over the years a complex web of legal-assistance-treaties has

developed.12

The Council of Europe and later the European Union,

especially, have been driving forces in the facilitation of treaties modifying

the (traditionally international law inspired) appearance of legal assistance.

Art. 4 of the EU Mutual Legal Assistance Convention of 2000 provides an

example,13

insofar as it changes the aforementioned open-ended discretion

of the requested State to its mirror image: Now in principle the requested

State is obliged to follow the specifications of the requesting State and it has

to do so as soon as possible provided that the request is in line with the

foundational principles of the requested States legislation.14

Sure enough the

matrix of bi- and multilateral agreements on legal assistance is enormously

complex. Of course, its complexity ultimately only reflects the individuality,

the still considerably differing crime-policy-stances of the Member States of

the Council of Europe respectively (even) of the EU, which – from a

“classical” international-law-perspective – appears to be no surprise given

the State‟s sovereign dignity. In the end, this observation leads back to the

10

Cf. K. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, 2nd ed. (2006), § 10, para. 73. Although

executive powers in fact are delegated to the Prosecution at the Higher Regional

Courts (A. Sinn & L. Wörner, „The European Arrest Warrant and its Implementation

in Germany‟, 2 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik [2007] 5, 204, 210). 11

Spencer, supra note 9, 602. 12

Cf. (exemplarily) below at B.I.1. 13


This provision is known as the ordre public caveat in international law and can be

considered a fundamental principle by which collisions between differing legal

systems can be solved.


1093

observation that legal assistance in criminal matters in its nucleus remains

rooted in international law.

However, at least in the EU more fundamental changes (compared

with the piecemeal-approach of modifying treaties) seem to be underway:

Even more profound than the partial addition to, or replacement of,

“classical legal assistance law”15

by way of international agreements, are the

results of implementing the principle of mutual recognition in the field of

legal assistance in the EU. Simplified, this principle, which has its origins in

the Common Market, states that any decision of a Member State regarding

criminal law which has come to pass in a rightful way has to be accepted as

such in any other Member State, even if the decision in question is not in

accordance with criminal law in the accepting State.16

While both

“traditional” mutual assistance and mutual recognition based legal

assistance in criminal matters are about the same thing, namely bundling

resources in criminal matters, there is a notable difference: with mutual

recognition it is not as much a polite request but rather an order which is

given to the assisting State. The assisting State is in principle obliged to

carry out the order, possibly even in the manner in which the ordering State

wants it done. In practice, however, the contrast occasionally may not be as

evident since mutual-recognition as the case may be – depending on the

content and scope of the grounds to refuse the execution of a mutual-

recognition-instrument – may converge towards traditional mutual

assistance.17

Remarkably, mutual recognition instruments, e.g. the

Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, do not abandon any

traditional prerequisites for – or hindrances to – mutual-assistance but let

them resurface (at least partially) in the guise of (more or less far-reaching)

grounds for refusal.18

But despite this, due to the far reaching potentials of

the consistent application of mutual recognition, the explicit

15

Cf. H. Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, 4th ed.(2010), § 2, para.

5 (“klassisches Rechtshilferecht”). 16

On mutual recognition cf. inter alia Communication from the Commission to the

Council and the European Parliament, 26 July 2000, COM (2000) 495 final; V.

Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (2009), 116, S. Peers, „Mutual Recognition and

Criminal Law in the European Union‟, 41 Common Market Law Review (2004) 5, 35;

M. Böse, „Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung in der transnationalen

Strafrechtspflege der EU‟ in C. Momsen et al. (eds), Fragmentarisches Strafrecht

(2003), 233. 17

K. Ambos, „Transnationale Beweiserlangung‟, 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale

Strafrechtsdogmatik (2010) 9, 557, 561. 18

Ambos, supra note 17, 560.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1094

acknowledgement of the principle of mutual recognition by European

primary-law constitutes a fundamental paradigm shift to keep in mind.19

Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 this principle

has been incorporated in Art. 82.1 Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU)20

. As it is well known the principle of mutual

recognition has been widely criticized, since it cannot be transferred to

criminal law without argument. To put it mildly, despite its

acknowledgement by the TFEU, the precise functionality, legitimacy and

the scope of the principle of mutual recognition (of judicial decisions)

ultimately still appears unsettled. However, according to the will of the

Council it still should act as the leading principle for judicial cooperation.21

Notwithstanding remaining basic concerns about the applicability of mutual

recognition to the realms of criminal law its relative success – highlighted

most spectacularly by the implementation of the Framework Decision on the

European Arrest Warrant (hereafter Arrest Warrant) – appears to be

connected to the idiosyncratic international-law-character of the EU, i.e. the

advanced development of its integration status which is significantly higher

if compared to traditional structures of international law. With regard to the

advancement of the EU which is acquiring a role that – by international law

standards –, traditionally is associated with States it may be added that in

recent times the EU has been party to several international agreements

which influence its Member States by altering and modifying those

international agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters which have

been agreed upon beforehand with third parties. Remarkably, the Union acts

with binding effect on its Member States in a field which traditionally is

closely associated with interstate parity. This tendency can be seen very

clearly in the recent agreements on mutual legal assistance between the EU

and the United States of America (USA).22

These agreements served to

modify the already existing bilateral treaties between EU-Member States as

e.g. Germany and the USA in the area of extradition and altered, for

19

Cf. Spencer, supra note 9, 602 and Ambos, supra note 17, 557. 20

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, OJ 2008, C115/47

[TFEU]. 21

This is evidenced by the Council‟s The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure

Europe serving the citizen, 2 December 2009, Council Document 17024/09, which

shall be discussed in more detail in B. I. 22

Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of

America, 25 June 2003, OJ 2003 L181/27 and Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance

between the European Union and the United States of America, 19 July 2003, OJ 2003

L181/34.


1095

example, the bilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance between Germany

and the USA by way of negotiation of a supplementary treaty even before

the original treaty entered into force. This became a necessity, since the

agreement between the EU and the USA in the area of other assistance23

was on its way.24

The developments which have been alluded to are part of a

complicated matrix. From these surrounding international regulations which

have become increasingly complex, new and sometimes unforeseen

problems arise. In order to adequately discuss those problems, we will begin

with a short outline of the development of the international framework of

legal assistance law, especially in context of the EU (see B. I.). Following

this general outline, we will take a look at those new and complex problems

which may arise de lege lata et ferenda on a national (see B. II.), European

(see B. III.) and intercontinental (see B. IV.) level. The following text aims

to shed light on these subjects.

B. Recent Developments

Legal assistance in criminal matters (also: judicial cooperation) as

already mentioned above includes three areas: extradition, assistance in the

execution of foreign judgments and other assistance. While legal assistance

in accordance with the traditional mutual-assistance-approach will be

rendered between States or – on the basis of the principle of mutual

recognition of “judgments and [other] judicial decisions” (cf. Art. 82.1

TFEU) – between those (judicial) authorities which are issuing “decisions”,

the rendering of legal assistance (its framework-conditions) can be arranged

or provided for on another level between several different players including

the EU, the individual Member States of the EU and non-Member States.

Judicial cooperation can therefore be facilitated amongst Member States of

the EU (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands for instance by way of

implementation of the Framework decision on the European Arrest

Warrant), amongst the EU and non-Member States by way of treaty

between the EU and said States with binding results for Member States (as

23

I.e. mutual legal assistance, which does not fall in the areas of extradition or assistance

in the execution of foreign judgements. 24

This short outline of the influence of EU legislation in the area of already existing

bilateral treaties shall suffice for now in order to not confuse the reader. We will delve

deeper into this subject specifically regarding the already mentioned agreements in

part B. IV.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1096

is the case with the legal-assistance-relations between EU-member Germany

and the USA) and between individually acting Member States of the EU and

non-Member States (e. g. Germany and India)25

. Due to the EU‟s desire to

become a major global player and its explicitly stated intent to create an

“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” it has developed into a major force

to account for the implementation of new procedures, treaties and laws

regarding legal assistance in criminal matters. These developments appear

to parallel the EU‟s progress from modest international law roots towards a

sui-generis entity which might turn out to be influential e.g. with regard to

the Mercosur-Union. Keeping this background in mind, we will first discuss

the general outline of the international framework of legal assistance law,

while focusing on new efforts on judicial cooperation originating in the EU.

Our approach is based on the assumption that the complexities of

international law can be more fully understood by keeping European

developments firmly in sight.

I. Development of the Framework of Legal Assistance Law in

the EU: from Schengen to the Stockholm Programme

As already mentioned, the fundamental difference between traditional

legal assistance and “the European way” lies in the principle of mutual

recognition applied within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

(AFSJ). Legal assistance in an international context in the past was rendered

in the form of mutual assistance based on aforementioned principles

whereas in recent times in the EU the principle of mutual recognition

provides the foundation for instruments of legal assistance, most notably the

European Arrest Warrant. Before we delve deeper into the most recent

developments regarding this subject however, a closer look in brief at the

development of legal assistance in the EU, focusing on the Schengen

Agreement, may round off the interim picture.

25

Cf. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Indien über

die Auslieferung vom 27.06.2001 (Agreement on Extradition between Germany and

India, 27 June 2001), BGBl. II 2003, 1634; BGBl. II 2004, 787.


1097

1. The Schengen Agreement as Predecessor to Mutual

Recognition

The system of mutual assistance instruments – as indicated – can be

considered rather complex consisting mainly of the Council of Europe

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), which is

supplemented by its additional protocol from 1978 and the Convention on

mutual assistance between the Member States of the EU from the 29 May

2000 with its additional protocol from 2001. Also the Benelux Treaty of

196226

and the Schengen Implementing Convention of 199027

, which in

accordance with its Art.48 serves to amend to the Council of Europe‟s

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959) with regard to

assistance in criminal matters, deserve to be mentioned. Furthermore several

bilateral treaties exist as well as the Nordic agreements.28

The Schengen-

acquis has meanwhile been integrated into the EU-framework by way of the

Amsterdam treaty, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and has taken

effect on 1 May 1999. Since then the acceptance of the Schengen

regulations is a necessary prerequisite for all new member candidates in the

EU. Regarding the Schengen Implementing Convention, it has to be

mentioned that this agreement represented a significant step forward in the

development of judicial cooperation from a perspective of efficiency. The

grounds to refuse execution of a mutual assistance request were reduced.29

Regarding search and seizure orders, only the requirements of double

criminality and the ordre public were upheld as grounds for refusal

according to Art. 51.30

By way of converse argument this means that the

presence of double incrimination is not required for all other (less invasive)

investigation measures. From today‟s perspective, these developments

spearheaded the trend towards mutual recognition which is now prevalent in

the European Union and at the same time make it apparent that in practice

the boundaries between mutual assistance and mutual recognition might be

26

Benelux treaty concerning extradition and mutual assistance in criminal Matters, 27

June 1962, 616 U.N.T.S., 8893. 27

OJ 2000 L239/1. 28

Cf. e.g. A. Lach, „Transnational Gathering of Evidence in Criminal Cases in the EU

de lege lata and de lege ferenda‟, 4 eucrim (2009) 3, 107. 29

L. Bachmaier Winter, „European Investigation Order for Obtaining Evidence in the

Criminal Proceedings‟, 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2010) 9,

580. 30

T. Hackner, „Internationale Rechtshilfe in der Praxis von Schengen‟ in S.

Breitenmoser et al. (eds), Schengen in der Praxis (2009), 277, 285.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1098

blurry depending on the concrete formulation of the instrument in

question.31

The practical importance of the legal-assistance-related articles of the

Schengen Implementing Convention may have been diminished since the

Convention on mutual assistance between the Member States of the EU has

taken precedence according to its Art. 2.32

However the relevance of the

Schengen Implementing Convention still remains, which can in part be

attributed to Art. 95 et seqq. Those articles regulate the search for persons,

be it as witnesses (Art. 98) or in order to extradite them (Art. 95)33

. Also

Art.54 of the Schengen Implementing Convention is highly relevant,34

since

it serves as the foundation for an European ne bis in idem, which has also

found its way to the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).35

Two

principles which have not been touched upon by the Schengen

Implementing Convention are the already mentioned principle of double

criminality (at least regarding the very sensitive aspect of search and seizure

orders) and the principle of non-extradition of citizens of the requested

State. This is interesting to note, since those principles have been hardly

fought over in the discussion on the European Arrest Warrant.36

The most recent developments regarding the Schengen-acquis,

however, are the joining of Switzerland which – as a non-EU-State – has

acceded to Schengen according to the agreement from 26 October 200437

31

Cf. supra note 17 et seqq. 32

Hackner, supra note 30, 285. 33

Id., 295. 34

O. Lagodny, „Die Grundlagen der internationalen Rechtshilfe im Rahmen von

Schengen‟, in S. Breitenmoser et al. (eds), Schengen in der Praxis (2009) 259, 266.

With regard to the interrelation with Art. 50 of the EU‟s Charta of Basic Rights cf.

