geuss liberalism its discontents
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Liberalism and Its DiscontentsAuthor(s): Raymond GeussSource: Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), pp. 320-338Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072588
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LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
RAYMONDGEUSS
Universityof Cambridge
Agentsin contemporaryWestern ocieties find themselvesin an odd situ-ation. On theonehand,we seem tohavenorealisticalternativeo liberalism;that s, we knowof no otherapproacho humansociety andpoliticsthat s at
thesametime as theoreticallyrich andcomprehensiveas liberalismandalso
even remotelyas morallyacceptableto wide sections of the population n
Western ocieties,astheyarenowinfact constituted.'Liberal deaspermeateour social worldandoureverydayexpectationsabouthowpeopleand nstitu-
tionswill andoughtto act;theyconstitute he finalframeworkwithin which
ourpoliticalthinkingmoves. Prima acie nonliberal orms of habitualbelief,such as those associatedwith certainreligions,formsof nationalism, esidual
class enmities,and so on, still, of course, exist, butthey seem to be, atbest,isolated andlocalised foreignbodies in a universe,the overall structureof
which is essentiallyliberal; n societies thatareor areaspiring o be 'West-
ern',even these nonliberaldeologicalfragments ometimesadoptprotectivecolouration n the form of the best veneer of compatibilitywith liberalism
theycan muster.
Onthe otherhand,therearesigns of a significant heoretical,moral,andpoliticaldisaffection with some aspectsof liberalism.Liberalismhas for a
longtimeseemed to lack much nspirational otential;t is goodatdissolving
AUTHORSNOTE:This ext s a revisedversionofan articleI wrote n Germanandpublished n
December2001 in theDeutscheZeitschrift ir Philosophieunderthe title 'Das Unbehagenam
Liberalismus'.Theoriginal Germanarticle in turnwas the contentof a series of three talksI
gave at the Universityof Saarbriicken n December 2000. My thanksto Professor WilfriedHinschof Saarbriickenfor hekind nvitation ospeakthere,and also to thecolleagues in Cam-
bridgewithwhomI have discussed this topicmost requently,JohnDunn,ZeevEmmerich, nd
QuentinSkinnerI also owea greatdebtofgratitude oHilaryGaskinand to thetwoanonymousreaders or this ournal whohelpedme to correctseveral mistakesandsignificantly mprove he
original Germanversionof the essav.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 30 No. 3, June2002 320-338
? 2002 Sage Publications
320
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 321
traditionalmodesof life andtheirassociatedvalues,but less obviously goodat
replacingthemwith
anythingparticularlydistinctiveor admirable.2 t fits
all too comfortablywith some of the more ignoble aspects of commercial
society. What contributioncould liberalismconceivablymake to thinkingabout the general degradationof the planetaryenvironment?Liberal deals
like individualism, oleration,orlimitationof statepower,seemeithershort-
sightedlyconfused or mere covers for hegemonic designs. As the Harvard
politicalscientist SamuelHuntingdonnotoriouslywrote,'What s universal-
ism tothe West s imperialism o therest' 3Oldercriticismsof liberalismhave
also lost none of theirpowerandplausibility: hat t hasno clearremedyfor
poverty, orreprehensibleormsof inequalityof power,of conditionsof life,and so on. To the extent to which liberalism s committed o theprinciplesof
individual nitiativeandthe defence of privateproperty,t is hard o avoid the
suspicionthat t is ratherpartof theproblem hanpartof the solution. Politi-
cal theories, however, which, like liberalism,are deeply anchored in the
social institutions,the mentality,and the form of life of largeandwealthy
populationscannoteasily be shifted by even the most vigorous forms of
intentionalhumanaction.Thisinertiaeven in the face of massive andtelling
criticism s notmerelythedisreputable esult of the brutepowerof thepast;rather, n an uncertain,dangerous,andunpredictableworld there aregood
generalreasons not to embarkon radicalchangesin one's social formation
unless one is forced to it by demonstrableoverwhelmingnecessity.The title of this essay is modelledon that of a late essay by Freud.4For
Freudwe modems are condemned to suffer from cultural mperativesand
regulations hatdo not allow us to lead a biologically fulfilling life, butthat
we arealso not able simplyto throw off. 'Discontent'withcivilisationis an
unavoidableate,giventheincompatibilitybetween ourbiology andthe nec-essarydemandsof anyform of specificallyhumansociety,andFreud hinks
that t is strictly mpossibletodoawaywith italtogether;he bestwe can do is
tryto mitigatesomeof its worst effects. Incontrast o this,thediscontentwe
feel with liberalism s of a different ype, if only becausewe canbe sure that
changesin the world aroundus, in ourpolitics,our social arrangements, ur
economic circumstances,or perhapssimplyan improvementn ourpowersof theoretical magination,will sooneror laterdissolve liberalismandrender
it as irrelevanto us as feudalismortheoriesof moralitybased on honour. nthe meantime,though,we are stuck with a politicaland social regimeand a
set of associated doctrineswhose deficiencies arepalpable.
