globalization and the race to the bottom economic competition (a.k.a. globalization) aging...
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Globalization and the Race to the Bottom
Globalization and the Race to the Bottom
Economic Competition (a.k.a. Globalization)
Aging populationsIncreasing frustration/distrust of
public authorityFiscal Crises
Economic Competition (a.k.a. Globalization)
Aging populationsIncreasing frustration/distrust of
public authorityFiscal Crises
Expected Effects of Globalization on Taxes and Public Spending
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1980 1990 2000 2010
Perc
en
t G
DP
Sweden Germany USA Japan
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Tota
l Tax
Bu
rden
as
% o
f G
DP
Unweighted OECD Ave. United States Japan Sweden
In Fact we see Variation - Not Convergence
In Fact we see Variation - Not Convergence
The Scientific Method - Derived from the Hard Sciences
The Scientific Method - Derived from the Hard Sciences
[Social scientists] envision a world composed of linear relationships among variables, parity in the size of cause and effect, recurrent patterns over time, and the fundamental insignificance of chance happenings. Alan Zuckerman (1997)
[Social scientists] envision a world composed of linear relationships among variables, parity in the size of cause and effect, recurrent patterns over time, and the fundamental insignificance of chance happenings. Alan Zuckerman (1997)
Evolutionary Science?Evolutionary Science?
Evolutionary science has required an investigation of “additional principles that apply only to living organisms… This required a restructuring of the conceptual world of science that was far more fundamental than anyone had imagined at the time.” Ernst Mayr, 2004
Evolutionary science has required an investigation of “additional principles that apply only to living organisms… This required a restructuring of the conceptual world of science that was far more fundamental than anyone had imagined at the time.” Ernst Mayr, 2004
If politics were mechanics:If politics were mechanics:We could:Assume variable independenceOmit or control for:
emergence contingency Human Agency
Accurately predict change.
We could:Assume variable independenceOmit or control for:
emergence contingency Human Agency
Accurately predict change.
My argument:Political Systems are
Complex Adaptive Systems:They Evolve and Adapt in a dynamic environment
(which they, in part, create themselves)
My argument:Political Systems are
Complex Adaptive Systems:They Evolve and Adapt in a dynamic environment
(which they, in part, create themselves)
This model explicitly brings in:•Historical context (the dynamic ecology)•Contingency•Emergence•Symbiosis and Co-Evolution•Agency (source of Variation)
This model explicitly brings in:•Historical context (the dynamic ecology)•Contingency•Emergence•Symbiosis and Co-Evolution•Agency (source of Variation)
How Political Systems EvolveHow Political Systems Evolve
• Institutions are the ‘rules’ structuring political life • Institutions, like genes, are nothing more than
behavioral instructions (rules).• Human agency and creativity are the sources of
variation in institutional evolution.• Humans rationally calculate as much as they can,
but are biased thinkers.• History Matters:
• Institutions structure strategic choices AND ultimately shape preferences because institutional choices at time A become part of the ecological context at time B.
• Institutions are the ‘rules’ structuring political life • Institutions, like genes, are nothing more than
behavioral instructions (rules).• Human agency and creativity are the sources of
variation in institutional evolution.• Humans rationally calculate as much as they can,
but are biased thinkers.• History Matters:
• Institutions structure strategic choices AND ultimately shape preferences because institutional choices at time A become part of the ecological context at time B.
Two Evolutionary Narratives (if time allows)
Two Evolutionary Narratives (if time allows)
The USA - The Land of Milk and Honey, racing toward the bottom.
Sweden - The Bumble-bee that should not fly
The USA - The Land of Milk and Honey, racing toward the bottom.
Sweden - The Bumble-bee that should not fly
The United States: Contingent Conditions
The United States: Contingent Conditions
Massive natural resources and huge land mass to exploit.
Destination for world’s greatest migration
Fear of the democracy.Institutional fragmentationChecks and balances, federalism, etc.Slavery
Massive natural resources and huge land mass to exploit.
Destination for world’s greatest migration
Fear of the democracy.Institutional fragmentationChecks and balances, federalism, etc.Slavery
America Adaptation and Institutional Choices
America Adaptation and Institutional Choices
Early Century - FDR and the push for a public sphere. Why did it fail?
Both Political Institutions and Cognitive Frames are Biased against Government(New Deal, Great Society, War on Poverty)
Second best choices: Targeted social welfare benefits (esp. via tax incentives)
Increasing Distrust of Government Growing inequality
Early Century - FDR and the push for a public sphere. Why did it fail?