Satzger, supra note 15, § 10, para. 68. 35


Lagodny, supra note 30, 269. 37

Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss

Confederation on the Swiss Conferation’s association with the implementation,

application and development of the Schengen acquis, 26 October 2004, OJ 2004

L370/78, L368/26; 2008 L53/1. This has lead to very close ties between Switzerland

and the rest of the Schengen-states, since Switzerland has to follow along closely with

new developments in the Schengen-area if it wants to be part of the acquis. Its only

alternatives are acceptance and implementation of new legislation or the termination

of the cooperation as a whole if it does not want to go along with new developments

(Hackner, supra note 30, 283). While Switzerland can take part in the developmental

stages of new legislation on an informal level, final acceptance of said legislation is

the prerogative of the EU‟s structures and Member States (Cf. id., 283): Regarding

new developments, Switzerland has to notify the EU during a period of 30 days after


1099

and the invention of the principle of availability which states that

information which is relevant for criminal prosecution and available in any

given State of the EU has to be made also available to any other Member

State.38

It has been incorporated into the Schengen-acquis indirectly by way

of the Prüm Convention39

which aims to simplify the exchange of

information relevant to criminal prosecution such as DNA-profiles and

fingerprints.40

The mechanism introduced by the principle of availability has

been criticized due to (its inherent potential for) the transfer of competence

from judicial authorities to police authorities so that information which has

been gained by following strict judicial control procedures eventually might

be turned over to police authorities without further assessment by a judge.41

In this regard there are obvious similarities to criticism towards the (mutual-

recognition-based) European Investigation Order. Since this instrument will

be discussed thoroughly further on in the text, we will refrain from delving

deeper into the subject at this time. However, this clearly shows that the

Schengen-acquis might be considered the testing ground for new concepts

regarding legal assistance in criminal matters in the EU.

2. The Stockholm Programme and its Corresponding Action

Plan

While the Schengen Agreement marks the very first beginning of the

journey towards mutual recognition, the Stockholm Programme and its

corresponding Action Plan can be considered the state-of-the-art agenda for

being informed by the Council of the acceptance of new Schengen-legislation, if it

wants to implement this legislation. Afterwards, an adequate period will be granted in

order to implement the Schengen-legislation. Until then, the Schengen-legislation has

to be applied temporarily. If Switzerland does not act during those periods or if it

notifies the EU of its non-acceptance, the Schengen-association will be terminated.

Also, Switzerland is not bound to the ECJ‟s interpretation of EU-law, even if it is part

of the Schengen-acquis (Id., 283). 38

Cf. The Hague Programme, 3 March 2005, OJ 2005 C53/7. 39

Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the

Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the

Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-

border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and

illegal migration, 27. May 2005, Council Document 10900/05 [Prüm Convention].

While the Prüm Convention was originally a multilateral treaty which had been signed

only by some EU-Member States, it was intended from the beginning to incorporate

the agreement into the Schengen-acquis, cf. Hackner, supra note 30, 299. 40


Id., 300.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1100

the development of legal assistance in criminal matters on the basis of

mutual recognition. According to the Council of the European Union‟s

Stockholm Programme42

the priorities regarding the improvement of legal

assistance in criminal matters will lie in furthering mutual trust between the

Member States in order to enable them to act in accordance with the

principle of mutual recognition.

Remarkably, the protection of the rights of suspected and accused

persons is seen as an essential pre-condition for the facilitation of further

trust.43

Consequentially, the rapid accession of the EU to the European

Convention is regarded as one of the key steps44

to further mutual trust. At

the same time, regardless of tangible successes (or failures) with respect to

the improvement of mutual trust, the creation of a mighty single mutual-

recognition-based-instrument to supplement the complex system of mutual-

assistance on evidence-gathering in cases with cross-border-dimensions is

concretely envisioned.45

This new system shall encompass as many types of

evidence gathering as possible by replacing the existing instruments which

are of a fragmentary nature. A detailed roadmap for the implementation of

these tools can be found in the Commission‟s action plan for the realization

of the Stockholm Programme.46

The main waypoints in the area of criminal

law are seen in preventing criminals to avoid arrest by exploiting judicial

differences between Member States, the implementation of a complete

system to obtain evidence and the creation of a European public prosecution

department which will be founded on Eurojust. Focusing strictly on legal

assistance in criminal matters the next steps shall be:

- A proposition on laws regarding a complete system for obtaining all

kinds of evidence in criminal matters. This system shall be based on

the principle of mutual recognition. The proposition itself shall be

put forth by the Commission in 2011.

- A proposition on laws to create a common standard for securing the

admissibility of evidence in criminal matters which also shall be put

forth by the Commission in 2011.

42

Stockholm Programme, supra note 21. 43

Id., 17. 44

Id., 11-12. 45

Id., 22. 46

Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, 20 April 2010, COM(2010)

171.


1101

- Furthermore in 2011 a proposition on laws regarding the mutual

recognition of fines, including fines for reckless conduct in traffic

shall be put submitted by the Commission.

- A handbook on the execution of the treaties on legal assistance and

extradition between the EU and the USA is envisaged for as early as

2010.

Those main waypoints will yet have to be reached but unsurprising in

the face of the boldness of the action plan animated discussion has already

been spawned regarding these plans, especially concerning the procurance

of evidence and the admissibility of said evidence. Before we will explore

this subject further however, a look at recent developments in those areas of

judicial cooperation which have been examined before appears appropriate

in order to remind us of the status quo and its problems.

II. Present Application Difficulties of Mutual Recognition

The European Arrest Warrant has proven to be a kind of acid test of

mutual recognition. It, therefore, has been widely discussed47

so that a short

recapitulation will suffice before addressing specific recent German case

law as an example for the transposition of the Framework Decision

highlighting the challenges posed by the Arrest Warrant. The Arrest

Warrant has been incorporated in part eight of the German IRG (Gesetz

über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen – Law on International

Assistance in Criminal Matters) which is where most of the rules concerning

judicial cooperation in criminal matters can be found. Less than one year

later though, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court in the

Darkanzali-Case declared the first European Arrest Warrant Act

unconstitutional and void due to a violation of the Right not to be

extradited;48

also its accordance with the Right of Recourse to Court49

was

questionable.50

47

Cf. inter alia Alegre & Leaf, supra note 5; K. M. Böhm, „Das neue Europäische

Haftbefehlsgesetz‟, 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2006) 36, 2592; B.

Schünemann, „Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum europäischen

Haftbefehl‟, 25 Strafverteidiger (2005) 12, 681. 48

The Right not to be extradited can be found in the German constitution (Grundgesetz)

in Art. 16 (2). It reads: “No German may be extradited to a foreign country. The law

may provide otherwise for extraditions to a member state of the European Union or to

an international court, provided that the rule of law is observed.” available at

http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html (last visited 21

December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1102

Even though the implementation of the Arrest Warrant intended to

simplify judicial cooperation regarding the extradition and procedure of

criminal trials, its effects can be exactly opposite as the following recent

examples from German case law will show: both cases have been decided

by the Higher Regional Court in Oldenburg51

and discuss pre-trial

confinement in order to prevent flight from German jurisdiction. In both

cases the accused persons were Dutchmen who had their respective fixed

abode in the Netherlands and were prosecuted for trafficking marijuana in

large quantities. For persons without a fixed abode who can expect long-

term imprisonment there is a knee-jerk reaction in German criminal

jurisdiction to assume that they will flee without awaiting trial, so in most of

these cases pre-trial confinement can be considered as given. However the

issue of flight is comparatively smaller when a fixed abode is present. This

line of thought is also valid in those cases where the accused have their

residency in a Member State of the EU52

, because in principle they can be

brought to trial via arrest and extradition thanks to the Arrest Warrant.

Accordingly, it had to be expected that the accused in the cases discussed

here would be granted bail and not be taken into custody. This, however, is

not what transpired. The First Senate of the Higher Regional Court decided

in both cases that there was a higher risk for the accused Dutchmen to flee

their respective trials when compared to German citizens. The Court denied

bail in both cases, arguing that the possibility of issuing an Arrest Warrant

was irrelevant in these cases. This was based on the fact that it would be

possible for the Netherlands to allow extradition for their citizens only on

the condition that they would be brought back to the Netherlands to serve

their sentence if they were convicted to prison (based on Art. 5 No. 3 FD

2002/584/JI, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant

which has been incorporated in Art. 6 of the Dutch law on extradition, the

Overleveringswet)53

. Also another condition for extradition of the accused

49

The Right of Recourse to Court is found in the German constitution in Art. 19 (4) 1:

“Should any person‟s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to

Court.” 50

Cf. BVerfG, 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, 58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2005)

32, 2289. 51

OLG Oldenburg, 4 November 2009, 1 Ws 599/09 and OLG Oldenburg, 8 February

2010, 1 Ws 67/10. Both of these decisions are available in 30 Strafverteidiger (2010)

5, 254 with a comment by S. Kirsch. 52

OLG Naumburg, 10 October 1996, 1 Ws 101/96. This decision is available in 17

Strafverteidiger (1997) 3, 138. LG Offenburg, 15. December 2003, 3 Qs 114/03 is

available in 24 Strafverteidiger (2004) 6, 326. 53

Staatsblad (2004), 195, quoted after S. Kirsch supra note 51, 257.


1103

Dutchmen would have to be met by German authorities in order to proceed,

namely to accept the transformation of the German prison sentence to a

sentence which is deemed acceptable under Dutch law.54

It stands to reason

that the Dutch sentence after transformation would not be as severe as the

German sentence because the German stance on ownership, use and selling

of marijuana is significantly stricter than the Dutch model. Since the

accused can expect to serve a significantly reduced prison sentence in case

of his extradition by the Netherlands due to the Dutch model, it would be in

his best interests to flee to the Netherlands without awaiting trial in

Germany. Firstly, it has to be noted that the Higher Regional Court‟s course

of action arguably constitutes discrimination against a citizen of a Member

State because of his citizenship, which is strictly forbidden according to Art.

18 TFEU.55

Secondly, and more relevant regarding the future direction of policy in

the area of criminal law in the EU, are the following thoughts: the decisions

of the Higher Regional Court lead one to believe that their main motivation

does not lie in securing the realization of the criminal trial but rather in

enforcing Germany‟s legal policy regarding “soft-drug” use. However this

motivation is rejected by the Higher Regional Court in its second decision

from 8 February 2010 where the Senate explicitly states:

“The question which is discussed here is not about the enforcement of

standards according to German criminal law but rather about securing

the realization of the criminal trial.”56

Yet, the impression remains that the Court acts against the legislators‟

intention to accept the Dutch practice with all its consequences. This

intention which has been manifested in the signing and ratification of the

European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons57

includes

necessarily the acceptance of results which may not always correspond with

German legal policy in the field of criminal law. It appears to be

inconsistent behavior on the part of Germany to act against its former

statements, especially considering that these same models which have been

54

Based on Art. 11 of the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,

21 March 1983, ETS 112. 55

Cf. S. Kirsch supra note 51, 257. 56

OLG Oldenburg, 8 February 2010, 1 Ws 67/10, 30 Strafverteidiger (2010) 5, 255,

256. Translation by the authors. 57

Cf. supra note 54.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1104

criticized by the Court have been incorporated in the German IRG as well.58

The mentioned Higher-Regional-Court-decisions serve as a perfect example

of why the (in)famously evoked “high degree of trust and solidarity”59

within the EU is at least questionable and justify the Belgian scholar Klip‟s

ironic remarks on the ubiquitous use of this slogan.60

“It must be noted that there is a large gap between what the member

states say and arrange officially and the actual performance. I suffice

here with the example of the mutual confidence that all states have in

each other. This confidence is so great that it must be ordained at

regular intervals that there shall be mutual confidence. Despite this in

mutual recognition all manner of old grounds for refusal are

steadfastly adhered to.”

It appears obvious that a most effective means to create trust would be

the harmonization of differing Member States‟ laws and for the sake of

completeness it may be noted that the Commission‟s action plan for the

realization of the Stockholm Programme explicitly acknowledges that there

is still a lot of work to do in the area of harmonizing European criminal law

as illustrated in the following quote:

“The administration of justice must not be impeded by unjustifiable

differences between the member states‟ judicial systems: criminals

should not be able to avoid prosecution and prison by crossing borders

58

Cf. S. Kirsch supra note 51, 258. As in the Netherlands, the extradition of German

citizens is only admissible if the condition is met that they would be brought back to

Germany to serve their sentence if they were convicted as according to their wish, cf.

s. 80.1 IRG. Also, the transformation of a foreign sentence to a sentence according to

German standards has been realized in s. 54 IRG. 59

Cf. the exemplarily vague reference to mutual trust in the ECJ‟s decision on the

European Arrest Warrant: Case 303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de

Ministerraad, [2007], para. 57: “With regard, first, to the choice of the 32 categories

of offences listed in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, the Council was able to

form the view, on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in the light of

the high degree of trust and solidarity between the Member States, that, whether by

reason of their inherent nature or by reason of the punishment incurred of a maximum

of at least three years, the categories of offences in question feature among those the

seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting public order and public safety

justifies dispensing with the verification of double criminality.” 60

A. Klip, „European Integration and Harmonisation and Criminal Law‟ in D. M. Curtin

et al. (eds), European Integration and Law (2006), 137.