Historically,iberalism s an inventionof the nineteenth entury.5Liberal'
wasoriginallya wordused todesignateapoliticalparty; t seems tohave been
used for the first time in about 1810-11 to referto a groupin Spainwhose
membersadvocateda limitationof theprivilegesof thekingand heintroduc-
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322 POLITICALTHEORY June2002
tion of a constitutionalmonarchyonthe Britishmodel.Expost,alegitimising
prehistoryof liberalism is constructed in which
Spinoza,Locke,
Montesquieu,Adam Smith,and others are made to featureprominentlyas
theoreticalprecursors. ince at the latestthe middleof the nineteenth entury,
then, 'liberalism'refers both to a relativelyabstract heoreticalstructure-a
collection of characteristicarguments, deals, values, concepts-and to a
socialreality,apoliticalmovement hat s at leastpartiallynstitutionalisedn
organisedparties.Janus-facedhistoricalphenomenaof thiskind thatencom-
passbothconceptualor theoreticalelements and real social forcespose spe-cial difficulties for traditional orms of philosophy.Since its beginning,phi-
losophy has oriented itself primarilyon the analysis and evaluation of
relativelywell-definedarguments,butthestrugglebetweencompetingpolit-icalgroups s nota seminardiscussion.Questionsof definitionandof purelytheoretical onsistencyareoften not the most relevantonestoaskinpolitics.6
II
Classicalliberalism s best understoodas a negativephenomenon,a reac-tionagainstcertainevents,theories,and social andpoliticaltendencies nthe
lateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies hatearlyliberals dentifiedas
especiallydangerous.7naddition, his was a twofoldreaction,a kind of war
on two fronts. In one direction,as it were, vis-a-vis the past, liberalism
opposes absolutismandalso the cameralist dea that the state had the dutyandtheright o carefor thepositivewell-beingof its members n an extensive
sense. In the otherdirection,facing the future,classical liberalismstrongly
rejectstheexaggeratedmoralisationof politics that t sees as propagatedbythe FrenchRevolutionaries.The ideological precursorsof liberalism n the
eighteenthcenturywere staunchopponentsof thesubordinationf politicsto
theology,andto the extent to which an absolutistethicssimply stepsinto the
placethatnow discredited heologyonce occupiedin thepoliticalandsocial
spherewithoutchangingtheexistingstructures,t too becomesanappropri-ate object of liberal criticism. Rousseau's theory of the republic as the
embodimentof aunitarygeneralwill opensupahighlyinsalubrious, pecifi-
cally modernpossibility,thatof clothing politicaldecisionswith the mantleof anunlimited,secularmoralauthority.Kant'sattempt o groundpoliticson
a nonnaturalistategoricalethics is understoodby liberalsas a parallelphe-nomenon and correspondinglycondemned. Thus, for the early liberal
Benjamin Constant, Robespierre's 'republique de la vertu et de la terreur' is
a natural utcomeof takingRousseau'scentralconceptionsat facevalue,and
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 323
absolutistethics of the Kantian ypeisjust another, lightlyetiolatedversion
of the same basicposition.8Thereare four chief componentsof the classical liberalismof Constant,
Mill, andde Tocqueville.First, iberalsassignahigh positivevalue to tolera-
tion, as the cardinalvirtue of humansocieties. This is the oldest layerin the
liberalsynthesis.Second,liberalsattributepecialnormativemportanceo a
particular ind of humanfreedom.Society should consist as much aspossi-ble of voluntary elationsbetweenpeople,and nparticular,he free assentof
the members s theonly sourceof political authority.Third, iberalsare com-
mitted o individualism: societyis good onlyto theextentto which theindi-
vidualsin it are well off. Fourth, iberalism s characterisedby a particularkind of anxiety, hefear of unlimited,concentrated, rarbitrary ower.Limi-
tation of suchpoweris thusalwaysa goal of liberalpolitics.These four ele-
ments constitute the political substanceof the traditional iberalism of the
nineteenthcentury.Sincemy intention s to start romliberalismas a historicalphenomenon,
it is importanto tryas far as possibleto avoidanachronism,hatis, to avoid
narratinghehistoryof liberalism romanend-point n thepresent hat s pos-
itivelyvalued andassumed eleologicallyas the naturalgoal of thehistorical
process. Precisely this kind of anachronisticview seems to me to have
become increasinglycommon in late twentieth-century iberalism, espe-
ciallyunder heimpactof the workof JohnRawls.Startingn the later1950s,Rawls'sworkgave impetusto a revival of politicalphilosophy,a disciplinethathadbeenpronouncedmoribundby someof its mostdistinguishedpracti-tionersa few years before, and his early achievement,especially as docu-
mentedby TheoryofJustice9 ed to acorresponding ttempt oreinterprethe
historyof liberalismretrospectivelynthelightof hisposition.This had somepeculiarresults,given thatTheoryof Justice(andthe associatedearlywrit-
ings)represented significantdepartureromwhat had been the main lineof
liberalthinking n a numberof important espects.Firstof all,as thetitle of Rawls'smajorearlywork ndicates,heplacedthe
conceptofjusticeat the centreof attention.Since 'justice'for him is thechief
virtue of a humansociety,it is understandablehat he organiseshis political
philosophyarounda 'theoryof justice'. This,however, s arather urprising
development.To be sure,justice was of great importance o a number ofpaganthinkers n the ancient world-the qualification pagan' s importantherebecause the Paulinestrandof primitiveChristianity nceagaindemoted
justice(andthe 'law')in favourof 'grace' 0-but I think t is fairto saythatno
particularaliencyhad been attributedo 'justice' n thepoliticalphilosophyof the modem period.The two originatorsof modem politicalphilosophy,
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324 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002
Machiavelli and Hobbes, set the tone. For Hobbes, security and self-
preservationarethe basic
politicalvirtuesandthe
highestgoalsof
politics.'Justice' s a mereword,the contentof which is given by the law laiddownbythesovereign; t is thus ahighlyderivativeandnotvery significantphenome-non. Machiavellirecognisesthe varietyof disparategoals thathumanspur-sue and a correspondingvarietyof differentconceptionsof the good andof
the good life-there is the life of piety,of wealthaccumulation,of politics.Even withinthe realmof politics,apoliticalcommunity s theobjectof praiseon accountof its 'greatness',not itsjustice (in theDiscorsi), and an individ-
ual is 'virtuoso'by virtueof beingable to attain ame,honour,glory,praise,and so forth,rather han orbeing 'just' n mattersof the distribution f goodsor the administration f given laws. The theoreticalupshotof the work of
these two theorists s that ustice is a minorpropertyof subordinate dminis-
trativesystemsrather han the chief virtue of a society as a whole, and that
'beingjust' is the appropriate efiningcharacter raitof the administrator,
functionary, rbureaucratather hanof thepoliticianor citizen.To umpfor-
ward by several centuries from Hobbes, Marx, too, treatsjustice as an
epiphenomenon.Each socioeconomic formationgenerates heconceptionof
justiceit 'needs'to allowproduction oproceedas smoothlyaspossible,andthisconceptionremainsdependenton and has no standingoutsidethe mode
of productionnquestion.This relative heoretical nsoucianceabout hecon-
ceptofjustice is notmerelya general eatureof much of themostinterestingmodempolitical philosophy,but it seems especiallycharacteristic f classi-
cal liberalism.Afterall, for Humboldt,Constant,Mill, and de Tocqueville,
toleration, freedom, and individualism were focal issues, butjustice was
eithercompletely invisible (Constant),or at best a minor side-issue (J. S.