Both Political Institutions and Cognitive Frames are Biased against Government(New Deal, Great Society, War on Poverty)
Second best choices: Targeted social welfare benefits (esp. via tax incentives)
Increasing Distrust of Government Growing inequality
Sweden: Contingent Conditions
Sweden: Contingent Conditions
Small homogeneous population Significant natural resourcesNorthern edge of expanding EuropeAble to stay neutral in TWO wars - arms
supplier and manufacturing advantageLate/concentrated industrial
developmentHuge conflict between economic classes
Small homogeneous population Significant natural resourcesNorthern edge of expanding EuropeAble to stay neutral in TWO wars - arms
supplier and manufacturing advantageLate/concentrated industrial
developmentHuge conflict between economic classes
Sweden:Adaptation and
Institutional Choice
Sweden:Adaptation and
Institutional ChoiceHighly concentrated economy (unions
and employers)Electoral Rules bias towards
compromiseThe “Historic Compromise” - SaltsjöbadWomen instead of immigrants into labor
market
Highly concentrated economy (unions and employers)
Electoral Rules bias towards compromise
The “Historic Compromise” - SaltsjöbadWomen instead of immigrants into labor
market
Universalism: A simple Model
Universalism: A simple Model
Pre-Tax Income
Tax Rate 30% After tax Income Benefit per Family
Final Income
10,000 3,000 7,000 16,000 23,000 50,000 15,000 35,000 16,000 51,000 100,000 30,000 70,000 16,000 86,000
* 3,000 + 15,000 + 30,000 = 48,000 / 3 = 16,000 Income Ratio before taxes and benefits 1 to 10
(10,000 to 100,000) Income Ration after taxes and benefits 1 to 3.7
(23,000 to 86,000)
Pre-Tax Income
Tax Rate 30% After tax Income Benefit per Family
Final Income
10,000 3,000 7,000 16,000 23,000 50,000 15,000 35,000 16,000 51,000 100,000 30,000 70,000 16,000 86,000
* 3,000 + 15,000 + 30,000 = 48,000 / 3 = 16,000 Income Ratio before taxes and benefits 1 to 10
(10,000 to 100,000) Income Ration after taxes and benefits 1 to 3.7
(23,000 to 86,000)
Increasing Support for the Universal Welfare State
Sweden
Increasing Support for the Universal Welfare State
Sweden
Opinion Balance Opinion Balance
Answers to the following question: ÒTaxes are used for various purposes. Do you think the revenues spent on the purposes mentioned below should be increased, held the same, or reduced?Ó The figures in the table represent the percentage of those wishing to increase expenditures minus the percentage of those wishing to reduce them.
Program 1981 1986 1992 1997 2002 Health care +42 +44 +48 +75 +77 Support for the elderly +29 +33 +58 +68 +69 Support to families with children +19 +35 +17 +30 +26 Housing allowances -23 -23 -25 -20 -40 Social assistance -5 -5 -13 +-0 -7 Primary and secondary education +20 +30 +49 +69 +70
Table 2.1 Sweden: Social and Economic Data and World Ranking Figure World Rank
Tax as % GDP (2005) 50.7 Public Spending as % GDP (2006) 54.3 1 (highest) Social Spending as % GDP (2003) 35.1 1 (highest) Public Spending on Education as % GDP (all levels) 6.5 2 (from highest) Global Competitiveness Rank 3 (from highest) R+D per capita (US $) 1112 1 (highest) Employment rate (2006) 74.5 6 (from highest) Internet users per 1,000 inhabitants 320 3 (from highest) Gini Index 2.52 1 (most equal) Human Development Index (World Bank, 2005) .956 6 (from highest) Life expectancy (2005) 80.6 6 (from highest) Paid maternity + parental leave (weeks) (1998-2002) 78 1 (highest) WomenÕs employment rate (2006) 76.0 3 (from highest) Gender wage gap (%) (2004) 14.8 6 (from lowest) Poverty Rate 6.5 3 (from lowest) Infant mortality rate per 1000 3.7 4 (from lowest)
Table 2.1 Sweden: Social and Economic Data and World Ranking Figure World Rank
Tax as % GDP (2005) 50.7 Public Spending as % GDP (2006) 54.3 1 (highest) Social Spending as % GDP (2003) 35.1 1 (highest) Public Spending on Education as % GDP (all levels) 6.5 2 (from highest) Global Competitiveness Rank 3 (from highest) R+D per capita (US $) 1112 1 (highest) Employment rate (2006) 74.5 6 (from highest) Internet users per 1,000 inhabitants 320 3 (from highest) Gini Index 2.52 1 (most equal) Human Development Index (World Bank, 2005) .956 6 (from highest) Life expectancy (2005) 80.6 6 (from highest) Paid maternity + parental leave (weeks) (1998-2002) 78 1 (highest) WomenÕs employment rate (2006) 76.0 3 (from highest) Gender wage gap (%) (2004) 14.8 6 (from lowest) Poverty Rate 6.5 3 (from lowest) Infant mortality rate per 1000 3.7 4 (from lowest)
Sweden: A case of Increasing Returns?Sweden: A case of
Increasing Returns?
Sweden’s success is neither obvious, nor
inevitable.
Sweden’s success is neither obvious, nor
inevitable.
Competitive, open economy and the “Universal Social Welfare State”
High trust society
Competitive, open economy and the “Universal Social Welfare State”
High trust society
Political Evolution and Institutional Choice
Political Evolution and Institutional Choice
Institutions, like genes, are rules that structure behavior by telling actors how to behave in particular contexts.History “evolves” precisely because humans have the capacity to create, select and copy institutions.When building institutions, we build part of the ecological contexts in which future generations make new choices. Human’s thus make their own ‘evolutionary history’ but they cannot make it exactly according to their wishes.
Institutions, like genes, are rules that structure behavior by telling actors how to behave in particular contexts.History “evolves” precisely because humans have the capacity to create, select and copy institutions.When building institutions, we build part of the ecological contexts in which future generations make new choices. Human’s thus make their own ‘evolutionary history’ but they cannot make it exactly according to their wishes.