1105

and exploiting differences between national legal systems. A solid

common European procedural base is needed.”61

The effects of the remaining diversity of Member States‟ criminal law

(and crime-policy-approaches) are perfectly illustrated in the case which has

been presented here, as it would have been sensible to look for alternatives

to provisional detention.62

First steps to solve the problem – once more on

the basis of mutual recognition – have been taken with the FD

2009/829/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to

decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional

detention.63

The problems of different treatment between residents and non-

residents as they have surfaced in the cases which we have just discussed

have also been foreseen by the Council of the European Union. This is

evidenced in No. 5 of the reasons for adoption of FD 2009/829/JHA which

states:

“As regards the detention of persons subject to criminal proceedings,

there is a risk of different treatment between those who are resident in

the trial state and those who are not: a non-resident risks being

remanded in custody pending trial even where, in similar

circumstances, a resident would not. In a common European area of

justice without internal borders, it is necessary to take action to ensure

that a person subject to criminal proceedings who is not resident in the

trial state is not treated any differently from a person subject to

criminal proceedings who is so resident.”64

In order to reach these goals the Framework Decision allows for

several types of supervision measures which are specified in Art. 8 FD

2009/829/JI. Art.8.1 specifies those supervision measures which have to be

monitored by each Member State as a minimum standard, e.g. an obligation

for the supervised person to notify the authorities of any change of residence

or an obligation not to enter certain places. Art. 8.2 names several other

61

Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, supra note 46, 5. 62

Cf. S. Kirsch supra note 14, 257, who points out that there is no reason which

definitely prohibits the possibility of a Dutchmen appearing at his criminal trial in

Germany. 63

Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA, 23 October 2009, OJ 2009 L294/20. 64

OJ 2009 L294/20.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1106

supervision measures which can be monitored by the Member States if they

so choose, as soon as they transpose the Framework Decision to national

law, most notably the obligation to deposit bail. According to Art. 13 FD

2009/829/JI those supervision measures, if incompatible to the law of the

executing State, may be adapted to the types of supervision measures which

most closely resemble the supervision measure of the executing State in a

comparable case while also corresponding to the originally intended

supervision measure. For several offences which are listed in Art. 14 of the

Framework Decision, the principle of double criminality is not deemed

necessary, however Member States may for constitutional reasons “opt-out”

of some or all of the offences listed. Art. 15 lists different reasons which

might give grounds for the non-recognition of decisions on supervision

measures, e. g. the ne bis in idem principle or the lack of criminal

responsibility under the law of the executing State due to age.

III. Simplifying Legal Assistance by the Introduction of

Mutual-Recognition-Based Tools?

Instead of a substantial step-by-step approximation of relevant

Member State‟s laws the Union relies heavily on the fast-track of mutual

recognition which recently has been expanded to the field of evidence-

gathering by the Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant

(hereafter Evidence Warrant).65

However, the scope of the Evidence

Warrant is rather limited as it only applies to pre-existing evidence, meaning

“objects, documents and data” already in existence in themselves and

insofar at hand (in the requested State).66

Accordingly an Evidence Warrant

allows for “measures, including search or seizure” provided67

that the

Warrant regards to an offence listed under Art. 14.2 FD – a mechanism

similar to the Arrest Warrant. Pursuant to Art. 4.2 FD an Evidence Warrant

should not be issued with regard to (the request of) interviews, bodily

examinations, obtaining of real time information (as in case of intercepting

communications) or communication data. Furthermore excluded is the

request for an “analysis of existing objects, documents or data”, which

makes it apparent that the Evidence Warrant only aims at evidence-

gathering that concerns objects/data which (at least in itself) are already at

65

Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, 18 December 2008, OJ 2008 L350/72. 66

Cf. consideration 7, Art. 1 para. 1 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA supra

note 65. 67

Cf. Art. 11 para. 3 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA supra note 65.


1107

hand. The Evidence Warrant‟s concept therefore restricts the requesting

State‟s authority to a somewhat accessory role with regard to investigations

in the requested State. Hence the Evidence Warrant will arguably be no

breakthrough improvement. As practitioners in order to obtain evidence

from abroad in most cases anyway have to rely on the traditional

instruments of mutual legal assistance (esp. the 1959 and 2000 Conventions

on mutual assistance in criminal matters) they might decide to request all

evidence through the traditional channel.68

Nevertheless because of doubts

concerning the applicability of the principle of mutual recognition to the

gathering of evidence the approval-process was a lengthy one that took five

years.69

From the perspective of European-Union-crime-policy it may be

emphasized that the Evidence Warrant from the beginning was perceived

only as a “step towards a single mutual recognition instrument that would in

due course replace all existing mutual recognition regime”.70

1. Basic Doubts Concerning the Applicability of the Principle

of Mutual Recognition to the Area of Evidence-Gathering

As has already been emphasized, European Law acknowledges the

principle of mutual recognition as the foundation of legal cooperation in the

European Union (Art. 82 TFEU). Nevertheless although mutual recognition

might work reasonably well in certain areas of legal assistance, it will not

necessarily work as well in others.71

That those concerns are not ill-founded

shows a comparison between the field of obtaining evidence and the area of

extradition: Within the European Union traditional extradition law

structures have been replaced by the EAW. The EAW was subject to

constitutional concerns in several Member States and its implementation

laws differ considerably. Nevertheless an Arrest Warrant in a way appears

to be a “static” product of a certain national procedure;72

its content and

significance is quite obvious: an authority decides that a certain individual

shall be put under arrest to ensure he will stand trial. In contrast, the

significance of a certain act of evidence-collecting cannot be separated from

68

Bachmaier Winter, supra note 29, 583. 69

Id., 581. 70

Commission Proposal for the European Evidence Warrant for obtaining objects,

documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, 14 November 2003,

COM (2003) 688 final, 11. 71


Cf. Ambos, supra note 17, 559.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1108

the (possibilities of the) future use of the evidence within the trial-

proceedings. If – because of those characteristics of evidence-gathering –

evidence-warrants could not be compared to common-market products the

applicability of mutual recognition to transnational evidence gathering

becomes questionable: Why should an evidence-warrant issued in Member

State X be recognized in Member State Y? The ready answer would be:

Because there is an overwhelming trust between States X and Y! But this

explanation only raises further questions since the subject of trust (which

perfectly well might exist) seems to be the (quality of) Member State

proceedings i.e. Member State proceedings as a whole. Mentioned problems

are of course amplified by the diversity of Member State rules on collecting

evidence73

and admissibility; an instrument aimed at simplifying legal

assistance with regard to the field of evidence gathering has to take into

account that the facilitated obtaining of evidence would be completely

senseless if the evidence turned out to be inadmissible (because of the

circumstances of the taking of evidence). It may be emphasized that

aforementioned concerns are not restricted to the ongoing academic

discussion but have been most recently adopted by German Parliament.74

2. Further Steps ahead: Initiatives of the Commission and a

Member State group

However, the Framework Decision on the Evidence Warrant

eventually has been adopted in December 2008 and is to be implemented by

the Member States until 19 January 2011. But, until now the Evidence

Warrant is only in force in Denmark75

; none have ever been issued,

therefore there are no practical experiences concerning the application of

mutual recognition in the field of evidence-gathering further steps could

draw from.76

73


German Parliament Decision of 7 October 2010, available at

http://www.strafverteidiger-bayern.de/media/pdf/2010-10-07_Beschluss-BT_Europ-

ischeErmittlungsanordnung.pdf (last visited 18 December 2010); cf. also BT-Drs.

17/3234, 4. 75

Cf. Commission opinion „Cross-border crime‟ of 24 August 2010 IP/10/1067

available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/10

67&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&guiLanguage=en (last visited 18

December 2010). 76

Cf. BT-Drs. 17/660, 3.


1109

a) The Green Paper

Notwithstanding in November 2009 the commission adopted the

“Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters …”77

. The basic

idea behind that initiative is to replace the complex system of mutual legal

assistance (concerning evidence-gathering) by a single tool based on the

principle of mutual recognition. Instruments based on the principle of

mutual assistance “may be regarded as slow and inefficient”.

“[T]he most effective solution to the above mentioned difficulties

would seem to lie in the replacement of the existing legal regime on

obtaining evidence in criminal matters by a single instrument based on

the principle of mutual recognition and covering all types of

evidence”.78

The Green Paper appears rather sketchy what might be explained by

the sensitiveness of the matter.79

Member States‟ responses are differing;

Germany especially has taken up a critical stance concerning the

commission‟s initiative.80

The German reply of February 2010 stresses that

“obtaining evidence should be considered in the overall context of national

law” thus adopting a core-concern regarding the application of mutual

recognition to the area of evidence-gathering. The official statement

underlines this point by exemplifying: “For instance, far-reaching

investigatory powers may be counter-balanced by extensive rights to refuse

testimony.” Given the (still) “considerable differences” between Member

States‟ “minimum standards for defendants in criminal proceedings”

mutual-recognition instruments for obtaining up to-date evidence lack a

77

Commission Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one

Member State to another and securing its admissibility, 11 November 2009,

COM(2009), 624 final. 78

Id., 4-5. 79

Critical S. Allegrezza, „Critical Remarks on the Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence in

Criminal Matters from one Member State to another and Securing its Admissibility‟, 5

Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2010) 9, 569, 570: “skeletal text,

partly confused, which treats roughly subtle issues that would deserve much greater

attention and evaluation”. 80

Cf. Replies of the Federal Republic of Germany to the questions under points 5.1 and

5.2 of the Green Paper of 26 February 2010, available at

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0004/national_governments/germa

ny_en.pdf (last visited 17 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1110

sufficient basis since “minimum standards would […] be indispensable with

a view to extending the principle of mutual recognition to broad areas of

obtaining evidence”. Remarkably this stance seems to question the

precedence of mutual recognition over harmonization (at least where

evidence-gathering is concerned): Since Art. 82.2 TFEU only provides for

the adoption of minimum rules while explicitly taking into account the

differences between Member States‟ legal systems and traditions the

development might have reached a deadlock: on the one hand extending the

principle of mutual recognition to the field of evidence gathering requires a

sufficient degree of harmonization of Member States‟ rules of procedure –

on the other hand Art 82.2 TFEU unequivocally acknowledges the

differences which are effectively hindering mutual recognition.81

But, of

course, whether there is a deadlock depends on the degree of harmonization

one deems necessary as sufficient basis for mutual recognition. The German

position seems to be the most rigid in the EU.82

Other Member States, for

example Austria, France or the Netherlands are basically in favor of

extending the principle of mutual recognition to the area of evidence

gathering and moreover one has to bear in mind that an evidence gathering

instrument based on the principle of mutual recognition could be adopted

under the terms of the ordinary legislative procedure; strangely the

emergency brake-procedure would only be available with regard to

harmonizing measures which could effectively create the basis for mutual

recognition.83

b) Draft Directive on the European Investigation Order in

Criminal Matters (Investigation Order)

However, the discussion on the Green Paper might already be rather

out of date since in April 2010 several Member States brought forward their

own proposal for a directive regarding the European Investigation Order in

criminal matters (Investigation Order hereafter)84

. The initiative proposes an

81

In Art. 82.2 it says: “Such rules shall take into account the differences between the

legal traditions and systems of the Member States.” 82

This might be explained by the difficult implementation-history of the EAW and the

skeptical Lisbon-Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. 83

Cf. Art. 82.1, 2 and 3 TFEU; 16.3 TEU. 84

Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the

European Investigation Order in criminal matters of 29 April 2010, Council Document

9145/10, Interinstitutional File 2010/0817 (COD).


1111

instrument that (differing from the Evidence Warrant) would cover any kind

of investigative measures (except the organizing of joint investigation teams

and certain interceptions of communication; Art. 3 draft directive). The

obvious main advantage of the Investigation Order coheres with the

commission‟s concern expressed in the Green Paper that is to simplify the

existing complicated system of legal assistance. But to what extent the

adoption of the Investigation Order will turn out as an improvement of the

difficult area of legal assistance of course depends on details of the directive

(and its implementation laws). The Initiative seems (at least implicitly) to

acknowledge fundamental difficulties: According to s. 6 of the preamble of

the Investigation Order on the one hand “a new approach is needed, based

on the principle of mutual recognition”; on the other hand “the flexibility of

the traditional system of mutual legal assistance” is to be taken into

account.85

It is not easy to tell what will happen in the near future. The German

stance, especially, regarding the instruments mentioned before is very

skeptical. However, it appears advantageous to concentrate on the

Investigation Order. In its basic structure (as an evidence-gathering-

instrument founded on the principle of mutual recognition) the Investigation

Order parallels the Evidence Warrant; the inherent problems of applying

mutual recognition to the field of evidence gathering become all the more

apparent with regard to the Investigation order due to its wider scope.

Indeed, the application range of the proposed instrument in terms of

investigation-measures and procedures covered by an Investigation Order

conceivable would be wide. Pursuant to Art. 3 of the draft, an Investigation

Order would cover any kind of investigative measures (except the

organizing of joint investigation teams and certain interceptions of

communication; Art. 3 draft directive). Furthermore, pursuant to Art.4.b, the

draft directive would cover any investigations with regard to any

administrative offences. But e.g. German judges have expressed concerns

that the implementation of the draft directive without limitations with

respect to its applicability to mere administrative offences (in German:

Ordnungswidrigkeiten) might bring forth surplus load.86

Art. 2 of the draft

directive deals with the practical important and sensitive aspect of the

85

Id., 2. 86

Cf. Stellungnahme des Deutschen Richterbundes zur belgischen Initiative für eine

Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Europäische

Ermittlungsanordnung in Strafsachen, Ratsdok. 9145/10, no. 29/10 (2010) available at

http://www.drb.de/cms/index.php?id=658 (last visited 18 December 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1112

competent authorities Member States can respectively are to designate for

issuing and executing Investigation Orders. Where the execution authority is

concerned the Member States have only a limited implementation margin

insofar as the designated authority has to have the competence “to undertake

the investigative measure mentioned in the Investigation Order in a similar

national case”.87

In other words: police-authorities would be designated as

executing authorities. Art.2.a) draft directive pertains to the authorities

competent to issue an Investigation Order. It is identical to Art. 2.c) FD and

hence raises identical questions. According to Art. 2.a)i draft directive,

judges, courts and investigating magistrates can be designated as competent

“issuing authorities”„; in addition to that “public prosecutor[s] competent in

the case concerned” are explicitly included. Art. 2.a)ii draft directive

furthermore provides a sweeping clause that seems open to discussion: it

allows for the designation of

“any other judicial authority as defined by the issuing State and, in

the specific case, acting in its capacity as an investigating authority in

criminal proceedings with competence in the case concerned to order

the gathering of evidence in accordance with national law”.