Mill), or finallyan objectof some suspicionbecause it could be thoughttopresupposea unitary, entralisingview of society that was a dangerto indi-
vidualism Humboldt).Prima acie, it seemshighlyunlikelythat heanalysisof a conceptlike 'justice',which is so highlydependenton shiftingformsof
economic activityandon historicallyextremelyvariableconceptionsof the
good life, could give one anyrealgraspon thecentralphenomenonof poli-tics. If this is correct, he Rawlsianprojectwasheaded nthewrongdirection
from the start, but even if Rawls's reorientationof political philosophy
around heconceptofjustice was on its own terms a philosophically ruitfulmove, it representsa singularlyunfortunateposition from which to try to
rewritethe historyof liberalism,a movementwhose membersoverwhelm-
ingly hadverydifferentconcerns.
The second main element in Rawls's early programmewas a remoral-
isation of political philosophy. For him, in contrast to most nineteenth-
century iberals,politicalphilosophywas 'appliedethics', andthe 'ethics'in
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 325
question s acomplexandoriginalconstruction.Rawls is not in anyinterest-
ingsense a Kantianbecause he has no room in his
theoryfor such central
Kantiandoctrinesasthatof the 'apriori',buthe is alsoatpainstoemphasisea
certaincontinuitybetween his position and Kantianethics, particularlyon
two issues: the centralityof individual 'autonomy'and the priorityof the
rightto the good." The characteristic arlier iberalview,however,was one
of great suspiciontoward he intrusionof specificallymoralcategoriesinto
politics, and in particularof principled rejection of the Kantianethics.
Rawls's work hadthe curious effect of advancingKant to the positionof a
kind of patronsaint of liberalism.This is mildlyparadoxical,because Kant
had been seen for most of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesby the
main philosophic proponentsof liberalism(Constant,J. S. Mill, I. Berlin;also BenthamandDewey) as an archanti-liberal.
Pre-Rawlsian iberals had two mainobjectionsto Kant.Firstof all, the
concept of the a priori,which is structurallyndispensable or all formsof
Kantianism,s not acceptable o liberals. Kant's abstract onceptionof rea-
son(whichcan insomesensebe seen asthe sourceof hisdoctrineof the apri-
ori)constitutesanattempt oabsolutiseaccidental ormsof thinking hathap-
pento be sociallyimportant tsomeparticularime,andthustofreezehuman
developmentat some givenlevel. Becausepeopleat a certain imeandplaceallthink hatmurderers houldbeexecuted, hatall formsof tellinganuntruth
areintolerable,orthattherightsof propertyareincompatiblewithtaxation,and cannotperhapseven coherently magine any alternatives, hese beliefs
will be stylisedas universalprinciplesand circumflexedwiththehyperbolicradianceof the apriori.An aprioriphilosophy s for liberalsa fetteronhuman
progress.A Kantianethics of unvaryinga prioriprinciples s incompatible
with theopenness, flexibility,andwillingnesstorevise one's view andadaptto therealitiesof thesituationdemandedof liberalpolitics.Second,althoughboth Kant andclassical liberalismare committedto the value of freedom,theirrespectiveconceptionsof freedomareradicallydifferent.Most liberals
are highly suspicious of Kantianfreedom-based-on-reason nd, in fact,
stronglysuspectthat his 'positive'conceptionof freedomcan beused tojus-
tify forms of totalitarianism.12
To avoidanypossible misunderstandingn thispoint,I amcertainlynot
claimingthata Kantian tylephilosophy s absolutely ncompatiblewithanyform of liberalism.Tomake anassertion ikethatwould be to makepreciselyone of themistakesI amsuggesting hat(some)moder liberalsmake,that s,to assumethat here s anessence of liberalismand anessence of Kantianism
andthat he two canbecompatibleorincompatible. f 'liberalism'and 'Kant-
ianism' are open concepts, it is not excluded thataftera sufficientlylong
periodof time, it mightbe possible thatthe two could be made to converge.
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326 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002
Similarly,nothingpreventsus fromusingourpresentconceptsanachronisti-
callyif we wishtodo
that,especiallyif we can
givesome
plausiblereason or
wanting odoit. WhatIdowish toassert, hough, s thatasamatterof factthe
majorityof liberal heoreticiansn thenineteenth entury,and a notinsignifi-cantnumber n theearlytwentiethcentury, aw Kantas anopponentof their
basic projectand that this is a fact that liberals who wish to be Kantians
shouldrecogniseand take some kindof positionon rather hanignoring.If
they were wrong,why exactly wereConstant,J. S. Mill, Dewey, and Isaiah
Berlinwrongaboutthe compatibilityof Kantianismand liberalism?What-
ever the best way forward or liberals in the twenty-firstcentury mightbe,neitherKantnorRawlsprovidesanilluminatingmode of cognitiveaccess to
the historicalphenomenonof liberalism.
III
Topassnow from thehistoryof liberalism o itspresentstate andpossiblefuture,one sometimeshears he claim that iberalismdiffersfromotherpolit-
ical philosophiesthrough ts recognitionof thepluralityof potentiallyvalu-ablemodesof life. This is a highly misleadingassertion.Firstof all, liberal-
ism has no monopolyon the praiseof pluralism.After all, Marx, too, was
convincedthat the capitalisteconomic formationmade it possible for indi-
viduals to developandparticipaten a wide varietyof diverseforms of life.
Second, the multipleforms of life which liberalismrecognises are alwaysassumed to be embedded n anoverridingconsensus thathas a latent moral
significance.What s distinctiveabout iberalism sn't, therefore, o much ts
opennessto pluralismas its view thatall societies should be seen as capableof attaining onsensus,despitea lack of homogeneity nthemanners,beliefs,and habitsof theirmembers.Canone give anyreasonsforadopting his atti-
tude towardconsensus?It is not completelyclear what 'consensus'means.
The term vacillates betweendescriptiveand normativeuses in a way thatis
confusing.One candistinguish ourkinds of case.Thefirst s thecase of sim-
ple empiricalagreement.We are bothstanding n therain,andundernormal
circumstances will assume thatyou too knowit is raining.The second kind
of case is that of adaptivebehaviour,conformism,acquiescence,or modusvivendi.Peopledoasothersdo in someparticular reaof life withoutgivingit
muchthought,orbecausetheythinktheymust bow toforce majeure.Thus,certain Islamic groupsin the United Kingdomno longer circumcise their
youngwomen becausetheydon'twantproblemswiththeBritishpolice and
courts,despitethe factthatthey by no meansagreethattheyshouldgive upthis practicethatthey take, to use the now fashionable argon,to be partly
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Geuss/ LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 327
constitutiveof their 'identity'. They just thinkthey haveno choice. A third
groupof cases concernsformal
agreements,as in the
paradigmaticase of
contracting. n acontractallpartiesexplicitlyaffirm hat heywill behave n a
certainway,usuallyby transferring ertainresourcesor performingcertain
services.However,all partiesto a contractneed not haveequally good rea-
sons to enter ntoit, andthey certainlyneednothave the same reasons. Two
people can agreeon state-enforcedvegetarianism,he one for religious,the
otherfor medical or sociopoliticalreasons.Thefourthpossiblecase of con-
sensusis one in which theparticipants ave the same reasonsforagreement.Evenif theagentshave the same reasons oragreeing, t does not follow from
that actalone that heagreementhasany particular ormative alueor stand-
ing.Twothieves canhavethe samereasonsforwanting ocooperate n abur-
glary.If one agreesthatincreasing he numberof personsinvolveddoes not
changethestandingof any agreement, t isn't clear thateven the existence of
universalconsensus need be anythingmore than one fact amongothers.