The explanatory memorandum argues that the term “judicial

authority” is not meant in strictu sensu88

, according to its interpretation even

police authorities can be designated by Member States as issuing authorities

provided that the authority in question “has the power to order the

investigative measure concerned at national level”.

Once more the problem of the diversity of Member States‟ criminal

procedure rules on the preliminary proceedings appears: since police

authorities in part have far reaching investigative powers (of their own) a

single instrument aimed at simplifying transnational gathering can hardly

exclude police bodies as competent issuing authorities. On the contrary, to

be efficient an Investigation Order should include any authorities competent

in the field of criminal prosecution.89

But an approach of such broadness

raises doubts. First of all, the TFEU differentiates between judicial and

police cooperation. Hence it seems dubious whether a directive that covers

the issuing of Investigation Orders by police authorities that – depending on

87

Explanatory Memorandum, 3 June 2010, Council Document 9288/10 ADD 1,

Interinstitutional File 2010/0817 (COD), 5. 88

Id., 4. 89

Cf. Stellungnahme des Deutschen Richterbundes, supra note 86.


1113

the situation on the requested side90

– as the case may be are executed by

police authorities would find a sufficient basis in Art. 82.1 TFEU.

Accordingly the commission in answer to the initiative has pointed out that

it ought to be clarified that no regulation is planned that could be interpreted

as covering police-cooperation.91

In addition to similar doubts concerning

the coverage of Art.82.1 TFEU, the inclusion of any public authorities

beyond Member State courts and (investigation) judges obviously would put

a particular burden on the (material) foundation of the proposed

Investigation Order. Even under domestic circumstances e.g. German

criminal procedure law bestows varying degrees of competence on judicial

authorities on the one hand and other public authorities on the other hand

like prosecutors and police bodies; there are certain investigative measures

which only can be authorized by a judge. Others like searches can only be

authorized by the prosecution or its investigating-officers in case of

imminent danger. Any such differentiations reflect the assumption that

judicial decisions are of superior quality compared to decisions by other

public authorities. Hence it might be acceptable that the Investigation Order

(as outlined above) effectively would force the executing party into blindly

trusting in the soundness of the substantive grounds for the request provided

that the request was issued by a judge/a court. That the same could be said

with regard to police issued Investigation Orders seems doubtful given the

fact that even in domestic cases governed exclusively by national law

several restrictions are imposed on the police (and to a lesser degree on

prosecutors) which do not apply for judicial decisions. Of course one might

argue that because of the similar working methods and the common mission

of crime fighting that a high degree of mutual trust exists especially between

police officers of different Member State forces. But it seems open to

discussion whether mutual trust between law enforcement personnel can

provide a sufficient basis for mutual recognition.92

For instance, the German

Parliament has recently pointed out that mutual trust between Member

States (authorities) does not provide for a sufficient basis with respect to

mutual recognition in the area of criminal law; since mutual recognition in

this field amounts to transnational restrictions which affect the citizen the

citizen’s trust in the European Union is required to allow for mutual

recognition.93

90

Cf. Council Document of 4 October 2010, 13049/1/10. 91

Commission Comment of 24 August 2010, C(2010) 5789 final, 3. 92

Convincing Bachmaier Winter, supra note 29, 586. 93

Cf. supra note 74.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1114

Art. 5 draft proposal deals with “content and form of” an Investigation

Order. With regard to the substantial reason for its decision to issue an

Investigation Order the issuing authority is (only) to supply a “summary of

facts”„94

and will certify the accuracy of the Investigation Order’s content

(Art. 5 No. 1 draft proposal which parallels Art. 6 FD). On closer

inspection, however, it seems dubious whether Art. 82.1 TFEU (the

principle of mutual recognition) could provide a sufficient basis for the

outlined procedure. Reference objects of the principle of mutual recognition

acknowledged in Art.82 TFEU are “judgments and judicial decisions”. With

respect to this the FD on the Arrest Warrant questionnaire requests issuing

authorities to indicate the “Decision on which the warrant is based”95

thus

(at least formally) differentiating between a judicial decision (as a subject of

recognition) and the warrant as the instrument/medium by which the

recognition procedure is to be facilitated. The Investigation Order

questionnaire in contrast does not refer to a “decision” which could be

regarded as the subject matter of a mutual recognition process. Hence, if for

instance a public prosecutor would fill in an investigation order and certify

its content it seems open to question whether that act qualifies as a “judicial

decision” whether the Investigation Order in itself can be a “decision” in

terms of Art.82.1 TFEU. Remarkably the issuing of an Investigation Order

does not even seem to require a declaration that the requested investigation-

measure could be authorized domestically by the issuing authority. But,

given that the principle of mutual recognition implies the existence of a

judgment or a judicial decision that in its content could be “recognized” a

judicial decision seems to be bound to have a content that exceeds that of a

mere request. If an Investigation Order (an Evidence Warrant) would require

a judicial decision on the (domestic) admissibility of the desired measure, it

(arguably) would carry a statement, a declaration which in its content (in

principle) appears to be open to recognition to application abroad. But if –

in contrast – (lacking any such declaration) the communicative content of an

Investigation Order due to the lack of any such declarations at a closer look

boils down to a mere request addressed to a foreign authority to do this or

94

Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the

European Investigation Order in criminal matters, 29 April 2010, Council Document

9145/10, Interinstitutional File 2010/0817 (COD), Annex A lit F. 95

Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 13 June 2002 on the European arrest

warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L190/14,

Annex, lit. b (“Decision on which the warrant is based: […] Arrest warrant or judicial

decision having the same effect […] Enforceable judgement”).


1115

that arguably there would be no subject to recognition96

. A mere request

could only be denied or complied with, ultimately mutual assistance-style.

Furthermore, it might turn out to be problematic that an Investigation

Order (as well as an Evidence Warrant) would provide the executing

authority only with a “summary of the facts” regarding the substantive

reasons for the request. Of course, one might bring forward that there

simply is no need for further information since the executing authority is to

act on the basis of trust in the substance of the order. However, (in domestic

cases) e.g. the German Federal Constitutional Court stresses that authorities

competent to order e.g. searches are to evaluate the reasons for the requested

measure thoroughly. Hence, (domestically) an investigating judge cannot

simply adopt the position of the prosecution office or the police. On the

contrary, he is obliged to decide on his own responsibility e.g. on the

lawfulness of a search.97

Of course, the problem is intrinsically tied to the

mutual recognition foundation of the Investigation Order. Inevitably mutual

recognition tends to equalize differentiations with regard to (domestic)

competences.98

Keeping this in mind it is difficult to imagine how the (in

this example German) legislator (beside his unwillingness to implement

mutual recognition based evidence gathering instruments) could implement

the Investigation Order‟s or the Evidence Warrant‟s mechanism in a manner

consistent with the role of the investigating judge as outlined above.

Art. 8 of the draft directive – on the basis of the principle of mutual

recognition – obliges the execution authority to recognize and execute

Investigation Orders “without any former formality” unless grounds for

non-execution respectively for non-recognition are invoked. However,

depending on the content and application range of the grounds to refuse the

execution of a request a mutual recognition instrument (as the proposed

Investigation Order) converges toward traditional mutual assistance

instruments.99

As mentioned previously mutual legal assistance is rendered

on the provision of the non-existence of “traditional” hindrances; mutual

recognition instruments do not effectively abandon any such hindrances but

96

Cf. Stellungnahme des Deutschen Richterbundes, supra note 86. 97

Most recently BVerfG, 31 August 2010, 2 BvR 223/10, para. 24. 98

Cf. H. Ahlbrecht, „Der Rahmenbeschluss-Entwurf der Europäischen

Beweisanordnung‟, 26 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2006) 2, 70, 72 with regard to

the EEW. 99

Ambos, supra note 17, 561.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1116

lets them resurface in the guise of (more or less far-reaching) grounds for

refusal.100

With regard to this, the proposed Investigation Order provides for

“grounds for non-recognition or non-execution” which appear to be limited

(Art. 10 Investigation Order). Firstly, the requested State can refuse

execution in case of hindering immunities or privileges (in terms of Art.

10.1 a) draft directive). Requested authorities furthermore could invoke

national-security-reasons for not executing an Investigation Order (Art. 10.1

b) draft directive). Art. 10.1 d) draft directive deals with Investigation

Orders that are not being issued within criminal proceedings. Thus the

requested authority may refuse the execution provided that the Investigation

Order derives from foreign proceedings regarding (only) administrative

offences and the requested investigative measure would not be authorized in

a similar national case.101

As already mentioned there are some doubts about

the broadness of the application range of the proposed instruments in terms

of the types of procedures covered. Since in cases of only administrative

proceedings regarding administrative offences (compared to criminal

proceedings) the proportionality of many investigative measures per se

appears dubious, one may wonder whether a restriction of Art. 4 b)/c) draft

proposal by way of a de minimis rule would be more appropriate.102

By

comparison with the draft proposal the FD offers more grounds for non-

recognition, including inter alia the infringement of ne bis in idem, the

lacking of double criminality (provided the Evidence Warrant refers to a

search or seizure with regard to an offence not listed in Art. 14.2 FD)103

and

the manifest incorrectness of the request (Art. 13.1 h FD).

However, Art. 10.1 c) draft directive deserves a closer look since it

might turn out a kind of back-door allowing requested authorities to avoid

execution in several cases. In conjunction with Art.9, the mentioned ground

for non-execution addresses the problem that the exact type of the requested

measure is not regulated in the requested Member State or could not be

authorized in a domestic case. Conceivably, those situations would not be

uncommon given the diversity of Member States‟ procedural law. However,

that the requested measure is not regulated in the requested State does not

pose automatic grounds for refusal.104

In such cases pursuant to Art. 9 the

100

Ambos, supra note 17, 560. 101



Cf. Art. 13.1 b Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 95. 104

Bachmaier Winter, supra note 29, 583.


1117

requested authority is to take recourse to an investigative measure other than

that provided for in the Investigation Order. Recognition or execution of the

Investigation Order may only be refused if there is no other investigative

measure available which will make it possible to achieve a similar result

(Art. 10.1 c Investigation Order). The same procedure applies, if the

measure indicated in the Investigation Order exists, yet is limited to a

category of offences which do not include the offence stated in the request

(Art. 9.1 b, 10.1 c Investigation Order). Arts 9 and 10 Investigation Order

thus appear to provide Member States with an implementation margin that

remarkably covers the traditional dual criminality requirement. If, provided

there is no other investigative measure available which will make it possible

to achieve a similar result–, a request can be refused pursuant to Art. 10.1 b)

Investigation Order because the measure in question is only regulated with

regard to more serious crimes, it all the more should be possible to reject a

request that refers to a measure that could under no circumstances be

applied within domestic proceedings because the stated offence does not

exist.105

On the other hand one might argue that there is no need for an

extensive use of the implementation margins since – unlike

extradition/surrendering – not all kinds of investigative measures do

intensively infringe fundamental rights of the persons concerned.106

Member

States therefore might resort to a compromise solution which seems to be in

accordance with the implementation margin offered by Art. 9 and 10

Investigation Order: The dual criminality standard could be disregarded

with respect to measures of only limited intrusiveness. In the case of

investigation measures that restrict fundamental rights (in an intensive way)

like searches or confiscation measures a dual criminality standard appears

necessary: at least in these cases mutual recognition lacks a sufficient basis

since the issuing and executing a State‟s rules regarding the requested

investigation-measure (obviously) are completely disharmonic if a measure

that restricts fundamental rights is lawful in the issuing State but not

provided for (and therefore disproportional) in the requested State.107

A

related situation occurs when the requested measure is provided for in the

stated offence but its execution would not be necessary or proportional due

to the circumstances of the case. Under such circumstances the proposed

Investigation Order appears not to allow for a refusal of the request.

105


Ambos, supra note 17, 560. 107

Convincing Bachmaier Winter, supra note 29, 585.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1118

Furthermore, the requested authority will not even have the necessary

information for a proper examination of the proportionality of the measure

in question since the intended standard form does only contain an obligation

for the requesting authority to procure merely a “[s]ummary of facts and

description of circumstances in which the offence(s) underlying the

Investigation Order has (have) been committed”.108

The executing authority

is bound to trust the assessment of the requesting authority.109

Certainly one

might point out that this kind of trust is what mutual recognition is about.

But on the other hand both case groups appear similar: in the first case

group (covered by Art. 9 and 10 Investigation Order) the national legislator

deems the investigation of a certain type of conduct disproportional and

therefore does not provide authorities with (certain) investigation-measures;

in the second case group (which is arguably not covered by Art. 9 and 10

Investigation Order) a certain technique is generally provided for, but given

the circumstances of the case might by flagrantly un-proportional.

Regardless the pivotal importance of the principle of proportionality

especially in search cases110

according to the Investigation Order proposal

the executing authority will not (and could not) examine the proportionality

of the requested measure. The person concerned on his part can challenge

“the substantive reasons for issuing the Investigation Order […] only in an

action brought before a court of the issuing state” (Art. 13 Investigation

Order).111

As already suggested, before any instrument on transnational

evidence-gathering – irrespective of its foundation (mutual legal assistance

or mutual recognition) – has to deal with the problem of the admissibility of

the obtained evidence.112

Any transnational gathering of evidence on the

simplifying basis of mutual recognition would obviously be pointless if

obtained evidence would turn out to be inadmissible in the requesting State.

Art. 8.2 draft directive tackles this problem on the basis of the forum-regit-

actum-principle: As a rule “[t]he executing authority shall comply with the

formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing authority […]

provided that such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the

fundamental principles of law of the executing State”. Remarkably with

regard to the crucial question of ensuring the admissibility of evidence

108

Cf. Annex A of the proposition. 109


Cf. L. Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozessordnung, 53rd ed. (2010), s. 102, para. 15a. 111

Cf. supra note 118. 112

Cf. supra note 73.


1119

obtained abroad the proposal adopts a model well-known from mutual legal

assistance instruments. Art. 8.2 Investigation Order appears to be modeled

closely on Art. 4.1 of the EU-Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal

Matters of May 2000. Once more the obstacles become apparent that

hamper the application of the mutual recognition principle to the little

harmonic environment of evidence law. These limitations would affect the

practicability of the proposed instrument since the executing authority –

regardless the shift from mutual assistance to mutual recognition - still is

compelled to apply foreign procedural rules. Art. 8.2. Investigation Order at

least allows for the requesting authority to “expressly indicate” the relevant

regulations but this provision as well does not constitute an alteration from

the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance.113

This remarkable continuity obviously stems from a lack of

harmonization of procedural law in the EU-Member States: the best way to

make sure that evidence gathered abroad will be domestically admissible

would be the harmonization of the relevant procedural regimes. But it needs

not emphasizing that, this goal is not realistic.114

Certainly an alternative to

the forum-regit-actum approach (and rather radical) solution could be

reached by way of combining the locus-regit-actum rule with the principle

of mutual recognition. Evidence would be obtained according to the relevant

laws of the executing State; the courts of the requesting authority‟s State

would admit the obtained evidence provided only that it had been gathered

in accordance with the relevant regulations of the executing State.115

One might bring forward in favor of this approach that

notwithstanding the differences of Member State‟s procedural laws within

the EU all Member States at least are bound by the ECHR.116

But, the

initiative arguably rightly refrains from mentioned radical approach since a

locus-regit-actum rule concerning the gathering of evidence in combination

with the facilitation of unlimited admissibility on the basis of mutual

recognition could only amount to a de facto total harmonization of Member

113

Convincing Ambos, supra note 17, 561. 114


Cf. id., 587 with reference to the accordant legislation of the Spanish Supreme Court.

Noteworthy German Courts do not (principally) exclude any evidence that have been

obtained abroad in ways inconsistent with domestic procedure law. Instead a

“Beweiswürdigungslösung„ is preferred. This means that the circumstances of the

evidence-gathering will be taken into account (only) with regard to the weighing of

evidence. Cf. B. Roger, „Europäisierung des Strafverfahrens‟, 157 Goltdammer’s

Archiv für Strafrecht (2010) 1, 28. 116

Cf. Ambos, supra note 17, 562.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1120

States admissibility rules which would not (even) be covered by Art. 82.2

TFEU.117

Mutual recognition therefore effectively would level Member

States differing admissibility regimes thus infringing the principle of

subsidiarity (Art. 5.3 TEU) as well as the limitations established by Art.

82.2 TFEU as “differences between the legal traditions and systems of the

Member States” would not be taken into account but ignored.

Further, different problems are likely to arise if requests were directed

at States that domestically make generous use of the principle of opportunity

by States that tend to adhere to the principle of legality. From a Spanish

perspective Bachmaier Winter exemplifies insofar with regard to the

Spanish and Dutch laws on minor drug offences: it often occurs that Spanish

investigation judges (up till now on the basis of mutual assistance) request

Dutch authorities to gather evidence related to drug offences which would

not be prosecuted in the Netherlands. In modern practice the State applying

the opportunity principle will refuse the execution of the request.118

Tendencies to extend the principle of opportunity are driven not least by

economic considerations; hence a State that applies the principle of

opportunity to certain offences (considered domestically as less serious) will

not allocate the resources to the investigation of those offences which would

be required in case of the consistent application of the legality-principle.

Such domestic crime/politics decisions (of the requested State) would be

undermined if its authorities were obliged to investigate any (minor) crimes

(which domestically would be dealt with on the basis of the principle of

opportunity) provided by a foreign request by way of an Investigation

Order.

Art. 13 draft directive (as well as Art. 18.2 FD) allows for legal

remedies, yet the “substantive reasons for issuing the Investigation Order

can be challenged [by interested parties] only in an action brought before a

court of the issuing State”. While this burden put to the suspect is merely a

consequence of the application of the principal of mutual recognition it

nevertheless emphasizes that it should be the mutual trust of the citizens

(and not that of brother authorities) providing a sufficient basis for mutual

recognition of investigating measures. Furthermore, one has to consider that

in cases where interested parties may have good reason to contest the

substantive reasons for a certain measure (e.g. for the search of a building)

given by an authority of member State X as well as the way of its execution

117


Bachmaier Winter, supra note 29, 585.


1121

by an authority of member State Y the Investigation Order (and Evidence

Warrant) would create a division of remedies. The interested party (who

might be a citizen of a third State) would have to challenge the given

reasons for the measure before a court of State X and the circumstances of

its execution before a court of the State Y. Only time will tell if the

European Court for Human Rights will assess the legal remedies which the

FD and the draft proposal allow for as “effective” ones in terms of Art. 13

European Convention on Human Rights. Similar doubts arise with regard to

Art. 6 ECHR since the draft proposal as well as previous EU instruments are

aimed unilaterally at further strengthening the efficiency of criminal

prosecutions. Undeniably any attempt at the strengthening of the

prosecution tends to endanger the balance between prosecution and defense.

Needless to say the defense is not provided with complementary tools

regarding evidence-gathering in trans-national cases. Conceivably

Strasbourg will have to decide whether the Human Rights guarantee of the

equality of arms is infringed.

Of course one might argue in favor of the initiatives that the idea of

the draft directive as well as of the FD is (merely) the simplification and

therefore improvement of legal assistance with regard to criminal matters

within the EU. Yet, arguably this would amount to an artificial restriction of

one‟s perspective. Indeed there is widespread criticism (which by far is not

restricted to academic circles) that the EU crime policy overemphasizes the

efficiency of prosecutions. For instance the FD on certain procedural rights

has still not been approved119

and the German Parliament has argued out

that further extensions of the principle of mutual recognition without

implementing the Council‟s “Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights

of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings”120

could only

undermine the mutual trust which has been established so far and thus turn

out to be simply counterproductive.121

IV. Intercontinental European Union Acts

In regards to an intercontinental perspective on legal assistance related

developments affecting the framework of international law it may be noted

119


Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for Strengthening

Procedural Rights for Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings, OJ

2009 C295/01. 121

Cf. above supra note 74.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1122

that recent intercontinental instruments of course are not based on the

principle of mutual recognition but on the international agreements

regarding mutual legal assistance. Nevertheless, they appear as signs of

shifting international law paradigms.

1. Mutual Legal Assistance between the EU and the USA

The most far-reaching developments have taken place in the area of

legal assistance between the EU and its member States and the USA. Just

like individual member States, the EU itself has acquired an ability to enter

international treaties due to its status as an international legal personality, cf.

Art 47 TEU. While the EU is not considered a State (thus lacking an

entitlement to examine its own jurisdiction), it has at least the status of an

international organization.122

Accordingly the entering of international

treaties is valid as long as the EU acts in accordance with those areas in

which it has been given competence.123

The hitherto existing jurisprudence,

which acknowledged the existence of so-called implicit competences to

enact treaties,124

has been recorded in Arts 3.2 and 216.1 TEU.125

Therefore

the EU now has been given competence in those cases in which a treaty is

necessary to realize goals which have been mentioned in the EU‟s primary

legislation. This goes also for those cases in which the treaty in question has

been envisioned for the future in binding EU legislation or in cases in which

existing legislation could be hindered or altered if the treaty in question

would not be entered.126

Art. 218 TEU specifies the procedure which has to

be followed in these cases. Since the institutions of the EU are bound to act

in accordance with international treaties due to Art. 216.2 TEU, those

international treaties which have been entered take precedence to the EU‟s

secondary legislation. Also it has to be noted that directly applicable clauses

can deliver direct legal effects to EU citizens.127

However the EU‟s primary

legislation takes precedence to international treaties. This follows from Art.

218.11 TFEU which enables the ECJ to decide in an opinion if prospective

international treaties are reconcilable with the EU‟s primary legislation.128

122

Cf. W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht (2010), Volume 5, Chapter 1 § 2, para. 42. 123

Cf. Id., Chapter 1 § 2, para. 39. 124

Cf. ECJ Case 22/70, Commission v Council, Slg. 1971, 263. 125

Critical R. Streinz et al., Der Vertrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU, 3rd ed.

(2010), 133 as the TFEU exceeds the existing jurisprudence. 126

Frenz, supra note 122, Chapter 6 § 2, para. 602. 127

Cf. id., Chapter 6 § 2, para. 598. 128

Cf. id., Chapter 1 § 2, para. 45.


1123

This also leads to the conclusion that EU primary legislation is the measure

in those cases in which the Union acts based on intercontinental law.129

These developments consist of the signing of two agreements, namely on

the area of extradition130

and the area of other assistance.131

In Germany,

those agreements have been implemented by the signing of three treaties.132

The agreements between the EU and the USA came to pass in reaction

to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Like most Member States, Germany has

declared that certain constitutional requirements have to be guaranteed in

order to bind Germany to the agreement.133

The object of the agreements is

to simplify the practices in extradition and mutual legal assistance in

criminal matters by establishing singular rules in order to better fight

terrorism and organized crime.134

The agreement on extradition consists of

22 articles and regulates only parts of the area of extradition by adding to

bilateral treaties already in existence. But, as it consists of rules which stray

from rules in already existing bilateral treaties, the agreement between the

EU and the USA on extradition remarkably takes precedence over rules

agreed on by (traditional) way of bilateral agreement.135

The mutual-legal-

assistance-agreement encompasses 18 articles and aims to simplify several

129

Cf. id., Chapter 1 § 2, para. 46. 130

Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of

America, 25 June 2003, OJ 2003 L 181/27. 131

Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United

States of America, 25 June 2003, OJ 2003 L 181/34. 132

Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America on

Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 14 October 2003, BGBl. II 2007, 1620;

Second Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany

and the United States of America Concerning Extradition, signed on 18 April 2006,

BGBl. II 2007, 1634; Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty between the Federal

Republic of Germany and the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in

Criminal Matters, 18 April 2006, BGBl. II 2007, 1637. The treaty on mutual legal

assistance and its supplemental treaty entered into force on 18 October 2009. The

agreements between the EU and the USA as well as the Second Supplementary Treaty

have entered into force on 1 February 2010, cf. D. Brodowski, „Strafrechtsrelevante

Entwicklungen in der Europäischen Union‟, 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale

Strafrechtsdogmatik (2010) 5, 376, 385. 133

According to Art. 24.5 TEU in the consolidated version after the Treaty of Nice which

reads: “No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the

Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional

procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall

nevertheless apply provisionally.” 134

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 74. 135

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 70.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1124

areas of mutual legal assistance, e.g. in the areas of identification of bank

information, video conferencing regarding testimony and joint investigative

teams. Just like the agreement on extradition, it also aims at adding to

already existing regulations and takes precedence in case of normative

collisions.136

a) Extradition

The area of extradition between Germany and the USA is governed by

the bilateral Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the

United States of America Concerning Extradition from 20 June 1978 which

has entered into force on 29 August 1980.137

This treaty has been adapted by

the Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty between the Federal Republic of

Germany and the United States of America Concerning Extradition which

has been signed on 21 October 1986 and has entered into force on 11 March

1993.138

The Second Supplementary Treaty dating from 18 April 2006

serves to harmonize the bilateral extradition treaty with the regulations of

the EU-USA agreement on extradition. The changes which have been made

by the Second Supplementary Treaty are strictly oriented on the regulations

laid down in the EU-USA agreement on extradition which do not leave

much room for differing bilateral rules between the different Member States

and the USA. Therefore we now have two instruments of international law

which are both to be followed. However regulations of the EU-USA

agreement have been incorporated into the bilateral treaty by way of the

Second Supplementary Treaty in order to prevent fuzziness in everyday

application of these instruments.139

Of special interest are Arts 1 and 5 of the Second Supplementary

Treaty. Art. 1 deals with cases in which the person to be extradited is

threatened by the possibility of capital punishment in the USA. Art. 1 of the

Second Supplementary Treaty changes Art. 12 of the original Treaty on

extradition insofar as Germany may grant extradition on the condition that

the death penalty will not be imposed or that it will not be carried out. If the

USA does not accept these conditions, the request for extradition may be

denied. In this regard, the wording of Art. 1 of the Second Supplementary

136

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 74. 137

BGBl. II 1980, 646, 1300. 138

BGBl. II 1988, 1086; BGBl. II 1993, 846. 139

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 62.