One standardiberal ine of argumentends to runthe notions of 'consen-
sus' that areprominent n these differentcases together.Effective coordina-
tion of action s highlydesirable f humansareto surviveand ive a life anyof
them will find worthliving, but coordinationof actionrequiresthat somekindof at leastminimalandtacitagreementn values and normative oncep-tions exist between thecooperatingparties. f thepartiesdid not sharea largenumber of such values, cooperationwould break down. Therefore,it is
claimed,there exists in everysociety a basic consensusthatcan serveas the
basis on whichfurtheragreements ouldbereached, herebyexpandingeven
further he human ocialsphere n which freedomandnormativity eacefullyintertwine.From histhe further onclusion s drawn hat t is alwayspossible
andrational or humansto tryreach consensuswith theirfellows, or at anyrate with those with whomthey mustregularlydeal.13
To be moreprecise,there arethree variantsof the liberal thesis. Firstan
empiricalversion:in fact, in everyfunctioningsociety thereis, one way or
another,a basic consensus.Second,thepoliticalthesis that t is always possi-ble 'inprinciple' o elaborate he basicconsensuson whichsocial life restsso
thatpeacefulresolutionof conflictsis possible.The thirdmoralisingvariant
has a strongerand a weakerversion.
Thestrongerasserts hatwe are all in some sense obligedto reachconsen-sus or that t is alwaysrational or us totrytoreachconsensus; he weaker hat
it is alwaysa good idea to tryto reachconsensus.
Againstthese liberalpositions,MarxistsandNietzscheanscan makecom-
mon cause. Nietzsche sees humansociety as a field of potentialand actual
conflict,although he 'conflict' nquestionmaynotalwaysbe amatterof fist-
icuffs butmayinvolveonly theexchangeof arguments nd witticisms.Inthe
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328 POLITICALTHEORY June2002
realworld,Nietzscheargues,anyexisting 'consensus'can be no more thana
momentaryruceentered nto for
pragmaticeasonsandwith no moral
mpli-cations,and to expect anythingmoreis a utopianhope.Marxists n anycase have alwaysbeen of the opinionthat irreconcilable
conflict,continuingdisagreement, ndsocial division arethe normal tatesof
all formsof societythathave existedupto now.Apparentpublicconsensus s
merelythe false (andthin)ideologicalcover that hides a chasmof division
that s asdeepandunbridgeable sanything n the humanworldcanbe. In its
classic form,Marxism eaches thateveryclass society is divided ntogroupsthat not only have no common good but have diametricallyopposedbasic
interests.What is good for the capitalists s bad for the proletariat, nd vice
versa.Onlya classless societycould lacksociallyentrenchednsolublecon-
flicts of interest. ncapitalistsocieties,politics-as-usuals apointlessactivityformembersof theproletariat, ndtheonlysensiblewayto act in thelongrun
is activeengagement n the class struggle.Fora varietyof reasons,the aboveanalysisnowadaysseems out of date.
The thesis thattheeconomicallyandpoliticallyrelevantstructure f a mod-
em societycan be exhaustivelydescribedby the contrastbetweencapitalists
andproletariats no longer plausible.This shouldnot, however,be takento
implythat iberalconceptionsof socialharmonyand the unlimitedpossibil-
ity of peaceful consensus have become any more convincing,because the
mainproblemof the Marxistanalysisis that it oversimplifies he sources of
conflict anddivisionin the modem world. Insteadof one main contradiction
between workersandcapitalists,there is an almostunsurveyablevarietyof
groups hatarepotentiallyoractually nconflict with eachother,groups hat
in some cases havevery sharplydefined,completely incompatible nterests
and control over considerablepowersand resources.In a given case, it may sometimesbe possible to attainagreementabout
somepointsof dispute n real orhypotheticaldiscussion. Sometimesthere s
neutralgroundora groundconstitutedby sharedbeliefs on to which one can
withdrawto find compromises-sometimes, not always. In every societytherearebothareasof consensus and areasof conflict. Both shouldbeunder-
stood naturalistically, nd individuals,social groups,and institutionsmust
learnto deal with both.Naturallywe often-but notalways-have perfectly
goodreasonsfortakingpart n discussion,especiallywhenthealternativesphysicalviolence withopponentswho arestronger hanwe are,but whether
the reasonswe do (ordo not)havein aparticular ase aregood, less good, or
ridiculouslybadis anempiricalmatter.'4Noneof the three iberal hesesaboutconsensus seems tome atallplausi-
ble.Firstof all, it seemsobvious thatmanysocietiesareperfectlywell ableto
maintain hemselvesalthough heirmembersdo not takepart n a consensus
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Geuss/ LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 329
that s inany waynormativelybinding;manypeopleinmanysocietiessimply
putupwith
existingarrangementshat
heymustendureasbest
theycan. Sec-
ond, the claim thatit is 'in principle'alwayspossible to attainconsensusis
completelyuninformative ntil one knows,in more detail thanhas ever been
providedby liberals,whatexactly 'inprinciple'means.Furthermore,ven if
the claimweretrue,why shoulda statementaboutaconsensusthat 'couldbe
attained'under some fictive or hypotheticalcircumstanceshave any direct
relevance o agivenrealpoliticalsituation?Finally, t is alwaysanopen ques-tionwhetherornot it is agoodidea to enter nto discussionorattempt o reach
consensus.If I am dealingwith a small groupof armedfanatics,it is by no
means clearthatIoughtto arguewith them rather han mmediatelyanduni-
laterallydisarming hem. Tobe sure,I will probablyhavevariousreasonsfor
tryingto do thiswith as littleuse of forcemyself aspossible,buteven if I use
minimalforce I won't be discussing anythingwiththem,anda prioriI can't
know thatanyparticularevel of applicationof force will be sufficient.