1125

Treaty is nearly identical to Art. 13 of the EU-USA agreement.140

Art. 5

concerns the collision of requests for extradition by several States. Art. 5

clarifies that the request for surrender pursuant to the Arrest Warrant is

treated as a competing request for extradition and does not deserve special

treatment.141

b) Other Assistance

The bilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance between Germany and

the USA dating from 14 October 2003 only has been signed after

considerable negotiation. Since the agreement between the EU and the USA

was on its way, the Supplementary Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance

between Germany and the USA has been negotiated even before the original

treaty entered into force. The Supplementary Treaty aims at incorporating

the changes made by the EU-USA agreement in the bilateral treaty between

Germany and the USA, thereby giving way to a consolidated version of the

original bilateral treaty. By this treaty, dating from 18 April 2006, the

regulations contained in the Arts 4 to 12 of the agreement between the EU

and the USA, which have not been included in the original treaty, will

become part of the treaty on mutual legal assistance between Germany and

the USA. According to Art. 3.2 a) of the EU-US agreement, every Member

State has to acknowledge in a written instrument between itself and the

USA the application of its bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in force

with the United States of America. By the signing of the supplemental

treaty, this demand has been met.142

The treaty starts out with regulations on foundational matters, namely

the obligation of both parties involved to lend mutual assistance143

(Art. 1),

the establishing of Central Authorities to make and receive requests144

(Art.2) and the establishment of the right to refuse requests due to the ordre

public principle (Art. 3). Arts 4 to 13 deal with the different shapes of legal

assistance, while Arts 14 to 16 deal mainly with confidentiality issues and

140

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 62. 141

Cf. BT-Drs. 16/4377, 63. 142

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 74. 143

Art. 1 also defines what is included as assistance and defines competent authorities

which can request legal assistance. 144

For the United States, Central Authority is in principle the Attorney General or a

person which has been assigned by him with this task. For Germany, Central

Authority is in principle the Federal Ministry of Justice. In case of urgency requests

may be communicated between other authorities.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1126

the protection of sensitive data. Arts 17 to 26 describe technicalities in the

way in which legal assistance will be granted, e.g. contents and form of

requests and expenses.145

As in the area of extradition, there is a possibility to deal with

differing views on capital punishment. While this area is explicitly dealt

with in Art. 1 of the Second Supplementary Treaty on extradition, in the

area of other assistance this problem can be solved by utilizing the ordre

public rule in Art. 3 thereby denying legal assistance. Another possibility

would be to grant legal assistance according to Art. 15.1 on the condition

that the death penalty will not be imposed or that it will not be carried

out.146

2. Mutual Legal Assistance between the EU and Japan

Another noteworthy development is the signing of the Agreement

between the European Union and Japan on Mutual Legal Assistance in

Criminal Matters.147

The agreement consists of 31 articles. Arts 1 to 3 regulate

foundational matters like the object and purpose of the agreement as well as

the scope of mutual legal assistance. According to Art. 1.2 the agreement

does not apply to extradition, transfer of proceedings in criminal matters and

enforcement of sentences except in case of freezing or seizure and

confiscation of proceeds or instrumentalities which is dealt with in Art. 25.

Arts 4 to 6 deal with establishing central authorities and the communication

between them as well as establishing the authorities competent to originate

requests. Arts 7 to 10 describe technicalities in the way in which legal

assistance will be granted, e.g. concerning contents and form of requests, the

language to be used and the execution of requests in general. Art. 11 deals

with the grounds for refusal of a request while Art. 13 puts limitations on

the use of testimony, statements, items or information. Arts 14 to 22 deal

mainly with different shapes of legal assistance while Arts 23 and 24

regulate safe conduct for those who have to appear before the competent

authorities in the requesting State and the temporary transfer of persons in

custody. The remaining articles regulate matters like relation to other

instruments, territorial application and entry into force and application of the

145

BT-Drs. 16/4377, 52. 146

Cf. BT-Drs. 16/4377, 54. 147

Agreement between the European Union and Japan on Mutual Legal Assistance in

Criminal Matters, 30 November 2009, OJ 2010 L 39/20.


1127

agreement. The Agreement which is based on Art. 82.1 TFEU has not

entered into force yet, since it depends on the assent of the European

Parliament according to Art. 218.6 a) TFEU. As soon as the agreement

enters into force, it will become directly enforceable law in the EU and the

Member States according to Art. 216.2 TFEU, since it does not require

ratification in the Member States. From a German viewpoint this would

mean that the Agreement would take precedence in comparison to the IRG.

If this meets constitutional demands after the Lisbon-ruling by the Federal

Constitutional Court may be doubted.148

V. Conclusion

After all, the most vivid playground in legal assistance in criminal

matters appears to be the furthering of mutual recognition most recently

evidenced by the ongoing discussion surrounding the proposal of a

European Investigation Order. However even in the utilization of

established instruments there are still challenges to be met; as the examples

from German case law regarding the Arrest Warrant suggest, mutual trust

does not seem to be a dependable reality yet. Notwithstanding, the Council‟s

Stockholm Programme and its corresponding action plan amongst other

things aim to further mutual trust, remarkably, by way of creating new tools

of legal assistance with focus on the gathering of evidence in criminal cases.

However this might be compared to putting the cart in front of the horse,

since it seems to be that trust constitutes a prerequisite for mutual

recognition (not the other way round). Keeping this dynamic in mind, it

appears to be of special interest not the least from an international law

perspective that the capacity (and legitimacy) of the principle of mutual

recognition – despite its relative success at least in terms of the growing

numbers of instruments based on it – still do not seem to be clear. On the

contrary any input from a principle-led perspective on the possible potential

of “trust” (which arguably does not go without saying!) for the furthering of

inter-State respectively inter-authority relations and the (ever increasing)

integration status of the European Union appears to be of mutual interest –

from the international law perspective as well as the practical view on the

diverse problems of galloping Europeanization. Recent developments and

problems of legal assistance in criminal matters cannot be explained nor

fully understood from a traditional international law perspective. This

148

Brodowski, supra note 132, 386.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1087-1128

1128

proves the assumption that international law doctrine can only benefit from

taking into close account and evaluating the repercussions from the

furthering of the principle of mutual recognition in the realms of criminal

law.


doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-2-3-engelhardt

The Millennium Development Goals and

Human Rights at 2010 – An Account of the

Millennium Summit Outcome

Marie von Engelhardt

Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................... 1130

A. Introduction ................................................................................... 1130

B. The Millennium Development Goals – A Development

and Human Rights Agenda? ......................................................... 1131

I. Source and Substance of a Collective Promise ............................. 1131

II. Human Rights, Development and the MDGs ............................... 1135

C. The 2010 Millennium Summit Outcome – “Keeping the

Promise” ........................................................................................ 1138

I. Stock Taking at the Millennium Summit ...................................... 1138

II. Key Themes in the Outcome Document ....................................... 1141

D. Human Rights, Development and the MDGs – Revisited ............ 1145

The author works as a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative

Public and International Law in Heidelberg and is a member of the Schumpeter

Research Group on the “Law and Governance of Development Cooperation”.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1130

Abstract

In September 2010, the heads of State and government of over 140 countries

gathered at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York, to review

progress made towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Adopted in 2000, the 8 concrete and time-bound MDGs that have become

the shared development agenda of the international community are

reminiscent of economic and social rights, but contain no explicit reference

to human rights. With five years to go to the MDGs target date of 2015, the

Millennium Summit adopted the Outcome Document “Keeping the

Promise”, that serves here as a test case to assess the current state of the

debate over human rights and development. Although human rights rhetoric

has increasingly entered into the development discourse, its influence on

development practice remains limited, and human rights come second on an

agenda increasingly dominated by the aid effectiveness concept and its

vocabulary.

A. Introduction

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent a global

action plan to combat poverty and, in the words of UN Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon, “the most important collective promise ever made to the

world's most vulnerable people”.1 With five years to go to the MDGs target

date of 2015, world leaders gathered from 20 to 22 September at the United

Nations Millennium Summit in New York, taking stock of progress towards

the MDGs since they were agreed in 2000. At the high-level plenary

meeting of the General Assembly, the heads of State and government of

almost 140 countries adopted a 32-pages long Outcome Document with the

title “Keeping the promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development

Goals”, reinvigorating their commitment to reach the concrete and time-

bound targets of the MDGs.2

1 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon‟s speech to the European Forum on The

International Financial Crisis and the Millennium Development Goals, in Alpbach, 4

September, UN Doc SG/SM/13087 DEV/2808, 7 September 2010. 2 Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, GA

Res. A/65/L.1, 17, September 2010, adopted by consensus on 22 September 2010.


An Account of the Millennium Summit Outcome 1131

Although the uneven track record and the huge gaps remaining in

achieving the MDGs call for deeds rather than words to keep the promise,

the focus of this article lies on the Outcome Document. Inspired by Philip

Alston‟s suggestion in 2005, the Outcome Document is used as a “lens

through which to assess the current state of the ongoing debate over human

rights and development”. In comparison to the Millennium Declaration of

2000, the basis of the MDGs, and the World Summit Outcome of 2005, a

record of the first stock taking, the document yields an interesting picture of

the shifting trends in international development policy over the last decade.3

Since 2000, human rights rhetoric has increasingly entered into the

development discourse as a whole and the MDGs in particular. The

influence of human rights on development practice, however, remains

limited. Human rights come second on an agenda increasingly dominated by

the aid effectiveness concept and its vocabulary.4

B. The Millennium Development Goals –

A Development and Human Rights Agenda?

I. Source and Substance of a Collective Promise

The Millennium Development Goals are based on the Millennium

Declaration adopted by heads of State and government at a high-level

plenary meeting of the General Assembly in September 2000 in New York.5

The Millennium Declaration, building upon a decade of major United

Nations conferences and summits, contains a wide range of commitments of

Member States to promote peace, human rights, democracy, and

3 United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, 18 September 2000; 2005

World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005. 4 Philip Alston in 2005, referring to the MDG initiative as a whole; P. Alston, „Ships

Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development

Debate seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals‟, 27 Human

Rights Quarterly (2005) 3, 755, 757. 5 For an account of the antecedents of the MDGs‟ adoption, see D. Hulme, „The

Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human Development Meets Results-

based Management in an Imperfect World‟, Brooks World Poverty Institute (BWPI)

Working Paper 16, December 2007, 3-12, available at http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac

.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-1607.pdf (last visited 21November 2010).

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1132

environmental sustainability.6 Most importantly, Member States pledge to

form a new global partnership for development, setting out time-bound and

quantifiable goals and targets for combating poverty in its many dimensions.

On the basis of Chapter III, “Development” of the Millennium

Declaration, the UN Secretariat, in consultations with the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), subsequently elaborated 8 concise

goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators.7 In brief, these 8 Millennium

Development Goals endeavor to (1) half poverty and hunger; (2) achieve

universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality; (4) reduce child

mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and

other diseases; and (7) establish a global partnership of industrialized and

developing countries in order to facilitate the implementation of MDGs No.

1 to 7.

The MDGs managed to place development firmly on the agenda of the

international community, and at the same time emerged as the international

community‟s shared development agenda. By setting out a comprehensive

vision for development, they initiated a decade of development activism that

brought unprecedented attention to the fight against poverty as a

responsibility of both developing and developed countries. By setting out

concrete, quantifiable goals, they have become a common framework and

yardstick for such diverse actors as UN agencies, the World Bank,

philanthropic foundations, and grass-roots NGOs. In the words of the

Overseas Development Institute, a London-based development think tank,

the MDGs represent “the most determined effort in history to galvanize

international action around a common set of development targets. Their

success or failure will have immense consequences, not only for the world‟s

poor, but also for the credibility of collective action by the international

community”8.

Raising such high expectations, with their universal pretensions and

with their ambitious targets, the MDGs are bound to attract criticism from

6 G. Pleuger, „United Nations Millennium Declaration‟, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max

Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008), paras 1-5 (last visited 21

November 2010). 7 See Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium

Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/56/326, 6 September 2001,

Annex. 8 „Achieving the MDGs: The Fundamentals‟, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Briefing Paper 43, September 2008, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources

/download/1933.pdf (last visited 21 November 2010).



many sides. They have been accused at times of being unrealistic or under-

ambitious, and of drawing attention, time, and resources away from other

initiatives.9 From an economic perspective, they have been criticized for

setting global targets for such diverse countries as India and Mauretania,

suggesting a one-size-fits-all prioritization and paying undue regard to the

different starting points, capacities, and needs of individual countries.10

As

Todd Moss from the Center for Global Development, a Washington-based

research institution, captures pointedly, the MDGs are highly successful in

fundraising, but otherwise inappropriate as national goals and wrong to

claim collective accountability, because “when everyone is responsible then

no one is”11

.

The question of accountability leads over to the question of legal

status. Do the MDGs create obligations under international law? The MDGs

build upon the Millennium Declaration that was adopted in the form of a

General Assembly resolution. As such, it has only a recommendatory, not a

legally binding character.12

This remains valid despite the solemn adoption

of the Declaration by consensus.

9 For an overview of the major criticisms brought against the MDGs, see, for example:

„Beyond the Millennium Development Goals‟, OECD Insights (24 September 2010),

available at http://oecdinsights.org/2010/09/24/beyond-the-millennium-development-

goals/ (last visited 21 November 2010). 10

Most prominently, D. Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to

Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (2006). 11

T. Moss, „Are the MDGs Useful for Africa?‟, The Huffington Post (5 August 2010),

available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-moss/are-the-mdgs-useful-for-

a_b_672429.html (last visited 21 November 2010); also: T. Moss, „What Next for the

Millennium Development Goals?‟, 1 Global Policy (May 2010) 2, 218-220; according

to Amnesty International, the central problem with the Goals that do not advocate a

rights-based approach is indeed a lack of accountability, enhanced by the failure to

take into account the human rights obligations of States and to include human rights

benchmarks in MDG progress monitoring, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org

/demand-dignity/fight-poverty-with-human-rights/millennium-developmentgoals/page

.do?id=1041190 (last visited 21 November 2010). 12

Under Art. 25 UN Charter, only the Security Council can take decisions which are

binding on all Member States. In general, resolutions of the General Assembly are not

binding on UN Member States but serve as recommendations, I. Brownlie, Principles

of Public International Law (2003), 14 and A. Boyle & C. Chinkin, The Making of

International Law (2006), 116, acknowledging, however, that General Assembly

Resolutions can play an important role in the development of international law.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1134

Some authors argue, however, that the Goals have since developed

into customary international law, becoming binding on all states.13

Such

argumentation is usually built around two strands. First, states have repeated

and gradually concretized their commitment to the MDGs on many

occasions, often key international summits, including the UN Conference on

Financing for Development in Monterrey and the World Summit on

Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002; the World Summit in

New York and the Group of Eight Summit in Gleneagles (UK) in 2005; and

most recently, the Millennium Summit 2010 in New York.14

The Goals have

also entered the strategies and policy documents of many bilateral and

multilateral donors, for example the German Federal Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and Development (BMZ)15

or the European Union.16

Second,

there is a clear overlap between many of the MDGs and (particularly

economic and social) human rights and human rights principles. Thus, the

MDGs must be placed within the context of obligations to promote human

rights previously entered into by Member States and reaffirmed in the

Millennium Declaration and on subsequent occasions.17

13

G. Nankani et al., „Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies‟, in P. Alston &

M. Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development. Towards Mutual Reinforcement

(2005), 496-497; cautiously also Alston, supra note 5, 774. 14

GA Draft Outcome of the International Conference on Financing for Development:

Monterrey Consensus, UN Doc A/AC.257/L.13, 30 January 2002; The Johannesburg

Declaration on Sustainable Development, adopted at the 17th plenary meeting of the

World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2, 4

September 2002. 15

For example, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und

Entwicklung, BMZ Konzept 172: Förderung von Good Governance in der deutschen

Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn (2009); Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche

Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ Konzept 155: Entwicklungspolitischer

Aktionsplan für Menschenrechte 2008 – 2010, Bonn (2008). 16

Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the

Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the

Commission on European Union Development Policy: „The European Consensus‟ of

24 February 2006, 46/01 OJ 2006 C 46; see also: Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: „A twelve-point EU action plan

in support of the Millennium Development Goals‟, Brussels, 21 April 2010,

COM(2010)159 final. 17

M. Robinson, „What Rights Can Add to Good Development Practice‟, in Alston &

Robinson, supra note 14, 41; Alston, supra note 4, 774: “the MDGs have been

affirmed, reiterated,, and restated in ways and forms and with greater frequency and



Clearly, to the extent that they overlap, the respective MDGs have a

normative dimension by repeating or concretizing existing obligations,

rather than producing new ones. This, however, only applies to the areas of

overlap and narrow core of the rights. The concrete targets and timelines

attached to the MDGs in a Secretary General Report (and it is those that set

them apart from previous initiatives) create only political and moral, but no

legal commitments. The continuous reiterations of the MDGs must be

interpreted in line with this trajectory and do not qualify as opinio iuris.

II. Human Rights, Development and the MDGs

Unlike the Millennium Declaration which reaffirms the commitment

to human rights and democracy, the MDGs themselves do not refer to

human rights explicitly, are not expressed in a rights-language, and do not

advocate a rights-based approach to development.18

In particular, while

some economic and social rights can still be read into the MDGs, civil and

political rights fall clearly off the radar.

Accordingly, the most dominant reaction of the human rights

community to the MDGs has been criticism, which comes across as more or

less constructive and engaging depending on whether the emphasis is on the

communalities or differences of the human rights and MDGs agendas.19

Some human rights advocates reject the very concept of the MDGs for

prescribing a selection of confined, quantifiable targets from the top-down

while omitting or even undermining existing human rights obligations.20

insistence than economic and social rights have ever been”; on the relationship

between MDGs and Human Rights, see below, Part B.II. 18

Amnesty International, „Combating Exclusion: Why Human Rights are Essential for

the MDGs‟, 7 SUR – International Journal of Human Rights (2010) 12, 55, 55: “The

MDGs – while covering areas where States have clear obligations under international

human rights law such as food, education and health - are largely silent on human

rights.” 19

See, for example, M. Robinson, supra note 18, 40-41; Alston, supra note 4, 764-765;

G. Schmidt-Traub, „The Millennium Development Goals and Human rights-based

Approaches: Moving Towards a Shared Approach‟, 13 The International Journal of

Human Rights (February 2009) 1, 72, 77; Amnesty International, supra note 19, 57-

62. 20

Alston, supra note 5, 762-764; for example, M.E. Salomon states “at best the MDGs

might be understood as a feeble complement to the international economic regime, at

worst as a vehicle for advancing the will and preferences of influential states and their

industries.” M.E. Salomon, „Poverty, Privilege and International Law: The

Millennium Development Goals and the Guise of Humanitarianism‟, 51 German

Yearbook of International Law (2008), 39, 47-48.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1136

These “essentialist critiques” of the MDGs are implicit in Thomas Pogge‟s

question: Why aim at halving poverty if this means leaving at least half of

today‟s poor in a state of deprivation?21

The more common reaction on parts of human rights activists is to

laud the MDG initiative for bringing about an unprecedented focusing of

efforts to promote human development and the human dignity of those

living in abject poverty - an objective shared with the human rights agenda -

while criticizing parts of the MDGs concept or approach. For example, it is

argued that a human rights perspective entails a more holistic understanding

of poverty and its structural causes than suggested by the MDGs.22

An

approach to development that is grounded in the indivisibility and

interdependence of human rights requires empowering the individual

(rights-holder); respecting the principles of non-discrimination,

participation, and accountability; and all the while remaining within the

normative framework of international human rights law.23

Although the liaison between human rights and development was not

stipulated in the concept and phrasing of the Goals, the debate between the

development and human rights communities has taken on over the last

decade. The debate has moved forward on a conceptual level, through the

work of the High Level Task Force on the Right to Development,24

and on a

21

T. Pogge, The First UN Millennium Development Goal: A Cause for Celebration?,

Evening Address at the University of Oslo Global Justice Symposium (2003),

available at http://www.etikk.no/globaljustice/ (last visited 21 November 2010). 22

On the distinct approaches to poverty contained in the human rights movement and

the MDGs, see P. Nelson, „Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and

the Future of Development Cooperation‟, 35 World Development (2007) 12, 2041-

2055. 23

There are differing conceptions of a rights-based approach to development. The

elements reflected here are based on M. Darrow & A. Tomas, „Power, Capture, and

Conflict. A Call for Human Rights Accountability in Development Cooperation‟, 27

Human Rights Quarterly (2005) 2, 471, 482-492; for the UN, the central reference is

“The Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a

Common Understanding among UN Agencies”. Report of the Second Interagency

Workshop on Implementing a Human Rights-based Approach in the Context of UN

Reform (Stamford, USA, 5-7 May 2003); for an overview of donor approaches, see

L.-H. Piron & T. O‟Neil, „Integrating Human Rights into Development. A Synthesis

of Donor Approaches and Experiences‟, ODI Report (2005) prepared for the OECD

DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET). 24

The High Level Task Force establishes a link between development and human rights

with view to the MDG implementation process. UN Commission on Human Rights,

Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to

Development (Geneva, 13–17 December 2004), UN Doc E/CN4./2005/WG.18.2. In



more operational level, through the adoption by an increasing number of

bilateral and multilateral donors of a more or less vigorous human rights-

based approach to development.25

In 2003, the Human Development Report

recognizes that each of the MDGs “can be directly linked to economic,

social and cultural rights”, that national development strategies must respect

human rights, and that without sound governance, including in terms of

human rights, no country will succeed in its development efforts.26

The

2005 World Summit Outcome refers repeatedly to the role of human rights

and, unlike the Millennium Declaration, establishes a direct link between

human rights and development cooperation.27

However, despite the rhetoric of human rights and development

having entered into the overall development agenda, it holds true that “the

acknowledgment of the importance of human rights has yet to have a

systematic impact upon practice on the ground”28

. Rights-based approaches

to development often remain too abstract, conceptual, and unsuitable overall

to inform the day-to-day decisions that development practitioners need to

make; evaluations substantiating the value-additions of a human-rights

based approach to development for beneficiaries are still largely pending.29

Within the UN system, the bodies dealing with development and human

rights “are not only separate from each other but they also lack any real

mechanisms enabling them to coordinate their respective activities”30

. And

the HLTF, UN human rights experts pursue a critical dialogue with representatives of

the World Bank, IMF, WTO and other organizations with a view to working out

common analyses and recommendations for a human rights based approach to

development in the framework of the global compact.” Pleuger, supra note 7, 18. 25

See the references in supra note 24. 26

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2003.

Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to End Poverty (2003),

28, 15 and 16 respectively. 27

World Summit Outcome, supra note 4, paras 9, 12, 62, 68 and particularly 24 lit. b:

“To reaffirm that good governance is essential for sustainable development; […]

respect for human rights, including the right to development, […] are also essential”.

The term “human rights” appeared only once in the Monterrey Consensus, the final

text adopted at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, but

6 times in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, adopted by the 2002 World

Summit on Sustainable Development, supra note 15. 28

Alston, supra note 5, 826. 29

See, for example, Schmidt-Traub, supra note 20, 71; Alston, supra note 5, 802 and

807. 30

E. Dominguez Redondo, „The Millennium Development Goals and the Human Rights

Based Approach: Reflecting on Structural Chasms with the United Nations System‟,

13 The International Journal of Human Rights (February 2009) 1, 29, 31.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1138

while the current MDG accountability framework, consisting of voluntary

monitoring and reporting at the national level, and UN reports on regional

and global progress, is considered insufficient, the existing human rights

monitoring and accountability mechanisms have not been used widely to

provide redress.31

These gaps are to blame on both the human rights and development

community. Few human rights organizations have articulated effective

strategies in the defense and promotion of economic and social rights,32

and

a persistent skepticism towards the MDGs stands in the way of a more

practical engagement with the initiative.33

Ten years after the adoption of

the MDGs and despite surging human rights rhetoric in development, the

human rights regime still, for the most part, has to “content itself with

playing a limited role in directing the course of the development agenda”34

.

C. The 2010 Millennium Summit Outcome – “Keeping

the Promise”

I. Stock Taking at the Millennium Summit

The Millennium Summit 2010 was mandated by the General

Assembly to review progress and gaps, take account of lessons learned and

best practices, and elaborate concrete strategies for action to achieve the

31

Amnesty International, supra note 19, 60; C. Doyle, „Millennium Development Goals

and Human Rights: In Common Cause or Uneasy Partners?‟, 13 The International

Journal of Human Rights (February 2009) 1, 5, 6; M. S. Carmona: „The Obligations of

'International Assistance and Cooperation under the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Possible Entry Point to a Human Rights

Based Approach to Millennium Development Goal 8‟, 13 The International Journal of

Human Rights (February 2009) 1, 86, 87. 32

F. Azzam, „Reflections on Human Rights Approaches to Implementing the MDGs‟, 2

SUR – International Journal on Human Rights (2005) 2, 22, 24. 33

On the need to harness the complementarity of human rights and the MDGs, see, for

example, Alston, supra note 5, 827; S. Carmona, supra note 32 , 35; Doyle, supra

note 32, 6. 34

Doyle, supra note 32, 6. It is exemplary that the human rights discourse at the World

Bank has been abating, after a brief upsurge under the Presidency of James D.

Wolfensohn. See, G. Sarfaty, „Why Culture Matters in International Institutions. The

Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank‟, 103 American Journal of

International Law (2009) 4, 647-683.



MDGs until 2015.35

Based on this mandate and following the launch of the

UN Secretary-General‟s report “Keeping the Promise” in March 2010,36

diplomats negotiated a draft outcome document in the run-up to the Summit

in September.37

The months leading to the Summit also saw the publication

of the Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, which contains the

latest data on progress on all goals globally and regionally, and the MDG

Gap Task Force Report 2010 on implementation gaps in the commitments

made under MDG 8.38

The picture that emerged from these reports is mixed: while progress

has been made on some goals and in some regions, it remains too slow and

uneven. The number of poor has fallen from 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4

billion in 2005, but this is largely due to the economic growth of China and

Eastern Asia; in the backdrop of the global economic crisis, the number of

people in extreme poverty is projected to increase by 64 million by the end

of 2010, according to a World Bank study.39

Major strides have been made

on getting children into school, though they are not sufficient to reach MDG

2 by 2015; in some regions, gender parity in educational enrolment remains

elusive, and progress on gender equality is overall sluggish.40

Advances

have been made on some health-related Goals, such as reducing child

mortality and increasing the coverage of antiretroviral therapy and malaria

35

GA Resolution on the Organization of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixty-

fifth session of the General Assembly, GA Res. 64/184, 5 February 2010, para. 3. 36

Keeping the Promise: A Forward-looking Review to Promote an Agreed Action

Agenda to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, Report of the

Secretary-General, UN Doc A/64/665, 12 February 2010. 37

During the negotiations, it is reported that developing countries did not act as a

uniform group with homogenous interests, nor were the newly industrializing or

emerging donors interested in taking the lead – instead, the debate was dominated by

those countries that used the platform to criticize existing power relations in the

international system, see S. Weinlich, „Warum ein Konsens in den Millenniumszielen

so schwierig ist‟, Zeit Online (20 September 2010), available at

http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-09/UN-Entwicklungsziele-Konsens?page=1

(last visited 21 November 2010). 38

United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (2010); and

focusing on MDG 8, see UN MDG Gap Task Force Report 2010, The Global

Partnership for Development at a Critical Juncture (2010). The UN Gap Task Force

brings together more than 20 UN agencies, the IMF, World Bank, WTO and OECD. 39

MDG Report 2010, supra note 39, 15; The International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development / The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects. Crisis, Finance, and

Growth (2010) Foreword, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/

INTGEP2010/Resources/GEP2010-Full-Report.pdf. 40

MDG Report 2010, supra note 39, 16, 20-21.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1140

control, yet maternal mortality rates remain far off the reduction rates

foreseen in MDG 5.41

The world is on track to meet the drinking water

target - of halving the proportion of population without access to safe

drinking water, whereas sanitation facilities are lacking for half of the

population of developing countries.42

Finally, while Official Development

Assistance (ODA) flows are still on the rise, only five donor countries have

reached the UN target of 0.7% of gross national income for aid.43

At the

current pace, many of the MDG targets are likely to be missed in most

regions – and it is expected that the international community will not be able

to keep the promise it made in 2000.44

Against this background, the Millennium Summit faced three key

challenges: it had to rally state support around the MDG initiative at a time

when the global financial crisis and the global food crisis had diminished

resources for the fight against poverty, while increasing the number and

needs of the poor. Second, it had to sell the MDGs as a formula to success,

even as the very uneven track record and the major gaps remaining gave

little reason for optimism in the prior to the Summit. Third, it had to

generate consensus between the industrialized and the developing world, in

two trenches that have characterized international development politics

since the earliest day.