IV
Whichparts, hen,of classical liberalismdeserveto be furtherdevelopedand cultivated?In the first place the criticismof theocraticconceptionsof
society or, what is another form of the same thing, of absolutist(that is,
explicitlyorimplicitlytheocentric) orms of ethics. The Kantianphilosophyis no morethanat best a half-secularisedversionof such a theocraticethics,
with 'Reason' n theplaceof God. This doesnot amount o muchmorethana
changeof names.15The purenormative tandpointhat Kant'sethics tries to
occupy,a standpointn which we consideronlythenormatively elevant ea-tures of a possible world, abstractingstrictlyfrom the real world and the
empiricalaccidents of concretesituations, s an expressionof whatDeweycalled 'thequestforcertainty'.16nan insecureworld,weak humansstruggle
convulsivelytoreachsomekind of stability; he apriori s anovercompensa-tionin thought orexperiencedhumanweakness.17 his is one of theoriginsof Kant'snotoriousrigidity,his authoritarianevotionto 'principles',andhis
tendencyto promote ocal habitsof thoughtto constituentsof the absolute
frameworkwithin which alone (purportedly), nycoherentexperiencewaspossible; thus, Euclidean geometry is declared the a priori condition of
humanexperience,andsadisticremnantsof puritanismbecomedemandsof
purepractical eason.18 lassical iberalismrejectedKant'spracticalphiloso-
phy,butperhaps his is not enough. Perhapsone should also rejectthe veryidea of a purenormative tandpoint.
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330 POLITICALTHEORY June2002
This mightbe thoughtto be a ratherextremesuggestion.Kantianshave
some humanailings
likeeveryoneelse;
these neednot bethought
o reflect
negativelyon thepurenormative tandpoint. s thereanyreasonto thinkthat
theveryidea of apurenormative tandpoint mpliestheattempt o absolutise
accidentalexistinghabits of thought?Rather hantryingto give a directanswerto thisquestion,I would like to
approach t by discussingtwo examples.Both are drawnfrom the work of
John Rawls. As I said,Rawls was nevera strictKantian,andas his thought
developed,he moved furtherandfurtherawayfromcommitment o anyform
of purenormativity.This is a further eason ousehimas anexample: f some
of the deficiencies inherent n adoptingapurenormative tandpointare visi-
ble even in a philosopherwho has moved as farbeyondKant as Rawlshas,this seems to me to give furtherweight to suspicionsabout the normative
standpointas a whole.
To startwith the firstexample,in Theoryof Justice,Rawls claims to be
describing he 'reflectiveequilibrium'hatwouldbe attainedby certain ullyrationalagentswhoengaged ndiscussionundercertain dealisedconditions.
This state of reflectiveequilibriums best understoodas a kindof successor
to thepurenormativeperspective.Afterall, thepointof one of the main con-structions-the introductionof the 'veil of ignorance'- is precisely to
exclude from considerationempirical nformation hatmight prejudice he
overridingnormative orceof theoutcome.Itis, then,extremelystriking,not
to sayastounding, o thelay reader hatthecomplextheoreticalapparatus f
Theoryof Justice,operating hroughover500 pagesof densely argued ext,eventuates n a constitutionalstructure hatis a virtualreplica(with some
extremely minordeviations)of the arrangementshat exist in the United
States.19 t strainscredulityto the breakingpoint to believe that 'free andrationalagents'(withno furtherqualifications), venif theywerediscussingbehindanartificialveil of ignorance,andassuming hat heywereto agreeon
anythingat all under those circumstances,would light on precisely these
arrangements. omecriticsmightfastenon this as an indicationof the essen-
tiallyconservativebias of Rawls's discussion:the theoretical magination s
employed not to thinkaboutalternativesto the statusquo, but in order to
reproduce t schematically n thought,presenting t as the outcomeof full,
free,rationaldiscussion.20 hismightseemgrosslyunfair,givenRawls'sevi-dent intention to produce a work that would have some powerfulredistributivemplications.If, however,one thinks it at all reasonable to
judgewhat is afterall presentedas a political philosophyby its actualpoliti-cal effects, it is hard to see how Rawls's perfectly genuine redistributive
hopes could have any chance of being realised-and not merely because
Rawlshas no theoryof politicalaction or agency, although hatis also true.
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 331
The actualeffect of Rawls's theoryis to undercut heoreticallyanystraight-forward
appealo
egalitarianism.Egalitarianismasthe
advantagehat
grossfailureto comply with its basic principles s not difficultto monitor.There
are, to be sure, well-known and unsettled issues about comparabilityof
resourcesand aboutwhetherresourcesarereallytheproperobjectsforegali-tarians o be concernedwith,but therecan be little doubt hat f personA in a
fully monetarised ociety has ten thousand imes themonetaryresourcesof
personB, then undernormalcircumstances he two arenot for most politi-
cally relevantpurposes 'equal'.Rawls'stheoryeffectively shifts discussionawayfrom the utilitariandis-
cussion of the consequencesof a certaindistributionof resources,and also
away from an evaluationof distributions rom the point of view of strict
equality; nstead,hefocuses attentionon acomplexcounterfactualudgment.The questionis not, 'Does A have grossly more thanB?'-a judgmentto
which within limits it might not be impossible to get a straightforwardanswer-but rather hevirtuallyunanswerable: WouldB have even less if A
had less?' One cannot even begin to think aboutassessing any such claim
withoutmakinganenormousnumberof assumptionsaboutscarcityof vari-
ous resources,the formthe particular conomy in questionhad,the prefer-ences, and in particularhe incentivestructure, f thepeoplewho lived in it,andunless one had a rather obustanddetailedeconomictheoryof a kind that
few peoplewill believeanyeconomisttodayhas. In a situationof uncertaintylike this, the actualpoliticalonusprobandiin fact tacitlyshifts to the have-
nots;21he 'haves' ack an obvioussystematicmotivation oargue or redistri-
butionof theexcess wealththeyown,orindeedto findargumentso thatcon-
clusionplausible.Theydon'tinthe samewayneedtoproveanything; hey,ex
hypothesi,'have' the resources n question:'Beatipossedentes'.How, however, are the have-nots-or intellectuals speaking in their
name-supposed to makeanargumenthatdependsbothonconvincingoth-
ers of the generalplausibilityof Rawls's approachand in additionon what
cannot be more than a highly speculative evaluation of a complexcounterfactual claim? That Rawls's early views have had no real
redistributive ffect is not merely a result of the usual difficultyof imple-