Nevertheless, heads of State and government reached agreement on

the Outcome Document “Keeping the Promise – United to Achieve the

Millennium Development Goals”, a title that connotes its main message:

that the MDGs can still be reached until 2015, but only through a

partnership effort. The document then proceeds in four parts: starting with

the reiteration of common values and commitments, it reviews successes

and remaining gaps and importantly, takes note of lessons learned and best

41

Id., 26 (child mortality), 30 (maternal health), 40 (HIV/AIDS, malaria). 42

Id., 58-61. 43

Id., 66-67; Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a definition introduced by the

OECD in 1969, and is today a generally recognized category to determine which

financial flows to developing countries constitute official development aid. For more

information, see the OECD webpage, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ (last

visited 21 November 2010). 44

MDG Report 2010, supra note 39, 4-5; This is no reason to go as far as K. Anderson,

however, calling the MDGs “development zombies” that do not warrant a global

review: K. Anderson, „Millennium Development Goals‟, Opinio Juris (20 September

2010), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/20/millennium-development-goals/

(last visited 21 November 2010).



practices.45

This is followed by an “agenda for action” that is rather an

aggregation of vague political and economic concepts, repetitive

reiterations, and few concrete suggestions for each of the 8 MDGs.46

The

document concludes with mandating the General Assembly to continue

review, and the Secretary General to report annually on progress made in

the implementation of the MDGs.47

II. Key Themes in the Outcome Document

The Outcome Document reflects and responds to the three challenges

described above – an ill-tempered donor-community at times of crises, a

bleak-looking track record in implementing the MDGs, and a well-known

dichotomy of industrialized and developing countries. The text recognizes

the impact of the “multiple and interrelated crises”, including the global

economic and financial crisis and the food crisis, to acknowledge new

restraints and new vulnerabilities.48

It oscillates diplomatically between the

recognition of what has been reached, and the concern over what is still

missing: between “progress […] despite setbacks”, “challenges and

opportunities”.49

And it responds to the dichotomy by making “partnership”

the centerpiece of the document, with the word appearing no less than 19

times in the text.50

A “global partnership for development” primarily demands mutual

efforts and mutual responsibilities of both partners, and is thus a viable

concept to overcome the blame game between developing and developed

countries.51

The Outcome Document strikes a noticeable balance between

national and international responsibilities for achieving the MDGs, a

45

On lessons learned and best practices, see Keeping the Promise, supra note 3, para.

23. 46

Id., paras 36-79. 47

Id., paras 79-81. 48

The word “crisis”/“crises” appears 8 times in the text, id., paras 5, 6, 22, 33, 70 lit. n

and 78 lit. q. 49

Id., e.g. paras 5, 6, 19, 20 and 22. 50

Id., paras 5, 7, 9, 21, 24, 30, 38, 44, 50, 56, 70 lit. l, 76 lit. d, 77 lit. i, 78 lit. a, d, s (not

including “public-private partnerships”). It appears once in the Millennium

Declaration, supra note 4, para 20 and ten times in the Chapter on Development in the

World Summit Outcome 2005, supra note 4. 51

Critical is M.E. Salomon: “While rhetorically MDG 8 concerns developing „a global

partnership‟, the weight of the responsibility for giving effect to the partnership is

understood to rest with developed countries and it is those countries that report against

it.”, Salomon, supra note 21, 56.

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1142

balance alternating between “indispensable” national ownership and global

partnership,52

“primary responsibility” and “shared responsibility”,53

calls

for more transparent and accountable national and international

governance.54

In this sense, the formula for achieving the MDGs implicit in

the document suggests an optimistic interplay of “intensified collective

action” and “enhanced global partnership”, together with nationally owned

development strategies and more aid effectiveness.55

Aid effectiveness, the new buzzword of the development community,

is another major theme in the Outcome Document. Since the OECD

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) endorsed the Paris Declaration

on Aid Effectiveness in 2004, the principles of ownership, alignment,

harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability have

become the central reform agenda agreed by donor and recipient states to

improve the effectiveness and quality of aid.56

The Paris principles are thus

not originally a vocabulary of the United Nations system, but have since

started entering the development discourse even within the United

Nations.57

Compared to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, where the then

52

See Keeping the Promise, supra note 3, para. 10. 53

Id., paras 10, 36. 54

Id., paras 10, 23 lit. n, 52, 70 lit. o. 55

Id., para. 9: “We are convinced that the Millennium Development Goals can be

achieved […] with renewed commitment, effective implementation and intensified

collective action by all Member States and other relevant stakeholders at both the

domestic and international levels, using national development strategies and

appropriate policies and approaches that have proved to be effective, with

strengthened institutions at all levels, increased mobilization of resources for

development, increased effectiveness of development cooperation and an enhanced

global partnership for development.” See also para. 23, which enumerates lessons

learned and successful policies, where national ownership on the one hand and more

transparent and accountable international development corporation on the other hand

feature prominently. 56

OECD DAC, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2 March 2005) and Accra

Agenda for Action, adopted by the 3rd

High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in

Accra (September 2008) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

58/16/41202012.pdf (last visited 22.November 2010). 57

See, for example, United Nations Development Programme, Joint Evaluation of the

UNDG Contribution to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2008), available

online http://www.undp.org/evaluation/thematic/pd.html (last visited 24 November

2010); World Summit Outcome 2005, supra note 4, para. 23 lit. c; or Economic and

Social Council, Press Release (29 June 2010), ECOSOC/6432: Coherence, aid

effectiveness among key topics as Economic and Social Council launches second

Development cooperation forum, available at http://www.un.org/News/



new aid effectiveness vocabulary hardly appeared, in the 2010 Outcome,

national ownership, results-based management, donor harmonization and

alignment with national priorities are repeatedly evoked and infused into the

strategies to achieve the MDGs.58

They are greeted by major donor

countries, which accentuated the same principles in their speeches at the

Summit.59

If aid effectiveness is a new theme, good governance and the rule of

law, two concepts that have played a dominant role in the development

discourse over the last two decades, feature less prominently. Compared to

the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit, where the MDGs

are embedded in a document that makes a strong call for participatory and

rule-based (development) policy-making, reference to good governance and

the rule of law is less explicit in the 2010 Outcome.60

This is not to say,

however, that the concepts have been abandoned – rather, they resound in

more precise policy suggestions and best practices that advance the “full

participation of all segments of society”, the fight against corruption, or

transparent and accountable governance.61

Press/docs/2010/ecosoc6432.doc.htm (last visited 22. November 2010). Further, most

UN agencies have adopted a results-based management approach which they follow

more or less rigorously, for example UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO and

WFP. 58

Keeping the Promise, supra note 3, on the concepts of aid effectiveness (paras 9, 64,

and health-related in para; 73 lit. d, j and k); ownership (paras 10, 23 lit. a, 36, 58, 64);

results-based management (paras 59, 64, 78 lit. f); harmonization (paras 64, 73 lit. m);

alignment (paras 64, 73 lit. b, m); and accountability (paras 23 lit. o, 59, 72 lit. g, 73

lit. a, 78 lit. c, f). Note, however, what comes across as a disclaimer in para. 64: “We

also bear in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all formula that will guarantee effective

assistance and that the specific situation of each country needs to be fully considered.” 59

For example, Barack Obama presented the new U.S. Global Development Policy,

resting on enhanced ownership (or: national leadership), mutual accountability, and

performance-based lending, Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development

Goals Summit in New York, New York (22 September 2010), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/remarks-president-

millennium-development-goals-summit-new-york-new-york (last visited 21

November 2010); also: Speech of the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the United

Nations General Assembly (21 September 2010), available at

http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_683608/Content/DE/Rede/2010/09/2010-09-21-

bk-un-millenium-rede.html (last visited 21 November 2010). 60

The words “good governance” (paras 11, 77 lit. d), “rule of law” (paras 3, 11) and

“democratic” (paras 3, 78 lit. f) appear twice each in Keeping the Promise, supra note

3. 61

Id., para. 23 lit. l, para. 36; para. 18: “we acknowledge the role of national parliaments

in furthering the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.”

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1144

Partnership, aid effectiveness, good governance – now what is the role

of human rights in the Outcome Document of the 2010 Millennium

Summit? In the text, the conceptual link between individual MDGs and

economic and social rights is made as clear as never before.62

Beyond the

general assertion of “respect for all human rights, including the right to

development” in the first part,63

the document‟s agenda for action contains a

reaffirmation of the right to food under MDG 1,64

a commitment to achieve

MDG 2 through realizing the right to education,65

several affirmations of

women‟s and children‟s rights,66

and a pledge to take steps to realize the

right to health.67

Yet many of the demands voiced by the human rights community

prior to the Summit were not taken up.68

There is no explicit endorsement of

a rights-based approach to development, although the recognition “that the

respect for and promotion and protection of human rights is an integral part

of effective work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals”

comes fairly close.69

While the need for (mutual) accountability is stressed

throughout the document, accountability remains a vague concept and is not

associated with human rights accountability and the mechanisms to

safeguard it.70

In sum, it seems that the trend observed above continues, that human

rights are given credit in development rhetoric and gain recognition as a

62

The link was also made in the Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, where

Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon recognizes that the “Goals represent human needs

and basic rights that every individual around the world should be able to enjoy”,

Foreword, 3; S. Zaidi, „Millennium Development Goal 6 and the Right to Health:

Conflictual or Complementary?‟, 7 SUR International Journal on Human Rights

(2010) 12, 123, 124. 63

Keeping the Promise, supra note 3, para. 3. Further: paras 12, 13, 23 lit. j. 64

Id., para. 70 lit. u. 65

Id., para. 71 lit.. a. 66

Id., paras 72 lit. a, g, k, 73 lit. i. 67

Id., para. 75 lit. a. 68

See, for example, Amnesty International, supra note 12; International Alert,

„Replacing the MDGs with a Better Framework‟, Submission to the International

Development Committee Inquiry: The 2010 Millennium Development Goals Review

Summit: Looking ahead to after the MDG deadline of 2015, (7 October 2010). 69

Keeping the Promise, supra note 3, para. 53. 70

Other terms, too, such as participation and non-discrimination, could be made less

“open-ended, contingent, and too often subjective” if “rooted in identified standards”,

Alston, supra note 5, 760.



moral framework for development efforts, while their impact on the

operational development agenda remains limited.

D. Human Rights, Development and the MDGs –

Revisited

Certainly, the world today is a different one than it was in 2000, when

heads of State and government first committed to the time-bound targets of

the MDGs. The last decade has brought new challenges (economic and food

crises, climate change) and has seen the rise of new actors (emerging

donors), new interests (security-development nexus), and new concepts (aid

effectiveness) in development cooperation.

Against this background, it is remarkable that States reaffirmed their

common resolve and responsibility to achieve the MDGs in the Outcome

Document, and that human rights rhetoric has taken such a strong hold

therein. Meanwhile, it is a separate question whether the lofty promises and

human rights language in the Outcome Document must be deemed

significant or irrelevant in the light of the many gaps in the implementation

of the Goals; the answer is likely to depend on how the contribution of the

MDG initiative to the cause of development cooperation in general is

estimated.71

In conclusion and turning from material goals to procedures, it seems

that development policy even within the United Nations system is currently

following the Paris-path towards aid effectiveness. Although the concepts of

effectiveness, results-orientation and the consequential strategy of

performance-based allocation cause suspicion on parts of the human rights

community, it cannot be neglected that there are substantial common

grounds between the two.72

If the ownership principle is understood not to

71

The only substantial commitment consisted in the launch of a Global Strategy for

Women‟s and Children‟s Health, a global effort to accelerate progress on MDGs 4 and

5, bolstered by over $40 billion in resources; for more information see

http://www.un.org/sg/globalstrategy.shtml (last visited 21 November 2010). 72

See the paper authored by GOVNET (the OECD‟s Governance and Development

Section), „Human Rights and Aid Effectiveness‟ (2007); more action-oriented:

„Human Rights and Aid Effectiveness: Key Actions to Improve Inter-Linkages‟

(2008); further OECD publications on the topic available at

http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34565_43490845_1_1_1_1,00.ht

ml (last visited 21 November 2010);and also M. Foresti et al., „Aid Effectiveness and

Human Rights: Strengthening the Implementation of the Paris Declaration‟, Overseas

GoJIL 2 (2010) 3, 1129-1146 1146

stop at the nation State level, for example, but to include an individual

dimension, it has an undeniable link to the right to development and

participatory rights. Similarly, accountability is stressed in both the human

rights and aid effectiveness agenda.

Given that “[p]overty eradication” is rarely presented “through the

lenses […] of international regulation”, human rights have already made

huge strides in establishing themselves as a normative framework for

development activities.73

To be more influential on development practice,

maybe the human rights community could engage in a more constructive

dialogue with the aid effectiveness agenda, so that reservation on both sides

does not again stand in the way of harnessing complementarities for a

common cause.

Development Institute, October 2006, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/

download/1538.pdf (last visited 21 November 2010). 73

C. Chinkin, „The United Nations Decade for the Elimination of Poverty: What Role

for International Law?‟, 54 Current Legal Problems (2001), 553, 554.