mentingpoliticaltheories n the real world.The secondexamplecomes from
Rawls's late work On the Lawof Peoples. In this work in which Rawls dis-cusses certainaspectsof internationalelations,he introduces hecategoryof
an 'outlawstate',a 'regimethatrefuses to complywith a reasonableLaw of
Peoples' (p. 90), and writes that 'France,Spain, the Hapsburgs-or, more
recently Germany'were instances of 'outlaw states' (pp. 105f.). 'Outlaw
state' is a slightly more refined variantof the term'roguestate', which has
come to fashionableuse inthe contextof theattemptby the Bush administra-
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332 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002
tion to justify its missile defence programme,22nd Rawls's claims about
'outlaw states'arethephilosophicalpendent
of formerU.S. PresidentRea-
gan's characterisation f the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire'.At this late
pointin his career,Rawls has movedveryfarindeedawayfromKantianism,but this is still the sort of easy-going,butnarrow-minded,moralisation hat
some of the most interestingpolitical theorists of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies-Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche, Freud,Dewey-wished toputan end to andreplacewith morehighlydifferentiatedmodes of dealingwith
historyandpolitics. ForRawls, it seems a truthtoo self-evident to require
mentioningthat Spanish hegemony over Latin America in the eighteenth
centurywas something utterlydifferentfrom and much worse than North
Americanhegemonyover the sameregion n theearlytwentiethcentury.The
BritishEmpiredid notalwaysuse kidgloves indealingwithcompetitorsand
subjects,butfor Rawlsitwas,incontrast oFrance,apparently everan 'out-
law state'.Italso doesnotseem tooccurtohim evenas an abstractpossibilitythat heUnited Statesmightbe consideredby some an 'outlawstate',despitea historyof annihilationof indigenous populations,slavery,and repeated
military nterventionn CentralAmerica(andelsewhere).It is hardeven for
those of us who belong to the privileged, inherentlynonoutlaw,Anglo-Americanworldto resistthe conclusionthat hispartof Rawls'stheory s sig-
nificantlyinfluencedby ethnocentrism.Naturally hereare massive differ-
ences betweentheSpanishEmpireof theseventeenth enturyandthe British
Empireof the nineteenthcentury-who woulddenythat?It is also true that
politicians have a stronginterest in distinguishingas sharplyas possiblebetween theirownpolicies (andthe actualeffects of these)and those of their
analogues n other states-what is firmnessof purposewith us is repression
in them.23Nowadays most moder governmentswill have huge staffs ofexperts, awyers,and researcherswho arepaidto seek outgrounds or mak-
ing the appropriate istinctionsas vividlyandconvincinglyas possible.The
fact thatoccasionally n someparticularxtremecases one can't findanycon-
vincingdifferences s notreallyanargumentor thepoliticalrelevanceof the
strictlynormative tandpoint. nthose extremecases in whichadopting his
standpointdoes deliver a practicallyuseful answer,we usuallyhave suffi-
cient reasons to come to a decisionof avarietyof kinds,and in mostrun-of-
the-mill cases normativity ives us aclear decision thatseemsplausibleonlybecause the analysisthat mustprecedethe normativityudgmentrendersa
complex situationartificiallysimple andperspicuous.This analysis,which
eventuates n thejudgment'thisis murder', this is fraud',and so on, is what
is actually doing the work.
Thehistoricalstruggleagainst heocracy,absolutism,anddogmatismhas
left behind in liberalisma thickdepositof scepticismnot only vis-a-vis all-
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 333
encompassingworldviews,but also vis-a-vis universalistpoliticaltheoriesof
anykind. On this
pointConstant, Berlin,
Popper,and
Rorty(and also, of
course,Burke)areof one accord.Classical liberalismdid not wish to be an
all-encompassing,universalworldview but merely a political programmeaimedateliminating specific social andpoliticalevils.
Inits origin,liberalismhad no ambition o be universaleither n the sense
of claimingto be validforeveryoneandeveryhumansociety or in the sense
of purportingo give ananswerto all the importantquestionsof human ife.
There is no clearly developed single epistemologyfor classical liberalism,but it would seem that a liberal would have to believe that liberal views are
easily accessible to humanswho have no special expertiseor epistemically
privilegedposition.The ideal of liberalism s a practicallyengaged political
philosophy hat s bothepistemicallyandmorallyhighlyabstemious.That s,atbest,averydifficultandpossiblyacompletelyhopelessproject. t is there-
fore notsurprisinghat iberalssuccumbagainandagainto thetemptation o
go beyondthelimitstheywouldideallyset themselvesandtryto makeof lib-
eralisma completephilosophyof life. Forcomplicatedhistoricalreasons, n
the middle of the twentiethcentury,Kantianismpresented tself as a 'philo-
sophicalfoundation' oraversionof liberalism,and iberalsatthat imeweresufficientlyweak andself-deceived (or strongandopportunistic) o acceptthe offer.Evenwith the infusion of a significantdose of the Kantianphiloso-
phy,however,liberalismhas not succeeded in producinga position thatis
'universal' n any relevant sense. Neither has it demonstratedan ability to
remainfaithfulto its originaltheoreticaland moralabstemiousnesswithout
losing politicaleffectiveness.
Rortyhas made the extremelyastute andimportantobservation hatthe
a priori,theocentrism even in its attenuated orm as a 'philosophyof rea-son'), the purelynormativestandpoint,anda specific form of the 'spiritof
heaviness'24 ll naturallygo together.A consistent iberalismwouldhaveto
turn ts backon all of them.
Unfortunately,Rortystronglysuggestsaninterpretation f this observa-
tion thatdoes notdojusticetoit,andhe seems to draw romthisinterpretationtwofalseconsequences.Firstof all,Rorty s obviouslykeen topromote ronyas the mostappropriate ttitude or a contemporaryiberal.While, however,
it is truethattherejectionof atheocentricview of theworld will mostlikelybringwith it a discreditingof acertainnumberof humanattitudes hatwere
closely associatedwith it-automatic deference to authority,attraction o
certainkinds of solemnity,unctiousness,andobscurantism-irony is notthe
only alternative o piety.Anotheralternatives to adoptan extremelybusi-
nesslikeattitude, o identifyoneself fully withvariousprojects n theworld,
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334 POLITICALTHEORY June2002
andso forth.Indeed, ookingatthe matterhistorically, herewouldnot seem
to beany particular
aturalaffinity
between liberalismandirony.
If one con-
sidersthemostsignificant ronistsof themoder period-Pascal (inthe 'Let-
tresProvinciales'),Swift, Voltaire,Kierkegaard-only Voltaire eemsinany
importantwayaprecursor f liberalism,and I thinkone would search n vain
in thewritingsof themajor iguresof liberalism Humboldt,Constant,Mill)fortracesof irony.Infact,theonly obvious 'ironist'amongthepoliticalphi-
losophersof the nineteenth entury s deMaistre,whowasanythingbuta lib-
eral.When de Maistre n a famouspassage25eports hat he executionerafter
discharginghis functionreturnshomeina self-satisfiedmood,sayingtohim-
self, 'No one can breaka man on the wheel as well as I can', this is anarche-
typical nstanceof whatwe usuallycall irony.deMaistre s invitingus hereto
look at this situationsimultaneouslyfrom three distinctperspectivesthat
conflict. There s thepointof view of the executionerhimself('the only man
who wearsgloves inchurch'); hepointof view of (post-Beccarian) ommon
sense, which finds the executioner(andhis family) repellentand his self-
satisfactionnauseous;andfinallythepointof view of God,whosees theexe-
cutioneras the necessarycentralpointof any society,holdingit all together
and making civilised life possible. 'Ironically', the executioneris (fromGod'spointof view and, therefore,also de Maistre'sto some extent)right,not perhapsrightto be self-satisfied,butrightto glory in the efficient dis-
chargeof a dignifiedand commodiousoffice. The examplesof de Maistre
andKierkegaard lso show that ronyis notin itself inherently ncompatiblewith a theocentricview of the world.
Rortyto be sure would be unmovedby all this, becausehe is not using
'irony' n the normalsense in whichwe use that term-which is admittedly
hard o grasp-but ratherhe is engagedin theprojectof 'usingold wordsinnew senses'26 so as to breakdownexistingvocabularies.Rather, or him an
ironist s someonewho hasdoubtsabout heexisting'final'vocabularynuse
in society and 'does not believe thathervocabulary s closerto realitythan
others, that it is in touch with a power not herself'.27 On this use of the term,
neitherPlato,de Maistre,norKierkegaard reironists,a consequencethatI
thinkRortywould welcome.Nor,although thinkRortywoulddisagreewith
me, is Hegel.28Mostoddlyof all,Heidegger urnsout onthisreading obe an
ironist,a claim thatwill not,I think, mmediatelyrecommendtself toanyonewho has followed theearth-heavy ootfallof the Sage of Messkirch hrough
anyof his worksand who retainsagraspon anyof the senses 'irony'hashad
in Europeanife since antiquity.29one of this,again,would botherRorty-of course, breakingdown the old vocabularywill generateparadoxes ike
this,andmy pointingthem outisjust partof mystrategyof being, in Rorty's
eyes, conventionalandboring,or of rejiggingthe meaningof 'irony'to suit
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Geuss/ LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 335
myownpurposes.If, however, irony', nthetraditional r theRortyan ense,is not the
onlypossibleattitudewe can
adoptf we wantto avoid
piety,andif
'irony' n Rorty'ssenseis ratherdifferent romwhatthe traditionwould have
called 'irony', t is hard oavoidaskingwhywe shouldaccedeto Rorty'ssug-
gestion. And to answer this in turn,it mightbe useful to think about what
motivatesRorty omakethissuggestionandwhattheconsequencesof adopt-
ingitwouldbe.Thisbringsme tothesecondplacein which he seemstome to
pointus in thewrongdirection.I thinkhis motivation s to detachus as much
as possible from tryingto approachpolitics theoreticallyand to denigrate
politicalactionin a verysubtle andsophisticatedway.Ironystandsorthogo-nal to anyform of active,practicalengagementwith the world. It is a luxuryof people who do not pressinglyhave to act, the kind of people Rortycalls
withadmiration bookish ntellectuals',andwhomhe wishestoencourage o
find self-realisation n private ife, notpolitics.30Thisis why it is particularly
impressivethat Socratesand Kierkegaard,who thoughtthey did in some
sense have to act, also allowed themselves to indulge in irony.An 'ironic'
execution s eitherno executionat all (buta literaryor theatrical vent),oritis
a form of attemptedadditionalmockeryof the victim, or both at the same
time: 'This is Jesus,Kingof theJews'.The Christianhinks hat hisis doublyironic,and that thejoke is finallyon Pilate.
The liberal who gives up the sanctimoniousnessof the purelynormative
standpointwill perhaps,asRortycorrectlyrecognises,standata certainkind
of distanceto somekindsof beliefs, but the attitude nvolvedin this does not
seemappropriately apturedbycallingit either'irony'or(anotheroldercon-
tender) 'scepticism'. With this, one is returned o the issue from which I
started,namely,whatattitudewe shouldadopt owardiberalism.Thiscannot
be completely separated rom questionsabout the intentions of liberalismandhowto describethe kinds of attitudes hatare,havebeen,ormight easilybe or have been associated with existingformsof liberalism.Ironywill not
allow the rightkind of theoreticallyreflective,engaged political practice.Some will (correctly) object that the demand that I made earlier that
anachronismbe avoided s an ideal impossible fully to attain.Of course,the
account of 'liberalism'I have given is a selective one-an ideal type-thatarises from emphasisingcertain featuresand downplayingothers,and the
choice of what to emphasiseto some extentdependson what I judge to bephilosophically ruitfulandmorallyandpoliticallyvaluable.We all haveno
alternativebut to construct hepastin thelightof what we taketo be a viable
future,but it does not follow from this that all constructionsare equally
enlighteningorthat he usualempiricalanddocumentary tandardsorjudg-
ing historical accounts are irrelevant.The anti-Kantianand anti-Rawlsian
perspectivehas,in my view,a twofoldadvantage. tis abetterguideto liber-
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336 POLITICALTHEORY June2002
alism as a historicalphenomenon, hatis, one thatallowus to attaina fuller,moredetailed,andmore correct
understandingf its
history,and t alsoat the
same time providesa more promisingorientation or thinkingand acting
politicallyin the future.
As longasthe realsocial, economic,andpolitical nstitutionsand circum-
stances of ourlife do not change,31we cannotexpect to ridourselves com-
pletely of our discontent with liberalism.This might, however, even be
thought o be avindicationof one strandn theliberal radition,hestrand hat
is action-orientedbut reflexively anti-utopianand asserts that no systemeitherof actionorthought s perfect.This shouldhold as much forliberalism
asforanything lse. Thiskindof discontent, hen,mightnotnecessarilybe an
objectionbut a sign of the continuingvitalityof this tradition.
NOTES
1. JohnDunn, WesternPolitical Thought n the Face of the Future,2d ed. (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993).
2. Alastair MacIntyre,After Virtue(London:Duckworth, 1981); FriedrichNietzsche,Jenseits von Gut und Bise, in KritischeStudien-Ausgabe,ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montanari Berlin:de Gruyter,1980), vol. 5, ?260 andZurGenealogieder Moral in Kritische
Studien-Ausgabe, d. GiorgioColli andMazzinoMontanariBerlin:de Gruyter,1980),vol. 5,
Essay II, ?? 11-12.
3. SamuelHuntington,The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remakingof the WorldOrder
(London:Simon & Schuster,1977), 184.
4. SigmundFreud,Das Unbehagen n der Kultur n Studienausgabe,vol. IX (Frankfurt:
Fischer,1974).5. See alsochapter2 of myHistoryand Illusion n Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-
sity Press,2001).6. See also my Historyand Illusion in Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
2001), 1-13 and69-73.
7. I'm particularly nterested n four theoristsas representativesof classical liberalism:
Wilhelm von Humboldt(especially his Ideen zu einem versuch,die Grenzendes Staates zu
bestimmen Stuttgart:Reclam,1967]),BenjaminConstant De la libertechezles moderes, ed.
M. Gauchet[Paris:Hachette,1980]), Alexis de Tocqueville(L'ancienrdgimeet la revolution
[Paris:Gallimard1967]),andJ. S. Mill ('OnLiberty', n 'OnLiberty'andOtherWritings, d. S.
Collini [Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989]).8. See below,footnote 16.
9. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971.10.See, forinstance,AlanBadiou,SaintPaul:Lafondationde l'universalisme Paris:PUF,
1997), esp. chapterVII. This element becomes even more prominentin the work of the
'Ultrapauliner'GiinterBornkamm,Paulus[Stuttgart:Kohlhammer, 969],24) Marcion,about
whom the best work is still Adolf von Harnack,Marcion:Das EvangeliumvomfremdenGott
(Leipzig, 1924, reprintedDarmstadt1985).11. See Theoryof Justice,? 40, for the first of these andTheoryof Justice,p. 31 n. 16 and
throughout or the second.
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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 337
12. See IsaiahBerlin,FourEssays on Liberty Oxford).13. To be sure,one mustperhapsdistinguishmerelyapparent onsensus,pseudo-consensus,
from realvoluntaryagreement,but this is a minorcorrection hatchanges nothingin the basicstructure f the argument.
14. See also my Public Goods,Private Goods (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
2001), 96-104.
15. It was a commonlyheldobjection o Kant nthe lateeighteenthcentury hathiscriticism
of traditionalheologywas substantively adical n nameonly.The whole contentof traditional
theology could be reintroduced imply by renaming t 'Postulatesof Pure PracticalReason'.
This was notexactlyfair because not all of traditionalheologywouldsurviveKant'sattack.A
laterversion of basically the same line of thoughtoccurs in Stirner'scriticismof Feuerbach
(Stirner,Der Einzigeund sein Eigentum Stuttgart:Reclam, 1967]).Feuerbach,Stirnerclaims,
doesn't, as he pretends,radically detheologise religion, he simply uses the words 'humanessence' in placeof the word 'God'. The structure f Feuerbach's heoryand the content of the
moral obligations it imposes on individuals,though, remain the same as that of traditional
theology.16.JohnDewey, TheQuestfor Certainty n JohnDewey: The Later Works 925-1953, ed.
JohnBoydston(Southern llinoisPress, 1988),vol. 4; similarthoughts n TheodorAdornoand
Max Horkheimer,Die DialektikderAufklarung Frankfurt:Fischer,1969).17. In a complex industrialisedworld,there is a furtherreason for adherence o fixed and
rigid generalprinciples: fficiencyandsimplicityof administration. ee my Historyand Illusion
in Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), 150-52.
18. For Kant as 'gallows-philosopher', ee JacquesLacan,SeminaireVII:L'ethiquede la
psychanalyse Paris:Seuil, 1986),andalsoAdornoandHorkheimer,DialektikderAufklarung.19. Of course it is not at all difficult to see how Americansmightfind it plausiblethatany
rational agents discussing politics under favourable conditions would agree on these
arrangements.20. See Theodor Adorno, Der Positivismusstreit n der deutschen Soziologie (Berlin:
Luchterhand, 972) 'Einleitung'; ee alsomy Morality,Culture,andHistory Cambridge:Cam-
bridge UniversityPress, 1999), 69-76.
21. This is not a logical point.22. See Noam
Chomsky,RogueStates(London:PlutoPress,2000).
23. Sometimes, of course, politicians have the reverse interest,one in presentingtheir
programmesas being as like as possible those of some favouredmodel.
24. Nietzsche,Also sprachZarathustra.
25. Joseph de Maistre,Les Soirees de Petersbourg(Paris:Edition du vieux colombier,
1960), 40.
26. RichardRorty, Contingency, rony,and Solidarity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress 1989), 78.
27. Ibid.,73.
28. Hegeldid changehis mind on a numberof thingsduringhis philosophicallyactivelife,
but the one thing he never gave up was the commitmentto a form of absolute knowledge(couchedin a finalvocabulary)andalso a rejectionof whathe called 'irony'(whichhe saw as
instantiatedn the workof FriedrichSchlegel).29. Itis, of course,alsothecase thatHeidegger s nota liberal,and s aparadigm f those atti-
tudes of willful obscurantism,authoritarianism,ndsanctimoniousness hat liberalismshould
terminate.
30. Rorty,Contingency, rony,and Solidarity,65.
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338 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002
31. 'Le liberalismen'est evidemmentpas une ideologie ni un iddal. C'est uneforme de
gouvernementet de "rationalite"gouverementale fort complexe.'Michel Foucault,Dits et
ecrits,vol. IV (Paris:Gallimard,1994), 36.
RaymondGeuss is a Reader in Philosophyat the Universityof Cambridge;his most
recent booksare Historyand Illusionin Politics (CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001);PublicGoods,PrivateGoods(PrincetonUniversityPress,2001); and At CrossPurposes
(London:HearingEye, 2001).